AFTER the close of the campaign on the St. Lawrence, in
November, 1813, General Wilkinson’s army, numbering about eight
thousand men, sick and well, went into winter-quarters at French Mills,
on the Canada line, about eight miles south of the St. Lawrence.
Wilkinson was unfit for service, and asked leave to remove to Albany,
leaving Izard in command; but Armstrong was not yet ready to make the
new arrangements, and Wilkinson remained with the army during the
winter. His force seemed to stand in a good position for annoying the
enemy and interrupting communications between Upper and Lower Canada;
but it lay idle between November 13 and February 1, when, under orders
from Armstrong, it was broken up.[23] Brigadier-General Brown, with two
thousand men, was sent to Sackett’s Harbor. The rest of the army was
ordered to fall back to Plattsburg,--a point believed most likely to
attract the enemy’s notice in the spring.[24]
Wilkinson obeyed, and found himself, in March, at Plattsburg with
about four thousand effectives. He was at enmity with superiors and
subordinates alike; but the chief object of his antipathy was the
Secretary of War. From Plattsburg, March 27, he wrote a private letter
to Major-General Dearborn,[25] whose hostility to the secretary was
also pronounced: “I know of his [Armstrong’s] secret underworkings, and
have therefore, to take the bull by the horns, demanded an arrest and
a court-martial.... Good God! I am astonished at the man’s audacity,
when he must be sensible of the power I have over him.” Pending the
reply to his request for a court-martial, Wilkinson determined to make
a military effort. “My advanced post is at Champlain on this side. I
move to-day; and the day after to-morrow, if the ice, snow, and frost
should not disappear, we shall visit the Lacolle, and take possession
of that place. This is imperiously enjoined to check the reinforcements
he [Prevost] continues to send to the Upper Province.”[26]
The Lacolle was a small river, or creek, emptying into the Sorel
four or five miles beyond the boundary. According to the monthly
return of the troops commanded by Major-General de Rottenburg, the
British forces stationed about Montreal numbered, Jan. 22, 1814, eight
thousand rank-and-file present for duty. Of these, eight hundred and
eighty-five were at St. John’s; six hundred and ninety were at Isle
aux Noix, with outposts at Lacadie and Lacolle of three hundred and
thirty-two men.[27]
Wilkinson knew that the British outpost at the crossing of Lacolle
Creek, numbering two hundred men all told,[28] was without support
nearer than Isle aux Noix ten miles away; but it was stationed
in a stone mill, with thick walls and a solid front. He took two
twelve-pound field-guns to batter the mill, and crossing the boundary,
March 30, with his four thousand men, advanced four or five miles to
Lacolle Creek. The roads were obstructed and impassable, but his troops
made their way in deep snow through the woods until they came within
sight of the mill. The guns were then placed in position and opened
fire; but Wilkinson was disconcerted to find that after two hours the
mill was unharmed. He ventured neither to storm it nor flank it; and
after losing more than two hundred men by the fire of the garrison, he
ordered a retreat, and marched his army back to Champlain.
With this last example of his military capacity Wilkinson disappeared
from the scene of active life, where he had performed so long and
extraordinary a part. Orders arrived, dated March 24, relieving him
from duty under the form of granting his request for a court of
inquiry. Once more he passed the ordeal of a severe investigation, and
received the verdict of acquittal; but he never was again permitted to
resume his command in the army.
The force Wilkinson had brought from Lake Ontario, though united
with that which Wade Hampton had organized, was reduced by sickness,
expiration of enlistments, and other modes of depletion to a mere
handful when Major-General Izard arrived at Plattsburg on the first
day of May. Izard’s experience formed a separate narrative, and made
a part of the autumn campaign. During the early summer the war took
a different and unexpected direction, following the steps of the new
Major-General Brown; for wherever Brown went, fighting followed.
General Brown marched from French Mills, February 13, with two thousand
men. February 28, Secretary Armstrong wrote him a letter suggesting an
attack on Kingston, to be covered by a feint on Niagara.[29] Brown, on
arriving at Sackett’s Harbor, consulted Chauncey, and allowed himself
to be dissuaded from attacking Kingston. “By some extraordinary mental
process,” Armstrong thought,[30] Brown and Chauncey “arrived at the
same conclusion,--that the main action, an attack on Kingston, being
impracticable, the _ruse_, intended merely to mask it, might do as
well.” Brown immediately marched with two thousand men for Niagara.
