WEAK as was the army at Niagara, it was relatively stronger
than the defence at any other threatened point. Sackett’s Harbor
contained only seven hundred effectives.[137] On Lake Champlain,
Major-General Izard tried to cover Plattsburg and Burlington with about
five thousand regular troops.[138] Already Armstrong knew that large
British reinforcements from Wellington’s army were on their way to
Canada;[139] and within a few weeks after the battle of Lundy’s Lane
eleven thousand of the best troops England ever put in the field were
camped on or near the Sorel River, about to march against Izard’s five
thousand raw recruits.
They could march nowhere else. Not only was the line of Lake
Champlain the natural and necessary path of an invading army, but the
impossibility of supplying any large number of troops in Upper Canada
made Lake Champlain the only region in which a large British force
could exist. Sir George Prevost had reached the limit of his powers
in defending Upper Canada. His commissary-general, W. H. Robinson,
wrote to him, August 27, expressing “the greatest alarm” on account of
deficient supplies at Burlington Heights and Niagara, where instead of
nine thousand rations daily as he expected, he was required to furnish
fourteen thousand, half of them to Indians.[140] Much as Prevost
wanted to attack Sackett’s Harbor, and weak as he knew that post to
be, he could not attempt it, although he had thirteen or fourteen
thousand rank-and-file idle at Montreal. In October he went to Kingston
expressly to arrange such an attack, and found it impossible.
“An investigation of the state of the stores at this post,”
he wrote to Lord Bathurst October 18,[141] “proved that the
articles for the armament and equipment for a ship of the class
of the ‘St. Lawrence,’ carrying upward of one hundred guns,
had absorbed almost the whole of the summer transport-service
from Montreal, leaving the materials for an undertaking of the
magnitude of the destruction of Sackett’s Harbor still at the
extremity of the line of communication; and now, by giving
precedence to that supply of provisions and stores without
which an army is no longer to be maintained in Upper Canada,
its removal is inevitably postponed until the winter roads are
established.”
Not only were military operations on a large scale impossible in Upper
Canada, but for the opposite reason occupation of Lake Champlain by a
British force was necessary. Northern New York and Vermont furnished
two thirds of the fresh beef consumed by the British armies. General
Izard reported to Armstrong, July 31,[142]--
“From the St. Lawrence to the ocean, an open disregard prevails
for the laws prohibiting intercourse with the enemy. The road to
St. Regis is covered with droves of cattle, and the river with
rafts, destined for the enemy. The revenue officers see these
things, but acknowledge their inability to put a stop to such
outrageous proceedings. On the eastern side of Lake Champlain
the high roads are found insufficient for the supplies of
cattle which are pouring into Canada. Like herds of buffaloes
they press through the forest, making paths for themselves....
Nothing but a cordon of troops from the French Mills to Lake
Memphramagog could effectually check the evil. Were it not
for these supplies, the British forces in Canada would soon
be suffering from famine, or their government be subjected to
enormous expense for their maintenance.”
After Chauncey, August 1, regained possession of Lake Ontario, any
British campaign against Sackett’s Harbor or Detroit became doubly
impossible, and the occupation of Lake Champlain became doubly
necessary. Prevost wrote to Bathurst, August 27,[143]--
“In fact, my Lord, two thirds of the army in Canada are at this
moment eating beef provided by American contractors, drawn
principally from the States of Vermont and New York. This
circumstance, as well as that of the introduction of large sums
in specie into this province, being notorious in the United
States, it is to be expected that Congress will take steps to
deprive us of those resources; and under that apprehension large
droves are daily crossing the lines coming into Lower Canada.”
The fear that Izard might at any moment take efficient measures to
cut off the British supplies gave double force to the reasons for
occupying Lake Champlain, and forcing the military frontier back beyond
Plattsburg and Burlington.
The political reasons were not less strong or less notorious than
the military. England made no secret of her intention to rectify
the Canadian frontier by lopping away such territory as she could
conquer. July 5, the day of the battle of Chippawa, Lieutenant-Colonel
Pilkington sailed from Halifax, and under the naval protection
of Sir Thomas Hardy in the “Ramillies,” landed at Eastport, July
11, with the One-Hundred-and-second regiment, some engineers and
artillery,--a detachment of six hundred men,--and took possession of
Moose Island.[144] Fort Sullivan, with six officers and eighty men,
capitulated, and Great Britain took permanent possession of the place.
