THE battle of Lundy’s Lane lasted five hours, and Drummond
believed the American force to be five thousand men. In truth, at no
moment were two thousand American rank-and-file on the field.[93]
“The loss sustained by the enemy in this severe action,” reported
Drummond,[94] “cannot be estimated at less than fifteen hundred men,
including several hundred prisoners left in our hands.” Drummond’s
estimate of American losses, as of American numbers, was double the
reality. Brown reported a total loss, certainly severe enough, of eight
hundred and fifty-three men,--one hundred and seventy-one killed,
five hundred and seventy-two wounded, one hundred and ten missing.
Drummond reported a total loss of eight hundred and seventy-eight
men,--eighty-four killed, five hundred and fifty-nine wounded, one
hundred and ninety-three missing, and forty-two prisoners. On both
sides the battle was murderous. Brown and Scott were both badly
wounded, the latter so severely that he could not resume his command
during the war. Drummond and Riall were also wounded. On both sides,
but especially on the American, the loss in officers was very great.
The effect of the British artillery on Scott’s brigade, while daylight
lasted, had been excessive, while at that period of the battle the
British could have suffered comparatively little. Among Scott’s
battalions the severest loss was that of Brady’s Twenty-second
regiment, from Pennsylvania,--at the opening of the campaign two
hundred and twenty-eight strong, officers and men. After Lundy’s Lane
the Twenty-second reported thirty-six killed, ninety wounded, and
seventeen missing. The Ninth, Leavenworth’s Massachusetts regiment,
which was returned as numbering three hundred and forty-eight officers
and men June 31, reported sixteen killed, ninety wounded, and fifteen
missing at Lundy’s Lane. The Eleventh, McNeil’s Vermont battalion,
which numbered three hundred and four officers and men June 30,
returned twenty-eight killed, one hundred and two wounded, and three
missing. The Twenty-fifth, Jesup’s Connecticut corps, numbering
three hundred and seventy officers and men at the outset, reported
twenty-eight killed, sixty-six wounded, and fifteen missing. These four
regiments, composing Scott’s brigade, numbered thirteen hundred and
eighty-eight officers and men June 30, and lost in killed, wounded,
and missing at Lundy’s Lane five hundred and six men, after losing two
hundred and fifty-seven at Chippawa.
Ripley’s brigade suffered less; but although, after the British guns
were captured, the Americans were exposed only to musketry fire, the
brigades of Ripley and Porter reported a loss of two hundred and
fifty-eight men, killed, wounded, and missing. The three artillery
companies suffered a loss of forty-five men, including Captain Ritchie.
The total loss of eight hundred and fifty-three men was as nearly as
possible one third of the entire army, including the unengaged pickets
and other details.
When Ripley, following the artillery, arrived in camp toward one
o’clock in the morning,[95] Brown sent for him, and gave him an
order to return at day-break to the battle-field with all the force
he could collect, “and there to meet and beat the enemy if he again
appeared.”[96] The order was impossible to execute. The whole force
capable of fighting another battle did not exceed fifteen or sixteen
hundred effectives, almost without officers, and exhausted by the
night battle.[97] The order was given at one o’clock in the morning;
the army must employ the remainder of the night to reorganize its
battalions and replace its officers, and was expected to march at four
o’clock to regain a battle-field which Brown had felt himself unable
to maintain at midnight, although he then occupied it, and held all
the enemy’s artillery. The order was futile. Major Leavenworth of
the Ninth regiment, who though wounded commanded the first brigade
after the disability of Scott, Brady, Jesup, and McNeil, thought it
“the most consummate folly to attempt to regain possession of the
field of battle,” and declared that every officer he met thought like
himself.[98]
Yet Ripley at dawn began to collect the troops, and after the
inevitable delay caused by the disorganization, marched at nine
o’clock, with about fifteen hundred men, to reconnoitre the enemy. At
about the same time Drummond advanced a mile, and took position in
order of battle near the Falls, his artillery in the road, supported by
a column of infantry. A month earlier Drummond, like Riall, would have
attacked, and with a force greater by one half could hardly have failed
to destroy Ripley’s shattered regiments; but Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane
had already produced an effect on the British army. Drummond believed
that the Americans numbered five thousand, and his own force in the
ranks was about twenty-two hundred men. He allowed Ripley to retire
unmolested, and remained at the Falls the whole day.
