The autumn of 1914 saw the appearance of a new Separatist paper,

_Eire-Ireland_, which appeared as a weekly on October 26th and was changed

to a daily after the second number. It is significant of the change in

Irish feeling that it was now possible to run a Separatist daily paper in

Dublin, and of the gradual rapprochement between Irish parties that this

paper, intended as the organ of the Irish Volunteers, was edited by Mr.

Arthur Griffith, the founder of the Sinn Fein movement. Its attitude

towards the war was defined in an article by Roger Casement in the first

number: "Ireland has no quarrel with the German people or just cause of

offence against them.... Ireland has suffered at the hands of British

administrators a more prolonged series of evils deliberately inflicted

than any other community of civilized men." It emphasized the view of the

Volunteers that Mr. Redmond's advice to take their place in the firing

line was out of harmony with their principles. "The Irish Volunteers had

from the beginning and still have but a single duty--to secure and

safeguard the rights and liberties of Ireland." The new daily contained a

column "The War Day by Day" in which a critical analysis of the military

situation was attempted. While most of the other Irish papers merely

reproduced the amateur war criticisms of Fleet Street, the editor of

_Eire_, assuming that English newspapers were giving only one side of the

case, attempted an independent study of the situation, which was made to

appear much less favourable to the Allies than was asserted by other Irish

papers. Stories of German atrocities were analyzed and ridiculed. The

fortunes of the Irish regiments were followed with a jealous eye: it was

asserted that they were being sacrificed unnecessarily while English

regiments were spared, and the Government was challenged to prepare and

publish complete casualty lists for the Irish regiments of the line. The

protest of the German professors against the alleged Allied calumnies was

printed in full and annotated with sympathy. The assurance given to Roger

Casement by the German Acting-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to

the contemplated action of German troops if they should land in Ireland

was printed as a document of first-rate international importance. It was

assumed that the Ballot Act would be enforced in Ireland and passive

resistance to its enforcement was urged from the first number of the

paper. _Eire_ did not run for much more than six weeks. Its last number

(December 4) was a broad sheet announcing that the printer, whose premises

had been entered by a military force which had confiscated his property,

felt unable to continue the printing of the paper.

_Eire_ did not so much make, as voice, the opinions of a considerable

section of Irish Nationalist opinion. The newspapers were scanned eagerly

every morning all over Ireland for tidings of the Irish regiments. It was

known that they were engaged, that they were outnumbered, that they would

fight like lions ("the Gaels went out to battle but they always fell"): a

disquieting and ominous silence reigned as to their fate. It was assumed

that the news was bad and that it was being kept back: it began to be

asserted that they were being put upon forlorn hopes to spare the more

valued English regiments: and even those who did not credit the suspicion

felt uneasy when it was expressed. It may have been necessary to refrain

from telling the whole truth in official reports, but every course has its

disadvantages and, so far as Ireland was concerned, this had the result of

arousing suspicion and distrust. And to the question "Why, if these men

can fight and die for the freedom of others, are they not considered

worthy of the freedom they desire for themselves?" the answers did not

carry conviction.

The official "War News" printed in the Irish papers was read with

detachment and reserve; stories of German atrocities were received with

unimpressionable scepticism. This was not due to any pro-German bias, or

to any Sinn Fein propaganda. Peasants in remote villages who never saw

any paper but an odd copy of the _Freeman's Journal_ or the _Irish Daily

Independent_, and who were Redmondites to a man, discussed these matters

with a completely open mind, and with (to those who did not know them)

surprising acumen. People accustomed for years to read that their county

or their province, in which some unpopular grazier had been boycotted, was

"seething with outrage and disorder," to be told that a district in which

there was known not to be as much crime in a year as there was in an

English district of the same size every month was "in a state bordering on

almost complete lawlessness," were not moved when the Germans were charged

on the same authority with crimes against civilization. The word of "our

English correspondent" was simply "not evidence" against anybody. This

invincible scepticism, born of experience, was quite wrongly interpreted

as being the result of "pro-German" sympathies when it proved an

unexpected obstacle to the recruiting campaign.

