_Retrospect of the causes leading to the Rupture with
Russia--originate in the Treaty of Tilsit--Russia's alleged Reasons
of Complaint--Arguments of Napoleon's Counsellors against War with
Russia--Fouché is against the War--Presents a Memorial to Napoleon
upon the Subject--His Answer--Napoleon's Views in favour of the War,
as urged to his various Advisers._
[Sidenote: RUPTURE WITH RUSSIA.]
We are now approaching the verge of that fated year, when Fortune,
hitherto unwearied in her partiality towards Napoleon, turned first upon
himself, personally, a clouded and stormy aspect. Losses he had
sustained both by land and sea, but he could still remark, as when he
first heard of the defeat at Trafalgar--"I was not there--I could not be
every where at once." But he was soon to experience misfortunes, to the
narrative of which he could not apply this proud commentary. The reader
must be first put in remembrance of the causes of the incipient quarrel
betwixt the empire of France and that of Russia.
Notwithstanding the subsequent personal intimacy which took place
betwixt the two sovereigns, and which for five years prevented the
springing up of any enmity betwixt Alexander and Napoleon, the seeds of
that quarrel were, nevertheless, to be found in the treaty of
pacification of Tilsit itself.[88] Russia, lying remote from aggression
in every other part of her immense territory, is open to injury on that
important western frontier by which she is united with Europe, and in
those possessions by virtue of which she claims to be a member of the
European republic. The partition of Poland, unjust as it was in every
point of view, was a measure of far greater importance to Russia than
either to Austria or Prussia; for, while that state possessed its former
semi-barbarous and stormy independence, it lay interposed in a great
measure betwixt Russia and the rest of Europe, or, in other words,
betwixt her and the civilized world. Any revolution which might restore
Poland to the independence, for which the inhabitants had not ceased to
sigh, would have effectually thrust the Czar back upon his forests,
destroyed his interest and influence in European affairs, and reduced
him comparatively to the rank of an Asiatic sovereign. This liberation
of their country, and the reunion of its dismembered provinces under a
national constitution, was what the Poles expected from Buonaparte. For
this they crowded to his standard after the battle of Jena; and although
he was too cautious to promise any thing explicitly concerning the
restoration of Poland to its rank among nations, yet most of his
measures indicated a future purpose of accomplishing that work. Thus,
when those Polish provinces which had fallen to the portion of Prussia,
were formed into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, as an independent
principality, and the sovereignty was conferred, not without a secret
meaning, on the King of Saxony, a descendant of the ancient monarchs of
Poland, what could this be supposed to indicate, save the commencement
of an independent state, to which might be added, as opportunity
occurred, the remaining districts of Poland which had been seized upon
by Austria and Russia? "To what purpose," asked those statesmen, who
belonged to the old Russian or anti-Gallican party in the empire, "are
those stipulations for a free military road and passage of troops from
Saxony to Warsaw and its territory, through Silesia, if it is not that
France may preserve the means of throwing an overpowering force into the
duchy, so soon as it shall be her pleasure to undo the work of the sage
Catherine, by depriving Russia of those rich Polish provinces, which her
policy had added to the empire? Wherefore," asked the same persons,
"should there have been a special article in the same treaty of Tilsit,
that France should retain Dantzic until a maritime peace, unless it was
to serve as a place of arms in the event of a new war with Russia, the
probability of which Napoleon, therefore, must certainly have calculated
upon, even at the very moment when he cultivated such close personal
intimacy with the Emperor Alexander?"
These suspicions were considerably increased by the articles of peace
concluded with Austria at Schoenbrun. By that treaty all Western
Galicia, together with the city of Cracow, and other territories, were
disjoined from Austria, and added to the dukedom of Warsaw, marking, it
was supposed, still farther, the intention of Napoleon, at one time or
another, to restore in its integrity the ancient kingdom of Poland, of
which Russia alone now held the full share allotted to her by the
partition treaties.