Ripley returned to camp at noon and made his report to Brown. The
question requiring immediate decision was whether to maintain or
abandon the line of the Chippawa River. Much could be said on both
sides, and only officers on the spot could decide with certainty how
the enemy could be placed under most disadvantage, and how the army
could be saved from needless dangers. Ripley, cautious by nature,
recommended a retreat to Fort Erie. With the assent, as he supposed, of
Brown and Porter,[99] Ripley immediately broke up the camp at Chippawa,
and began the march to Fort Erie, sixteen miles in the rear. Although
complaint was made of the retreat as confused, hasty, and unnecessary,
it was conducted with no more loss or confusion than usual in such
movements,[100] and its military propriety was to be judged by its
effects on the campaign.
The same evening, July 26, the army arrived at Fort Erie and camped.
Brown was taken from Chippawa across the river to recover from his
wound. Scott was also removed to safe quarters. Ripley was left with
the remains of the army camped on a plain, outside the unfinished
bastions of Fort Erie, where the destruction of his entire force
was inevitable in case of a reverse. Ripley favored a withdrawal
of the army to the American side; but Brown, from his sick bed at
Buffalo, rejected the idea of a retreat, and fortunately Drummond’s
reinforcements arrived slowly. The worst result of the difference
in opinion was to make Brown harsh toward Ripley, who--although
his record was singular in showing only patient, excellent, and
uniformly successful service--leaned toward caution, while Brown and
Scott thought chiefly of fighting. The combination produced admirable
results; but either officer alone might have failed.
[Illustration:
PLAN
of the Attack and Defence
of Fort Erie,
By JN. LE BRETON, LT. DY. AG. Q. M.
GEN’L.
_Ms. British Archives._
STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y.]
Distrusting Ripley, and angry at losing the British cannon at Lundy’s
Lane as well as at the retreat from Chippawa, Brown wrote, August 7,
to the Secretary of War a report containing an improper implication,
which he afterward withdrew, that Ripley was wanting either in courage
or capacity.[101] He also summoned Brigadier-General Gaines from
Sackett’s Harbor to command the army.[102] Gaines arrived, and as
senior brigadier assumed command at Fort Erie, August 4, while Ripley
resumed command of his brigade. During the week that elapsed before
Gaines’s arrival, the army, under Ripley’s orders, worked energetically
to intrench itself in lines behind Fort Erie; and after Gaines took
command the same work was continued without interruption or change of
plan, under the direction of Major McRee, Major Wood, and Lieutenant
Douglass of the Engineers.
The result was chiefly decided by Drummond’s errors. Had he followed
Ripley closely, and had he attacked instantly on overtaking the
retreating army at Fort Erie or elsewhere, he would have had the
chances in his favor. Had he crossed the river and moved against
Buffalo, he would have obliged Brown to order the instant evacuation of
Fort Erie, and would have recovered all the British positions without
the loss of a man. Drummond took neither course. He waited two days at
Chippawa before he moved up the river within two miles of Fort Erie.
About August 1 his reinforcements arrived,--DeWatteville’s regiment
from Kingston, and the Forty-first from Fort George,--replacing
his losses, and giving him three thousand one hundred and fifty
rank-and-file;[103] but he seemed still undecided what course to
adopt. The battles of Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane had given the British
army respect for American troops, and Drummond hesitated to assault
the unfinished works at Fort Erie, although he was fully one half
stronger in men than Gaines and Ripley, who had barely two thousand
rank-and-file after obtaining such reinforcements as were at hand.
_Strength of Scott’s Brigade, Fort Erie, July 31, 1814._
PRESENT FOR DUTY. AGGREGATE.
/-------------/\-------------\
Non-com. Officers, Officers. Present and
rank-and-file. absent.