When the secretary learned of this movement, although it was contrary
to his ideas of strategy, he wrote an encouraging letter to Brown,
March 20:[31]
“You have mistaken my meaning.... If you hazard anything by this
mistake, correct it promptly by returning to your post. If on
the other hand you left the Harbor with a competent force for
its defence, go on and prosper. Good consequences are sometimes
the result of mistakes.”
The correspondence showed chiefly that neither the secretary nor the
general had a distinct idea, and that Brown’s campaign, like Dearborn’s
the year before, received its direction from Chauncey, whose repugnance
to attacking Kingston was invincible.
Brown was shown his mistake by Gaines, before reaching Buffalo March
24, and leaving his troops, he hurried back to Sackett’s Harbor,
“the most unhappy man alive.”[32] He resumed charge of such troops
as remained at the Harbor, while Winfield Scott formed a camp of
instruction at Buffalo, and, waiting for recruits who never came,
personally drilled the officers of all grades. Scott’s energy threw
into the little army a spirit and an organization strange to the
service. Three months of instruction converted the raw troops into
soldiers.
Meanwhile Brown could do nothing at Sackett’s Harbor. The British
held control of the Lake, while Commodore Chauncey and the contractor
Eckford were engaged in building a new ship which was to be ready
in July. The British nearly succeeded in preventing Chauncey from
appearing on the Lake during the entire season, for no sooner did Sir
James Yeo sail from Kingston in the spring than he attempted to destroy
the American magazines. Owing to the remote situation of Sackett’s
Harbor in the extreme northern corner of the State, all supplies and
war material were brought first from the Hudson River to Oswego by way
of the Mohawk River and Oneida Lake. About twelve miles above Oswego
the American magazines were established, and there the stores were kept
until they could be shipped on schooners, and forwarded fifty miles
along the Lake-shore to Sackett’s Harbor,--always a hazardous operation
in the face of an enemy’s fleet. The destruction of the magazines would
have been fatal to Chauncey, and even the capture or destruction of the
schooners with stores was no trifling addition to his difficulties.
Sir James Yeo left Kingston May 4, and appeared off Oswego the next
day, bringing a large body of troops, numbering more than a thousand
rank-and-file.[33] They found only about three hundred men to oppose
them, and having landed May 6, they gained possession of the fort
which protected the harbor of Oswego. The Americans made a resistance
which caused a loss of seventy-two men killed and wounded to the
British, among the rest Captain Mulcaster of the Royal Navy, an active
officer, who was dangerously wounded. The result was hardly worth the
loss. Four schooners were captured or destroyed, and some twenty-four
hundred barrels of flour, pork, and salt, but nothing of serious
importance.[34] Yeo made no attempt to ascend the river, and retired to
Kingston after destroying whatever property he could not take away.
Although the chief American depot escaped destruction, the disgrace and
discouragement remained, that after two years of war the Americans,
though enjoying every advantage, were weaker than ever on Lake Ontario,
and could not defend even so important a point as Oswego from the
attack of barely a thousand men. Their coastwise supply of stores to
Sackett’s Harbor became a difficult and dangerous undertaking, to be
performed mostly by night.[35] Chauncey remained practically blockaded
in Sackett’s Harbor; and without his fleet in control of the Lake the
army could do nothing effectual against Kingston.
In this helplessness, Armstrong was obliged to seek some other line on
which the army could be employed against Upper Canada; and the idea
occurred to him that although he had no fleet on Lake Ontario he had
one on Lake Erie, which by a little ingenuity might enable the army to
approach the heart of Upper Canada at the extreme western end of Lake
Ontario. “Eight or even six thousand men,” Armstrong wrote[36] to the
President, April 30, “landed in the bay between Point Abino and Fort
Erie, and operating either on the line of the Niagara, or more directly
if a more direct route is found, against the British post at the head
of Burlington Bay, cannot be resisted with effect without compelling
the enemy so to weaken his more eastern posts as to bring them within
reach of our means at Sackett’s Harbor and Plattsburg.”
Armstrong’s suggestion was made to the President April 30. Already
time was short. The allies had entered Paris March 31; the citadel of
Bayonne capitulated to Wellington April 28. In a confidential despatch
dated June 3, Lord Bathurst notified the governor-general of Canada
that ten thousand men had been ordered to be shipped immediately
for Quebec.[37] July 5, Major-General Torrens at the Horse-guards
informed Prevost that four brigades,--Brisbane’s, Kempt’s, Power’s, and
Robinson’s; fourteen regiments of Wellington’s best troops,--had sailed
from Bordeaux for Canada.[38] Prevost could afford in July to send
westward every regular soldier in Lower Canada, sure of replacing them
at Montreal by the month of August.