The gradual growth of Sinn Fein and anti-English (which was only

accidentally and not on principle pro-German) sentiment during the war,

and the increasing difficulties found in the way of the recruiting

campaign, were due mainly to a growing disbelief in the sincerity of

English statesmen in their dealings with Ireland. The Government had gone

too far in the direction of Home Rule to make Unionists sure that the

promised Amending Bill would secure that they should not be "coerced": it

had not gone far enough to make Nationalists sure that it really meant to

do what it had promised. The result was the conviction upon all hands that

their rights must be secured by their own efforts not by reliance upon the

lukewarm sympathy of others. This conviction was not a matter of a sudden

growth nor did it always find expression in the same way: it acted at once

in favour of, and to the detriment of, recruiting: it was professed both

by Nationalists and by Unionists. At first recruits joined because the war

was just, because the Empire was in danger, because England had granted

Ireland a "charter of liberty," because the civilization of Europe was

threatened, because there was fighting afoot. Probably the majority

enlisted for one or other of these reasons. But the theory of "a free gift

of a free people" expounded by Mr. Asquith in Dublin fell more and more

into the background. It began to be represented on both sides that the

more recruits either party sent to the war the stronger would be the lien

of that party upon the sympathy of the English Government. Unionists whose

blood had flowed for England in Flanders could not be abandoned after such

a sacrifice: Nationalists who had given their best and bravest to the

cause of freedom could not be denied the freedom for which such a price

had been paid. The official recruiting campaign wavered in its appeal

between the two points. Its minor ineptitudes need hardly be taken into

account. It was hardly politic to cover the walls of police barracks in

Protestant villages in Ulster with green placards drawing attention to a

few weighty words of Cardinal Logue: these follies did neither harm nor

good. But it was different when appeals to the chivalry and bravery of

Irishmen alternated with deductions from the famous phrase about "the

rights of small nations." When Irish Nationalists were implored to rally

to the defence of the Friend of Little Nations the size of Ireland was not

likely to be forgotten. The inference that in fighting for the liberties

of small nations Irishmen would be helping their own nation to secure the

same liberty was the inference intended: but it was not always the

inference actually drawn. The person who first conceived the idea of

making use of that phrase for recruiting purposes in Ireland did the cause

of recruiting an unforeseen but serious disservice. Was it, after all,

really true (it was asked) that England could not recognize the freedom of

Ireland until Ireland had first helped England to force Germany to

recognize the freedom of Belgium? Was the freedom of Ireland then not a

matter of right but the result of a bargain--the equivalent of how many

fighting men? Had England been the friend of small nations before the war,

was she to be their friend during the war, or was Ireland only to help her

to be their friend after the war was over? The right of Ireland to more

freedom than she had enjoyed had seemed to be recognized before the war

had been spoken of; what had become of the recognition of it? And even

bargaining, however distasteful, has its usages: it was no bargain when

one side was called upon to pay up and the other carefully refrained from

promising anything definite in return.

The bulk of the recruits enlisted during the first year of the war, and

enlisted for worthy and honourable motives: when recruiting became, as it

did become later, a question of party tactics the results were less

favourable. But quite early in the war it became plain that there was

going to be a contest between the two Irish parties as to which should

have most to show for itself at the end, and there was no burning desire

to assist political opponents to obtain recruits. Sir Edward Carson

refused absolutely to stand on the same recruiting platform as Mr.

Redmond; the Belfast Unionist papers found it a grave lapse from principle

in the present Lord Chancellor of England that he addressed a recruiting

meeting in Liverpool in the company of Home Rulers. The Ulster Volunteer

Force was informed practically that it had a two-fold duty, to fight for

the Empire abroad, and to keep up the organization at home. It was plain

from the first that in Ireland there was to be no "party truce," and it

was recognized on all hands before long that when the war was over the old

fight was to be renewed. The position of the Home Rule Act, penned in the

Statute Book, with an Amending Bill waiting to tear it to pieces when the

time came for it to be allowed out, made this inevitable. And the

Government did not find it in its heart to hold an even balance between

the parties: and when the balance began to dip the end was in sight for

those who had eyes to see.

The only party really able to turn to account the situation thus created

was the Sinn Fein party. It had preached for years that the English

governing classes, indeed the English nation, were not, in spite of their

apparent readiness to listen to the Parliamentary Party, the friends of

Irish Nationalism in any real sense: that they had no intention (and never

had) of satisfying the just claims of Ireland: that the Parliamentarians

were mere pawns in a party game, to be sacrificed when it suited both or

either of the English parties: that the word of English statesmen could

not be trusted, and that Ireland had nothing to gain from them: that

self-reliance, vigilance and distrust of England were "the sinews of good

sense" in Irish politics. It had hinted, not obscurely, that the

opportunity of Ireland would come when England should be involved in a

European war, and that Ireland must be prepared when the day came to use

the opportunity. It now pointed a triumphant finger to what was going on

in Ireland and asked which had been the truer prophet, itself or the

Parliamentary Party. It quoted the returns of recruiting in Ulster in

support of its thesis: "The fact that out of 200,000 Unionists of military

age in Ireland--men who talked Empire, sang Empire and protested they

would die for the British Empire--four out of every five are still at

home, declaring they will not have Home Rule, is proof that the Irish

Unionist knows his present business." That Irish soldiers were to be used

to further English interests, and not the cause of Ireland, was (it held)

proved by extracts from English newspapers, where in unguarded moments the

naked truth peeped out: it gave prominence to a quotation from the

_Liverpool Post_ of September 12, 1914: "His Majesty could make a

triumphal tour of Ireland, North, South, East and West, and in reply to

his personal appeal, there would be 300,000 Irishmen of all creeds and

classes for the Front in less than a week. In England the question becomes

more and more important in the interests of the efficiency of our trade,

whether we can spare any more skilled mechanics for the ranks of battle.