Ninth Regiment 139 8 569
Eleventh Regiment 293 11 624
Twenty-second Regiment 218 10 408
Twenty-fifth Regiment 255 7 676
General Staff 4 4
--- -- -----
Total 905 40 2281
_Strength of Ripley’s Brigade._
First Regiment 141 6 220
Twenty-first Regiment 441 20 849
Twenty-third Regiment 292 12 713
General Staff 4 4
--- -- ----
Total 874 42 1786
_Monthly return of troops under Major-General Brown, Fort Erie,
July 31, 1814._
Bombardiers, etc. 58 2 69
Light Dragoons 47 1 64
Artillery Corps 241 12 364
First Brigade 905 40 2281
Second Brigade 874 42 1786
---- -- ----
Total of Brown’s army 2125 97 4564
Drummond began operations by ordering a detachment of six hundred
men to cross the river and destroy the magazines at Black Rock and
Buffalo.[104] During the night of August 3 Colonel Tucker of the
Forty-first, with four hundred and sixty rank-and-file of his own and
other regiments,[105] landed two or three miles below Black Rock, and
advanced against it. They were met at the crossing of a creek by two
hundred and forty men of Morgan’s Rifles, then garrisoning Black Rock,
with some volunteers. The effect of the rifles was so deadly that
the British troops refused to face them, and Tucker returned after
losing twenty-five men. This repulse, as creditable in its way to the
American army as the battles at Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane, caused much
annoyance to Drummond, who issued an order, August 5, expressing “the
indignation excited by discovering that the failure of an expedition,
the success of which... would have compelled the enemy’s forces to
surrender or... encounter certain defeat, was attributable to the
misbehavior of the troops employed.”[106] The only success achieved by
British detachments was the cutting out of two American schooners which
covered the approach to Fort Erie, near the shore.
Drummond having decided not to assault the lines of Fort Erie until
he had made an impression on the works, next sent for guns of heavy
calibre.[107] Ten days were passed in opening trenches and constructing
batteries. Gaines and Ripley employed the time in completing their
defences. Of these, the so-called Fort Erie was the smallest part,
and made only the salient angle toward Drummond’s approaches. As the
British had constructed the fort, it was a small, unfinished work,
about one hundred and fifty yards from the Lake-shore, open in the
rear, and mounting three guns. The American engineers completed its
rear bastions, and constructed an earthwork seven feet high, with a
ditch, to the shore, where a small stone-work completed the defence on
that side, and brought the lines to the water’s edge. The stone-work
was called the Douglass battery, after the lieutenant of engineers who
built it. Fort Erie, Battery Douglass, and their connecting breastwork
secured the camp on the right. A similar breastwork, nearly at right
angles with the first, was extended three hundred and fifty yards
westward parallel with the Lake-shore, then turning slightly ran three
hundred and fifty yards farther till it neared the Lake-shore, where
it was finished on Snake Hill by a projecting battery called Towson’s.
Traverses were constructed, and a strongly intrenched camp, about seven
hundred yards by two hundred and fifty, was thus formed, open on its
rear to the Lake.
Hindman had general charge of the artillery. Battery Douglass mounted
one gun; another was mounted on the neighboring line; Fort Erie
contained six,[108] under Captain Williams; Biddle’s and Fanning’s
(Ritchie’s) four guns were placed on the long line in the front; and
Towson had six field-pieces at the extreme left.[109] Scott’s brigade,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinwall, was posted on the right;
Porter’s volunteers and the First Rifles occupied the centre; and
Ripley with the Twenty-first and Twenty-third regiments defended the
left.
Drummond opened with six guns, August 13, and prepared for assault the
following day. His arrangements were somewhat complicated. He divided
the attacking force into three columns, retaining another division in
reserve. The strongest column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer
of DeWatteville’s regiment, was composed of portions of four regular
regiments, and numbered about thirteen hundred men; these were to
assault Towson and Ripley on Snake Hill. The centre column, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond of the One-Hundred-and-fourth, numbered
only one hundred and ninety rank-and-file, including a party of seamen
and marines;[110] these were to attack Fort Erie. The third column,
under Colonel Scott of the One-Hundred-and-third regiment, numbered six
hundred and fifty rank-and-file; these were to assault the breastworks
between Fort Erie and Battery Douglass.[111] According to these
numbers, Drummond meant to assault with twenty-one hundred and forty
rank-and-file, or about twenty-four hundred men all told. His reserve
numbered one thousand men.[112] Some further number must have been
detailed in camp duty.