Moose Island was disputed territory, and its occupation was not
necessarily conquest; but the next step showed wider views. August 26,
Lieutenant-General Sir J. C. Sherbrooke, the British governor of Nova
Scotia, set sail from Halifax with a powerful fleet, carrying near two
thousand troops, and arrived September 1 at the Penobscot.[145] At
his approach, the American garrison of the small battery at Castine
blew up their fort and dispersed. In all Massachusetts, only about six
hundred regular troops were to be found, and beyond the Penobscot, in
September, 1814, hardly a full company could have been collected. The
able-bodied, voting, male population of the counties of Kennebeck and
Hancock, on either side of the Penobscot River, capable of bearing
arms, was at that time about twelve thousand, on an estimate of one in
five of the total population; but they offered no resistance to the
British troops.
One misfortune led to another. A few days before Sherbrooke’s arrival
at Castine the United States ship “Adams,” a heavy corvette carrying
twenty-eight guns, having escaped from Chesapeake Bay and cruised
some months at sea struck on a reef on the Isle of Haut, and was
brought into the Penobscot in a sinking condition. Captain Morris, who
commanded her, took the ship up the river about twenty-five miles, as
far as Hampden near Bangor, and removed her guns in order to repair
her. Sherbrooke, on occupying Castine, sent a detachment of some
six hundred men in boats up the river to destroy the ship, while he
occupied Belfast with another regiment.[146] Captain Morris hastily put
his guns in battery, and prepared to defend the ship with his crew,
numbering probably more than two hundred men, relying on the militia
to cover his flanks. On the morning of September 3, in a thick fog,
the enemy’s boats approached and landed their infantry, which attacked
and routed the militia, and obliged Captain Morris to set fire to the
“Adams,” abandon his guns, and disperse his men.[147] The British force
then marched to Bangor, which they occupied without opposition. Their
entire loss was one man killed and eight wounded.[148] At Bangor they
remained nearly a week, destroying vessels and cargoes; but Sir John
Sherbrooke had no orders to occupy the country west of the Penobscot,
and his troops returned September 9 to Castine.
At Castine the British remained, while another detachment occupied
Machias. All the province of Maine east of the Penobscot was then in
Sherbrooke’s hands. The people formally submitted. One hundred miles
of Massachusetts sea-coast passed quietly under the dominion of the
King of England. The male citizens were required to take, and took, the
oath of allegiance to King George,[149] and showed no unwillingness
to remain permanently British subjects. After September 1 the United
States government had every reason to expect that Great Britain would
require, as one condition of peace, a cession of the eastern and
northern portions of Maine.
For this purpose the British needed also to occupy Lake Champlain, in
order to make their conquests respectable. The British general might
move on Plattsburg or on Burlington; but in order to maintain his
position he must gain naval possession of the Lake. In such a case the
difficulties of the American government would be vastly increased,
and the British position would be impregnable. Armstrong knew these
circumstances almost as well as they were known to Sir George Prevost.
In May the British flotilla entered Lake Champlain from the Sorel
River, and cruised, May 9, as far southward as Otter Creek, terrifying
Vermont for the safety of the American flotilla under Lieutenant Thomas
Macdonough at Vergennes. Irritated and alarmed by this demonstration,
Armstrong ordered Izard to seize and fortify Rouse’s Point, or the
mouth of Lacolle River, or Ash Island, and so close the entrance
to the Lake.[150] Apparently Armstrong gave the order in ignorance
that Lacolle River and Ash Island were strongly fortified British
positions,[151] and that a battery established at Rouse’s Point, in
the relative situation of forces, must have fallen into British hands.
On this point the opinion of Izard was more valuable than that of
Armstrong; and Izard, after much study and inquiry, decided to erect
his fortifications at Plattsburg. He preferred the task of taking a
position which he could certainly hold, although it would not prevent
the enemy from passing if they chose to leave it behind them. At
Plattsburg, therefore, he collected his troops, amounting to five or
six thousand men, and constructed strong forts, while Macdonough’s
fleet took position in the bay.
