SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE.
We have now run over the three fundamental laws of nature, _that of the
stability of possession, of its transference by consent_, and _of the
performance of promises_. 'Tis on the strict observance of those three
laws that the peace and security of human society entirely depend; nor
is there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among
men, where these are neglected. Society is absolutely necessary for
the well-being of men; and these are as necessary to the supports
of society. Whatever restraint they may impose on the passions of
men, they are the real offspring of those passions, and are only a
more artful and more refined way of satisfying them. Nothing is more
vigilant and inventive than our passions; and nothing is more obvious
than the convention for the observance of these rules. Nature has,
therefore, trusted this affair entirely to the conduct of men, and has
not placed in the mind any peculiar original principles, to determine
us to a set of actions, into which the other principles of our frame
and constitution were sufficient to lead us. And to convince us the
more fully of this truth, we may here stop a moment, and, from a review
of the preceding reasonings, may draw some new arguments, to prove that
those laws, however necessary, are entirely artificial, and of human
invention; and consequently, that justice is an artificial, and not a
natural virtue.
I. The first argument I shall make use of is derived from the vulgar
definition of justice. Justice is commonly defined to be _a constant
and perpetual will of giving every one his due_. In this definition
'tis supposed that there are such things as right and property,
independent of justice, and antecedent to it; and that they would have
subsisted, though men had never dreamt of practising such a virtue.
I have already observed, in a cursory manner, the fallacy of this
opinion, and shall here continue to open up, a little more distinctly,
my sentiments on that subject.
I shall begin with observing, that this quality, which we call
_property_, is like many of the imaginary qualities of the
_Peripatetic_ philosophy, and vanishes upon a more accurate inspection
into the subject, when considered apart from our moral sentiments, 'Tis
evident property does not consist in any of the sensible qualities
of the object. For these may continue invariably the same, while the
property changes. Property, therefore, must consist in some relation of
the object. But 'tis not in its relation with regard to other external
and inanimate objects. For these may also continue invariably the
same, while the property changes. This quality, therefore, consists in
the relations of objects to intelligent and rational beings. But 'tis
not the external and corporeal relation which forms the essence of
property. For that relation may be the same betwixt inanimate objects,
or with regard to brute creatures; though in those cases it forms no
property. 'Tis therefore in some internal relation that the property
consists; that is, in some influence which the external relations of
the object have on the mind and actions. Thus, the external relation
which we call _occupation_ or first possession, is not of itself
imagined to be the property of the object, but only to cause its
property. Now, 'tis evident this external relation causes nothing in
external objects, and has only an influence on the mind, by giving us
a sense of duty in abstaining from that object, and in restoring it to
the first possessor. These actions are properly what we call _justice_;
and consequently 'tis on that virtue that the nature of property
depends, and not the virtue on the property.
If any one, therefore, would assert that justice is a natural virtue,
and injustice a natural vice, he must assert, that abstracting from the
notions of _property_ and _right_ and _obligation_, a certain conduct
and train of actions, in certain external relations of objects, has
naturally a moral beauty or deformity, and causes an original pleasure
or uneasiness. Thus, the restoring a man's goods to him is considered
as virtuous, not because nature has annexed a certain sentiment of
pleasure to such a conduct with regard to the property of others, but
because she has annexed that sentiment to such a conduct, with regard
to those external objects of which others have had the first or long
possession, or which they have received by the consent of those who
have had first or long possession. If nature has given us no such
sentiment, there is not naturally, nor antecedent to human conventions,
any such thing as property. Now, though it seems sufficiently evident,
in this dry and accurate consideration of the present subject, that
nature has annexed no pleasure or sentiment of approbation to such a
conduct, yet, that I may leave as little room for doubt as possible, I
shall subjoin a few more arguments to confirm my opinion.
_First_, If nature had given us a pleasure of this kind, it would
have been as evident and discernible as on every other occasion; nor
should we have found any difficulty to perceive, that the consideration
of such actions, in such a situation, gives a certain pleasure and
sentiment of approbation. We should not have been obliged to have
recourse to notions of property in the definition of justice, and at
the same time make use of the notions of justice in the definition of
pro-property. This deceitful method of reasoning is a plain proof that
there are contained in the subject some obscurities and difficulties
which we are not able to surmount, and which we desire to evade by this
artifice.