Drummond’s instructions, dated August 14, to Colonel Fischer were
minute.[113] Fischer’s column was to march immediately, in order to
pass through the woods before dark, and halt for the night opposite
the point of attack, with every precaution against discovery:--
“You are to advance to the attack precisely at two o’clock. You
are to enter the enemy’s position betwixt Snake Hill and the
Lake, which is represented to be sufficiently open; but this
is not to prevent your making your arrangements for assaulting
any other part of the position by means of the short ladders
and hay-bags with which you will be furnished. In order to
_insure success_, the Lieutenant-General most strongly
recommends that the flints be taken out of the firelocks, with
the exception of a reserve of select and steady men who may be
permitted to retain their flints, if you think it necessary or
advisable, not exceeding one third of your force. This reserve,
with the detachment of artillery, should take post on Snake
Hill.”
A demonstration was to be made a few minutes before two o’clock against
the American pickets opposite the centre of the line.
Drummond’s general orders concluded by encouraging his men to consider
their task easy:[114]--
“The Lieutenant-General most strongly recommends a free use of
the bayonet. The enemy’s force does not exceed fifteen hundred
fit for duty, and those are represented as much dispirited.”
The British general under-estimated Gaines’s force, which probably
contained at least two thousand rank-and-file fit for duty August 14,
who though possibly overworked and inclined to grumble, were ready to
fight. Neither Gaines nor Ripley, nor any of the excellent officers
of engineers and artillery who defended the lines of Fort Erie, were
likely to allow themselves to be surprised or even approached by a
force no greater than their own without ample resistance. They kept
strong pickets far in advance of their lines, and were alive to every
sign of attack. Soon after midnight of August 14 the fire of the
British siege-guns slackened and ceased. At the same moment Gaines
left his quarters and Ripley ordered his brigade to turn out. Both
officers looked for an assault, and were not mistaken. At two o’clock
the pickets fired and fell back, and at half-past two o’clock Colonel
Fischer’s advancing column moved against Snake Hill.
There at the breastworks were Towson’s guns and the Twenty-first
regiment commanded by Major Wood of the Engineers, only two hundred
and fifty strong, but as steady as at Lundy’s Lane.[115] A part of
Fischer’s brigade marched gallantly up to the abattis, bayonets
charged and guns without flints, and approached within ten feet of the
breastwork, but failed to reach it. The other column, DeWatteville’s
regiment at its head, “marching too near the Lake,” according to
Colonel Fischer’s report,[116] “found themselves entangled between
the rocks and the water, and by the retreat of the flank companies
were thrown in such confusion as to render it impossible to give them
any kind of formation during the darkness of the night, at which time
they were exposed to a most galling fire of the enemy’s battery.” A
part of De Watteville’s regiment waded through the water round the
American line, and came into the camp on the flank, but found there two
companies posted to meet such an attempt, and were all captured, so
that Colonel Fischer, writing his report the next day, seemed ignorant
what had become of them.
The attack and repulse of Colonel Fischer on the extreme American
left were soon over, and the story was easy to understand; but the
attack on Fort Erie and the extreme right was neither quickly ended
nor easily understood. There a column of more than seven hundred men,
all told, under Colonel Scott of the One-Hundred-and-third, was to
attack the Douglass battery. Another column, numbering somewhat more
than two hundred men, all told, under Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond of
the One-Hundred-and-fourth, was to assault Fort Erie. The American
line between Battery Douglass and Fort Erie was held by the Ninth
regiment and the volunteers, and was covered by the battery. Fort Erie
was defended by about one hundred and eighteen men of the Nineteenth
regiment under Major Trimble, and about sixty artillerists[117] under
Captain Williams.
The most intelligible account of the battle at the eastern end of the
lines was given neither in Gaines’s nor Drummond’s reports, but in some
charges afterward brought against Gaines by Major Trimble, who was
angry at the language of Gaines’s report. Trimble’s charges were judged
to be frivolous, but his story of the battle was more precise than any
other.
