_Proceedings of the Army under Prince Bagration--Napoleon's
manœuvres against him--King Jerome of Westphalia is disgraced for
alleged inactivity--Bagration is defeated by Davoust, but succeeds
in gaining the interior of Russia, and re-establishing his
communication with the Grand Army--which retreats to Drissa--Barclay
and Bagration meet at Smolensk on the 20th July--The French Generals
become anxious that Napoleon should close the campaign at Witepsk
for the season--He persists in proceeding--Smolensk evacuated by De
Tolly, after setting fire to the place--Reduced condition of the
French, and growing strength of the Russian Armies--Peace effected
between Russia, and England, Sweden, and Turkey--Napoleon resolves
to advance upon Moscow._
[Sidenote: PROTRACTED STAY AT WILNA.]
Napoleon continued to occupy his headquarters at Wilna, from 28th June
to 16th July, the space of eighteen days. It was not usual with him to
make such long halts; but Wilna was his last point of communication with
Europe, and he had probably much to arrange ere he could plunge into the
forests and deserts of Russia, whence all external intercourse must be
partial and precarious. He named Maret Duke of Bassano, Governor of
Lithuania, and placed under the management of that minister the whole
charge of correspondence with Paris and with the armies; thus rendering
him the centre of administrative, political, and even military
communication between the Emperor and his dominions.
It must not be supposed, however, that these eighteen days passed
without military movements of high importance. The reader must remember,
that the grand army of Russia was divided into two unequal portions.
That commanded under the Emperor by Barclay de Tolly, had occupied Wilna
and the vicinity, until the French entered Lithuania, when, by a
preconcerted and well-executed retreat, they fell back on their strong
fortified camp at Drissa. The smaller army, under Prince Bagration, was
much farther advanced to the south-westward, and continued to occupy a
part of Poland. The Prince's headquarters were at Wolkowisk; Platoff,
with 7000 Cossacks, lay at Grodno, and both he and Bagration maintained
communication with the main army through its left wing, which, under
Dorokhoff, extended as far as Lida. The army of Bagration had been
posted thus far to the south-west, in order that when Napoleon crossed
the Niemen, this army might be placed in his rear as he advanced to
Wilna. To execute this plan became impossible, so much greater was the
invading army than the Russians had anticipated. On the contrary, the
French were able to protect the flank of their advance against Wilna by
an army of 30,000 men, under the King of Westphalia, placed betwixt them
and this secondary Russian army. And far from having it in his power to
annoy the enemy, Bagration was placed so much in advance, as greatly to
hazard being separated from the main body, and entirely cut off. The
Russian prince accordingly had directions from Barclay de Tolly to get
his army out of their perilous situation; and again, on the 13th of
July, he had orders from Alexander to move on the camp of Drissa.
When Napoleon arrived at Wilna, the danger of Bagration became imminent;
for the intrenched camp at Drissa was the rendezvous of all the Russian
corps, and Napoleon being 150 wersts, or seven days' march, nearer to
Drissa than Bagration, neither Napoleon nor any other general had ever
so fair an opportunity for carrying into execution the French Emperor's
favourite manœuvre, of dividing into two the line of his enemy, which
was unquestionably too much extended.
It was the 30th of July ere Napoleon was certain of the advantage which
he possessed, and he hastened to improve it. He had despatched the
greater part of his cavalry under Murat, to press on the retreat of the
grand Russian army; the second corps under Oudinot, and the third under
Ney, with three divisions of the first corps, were pushed towards the
Dwina on the same service, and constituted a force too strong for the
army of Barclay de Tolly to oppose. On the right of the army, the King
of Westphalia had directions to press upon Bagration in front, and throw
him upon the army of Davoust, which was to advance on his flank and
towards his rear. It was concluded, that Bagration, cut off from the
grand army, and attacked at once by Jerome and Davoust, must necessarily
surrender or be destroyed.
Having thus detached very superior forces against the only two Russian
armies which were opposed to him, Buonaparte himself, with the Guards,
the army of Italy, the Bavarian army, and three divisions of Davoust's
corps d'armée was at liberty to have marched forward upon Witepsk,
occupying the interval between the corps of Murat, who pressed upon
Alexander and De Tolly, and of Davoust, who was pursuing Bagration. By
thus pressing on where there was no hostile force opposed to him,
Napoleon might have penetrated between the two Russian armies, to each
of whom a superior force was opposed, might have forced himself between
them and occupied Witepsk, and threatened both St. Petersburgh and
Moscow; or, if he decided for the latter capital, might have advanced as
far as Smolensk. That Buonaparte, formed this plan of the campaign on
the 10th of July at Wilna, we are assured by Ségur; but it was then too
late for putting it in execution--yet another week was lost at
Wilna.[121] All seem to have been sensible of an unusual slowness in
Napoleon's motions on this important occasion; and Ségur attributes it
to a premature decay of constitution,[122] of which, however, we see no
traces in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814.[123] But the terrible disorder
of an army, the sick and stragglers of which absolutely filled
Lithuania, and that army one of such immense size, required considerable
time to remodel and new-organise it; and this of itself, a misfortune
inherent in the enterprise, is sufficient to account for the halt at
Wilna.
