_Allies on whose assistance Buonaparte might count--Causes which
alienated from him the Prince-Royal of Sweden--who signs a Treaty
with Russia--Delicate situation of the King of Prussia, whose
alliance the Emperor Alexander on that account declines--A Treaty
with France dictated to Prussia--Relations between Austria and
France--in order to preserve them Buonaparte is obliged to come
under an engagement not to revolutionize Poland--His error of policy
in neglecting to cultivate the alliance of the Porte--Amount of
Buonaparte's Army--Levies for the protection of France in the
Emperor's absence--Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo by Lord
Wellington--Buonaparte makes overtures of Peace to Lord
Castlereagh--The Correspondence broken off--Ultimatum of Russia
rejected--Napoleon sets out from Paris, 9th May, 1812--and meets the
Sovereigns his allies at Dresden--A last attempt of Napoleon to
negotiate with Alexander proves unsuccessful._
The several powers, who might in their different degrees of strength aid
or impede the last and most daring of Buonaparte's undertakings,
were--Denmark, Saxony, Sweden, and Prussia, in the north of Europe; in
the south, Austria, and the Turkish empire.
Denmark and Saxony were both devoted to the cause of France; but the
former power, who had made over to Napoleon her seamen, had no land
troops to spare for his assistance. The few that she had on foot were
scarce sufficient to protect her against any enterprise of Sweden or
England.
Saxony was also the firm friend of Napoleon, who had enlarged her
dominions, and changed her ruler's electoral bonnet into a royal crown.
It is true, if Poland was to be regenerated, as seemed to be the natural
consequence of a war with Russia, the King of Saxony must have reckoned
upon losing his ducal interest in the grand duchy of Warsaw. But from
this he derived little present advantage; and as he was secure of
indemnification, the apprehension of that loss did not prevent him from
following the banner of Napoleon, with the same good-will as ever.
[Sidenote: PRINCE-ROYAL OF SWEDEN.]
Very different was the condition of Sweden. That kingdom, since the
reign of Francis I., had been the ancient and natural ally of France
against Russia; in acting against which last power her local advantages
afforded great facility. Sweden was also governed at the moment by a
Frenchman. But the Prince-Royal had received more injuries and affronts
than favours at the hands of the Emperor Napoleon; and the violent
policy which the latter was in the habit of using towards those of his
allies and neighbours, who did not submit unresistingly to all his
demands, had alienated from France the hearts of the Swedes, and from
his own person the friendship of his old companion in arms. We have
mentioned the mode of argument, or rather declamation, which he had used
to compel the Swedes into a total exclusion of English manufactures,
contrary to a reservation made in a recent treaty, by which the Swedes
had retained the right of importing colonial goods and salt, while
consenting to exclude British commodities generally. With the same
urgency and menaces, he had compelled the Crown Prince to declare war
against Britain.
But although Napoleon succeeded in both points, he could not oblige
Britain to treat Sweden as a belligerent power. On the contrary, England
seemed not in the slightest degree to alter the relations of amity to a
state whom she considered as having adopted the attitude of an enemy
towards her, merely from compulsion too powerful to be resisted. This
moderation on the part of Great Britain did not prevent Sweden from
feeling all the evils of the anti-social system of Buonaparte. Her
commerce was reduced to a mere coasting trade, and her vessels skulked
from port to port, exposed to the depredations of Danish and French
privateers, who seized upon and confiscated upwards of fifty Swedish
ships, under pretence of enforcing the non-intercourse system. The
Prince-Royal applied for redress at the court of Paris; but although
vague promises were given, yet neither were the acts of piracy
discontinued, nor any amends made for those daily committed. The Baron
Alquier, who was the French envoy at Stockholm, used, according to
Bernadotte's expression, the language of a Roman proconsul, without
remembering that he did not speak to slaves.[93]
When asked, for example, to state categorically what Napoleon expected
from Sweden, and what he proposed to grant her in return, Alquier
answered, that "the Emperor expected from Sweden compliance in every
point conformable to his system; after which it would be time enough to
inquire into what his Imperial Majesty might be disposed to do in favour
of Sweden."
On another occasion, the French envoy had the assurance to decline
farther intercourse with the Crown Prince on the subject of his mission,
and to desire that some other person might be appointed to communicate
with him. There can be no doubt, that, in this singular course of
diplomacy, Baron Alquier obeyed his master's instructions, who was
determined to treat the Prince-Royal of Sweden, emancipated as he was
from his allegiance to France by letters-patent from the Imperial
Chancery, as if he had still been his subject, and serving in his
armies. Napoleon went so far as to say, before his courtiers, that he
had a mind to make Bernadotte finish his lessons in the Swedish language
in the Castle of Vincennes. It is even said, that the Emperor thought
seriously of putting this threat into execution, and that a plot was
actually formed to seize the person of the Prince-Royal, putting him on
board a vessel, and bringing him prisoner to France. But he escaped this
danger by the information of an officer named Salazar, formerly an
aide-de-camp of Marmont, who conveyed to the Prince timely information
of the outrage which was intended.[94]
With so many causes of mutual animosity between France and Sweden, all
arising out of the impolitic vehemence by which Buonaparte endeavoured
to drive, rather than lead, the Prince-Royal into the measures he
desired, it can hardly be supposed that the last would neglect any
opportunity to assert his independence, and his resolution not to submit
to a superiority so degrading in itself, and so ungraciously and even
unmercifully exercised.