“A discrepancy in the opinions of the Cabinet,” according to
Armstrong,[39] delayed adoption of a plan till June, when a compromise
scheme was accepted,[40] but not carried out.
“Two causes prevented its being acted upon _in extenso_,”
Armstrong afterward explained,[41]--“the one, a total failure
in getting together by militia calls and volunteer overtures
a force deemed competent to a campaign of demonstration and
manœuvre on the peninsula; the other, an apprehension that the
fleet, which had been long inactive, would not yet be found
in condition to sustain projects requiring from it a vigorous
co-operation with the army.”
Brown might have been greatly strengthened at Niagara by drawing
from Detroit the men that could be spared there; but the Cabinet
obliged Armstrong to send the Detroit force--about nine hundred in
number--against Mackinaw. Early in July the Mackinaw expedition,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Croghan, started from Detroit, and
August 4 it was defeated and returned. Croghan’s expedition did not
even arrive in time to prevent a British expedition from Mackinaw
crossing Wisconsin and capturing, July 19, the distant American post at
Prairie du Chien.[42]
Armstrong did not favor Croghan’s expedition, wishing to bring him and
his two batteries to reinforce Brown, but yielded to the Secretary of
the Navy, who wished to capture Mackinaw,[43] and to the promises
of Commodore Chauncey that on or before July 1 he would sail from
Sackett’s Harbor, and command the Lake. In reliance on Chauncey, the
Cabinet, except Monroe, decided that Major-General Brown should cross
to the Canadian side, above the Falls of Niagara, and march, with
Chauncey’s support, to Burlington Heights and to York.[44]
This decision was made June 7, and Armstrong wrote to Brown, June 10,
describing the movement intended.[45] The Secretary of the Navy, he
said, thought Chauncey could not be ready before July 15:
“To give, however, immediate occupation to your troops, and to
prevent their blood from stagnating, why not take Fort Erie and
its garrison, stated at three or four hundred men? Land between
Point Abino and Erie in the night; assail the Fort by land and
water; push forward a corps to seize the bridge at Chippawa;
and be governed by circumstances in either stopping there or
going farther. Boats may follow and feed you. If the enemy
concentrates his whole force on this line, as I think he will,
it will not exceed two thousand men.”
Brown had left Sackett’s Harbor, and was at Buffalo when these orders
reached him. He took immediate measures to carry them out. Besides his
regular force, he called for volunteers to be commanded by Peter B.
Porter; and he wrote to Chauncey, June 21,[46] an irritating letter,
complaining of having received not a line from him, and giving a sort
of challenge to the navy to meet the army before Fort George, by July
10. The letter showed that opinion in the army ran against the navy,
and particularly against Chauncey, whom Brown evidently regarded
as a sort of naval Wilkinson. In truth, Brown could depend neither
upon Chauncey nor upon volunteers. The whole force he could collect
was hardly enough to cross the river, and little exceeded the three
thousand men on whose presence at once in the boats Alexander Smyth had
insisted eighteen months before, in order to capture Fort Erie.
So famous did Brown’s little army become, that the details of its force
and organization retained an interest equalled only by that which
attached to the frigates and sloops-of-war. Although the existence
of the regiments ceased with the peace, and their achievements were
limited to a single campaign of three or four months, their fame
would have insured them in any other service extraordinary honors and
sedulous preservation of their identity. Two small brigades of regular
troops, and one still smaller brigade of Pennsylvania volunteers, with
a corps of artillery, composed the entire force. The first brigade was
commanded by Brigadier-General Winfield Scott, and its monthly return
of June 30,1814, reported its organization and force as follows:[47]--
_Strength of the First, or Scott’s, Brigade._
PRESENT FOR DUTY. AGGREGATE.
/--------------^-------------\
Non-com. Officers, Officers. Present and
rank-and-file. absent.
