OF THE MEASURES OF ALLEGIANCE.
Those political writers who have had recourse to a promise, or original
contract, as the source of our allegiance to government, intended
to establish a principle which is perfectly just and reasonable;
though the reasoning upon which they endeavoured to establish it, was
fallacious and sophistical. They would prove, that our submission to
government admits of exceptions, and that an egregious tyranny in the
rulers is sufficient to free the subjects from all ties of allegiance.
Since men enter into society, say they, and submit themselves to
government by their free and voluntary consent, they must have in
view certain advantages which they, propose to reap from it, and for
which they are contented to resign their native liberty. There is
therefore something mutual engaged on the part of the magistrate,
viz. protection and security; and 'tis only by the hopes he affords
of these advantages, that he can ever persuade men to submit to him.
But when, instead of protection and security, they meet with tyranny
and oppression, they are freed from their promises, (as happens in
all conditional contracts), and return to that state of liberty
which preceded the institution of government. Men would never be so
foolish as to enter into such engagements as should turn entirely
to the advantage of others, without any view of bettering their own
condition. Whoever proposes to draw any profit from our submission,
must engage himself, either expressly or tacitly, to make us reap some
advantage from his authority; nor ought he to expect, that, without the
performance of his part, we will ever continue in obedience.
I repeat it: This conclusion is just, though the principles be
erroneous; and I flatter myself, that I can establish the same
conclusion on more reasonable principles. I shall not take such a
compass, in establishing our political duties, as to assert that men
perceive the advantages of government; that they institute government
with a view to those advantages; that this institution requires a
promise of obedience, which imposes a moral obligation to a certain
degree, but, being conditional, ceases to be binding whenever the other
contracting party performs not his part of the engagement. I perceive,
that a promise itself arises entirely from human conventions, and is
invented with a view to a certain interest. I seek, therefore, some
such interest more immediately connected with government, and which may
be at once the original motive to its institution, and the source of
our obedience to it. This interest I find to consist in the security
and protection which we enjoy in political society, and which we can
never attain when perfectly free and independent. As the interest,
therefore, is the immediate sanction of government, the one can have no
longer being than the other; and whenever the civil magistrate carries
his oppression so far as to render his authority perfectly intolerable,
we are no longer bound to submit to it. The cause ceases; the effect
must cease also.
So far the conclusion is immediate and direct, concerning the _natural_
obligation which we have to allegiance. As to the _moral_ obligation,
we may observe, that the maxim would here be false, that _when the
cause ceases the effect must cease also_. For there is a principle
of human nature, which we have frequently taken notice of, that men
are mightily addicted to _general rules_, and that we often carry our
maxims beyond those reasons which first induced us to establish them.
Where cases are similar in many circumstances, we are apt to put them
on the same footing, without considering that they differ in the most
material circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent than
real. It may therefore be thought, that, in the case of allegiance,
our moral obligation of duty will not cease, even though the natural
obligation of interest, which is its cause, has ceased; and that men
may be bound by _conscience_ to submit to a tyrannical government,
against their own and the public interest. And indeed, to the force of
this argument I so far submit, as to acknowledge, that general rules
commonly extend beyond the principles on which they are founded; and
that we seldom make any exception to them, unless that exception have
the qualities of a general rule, and be founded on very numerous and
common instances. Now this I assert to be entirely the present case.
When men submit to the authority of others, 'tis to procure themselves
some security against the wickedness and injustice of men, who are
perpetually carried, by their unruly passions, and by their present
and immediate interest, to the violation of all the laws of society.
But as this imperfection is inherent in human nature, we know that it
must attend men in all their states and conditions; and that those
whom we choose for rulers, do not immediately become of a superior
nature to the rest of mankind, upon account of their superior power and
authority. What we expect from them depends not on a change of their
nature, but of their situation, when they acquire a more immediate
interest in the preservation of order and the execution of justice.
But, besides that this interest is only more immediate in the execution
of justice among their subjects; besides this, I say, we may often
expect, from the irregularity of human nature, that they will neglect
even this immediate interest, and be transported by their passions
into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition. Our general knowledge
of human nature, our observation of the past history of mankind,
our experience of present times; all these causes must induce us to
open the door of exceptions, and must make us conclude, that we may
resist the more violent effects of supreme power without any crime or
injustice.
Accordingly we may observe, that this is both the general practice and
principle of mankind, and that no nation that could find any remedy,
ever yet suffered the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blamed for
their resistance. Those who took up arms against Dionysius or Nero, or
Philip the Second, have the favour of every reader in the perusal of
their history; and nothing but the most violent perversion of common
sense can ever lead us to condemn them. 'Tis certain, therefore, that
in all our notions of morals, we never entertain such an absurdity
as that of passive obedience, but make allowances for resistance in
the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression. The general
opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in this of
morals 'tis perfectly infallible. Nor is it less infallible, because
men cannot distinctly explain the principles on which it is founded.
Few persons can carry on this train of reasoning: 'Government is a mere
human invention for the interest of society. Where the tyranny of the
governor removes this interest, it also removes the natural obligation
to obedience. The moral obligation is founded on the natural, and
therefore must cease where _that_ ceases; especially where the subject
is such as makes us foresee very many occasions wherein the natural
obligation may cease, and causes us to form a kind of general rule for
the regulation of our conduct in such occurrences.' But though this
train of reasoning be too subtile for the vulgar, 'tis certain that
all men have an implicit notion of it, and are sensible that they owe
obedience to government merely on account of the public interest; and,
at the same time, that human nature is so subject to frailties and
passions, as may easily pervert this institution, and change their
governors into tyrants and public enemies. If the sense of public
interest were not our original motive to obedience, I would fain ask,
what other principle is there in human nature capable of subduing
the natural ambition of men, and forcing them to such a submission?
Imitation and custom are not sufficient. For the question still recurs,
what motive first produces those instances of submission which we
imitate, and that train of actions which produces the custom? There
evidently is no other principle than public interest; and if interest
first produces obedience to government, the obligation to obedience
must cease whenever the interest ceases in any great degree, and in a
considerable number of instances.