Such was the state of matters betwixt the two countries, when, from the
approaching war with Russia, the assistance of Sweden became essential
to France. But what bait could Napoleon hold out to bring back an
alienated friend? He might, indeed, offer to assist Bernadotte in
regaining the province of Finland, which, by the connivance of Napoleon,
had been conquered by Russia. But the Crown Prince concluded, that, to
enter into a war with the view of recovering Finland, would occasion
expenses which the country could not afford, and which the acquisition
of Finland could not compensate, even supposing it sure to be
accomplished. Besides, the repossession of Finland would engage Sweden
in perpetual disputes with Russia, whereas the two nations, separated by
the Gulf of Bothnia, had at present no cause of difference. On the other
hand, by siding with Russia in the great contest which was impending,
Sweden might expect the assistance of that empire, as well as of
Britain, to achieve from Denmark, the ally of France, the conquest of
her kingdom of Norway, which, in its geographical situation, lay so
conveniently for Sweden, and afforded her the whole range of sea-coast
along the western shores of Scandinavia. It is said that the
Prince-Royal offered to Napoleon to enter into a league, offensive and
defensive, with France, providing Norway as well as Finland were added
to his dominions; but the Emperor rejected the terms with disdain. The
whole alleged negotiation, however, has been disputed and denied.[95]
So soon as Bonaparte found there was no hope of conciliating the
Prince-Royal, which indeed he scarce seems seriously to have attempted,
he proceeded, without waiting for the ceremony of declaring war, to
strike against Sweden the most severe, or rather the only blow, in his
power. In January 1812, General Davoust marched into Swedish Pomerania,
the only possession of Sweden south of the Baltic sea, seized upon the
country and its capital, and proceeded to menace the military occupation
of Prussia, so far as that country was not already in the hands of
France.
Receiving no satisfaction for this aggression, Sweden, 24th March, 1812,
signed a treaty with Russia, declaring war against France, and proposing
a diversion, with a joint force of 25 or 30,000 Swedes, together with 15
or 20,000 Russians, upon some point of Germany. And the Emperor of
Russia became bound, either by negotiation or military co-operation, to
unite the kingdom of Norway to that of Sweden, and to hold the Russian
army, which was at present in Finland, as disposable for that purpose.
Thus was the force of Sweden, rendered yet more considerable by the high
military character of its present chief, thrown into the scale against
France, to whom, but for the passionate and impolitic character of
Napoleon's proceedings towards her, she might, in all probability, have
remained the same useful and faithful ally which she had been since the
alliance of Francis I. with Gustavus Vasa.
No reason can be discovered for insulting Sweden at the precise moment
when her co-operation would have been so useful, excepting the animosity
of Napoleon against a prince, whom he regarded as an ancient rival
before the 18th Brumaire, and now as a contumacious and rebellious
vassal. A due regard to the honour and interest of France would have
induced him to lay aside such personal considerations. But this does
not appear to have been in Buonaparte's nature, who, if he remembered
benefits, had also a tenacious recollection of enmities, said to be
peculiar to the natives of Corsica. When this feeling obtained the
ascendency, he was too apt to sacrifice his policy to his spleen.
[Sidenote: PRUSSIA.]
The situation of the King of Prussia, at the breaking out of the dispute
between the empires of France and Russia, was truly embarrassing. His
position lying betwixt the contending parties, rendered neutrality
almost impossible; and if he took up arms, it was a matter of
distracting doubt on which side he ought to employ them. Oppressed by
French exactions and French garrisons; instigated, besides, by the
secret influence of the Tugendbund, the people of Prussia were almost
unanimous in their eager wish to seize the sword against France, nor was
the King less desirous to redeem the independence, and revenge the
sufferings, of his kingdom. The recollections of an amiable and beloved
Queen, who had died in the prime of life, heart-broken with the
distresses of her country, with her hands locked in those of her
husband, called also for revenge on France, which had insulted her when
living, and slandered her when dead.[96]
Accordingly it is now well understood, that the first impulse of the
King of Prussia's mind was to throw himself into the arms of Russia, and
offer, should it cost him his life and crown, to take share in the war
as his faithful ally. But the Emperor Alexander was sensible that, in
accepting this offered devotion, he would come under an obligation to
protect Prussia in case of those reverses, which might be almost
reckoned on as likely to occur in the early part of the campaign. The
strongest fortresses in Prussia were in the hands of the French, the
army of the King did not amount to more than 40,000 men, and there was
no time to arm or organise the national forces. In order to form a
junction with these 40,000 men, or as many of them as could be
collected, it would be necessary that Alexander should precipitate the
war, and march a strong army into Silesia, upon which the Prussians
might rally. But such an army, when it had attained its object, must
have had in front the whole forces of France, Saxony, and the
Confederacy of the Rhine, while the hostile troops of the grand duchy of
Warsaw, with probably a body of Austrian auxiliaries, would have been in
their rear. This premature movement in advance, would have resembled the
conduct of Austria in the unhappy campaigns of 1805 and 1809; in both of
which she precipitated her armies into Bavaria, in hopes of acquiring
allies, but only exposed them to the decisive defeats of Ulm and
Eckmühl. It would also have been like the equally ill-omened advance of
the Prussian army in 1806, when hurrying forward to compel Saxony to
join him, the Duke of Brunswick gave occasion to the unhappy battle of
Jena.
Experience and reflection, therefore, had led the Russian Emperor and
cabinet to be of opinion, that they ought to avoid encountering the
French in the early part of the campaign; and, in consequence, that far
from advancing to meet them, they should rather suffer the invaders to
involve themselves in the immense wastes and forests of the territories
of Russia itself, where supplies and provisions were not to be found by
the invader, and where every peasant would prove an armed enemy. The
support which could be derived from an auxiliary army of Prussians,
amounting only to 40,000 men, of whom perhaps the half could not be
drawn together, was not, it appeared, an adequate motive for altering
the plan of the campaign, which had been founded on the most mature
consideration. The Emperor Alexander, therefore, declined accepting of
the King of Prussia's alliance, as only tending to bring upon that
Prince misfortunes, which Russia had not even the chance of averting,
without entirely altering those plans of the campaign which had been
deliberately adopted. Foreseeing at the same time that this refusal on
his part must have made it necessary for Frederick, whose situation
rendered neutrality impossible, to take part with France, the Emperor
Alexander generously left him at liberty to take the measures, and form
the connexions, which his circumstances rendered inevitable, assuring
him, nevertheless, that if Russia gained the ascendant, Prussia should
derive the same advantage from the victory, whatever part she might be
compelled to adopt during the struggle.
