_Napoleon's Plan of the Campaign against Russia--Understood and
provided against by Barclay de Tolly, the Russian
Generalissimo--Statement of the Grand French Army--Of the Grand
Russian Army--Disaster on the river Wilia--Difficulties of the
Campaign, on the part of the French--Their defective Commissariat
and Hospital Department--Cause of Buonaparte's determination to
advance--His forced marches occasion actual delay--Napoleon remains
for some days at Wilna--Abbé de Pradt--His intrigues to excite the
Poles--Neutralized by Napoleon's engagements with Austria--An
attempt to excite Insurrection in Lithuania also fails._
In ancient history, we often read of the inhabitants of the northern
regions, impelled by want, and by the desire of exchanging their frozen
deserts for the bounties of a more genial climate, breaking forth from
their own bleak regions, and, with all the terrors of an avalanche,
bursting down upon those of the south. But it was reserved for our
generation to behold the invasion reversed, and to see immense hosts of
French, Germans, and Italians, leaving their own fruitful, rich, and
delightful regions, to carry at once conquest and desolation through
the dreary pine forests, swamps, and barren wildernesses of Scythia. The
philosopher, Hume, dedicated an essay to consider, whether futurity
might expect a new inundation of barbarian conquerors; a fresh "living
cloud of war," from the northern hives; but neither to him nor any one
else had it occurred to anticipate the opposite danger, of combined
hundreds of thousands from the fairest and most fertile regions of
Europe, moving at the command of a single man, for the purpose of
bereaving the wildest country of Europe of its national independence.
"Russia," said Buonaparte, in one of his Delphic proclamations, "is
dragged on by her fate; her destiny must be accomplished. Let us march;
let us cross the Niemen; let us carry war into her territories. The
second war of Poland will be as glorious to the French arms as the
first; but the peace we shall conclude shall carry with it its
guarantee, and terminate that haughty influence which Russia has
exercised for more than fifty years on the affairs of Europe."[111]
Napoleon's final object was here spoken out; it was to thrust Russia
back upon her Asiatic dominions, and deprive her of her influence in
European politics.
The address of the Russian Emperor to his troops was in a different,
more manly, rational, and intelligible strain, devoid of those
blustering attempts at prophetic eloquence, which are in bad taste when
uttered, and, if they may acquire some credit among the vulgar when
followed by a successful campaign, become the most bitter of satires,
if fortune does not smile on the vaticination. Alexander enforced on his
subjects the various efforts which he had made for the preservation of
peace, but which had proved fruitless. "It now only remains," he said,
"after invoking the Almighty Being who is the witness and defender of
the true cause, to oppose our forces to those of the enemy. It is
unnecessary to recall to generals, officers, and soldiers, what is
expected from their loyalty and courage; the blood of the ancient
Sclavonians circulates in their veins. Soldiers, you fight for your
religion, your liberty, and your native land. Your Emperor is amongst
you, and God is the enemy of the aggressor."[112]
The sovereigns who addressed their troops, each in his own peculiar mode
of exhortation, had their different plans for the campaign. Buonaparte's
was formed on his usual system of warfare. It was his primary object to
accumulate a great force on the centre of the Russian line, to break it
asunder, and cut off effectually as many divisions, as activity could
surprise and overmaster in such a struggle. To secure the possession of
large towns, if possible one of the two capitals, Petersburgh or Moscow;
and to grant that which he doubted not would by that time be humbly
craved, the terms of a peace which should strip Russia of her European
influence, and establish a Polish nation in her bosom, composed of
provinces rent from her own dominions--would have crowned the
undertaking.
[Sidenote: BARCLAY DE TOLLY.]
The tactics of Napoleon had, by long practice, been pretty well
understood, by those studious of military affairs. Barclay de Tolly,
whom Alexander had made his generalissimo, a German by birth, a
Scotchman by extraction, had laid down and recommended to the Czar, with
whom he was in great favour, a plan of foiling Buonaparte upon his own
system. He proposed that the Russians should first show only so much
opposition on the frontier of their country, as should lay the invaders
under the necessity of marching with precaution and leisure; that they
should omit no means of annoying their communications, and disturbing
the base on which they rested, but should carefully avoid every thing
approaching to a general action.[113] On this principle it was proposed
to fall back before the invaders, refusing to engage in any other action
than skirmishes, and those upon advantage, until the French lines of
communication, extended to an immeasurable length, should become liable
to be cut off even by the insurgent peasantry. In the meanwhile, as the
French became straitened in provisions, and deprived of recruits and
supplies, the Russians were to be reinforcing their army, and at the
same time refreshing it. Thus, it was the object of this plan of the
campaign not to fight the French forces, until the bad roads, want of
provisions, toilsome marches, diseases, and loss in skirmishes, should
have deprived the invading army of all its original advantages of
numbers, spirit, and discipline. This procrastinating system of tactics
suited Russia the better, that her preparations for defensive war were
very far from being completed, and that it was important to gain time to
receive arms and other supplies from England, as well as, by making
peace with the Turks, to obtain the disposal of the large army now
engaged upon the Danube.