Ninth Regiment 332 16 642
Eleventh Regiment 416 17 577
Twenty-second Regiment 217 12 287
Twenty-fifth Regiment 354 16 619
General Staff 4 4
---- -- ----
Total 1319 65 2129
The Ninth regiment came from Massachusetts, and in this campaign was
usually commanded by its lieutenant-colonel, Thomas Aspinwall, or
by Major Henry Leavenworth. The Eleventh was raised in Vermont, and
was led by Major John McNeil. The Twenty-second was a Pennsylvania
regiment, commanded by its colonel, Hugh Brady. The Twenty-fifth was
enlisted in Connecticut, and identified by the name of T. S. Jesup,
one of its majors. The whole brigade, officers and privates, numbered
thirteen hundred and eighty-four men present for duty on the first day
of July, 1814.
The Second, or Ripley’s, brigade was still smaller, and became even
more famous. Eleazar Wheelock Ripley was born in New Hampshire, in the
year 1782. He became a resident of Portland in Maine, and was sent as a
representative to the State legislature at Boston, where he was chosen
speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, Jan. 17, 1812,
on the retirement of Joseph Story to become a Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. A few weeks afterward, March 12, 1812,
Ripley took the commission of lieutenant-colonel of the Twenty-first
regiment, to be enlisted in Massachusetts. A year afterward he
became colonel of the same regiment, and took part in the battle of
Chrystler’s Field. Secretary Armstrong made him a brigadier-general
April 15, 1814, his commission bearing date about a month after that
of Winfield Scott. Both the new brigadiers were sent to Niagara, where
Scott formed a brigade from regiments trained by himself; and Ripley
was given a brigade composed of his old regiment, the Twenty-first,
with detachments from the Seventeenth and Nineteenth and Twenty-third.
The strength of the brigade, July 1, 1814, was reported in the monthly
return as follows:--
_Strength of the Second, or Ripley’s, Brigade._
PRESENT FOR DUTY. AGGREGATE.
+---------------^-----------------+
| Non-com. Officers, Officers. | Present and
rank-and-file. absent.
Twenty-first Regiment 651 25 917
Twenty-third Regiment 341 8 496
General staff 2 2
--- -- ----
Total 992 35 1415
Ripley’s old regiment, the Twenty-first, was given to Colonel
James Miller, who had served in the Tippecanoe campaign as major
in the Fourth Infantry, and had shared the misfortune of that
regiment at Detroit. The other regiment composing the brigade--the
Twenty-third--was raised in New York, and was usually commanded by
one or another of its majors, McFarland or Brooke. Ripley’s brigade
numbered one thousand and twenty-seven men present for duty, on the
first day of July.
The artillery, under the command of Major Hindman, was composed of four
companies.
_Strength of Hindman’s Battalion of Artillery._
PRESENT FOR DUTY. AGGREGATE.
Towson’s Company 89 101
Biddle’s Company 80 104
Ritchie’s Company 96 133
Williams’s Company 62 73
--- ---
Total 327 413
The militia brigade was commanded by Peter B. Porter, and consisted of
six hundred Pennsylvania volunteer militia, with about the same number
of Indians, comprising nearly the whole military strength of the Six
Nations.[48]
_Strength of Major-General Brown’s Army, Buffalo, July 1, 1814._
PRESENT FOR DUTY. AGGREGATE.
/--------------/\-------------\
Non-com. Officers, Officers. Present and
rank-and-file. absent.
Artillery 330 15 413
Scott’s Brigade 1312 65 2122
Ripley’s Brigade 992 36 1415
Porter’s Brigade 710 43 830
---- --- ----
Total 3344 159 4780
Thus the whole of Brown’s army consisted of half-a-dozen skeleton
regiments, and including every officer, as well as all Porter’s
volunteers, numbered barely thirty-five hundred men present for duty.
The aggregate, including sick and absent, did not reach five thousand.
The number of effectives varied slightly from week to week, as men
joined or left their regiments; but the entire force never exceeded
thirty-five hundred men, exclusive of Indians.
According to the weekly return of June 22, 1814, Major-General
Riall, who commanded the right division of the British army, had a
force of four thousand rank-and-file present for duty; but of this
number the larger part were in garrison at York, Burlington Heights,
and Fort Niagara. His headquarters were at Fort George, where he
had nine hundred and twenty-seven rank-and-file present for duty.