While the King of Prussia saw his alliance declined by Russia, as rather
burdensome than beneficial, he did not find France at all eager to
receive him on her part as a brother of the war. He offered his alliance
to Buonaparte repeatedly, and especially in the months of March, May,
and August, 1811; but receiving no satisfaction, he began to be
apprehensive that his destruction was intended. There was some reason
for this fear, for Napoleon seems to have entertained a personal dislike
towards Frederick, and is said to have exclaimed, when he was looking
over a map of the Prussian territories, "Is it possible I can have been
simple enough to leave that man in possession of so large a kingdom?"
There is great reason, besides, to suppose, that Napoleon may have
either become acquainted with the secret negotiations betwixt Prussia
and Russia, or may have been induced to assume from probability the fact
that such had existed. He hesitated, certainly, whether or not he would
permit Prussia to remain an independent power.
At length, however, on the 24th of February, 1812, a treaty was dictated
to Frederick, under condition of subscribing which, the name and title
of King of Prussia were to be yet left him; failing his compliance,
Davoust, who had occupied Swedish Pomerania, was to march into Prussia,
and treat it as a hostile country. In thus sparing for the time a
monarch, of whom he had every reason to be jealous, Napoleon seems to
have considered it more advisable to use Frederick's assistance, than to
throw him into the arms of Russia. The conditions of this lenity were
severe; Prussia was to place at the disposal of France about 20,000 men,
with sixty pieces of artillery, the disposable part of the poor remnant
of the standing army of the great Frederick. She was also to supply the
French army with every thing necessary for their sustenance as they
passed through her dominions; but the expense of these supplies was to
be imputed as part of the contributions imposed on Prussia by France,
and not yet paid. Various other measures were taken to render it easy
for the French, in case of necessity, to seize such fortresses belonging
to Prussia as were not already in their hands, and to keep the Prussian
people as much as possible disarmed, a rising amongst them being
considered inevitable if the French arms should sustain any reverse.
Thus, while Russia fortified herself with the assistance of France's old
ally Sweden, France advanced against Russia, supported by the remaining
army of Frederick of Prussia, who was at heart Alexander's best
well-wisher.
[Sidenote: RELATIONS WITH AUSTRIA.]
Napoleon had, of course, a weighty voice in the councils of his
father-in-law of Austria. But the Austrian cabinet were far from
regarding his plans of ambitious aggrandisement with a partial eye. The
acute Metternich had been able to discover and report to his master, on
his return to Vienna in the spring of 1811, that the marriage which had
just been celebrated, would not have the effect of inducing Napoleon to
sheathe his sword, or of giving to Europe permanent tranquillity. And
now, although on the approach of the hostilities into which they were to
be involved by their formidable ally, Austria agreed to supply an
auxiliary army of 30,000 men, under Prince Schwartzenberg, it seems
probable that she remembered, at the same time, the moderate and lenient
mode of carrying on the war practised by Russia, when the ally of
Napoleon during the campaign of Wagram, and gave her general secret
instructions to be no further active in the campaign than the decent
supporting of the part of an auxiliary peremptorily required.
In one most material particular, the necessity of consulting the
interests of Austria interfered with Napoleon's readiest and most
formidable means of annoying Russia. We have repeatedly alluded to the
re-establishment of Poland as an independent kingdom, as a measure which
would have rent from Russia some of the finest provinces which connect
her with Europe, and would have gone a certain length in thrusting her
back into the character of an Asiatic sovereignty, unconnected with the
politics of the civilized world. Such re-construction of Poland was
however impossible, so long as Austria continued to hold Galicia; and
that state, in her treaty of alliance with France against Russia, made
it an express condition that no attempt should be made for the
restoration of Polish independence by Napoleon, without the consent of
Austria, or without making compensation to her for being, in the event
supposed, deprived of her share of Poland. This compensation, it was
stipulated, was to consist in the retrocession, on the part of France,
of the Illyrian provinces, yielded up by his Imperial Majesty of Austria
at the treaty of Schoenbrun.
By submitting to this embargo on his proceedings in Poland, Napoleon
lost all opportunity of revolutionizing that military country, from
which he drew therefore little advantage, unless from the duchy of
Warsaw. Nothing but the tenacity with which Buonaparte retained every
territory that fell into his power, would have prevented him from at
once simplifying this complicated engagement, by assigning to Austria
those Illyrian provinces, which were entirely useless to France, but on
which her ally set great value, and stipulating in return--what Austria
would then have willingly granted--the power of disposing, according to
his own pleasure, as well of Galicia, as of such parts of the Polish
provinces as should be conquered from Russia; or in case, as De Pradt
insinuates,[97] the Court of Austria were averse to the exchange, it was
in the power of Napoleon to have certainly removed their objections, by
throwing Venice itself into the scale. But we have good reason to
believe that Illyria would have been a sufficient inducement to the
transaction.