The capture of the German trade is almost as vital to the existence of the

Empire as the destruction of Prussian militarism."

By the end of 1914 all avowedly Sinn Fein papers had been suppressed, and

the two American papers, the _Gaelic American_ and the _Irish World_, had

been prohibited in Ireland. The latter had been a supporter of Mr.

Redmond's policy but had parted company with him on the question of

recruiting in Ireland. The editor of _Sinn Fein_ countered the suppression

of his paper by an ingenious device. He began to publish a bi-weekly

called _Scissors and Paste_, which contained nothing but extracts from

other English, Irish, Colonial and American papers. It was introduced to

the reader in the only editorial it contained, entitled "Ourselves": "It

is high treason," it ran, "for an Irishman to argue with the sword the

right of his small nationality to equal political freedom with Belgium or

Servia or Hungary. It is destruction to the property of his printer now

when he argues it with the pen. Hence while England is fighting the battle

of the Small Nationalities, _Ireland_ is reduced to _Scissors and Paste_.

Up to the present the sale and use of these instruments have not been

prohibited by the British Government in Ireland." The columns of the

_Times_, the _Daily Mail_, and the _Morning Post_ supplied the German

Wireless messages: the _New York Times_ was drawn upon for James O'Donnell

Bennett's articles protesting against the reports of German atrocities. In

addition it printed suitable extracts from _The Reliques of Father Prout_,

from Barry's _Songs of Ireland_, Thomas Davis's _Essays_ and Sir Samuel

Ferguson: it reprinted Curran's speech in defence of the printer of _The

Press_ in 1797. It ransacked the _Daily Mail_ for that journal's vigorous

denunciations of the French in 1899: "If they cannot cease their insults

their colonies will be taken from them and given to Germany and Italy--we

ourselves want nothing more.... France will be rolled in the blood and mud

in which her Press daily wallows." The paper ran for a little over a

month. Its undoing was an extract from the _Irish Times_, a copy of a

notice posted on a Sunday morning in January, 1915, in places near a

number of Roman Catholic churches in Wexford: "People of Wexford, take no

notice of the police order to destroy your own property and leave your

own homes if a German army lands in Ireland. When the Germans come they

will come as friends and to put an end to English rule in Ireland.

Therefore stay in your homes and assist as far as possible the German

troops. Any stores, hay, corn or forage taken by the Germans will be paid

for by them."

Just before the disappearance of _Scissors and Paste_, the _Irish Worker_,

three weeks after its suppression, appeared again in Glasgow, where it was

printed by the Socialist Labour Party, and began to circulate once more in

Ireland.

After five months Mr. Arthur Griffith was again able to start a paper. The

Dublin printers could not be induced to take the risk of printing for him

again: but Belfast supplied one with the necessary enterprise. On June 19,

1915, _Nationality_ appeared as a penny weekly paper and continued to

appear until the Easter Rising in 1916. In tone _Nationality_ was a

reproduction of its predecessors and as the main characteristic of Sinn

Fein propaganda was its directness and simplicity two extracts from its

columns will suffice. An editorial (signed C.) on "The Fenian Faith"

written towards the end of 1915 contains the following: "The Fenians and

the Fenian faith incarnated in Allen, Larkin and O'Brien were of a

fighting and revolutionary epoch. They can only be commemorated by men of

another fighting and revolutionary generation. That generation we have

with us to-day. For we have the material, the men and stuff of war, the

faith and purpose and cause for revolution.... We shall have Ireland

illumined with a light before which even the Martyrs' will pale: the light

of Freedom, of a deed done and action taken and a blow struck for the Old

Land"; and a month or so later: "The things that count in Ireland against

English Conscription are national determination, serviceable weapons and

the knowledge of how to use them." Under the stress of circumstances Sinn

Fein seemed to have abandoned the policy of the days of peace and to have

come round in time of war to the policy which, even two years before the

war, had been enunciated in _Irish Freedom_: "Ireland can be freed by

force of arms; _that_ is the fact which ever must be borne in mind. The

responsibility rests with the men of this generation. They can strike with

infinitely greater hopes of success than could their fathers and their

grandsires: but if they let this chance slip ... if they strike no blow

for their country, whilst England herself is in handgrips with the most

powerful nation in Europe, then the opportunity will have passed and

Ireland will be more utterly under the heel of England than ever she was

since the Union." This was written in September, 1912. But the task of

putting the policy into practice, of welding the (at times) discordant

elements of anti-Parliamentarian Nationalism together and making possible

a united effort was reserved for other hands and another mind than those

of the founder of Sinn Fein.