At the same time it was easy to foresee, that so long a retreat,
together with the desolation occasioned to the Russian territory by the
presence of an invading army, might wear out the patience of the Russian
soldiery. Some advantageous position was therefore to be selected, and
skilfully fortified before hand, in which a stand might be made, like
that of Lord Wellington in the lines at Torres Vedras. For this purpose,
a very large fortified camp was prepared at Drissa, on the river Düna,
or Dwina, which, supposing the object of the French to have been St.
Petersburgh, would have been well calculated to cover that capital. On
the other hand, were the French to move on Moscow, which proved their
final determination, the intrenchments at Drissa were of no importance.
We must speak of the immense hosts combined under Buonaparte, as if they
were all constituent parts of one army, although the theatre of war
which they occupied was not less than an hundred and twenty French
leagues in extent of front.
Macdonald commanded the left wing of the whole French army, which
consisted of above 30,000 men: his orders were to penetrate into
Courland, and threaten the right flank of the Russians; and, if it were
found advisable, to besiege Riga, or at least to threaten that important
sea-port. The extreme right of Napoleon's army was placed towards Pinsk,
in Volhynia, and consisted almost entirely of the Austrian auxiliaries,
under Prince Schwartzenberg. They were opposed to the Russian army under
General Tormazoff, which had been destined to protect Volhynia. This was
a false step of Napoleon, adopted, doubtless, to allay the irritable
jealousy of his ally Austria, on the subject of freeing and restoring
the kingdom of Poland. The natives of Volhynia, it must be remembered,
are Poles, subjected to the yoke of Russia. Had French troops, or those
of the grand duchy of Warsaw, been sent amongst them, the Volhynians
would probably have risen in arms to vindicate their liberty. But they
had little temptation to do so when they only saw the Austrians, by
whose arms Galicia was yet detained in subjection, and whose Emperor was
as liable as Alexander himself to suffer from the resuscitation of
Polish independence.
Betwixt the left wing, commanded by Macdonald, and the right under
Schwartzenberg, lay the grand French army, divided into three masses.
Buonaparte himself moved with his Guards, of which Bessières commanded
the cavalry, the Maréschals Lefebvre and Mortier the infantry. The
Emperor had also under his immediate command and corps d'armée,
commanded by Davoust, Oudinot, and Ney; which, with the divisions of
cavalry under Grouchy, Montbrun, and Nansouty, amounting, it was
computed, to no fewer than 250,000 men, were ready to rush forward and
overpower the opposite army of Russians, called the Army of the West.
King Jerome of Westphalia, with the divisions of Junot, Poniatowski, and
Regnier, and the cavalry of Latour Maubourg, forming a mass of about
80,000 men, were destined in the same manner to move forward on the
Russian second, or supporting army. Lastly, a central army, under
Eugene, the Viceroy of Italy, had it in charge to press between the
first and second Russian army, increase their separation, render their
junction impossible, and act against either, or both, as opportunity
should arise. Such was the disposition of the invading force. Murat,
King of Naples, well-known by his old name of "_Le Beau Sabreur_,"
commanded the whole cavalry of this immense army.
On the other hand, the grand Russian army, commanded by the Emperor in
person, and more immediately by Barclay de Tolly, advanced its
headquarters as far as Wilna; not that it was their purpose to defend
Lithuania, or its capital, but to oblige the French to manœuvre, and
so show their intentions. It amounted to 120,000 men. On the north,
towards Courland, this grand army communicated with a division of 10,000
men, under Count Essen; and on the south held communication, but on a
line rather too much prolonged, with the second army under the gallant
Prince Bagration, one of the best and bravest of the Russian generals.
Platoff, the celebrated Hettman, or captain-general of the Cossacks,
attended this second army, with 12,000 of his children of the desert.