Meantime Bagration, in a precarious situation, defended himself with the
greatest skill and gallantry. Being cut off from the direct road to
Drissa, it was his object to retreat eastward to his rear, instead of
moving northward by his right flank, and thus to make his way towards
the Dwina, either through Ostrowno and Minsk, or by the town of
Borizoff. When he gained the Dwina, Bagration trusted to form a junction
with the grand army, from which he was now so fearfully separated. The
actual strength of his army was, however, increased not only by the
Hettman Platoff with his Cossacks, who, being advanced south-westward as
far as Grodno, made in fact a part of Bagration's command, and assisted
him materially in his retreat; but also by the division of General
Dorokhoff, which, forming the extreme left of the grand Russian army,
was cut off in the retreat upon Drissa by the advance of the French, and
therefore had been placed also in communication with Bagration. So that,
numerically, the prince might have under his command from 40 to 50,000
men.
The ground which Bagration had to traverse was the high plain of
Lithuania, where arise the sources of the rivers which take different
directions to the Black and Baltic Seas. The soil is unusually marshy,
and traversed by long causeways, which the Russians made use of in
defending themselves against the attacks of Jerome's advanced guard. But
while Bagration struggled against the attempt on his front, Davoust,
having occupied all the posts on the Russian's right flank, and
succeeded in preventing him taking the shortest road to Drissa, began
next to cut him off from his more circuitous route to the east,
occupying the town of Minsk, and the defiles by which Bagration must
issue from Lithuania towards Witepsk and the Dwina. The occupation of
Minsk greatly embarrassed the retreat of Bagration; insomuch, that the
French were of opinion that it was only the want of skill and enterprise
on the part of King Jerome of Westphalia, who did not, it was said,
press the Russians with sufficient vigour, that prevented the Russian
prince being thrust back on Davoust, and totally destroyed. At any rate,
Jerome, whether guilty or not of the alleged slowness of movement, was,
according to the fashion in which the chief of the Napoleon dynasty
treated the independent princes whom he called to sovereignty, sent back
in disgrace to his Westphalian dominions, unaccompanied even by a
soldier of his guards, for all of whom Napoleon had sufficient
employment.
Several skirmishes were fought between the corps of Bagration, and those
opposed to it, of which the event was dubious. Platoff and his Cossacks
had more than one distinguished success over the Polish cavalry, who,
with all their fiery courage, had not yet the intimate acquaintance with
partisan war, which seems to be a natural attribute of the modern
Scythians. In the meanwhile, Bagration, continuing his attempts at
extricating his army, made another circuitous march towards the south,
and avoiding his pursuers, he effected the passage of the Beresina at
Bobruisk. The Dnieper (anciently the Borysthenes) was the next obstacle
to be overcome, and with a view to regain the ground he had lost,
Bagration ascended that stream as far as Mohiloff. Here he found
himself again anticipated by Davoust, who was equally, though less
unpleasantly surprised, by finding himself in front of Bagration, who
prepared to clear his way by the sword. The combat was at first
advantageous to the Russians, but they were at length repulsed roughly,
and lost the battle; without, however, suffering much, except in the
failure of their purpose. Disappointed in this attempt, Bagration, with
unabated activity, once more altered his line of retreat, descended the
Dnieper so far as to reach Nevoi-Bikoff, finally crossed at that point,
and thus gained the interior of Russia, and an opportunity of again
placing himself in communication with the grand Russian army, from which
he had been so nearly cut off.[124]
It was certainly a new event in the history of Napoleon's wars, that two
large armies of French should be baffled and out-manœuvred by a
foreign general. And yet this was clearly the case; for, admitting that
the Russians committed originally the great error of extending their
line too far from Drissa, the intended point of union, and although, in
consequence, the army of Bagration run great risk of being cut off, yet
the manœuvres by which he effectually eluded the enemy, showed
superior military talent on the part of the general, as well as
excellent discipline on that of the soldiers, and were sufficient for
the extrication of both.[125]
[Sidenote: GENERAL WITGENSTEIN.]
We return to the grand army, commanded by the Emperor, or rather by
Barclay de Tolly, which, though pressed by Murat, at the head of the
greater part of the French cavalry, as well as by Oudinot and Ney, all
burning for combat, made a regular and successful retreat to the
intrenched camp at Drissa, where the Russian army had been appointed to
concentrate itself. The French troops, on their part, approached the
left bank of the Dwina, and that river now separated the hostile armies,
and there took place only partial actions between detached corps with
various success. But the Russian general Witgenstein, whose name began
to be distinguished both for enterprise and conduct, observing that
Sebastiani's vanguard of French cavalry had quartered themselves with
little precaution in the town of Drissa, he passed the river
unexpectedly on the night of the 2d July, beat up Sebastiani's quarters,
and was completely successful in the skirmish which ensued. Enterprises
of this sort show a firm and energetic character, and Napoleon began
already to be aware of the nature of the task he had before him, and of
the necessity of employing his own talents in the campaign.