While thus occupied, Izard cast anxious glances westward, doubting
whether, in case of a reverse at Niagara or Sackett’s Harbor, he ought
not to move on the St. Lawrence and threaten the British communications
between Montreal and Kingston.[152] The same idea occurred to
Armstrong, who in a letter dated July 27 recommended Izard to carry
it out.[153] The letter reached Izard August 10, when he had advanced
with his army to Chazy, and had learned enough of the concentration of
British troops in his front to be assured that they meant to direct
their serious attack against Lake Champlain. He wrote Armstrong a
letter, August 11, which failed only in saying too little, rather than
too much, of the dangers risked in obeying Armstrong’s order:[154]--
“I will make the movement you direct, if possible; but I shall
do it with the apprehension of risking the force under my
command, and with the certainty that everything in this vicinity
but the lately erected works at Plattsburg and Cumberland
Head will in less than three days after my departure be in
the possession of the enemy. He is in force superior to mine
in my front; he daily threatens an attack on my position at
Champlain; we are in hourly expectation of a serious conflict.
That he has not attacked us before this time is attributable to
caution on his part, from exaggerated reports of our numbers,
and from his expectation of reinforcements.... It has always
been my conviction that the numerical force of the enemy has
been under-rated. I believe this to be the strong point of our
frontier for either attack or defence, and I know that a British
force has been kept in check in Lower Canada for many weeks
past, greatly superior to that which I could oppose to it.”
Izard was right. Every week new British forces poured into Quebec and
were forwarded to Montreal. The arrival of the first division at Quebec
was announced in the American newspapers early in August. Within a few
weeks three brigades arrived and were sent to the front. When Izard
wrote, he was probably faced by ten thousand veteran British troops
within twenty or thirty miles of his position, and more were known to
be on their way. At such a moment the danger of attempting a diversion
was great; but Armstrong refused to believe it. Irritated by Izard’s
remonstrance, the secretary not only persisted in his own opinion, but,
abandoning the idea of a movement against the British communications
along the St. Lawrence, ordered Izard to march his army to Sackett’s
Harbor, and from there to operate either directly in force against
Kingston,[155] or to go on to Niagara and assist Brown, then hard
pressed at Fort Erie. “It is very distinctly my opinion,” wrote the
secretary August 12,[156] “that it has become good policy on our part
to carry the war as far to the westward as possible, particularly while
we have an ascendency on the Lakes.”
Izard obeyed. His troops, numbering four thousand men, began their
march August 29 for Sackett’s Harbor, and for several weeks at the
crisis of the campaign ceased to exist for military purposes. Within
the fortifications at Plattsburg Izard left a miscellaneous body of
three thousand, three hundred men,[157] without an organized battalion
except four companies of the Sixth regiment. Brigadier-General
Alexander Macomb, who as senior officer was left in command, reported
his force as not exceeding fifteen hundred effectives.[158]
Armstrong’s policy of meeting the enemy’s main attack by
annihilating the main defence never received explanation or excuse.
At times Armstrong seemed to suggest that he meant to rely on the
navy,[159]--and indeed nothing else, except Izard’s forts, was left to
rely upon; but in truth he rather invited the invasion of a British
army into New York to “renew the scene of Saratoga.”[160] As Izard
predicted, the enemy crossed the frontier at once after his departure,
occupying Chazy September 3, and approaching, September 5, within eight
miles of Plattsburg.
Great Britain had never sent to America so formidable an armament.