Independent of these, Bagration's army might amount to 80,000 men. On
the extreme left, and watching the Austrians, from whom perhaps no very
vigorous measures were apprehended, was Tormazoff, with what was termed
the army of Volhynia, amounting to 20,000 men. Two armies of reserve
were in the course of being formed at Novogorod and Smolensk. They might
amount to about 20,000 men each.[114]
Thus, on the whole, the Russians entered upon the campaign with a sum
total of 260,000 men, opposed to 470,000, or with an odds of almost one
half against them. But during the course of the war, Russia raised
reinforcements of militia and volunteers to greatly more than the
balance which was against her at the commencement.
[Sidenote: MARCH UPON THE NIEMEN.]
The grand imperial army marched upon the river Niemen in its three
overwhelming masses; the King of Westphalia upon Grodno, the Viceroy of
Italy on Pilony, and the Emperor himself on a point called Nagaraiski,
three leagues beyond Kowno. When the head of Napoleon's columns reached
the river which rolled silently along under cover of immense forests on
the Russian side, he advanced in person to reconnoitre the banks, when
his horse stumbled and threw him. "A bad omen," said a voice, but
whether that of the Emperor or one of his suite, could not be
distinguished; "a Roman would return." On the Russian bank appeared only
a single Cossack, who challenged the first party of French that crossed
the river, and demanded their purpose in the territories of Russia. "To
beat you, and to take Wilna," was the reply. The patrol withdrew, nor
was another soldier seen.[115]
A dreadful thunder-storm was the welcome which they received in this
wild land; and shortly after the Emperor received intelligence that the
Russians were falling back on every side, and manifested an evident
intention to evacuate Lithuania without a battle. The Emperor urged
forward his columns with even more than his usual promptitude, eager to
strike one of those formidable blows by which he was wont to annihilate
his enemy at the very commencement of the campaign. This gave rise to
an event more ominous than the fall of his horse, or the tempest which
received him on the banks of the Niemen. The river Wilia being swollen
with rain, and the bridges destroyed, the Emperor, impatient of the
obstacle, commanded a body of Polish cavalry to cross by swimming. They
did not hesitate to dash into the river. But ere they reached the middle
of the stream, the irresistible torrent broke their ranks, and they were
swept down and lost almost to a man, before the eyes of Napoleon, to
whom some of them in the last struggle turned their faces, exclaiming,
"_Vive l'Empereur!_" The spectators were struck with horror.[116] But
much greater would that feeling have been, could they have known that
the fate of this handful of brave men was but an anticipation of that
which impended over the hundreds of thousands, who, high in health and
hope, were about to rush upon natural and artificial obstacles, no less
formidable and no less insurmountable than the torrent which had swept
away their unfortunate advanced guard.
While his immense masses were traversing Lithuania, Napoleon fixed his
headquarters at Wilna,[117] the ancient capital of that province, where
he began to experience the first pressure of those difficulties which
attended his gigantic undertaking. We must pause to detail them; for
they tend to show the great mistake of those who have followed Napoleon
himself in supposing, that the Russian expedition was a hopeful and
well-conceived plan, which would certainly have proved successful, if
not unexpectedly disconcerted by the burning of Moscow, and the severity
of the weather, by which the French armies were compelled to retreat
into Poland.
We have elsewhere mentioned, that, according to Napoleon's usual style
of tactics, the French troops set out upon their campaign with bread and
biscuit for a few days, and when that was expended (which, betwixt waste
and consumption, usually happened before the calculated period,) they
lived on such supplies as they could collect in the country, by the
means of marauding or pillage, which they had converted into a regular
system. But Napoleon had far too much experience and prudence to trust,
amid the wastes of Russia, to a system of supplies, which had sufficed
for maintenance of the army in the rich fields of Austria. He knew well
that he was plunging with half a million of men into inhospitable
deserts, where Charles XII. could not find subsistence for twenty
thousand Swedes. He was aware, besides, of the impolicy there would be
in harassing the Lithuanians by marauding exactions. To conciliate them
was a great branch of his plan, for Lithuania, in respect to Russia, was
a conquered province, into which Napoleon hoped to inspire the same
desire of independence which animated Poland, and thus to find friends
and allies among the very subjects of his enemy. The utmost exertion of
his splendid talents, putting into activity the full extent of his
almost unlimited power, had been, therefore, turned towards collecting
immense magazines of provisions, and for securing the means of
transporting them along with the army. His strong and impassioned genius
was, for months before the expedition, directed to this important
object, which he pressed upon his generals with the utmost solicitude.