Other causes led to the same conclusion. The old Russians, a numerous
and strong party in the empire, which comprehended the greater part of
the large landholders, felt, as they had done under the Emperor Paul,
much distress, national and personal, from the interruption of the
British trade by Buonaparte's Continental System. Their timber, their
pitch, their potash, their hemp, and other bulky and weighty
commodities, the chief produce of their estates, for which the British
had been ready customers, remained on their hands, while they were
deprived of the colonial produce and manufactures of Britain, which they
were wont to receive in exchange for those articles, with mutual profit
and convenience to both parties. It was in vain that, to reconcile them
to this state of interdiction, they saw in the speeches and decrees of
Buonaparte, tirades about the freedom of the seas, and the maritime
tyranny of England. It seemed an ill-omened species of liberation, which
began by the destruction of their commerce and impoverishment of their
estates; and the Russian Boyards could no more comprehend the
declamation of Buonaparte against the English, than the millers of the
Ebro could be made to understand the denunciation of Don Quixote against
their customers. These magnates only saw that the Ruler of France wished
them to submit to great commercial distress and inconvenience, in order
to accelerate his plan of ruining Great Britain, after which achievement
he might find it a more easy undertaking to destroy their own natural
importance as a European power, by re-establishing Poland, and resuming
the fertile provinces on the western boundary; thus leading the Russian
Cabinet, if the French interest should remain paramount there, by a very
disadvantageous road to a still more disastrous conclusion.
There was, besides, spread through the Russian nation generally, a sense
that France was treating their Emperor rather on the footing of an
inferior. It is a thing entirely unknown in diplomacy, that one
government should pretend a right to dictate to another who is upon
terms of equality, the conditions on which she should conduct her
commerce; and the assuming such a right, seconded by threatening
language in case of non-compliance, has been always held a legitimate
cause of war. Indeed, the opinion that the French league disgraced the
Russian nation, plunged their country into embarrassments, and was
likely to occasion still farther misfortunes to them, became so general,
that the Emperor must have paid some attention to the wishes of his
people, even if his own friendship with Buonaparte had not been cooled
by late occurrences.
The alliance with Austria was of a character calculated to alarm
Alexander. Russia and Austria, though they had a common interest to
withstand the overpowering strength of Buonaparte, had been in ordinary
times always rivals, and sometimes enemies. It was the interference of
Austria, which, upon several occasions, checked the progress of the
Russians in Turkey, and it was Austria also which formed a barrier
against the increase of their power in the south of Europe. The family
connexion, therefore, formed by Buonaparte with the House of Hapsburg,
made him still more formidable to Russia, as likely to embrace the
quarrels and forward the pretensions of that power against the Czar,
even if France herself should have none to discuss with him.
But there was no need to have recourse to remote causes of suspicion.
Russia had, and must always have had, direct and immediate cause of
jealousy, while France or her Emperor claimed the permanent right of
thinking and deciding for her, as well as other nations, in the
relations of commerce and others, in which every independent state is
most desirous of exercising the right of deliberating for herself. This
was the true state of the case. To remain the ally of Buonaparte,
Alexander must have become his vassal; to attempt to be independent of
him, was to make him his enemy; and it can be no wonder that a
sovereign so proud and powerful as the Czar, chose rather to stand the
hazard of battle, than diminish the lustre, or compromise the
independence, of his ancient crown.
The time, too, for resistance, seemed as favourable as Russia could ever
expect. The war of Spain, though chequered in its fortune, was in no
respect near a sudden end. It occupied 250,000 of the best and oldest
French troops; demanded also an immense expenditure, and diminished, of
course, the power of the French Emperor to carry on the war on the
frontiers of Russia. A conclusion of these wasting hostilities would
have rendered him far more formidable with respect to the quality, as
well as the number, of his disposable forces, and it seemed the interest
of Russia not to wait till that period should arrive.