We cannot suppose Buonaparte blind to the importance of putting, as he
expressed it, all Poland on horseback; but whether it was, that in
reality he did not desire to establish an independent state upon any
terms, or whether he thought it hard to give up the Illyrian provinces,
ceded to France in property, in order to reconstruct a kingdom, which,
nominally at least, was to be independent; or whether, in fine, he had
an idea, that, by vague promises and hopes, he could obtain from the
Poles all the assistance he desired--it is certain that he embarrassed
himself with this condition in favour of Austria, in a manner which
tended to render complex and difficult all that he afterwards attempted
in Polish affairs; and lost the zealous co-operation and assistance of
the Lithuanians, at a time when it would have been invaluable to him.
[Sidenote: TURKEY.]
Turkey remains to be noticed as the sole remaining power whom Buonaparte
ought in prudence to have propitiated, previous to attacking Russia, of
which empire she is the natural enemy, as she was also held the natural
and ancient ally of France. Were it not that the talents of Napoleon
were much better fitted to crush enemies than to gain or maintain
friends, it would be difficult to account for his losing influence over
the Porte at this important period. The Turkish Government had been
rendered hostile to France by the memorable invasion of Egypt; but
Sultan Selim, an admirer of Napoleon's valour and genius, had become the
friend of the Emperor of France. Selim was cut off by a conspiracy, and
his successor was more partial to the English interests. In the treaty
of Tilsit, the partition of Turkey was actually agreed upon, though the
term was adjourned;[98] as, at the negotiations of Erfurt, Napoleon
agreed to abandon the Turkish dominions as far as the Danube, to become
the property of Russia, if it should be in her power to conquer them.
The Court of St. Petersburgh were ill-advised enough to make the
attempt, although they ought to have foreseen, even then, that the
increasing power of France should have withheld them from engaging in
any scheme of conquest at that period. Indeed, their undertaking this
war with the Ottoman empire, a proceeding so impolitic in case of a
rupture with France, may be quoted to show the Emperor Alexander's
confidence that no such event was likely to take place, and consequently
to prove his own determination to observe good faith towards Napoleon.
The Turks made a far better defence than had been anticipated; and
though the events of war were at first unfavourable to them, yet at
length the Grand Vizier obtained a victory before Routschouk, or at
least gave the Russian general such a serious check as obliged him to
raise the siege of that place. But the gleam of victory on the Turkish
banners was of brief duration. They were attacked by the Russians in
their intrenched camp, and defeated in a battle so sanguinary, that the
vanquished army was almost annihilated.[99] The Turks, however,
continued to maintain the war, forgotten and neglected as they were by
the Emperor of France, whose interest it chiefly was, considering his
views against Russia, to have sustained them in their unequal struggle
against that formidable power. In the meanwhile, hostilities languished,
and negotiations were commenced; for the Russians were of course
desirous, so soon as a war against France became a probable event, to
close that with Turkey, which must keep engaged a very considerable
army, at a time when all their forces were necessary to oppose the
expected attack of Napoleon.
At this period, and so late as the 21st March, 1812, it seemed to occur
all at once to Buonaparte's recollection, that it would be highly
politic to maintain, or rather to renew, his league with a nation, of
whom it was at the time most important to secure the confidence. His
ambassador was directed to urge the Grand Signior in person to move
towards the Danube, at the head of 100,000 men; in consideration of
which, the French Emperor proposed not only to obtain possession for
them of the two disputed provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, but also
to procure the restoration to the Porte of the Crimea.
This war-breathing message arrived too late, the Porte having adopted a
specific line of policy. The splendid promises of France succeeded too
abruptly to so many years of neglect, to obtain credit for sincerity.
The envoys of England, with a dexterity which it has not been always
their fortune to display, obtained a complete victory in diplomacy over
those of France, and were able to impress on the Sublime Porte the
belief, that though Russia was their natural enemy among European
nations, yet a peace of some permanence might be secured with her, under
the guarantee of England and Sweden; whereas, if Napoleon should
altogether destroy Russia, the Turkish empire, of which he had already
meditated the division, would be a measure no state could have influence
to prevent, as, in subduing Russia, he would overcome the last
terrestrial barrier to his absolute power. It gives no slight idea of
the general terror and suspicion impressed by the very name of Napoleon,
that a barbarous people like the Turks, who generally only comprehend so
much of politics as lies straight before them, should have been able to
understand that there was wisdom in giving peace on reasonable terms to
an old and inveterate enemy, rather than, by assisting in his
destruction, to contribute to the elevation of a power still more
formidable, more ambitious, and less easily opposed. The peace of
Bucharest was accordingly negotiated betwixt Russia and Turkey; of which
we shall hereafter have occasion to speak.
Thus was France, on the approaching struggle, deprived of her two
ancient allies, Sweden and Turkey. Prussia she brought to the field like
a slave at her chariot-wheels; Denmark and Saxony in the character of
allies, who were favoured so long as they were sufficiently subservient;
and Austria, as a more equal confederate, but who had contrived to
stipulate, that, in requital of an aid coldly and unwillingly granted,
the French Emperor should tie himself down by engagements respecting
Poland, which interfered with his using his influence over that country
in the manner which would best have served his purposes. The result must
lead to one of two conclusions. Either that Napoleon, confident in the
immense preparations of his military force, disdained to enter into
negotiations to obtain that assistance which he could not directly
command, or else that his talents in politics were inferior to those
which he displayed in military affairs.
[Sidenote: STATE OF THE ARMY.]