"For masses like those we are about to move, if precautions be not
taken, the grain of no country can suffice," he said, in one part of his
correspondence.--In another, "All the provision-waggons must be loaded
with flour, rice, bread, vegetables, and brandy, besides what is
necessary for the hospital service. The result of my movements will
assemble 400,000 men on a single point. There will be nothing to expect
from the country, and it will be necessary to have every thing within
ourselves."
These undeniable views were followed up by preparations, which,
abstractedly considered, must be regarded as gigantic. The cars and
waggons, which were almost innumerable, destined for the carriage of
provisions, were divided into battalions and squadrons. Each battalion
of cars was capable of transporting 6000 quintals of flour; each
squadron of heavy waggons nearly 4800 quintals; besides the immense
number dedicated to the service of the engineers and the hospitals, or
engaged in transporting besieging materiel and pontoons.
[Sidenote: DEFECTIVE COMMISSARIAT.]
This sketch must convince the reader that Napoleon had in his eye, from
the outset, the prospect of deficiency in supplying his army with
provisions, and that he had bent his mind to the task of overcoming it
by timely preparation. But all his precautions proved totally
inadequate. It was found a vain attempt to introduce military discipline
amidst the carters and waggon-drivers; and when wretched roads were
encumbered with fallen horses and broken carriages, when the soldiers
and wain-drivers began to plunder the contents of the cars and waggons
which they were appointed to protect and to manage, the confusion became
totally inextricable. Very far from reaching Lithuania, where their
presence was so essential, few of the heavy waggons ever attained the
banks of the Vistula, and almost none proceeded to the Niemen. Weeks and
months after the army had passed, some of the light cars and herds of
cattle did arrive, but comparatively few in number, and in most
miserable plight. The soldiers were, therefore, at the very commencement
of the campaign, compelled to have recourse to their usual mode of
supplying themselves, by laying contributions on the country; which,
while they continued in Poland, the immense fertility of the soil
enabled it to supply. But matters became greatly worse after entering
Lithuania, which the Russians had previously endeavoured to strip of all
that could benefit the French.
Thus, in the very first march from the Niemen and the Wilia, through a
country which was regarded as friendly, and before they had seen an
enemy, the immense army of Napoleon were incurring great loss
themselves, and doing infinite damage to the country on which they lived
at free cost, in spite of all the measures which Buonaparte had devised,
and all the efforts he had made to maintain them from their own stores.
This uncertain mode of subsistence was common to the whole army, though
its consequences were especially disastrous in particular corps.
Ségur[118] informs us, that the armies under Eugene and Davoust were
regular in their work of collecting contributions, and distributing them
among the soldiers; so that their system of marauding was less
burdensome to the country, and more advantageous to themselves. On the
other hand, the Westphalian, and other German auxiliaries, under King
Jerome, having learned the lesson of pillaging from the French, and
wanting, according to Ségur, the elegant manner of their teachers,
practised the arts they had acquired with a coarse rapacity, which made
the French ashamed of their pupils and imitators. Thus the Lithuanians,
terrified, alienated, and disgusted, with the injuries they sustained,
were far from listening to the promises of Napoleon, or making common
cause with him against Russia, who had governed them kindly, and with
considerable respect to their own habits and customs.
[Sidenote: IMMENSE LOSSES OF THE ARMY.]
But this was not the only evil. The direct loss sustained by the French
army was very great. In the course of the very first marches from the
Niemen and the Wilia, not less than 10,000 horses, and numbers of men
were left dead on the road. Of the young conscripts especially, many
died of hunger and fatigue; and there were instances of some who
committed suicide, rather than practise the cruel course of pillage by
which only they could subsist; and of others, who took the same
desperate step, from remorse at having participated in such cruelties.
Thousands turned stragglers, and subsisted by robbery. The Duke of
Treviso, who followed the march of the grand army, informed Napoleon,
that, from the Niemen to the Wilia, he had seen nothing but ruined
habitations abandoned, carriages overturned, broke open and pillaged,
corpses of men and horses--all the horrible appearances, in short, which
present themselves in the route of a defeated army.[119]
Those who desired to flatter Buonaparte, ascribed this loss to the storm
of rain, which fell at the time they were entering Lithuania. But summer
rain, whatever its violence, does not destroy the horses of an army by
hundreds and thousands. That which does destroy them, and renders those
that survive almost unfit for service during the campaign, and incapable
of bearing the hardships of winter, is hard work, forced marches, want
of corn or dry fodder, and the supporting them on the green crop which
is growing in the fields. It was now the season when, of all others, a
commander, who values the serviceable condition of his army, will avoid
such enterprises as require from his cavalry hard work and forced
marches. In like manner, storms of summer rain do not destroy the foot
soldiers exposed to them, more than other men; but forced marches on bad
roads, and through a country unprovided with shelter, and without
provisions, must ruin infantry, since every man, who, from fatigue, or
from having straggled too far in quest of food, chances to be left
behind, is left exposed without shelter to the effects of the climate,
and if he cannot follow and rejoin his corps, has no resource but to lie
down and die.