The same arguments which recommended to Russia to choose the immediate
moment for resisting the extravagant pretensions of France, ought, in
point of prudence, to have induced Napoleon to desist from urging such
pretensions, and to avoid the voluntarily engaging in two wars at the
same time, both of a character decidedly national, and to only one of
which he could give the influence of his own talents and his own
presence. His best and wisest generals, whom he consulted, or, to speak
more properly, to whom he opened his purpose, used various arguments to
induce him to alter, or at least defer his resolution. He himself
hesitated for more than a year, and was repeatedly upon the point of
settling with Russia the grounds of disagreement betwixt them upon
amicable terms.
[Sidenote: COMPLAINTS OF THE CZAR.]
The reasons of complaint, on the part of the Czar, were four in number.
I. The alarm given to Russia by the extension of the grand duchy of
Warsaw by the treaty of Schoenbrun, as if it were destined to be the
central part of an independent state, or kingdom, in Poland, to which
those provinces of that dismembered country, which had become part of
Russia, were at some convenient time to be united. On this point the
Czar demanded an explicit engagement, on the part of the French Emperor,
that the kingdom of Poland should not be again established. Napoleon
declined this form of guarantee, as it seemed to engage him to warrant
Russia against an event which might happen without his co-operation; but
he offered to pledge himself that he would not favour any enterprise
which should, directly or indirectly, lead to the re-establishment of
Poland as an independent state. This modified acquiescence in what was
required by Russia fell considerably short of what the Czar wished; for
the stipulation, as at first worded, would have amounted to an
engagement on the part of France to join in opposing any step towards
Polish independence; whereas, according to the modification which it
received at Paris, it only implied that France should remain neuter if
such an attempt should take place.
II. The wrong done by including the duchy of Oldenburg, though
guaranteed by the treaty of Tilsit to its prince, the Czar's near
relative and ally, in the territory annexed to France, admitted of being
compensated by an indemnification. But Russia desired that this
indemnification should be either the city of Dantzic, or some equally
important territory, on the frontiers of the grand duchy of Warsaw,
which might offer an additional guarantee against the apprehended
enlargement of that state. France would not listen to this, though she
did not object to compensation elsewhere.
III. The third point in question, was the degree to which the Russian
commerce with England was to be restricted. Napoleon proposed to grant
some relaxation on the occasions where the produce of Russia was
exported in exchange for that of England, to be effected by the way of
mutual licenses.
IV. It was proposed to revise the Russian tariff of 1810, so as, without
injuring the interests of Russia, it might relax the heavy duties
imposed on the objects of French commerce.
From this statement, which comprehends the last basis on which Napoleon
expressed himself willing to treat, it is quite evident, that had there
not been a deeper feeling of jealousy and animosity betwixt the two
Emperors, than those expressed in the subjects of actual debate betwixt
them, these might have been accommodated in an amicable way. But as it
was impossible for Napoleon to endure being called to account, like a
sovereign of the second rate, or at least in the tone of an equal, by
the Emperor of Russia; so the latter, more and more alarmed by the
motions of the French armies, which were advancing into Pomerania, could
not persuade himself, that, in agreeing to admit the present grounds of
complaint, Napoleon meant more than to postpone the fatal struggle for
superiority, until he should find a convenient time to commence it with
a more absolute prospect of success.
In the meantime, and ere the negotiations were finally broken off,
Buonaparte's counsellors urged him with as much argument as they dared,
to desist from running the hazard of an enterprise so remote, so
hazardous, and so little called for. They contended, that no French
interest, and no national point of honour, were involved in the
disagreement which had arisen. The principles upon which the points of
dispute might be settled, being in a manner agreed upon, they argued
that their master should stop in their military preparations. To march
an army into Prussia, and to call forth the Prussians as auxiliaries,
would, they contended, be using measures towards Russia, which could not
but bring on the war which they anxiously deprecated. To submit to
menaces supported by demonstrations of open force, would be destructive
of the influence of Russia, both at home and abroad. She could not be
expected to give way without a struggle.