It is true, that if the numbers, and we may add the quality, of the army
which France brought into the field on this momentous occasion, were
alone to be considered, Napoleon might be excused for holding cheap the
assistance which he might have derived from Sweden or the Porte. He had
anticipated the conscription of 1811, and he now called out that of
1812; so that it became plain, that so long as Napoleon lived and
warred, the conscription of the first class would be--not a conditional
regulation, to be acted or not acted upon according to occasion--but a
regular and never-to-be-remitted tax of eighty thousand men, annually
levied, without distinction, on the youth of France. To the amount of
these conscriptions for two years, were to be added the contingents of
household kings, vassal princes, subjected republics--of two-thirds of
Europe, in short, which were placed under Buonaparte's command. No such
army had taken the field since the reign of Xerxes, supposing the
exaggerated accounts of the Persian invasion to be admitted as
historical. The head almost turns dizzy as we read the amount of their
numbers.
The gross amount of the whole forces of the empire of France, and its
dependencies and allies, is thus given by Boutourlin:--[100]
Total amount of the French army, 850,000 men.
The army of Italy, under the Viceroy Eugene, 50,000
of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, with other
Poles, 60,000
of Bavaria, 40,000
of Saxony, 30,000
of Westphalia, 30,000
of Wurtemberg, 15,000
of Baden, 9,000
of the Princes of the Confederacy of the
Rhine, 23,000
The corps of Prussian auxiliaries, 20,000
of Austrian auxiliaries, 30,000
The army of Naples, 30,000
---------
1,187,000 men.
But to approximate the actual force, we must deduce from this total of
1,187,000, about 387,000 men, for those in the hospital, absent upon
furlough, and for incomplete regiments. Still there remains the
appalling balance of 800,000 men, ready to maintain the war; so that
Buonaparte was enabled to detach an army to Russia greatly superior to
what the Emperor Alexander could, without immense exertions, get under
arms, and this without withdrawing any part of his forces from Spain.
Still, however, in calculating all the chances attending the eventful
game on which so much was to be staked, and to encounter such attempts
upon France as England might, by his absence, be tempted to make,
Napoleon judged it prudent to have recourse to additional means of
national defence, which might extend the duty of military service still
more widely among his subjects than was effected even by the
conscription. As the measure was never but in one particular brought
into general activity, it may be treated of the more slightly. The
system consisted in a levy of national guards, divided into three
general classes--the Ban, the Second Ban, and Arriere-Ban; for
Buonaparte loved to retain the phrases of the old feudal institutions.
The First Ban was to contain all men, from twenty to twenty-six years,
who had not been called to serve in the army. The Second Ban included
all capable of bearing arms, from the age of twenty-six to that of
forty. The Arriere-Ban comprehended all able-bodied men from forty to
sixty. The levies from these classes were not to be sent beyond the
frontiers of France, and were to be called out in succession, as the
danger pressed. They were divided into cohorts of 1120 men each. But it
was the essential part of this project, that it placed one hundred
cohorts of the First Ban--(that is, upwards of 100,000 men, between
twenty and twenty-six years)--at the immediate disposal of the minister
of war. In short, it was a new form of conscription, with the advantage,
to the recruits, of limited service.
The celebrated philosopher Count La Cepède, who, from his researches
into natural history, as well as from the ready eloquence with which he
could express the acquiescence of the Senate in whatever scheme was
proposed by the Emperor, had acquired the title of King of Reptiles, had
upon this occasion his usual task of justifying the Imperial measures.
In this allotment of another mighty draught of the youth of France to
the purposes of military service, at a time when only the unbounded
ambition of Napoleon rendered such a measure necessary, he could
discover nothing save a new and affecting proof of the Emperor's
paternal regard for his subjects. The youths, he said, would be relieved
by one-sixth part of a cohort at a time; and, being at an age when
ardour of mind is united to strength of body, they would find in the
exercise of arms rather salutary sport, and agreeable recreation, than
painful labour or severe duty. Then the express prohibition to quit the
frontiers would be, their parents might rest assured, an absolute check
on the fiery and impetuous character of the French soldier, and prevent
the young men from listening to their headlong courage, and rushing
forward into distant fields of combat, which no doubt there might be
otherwise reason to apprehend. All this sounded very well, but the time
was not long ere the Senate removed their writ _ne exeat regno_, in the
case of these hundred cohorts; and, whether hurried on by their own
impetuous valour, or forced forward by command of their leaders, they
were all engaged in foreign service, and marched off to distant and
bloody fields, from which few of them had the good fortune to return.
[Sidenote: CIUDAD RODRIGO--BADAJOS.]
While the question of peace or war was yet trembling in the scales, news
arrived from Spain that Lord Wellington had opened the campaign by an
enterprise equally successfully conceived and daringly executed. Ciudad
Rodrigo, which the French had greatly strengthened, was one of the keys
of the frontier between Spain and Portugal. Lord Wellington had
blockaded it, as we have seen, on the preceding year, but more with the
purpose of compelling General Marmont to concentrate his forces for its
relief, than with any hope of taking the place. But, in the beginning of
January 1812, the French heard with surprise and alarm that the English
army, suddenly put in motion, had opened trenches before Ciudad Rodrigo,
and were battering in breach.
Marmont once more put his whole forces in motion, to prevent the fall of
a place which was of the greatest consequence to both parties; and he
had every reason to hope for success, since Ciudad Rodrigo, before its
fortifications had been improved by the French, had held out against
Massena for more than a month, though his army consisted of 100,000 men.
But, in the present instance, within ten days from the opening of the
siege, the place was carried by storm, almost under the very eyes of the
experienced general who was advancing to its relief, and who had no
alternative but to retire again to cantonments, and ponder upon the
skill and activity which seemed of a sudden to have inspired the British
forces.