The provisions of the hospital department had been as precarious as
those of the commissariat. Only 6000 patients could be accommodated in
the hospitals at Wilna, which is too small a proportion for an army of
400,000 men, even if lying in quarters in a healthy and peaceful
country, where one invalid in fifty is a most restricted allowance; but
totally inadequate to the numbers which actually required assistance, as
well from the maladies introduced by fatigue and bad diet, as by the
casualties of war. Although no battle, and scarce a skirmish had been
fought, 25,000 patients encumbered the hospitals of Wilna; and the
villages were filled with soldiers who were dying for want of medical
assistance. The King of Westphalia must be exempted from this general
censure; his army was well provided with hospitals, and lost much fewer
men than the others. This imperfection of the hospital department was an
original defect in the conception of the expedition, and continued to
influence it most unfavourably from beginning to end.
Napoleon sometimes repined under these losses and calamities, sometimes
tried to remedy them by threats against marauders, and sometimes
endeavoured to harden himself against the thought of the distress of his
army, as an evil which must be endured, until victory should put an end
to it. But repining and anger availed nothing; denunciations against
marauders could not reasonably be executed upon men who had no other
means of subsistence; and it was impossible to obtain a victory over an
enemy who would not risk a battle.
The reader may here put the natural question, Why Buonaparte, when he
found the stores, which he considered as essential to the maintenance of
his army, had not reached the Vistula, should have passed on, instead of
suspending his enterprise until he was provided with those means, which
he had all along judged essential to its success? He might in this
manner have lost time, but he would have saved his men and horses, and
avoided distressing a country which he desired to conciliate. The truth
is, that Napoleon had suffered his sound and cooler judgment to be led
astray, by strong and ardent desire to finish the war by one brilliant
battle and victory. The hope of surprising the Emperor Alexander at
Wilna, of defeating his grand army, or at least cutting off some of its
principal corps, resembled too much many of his former exploits, not to
have captivation for him. For this purpose, and with this expectation,
forced marches were to be undertaken, from the Vistula even to the Dwina
and Dnieper; the carts, carriages, cattle, all the supplies brought from
France, Italy, and Germany, were left behind, the difficulties of the
enterprise forgotten, and nothing thought of but the expectation of
finding the enemy at unawares, and totally destroying him at one blow.
The fatal consequence of the forced marches we have stated; but what may
appear most strange is, that Napoleon, who had recourse to this
expeditious and reckless advance, solely to surprise his enemy by an
unexpected attack, rather lost than gained that advantage of time, to
procure which he had made such sacrifices. This will appear from the
following detail:--
The army which had been quartered on the Vistula, broke up from thence
about the 1st of June, and advanced in different columns, and by forced
marches upon the Niemen, which it reached upon different points, but
chiefly near Kowno, upon the 23d, and commenced the passage on the 24th
of the same month. From the Vistula to the Niemen is about 250 wersts,
equal to 235 or 240 English miles; from Kowno, on the banks of the
Niemen, to Vitepsk, on the Dwina, is nearly the same distance. The whole
space might be marched by an army, moving with its baggage, in the
course of forty marches, at the rate of twelve miles a-day; yet the
traversing this distance took, as we shall presently see, four days
more, notwithstanding the acceleration of forced marches, than would
have been occupied by an army moving at an ordinary and easy rate, and
carrying its own supplies along with its columns. The cause why this
overhaste should have been attended with actual delay, was partly owing
to the great mass of troops which were to be supplied by the principle
of the marauding system, partly to the condition of the country, which
was doomed to afford them; and partly, it may be, to the political
circumstances which detained Napoleon twenty precious days at Wilna. The
first reason is too obvious to need illustration, as a flying army of
20,000 men bears comparatively light on the resources of a country, and
may be pushed through it in haste; but those immense columns, whose
demands were so unbounded, could neither move rapidly, nor have their
wants hastily supplied. But, besides, in a country like Lithuania, the
march could not be regular, and it was often necessary to suspend the
advance; thus losing in some places the time which great exertion had
gained in others. Wildernesses and pathless forests were necessarily to
be traversed in the utmost haste, as they afforded nothing for the
marauders, on whose success the army depended for support. To make
amends for this, it was necessary to halt the troops for one day, or
even more, in the richest districts, or in the neighbourhood of large
towns, to give leisure and opportunity to recruit their supplies at the
expense of the country. Thus the time gained by the forced marches was
lost in inevitable delays; and the advance, though attended with such
tragic consequences to the soldier, did not secure the advantage which
the general proposed to attain.