[Sidenote: WAR WITH RUSSIA.]
These advisers allowed, that a case might be conceived for justifying
an exertion to destroy the power of Russia, a case arising out of the
transactions between France and the other states of Europe, and out of
the apprehension that these states, aggrieved and irritated by the
conduct of France, might be tempted to seek a leader, patron, and
protector, in the Emperor Alexander. But this extremity, they alleged,
could not exist so long as France had the means of avoiding a perilous
war, by a mitigation of her policy towards her vassals and auxiliaries;
for if the states whose revolt (so to call it) was apprehended, could be
reconciled to France by a more lenient course of measures to be adopted
towards them, they would lose all temptation to fly to Russia as a
protector. In such case the power of Russia would no longer give
jealousy to France, or compel her to rush to a dubious conflict, for the
purpose of diminishing an influence which could not then become
dangerous to the southern empire, by depriving France of her clientage.
It might have been added, though it could not be so broadly spoken out,
that in this point of view nothing would have been more easy for France,
than to modify or soften her line of policy in favour of the inferior
states, in whose favour the Russian interference was expected or
apprehended. That policy had uniformly been a system of insult and
menace. The influence which France had gained in Europe grew less out of
treaty than fear, founded on the recollection of former wars. All the
states of Germany felt the melancholy consequences of the existence of
despotic power vested in men, who, like Napoleon himself, and the
military governors whom he employed, were new to the exercise and
enjoyment of their authority; and, on the other hand, the French Emperor
and his satellites felt, towards the people of the conquered, or
subjected states, the constant apprehension which a conscious sense of
injustice produces in the minds of oppressors, namely, that the
oppressed only watch for a safe opportunity to turn against them. There
was, therefore, no French interest, or even point of honour, which
called on Napoleon to make war on Alexander; and the temptation seems to
have amounted solely to the desire on Napoleon's part to fight a great
battle--to gain a great victory--to occupy, with his victorious army,
another great capital--and, in fine, to subject to his arms the power of
Russia, which, of all the states on the continent, remained the only one
that could be properly termed independent of France.
It was in this light that the question of peace and war was viewed by
the French politicians of the day; and it is curious to observe, in the
reports we have of their arguments, the total absence of principle which
they display in the examination of it. They dwell on the difficulty of
Napoleon's undertaking, upon its dangers, upon its expense, upon the
slender prospect of any remuneration by the usual modes of confiscation,
plunder, or levy of contributions. They enlarge, too, upon the little
probability there was that success in the intended war would bring to a
conclusion the disastrous contest in Spain; and all these various
arguments are insinuated or urged with more or less vehemence, according
to the character, the station, or the degree of intimacy with Napoleon,
of the counsellor who ventured to use the topics. But among his
advisers, none that we read or hear of, had the open and manly courage
to ask, Where was the justice of this attack upon Russia? What had she
done to merit it? The Emperors were friends by the treaty of Tilsit,
confirmed by personal intimacy and the closest intercourse at Erfurt.
How had they ceased to be such? What had happened since that period to
place Russia, then the friend and confessed equal of France, in the
situation of a subordinate and tributary state? On what pretence did
Napoleon confiscate to his own use the duchy of Oldenburg, acknowledged
as the property of Alexander's brother-in-law, by an express article in
the treaty of Tilsit? By what just right could he condemn the Russian
nation to all the distresses of his Anti-commercial System, while he
allowed them to be a free and independent state?--Above all, while he
considered them as a sovereign and a people entitled to be treated with
the usual respect due between powers that are connected by friendly
treaties, with what pretence of justice, or even decency, could he
proceed to enforce claims so unfounded in themselves, by introducing his
own forces on their frontier, and arming their neighbours against them
for the same purpose? Of these pleas, in moral justice, there was not a
word urged; nor was silence wonderful on this fruitful topic, since to
insist upon it would have been to strike at the fundamental principle of
Buonaparte's policy, which was, never to neglect a present advantage for
the sake of observing a general principle. "Let us hear of no general
principles," said Buonaparte's favourite minister of the period. "Ours
is a government not regulated by theory, but by emerging circumstances."