Neither Wolfe nor Amherst, neither Burgoyne nor Cornwallis, had led
so large or so fine an army as was under the command of Sir George
Prevost. According to his proposed arrangement, the light brigade,
under Major-General Robinson, contained four battalions of the
Twenty-seventh, Thirty-ninth, Seventy-sixth, and Eighty-eighth foot,
with artillery, and numbered two thousand eight hundred and eighty-four
rank-and-file. The second brigade, under Major-General Brisbane,
contained battalions of the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Forty-ninth, De
Meuron’s regiment and Canadian voltigeurs and chasseurs, numbering
four thousand and forty-eight rank-and-file. The third brigade, under
Major-General Power, contained battalions of the Third, Fifth,
Twenty-seventh, and Fifty-eighth, and numbered three thousand eight
hundred and one rank-and-file. The reserve, under Major-General Kempt,
contained battalions of the Ninth, Thirty-seventh, Fifty-seventh, and
Eighty-first, numbering three thousand five hundred and forty-nine
rank-and-file. Finally, fourteen hundred and eighty-eight men of the
Sixteenth and Seventieth regiments, under the command of Major-General
DeWatteville, were stationed between Coteau du Lac and Gananoque on the
St. Lawrence.[161]
Thus the left division of the British army in Canada numbered fifteen
thousand seven hundred and seventy effectives, or, including officers,
probably eighteen thousand men, without reckoning the Canadian militia,
either incorporated or sedentary. Two lieutenant-generals and five
major-generals were in command. Amply provided with artillery and
horses, every brigade well equipped, they came fresh from a long
service in which the troops had learned to regard themselves as
invincible. As they were at last organized, four brigades crossed
the border, numbering not less than “eleven thousand men with a
proportionate and most excellent train of artillery, commanded in
chief by Sir George Prevost, and under him by officers of the first
distinction in the service.”[162] A reserve of about five thousand men
remained behind.
The fleet was almost as formidable as the army. As the force of the
flotilla was reported to Prevost, it consisted of a thirty-six-gun
ship, the “Confiance;” an eighteen-gun brig, the “Linnet;” two ten-gun
sloops and twelve gunboats, carrying sixteen guns,[163]--all commanded
by Captain Downie, of the Royal Navy, detached by Sir James Yeo for the
purpose.
Such an expedition was regarded with unhesitating confidence, as able
to go where it pleased within the region of Lake Champlain. About every
other undertaking in America the British entertained doubts, but in
regard to this affair they entertained none.[164] Every movement of
the British generals showed conviction of their irresistible strength.
Had Prevost doubted the result of attacking Plattsburg, he could have
advanced by St. Albans on Burlington,[165] which would have obliged
Macomb and Macdonough to leave their positions. So little did his
army apprehend difficulty, that in advancing to Plattsburg in face of
Macomb’s skirmishers they did not once form in line, or pay attention
to the troops and militia who obstructed the road. “The British troops
did not deign to fire on them except by their flankers and advanced
patrols,” reported Macomb.[166] “So undaunted was the enemy that he
never deployed in his whole march, always pressing on in column.”
The fleet felt the same certainty. According to the best Canadian
authority,[167] “the strongest confidence prevailed in the superiority
of the British vessels, their weight of metal, and in the capacity and
experience of their officers and crews.” Captain Downie informed Sir
George Prevost’s staff-officer that he considered himself with the
“Confiance” alone a match for the whole American squadron.[168] Taking
the British account of the “Confiance” as correct, she was one hundred
and forty-six feet long on the gun-deck, and thirty-six feet broad; she
carried a crew of three hundred officers and men;[169] her armament
was thirty-seven guns,--twenty-seven long twenty-four-pounders,
six thirty-two-pound carronades, and four twenty-four-pound
carronades,--throwing in all nine hundred and thirty-six pounds.[170]
The American account, which was more trustworthy because the
“Confiance” became better known in the American than in the British
service, gave her thirty-one long twenty-four-pounders and six
carronades.[171]
Macdonough’s best ship was the “Saratoga.” Her dimensions were
not recorded. Her regular complement of men was two hundred and
ten, but she fought with two hundred and forty; she carried eight
twenty-four-pounders, twelve thirty-two and six forty-two-pound
carronades,--or twenty-six guns, throwing eight hundred and
twenty-eight pounds. Her inferiority to the “Confiance” at long range
was immense, and within carronade range it was at least sufficient to
satisfy Captain Downie. He believed that a few broadsides would dispose
of the “Saratoga,” and that the other American vessels must then
surrender.
Assuming Sir George Prevost’s report to have been correct, the two
fleets compared as follows:[172]--
_Force of British Fleet._
Long Short Weight of
Vessels. Guns. Long. Short. metal. metal. metal.