[Sidenote: WILNA.]
Upon arriving at Wilna, Napoleon had the mortification to find, that
although the Emperor Alexander had not left the place until two days
after he had himself crossed the Niemen, yet the Russian retreat had
been made with the utmost regularity; all magazines and provisions,
which could yield any advantage to the invaders, having been previously
destroyed to a very large amount. While Buonaparte's generals had orders
to press forward on their traces, the French Emperor himself remained
at Wilna, to conduct some political measures, which seemed of the last
importance to the events of the campaign.
The Abbé de Pradt had executed with ability the task intrusted to him,
of exciting the Poles of the grand duchy of Warsaw, with the hope of a
general restoration of Polish freedom. This brave but unhappy country,
destined, it would seem, to spend its blood in every cause but its own,
had, in that portion of it which formerly belonged to Prussia, and now
formed the grand duchy of Warsaw, gained but little by its nominal
independence. This state had only a population of about five millions of
inhabitants, yet maintained for the service of France, rather than for
its own, an armed force of 85,000 men. Eighteen regiments of these were
embodied with the Emperor's army, and paid by France; but the formation
and expense of the rest far exceeded the revenues of the duchy. The last
amounted only to forty millions of francs, while the expenses more than
doubled that sum. The grand duchy had also suffered its full share of
distress from the Continental System of Napoleon. The revenue of Poland
depends on the sale of the grain which her fertile soil produces; and
that grain, in the years previous to the present, had lain rotting in
the warehouses. The misery of the poor was extreme; the opulence of the
rich classes had disappeared, and they could not relieve them. The year
1811 had been a year of scarcity here as well as elsewhere; and, as in
former years the Poles had grain which they could not send to market, so
at present they had neither corn nor means to purchase it. To all these
disadvantages must be added, the plunder and misery sustained by the
duchy during the march of Buonaparte's numerous forces from the Vistula
to the Niemen.
Yet so highly toned is the national patriotism of the Poles, that it
kindled at the name of independence, notwithstanding the various
accumulated circumstances which tended to damp the flame. When,
therefore, a diet of the duchy of Warsaw was convened, where the nobles
assembled according to ancient form, all were anxious to meet Napoleon's
wishes; but an unfortunate hint which the Emperor had thrown out
concerning the length of the discourse with which the Diet was to be
opened, induced the worthy Count Mathuchewitz, whose duty it was to draw
up the peroration, to extend it to fifty pages of very close writing.
As all the assembly exclaimed against the prolixity of this mortal
harangue, the French ambassador, the Abbé de Pradt, was required to
substitute something more suitable for the occasion. Accordingly, he
framed a discourse more brief, more in the taste of his own country,
and, we doubt not, more spirited and able than that of Count
Mathuchewitz. It was hailed by the warm and enthusiastic applause of the
Diet. Notwithstanding which, when sent to Napoleon, then at Wilna, he
disapproved of it, as too obviously written in the French style of
composition, and intimated, in plain terms, that language, like that of
an ancient Pole, speaking his national sentiments in the Oriental tropes
of his national language, would better have suited the occasion.
The intimation of this dissatisfaction tore the veil from the Abbé de
Pradt's eyes, as he himself assures us. He foresaw that the infatuated
want of judgment which the Emperor displayed in disliking his discourse,
was that of a doomed and falling man; he dated from that epoch the
overthrow of Napoleon's power, and was so much moved with the spirit of
prophecy, that he could not withhold his predictions even before the
young persons connected with his embassy.
[Sidenote: DIET OF WARSAW.]
But a more fatal sign of Napoleon's prospects than could be inferred by
any except the author, from his disapprobation of the Abbé de Pradt's
discourse, occurred in his answer to the address of the Diet of the
grand duchy.