_Secondly_, Those rules by which properties, rights and obligations
are determined, have in them no marks of a natural origin, but many
of artifice and contrivance. They are too numerous to have proceeded
from nature; they are changeable by human laws; and have all of them a
direct and evident tendency to public good, and the support of civil
society. This last circumstance is remarkable upon two accounts.
_First_, Because, though the cause of the establishment of these laws
had been a _regard_ for the public good, as much as the public good
is their natural tendency, they would still have been artificial, as
being purposely contrived, and directed to a certain end. _Secondly_,
Because, if men had been endowed with such a strong regard for public
good, they would never have restrained themselves by these rules; so
that the laws of justice arise from natural principles, in a manner
still more oblique and artificial. 'Tis self-love which is their real
origin; and as the self-love of one person is naturally contrary to
that of another, these several interested passions are obliged to
adjust themselves after such a manner as to concur in some system
of conduct and behaviour. This system, therefore, comprehending the
interest of each individual, is of course advantageous to the public,
though it be not intended for that purpose by the inventors.
II. In the _second_ place, we may observe, that all kinds of vice
and virtue run insensibly into each other, and may approach by such
imperceptible degrees as will make it very difficult, if not absolutely
impossible, to determine when the one ends and the other begins; and
from this observation we may derive a new argument for the foregoing
principle. For, whatever may be the case with regard to all kinds
of vice and virtue, 'tis certain that rights, and obligations, and
property, admit of no such insensible gradation, but that a man
either has a full and perfect property, or none at all; and is either
entirely obliged to perform any action, or lies under no manner of
obligation. However civil laws may talk of a perfect _dominion_, and of
an imperfect, 'tis easy to observe, that this arises from a fiction,
which has no foundation in reason, and can never enter into our notions
of natural justice and equity. A man that hires a horse, though but
for a day, has as full a right to make use of it for that time, as he
whom we call its proprietor has to make use of it any other day; and
'tis evident that, however the use may be bounded in time or degree,
the right itself is not susceptible of any such gradation, but is
absolute and entire, so far as it extends. Accordingly, we may observe,
that this right both arises and perishes in an instant; and that a man
entirely acquires the property of any object by occupation, or the
consent of the proprietor; and loses it by his own consent, without any
of that insensible gradation which is remarkable in other qualities and
relations. Since, therefore, this is the case with regard to property,
and rights, and obligations, I ask, how it stands with regard to
justice and injustice? After whatever manner you answer this question,
you run into inextricable difficulties. If you reply, that justice
and injustice admit of degree, and run insensibly into each other,
you expressly contradict the foregoing position, that obligation and
property are not susceptible of such a gradation. These depend entirely
upon justice and injustice, and follow them in all their variations.
Where the justice is entire, the property is also entire: where the
justice is imperfect, the property must also be imperfect. And _vice
versa_, if the property admit of no such variations, they must also
be incompatible with justice. If you assent, therefore, to this last
proposition, and assert that justice and injustice are not susceptible
of degrees, you in effect assert that they are not _naturally_ either
vicious or virtuous; since vice and virtue, moral good and evil, and
indeed all _natural_ qualities, run insensibly into each other, and are
on many occasions undistinguishable.
And here it may be worth while to observe, that though abstract
reasoning and the general maxims of philosophy and law establish this
position, _that property, and right, and obligation, admit not of
degrees_, yet, in our common and negligent way of thinking, we find
great difficulty to entertain that opinion, and do even secretly
embrace the contrary principle. An object must either be in the
possession of one person or another. An action must either be performed
or not. The necessity there is of choosing one side in these dilemmas,
and the impossibility there often is of finding any just medium, oblige
us, when we reflect on the matter, to acknowledge that all property and
obligations are entire. But, on the other hand, when we consider the
origin of property and obligation, and find that they depend on public
utility, and sometimes on the propensity of the imagination, which
are seldom entire on any side, we are naturally inclined to imagine
that these moral relations admit of an insensible gradation. Hence
it is that in references, where the consent of the parties leave the
referees entire masters of the subject, they commonly discover so much
equity and justice on both sides as induces them to strike a medium,
and divide the difference betwixt the parties. Civil judges, who have
not this liberty, but are obliged to give a decisive sentence on some
one side, are often at a loss how to determine, and are necessitated
to proceed on the most frivolous reasons in the world. Half rights
and obligations, which seem so natural in common life, are perfect
absurdities in their tribunal; for which reason they are often obliged
to take half arguments for whole ones, in order to terminate the affair
one way or other.
