OF THE SOURCE OF ALLEGIANCE.
Though government be an invention very advantageous, and even in some
circumstances absolutely necessary to mankind, it is not necessary in
all circumstances; nor is it impossible for men to preserve society
for some time, without having recourse to such an invention. Men, 'tis
true, are always much inclined to prefer present interest to distant
and remote; nor is it easy for them to resist the temptation of any
advantage that they may immediately enjoy, in apprehension of an evil
that lies at a distance from them; but still this weakness is less
conspicuous where the possessions and the pleasures of life are few
and of little value, as they always are in the infancy of society.
An Indian is but little tempted to dispossess another of his hut, or
to steal his bow, as being already provided of the same advantages;
and as to any superior fortune which may attend one above another in
hunting and fishing, 'tis only casual and temporary, and will have
but small tendency to disturb society. And so far am I from thinking
with some philosophers, that men are utterly incapable of society
without government, that I assert the first rudiments of government
to arise from quarrels, not among men of the same society, but among
those of different societies. A less degree of riches will suffice
to this latter effect, is requisite for the former. Men fear nothing
from public war and violence but the resistance they meet with, which,
because they share it in common, seems less terrible, and, because it
comes from strangers, seems less pernicious in its consequences, than
when they are exposed singly against one whose commerce is advantageous
to them, and without whose society 'tis impossible they can subsist.
Now foreign war, to a society without government, necessarily produces
civil war. Throw any considerable goods among men, they instantly fall
a quarrelling, while each strives to get possession of what pleases
him, without regard to the consequences. In a foreign war, the most
considerable of all goods, life and limbs, are at stake; and as every
one shuns dangerous ports, seizes the best arms, seeks excuse for the
slightest wounds, the laws, which may be well enough observed while
men were calm, can now no longer take place, when they are in such
commotion.
This we find verified in the American tribes, where men live in concord
and amity among themselves, without any established government, and
never pay submission to any of their fellows, except in time of war,
when their captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after
their return from the field and the establishment of peace with the
neighbouring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in the
advantages of government, and teaches them to have recourse to it,
when, either by the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any fortuitous
inventions, their riches and possessions have become so considerable
as to make them forget, on every emergence, the interest they have in
the preservation of peace and justice. Hence we may give a plausible
reason, among others, why all governments are at first monarchical,
without any mixture and variety; and why republics arise only from the
abuses of monarchy and despotic power. Camps are the true mothers of
cities; and as war cannot be administered, by reason of the suddenness
of every exigency, without some authority in a single person, the same
kind of authority naturally takes place in that civil government which
succeeds the military. And this reason I take to be more natural than
the common one derived from patriarchal government, or the authority
of a father, which is said first to take place in one family, and to
accustom the members of it to the government of a single person. The
state of society without government is one of the most natural states
of men, and must subsist with the conjunction of many families, and
long after the first generation. Nothing but an increase of riches
and possessions could oblige men to quit it; and so barbarous and
uninstructed are all societies on their first formation, that many
years must elapse before these can increase to such a degree as to
disturb men in the enjoyment of peace and concord.
But though it be possible for men to maintain a small uncultivated
society without government, 'tis impossible they should maintain a
society of any kind without justice, and the observance of those
three fundamental laws concerning the stability of possession, its
translation by consent, and the performance of promises. These are
therefore antecedent to government, and are supposed to impose an
obligation, before the duty of allegiance to civil magistrates has
once been thought of. Nay, I shall go farther, and assert, that
government, _upon its first establishment_, would naturally be supposed
to derive its obligation from those laws of of nature, and, in
particular, from that concerning the performance of promises. When men
have once perceived the necessity of government to maintain peace and
execute justice, they would naturally assemble together, would choose
magistrates, determine their power, and _promise_ them obedience. As
a promise is supposed to be a bond or security already in use, and
attended with a moral obligation, 'tis to be considered as the original
sanction of government, and as the source of the first obligation to
obedience. This reasoning appears so natural, that it has become the
foundation of our fashionable system of politics, and is in a manner
the creed of a party amongst us, who pride themselves, with reason, on
the soundness of their philosophy, and their liberty of thought. 'All
men,' say they, 'are born free and equal: government and superiority
can only be established by consent: the consent of men, in establishing
government, imposes on them a new obligation, unknown to the laws
of nature. Men, therefore, are bound to obey their magistrates,
only because they promise it; and if they had not given their word,
either expressly or tacitly, to preserve allegiance, it would never
have become a part of their moral duty. This conclusion, however,
when carried so far as to comprehend government in all its ages and
situations, is entirely erroneous; and I maintain, that though the duty
of allegiance be at first grafted on the obligation of promises, and be
for some time supported by that obligation, yet it quickly takes root
of itself, and has an original obligation and authority, independent
of all contracts. This is a principle of moment, which we must examine
with care and attention, before we proceed any farther.