/-----/\-----\ /-----/\-----\
Confiance 37 31 6 744 192 936
Linnet 16 16 192 192
Chubb 11 1 10 6 180 186
Finch 10 4 6 24 108 132
Twelve Gunboats 16 8 8 162 256 418
-- -- -- ---- --- ----
Total 90 60 30 1128 736 1864
_Force of American Fleet._
Long Short Weight of
Vessels. Guns. Long. Short. metal. metal. metal.
/-----/\-----\ /-----/\-----\
Saratoga 26 8 18 192 636 828
Eagle 20 8 12 144 384 528
Ticonderoga 17 12 5 168 146 314
Preble 7 7 63 63
Ten Gunboats 16 10 6 192 108 300
-- -- -- --- ---- ----
Total 86 45 41 759 1274 2033
In this calculation the possible error consists only in one disputed
eighteen-pound columbiad on the “Finch,” and three disputed guns--one
long and two short--on the British gunboats. In one case the British
would have thrown about nineteen hundred pounds of metal,--in the
other, about eighteen hundred. A glance at the two tables shows that in
one respect Downie held a decisive superiority in his guns. He had no
less than sixty long-range pieces, while Macdonough had but forty-five.
Downie’s long-range guns threw at least eleven hundred pounds of metal;
Macdonough’s threw but seven hundred and sixty. If Downie chose his
own distance beyond range of the thirty-two-pound carronades, and
fought only his long guns, nothing could save Macdonough except extreme
good fortune, for he had but fourteen twenty-four-pound guns against
Downie’s thirty-four. Firing by broadsides, Downie could throw from his
single ship, the “Confiance,” sixteen twenty-four-pound shot, to which
Macdonough could reply only with eight, even if he used all his long
guns on the same side.
The Americans had a decided advantage only in their commander. Thomas
Macdonough, born in Delaware in 1783, was thirty years old when this
responsibility fell upon him. He had been educated, like most of the
naval heroes, in the hard service of the Tripolitan war, and had been
sent to construct and command the naval force on Lake Champlain in
the spring of 1813. Macdonough’s superiority over ordinary commanders
consisted in the intelligent forethought with which he provided for
the chances of battle. His arrangement showed that he foresaw, and
as far as possible overcame in advance, every conceivable attack. He
compelled the enemy to fight only as pleased himself.
[Illustration:
PLAN
OF THE
BATTLE
OF
PLATTSBURG
Position of vessels
20 M. after anchoring]
Macdonough anchored his four large vessels across Plattsburg Bay,
where it was a mile and a half wide, and placed his gunboats in their
rear to fill the gaps. Cumberland Head on his left and front, and Crab
Island on his right obliged the enemy to enter in a line so narrow
that Downie would find no room to anchor on his broadside out of
carronade range, but must sail into the harbor under the raking fire
of the American long guns, and take a position within range of the
American carronades.[173] As the battle was to be fought at anchor,
both squadrons would as a matter of course be anchored with springs on
their cables; but Macdonough took the additional precaution of laying
a kedge off each bow of the “Saratoga,” bringing their hawsers in on
the two quarters, and letting them hang in bights under water.[174]
This arrangement enabled him to wind his ship at any time without fear
of having his cables cut by the enemy’s shot, and to use his larboard
broadside if his starboard guns should be disabled. In effect, it
doubled his fighting capacity.
Sir George Prevost and the army were ready to move before Downie’s
fleet could be prepared. Marching directly forward with the utmost
confidence, Sir George turned the advanced American position at Dead
Creek Bridge and drove away the gunboats that covered it. He reached
the Saranac River September 6, and saw beyond it a ridge “crowned with
three strong redoubts and other field-works, and blockhouses armed with
heavy ordnance, with their flotilla at anchor out of gunshot from the
shore.”[175] The description was not exaggerated. Izard was himself a
trained engineer, and the works built by him, under the direction of
Major Totten of the Engineer Corps, were believed capable of resisting
for three weeks a combined attack by land and water, even if the
British fleet were victorious.[176] Three good companies of artillery
manned the guns. Excellent officers of every arm were in command.
Prevost properly halted, and declined to assault without the
co-operation of the fleet. He waited five days impatiently for Downie
to appear. Not till seven o’clock on the morning of September 11 did
the British flotilla sail round Cumberland Head. At the same time
Prevost ordered his troops to cross the Saranac and storm the American
works.