According to Major Trimble, Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond’s column was
directed against the north curtain of the fort, and was repulsed, but
continued the assault. Colonel Scott’s column at the same time advanced
within about sixty yards of the Douglass battery, but deterred by
the fire of the guns served under the direction of Major McRee and
Lieutenant Douglass of the Engineers, and by the loss of its commanding
officer Colonel Scott, who fell before the American line, the column
moved quickly to the right, gained the ditch of the northeast bastion
of Fort Erie, and under cover of the smoke and darkness entered the
bastion. There they were joined by Drummond’s men. They surprised
the artillerists, and in the scuffle Captain Williams and his
lieutenants--McDonough, Fontaine, and Watmough--were killed or disabled.
Without support the British columns could do no more, and
Lieutenant-General Drummond did not come to their support. None of the
reports mentioned the time at which the bastion was captured; but the
small British force, which could not have exceeded six or seven hundred
men, remained for more than two hours in or about the bastion, exposed
to the American fire, to which they could not reply with effect,
and waiting for Drummond and the reserve, which the Americans also
expected and trained their guns to enfilade. The British in the bastion
repeatedly attempted to advance from the bastion to gain possession of
the Fort, and twice tried to force the door of the stone mess-house
from which the men of the Nineteenth regiment kept up a destructive
fire. They repulsed the attacks made by reinforcements ordered by
Gaines into the Fort to recover the bastion; yet their destruction was
inevitable as soon as the dawn should arrive, for they could neither
advance nor escape, nor remain where they were, under the guns of the
garrison.
After maintaining themselves till five o’clock in this difficult
position, the British soldiers and sailors in the bastion were
panic-struck by the explosion of an ammunition-chest under the
platform. According to General Drummond’s official report, “Some
ammunition, which had been placed under the platform, caught fire
from the firing of guns in the rear, and a most tremendous explosion
followed, by which almost all the troops which had entered the place
were dreadfully mangled. Panic was instantly communicated to the
troops, who could not be persuaded that the explosion was accidental;
and the enemy at the same time pressing forward and commencing a heavy
fire of musketry, the Fort was abandoned, and our troops retreated
toward the battery.”
The explosion merely hastened the rout. Probably the attacking
columns would have fared still worse, had they remained. Even their
panic-stricken flight saved only a remnant. Of Drummond’s column,
said to number one hundred and ninety rank-and-file, one hundred and
eighty-eight officers and men were reported as missing, wounded,
or killed. Of Scott’s column, said to number six hundred and fifty
rank-and-file,--the Royal Scots and the One-Hundred-and-third
regiments,--four hundred and ninety-six officers and men were returned
as killed, wounded, or missing. Of the whole rank-and-file engaged
under Fischer, Scott, and Drummond, numbering two thousand one hundred
and fifty men, if the British report was correct, seven hundred and
eighty were officially reported among the casualties. The loss in
officers was equally severe. Colonel Scott was killed before the lines.
Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond was killed in the bastion. One major, ten
captains, and fifteen lieutenants were killed, wounded, or missing. The
total British loss was nine hundred and five among some twenty-four
hundred engaged. The total American loss was eighty-four men.[118]
General Drummond was excessively mortified by his failure, in truth the
severest blow that British arms could suffer at that moment. For the
fourth time in six weeks a large body of British troops met a bloody
and unparalleled check, if not rout, from an inferior force. In a
private letter to Prevost, dated August 16, Drummond attributed the
disaster to the misconduct of DeWatteville’s regiment, a foreign corps,
which was struck by panic:[119]--
“It appears that part of the forlorn hope and about half of
Watteville’s Light Company, by wading through the water,
though the footing was excessively rough and rocky along the
Lake-shore, turned the left flank of an abattis which extended
from the enemy’s battery on Snake Hill, the left of their
position, to the Lake, and part penetrated through the abattis
itself, and thereby gained the rear of the enemy’s works. The
fire of the enemy at this time being extremely heavy both from
artillery and musketry, it would seem as if a simultaneous shock
of panic pervaded the greater part of those not in immediate
advance; and the forlorn hope, not finding itself sufficiently
supported, was reluctantly under the necessity of relinquishing
the advantages they had gained, and of retiring again through
the water under a most galling fire. They lost many men, and
DeWatteville’s Light Company nearly half their number. The
Light Company of the Eighty-ninth, notwithstanding they were
almost overwhelmed by the grenadiers of DeWatteville in the
precipitancy of their retreat, was the only body that preserved
its order and remained firm upon its ground. By this act of
steadiness they fortunately lost scarcely a man. The main body
of DeWatteville’s regiment retreated in such confusion that they
carried the King’s regiment before them like a torrent. Thus by
the misconduct of this foreign corps has the opportunity been
totally lost.”