In the meantime, Barclay was led to change his plan, from learning the
danger to which Prince Bagration was exposed. The camp at Drissa became
too distant a point of junction, and there was every risk that the whole
body of the French army, which was now getting itself into motion, would
force a passage across the Dwina at Witepsk, a good deal higher up than
Drissa, and thus at once turn Barclay's left flank, and entirely
separate him from Bagration and his corps d'armée. Alarmed at this
prospect, Barclay evacuated the camp, and began to ascend the right side
of the Dwina, by Polotsk, towards Witepsk. This line of movement
converged with that of Bagration's retreat, and served essentially to
favour the desired junction of the two Russian armies. Witgenstein was
left near Drissa to observe the enemy, and cover the road to St.
Petersburgh. The army first arrived at Polotsk, when the Emperor
Alexander left the troops and hastened to Moscow, to recommend and
enforce energetic measures, and solicit the heavy sacrifices which the
emergency demanded. Barclay continued his march upon Witepsk, hoping to
get into communication with Bagration, to whom he had sent orders,
directing him to descend the Dnieper as far as Orcsa (or Orcha,) which
is about fifty-six wersts from Witepsk.
At this period Napoleon was directing his whole reserved forces upon the
same point of Witepsk, with a purpose as anxious to prevent the junction
of the two Russian armies, as that of Barclay to accomplish that
important movement. Had Napoleon's march commenced earlier, there can be
no doubt that he must have attained the disputed position sooner by
marching from Wilna, than Barclay could have reached it by ascending the
Dwina from Drissa. Hasting from Wilna upon the 4th, he might easily have
reached Witepsk on the 20th, and would then have found himself, with a
chosen army of 120,000 men, without an enemy on his front, posted
between the two hostile armies, each of which was pressed by a force
superior to their own, and having their flanks and communications at his
mercy. Instead of this advantageous condition, the Emperor found himself
in front of the grand army of Russia, in a situation where they could
not easily be brought to action, although severe and bloody skirmishes
took place between the cavalry on both sides.
On his part, Barclay was far from easy. He heard nothing of Bagration,
whom he expected to approach from Orcsa; and rather than abandon him to
his fate by a retreat, he formed, on the 14th July, the almost desperate
resolution of risking a general action with very superior forces
commanded by Napoleon. But just as he had made his dispositions for
battle, the Russian general received news from one of the prince's
aides-de-camp, which made him joyfully alter his determination. The
repulse at Mohiloff had, as before noticed, obliged Bagration to change
his line of retreat, which was now directed upon Smolensk. Barclay,
renouncing instantly his purpose of battle, commenced a retreat upon
the same point, and arriving at Smolensk on the 20th, was joined by
Bagration within two days after. The result of these manœuvres had
been on the whole disappointing to the Emperor of the French. The two
armies of Russians had united without material loss, and placed
themselves upon their own lines of communication. No battle had been
fought and won; and although Napoleon obtained possession of the
fortified camp at Drissa, and afterwards of Witepsk, it was only as
positions which it no longer served the enemy's purpose to retain.[126]
[Sidenote: WITEPSK.]
The marshals and generals who surrounded Napoleon began to wish and hope
that he would close at Witepsk the campaign of the season, and,
quartering his troops on the Dwina, await supplies, and the influence of
the invasion upon the mind of the Russian nation, till next spring. But
this suggestion Buonaparte treated with contempt, asking those who
favoured such a sentiment, whether they thought he had come so far only
to conquer a parcel of wretched huts.[127] If ever, therefore, he had
seriously thought of settling his winter-quarters at Witepsk, which
Ségur affirms, and Gourgaud positively denies, it had been but a passing
purpose. Indeed, his pride must have revolted at the very idea of
fortifying himself with intrenchments and redoubts in the middle of
summer, and confessing his weakness to Europe, by stopping short in the
midst of a campaign, in which he had lost one-third of the active part
of his great army, without even having fought a general action, far less
won a decisive victory.