III. The _third_ argument of this kind I shall make use of may be
explained thus. If we consider the ordinary course of human actions,
we shall find that the mind restrains not itself by any general and
universal rules, but acts on most occasions as it is determined by
its present motives and inclination. As each action is a particular
individual event, it must proceed from particular principles, and from
our immediate situation within ourselves, and with respect to the rest
of the universe. If on some occasions we extend our motives beyond
those very circumstances which gave rise to them, and form something
like _general rides_ for our conduct, 'tis easy to observe that these
rules are not perfectly inflexible, but allow of many exceptions.
Since, therefore, this is the ordinary course of human actions, we
may conclude that the laws of justice, being universal and perfectly
inflexible, can never be derived from nature, nor be the immediate
offspring of any natural motive or inclination. No action can be either
morally good or evil, unless there be some natural passion or motive to
impel us to it, or deter us from it; and tis evident that the morality
must be susceptible of all the same variations which are natural to the
passion. Here are two persons who dispute for an estate; of whom one is
rich, a fool, and a bachelor; the other poor, a man of sense, and has a
numerous family: the first is my enemy; the second my friend. Whether
I be actuated in this affair by a view to public or private interest,
by friendship or enmity, I must be induced to do my utmost to procure
the estate to the latter. Nor would any consideration of the right and
property of the persons be able to restrain me, were I actuated only
by natural motives, without any combination or convention with others.
For as all property depends on morality, and as all morality depends
on the ordinary course of our passions and actions, and as these again
are only directed by particular motives, 'tis evident such a partial
conduct must be suitable to the strictest morality, and could never
be a violation of property. Were men, therefore, to take the liberty
of acting with regard to the laws of society, as they do in every
other affair, they would conduct themselves, on most occasions, by
particular judgments, and would take into consideration the characters
and circumstances of the persons, as well as the general nature of the
question. But 'tis easy to observe, that this would produce an infinite
confusion in human society, and that the avidity and partiality of men
would quickly bring disorder into the world, if not restrained by some
general and inflexible principles. 'Twas therefore with a view to this
inconvenience, that men have established those principles, and have
agreed to restrain themselves by general rules, which are unchangeable
by spite and favour, and by particular views of private or public
interest. These rules, then, are artificially invented for a certain
purpose, and are contrary to the common principles of human nature,
which accommodate themselves to circumstances, and have no stated
invariable method of operation.
Nor do I perceive how I can easily be mistaken in this matter. I see
evidently, that when any man imposes on himself general inflexible
rules in his conduct with others, he considers certain objects as
their property, which he supposes to be sacred and inviolable. But
no proposition can be more evident, than that property is perfectly
unintelligible without first supposing justice and injustice; and that
these virtues and vices are as unintelligible, unless we have motives,
independent of the morality, to impel us to just actions, and deter
us from unjust ones. Let those motives, therefore, be what they will,
they must accommodate themselves to circumstances, and must admit of
all the variations which human affairs, in their incessant revolutions,
are susceptible of. They are, consequently, a very improper foundation
for such rigid inflexible rules as the laws of nature; and 'tis evident
these laws can only be derived from human conventions, when men have
perceived the disorders that result from following their natural and
variable principles.
Upon the whole, then, we are to consider this distinction betwixt
justice and injustice, as having two different foundations, viz.
that of _interest_, when men observe, that 'tis impossible to live
in society without restraining themselves by certain rules; and that
of _morality_, when this interest is once observed, and men receive
a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of
society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. 'Tis the
voluntary convention and artifice of men which makes the first interest
take place; and therefore those laws of justice are so far to be
considered as _artificial_. After that interest is once established and
acknowledged, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules
follows _naturally_, and of itself; though tis certain, that it is also
augmented by a new _artifice_, and that the public instructions of
politicians, and the private education of parents, contribute to the
giving us a sense of honour and duty, in the strict regulation of our
actions with regard to the properties of others.