'Tis reasonable for those philosophers who assert justice to be a
natural virtue, and antecedent to human conventions, to resolve all
civil allegiance into the obligation of a promise, and assert that 'tis
our own consent alone which binds us to any submission to magistracy.
For as all government is plainly an invention of men, and the origin of
most governments is known in history, 'tis necessary to mount higher,
in order to find the source of our political duties, if we would assert
them to have any _natural_ obligation of morality. These philosophers,
therefore, quickly observe, that society is as ancient as the human
species, and those three fundamental laws of nature as ancient as
society; so that, taking advantage of the antiquity and obscure origin
of these laws, they first deny them to be artificial and voluntary
inventions of men, and then seek to ingraft on them those other duties
which are more plainly artificial. But being once undeceived in this
particular, and having found that _natural_ as well as _civil_ justice
derives its origin from human conventions, we shall quickly perceive
how fruitless it is to resolve the one into the other, and seek, in the
laws of nature, a stronger foundation for our political duties than
interest and human conventions; while these laws themselves are built
on the very same foundation. On whichever side we turn this subject,
we shall find that these two kinds of duty are exactly on the same
footing, and have the same source both of their _first invention_ and
_moral obligation_. They are contrived to remedy like inconveniences,
and acquire their moral sanction in the same manner, from their
remedying those inconveniences. These are two points which we shall
endeavour to prove as distinctly as possible.
We have already shown, that men _invented_ the three fundamental
laws of nature, when they observed the necessity of society to their
mutual subsistence, and found that 'twas impossible to maintain any
correspondence together, without some restraint on their natural
appetites. The same self-love, therefore, which renders men so
incommodious to each other, taking a new and more convenient direction,
produces the rules of justice, and is the _first_ motive of their
observance. But when men have observed, that though the rules of
justice be sufficient to maintain any society, yet 'tis impossible
for them, of themselves, to observe those rules in large and polished
societies; they establish government as a new invention to attain
their ends, and preserve the old, or procure new advantages, by a more
strict execution of justice. So far, therefore, our _civil_ duties are
connected with our _natural_, that the former are invented chiefly for
the sake of the latter; and that the principal object of government
is to constrain men to observe the laws of nature. In this respect,
however, that law of nature, concerning the performance of promises, is
only comprised along with the rest; and its exact observance is to be
considered as an effect of the institution of government, and not the
obedience to government as an effect of the obligation of a promise.
Though the object of our civil duties be the enforcing of our natural,
yet the _first_[9] motive of the invention, as well as performance
of both, is nothing but self-interest; and since there is a separate
interest in the obedience to government, from that in the performance
of promises, we must also allow of a separate obligation. To obey the
civil magistrate is requisite to preserve order and concord in society.
To perform promises is requisite to beget mutual trust and confidence
in the common offices of life. The ends, as well as the means, are
perfectly distinct; nor is the one subordinate to the other.