The mortification of Drummond was acute in having to charge both his
attacking columns with being panic-stricken: “The agony of mind I
suffer from the present disgraceful and unfortunate conduct of the
troops committed to my superintendence, wounds me to the soul!” Yet
he offered no evidence to show that his troops fled before they were
beaten, nor did he explain why he had thought it useless to order
the reserve to their support after they had captured the bastion. In
reality the battle of Fort Erie was more creditable to the British than
the battles of Chippawa or Lundy’s Lane, and the Americans could not
admit that in either of the three the conduct of Drummond’s troops was
“disgraceful.”
The defeat so much weakened Drummond that he could no longer keep
the field without support, and immediately sent for two more
regiments,--the Sixth and the Eighty-second from Burlington and
York,--numbering about one thousand and forty rank-and-file, and making
good his losses.[120]
At that time Chauncey was in control of Lake Ontario. The anxieties and
delays in fitting out his new ship had ended in a fever, under which
he was still suffering when he received General Brown’s challenge of
July 13 to meet him opposite Fort George. Chauncey did not immediately
reply except by message through General Gaines. July 31, everything
being at last ready, he was carried on board his ship, and the next
day he sailed, arriving August 5 off Fort George. Brown’s army was then
besieged in Fort Erie, and could not approach the fleet. This situation
gave to Chauncey the opportunity of writing a letter to Brown, repaying
the harshness that Brown had shown to him.
“Was it friendly or just or honorable,” asked Chauncey,[121]
“not only to furnish an opening for the public, but thus to
assist them to infer that I had pledged myself to meet you on
a particular day at the head of the Lake, for the purpose of
co-operation, and in case of disaster to your army, thus to turn
their resentment from you, who are alone responsible, upon me,
who could not by any possibility have prevented, or retarded
even, your discomfiture? You well know, sir, that the fleet
could not have rendered you the least service during your late
incursion upon Upper Canada. You have not been able to approach
Lake Ontario on any point nearer than Queenston.”
Brown’s quarrel with Chauncey made much noise in its day, and, like
the less defensible quarrel with Ripley, proved that Brown was
unnecessarily aggressive; but in the situation of the United States,
aggressiveness was the most valuable quality in the service. That Brown
might have become a great general was possible, had his experience been
larger; but whatever was his merit as a general, his qualities as a
fighter were more remarkable than those of any other general officer in
the war. Except immediately after receiving his wound at Lundy’s Lane,
when his army was exhausted by four hours of extreme effort, he never
seemed satiated with fighting. Among all the American major-generals,
he alone made raw troops as steady as grenadiers, and caused militia to
storm entrenched lines held by British regulars.
Brown might have been well satisfied to let Drummond exhaust his
strength in attacking Fort Erie. From a military point of view, Fort
Erie was worthless for any other purpose than to draw the enemy to the
extreme end of their line, where they could with difficulty obtain
supplies, and could take no part in the serious campaigning intended on
Lake Champlain. For that object, no more pitched battles were needed.
Drummond’s force was wasting away by sickness and exposure.[122]
After the battle of August 15, the British continued to bombard Fort
Erie. No great damage was done; but a shell exploded in Gaines’s
quarters August 29, injuring him severely and obliging him to
relinquish command. Brown was still unfit for service, but was bent
upon more fighting, and knew that Ripley preferred to abandon Fort Erie
altogether. Accordingly he resumed command at Buffalo, September 2, and
set himself to study the situation.
The situation was uncomfortable, but in no way perilous. The lines
of Fort Erie were stronger than ever, and beyond danger of capture
from any British force that could be brought to assault them, until
Drummond should discover some new means of supplying troops with
subsistence. The army return of August 31 gave the precise strength of
the garrison.