The Diet of Warsaw, anticipating, as they supposed, Napoleon's wishes,
had declared the whole kingdom, in all its parts, free and independent,
as if the partition treaties had never existed; and no just-thinking
person will doubt their right to do so. They entered into a general
confederation, declared the kingdom of Poland restored, summoned all
Poles to quit the service of Russia, and finally, sent deputations to
the Grand Duke and the King of Saxony, and another to Napoleon,
announcing their desire to accelerate the political regeneration of
Poland, and their hope to be recognised by the entire Polish nation as
the centre of a general union. The expressions addressed to Napoleon
were in a tone of idolatry. They applied for the countenance of the
"Hero who dictated his history to the age, in whom resided the force of
Providence," language which is usually reserved to the Deity alone. "Let
the Great Napoleon," they said, "only pronounce his fiat that the
kingdom of Poland should exist, and it will exist accordingly. The
natives of Poland will unite themselves at once and unanimously to the
service of Him to whom ages are as a moment, and space no more than a
point." In another case, this exaggerated eloquence would have induced
some suspicion of sincerity on the part of those who used it; but the
Poles, like the Gascons, to whom they have been compared, are fond of
superlatives, and of an exalted and enthusiastic tone of language,
which, however, they have in all ages been observed to support by their
actions in the field.
The answer of Buonaparte to this high-toned address was unexpectedly
cold, doubtful, and indecisive. It was at this moment, probably, he felt
the pressure of his previous engagements with Austria, which prevented
his at once acquiescing in the wishes of the Polish mission. "He loved
the Polish nation," he said, "and in the situation of the Diet at
Warsaw, would act as they did. But he had many interests to reconcile,
and many duties to fulfil. Had he reigned when Poland was subjected to
those unjust partitions which had deprived her of independence, he would
have armed in her behalf, and as matters stood, when he conquered
Warsaw and its surrounding territories, he instantly restored them to a
state of freedom.----He applauded what they had done--authorised their
future efforts, and would do all he could to second their resolution. If
their efforts were unanimous, they might compel their oppressors to
recognise their rights; but these hopes must rest on the exertions of
the population." These uncertain and cool assurances of his general
interest in the Polish cause, were followed by the express declaration,
"That he had guaranteed to the Emperor of Austria the integrity of his
dominions, and he could not sanction any manœuvre, or the least
movement, tending to disturb the peaceable possession of what remained
to _him_ of the Polish provinces. As for the provinces of Poland
attached to Russia, he was content with assuring them, that, providing
they were animated by the spirit evinced in the grand duchy, Providence
would crown their good cause with success."
This answer, so different from that which the Poles had expected, struck
the mission with doubt and dismay. Instead of countenancing the reunion
of Poland, Napoleon had given an assurance, that, in the case of
Galicia, he neither could nor would interfere to detach that province
from Austria; and in that of the Polish provinces attached to Russia, he
exhorted the natives to be unanimous, in which case, instead of assuring
them of his powerful assistance, he was content with recommending them
to the care of that Providence, in whose place the terms of their
bombastic address had appeared to install Napoleon himself. The Poles
accordingly began from that period to distrust the intentions of
Napoleon towards the re-establishment of their independence, the more
so, as they observed that neither Polish nor French troops were employed
in Volhynia or elsewhere, whose presence might have given countenance to
their efforts, but Austrians only, who, for example's sake, were as
unwilling to encourage the Russian provinces of Poland to declare for
the cause of independence, as they would have been to preach the same
doctrines in those which belonged to Austria.[120]
Napoleon afterwards often and bitterly regretted the sacrifice which he
made on this occasion to the wishes of Austria; and he had the more
occasion for this regret, as the error seemed to be gratuitous. It is
true, that to have pressed Austria on the subject of emancipating
Galicia, might have had the effect of throwing her into the arms of
Russia; but this might probably have been avoided by the cession of the
Illyrian provinces as an indemnity. And, if this exchange could not be
rendered acceptable to Austria, by throwing in Trieste, or even Venice,
Napoleon ought then to have admitted the impossibility of reinstating
the independence of Poland, to have operated as a reason for entirely
declining the fatal war with Russia.
[Sidenote: LITHUANIA.]
The French ruler miscarried also in an effort to excite an insurrection
in Lithuania, although he named a provisional government in the
province, and declared the country was free of the Russian yoke. But the
Lithuanians, a colder people than the Poles, were not in general much
dissatisfied with the government of Russia, while the conduct of the
French armies in their territories alienated their minds from Napoleon.