To make this more evident, let us consider, that men will often bind
themselves by promises to the performance of what it would have been
their interest to perform, independent of these promises; as when they
would give others a fuller security, by superadding a new obligation
of interest to that which they formerly lay under. The interest in the
performance of promises, besides its moral obligation, is general,
avowed, and of the last consequence in life. Other interests may be
more particular and doubtful; and we are apt to entertain a greater
suspicion, that men may indulge their humour or passion in acting
contrary to them. Here, therefore, promises come naturally in play, and
are often required for fuller satisfaction and security. But supposing
those other interests to be as general and avowed as the interest in
the performance of a promise, they will be regarded as on the same
footing, and men will begin to repose the same confidence in them. Now
this is exactly the case with regard to our civil duties, or obedience
to the magistrate; without which no government could subsist, nor any
peace or order be maintained in large societies, where there are so
many possessions on the one hand, and so many wants, real or imaginary,
on the other. Our civil duties, therefore, must soon detach themselves
from our promises, and acquire a separate force and influence. The
interest in both is of the very same kind; 'tis general, avowed,
and prevails in all times and places. There is, then, no pretext of
reason for founding the one upon the other, while each of them has a
foundation peculiar to itself. We might as well resolve the obligation
to abstain from the possessions of others, into the obligation of a
promise, as that of allegiance. The interests are not more distinct in
the one case than the other. A regard to property is not more necessary
to natural society, than obedience is to civil society or government;
nor is the former society more necessary to the being of mankind,
than the latter to their well-being and happiness. In short, if the
performance of promises be advantageous, so is obedience to government;
if the former interest be general, so is the latter; if the one
interest be obvious and avowed, so is the other. And as these two rules
are founded on like obligations of interest, each of them must have a
peculiar authority, independent of the other.
But 'tis not only the _natural_ obligations of interest, which are
distinct in promises and allegiance; but also the _moral_ obligations
of honour and conscience: nor does the merit or demerit of the one
depend in the least upon that of the other. And, indeed, if we consider
the close connexion there is betwixt the natural and moral obligations,
we shall find this conclusion to be entirely unavoidable. Our interest
is always engaged on the side of obedience to magistracy; and there is
nothing but a great present advantage that can lead us to rebellion, by
making us overlook the remote interest which we have in the preserving
of peace and order in society. But though a present interest may thus
blind us with regard to our own actions, it takes not place with regard
to those of others; nor hinders them from appearing in their true
colours, as highly prejudicial to public interest, and to our own in
particular. This naturally gives us an uneasiness, in considering such
seditious and disloyal actions, and makes us attach to them the idea
of vice and moral deformity. 'Tis the same principle which causes us
to disapprove of all kinds of private injustice, and, in particular,
of the breach of promises. We blame all treachery and breach of faith;
because we consider, that the freedom and extent of human commerce
depend entirely on a fidelity with regard to promises. We blame all
disloyalty to magistrates; because we perceive that the execution of
justice, in the stability of possession, its translation by consent,
and the performance of promises, is impossible, without submission to
government. As there are here two interests entirely distinct from each
other, they must give rise to two moral obligations, equally separate
and independent. Though there was no such thing as a promise in the
world, government would still be necessary in all large and civilized
societies; and if promises had only their own proper obligation,
without the separate sanction of government, they would have but little
efficacy in such societies. This separates the boundaries of our public
and private duties, and shows that the latter are more dependent on the
former, than the former on the latter. _Education_, and _the artifice
of politicians_, concur to bestow a farther morality on loyalty, and to
brand all rebellion with a greater degree of guilt and infamy. Nor is
it a wonder that politicians should be very industrious in inculcating
such notions, where their interest is so particularly concerned.