Meanwhile the Russians, finding their two wings united, to the number of
120,000, were not inclined to remain inactive. The French army at
Witepsk lay considerably more dispersed than their own, and their plan
was, by moving suddenly upon Napoleon, to surprise him ere his army
could be concentrated. With this view, General Barclay directed the
march of a great part of the grand army upon Rudneia, a place about
half-way between Witepsk and Smolensk, being nearly the centre of the
French line of position. Their march commenced on the 26th July; but on
the next day, Barclay received information from the out-posts, which
induced him to conclude that Napoleon was strengthening his left flank
for the purpose of turning the Russian right wing, and assaulting the
town of Smolensk in their rear. To prevent this misfortune, Barclay
suspended his march in front, and began by a flank movement to extend
his right wing, for the purpose of covering Smolensk. This error, for
such it was, led to his advanced guard, who had not been informed of the
change of plan, being placed in some danger at Inkowo, a place about two
wersts from Rudneia. Platoff, however, had the advantage in the cavalry
skirmish which took place. The Russian general, in consequence of the
extension of his flank, discovered that there was no French force on the
left, and consequently, that he was in no danger on that point; and he
resumed his original plan of pressing the French at Rudneia. But while
Barclay lost four days in these fruitless marches and countermarches, he
at length learned, that the most speedy retreat towards Smolensk would
be necessary to save him from that disaster which he had truly
apprehended, though he mistook the quarter from which the danger was to
come.
While Barclay was in hopes of surprising Napoleon, the Emperor had laid
a scheme of a singularly audacious character, for inflicting the
surprise with which he had been himself threatened. Without allowing his
purpose to be suspended by the skirmishing on his front, he resolved
entirely to change his line of operations from Witepsk[128] upon the
Dwina, to concentrate his army on the Dnieper, making Orcsa the central
point of his operations, and thus, turning the left of the Russians
instead of their right, as Barclay had apprehended, he hoped to gain the
rear of their forces, occupy Smolensk, and act upon their lines of
communication with Moscow. With this purpose Napoleon withdrew his
forces from Witepsk and the line of the Dwina, with equal skill and
rapidity, and, by throwing four bridges over the Dnieper, effected a
passage for Ney, the Viceroy and Davoust. The King of Naples accompanied
them, at the head of two large corps of cavalry. Poniatowski, with
Junot, advanced by different routes to support the movement. Ney and
Murat, who commanded the vanguard, drove every thing before them until
they approached Krasnoi, upon 14th August, where a remarkable action
took place.[129] This manœuvre, which transferred the Emperor's line
of operations from the Dwina to the Dnieper, has been much admired by
French and Russian tacticians, but it has not escaped military
criticism.[130]
General Newerowskoi had been stationed at Krasnoi with above 6000 men, a
part of the garrison of Smolensk, which had been sent out for the
purpose of making a strong recognisance. But finding himself attacked by
a body of infantry stronger than his own, and no less than 18,000
cavalry besides, the Russian general commenced his retreat upon the road
to Smolensk. The ground through which the road lay was open, flat, and
favourable for the action of cavalry. Murat, who led the pursuit, and,
while he affected the dress and appearance of a cavalier of romance, had
the fiery courage necessary to support the character, sent some of his
light squadrons to menace the front of the Russian corps, while with his
heavy horse he annoyed their flanks or thundered upon their rear. To add
to the difficulties of the Russians, their columns consisted of raw
troops, who had never been under fire, and who might have been expected
to shrink from the furious onset of the cavalry. They behaved bravely,
however, and availed themselves of a double row of trees which borders
the high road to Smolensk on each side, to make their musketry
effectual, and to screen themselves from the repeated charges.
Protecting themselves as they retreated by a heavy fire, Newerowskoi
made good a lion-like retreat into Smolensk, having lost 400 men,
chiefly by the artillery, and five guns, but receiving from friend and
foe the testimony due to a movement so bravely and ably conducted.[131]
Upon the 14th of August,[132] the same day with this skirmish, Napoleon
arrived at Rassassina, upon the Dnieper, and continued during the 15th
to press forward towards Smolensk, in the rear of Ney and Murat. Prince
Bagration, in the meantime, threw General Raefskoi into Smolensk, with a
strong division, to reinforce Newerowskoi, and advanced himself to the
Dnieper, along the left bank of which he pressed with all possible speed
towards the endangered town. Barclay de Tolly was now made aware, as we
have already stated, that while he was engaged in false manœuvres to
the right, his left had been in fact turned, and that Smolensk was in
the utmost danger. Thus the two Russian generals pressed forward from
different points to the relief of the city, whilst Napoleon used every
effort to carry the place before their arrival.
[Sidenote: SMOLENSK.]
Smolensk, a town of consequence in the empire, and, like Moscow,
honoured by the appellation of the Sacred, and of the Key of Russia,
contains about 12,600 inhabitants. It is situated on the heights of the
left bank of the Dnieper, and was then surrounded by fortifications of
the ancient Gothic character. An old wall, in some places dilapidated,
was defended by about thirty towers, which seemed to flank the
battlements; and there was an ill-contrived work, called the Royal
Bastion, which served as a species of citadel. The walls, however, being
eighteen feet thick, and twenty-five high, and there being a ditch of
some depth, the town, though not defensible if regularly approached,
might be held out against a _coup-de-main_. The greatest inconvenience
arose from the suburbs of the place, which, approaching near to the wall
of the town, preserved the assailants from the fire of the besieged, as
they approached it. Raefskoi prepared to defend Smolensk at the head of
about sixteen thousand men. He was reinforced on the 16th of August by a
division of grenadiers under Prince Charles of Mecklenberg, who were
detached for that purpose by Bagration.