Downie intended, without regarding his superiority in long-range guns,
to sail in and to lay the “Confiance” alongside of the “Saratoga;” but
the wind was light and baffling, and his approach was so slow that he
could not long bear the raking fire of the American guns. As he came
within carronade range the wind baffling, he was obliged to anchor
at two cables’ lengths,[177] or three hundred yards,[178] and begin
action. With the same discipline that marked the movements of the
troops on shore, Downie came to, anchored, made everything secure, and
then poured a full broadside into Macdonough’s ship. The “Saratoga”
shivered under the shock of sixteen twenty-four-pound shot and canister
charges striking her hull; almost one-fifth of her crew were disabled;
but she stood stoutly to her work, and the whole line was soon hotly
engaged.
Americans usually had a decided advantage in their better gunnery, but
three hundred yards was a long range for thirty-two-pound carronades,
which at point-blank carried less than two hundred and fifty yards,
and lost accuracy in proportion to elevation.[179] Macdonough was
slow to prove superiority. Early in the battle the British suffered
a severe, and perhaps in the experience of this war a decisive, loss
in their commander, Captain Downie, instantly killed by one of his
own guns thrown off its carriage against him by a solid shot. Yet at
the end of two hours’ combat the British squadron was on the whole
victorious, and the American on the point of capture. Of the three
smaller American vessels, the “Preble” on the extreme right was driven
out of the engagement, and the British gunboats, turning the American
flank, attacked the “Ticonderoga,” which maintained a doubtful battle.
The American left was also turned, the “Eagle” having been driven to
take refuge between the “Saratoga” and “Ticonderoga,” in the centre.
Macdonough’s ship was then exposed to the concentrated fire of the
“Confiance” and “Linnet,” and his battery was soon silenced. The
“Saratoga” could no longer use a gun on the engaged side, and the
battle was nearly lost.
Then Macdonough’s forethought changed the impending defeat into
victory. His fire had nearly silenced the “Confiance,” and disregarding
the “Linnet,” he ceased attention to the battle in order to direct the
operation of winding ship. Little by little hauling the ship about,
he opened on the “Confiance” with one gun after another of the fresh
broadside, as they bore; and the “Confiance,” after trying in vain to
effect the same operation, struck her colors. Then the British fleet
was in the situation which Downie had anticipated for the Americans in
the event of silencing the “Saratoga.” The three smaller vessels were
obliged to surrender, and the gunboats alone escaped. The battle had
lasted from quarter past eight till quarter before eleven.
[Illustration:
POSITIONS
OF THE
BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES
AT
PLATTSBURG
AFTER A SKETCH BY
BRIG. GEN. MACOMB]
By land, the British attack was much less effective than by water. The
troops were slow in reaching their positions, and had time to make no
decisive movement. A column under Major-General Robinson was ordered
to move round by the right flank to a ford previously reconnoitred,
some distance up the Saranac, in order to gain a position whence
they could reverse the American works and carry them by assault;
but Robinson’s column missed its way, and before reaching the ford
heard the cheers of the American troops, and halted to ascertain its
cause.[180] The remainder of the army waited for Robinson’s column to
assault. The casualties showed that nothing like a serious engagement
took place. The entire loss of the British army from September 6 to
September 14 was officially reported as only thirty-seven killed and
one hundred and fifty wounded, and of this loss a large part occurred
previous to the battle of September 11. The entire American loss was
thirty-seven killed and sixty-two wounded.
In the naval battle, Macdonough reported fifty-two killed and
fifty-eight wounded, among about eight hundred and eighty men. The
British reported fifty-seven killed and seventy-two wounded, in
crews whose number was never precisely known, but was probably fully
eight hundred. In neither case was the loss, though severe, as great
relatively to the numbers as the severity of the action seemed to
imply. The “Saratoga” lost twenty-eight killed in a crew of two
hundred and forty. In Perry’s battle on Lake Erie, the “Lawrence” lost
twenty-two men killed in a crew of one hundred and thirty-one. About
one man in eight was killed on Macdonough’s ship; about one man in six
on Perry’s.