[Sidenote: FOUCHÉ'S MEMORIAL.]
We ought not to omit to mention that Fouché, among others, took up a
testimony against the Russian war. He had been permitted to return to
his chateau of Ferrières, near Paris, under the apology that the air of
Italy did not agree with his constitution. But Napoleon distrusted him,
and the police were commissioned to watch with the utmost accuracy the
proceedings of their late master. Fouché was well aware of this; and,
desirous that his remonstrance with the Emperor should have all the
force of an unexpected argument, he shut himself up in the strictest
seclusion while engaged in composing a production, which perhaps he
hoped might be a means of recalling him to recollection, if not to
favour.[89]
In an able and eloquent memorial, Fouché reminded Buonaparte, that he
was already the absolute master of the finest empire the world had ever
seen; and that all the lessons of history went to demonstrate the
impossibility of attaining universal monarchy. The French empire had
arrived, according to the reasoning of this able statesman, at that
point when its ruler should rather think of securing and consolidating
his present acquisitions, than of achieving farther conquests, since,
whatever his empire might acquire in extent, it was sure to lose in
solidity. Fouché stated the extent of the country which Napoleon was
about to invade, the poverty of the soil, the rigour of the climate, and
the distance which each fresh victory must remove him from his
resources, annoyed as his communications were sure to be by nations of
Cossacks and Tartars. He implored the Emperor to remember the fate of
Charles XII. of Sweden. "If that warlike monarch," he said, "had not,
like Napoleon, half Europe in arms at his back, neither had his
opponent, the Czar Peter, four hundred thousand soldiers, and fifty
thousand Cossacks. The invader, it was stated, would have against him
the dislike of the higher ranks, the fanaticism of the peasantry, the
exertions of soldiers accustomed to the severity of the climate. There
were, besides, to be dreaded, in case of the slightest reverse, the
intrigues of the English, the fickleness of his continental allies, and
even the awakening of discontent and conspiracy in France itself, should
an idea generally arise, that he was sacrificing the welfare of the
state to the insatiable desire of fresh enterprises and distant
conquests."
Fouché presented himself at the Tuileries, and requested an audience of
the Emperor, hoping, doubtless, that the unexpected circumstance of his
appearing there, and the reasoning in his memorial, would excite
Napoleon's attention. To his great surprise, Napoleon, with an air of
easy indifference, began the audience. "I am no stranger, Monsieur le
Duc, to your errand here. You have a memorial to present me--give it me;
I will read it, though I know already its contents. The war with Russia
is not more agreeable to you than that of Spain."--"Your Imperial
Majesty will pardon my having ventured to offer some observations on
this important crisis?" said the statesman, astonished to find himself
anticipated, when he believed he had laboured in the most absolute
secrecy.
"It is no crisis," resumed Napoleon; "merely a war of a character
entirely political. Spain will fall when I have annihilated the English
influence at St. Petersburgh. I have 800,000 men; and to one who has
such an army, Europe is but an old prostitute, who must obey his
pleasure. Was it not yourself who told me that the word _impossible_ was
not good French? I regulate my conduct more on the opinion of my army
than the sentiments of you grandees, who are become too rich; and while
you pretend anxiety for me, only are apprehensive of the general
confusion which would follow my death. Don't disquiet yourself, but
consider the Russian war as a wise measure, demanded by the true
interests of France, and the general security. Am I to blame, because
the great degree of power I have already attained forces me to assume
the dictatorship of the world? My destiny is not yet accomplished--my
present situation is but a sketch of a picture which I must finish.