During the vigorous years of its youth Sinn Fein had not confined its

propagandist activities to public meetings, the foundation of branches

and the publication of a paper. The National Council of Sinn Fein had

issued a series of "National Council Pamphlets" dealing with those aspects

of Sinn Fein policy upon which the public seemed to require instruction.

The first of these was a general exposition of the Sinn Fein policy by Mr.

Griffith. Others were "The Purchase of the Railways," "England's Colossal

Robbery of Ireland," a study of the financial relations between the two

countries since the Act of Union, "Ireland and the British Armed Forces,"

"Constitutionalism and Sinn Fein" and "How Ireland is Taxed," an

exposition of the fact (often ignored) that under the Union Ireland is the

most heavily taxed country in Europe. Finally, in 1912, a pamphlet by Mr.

Griffith, "The Home Rule Bill Examined," was a general review of the

powers conferred and withheld by the Home Rule Bill and an examination of

the real bearing of that measure upon the political and economic situation

of Ireland. The increasing difficulties which attended the publication of

a newspaper during the war, the increased demand for information upon the

situation created by it, the increasing number of those who felt that they

had something to say which required more space than could be afforded in a

newspaper, led to a revival of the publication of pamphlets. Early in 1915

a series of "Tracts for the Times" was projected by the Irish Publicity

League. The first of these was a tract "What Emmet means in 1915,"

significant of the direction in which minds were turning at the time. It

was followed by "Shall Ireland be Divided?" an impassioned protest against

the policy of partition and by "The Secret History of the Irish

Volunteers" (which ran through several editions), an account by The

O'Rahilly of the formation of the Volunteers, their policy, their attempts

to secure arms and their relations with the Parliamentary Party. The

traditional Sinn Fein view was enforced in "When the Government Publishes

Sedition," an analysis of the official census returns, showing that under

the Union the population of Ireland had been reduced by one-half, and in

two pamphlets on "Daniel O'Connell and Sinn Fein" an attempt was made to

commend the policy by an argument that O'Connell both in his methods and

his aims was really a Sinn Feiner, and by an exposition ("How Ireland is

Plundered") of the question of the Financial Relations in O'Connell's day

and since. Other pamphlets were "What it Feels Like" on the prison

experiences of the writer who had been imprisoned under the Defence of the

Realm Act for his political activities, "Ascendancy While You Wait" and

"Why the Martyrs of Manchester Died." During the same time the Cumann na

mBan, the women's branch of the Irish Volunteers, added to their

activities the publication of a "National Series" of pamphlets "Why

Ireland is Poor--English Laws and Irish Industries," "Dean Swift on the

Situation" and "The Spanish War," a reprint of a pamphlet published in

1790 by Wolfe Tone, urging the Irish Parliament to take into account in

the consideration of the threatened war with Spain solely and simply the

interests of Ireland, the only interests which it should allow itself to

consider. The Committee of Public Safety also in 1915 published a pamphlet

on "The Defence of the Realm Act in Ireland" showing how the Act was

administered for the suppression of Nationalist propaganda. The speech

which Mr. F. Sheehy-Skeffington delivered in the dock when charged under

the same Act with interfering with recruiting was published as a pamphlet

about the same time. The articles contributed to _Irish Freedom_ by P. H.

Pearse were reprinted under the title of "From a Hermitage" in the autumn

of 1915 as one of the "Bodenstown Series" of pamphlets, the first of which

had been Mr. Pearse's "How Does She Stand?" a reprint of two speeches

delivered in America in 1914 at Emmet Commemorations in New York and

Brooklyn and of the eloquent speech delivered at the grave of Wolfe Tone

in Bodenstown Churchyard in 1913. The funeral of O'Donovan Rossa in

August, 1915, also produced some pamphlets on Rossa's life and his

significance as a Fenian leader and a protagonist of the Irish Republican

cause. These pamphlets, and others, had a wide circulation; they were

eagerly discussed, especially among young Nationalists; they widened the

rift between the Parliamentary Party and their opponents, and had much to

do with the shaping of Irish Nationalist opinion.

The Evolution of Sinn Fein · 第 11 / 17 段