With needless precipitation, Prevost instantly retreated the next day
to Champlain, sacrificing stores to a very great amount, and losing
many men by desertion. The army was cruelly mortified, and Prevost lost
whatever military reputation he still preserved in Canada. In England
the impression of disgrace was equally strong. “It is scarcely possible
to conceive the degree of mortification and disappointment,” said the
“Annual Register,”[181] “which the intelligence of this defeat created
in Great Britain.” Yeo brought official charges of misconduct against
Prevost, and Prevost defended himself by unusual arguments.
“With whatever sorrow I may think of the unfortunate occurrences
to which I allude,” he wrote to Bathurst, three weeks
later,[182] “I consider them as light and trivial when compared
to the disastrous results which, I am solemnly persuaded, would
have ensued had any considerations of personal glory, or any
unreflecting disregard of the safety of the province, or of the
honor of the army committed to my charge, induced me to pursue
those offensive operations by land, independent of the fleet,
which it would appear by your Lordship’s despatch were expected
of me. Such operations, my Lord, have been attempted before, and
on the same ground. The history of our country records their
failure; and had they been undertaken again with double the
force placed under my command, they would have issued in the
discomfiture of his Majesty’s arms, and in a defeat not more
disastrous than inevitable.”
The Duke of Wellington was not so severe as other critics, and
hesitated to say that Prevost was wrong; “though of this I am certain,
he must equally have returned ... after the fleet was beaten; and I am
inclined to think he was right. I have told the ministers repeatedly
that a naval superiority on the Lakes is a _sine qua non_ of
success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should
be wholly defensive.”[183] Yet the Duke in conversation seemed to
think that his army in Canada was also at fault. “He had sent them
some of his best troops from Bordeaux,” he said five-and-twenty years
afterward,[184] “but they did not turn out quite right; they wanted
this iron fist to command them.”
Meanwhile Major-General Izard, by Armstrong’s order, marched his four
thousand men as far as possible from the points of attack. Starting
from Champlain, August 29, the army reached Sackett’s Harbor September
17, having marched about two hundred and eighty miles in twenty days.
At Sackett’s Harbor Izard found no orders from the government, for
the government at that time had ceased to perform its functions; but
he received an earnest appeal from General Brown to succor Fort Erie.
“I will not conceal from you,” wrote Brown, September 10,[185] “that
I consider the fate of this army very doubtful unless speedy relief
is afforded.” Izard, who had no means of testing the correctness of
this opinion, decided to follow Brown’s wishes, and made, September
17, the necessary preparations. Violent storms prevented Chauncey from
embarking the troops until September 21; but September 27 the troops
reached Batavia, and Izard met Brown by appointment. The army had then
been a month in movement. The distance was more than four hundred
miles, and no energy could have shortened the time so much as to have
affected the result of the campaign. At one end of the line Sir George
Prevost retreated from Plattsburg September 12; at the other end,
Lieutenant-General Drummond retreated from Fort Erie September 21; and
Izard’s force, constituting the largest body of regular troops in the
field, had been placed where it could possibly affect neither result.
Izard was a friend of Monroe, and was therefore an object of
Armstrong’s merciless criticism.[186] Brown was a favorite of
Armstrong, and shared his prejudices. The position of Izard at
Buffalo was calculated to excite jealousy. He had implicitly obeyed
the wishes of Armstrong and Brown; in doing so, he had sacrificed
himself,--yielding to Macomb the credit of repulsing Prevost, and
to Brown, who did not wait for his arrival, the credit of repulsing
Drummond. As far as could be seen, Izard had acted with loyalty toward
both Armstrong and Brown; yet both distrusted him. Brown commonly
inclined toward severity, and was the more sensitive because Izard, as
the senior officer, necessarily took command.
Until that moment Izard had enjoyed no chance of showing his abilities
in the field, but at Niagara he saw before him a great opportunity.
Drummond lay at Chippawa, with an army reduced by battle and sickness
to about twenty-five hundred men. Izard commanded fifty-five hundred
regular troops and eight hundred militia.[187] He had time to capture
or destroy Drummond’s entire force before the winter should set
in, and to gather the results of Brown’s desperate fighting. Brown
was eager for the attack, and Izard assented. October 13 the army
moved on Chippawa, and stopped. October 16, Izard wrote to the War
Department,[188]--
“I have just learned by express from Sackett’s Harbor that
Commodore Chauncey with the whole of his fleet has retired
into port, and is throwing up batteries for its protection.
