OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT.
Nothing is more certain, than that men are in a great measure governed
by interest, and that, even when they extend their concern beyond
themselves, 'tis not to any great distance; nor is it usual for
them, in common life, to look farther than their nearest friends and
acquaintance. 'Tis no less certain, that 'tis impossible for men to
consult their interest in so effectual a manner, as by an universal and
inflexible observance of the rules of justice, by which alone they can
preserve society, and keep themselves from falling into that wretched
and savage condition which is commonly represented as the _state of
nature_. And as this interest which all men have in the upholding of
society, and the observation of the rules of justice, is great, so
is it palpable and evident, even to the most rude and uncultivated
of the human race; and 'tis almost impossible for any one who has
had experience of society, to be mistaken in this particular. Since,
therefore, men are so sincerely attached to their interest, and their
interest is so much concerned in the observance of justice, and this
interest is so certain and avowed, it may be asked, how any disorder
can ever arise in society, and what principle there is in human nature
so _powerful_ as to overcome so strong a passion, or so _violent_ as to
obscure so clear a knowledge?
It has been observed, in treating of the Passions, that men are
mightily governed by the imagination, and proportion their affections
more to the light under which any object appears to them, than to its
real and intrinsic value. What strikes upon them with a strong and
lively idea commonly prevails above what lies in a more obscure light;
and it must be a great superiority of value that is able to compensate
this advantage. Now, as every thing that is contiguous to us, either in
space or time, strikes upon us with such an idea, it has a proportional
effect on the will and passions, and commonly operates with more force
than any object that lies in a more distant and obscure light. Though
we may be fully convinced, that the latter object excels the former, we
are not able to regulate our actions by this judgment, but yield to the
solicitations of our passions, which always plead in favour of whatever
is near and contiguous.
This is the reason why men so often act in contradiction to their known
interest; and, in particular, why they prefer any trivial advantage
that is present, to the maintenance of order in society, which so
much depends on the observance of justice. The consequences of every
breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and and are not liable to
counterbalance any immediate advantage that may be reaped from it. They
are, however, never the less real for being remote; and as all men are,
in some degree, subject to the same weakness, it necessarily happens,
that the violations of equity must become very frequent in society,
and the commerce of men, by that means, be rendered very dangerous
and uncertain. You have the same propension that I have in favour of
what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally
carried to commit acts of injustice as well as me. Your example both
pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new
reason for any breach of equity, by showing me, that I should be the
cully of my integrity, if I alone should impose on myself a severe
restraint amidst the licentiousness of others.
This quality, therefore, of human nature, not only is very dangerous
to society, but also seems, on a cursory view, to be incapable of any
remedy. The remedy can only come from the consent of men; and if men
be incapable of themselves to prefer remote to contiguous, they will
never consent to any thing which would oblige them to such a choice,
and contradict, in so sensible a manner, their natural principles and
propensities. Whoever chooses the means, chooses also the end; and
if it be impossible for us to prefer what is remote, 'tis equally
impossible for us to submit to any necessity which would oblige us to
such a method of acting.
But here 'tis observable, that this infirmity of human nature becomes
a remedy to itself, and that we provide against our negligence about
remote objects, merely because we are naturally inclined to that
negligence. When we consider any objects at a distance, all their
minute distinctions vanish, and we always give the preference to
whatever is in itself preferable, without considering its situation and
circumstances. This gives rise to what, in an improper sense, we call
_reason_, which is a principle that is often contradictory to those
propensities that display themselves upon the approach of the object.
In reflecting on any action which I am to perform a twelvemonth hence,
I always resolve to prefer the greater good, whether at that time it
will be more contiguous or remote; nor does any difference in that
particular make a difference in my present intentions and resolutions.
My distance from the final determination makes all those minute
differences vanish, nor am I affected by any thing but the general and
more discernible qualities of good and evil. But on my nearer approach,
those circumstances which I at first overlooked begin to appear, and
have an influence on my conduct and affections. A new inclination to
the present good springs up, and makes it difficult for me to adhere
inflexibly to my first purpose and resolution. This natural infirmity
I may very much regret, and I may endeavour, by all possible means, to
free myself from it. I may have recourse to study and reflection within
myself; to the advice of friends; to frequent meditation, and repeated
resolution: And having experienced how ineffectual all these are, I
may embrace with pleasure any other expedient by which I may impose a
restraint upon myself, and guard against this weakness.
The only, difficulty, therefore, is to find out this expedient, by
which men cure their natural weakness, and lay themselves under the
necessity of observing the laws of justice and equity, notwithstanding
their violent propension to prefer contiguous to remote. 'Tis
evident such a remedy can never be effectual without correcting
this propensity; and as 'tis impossible to change or correct any
thing material in our nature, the utmost we can do is to change our
circumstances and situation, and render the observance of the laws of
justice our nearest interest, and their violation our most remote.
But this being impracticable with respect to all mankind, it can only
take place with respect to a few, whom we thus immediately interest
in the execution of justice. These are the persons whom we call civil
magistrates, kings and their ministers, our governors and rulers,
who, being indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state,
have no interest, or but a remote one, in any act of injustice; and,
being satisfied with their present condition, and with their part in
society, have an immediate interest in every execution of justice,
which is so necessary to the upholding of society. Here, then, is the
origin of civil government and society. Men are not able radically to
cure, either in themselves or others, that narrowness of soul which
makes them prefer the present to the remote. They cannot change their
natures. All they can do is to change their situation, and render
the observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular
persons, and its violation their more remote. These persons, then, are
not only induced to observe those rules in their own conduct, but also
to constrain others to a like regularity, and enforce the dictates of
equity through the whole society. And if it be necessary, they may
also interest others more immediately in the execution of justice, and
create a number of officers, civil and military, to assist them in
their government.
But this execution of justice, though the principal, is not the
only advantage of government. As violent passion hinders men from
seeing distinctly the interest they have in an equitable behaviour
towards others, so it hinders them from seeing that equity itself,
and gives them a remarkable partiality in their own favours. This
inconvenience is corrected in the same manner as that above mentioned.
The same persons who execute the laws of justice, will also decide all
controversies concerning them; and, being indifferent to the greatest
part of the society, will decide them more equitably than every one
would in his own case.
By means of these two advantages in the _execution_ and _decision_
of justice, men acquire a security against each other's weakness and
passion, as well as against their own, and, under the shelter of their
governors, begin to taste at ease the sweets of society and mutual
assistance. But government extends farther its beneficial influence;
and, not contented to protect men in those conventions they make for
their mutual interest, it often obliges them to make such conventions,
and forces them to seek their own advantage, by a concurrence in some
common end or purpose. There is no quality in human nature which causes
more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer
whatever is present to the distant and remote, and makes us desire
objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value.
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in
common: because 'tis easy for them to know each other's mind; and each
must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his
part, is the abandoning the whole project. But 'tis very difficult, and
indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in any such
action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design,
and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a
pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and would lay the
whole burden on others. Political society easily remedies both these
inconveniences. Magistrates find an immediate interest in the interest
of any considerable part of their subjects. They need consult nobody
but themselves to form any scheme for the promoting of that interest.
And as the failure of any one piece in the execution is connected,
though not immediately, with the failure of the whole, they prevent
that failure, because they find no interest in it, either immediate
or remote. Thus, bridges are built, harbours opened, ramparts raised,
canals formed, fleets equipped, and armies disciplined, every where,
by the care of government, which, though composed of men subject to
all human infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most subtile
inventions imaginable, a composition which is in some measure exempted
from all these infirmities.