Ney arrived first under the walls of the city, and instantly rushed
forward to attack the citadel. He failed entirely, being himself
wounded, and two-thirds of the storming party cut off. A second attempt
was made to as little purpose, and at length he was forced to confine
his efforts to a cannonade, which was returned from the place with equal
spirit. Later in the day, the troops of Napoleon appeared advancing from
the eastward on one side of the Dnieper, while almost at the same moment
there were seen upon the opposite bank clouds of dust enveloping long
columns of men, moving from different points with uncommon celerity.
This was the grand army of Russia under Barclay, and the troops of
Bagration, who, breathless with haste and anxiety, were pressing forward
to the relief of Smolensk.
"At length," said Napoleon, as he gazed on the advance from the opposite
side, "at length I have them!"[133] He had no doubt it was the purpose
of the Russians to pass through the city, and, deploying from its gates,
to offer him under the walls that general action for which he longed,
and on which so much depended. He took all the necessary measures for
preparing his line of battle.
But the cautious Barclay de Tolly was determined, that not even for the
protection of the sacred city would he endanger the safety of his army,
so indispensably necessary to the defence of the empire. He dismissed to
Ellnia his more impatient coadjutor, Prince Bagration, who would
willingly have fought a battle, incensed as he was at beholding the
cities of Russia sacked, and her fields laid waste, without the
satisfaction either of resistance or revenge. Barclay in the meanwhile
occupied Smolensk, but only for the purpose of covering the flight of
the inhabitants, and emptying the magazines.
Buonaparte's last look that evening, was on the still empty fields
betwixt his army and Smolensk. There was no sign of any advance from its
gates, and Murat prophesied that the Russians had no purpose of
fighting. Davoust entertained a different opinion; and Napoleon,
continuing to believe what he most wished, expected with the peep of day
to see the whole Russian army drawn up betwixt his own front and the
walls of Smolensk. Morning came, however, and the space in which he
expected to see the enemy was vacant as before. On the other hand, the
high-road on the opposite side of the Dnieper was filled with troops and
artillery, which showed that the grand army of the Russians was in full
retreat. Disappointed and incensed, Napoleon appointed instant measures
to be taken to storm the place, resolving as speedily as possible to
possess himself of the town, that he might have the use of its bridge in
crossing to the other side of the Dnieper, in order to pursue the
fugitive Russians. There are moments when men of ordinary capacity may
advise the wisest. Murat remarked to Buonaparte, that as the Russians
had retired, Smolensk, left to its fate, would fall without the loss
that must be sustained in an attack by storm, and he more than hinted
the imprudence of penetrating farther into Russia at this late season of
the year. The answer of Napoleon[134] must have been almost insulting;
for Murat, having exclaimed that a march to Moscow would be the
destruction of the army, spurred his horse like a desperate man to the
banks of the river, where the Russian guns from the opposite side were
cannonading a French battery, placed himself under a tremendous fire, as
if he had been courting death, and was with difficulty forced from the
dangerous spot.[135]
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF SMOLENSK.]
Meantime, the attack commenced on Smolensk, but the place was defended
with the same vigour as on the day before. The field-guns were found
unable to penetrate the walls; and the French lost four or five thousand
men in returning repeatedly to the attack. But this successful defence
did not alter Barclay's resolution of evacuating the place. It might no
doubt have been defended for several days more, but the Russian general
feared that a protracted resistance on this advanced point might give
Napoleon time to secure the road to Moscow, and drive the Russian armies
back upon the barren and exhausted provinces of the northwest, besides
getting betwixt them and the ancient capital of Russia. In the middle of
the night, then, while the French were throwing some shells into the
place, they saw fires beginning to kindle, far faster and more generally
than their bombardment could have occasioned.[136] They were the work of
the Russian troops, who, having completed their task of carrying off or
destroying the magazines, and having covered the flight of the
inhabitants, had now set the dreadful example of destroying their own
town, rather than that its houses or walls should afford assistance to
the enemy.
[Sidenote: SMOLENSK.]
When the Frenchmen entered Smolensk, which they did the next morning,
18th August, most of the town, which consisted chiefly of wooden houses,
was yet blazing--elsewhere they found nothing but blood and ashes.[137]
The French troops were struck with horror at the inveterate animosity of
the Russians, and the desperation of the resistance which they met with;
and all began to wish a period to a war, where there was nothing to be
gained from the retreating enemy, except a long vista of advance through
an inhospitable wilderness of swamps, pine-forests, and deserts; without
provisions, and without shelter; without hospitals for the sick, and
dressings for the wounded; and without even a shed where the weary might
repose, or the wounded might die.