Lord Wellington was none of those generals who think that an advantage,
or a victory gained, is sufficient work for one campaign. The French
were hardly reconciled to the loss of Ciudad Rodrigo, so extraordinary
did it appear to them, when Badajos was invested, a much stronger place,
which had stood a siege of thirty-six days against the French in the
year 1811, although the defences were then much weaker, and the place
commanded by an officer of no talent, and dubious fidelity. It was now,
with incomprehensible celerity, battered, breached, stormed, and taken,
within twelve days after the opening of the trenches. Two French
Marshals had in vain interfered to prevent this catastrophe. Marmont
made an unsuccessful attempt upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and assumed the air of
pushing into Portugal; but no sooner did he learn the fall of the place,
than he commenced his retreat from Castel-Branco. Soult, who had
advanced rapidly to relieve Badajos, was in the act, it is said, of
informing a circle of his officers that it was the commands of the
Emperor--commands never under any circumstances to be disobeyed--that
Badajos should be relieved, when an officer, who had been sent forward
to reconnoitre, interrupted the shouts of "_Vive l'Empereur!_" with the
equally dispiriting and incredible information, that the English colours
were flying on the walls.
These two brilliant achievements were not only of great importance by
their influence on the events of the campaign, but still more so as they
indicated that our military operations had assumed an entirely new
character, and that the British soldiers, as now conducted, had not only
the advantage of their own strength of body and natural courage, not
only the benefit of the resources copiously supplied by the wealthy
nation to whom they belonged, but also, as began to be generally
allowed, an undoubted superiority in military art and science. The
objects of the campaign were admirably chosen, for the exertion to be
made was calculated with a degree of accuracy which dazzled and
bewildered the enemy; and though the loss incurred in their attainment
was very considerable, yet it was not in proportion to the much greater
advantages attained by success.
Badajos fell on the 7th April; and on the 18th of that month, an
overture of pacific tendency was made by the French Government to that
of Britain. It is not unlikely that Buonaparte, on beholding his best
commanders completely out-generalled before Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos,
might foresee in this inauspicious commencement the long train of defeat
and disaster which befell the French in the campaign of 1812, the events
of which could not have failed to give liberty to Spain, had Spain, or
rather had her Government, been united among themselves, and cordial in
supporting their allies.
It might be Lord Wellington's successes, or the lingering anxiety to
avoid a war involving so many contingencies as that of Russia; or it
might be a desire to impress the French public that he was always
disposed towards peace, that induced Napoleon to direct the Duke of
Bassano[101] to write a letter to Lord Castlereagh, proposing that the
integrity and independence of Spain should be guaranteed under the
_present reigning dynasty_; that Portugal should remain under the rule
of the Princes of Braganza; Sicily under that of Ferdinand; and Naples
under Murat; each nation, in this manner, retaining possession of that
which the other had not been able to wrench from them by force of war.
Lord Castlereagh immediately replied, that if the reign of King Joseph
were meant by the phrase, "the dynasty actually reigning," he must
answer explicitly, that England's engagements to Ferdinand VII. and the
Cortes presently governing Spain, rendered her acknowledging him
impossible.[102]
The correspondence went no farther.[103] The nature of the overture
served to show the tenacity of Buonaparte's character, who, in treating
for peace, would yield nothing save that which the fate of war had
actually placed beyond his reach; and expected the British to yield up
to him the very kingdom of Spain, whose fate depended upon the bloody
arbitrement of the sword. It also manifested the insincerity with which
he could use words to mislead those who treated with him. He had in many
instances, some of which we have quoted, laid it down as a sacred
principle, that princes of his blood, called to reign over foreign
states, should remain still the subjects of France and vassals of its
Emperor, whose interest they were bound to prefer on all occasions to
that of the countries they were called to govern. Upon these grounds he
had compelled the abdication of King Louis of Holland; and how was it
possible for him to expect to receive credit, when he proposed to render
Spain independent under Joseph, whose authority was unable to control
even the French marshals who acted in his name?
[Sidenote: HOSTILE PREPARATIONS.]
This feeble effort towards a general peace having altogether miscarried,
it became subject of consideration, whether the approaching breach
betwixt the two great empires could yet be prevented. The most active
preparations for war were taking place on both sides. Those of Russia
were defensive; but she mustered great armies on the Niemen, as if in
expectation of an assault; while France was rapidly pouring troops into
Prussia, and into the grand duchy of Warsaw, and assuming those
positions most favourable for invading the Russian frontier. Yet amid
preparations for war, made on such an immense scale as Europe had never
before witnessed, there seemed to be a lingering wish on the part of
both Sovereigns, even at this late hour, to avoid the conflict. This
indeed might have been easily done, had there been on the part of
Napoleon a hearty desire to make peace, instead of what could only be
termed a degree of hesitation to commence hostilities. In fact, the
original causes of quarrel were already settled, or, what is the same
thing, principles had been fixed, on which their arrangement might be
easily adjusted. Yet still the preparations for invading Russia became
more and more evident--the purpose was distinctly expressed in the
treaty between France and Prussia; and the war did not appear the less
certain that the causes of it seemed to be in a great measure abandoned.
The anxiety of Alexander was therefore diverted from the source of the
dispute to its important consequences; and he became most naturally more
solicitous about having the French troops withdrawn from the frontiers
of Poland, than about the cause that originally brought them there.
Accordingly, Prince Kourakin, the Russian plenipotentiary, had orders
to communicate to the Duke of Bassano his master's ultimatum. The
grounds of arrangement proposed by the Czar were, the evacuation of
Prussia and Pomerania by the French troops; a diminution of the garrison
of Dantzic; and an amicable arrangement of the dispute between Napoleon
and Alexander. On these conditions, which, in fact, were no more than
necessary to assure Russia of France's peaceable intentions, the Czar
agreed to place his commerce upon a system of licenses as conducted in
France; to introduce the clauses necessary to protect the French trade;
and farther, to use his influence with the Duke of Oldenburg, to obtain
his consent to accept some reasonable indemnification for the territory
which had been so summarily annexed to France.