Opposite Fort George, in Fort Niagara on the American side, five
hundred and seventy-eight rank-and-file were present for duty. At
Queenston were two hundred and fifty-eight; at Chippawa, four hundred
and twenty-eight; at Fort Erie, one hundred and forty-six. In all,
on the Niagara River Riall commanded two thousand three hundred and
thirty-seven rank-and-file present for duty. The officers, musicians,
etc., numbered three hundred and thirty-two. At that time only about
one hundred and seventy men were on the sick list. All told, sick
and well, the regular force numbered two thousand eight hundred and
forty men.[49] They belonged chiefly to the First, or Royal Scots; the
Eighth, or King’s; the Hundredth, the Hundred-and-third regiments, and
the Artillery, with a few dragoons.
As soon as Porter’s volunteers were ready, the whole American army
was thrown across the river. The operation was effected early in
the morning of July 3; and although the transport was altogether
insufficient, the movement was accomplished without accident or delay.
Scott’s brigade with the artillery landed below Fort Erie; Ripley
landed above; the Indians gained the rear; and the Fort, which was an
open work, capitulated at five o’clock in the afternoon. One hundred
and seventy prisoners, including officers of all ranks,[50] being
two companies of the Eighth and Hundredth British regiments were
surrendered by the major in command.
The next British position was at Chippawa, about sixteen miles below.
To Chippawa Major-General Riall hastened from Fort George, on hearing
that the American army had crossed the river above; and there, within a
few hours, he collected about fifteen hundred regulars and six hundred
militia and Indians, behind the Chippawa River, in a position not to
be assailed in front. The American army also hastened toward Chippawa.
On the morning of July 4 Scott’s brigade led the way, and after an
exhausting march of twelve hours, the enemy tearing up the bridges in
retiring, Scott reached Chippawa plain toward sunset, and found Riall’s
force in position beyond the Chippawa River. Scott could only retire a
mile or two, behind the nearest water,--a creek, or broad ditch, called
Street’s Creek,--where he went into camp. Brown and Ripley, with the
second brigade and artillery, came up two or three hours later, at
eleven o’clock in the night.[51] Porter followed the next morning.
Brown, knowing his numbers to be about twice those of Riall, was
anxious to attack before Riall could be reinforced; and on the morning
of July 5, leaving Ripley and Porter’s brigades encamped in the rear,
he reconnoitred the line of the Chippawa River, and gave orders for
constructing a bridge above Riall’s position. The bridge was likely
to be an affair of several days, and Riall showed a disposition to
interfere with it. His scouts and Indians crossed and occupied the
woods on the American left, driving in the pickets and annoying the
reconnoitring party, and even the camp. To dislodge them, Porter’s
volunteers and Indians were ordered forward to clear the woods; and at
about half-past four o’clock in the afternoon, Porter’s advance began
to drive the enemy’s Indians back, pressing forward nearly to the
Chippawa River. There the advancing volunteers and Indians suddenly
became aware that the whole British army was in the act of crossing
the Chippawa Bridge on their flank. The surprise was complete, and
Porter’s brigade naturally broke and fell back in confusion.[52]
[Illustration:
PLAN
OF THE
BATTLE OF CHIPPAWA
STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]
No one could have been more surprised than Brown, or more incredulous
than Scott, at Riall’s extraordinary movement. The idea that a British
force of two thousand men at most should venture to attack more than
three thousand, with artillery, covered by a deep, miry creek, had not
entered their minds. Riall drew up his little army in three columns on
the Chippawa plain,--the King’s regiment four hundred and eighty strong
in advance, supported by the Royal Scots five hundred strong, and the
Hundredth four hundred and fifty strong, with a troop of dragoons and
artillerists; in all about fifteen hundred regular troops, with two
twenty-four-pound field-pieces and a five-and-a-half inch howitzer. Six
hundred militia and Indians occupied the woods.[53] The whole force
advanced in order of battle toward Street’s Creek.
Brown was at the front when this movement was made. Porter was routed.
Ripley with the second brigade was in the rear. Scott, having rested
his brigade in the morning and given them a dinner to celebrate the
Fourth of July, had ordered a grand parade “to keep his men in breath,”
as he said; and while Riall’s regular force, fifteen hundred strong,
formed on the Chippawa plain a mile away, Scott’s brigade--which
a week before had been reported as containing thirteen hundred men
present for duty, and if all its details had been called in could
hardly have exceeded thirteen hundred men in the ranks on the afternoon
of July 5--was forming, before crossing the little bridge over Street’s
Creek to parade on the plain already occupied by the British. Owing to
the brushwood that lined the creek Scott could not see the plain, and
received no notice of danger until he approached the bridge at the head
of his brigade. At that moment General Brown in full gallop from the
front rode by, calling out in passing, “You will have a battle!”[54]
Scott remarked that he did not believe he should find three hundred
British to fight, and crossed the bridge.