Buonaparte himself hesitated,[138] and is reported to have then spoken
of concluding the campaign at Smolensk, which would, he said, be an
admirable head of cantonments.[139] "Here," he said, "the troops might
rest and receive reinforcements. Enough was done for the campaign.
Poland was conquered, which seemed a sufficient result for one year. The
next year they would have peace, or they would seek it at Moscow." But
in the interior of his councils, he held a different language, and
endeavoured to cover, with the language of prudence, the pride and
pertinacity of character which forbade him to stop short in an
enterprise which had yet produced him no harvest of renown. He stated to
his generals the exhausted state of the country, in which his soldiers
were living from hand to mouth; and the risk and difficulty of drawing
his supplies from Dantzic or Poland, through Russian roads, and in the
winter season. He alleged the disorganised state of the army, which
might move on, though it was incapable of stopping. "Motion," he said,
"might keep it together; a halt or a retreat would be at once to
dissolve it. It was an army of attack, not of defence; an army of
operation, not of position. The result was, they must advance on Moscow,
possess themselves of the capital, and there dictate a peace."[140]
The language which Ségur has placed in the mouth of the Emperor, by no
means exaggerates the dreadful condition of the French army. When
Napoleon entered the country, only six weeks before, the corps which
formed his operating army amounted to 297,000 men; and by the 5th
August, when preparing to break up from Witepsk, that number was
diminished to 185,000, not two-thirds of their original number, and a
great additional loss had been sustained in the movements and encounters
on the Dnieper. The wounded of the army were in the most miserable
state, and it was in vain that the surgeons tore up their own linen for
dressings; they were obliged to use parchment, and the down that grows
on the birch-trees; it is no wonder that few recovered.
Thus it may be concluded, that this rash enterprise carried with it,
from the beginning, the seeds of destruction, which, even without the
conflagration of Moscow, or the Russian climate, though the latter must
have been at all events included, made the expedition resemble that of
Cambyses into Egypt; of Crassus, and after him Julian, into Parthia; and
so many others of the same character, where the extent of preparation
only rendered the subsequent fate of the invaders more signally
calamitous.
While the French army was thus suffering a gradual or rather hasty
decay, that of the Russians was now receiving rapid reinforcements. The
Emperor Alexander, on leaving the army for Moscow, had convoked the
nobles and the merchants of that capital in their several assemblies,
had pledged to them his purpose never to make peace while a Frenchman
remained in Russia, and had received the most enthusiastic assurances
from both ranks of the state, of their being devoted to his cause with
life and property. A large sum was voted by the merchants as a general
tax, besides which, they opened a voluntary subscription, which produced
great supplies. The nobility offered a levy of ten men in the hundred
through all their estates; many were at the sole expense of fitting out
and arming their recruits, and some of these wealthy boyards furnished
companies, nay battalions, entirely at their own expense. The word peace
was not mentioned, or only thought of as that which could not be
concluded with an invader, without an indelible disgrace to Russia.
Other external circumstances occurred, which greatly added to the effect
of these patriotic exertions.
A peace with England, and the restoration of commerce, was the instant
consequence of war with France. Russia had all the support which British
diplomacy could afford her, in operating a reconciliation with Sweden,
and a peace with Turkey. The former being accomplished, under the
mediation of England, and the Crown Prince being assured in possession
of Norway, the Russian army under General Steigenteil, or Steingel,
which was, while Bernadotte's amicable disposition might be doubted,
necessarily detained in Finland, was now set at liberty, for the more
pressing service of defending the empire.
A peace, even still more important, was made with the Turks, at
Bucharest, on the 16th May. The Porte yielded up to Russia, Bessarabia,
and that part of Moldavia situated on the left of the river Pruth, and
Russia renounced all claim to the rest of the two provinces of Moldavia
and Wallachia. But the great advantage which accrued to Russia by this
treaty, was its setting at liberty a veteran army of 45,000 men, and
rendering them a disposable force in the rear of the French troops.
If the able statesman who at that period conducted the foreign affairs
of Great Britain [Lord Castlereagh] had never rendered to his own
country and to the world any other service than the influence which he
successfully exercised in these important diplomatic affairs, he must
have gone down to posterity as the minister who had foreseen and
provided, in the most critical moment, the mode of strengthening Russia
to combat with her formidable invaders, and which, after all her
exertions, was the means of turning the balance in her favour.
It was at Witepsk that Napoleon learned that the Turks had made peace;
and as it had only instigated him to precipitate his measures against
Smolensk, so now the same reason urged him to continue his march on
Moscow. Hitherto his wings had had the advantage of the enemy.
Macdonald, in blockading Riga, kept all Courland at his disposal, and
alarmed St. Petersburgh. More to the south, Saint Cyr had some hard
fighting with Witgenstein, and, after a severe battle at Polotsk, had
reduced that enterprising officer to the defensive.