They observed also the evasive answer which he returned to the Poles,
and concluded, that if the French Emperor should have occasion to make
peace with Alexander, he would not hesitate to do so at the expense of
those whom he was now encouraging to rise in insurrection. Thus the
moral effect which Napoleon expected to produce on the Russian frontier,
was entirely checked and counteracted; insomuch that of a guard of
honour, which the Lithuanians had proposed to serve for the Emperor's
person, only three troopers ever made their appearance on parade. Nor
did the country at large take any steps, either generally or
individually, to intimate a national interest in the events of the war,
seeming to refer themselves entirely to the course of events.
FOOTNOTES:
[111] Second Bulletin of the Grand Army, dated Wilkowiski, June 22,
1812.
[112] Dated Wilna, June 25. "The difference between the two nations, the
two sovereigns, and their reciprocal position, were remarked in these
proclamations. In fact, the one which was defensive was unadorned and
moderate; the other, offensive, was replete with audacity and the
confidence of victory. The first sought support in religion, the other
in fatality; the one in love of country, the other in love of
glory."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 117.
[113] The _base_ of military operations is, in strategie, understood to
mean that space of country which every army, marching through a hostile
territory, must keep open and free in the rear, otherwise his main body
must necessarily be deprived of its communications, and probably cut
off. The base, therefore, contains the supplies and depôts of the
army.--S.
[114] Ségur, tom. i., p. 117; Jomini, tom. iv., p. 50.
[115] Ségur, tom. i., p. 122.
[116] Ségur, tom. i., p. 128.
[117] "Napoleon, at Wilna, had a new empire to organise; the politics of
Europe, the war of Spain, and the government of France to direct. His
political, military, and administrative correspondence, which he had
suffered to accumulate for some days, imperiously demanded his
attention. Such, indeed, was his custom, on the eve of a great event, as
that would necessarily decide the character of many of his replies, and
impart a colouring to all. He therefore established himself at his
quarters, and in the first instance, threw himself on a bed, less for
the sake of sleep than of quiet meditation; whence, abruptly starting up
directly after, he rapidly dictated the orders which he had
conceived."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 131.
[118] Here and elsewhere we quote, as a work of complete authority,
Count Philip de Ségur's account of this memorable expedition. The author
is, we have always understood, a man of honour, and his work evinces him
to be a man of talent. We have had the opinion of several officers of
high character, who had themselves served in the campaign, that although
unquestionably there may be some errors among the details, and although
in some places the author may have given way to the temptation of
working up a description, or producing effect by a dialogue, yet his
narrative on the whole is candid, fair, and liberal. The unfriendly
criticism of General Gourgaud ["Examen Critique de l'Ouvrage de Ségur"]
impeaches Count Ségur's opportunities of knowing the facts he relates,
because his duty did not call him into the line of battle, where he
might have seen the military events with his own eyes. We conceive with
deference, that, as an historian, Count Ségur's situation was more
favourable for collecting intelligence than if he had been actually
engaged. We speak from high authority in saying, that a battle is in one
respect like a ball--every one recollects the next morning, the partner
with whom he danced, and what passed betwixt them, but none save a
bystander can give a general account of the whole party. Now, Count
Ségur eminently resembled the bystander in his opportunities of
collecting exact information concerning the whole events of the
campaign. His duty was to take up and distribute the lodgings at the
general headquarters. It was, therefore, seldom that an officer could go
to or return from headquarters without holding communication with Count
Ségur; and, having his plan of a narrative in view, he could not be the
man of ability he appears, if he did not obtain from those who arrived
at or left headquarters such information as they had to communicate. As
he had no pressing military duty to perform, he had nothing to prevent
his arranging and recording the information he collected; and when
General Gourgaud urges the impossibility of the historian's being
present at some of the most secret councils, he forgets that many such
secrets _percolate_ from the cabinet into the better-informed circles
around it, even before the seal of secrecy is removed, but especially
when, as in the present case, a total change of circumstances renders
secrecy no longer necessary. We have only to add, that though the
idolatry of Count Ségur towards Napoleon is not sufficient to satisfy
his critic, he must in other eyes be considered as an admirer of the
late Emperor; and that those who knew the French army, will find no
reason to suspect him of being a false brother.--S.
[119] Ségur, tom. i., p. 147; Jomini, tom. iv., p. 58.
[120] Ségur, tom. i., p. 122; De Pradt, p. 119.