_Strength of the Army at Fort Erie, Aug. 31, 1814._
PRESENT FOR DUTY. AGGREGATE.
/---------------/\-------------\
Non com. Officers, Officers. Present and
rank-and-file. absent.
Dragoons 27 1 48
Bombardiers, etc. 34 51
Artillery Corps 206 10 369
First Brigade 725 39 2311
Second Brigade 698 42 1646
Porter’s Brigade 220 16 599
First and Fourth Rifles 217 11 504
---- --- ----
Total 2127 119 5528
The regular force in Fort Erie numbered two thousand and thirty-three
effectives[123] September 4, and though annoyed by the enemy’s fire and
worn by hard work, they were in both these respects better situated
than the besiegers. Sooner or later the British would be obliged to
retreat; and Brown was informed by deserters that Drummond was then
contemplating withdrawal.[124] Brown estimated the British force very
loosely at three or four thousand;[125] and it was in fact about the
smaller number.
Drummond’s situation was told in his reports to Sir George Prevost.
September 8 be wrote[126] that he should not fail to seize any
favorable opportunity to attack; “but should no such opportunity
present itself, I feel it incumbent on me to prepare your Excellency
for the possibility of my being compelled by sickness or suffering
of the troops, exposed as they will be to the effects of the wet and
unhealthy season which is fast approaching, to withdraw them from their
present position to one which may afford them the means of cover.
Sickness has, I am sorry to say, already made its appearance in several
of the corps.” Three days afterward, September 11,[127] Drummond was
warned by several signs that his lines were to be attacked by Brown,
although “whether the account which is _invariably_ given by
deserters of his intention to act offensively ... be correct, I have
not yet been able accurately to ascertain.” Drummond’s batteries
had been almost silent for several days for want of ammunition,
and he could do nothing till the arrival of reinforcements,--the
Ninety-seventh regiment,--unaccountably delayed. Rain had begun, and he
dreaded its effect on the troops. In his next despatch, dated September
14,[128] he said that the rain had been incessant, and “as the whole of
the troops are without tents, and the huts in which they are placed
are wholly incapable of affording shelter against such severe weather,
their situation is most distressing.” The roads were impassable; the
nearest depot of supplies was Fort George, and Drummond had not cattle
enough to move a third of his heavy ordnance if a sudden movement
should be necessary. The enemy seemed about to cross the river in his
rear, and the Ninety-seventh regiment had not yet arrived:--
“In the mean time I have strong grounds for thinking that the
enemy will risk an attack,--an event which though from the
necessity of defending my batteries in the first instance with
the pickets alone I shall have to meet under every possible
disadvantage, yet I am very much disposed to hope may be the
most fortunate circumstance which can happen, as it will bring
us in contact with the enemy at a far cheaper rate than if we
were to be the assailants.”
While Drummond struggled between the necessity of retreat and the
difficulty of retreating, Brown was bent on attacking his lines. The
plan was open to grave objections, and a council of war, September 9,
discouraged the idea. Brown was much disappointed and irritated at the
result of the council, especially with Ripley; but while giving the
impression that he acquiesced, he brought over all the volunteers he
could obtain.[129] The number was never precisely given, but according
to the official reports of General Peter B. Porter who commanded them,
and of General Brown himself, they did not exceed one thousand.[130]
With these, and an equal number of regular troops, Brown undertook to
assault Drummond’s entrenchments.
The nearest British line was about six hundred yards from old Fort
Erie. From the first British battery on the Lake-shore, to Battery
No. 3 in the woods, the line extended nearly half a mile, covered by
abattis, but defended only by the brigade of troops on actual duty. If
carried, the first line could not be held without capturing the second
line, about fifty yards distant, and a third line, farther in the
rear; while the main British force was encamped, for reasons of health
and comfort, a mile behind, and was supposed to number at least three
thousand six hundred men, or quite sufficient to recover their works.