Equally favourable intelligence had reached from Volhynia, the extreme
right of the terrible line of invasion. The Russian General Tormasoff
had made, when least expected, his appearance in the grand duchy, driven
before him Regnier, who was covering that part of Poland, destroyed a
Saxon brigade, and alarmed Warsaw. But Regnier united himself with the
Austrian general Schwartzenberg, advanced on Tormasoff, and engaging him
near a place called Gorodeczna, defeated him with loss, and compelled
him to retreat. It was obvious, however, that the advantage of these two
victories at Polotsk and Gorodeczna, would be entirely lost, if General
Steingel, with the Finland army, should join Witgenstein, while
Tormasoff fell back on the Moldavian army of Russia, commanded by
Admiral Tchitchagoff.[141]
[Sidenote: ADVANCE UPON MOSCOW.]
For Napoleon to await in cantonments at Smolensk, in a wasted country,
the consequences of these junctions, which were likely to include the
destruction of his two wings, would have been a desperate resolution. It
seemed waiting for the fate which he had been wont to command. To move
forward was a bold measure. But the French army, in its state of
disorganisation, somewhat resembled an intoxicated person, who possesses
the power to run, though he is unable to support himself if he stand
still. If Napoleon could yet strike a gallant blow at the Russian grand
army; if he could yet obtain possession of Moscow the Holy, he reckoned
on sending dismay into the heart of Alexander, and dictating to the
Czar, as he had done to many other princes, the conditions of peace from
within the walls of his own palace. Buonaparte, therefore, resolved to
advance upon Moscow. And perhaps, circumstanced as he was, he had no
safer course, unless he had abandoned his whole undertaking, and fallen
back upon Poland, which would have been an acknowledgment of defeat that
we can hardly conceive his stooping to, while he was yet at the head of
an army.
FOOTNOTES:
[121] "The fortnight's halt at Wilna decided, in all probability, the
fate of the war. This delay, on the part of the conqueror of Ratisbon
and Ulm is so extraordinary, that it can alone be attributed to a cause
which will for ever remain a secret."--JOMINI, tom. iv., p. 58.
[122] "Those who were nearest to Napoleon's person said to each other,
that a genius so vast as his, and always increasing in activity and
audacity, was not now seconded as it had been formerly by a vigorous
constitution. They were alarmed at no longer finding their chief
insensible to the heat of a burning atmosphere; and they remarked to
each other with melancholy forebodings, the tendency to corpulence by
which his frame was now distinguished, the certain forerunner of
premature decay."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 165.
[123] "How happens it that the English author is more just towards
Napoleon than one of his generals? Sir Walter allows here, what I have
already observed, namely, the inconceivable accusation brought against
the faculties of Napoleon at a time when he showed so much energy and
perseverance, and when he not only resisted, and extricated himself
from, the most frightful reverses imaginable, but even rose from them
with surprising splendour. In an operation so gigantic as the attack
upon Russia, in a plan for the boldest campaign, prudence and extreme
slowness were imperative. How then, under such circumstances, can a
general officer, a pupil, as it were, of Napoleon, criticise his stay at
Wilna, and the extraordinary slowness of his movements? Would to heaven
that this delay had been carried far enough to prevent the grand army
from crossing the Dnieper during this campaign! But the great
inconvenience of Napoleon, as general of the grand army, was the
necessity of not prolonging his absence from Paris, and consequently of
terminating the campaign as quickly as possible; and this is another
powerful reason why he should not have hazarded so distant an
expedition."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 82.
[124] "This was no doubt taking a great circuit; but the prince
succeeded in his object, and restored to the hostile army a large body
of troops, which would have been rendered completely useless if
Napoleon's orders had been punctually executed. The success of this
movement proved for the Russians fully equivalent to the gain of a
battle. They were drawing nearer to their resources, whilst the French
army was compelled to follow them through vast barren wastes, where it
could not fail to be eventually annihilated."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 187.
[125] Jomini, tom. iv., p. 66; Ségur, tom. i., p. 160.
[126] Ségur, tom. i., p. 171; Jomini, tom. iv., p. 84.
[127] "Surrounded by disapproving countenances, and opinions contrary to
his own, he felt himself uncomfortable. All the officers of his
household opposed his plan, each in the way that marked his peculiar
character; Berthier, by a melancholy countenance, by lamentations, and
even tears; Lobau and Caulaincourt, by a frankness, which in the first
was stamped by a cold and haughty roughness, excusable in so brave a
warrior; and which, in the second, was persevering even to obstinacy,
and impetuous even to violence. The Emperor exclaimed, 'that he had
enriched his generals too much; that all they now aspired to was to
follow the pleasures of the chase, and to display their brilliant
equipages in Paris; and that doubtless they had become disgusted with
war.' When their honour was thus attacked, there was no longer any reply
to be made; they merely bowed and remained silent. During one of his
impatient fits, he told one of the generals of his guard, 'you were born
in a bivouac, in a bivouac you will die.'"--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 200.