This defeats all the objects of the operations by land in this
quarter. I may turn Chippawa, and should General Drummond not
retire, may succeed in giving him a good deal of trouble; but
if he falls back on Fort George or Burlington Heights, every
step I take in pursuit exposes me to be cut off by the large
reinforcements it is in the power of the enemy to throw in
twenty-four hours upon my flank or rear.”
In this state of mind, notwithstanding a successful skirmish, October
19, between Bissell’s brigade and a strong detachment of the enemy,
Izard made a decision which ruined his military reputation and
destroyed his usefulness to the service. He reported to the Department,
October 23,[189]--
“On the 21st, finding that he [Drummond] still continued
within his works, which he had been assiduously engaged in
strengthening from the moment of our first appearance, the
weather beginning to be severe, and a great quantity of our
officers and men suffering from their continued fatigues and
exposure, at twelve at noon I broke up my encampment, and
marched to this ground [opposite Black Rock] in order to prepare
winter quarters for the troops.”
Nothing remained but to break up the army. Brown was sent at his own
request to Sackett’s Harbor, where the next fighting was expected. A
division of the army went with him. The remainder were placed in winter
quarters near Buffalo. Fort Erie was abandoned and blown up, November
5, and the frontier at Niagara relapsed into repose.
Izard felt the mortification of his failure. His feelings were those
of a generous character, and his tone toward Brown contrasted to his
advantage both in candor and in temper with Brown’s language toward
him; but great energy generally implied great faults, and Brown’s
faults were better suited than Izard’s virtues for the work of an
American general at Niagara. Greatly to Izard’s credit, he not only saw
his own inferiority, but advised the government of it. He wrote to the
Secretary of War, November 20,[190]--
“The success of the next campaign on this frontier will in a
great measure depend on concert and good understanding among
the superior officers.... General Brown is certainly a brave,
intelligent, and active officer. Where a portion of the forces
is composed of irregular troops, I have no hesitation in
acknowledging my conviction of his being better qualified than I
to make them useful in the public service.”
So sensitive was Izard to the public feeling and his loss of standing
that he sent his resignation to the secretary, December 18,[191] in
terms which betrayed and even asserted his consciousness of shrinking
under the weight of responsibility:--
“I am fully aware that attempts have been made to lessen the
confidence of government as well as of the public in my ability
to execute the important duties intrusted to me,--duties which
were imposed unexpectedly and much against my inclination. It
is therefore not improbable that my voluntary retirement will
relieve the Department of War from some embarrassment, and
that my individual satisfaction will accord with the public
advantage,--especially as my view of the connection between
military command and responsibility differs materially from that
entertained by persons in high authority.”
A man who showed so little confidence in himself could not claim the
confidence of others, and in contact with stronger characters like
Armstrong, Brown, Scott, or Andrew Jackson could play no part but
that of a victim. His resignation was not accepted, but his career
was at an end. When he relieved the pressure kept by Brown constantly
applied to the extremity of the British line, the movement of war
necessarily turned back to its true object, which was Sackett’s
Harbor. Drummond no sooner saw Fort Erie evacuated and his lines
re-established, November 5, than he hurried on board ship with a part
of his troops, and reached Kingston, November 10,[192] where Sir
George Prevost had already prepared for an attack on Sackett’s Harbor
as soon as supplies could be brought from Quebec to Kingston over
the winter roads. Soon afterward Sir George Prevost was recalled to
England, and a new commander-in-chief, Sir George Murray, supposed to
be a man of higher capacity, was sent to take direction of the next
campaign. Reinforcements continued to arrive.[193] About twenty-seven
thousand regular troops, including officers, were in Canada;[194] a
seventy-four-gun ship and a new frigate were launched at Kingston;
and no one doubted that, with the spring, Sackett’s Harbor would be
formally besieged. Izard remained at Buffalo, doing nothing, and his
only influence on the coming as on the past campaign was to leave the
initiative to the enemy.