Lest those arguments should not appear entirely conclusive (as I think
they are), I shall have recourse to authority, and shall prove, from
the universal consent of mankind, that the obligation of submission to
government is not derived from any promise of the subjects. Nor need
any one wonder, that though I have all along endeavoured to establish
my system on pure reason, and have scarce ever cited the judgment even
of philosophers or historians on any article, I should now appeal to
popular authority, and oppose the sentiments of the rabble to any
philosophical reasoning. For it must be observed, that the opinions of
men, in this case, carry with them a peculiar authority, and are, in
a great measure, infallible. The distinction of moral good and evil
is founded on the pleasure or pain which results from the view of any
sentiment or character; and, as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown
to the person who feels it, it follows,[10] that there is just so much
vice or virtue in any character as every one places in it, and that
'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken. And, though
our judgments concerning the _origin_ of any vice or virtue, be not so
certain as those concerning their _degrees_, yet, since the question in
this case regards not any philosophical origin of an obligation, but a
plain matter of fact, 'tis not easily conceived how we can fall into
an error. A man who acknowledges himself to be bound to another for
a certain sum, must certainly know whether it be by his own bond, or
that of his father; whether it be of his mere good will, or for money
lent him; and under what conditions, and for what purposes, he has
bound himself. In like manner, it being certain that there is a moral
obligation to submit to government, because everyone thinks so; it must
be as certain that this obligation arises not from a promise; since no
one, whose judgment has not been led astray by too strict adherence to
a system of philosophy, has ever yet dreamt of ascribing it to that
origin. Neither magistrates nor subjects have formed this idea of our
civil duties.
We find, that magistrates are so far from deriving their authority, and
the obligation to obedience in their subjects, from the foundation of
a promise or original contract, that they conceal, as far as possible,
from their people, especially from the vulgar, that they have their
origin from thence. Were this the sanction of government, our rulers
would never receive it tacitly, which is the utmost that can be
pretended; since what is given tacitly and insensibly, can never have
such influence on mankind as what is performed expressly and openly.
A tacit promise is, where the will is signified by other more diffuse
signs than those of speech; but a will there must certainly be in the
case, and that can never escape the person's notice who exerted it,
however silent or tacit. But were you to ask the far greatest part of
the nation, whether they had ever consented to the authority of their
rulers, or promised to obey them, they would be inclined to think very
strangely of you; and would certainly reply, that the affair depended
not on their consent, but that they were born to such an obedience.
In consequence of this opinion, we frequently see them imagine such
persons to be their natural rulers, as are at that time deprived of
all power and authority, and whom no man, however foolish, would
voluntarily choose; and this merely because they are in that line
which ruled before, and in that decree of it which used to succeed:
though perhaps in so distant a period, that scarce any man alive could
ever have given any promise of obedience. Has a government, then, no
authority over such as these, because they never consented to it,
and would esteem the very attempt of such a free choice a piece of
arrogance and impiety? We find by experience, that it punishes them
very freely for what it calls treason and rebellion, which, it seems,
according to this system, reduces itself to common injustice. If you
say, that by dwelling in its dominions, they in effect consented to
the established government, I answer, that this can only be where they
think the affair depends on their choice, which few or none beside
those philosophers have ever yet imagined. It never was pleaded as an
excuse for a rebel, that the first act he performed, after he came
to years of discretion, was to levy war against the sovereign of the
state; and that, while he was a child he could not bind himself by his
own consent, and having become a man, showed plainly, by the first act
he performed, that he had no design to impose on himself any obligation
to obedience. We find, on the contrary, that civil laws punish this
crime at the same age as any other which is criminal of itself,
without our consent; that is, when the person is come to the full use
of reason: whereas to this crime it ought in justice to allow some
intermediate time, in which a tacit consent at least might be supposed.
To which we may add, that a man living under an absolute government
would owe it no allegiance; since, by its very nature, it depends not
on consent. But as that is as _natural_ and _common_ a government as
any, it must certainly occasion some obligation; and 'tis plain from
experience, that men who are subjected to it do always think so. This
is a clear proof, that we do not commonly esteem our allegiance to
be derived from our consent or promise; and a farther proof is, that
when our promise is upon any account expressly engaged, we always
distinguish exactly betwixt the two obligations, and believe the one to
add more force to the other, than in a repetition of the same promise.
Where no promise is given, a man looks not on his faith as broken
in private matters, upon account of rebellion; but keeps those two
duties of honour and allegiance perfectly distinct and separate. As
the uniting of them was thought by these philosophers a very subtile
invention, this is a convincing proof that 'tis not a true one; since
no man can either give a promise, or be restrained by its sanction and
obligation, unknown to himself.