[128] "This town contained 20,000 inhabitants, and presented, from the
beauty of its situation, a most delightful aspect. Poland and Lithuania
had, during more than two months, and through a space of more than 300
leagues, offered nothing to our view but deserted villages, and a
ravaged country. Destruction seemed to precede our steps, and in every
direction the whole population was seen flying at our approach, leaving
their habitations to hordes of Cossacks, who destroyed every thing which
they could not carry away. Having long experienced the most painful
deprivations, we regarded, with envious eyes, those well-built and
elegant houses, where peace and abundance seemed to dwell. But that
repose, which we had so eagerly anticipated, was again denied us, and we
were compelled to renew our pursuit of the Russians, leaving on our left
this town, the object of our most ardent wishes, and our dearest
hopes."--LABAUME, _Relation de la Campagne de Russie en 1812_, p. 74.
[129] Jomini, tom. iv., p. 95; Thirteenth Bulletin of Grand Army; Ségur,
tom. i., p. 221.
[130] See in the Appendix, No. II., an interesting extract from
"MANUSCRIPT OBSERVATIONS ON NAPOLEON'S RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, BY AN ENGLISH
OFFICER OF RANK."
[131] Ségur, tom. i., p. 223; Thirteenth Bulletin of the Grand Army.
[132] "As chance would have it, the day of this success was the
Emperor's birth-day. The army never thought of celebrating it. In the
disposition of the men and of the place, there was nothing that
harmonized with such a celebration; empty acclamations would have been
lost amid those vast deserts. In our situation there was no other
festival than the day of a complete victory. Murat and Ney, however, in
reporting their success to the Emperor, paid homage to that anniversary.
They caused a salute of a hundred guns to be fired. The Emperor
remarked, with displeasure, that in Russia it was necessary to be more
sparing of French powder; he was answered that it was Russian powder
taken the preceding day. The idea of having his birth-day celebrated at
the expense of the enemy drew a smile from Napoleon. It was admitted
that this very rare species of flattery became such men."--SÉGUR, tom.
i., p. 223.
[133] Ségur, tom. i., p. 230.
[134] "The Emperor replied; but the rest of their conversation was not
overheard. As, however, the King afterwards declared that he 'had thrown
himself at the knees of his brother, and conjured him to stop, but that
Napoleon saw nothing but Moscow; that honour, glory, rest, every thing
for him was there; that this Moscow would be our ruin!'--it was obvious
what had been the cause of their disagreement. So much is certain that
when Murat quitted his brother-in-law, his face wore the expression of
deep chagrin; his motions were abrupt; a gloomy and concentrated
vehemence agitated him; and the name of Moscow several times escaped his
lips."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 234.
[135] "Belliard warned him that he was sacrificing his life to no
purpose and without glory. Murat answered only by pushing on still
farther. Belliard observed to him, that his temerity would be the
destruction of those about him. 'Well then,' replied Murat, 'do you
retire and leave me here by myself.' All refused to leave him; when the
King angrily turning about, tore himself from the scene of carnage, like
a man who is suffering violence."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 235.
[136] "Napoleon, seated before his tent, contemplated in silence this
awful spectacle. It was as yet impossible to ascertain either the cause
or the result, and the night was passed under arms."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p.
236.
[137] "The bridges and public buildings were a prey to the flames. The
churches, in particular, poured out torrents of fire and smoke. The
domes, the spires, and the multitude of small towers which arose above
the conflagration, added to the effect of the picture, and produced
these ill-defined emotions which are only to be found on the field of
battle. We entered the place. It was half-consumed, of a barbarous
appearance, encumbered with the bodies of the dead and wounded, which
the flames had already reached. The spectacle was frightful. What a
train is that of glory!"--_Mémoires de RAPP_, p. 190.
"The army entered within the walls; it traversed the reeking and
bloodstained ruins with its accustomed order, pomp, and martial music,
and having no other witness of its glory but itself;--a show without
spectators, an almost fruitless victory, a melancholy glory, of which
the smoke that surrounded us and seemed to be our only conquest, was but
too faithful an emblem."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 237.
[138] "Napoleon slowly proceeded towards his barren conquest. He
inspected the field of battle. Melancholy review of the dead and dying!
dismal account to make up and deliver! The pain felt by the Emperor
might be inferred from the contraction of his features and his
irritation; but in him policy was a second nature, which soon imposed
silence on the first."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 238.
[139] "In the passage through its massive walls, Count Lobau exclaimed,
'What a fine head for cantonments!' This was the same thing as advising
the Emperor to stop there; but he returned no other answer to this
counsel than a stern look."--SÉGUR, tom. i., p. 244.
[140] Ségur, tom. i., p. 250.
[141] Ségur, tom. i., p. 242; Jomini, tom. iv., p. 105.