OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS.
When civil government has been established over the greatest part of
mankind, and different societies have been formed contiguous to each
other, there arises a new set of duties among the neighbouring states,
suitable to the nature of that commerce which they carry on with each
other. Political writers tell us, that in every kind of intercourse
a body politic is to be considered as one person; and indeed, this
assertion is so far just, that different nations, as well as private
persons, require mutual assistance; at the same time that their
selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord. But
though nations in this particular resemble individuals, yet as they are
very different in other respects, no wonder they regulate themselves by
different maxims, and give rise to a new set of rules, which we call
_the laws of nations_. Under this head we may comprise the sacredness
of the persons of ambassadors, the declaration of war, the abstaining
from poisoned arms, with other duties of that kind, which are evidently
calculated for the commerce that is peculiar to different societies.
But though these rules be superadded to the laws of nature, the former
do not entirely abolish the latter; and one may safely affirm, that the
three fundamental rules of justice, the stability of possession, its
transference by consent, and the performance of promises, are duties
of princes as well as of subjects. The same interest produces the same
effect in both cases. Where possession has no stability, there must
be perpetual war. Where property is not transferred by consent, there
can be no commerce. Where promises are not observed, there can be no
leagues nor alliances. The advantages, therefore, of peace, commerce,
and mutual succour, make us extend to different kingdoms the same
notions of justice which take place among individuals.
There is a maxim very current in the world, which few politicians are
willing to avow, but which has been authorized by the practice of
all ages, _that there is a system of morals calculated for princes,
much more free than that which ought to govern private persons_.
'Tis evident this is not to be understood of the lesser _extent_ of
public duties and obligations; nor will any one be so extravagant as
to assert, that the most solemn treaties ought to have no force among
princes. For as princes do actually form treaties among themselves,
they must propose some advantage from the execution of them; and the
prospect of such advantage for the future must engage them to perform
their part, and must establish that law of nature. The meaning,
therefore, of this political maxim is, that though the morality of
princes has the same _extent_, yet it has not the same _force_ as
that of private persons, and may lawfully be transgressed from a
more trivial motive. However shocking such a proposition may appear
to certain philosophers, 'twill be easy to defend it upon those
principles, by which we have accounted for the origin of justice and
equity.
When men have found by experience that 'tis impossible to subsist
without society, and that 'tis impossible to maintain society, while
they give free course to their appetites; so urgent an interest
quickly restrains their actions, and imposes an obligation to observe
those rules which we call _the laws of justice_. This obligation of
interest rests not here; but, by the necessary course of the passions
and sentiments, gives rise to the moral obligation of duty; while we
approve of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and disapprove
of such as tend to its disturbance. The same _natural_ obligation of
interest takes place among independent kingdoms, and gives rise to
the same _morality_; so that no one of ever so corrupt morals will
approve of a prince, who voluntarily, and of his own accord, breaks his
word, or violates any treaty. But here we may observe, that though the
intercourse of different states be advantageous, and even sometimes
necessary, yet it is not so necessary nor advantageous as that among
individuals, without which 'tis utterly impossible for human nature
ever to subsist. Since, therefore, the _natural_ obligation to justice,
among different states, is not so strong as among individuals, the
_moral_ obligation which arises from it must partake of its weakness;
and we must necessarily give a greater indulgence to a prince or
minister who deceives another, than to a private gentleman who breaks
his word of honour.
Should it be asked, _what proportion these two species of morality
bear to each other_? I would answer, that this is a question to which
we can never give any precise answer; nor is it possible to reduce to
numbers the proportion, which we ought to fix betwixt them. One may
safely affirm, that this proportion finds itself without any art or
study of men; as we may observe on many other occasions. The practice
of the world goes farther in teaching us the degrees of our duty,
than the most subtile philosophy which was ever yet invented. And
this may serve as a convincing proof, that all men have an implicit
notion of the foundation of those moral rules concerning natural and
civil justice, and are sensible that they arise merely from human
conventions, and from the interest which we have in the preservation
of peace and order. For otherwise the diminution of the interest would
never produce a relaxation of the morality, and reconcile us more
easily to any transgression of justice among princes and republics,
than in the private commerce of one subject with another.