There must be one universal European code, one court of appeal. The same
money, the same weights and measures, the same laws, must have currency
through Europe. I must make one nation out of all the European states,
and Paris must be the capital of the world. At present you no longer
serve me well, because you think my affairs are in danger; but before a
year is over you will assist me with the same zeal and ardour as at the
periods of Marengo and Austerlitz. You will see more than all this--it
is I who assure you of it. Adieu, Monsieur le Duc. Do not play the
disgraced courtier, or the captious critic of public affairs; and be so
good as to put a little confidence in your Emperor."[90]
He then turned his back on Fouché, and left him to reflect by what means
he, who so well knew all the machinations of the police, could himself
have become exposed to their universal vigilance, with some cause,
perhaps, to rejoice, that his secret employment, though unpleasing to
Buonaparte, was not of a character to attract punishment as well as
animadversion.[91]
[Sidenote: RUPTURE WITH RUSSIA.]
As Napoleon discountenanced and bore down the remonstrances of the
subtle Fouché, so he represented to his various advisers the war upon
which he was unalterably determined, in the light most proper to bring
them over to his own opinion. To the army in general the mere name of
war was in itself a sufficient recommendation. It comprehended
preferment, employment, plunder, distinction, and pensions. To the
generals, it afforded mareschals' batons; to the mareschals, crowns and
sceptres; to the civilians he urged, as to Fouché, that it was a war of
policy--of necessity--the last act in the drama, but indispensably
requisite to conclude the whole; to his most intimate friends he
expressed his conviction that his fortune could not stand still--that it
was founded on public opinion--and that, if he did not continue to
advance, he must necessarily retrograde. To his uncle, Cardinal Fesch,
he used a still more extraordinary argument. This prelate, a devout
Catholic, had begun to have compunction about his nephew's behaviour
towards the Pope; and these sentiments mingled like an ominous feeling
with the alarms excited by the risks of this tremendous undertaking.
With more than usual freedom, he conjured his kinsman to abstain from
tempting Providence. He entreated him not to defy heaven and earth, the
wrath of man, and the fury of the elements, at the same time; and
expressed his apprehension that he must at length sink under the weight
of the enmity which he incurred daily.[92] The only answer which
Buonaparte vouchsafed, was to lead the cardinal to the window, and,
opening the casement, and pointing upwards, to ask him, "If he saw
yonder star?"--"No, Sire," answered the astonished cardinal. "But I see
it," answered Buonaparte; and turned from his relation as if he had
fully confuted his arguments.
This speech might admit of two meanings; either that Napoleon wished in
this manner to express that his own powers of penetration were superior
to those of the cardinal, or it might have reference to a certain
superstitious confidence in his predestined good fortune, which, we have
already observed, he was known to entertain. But as it was not
Napoleon's fashion, whatever reliance he might place on such auguries,
to neglect any means of ensuring success within his power, we are next
to inquire what political measures he had taken to carry on the proposed
Russian war to advantage.
FOOTNOTES:
[88] Fouché, tom. ii., p. 71.
[89] Fouché, tom. ii., p. 80.
[90] Mémoires de Fouché, tom. ii., p. 90.
[91] Fouché afterwards remembered, that an individual in his
neighbourhood, mayor of a municipality, and whom he himself had employed
in matters of police, had one morning intruded rather hastily on him in
his study, under pretext of pleading the cause of a distressed tenant;
and concluded, that while he was searching for the papers concerning his
visitor's ostensible business, Mr. Mayor had an opportunity to glance at
the sheets on his scrutoire, where the repetition of V. M. I. and R. M.
(intimating your Imperial and Royal Majesty,) betrayed that he was
drawing up a memorial to Napoleon, and a word or two of the context
explained its purport.
[92] It is not unworthy of notice, that the Emperor's mother (Madame
Mère, as she was termed) always expressed a presentiment, that the
fortunes of her family, splendid as they were, would be altered before
her death; and when ridiculed by her children for her frugal
disposition, she used to allege she was saving money for them in their
distress; and in fact she lived to apply her boards to that purpose.--S.