Brown professed no intention of fighting the British army. He proposed
only “to storm the batteries, destroy the cannon, and roughly handle
the brigade upon duty, before those in reserve could be brought into
action.”[131]
Although Drummond expected and wished to be attacked, he kept no
proper pickets or scouts in the woods, and all day of September 16
American fatigue parties were at work opening a path through the forest
the distance of a mile, from Snake Hill on the extreme left to the
extremity of the British line in the woods. So little precaution had
Drummond’s engineers taken that they left the dense forest standing
within pistol-shot of the flank and rear of their Battery No. 3 on
their extreme right, and the American parties opened a path within one
hundred and fifty yards of the flank of the British line without being
discovered.
At noon, September 17, General Porter led a column of sixteen hundred
men--of whom one thousand were militia volunteers, and a part were
the Twenty-third regiment--along the path through the woods, in three
divisions, commanded by Colonel Gibson of the Fourth Rifles, Colonel E.
D. Wood of the Engineers, and Brigadier-General Davis of the New York
militia. At three o’clock, under cover of heavy rain, the whole force
fell suddenly on the blockhouse which covered the flank and rear of
the British battery No. 3, and succeeded in capturing the blockhouse
and mastering the battery held by DeWatteville’s regiment. While
detachments spiked the guns and blew up the magazine, the main column
advanced on Battery No. 2, while at the same time General Miller,
promoted to the command of Scott’s old brigade, moved with “the remains
of the Ninth and Eleventh Infantry and a detachment of the Nineteenth”
from a ravine in front of Battery No. 3 to pierce the centre of the
British line between Battery No. 3 and Battery No. 2.[132]
Within half an hour after the first gun was fired, Porter and Miller
had effected their junction within the British lines, had captured
Battery No. 2, and moved on Battery No. 1, by the Lake-shore. There the
success ended. Battery No. 1 could not be carried. By that time the
Royal Scots, the Eighty-ninth, the Sixth, and the Eighty-second British
regiments had arrived,--probably about one thousand men.[133] A sharp
engagement followed before Brown, after ordering his reserve under
Ripley to the assistance of Porter and Miller, could disengage his
troops. The three commanders of Porter’s divisions--Gibson, Wood, and
Davis--were killed or mortally wounded,--Gibson at the second battery,
Davis and Wood in assaulting the shore battery. Ripley was desperately
wounded at the same time. General Porter, Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinwall
of the Ninth, and Major Trimble of the Nineteenth, as well as a number
of other officers, were severely wounded. That the last action was
sharp was proved by the losses suffered by the British reinforcements.
According to the British official return, the four regiments which
came last into the field--the Royal Scots, Sixth, Eighty-second, and
Eighty-ninth--lost thirty-six killed, one hundred and nine wounded, and
fifty-four missing,--a total of two hundred men, in a short action of
half an hour at the utmost, without artillery.
The American forces were recalled by Brown and Miller as soon as their
progress was stopped, and they retired without serious pursuit beyond
the British lines. Their losses were very severe, numbering five
hundred and eleven killed, wounded, and missing, or about one fourth
of their number. Among them were several of the best officers in the
United States service, including Ripley, Wood, and Gibson. Drummond’s
loss was still more severe, numbering six hundred and nine,[134]
probably almost one man in three of the number engaged. The British
killed numbered one hundred and fifteen. The Americans reported
seventy-nine killed,--sixty regulars, and nineteen militia.
The next day Drummond issued a general order claiming a victory over an
American force of “not less than five thousand men, including militia;”
but his situation, untenable before the sortie, became impossible after
it. Three out of six battering cannon were disabled;[135] he had lost
six hundred men in battle, and his losses by sickness were becoming
enormous. “My effective numbers are reduced to considerably less than
two thousand firelocks,” he reported, September 21. Immediately after
the sortie, although reinforced by the Ninety-seventh regiment, he made
his arrangements to retreat.
“Within the last few days,” he wrote to Prevost, September
21,[136] “the sickness of the troops has increased to such an
alarming degree, and their situation has really become one of
such extreme wretchedness from the torrents of rain which
have continued to fall for the last thirteen days, and from
the circumstance of the Division being entirely destitute of
camp-equipage, that I feel it my duty no longer to persevere in
a vain attempt to maintain the blockade of so vastly superior
and increasing a force of the enemy under such circumstances. I
have therefore given orders for the troops to fall back toward
the Chippawa, and shall commence my movement at eight o’clock
this evening.”