In looking back at this document, it appears to possess as much the
character of moderation, and even of deference, as could be expected
from the chief of a great empire. His demand that France, unless it were
her determined purpose to make war, should withdraw the armies which
threatened the Russian frontier, seems no more than common sense or
prudence would commend. Yet this condition was made by Napoleon, however
unreasonably, the direct cause of hostilities.
The person, in a private brawl, who should say to an angry and violent
opponent, "Sheathe your sword, or at least lower its point, and I will
accommodate with you, on your own terms, the original cause of quarrel,"
would surely not be considered as having given him any affront, or other
cause for instant violence. Yet Buonaparte, in nearly the same
situation, resented as an unatonable offence, the demand that he should
withdraw his armies from a position, where they could have no other
purpose save to overawe Russia. The demand, he said, was insolent; he
was not accustomed to be addressed in that style, nor to regulate his
movements by the commands of a foreign sovereign. The Russian ambassador
received his passports; and the unreasonable caprice of Napoleon, which
considered an overture towards an amicable treaty as a gross offence,
because it summoned him to desist from his menacing attitude, led to the
death of millions, and the irretrievable downfall of the most
extraordinary empire which the world had ever seen. On the 9th May,
1812, Buonaparte left Paris; the Russian ambassador had his passports
for departure two days later.
[Sidenote: ROYAL FESTIVITIES.]
Upon his former military expeditions, it had been usual for Napoleon to
join his army suddenly, and with a slender attendance; but on the
present occasion he assumed a style of splendour and dignity becoming
one, who might, if any earthly sovereign ever could, have assumed the
title of King of Kings. Dresden was appointed as a mutual rendezvous for
all the Kings, Dominations, Princes, Dukes, and dependent royalties of
every description, who were subordinate to Napoleon, or hoped for good
or evil at his hands. The Emperor of Austria, with his Empress, met his
mighty son-in-law upon this occasion, and the city was crowded with
princes of the most ancient birth, as well as with others who claimed
still higher rank, as belonging to the family of Napoleon. The King of
Prussia also was present, neither a willing nor a welcome guest, unless
so far as his attendance was necessary to swell the victor's triumph.
Melancholy in heart and in looks, he wandered through the gay and
splendid scenes, a mourner rather than a reveller. But fate had amends
in store, for a prince whose course, in times of unparalleled distress,
had been marked by courage and patriotism.[104]
Amidst all these dignitaries, no one interested the public so much as
he, for whom, and by whom the assembly was collected; the wonderful
being who could have governed the world, but could not rule his own
restless mind. When visible, Napoleon was the principal figure of the
group; when absent, every eye was on the door, expecting his
entrance.[105] He was chiefly employed in business in his cabinet, while
the other crowned personages (to whom, indeed, he left but little to do)
were wandering abroad in quest of amusement. The feasts and banquets, as
well as the assemblies of the royal personages and their suites, after
the theatrical representations, were almost all at Napoleon's expense,
and were conducted in a style of splendour, which made those attempted
by any of the other potentates seem mean and paltry.
The youthful Empress had her share of these days of grandeur. "The reign
of Maria Louisa," said her husband, when at St. Helena, "has been very
short, but she had much to make her enjoy it. She had the world at her
feet." Her superior magnificence in dress and ornaments, gave her a
great pre-eminence over her mother-in-law, the Empress of Austria,
betwixt whom and Maria Louisa there seems to have existed something of
that petty feud, which is apt to divide such relations in private life.
To make the Austrian Empress some amends, Buonaparte informs us, that
she often visited her daughter-in-law's toilette, and seldom went back
without receiving some marks of her munificence.[106] Perhaps we may say
of this information, as Napoleon says of something else, that an Emperor
should not have known these circumstances, or at least should not have
told them. The truth is, Buonaparte did not love the Empress of Austria;
and though he represents that high personage as showing him much
attention, the dislike was mutual. The daughter of the Duke of Modena
had not forgot her father's sufferings by the campaigns of Italy.[107]
In a short time, however, the active spirit of Napoleon led him to tire
of a scene, where his vanity might for a time be gratified, but which
soon palled on his imagination as empty and frivolous. He sent for De
Pradt, the Archbishop of Malines, whose talents he desired to employ as
ambassador at Warsaw, and in a singular style of diplomacy, thus gave
him his commission: "I am about to make a trial of you. You may believe
I did not send for you here to say mass" (which ceremony the Archbishop
had performed that morning.) "You must keep a great establishment; have
an eye to the women, their influence is essential in that country. You
know Poland; you have read Rulhières. For me, I go to beat the Russians;
time is flying; we must have all over by the end of September; perhaps
we are even already too late. I am tired to death here; I have been here
eight days playing the courtier to the Empress of Austria." He then
threw out indistinct hints of compelling Austria to quit her hold on
Galicia, and accept an indemnification in Illyria, or otherwise remain
without any. As to Prussia, he avowed his intention, when the war was
over, to ruin her completely, and to strip her of Silesia. "I am on my
way to Moscow," he added. "Two battles there will do the business. I
will burn Thoula; the Emperor Alexander will come on his knees, and then
is Russia disarmed. All is ready, and only waits my presence. Moscow is
the heart of their empire; besides, I make war at the expense of the
blood of the Poles. I will leave fifty thousand of my Frenchmen in
Poland. I will convert Dantzic into another Gibraltar. I will give fifty
millions a-year in subsidies to the Poles. I can afford the expense.
Without Russia be included, the Continental System would be mere folly.
Spain costs me very dear; without her I should be master of the world;
but when I am so, my son will have nothing to do but to keep his place,
and it does not require to be very clever to do that. Go, take your
instructions from Maret."[108]
The complete confidence of success implied in these disjointed, yet
striking expressions, was general through all who approached Napoleon's
person, whether French or foreigners. The young military men looked on
the expedition against Russia as on a hunting party which was to last
for two months. The army rushed to the fatal country, all alive with
the hopes of plunder, pensions, and promotion. All the soldiers who were
not included railed against their own bad luck, or the partiality of
Napoleon, for detaining them from so triumphant an enterprise.[109]
[Sidenote: WAR WITH RUSSIA.]
Meantime, Buonaparte made a last attempt at negotiation, or rather to
discover what was the state of the Emperor Alexander's mind, who, while
he was himself surrounded by sovereigns, as the sun by planets, remained
lonely in his own orbit, collecting around him means of defence, which,
immense as they were, seemed scarcely adequate to the awful crisis in
which he stood. General Lauriston had been despatched to Wilna, to
communicate definitively with Alexander. Count de Narbonne, already
noticed as the most adroit courtier of the Tuileries was sent to invite
the Czar to meet Napoleon at Dresden, in hopes that, in a personal
treaty, the two sovereigns might resume their habits of intimacy, and
settle between themselves what they had been unable to arrange through
their ambassadors. But Lauriston could obtain no audience of the
Emperor, and the report of Narbonne was decidedly warlike. He found the
Russians neither depressed nor elated, but arrived at the general
conclusion, that war was become inevitable, and therefore determined to
submit to its evils, rather than avoid them by a dishonourable
peace.[110]
FOOTNOTES:
[93] Meredith's Memorials of Charles John, King of Sweden and Norway, p.
25.
[94] See Appendix to this Volume, No. I.
[95] See Meredith's Memorials, p. 38.
[96] In the _Moniteur_, a scandalous intrigue was repeatedly alluded to
as existing between this princess and the Emperor Alexander, and both to
M. Las Cases, and to others; Buonaparte affirmed the same personally;
telling, at the same time, as a good jest, that he himself had kept the
King of Prussia out of the way, to provide the lovers a stolen meeting
[vol. ii., p. 213.] These averments are so inconsistent with the
character universally assigned to this high-spirited and unhappy
princess, that we have no hesitation to assign them directly to calumny;
a weapon which Napoleon never disdained to wield, whether in private or
national controversy.--S.
[97] Histoire de l'Ambassade dans le Grand Duché de Varsovie en 1812.
[98] The fact is now pretty generally admitted to have been as stated in
the text. But in the public treaty, it appeared that France negotiated
an armistice, called that of Slobodsea, by which it was stipulated, that
the two disputed provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were to be restored
to the Turks. But the armistice, as had previously been settled between
Napoleon and Alexander, broke up without any such restoration; and a
congress, which was held at Jassy for the arrangement of the quarrel
between the Porte and Court of St. Petersburgh, having been also
dissolved without coming to an agreement, the war between the Turks and
Russians recommenced upon the Danube.--S.
[99] Jomini, tom. iii., p. 541.
[100] Histoire Militaire de la Campagne de Russie en 1812.
[101] "When Napoleon had determined that all the springs of his
diplomacy should be put in motion towards the north, he changed his
minister of foreign affairs, the complication of so many intrigues and
manœuvres becoming too much, not indeed for the zeal, but for the
energy of Champagny-Cadore. Napoleon did not think himself secure in
confiding the weight of affairs so important to any other person than
Maret, the chief of his _secrétariat_--that is to say, all foreign
affairs were, from that moment, concentrated in his cabinet, and
received no other impulse than from him. Under this point of view,
Maret, who was a true official machine, was the very man whom the
Emperor wanted. He really admired his master, with whose thoughts,
secrets, and inclinations he was acquainted. It was also he who kept the
secret-book, in which the Emperor made his notes of such individuals of
all countries and parties who might be useful to him, as well as of men
who were pointed out to his notice, and whose intentions he
suspected."--FOUCHÉ.
[102] "Here the matter dropped. Ashamed of its overtures, our cabinet,
whose only object was to have drawn Russia into some act of weakness,
perceived too late that it had impressed upon our diplomacy a character
of fickleness, bad faith, and ignorance."--FOUCHÉ.
[103] For copies of the Correspondence with the French Government
relative to Peace, see Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxiii., p. 10, 56.
[104] "Napoleon had expressed a wish that the Emperor of Austria,
several kings, and a crowd of princes, should meet him at Dresden: his
desire was fulfilled; all thronged to meet him; some induced by hope,
others prompted by fear; for himself, his motives were to feel his
power, to exhibit it, and enjoy it."--COUNT PHILIP DE SÉGUR, _Hist. de
Napoleon, et de la Grande Armée, en 1812_, tom. i., p. 89.
[105] "Whole nations had quitted their homes to throng his path; rich
and poor, nobles and plebeians, friends and enemies, all hurried to the
scene. Their curious and anxious groups were seen collecting in the
streets, the roads, and the public places. It was not his crown, his
rank, the luxury of his court, but him--himself--on whom they desired to
feast their eyes; a memento of his features which they were anxious to
obtain: they wished to be able to say to their less fortunate countrymen
and posterity that they had seen Napoleon."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 90.
[106] Las Cases, tom. i., p. 299.
[107] "The Empress of Austria made herself remarked, by her aversion,
which she vainly endeavoured to disguise; it escaped from her by an
involuntary impulse, which Napoleon instantly detected, and subdued by a
smile: but she employed her spirit and attraction in gently winning
hearts to her opinion, in order to sow them afterwards with the seeds of
hate."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 92.
[108] De Pradt, Histoire de l'Ambassade en Pologne, p. 55.
[109] De Pradt, Histoire de l'Ambassade en Pologne, p. 58.
[110] Ségur, tom. i., p. 97.