If Riall was unwise to attack, Scott tempted destruction by leaving
his secure position behind the creek; but at that moment he was in his
happiest temper. He meant to show what he and his brigade could do. As
his thin column crossed the bridge, the British twenty-four-pound guns
opened upon it; but the American line moved on, steady as veterans,
and formed in order of battle beyond. Towson’s three twelve-pounders
were placed in position near the river on the extreme right, and opened
fire on the heavier British battery opposite. The infantry deployed in
three battalions,--the right, under Major Leavenworth of the Ninth;
the centre, under Major McNeil of the Eleventh; the left, under Major
Jesup of the Twenty-fifth. Throwing the flanks obliquely forward,
and extending Jesup’s battalion into the woods on the left to prevent
outflanking, Scott ordered an advance; and at the same time Riall
directed the Royal Scots and the Hundredth to charge.[55] The two
lines advanced, stopping alternately to fire and move forward, while
Towson’s guns, having blown up a British caisson, were turned on the
British column. The converging American fire made havoc in the British
ranks, and when the two lines came within some sixty or seventy paces
of each other in the centre, the flanks were actually in contact. Then
the whole British line broke and crumbled away.[56] Ripley’s brigade,
arriving soon afterward, found no enemy on the plain. The battle had
lasted less than an hour.
Riall’s report made no concealment of his defeat.[57]
“I placed two light twenty-four-pounders and a five-and-a-half
inch howitzer,” he said, “against the right of the enemy’s
position, and formed the Royal Scots and Hundredth regiment with
the intention of making a movement upon his left, which deployed
with the greatest regularity and opened a very heavy fire. I
immediately moved up the King’s regiment to the right, while
the Royal Scots and Hundredth regiments were directed to charge
the enemy in front, for which they advanced with the greatest
gallantry under a most destructive fire. I am sorry to say,
however, in this attempt they suffered so severely that I was
obliged to withdraw them, finding their further efforts against
the superior numbers of the enemy would be unavailing.”
For completeness, Scott’s victory at Chippawa could be compared with
that of Isaac Hull over the “Guerriere;” but in one respect Scott
surpassed Hull. The “Constitution” was a much heavier ship than its
enemy; but Scott’s brigade was weaker, both in men and guns, than
Riall’s force. Even in regulars, man against man, Scott was certainly
outnumbered. His brigade could not have contained, with artillerists,
more than thirteen hundred men present on the field,[58] while Riall
officially reported his regulars at fifteen hundred, and his irregular
corps at six hundred. Scott’s flank was exposed and turned by the
rout of Porter. He fought with a creek in his rear, where retreat was
destruction. He had three twelve-pound field-pieces, one of which was
soon dismounted, against two twenty-four-pounders and a five-and-a-half
inch howitzer. He crossed the bridge and deployed under the enemy’s
fire. Yet the relative losses showed that he was the superior of his
enemy in every respect, and in none more than in the efficiency of his
guns.
Riall reported a total loss in killed, wounded, and missing of five
hundred and fifteen men,[59] not including Indians. Scott and Porter
reported a total loss of two hundred and ninety-seven, not including
Indians. Riall’s regular regiments and artillery lost one hundred
and thirty-seven killed, and three hundred and five wounded. Scott’s
brigade reported forty-eight killed and two hundred and twenty-seven
wounded. The number of Riall’s killed was nearly three times the number
of Scott’s killed, and proved that the battle was decided by the
superior accuracy or rapidity of the musketry and artillery fire, other
military qualities being assumed to be equal.
The battle of Chippawa was the only occasion during the war when equal
bodies of regular troops met face to face, in extended lines on an open
plain in broad daylight, without advantage of position; and never again
after that combat was an army of American regulars beaten by British
troops. Small as the affair was, and unimportant in military results,
it gave to the United States army a character and pride it had never
before possessed.
Riall regained the protection of his lines without further loss; but
two days afterward Brown turned his position, and Riall abandoned it
with the whole peninsula except Fort George.[60] Leaving garrisons in
Fort George and Fort Niagara, he fell back toward Burlington Bay to
await reinforcements. Brown followed as far as Queenston, where he
camped July 10, doubtful what next to do. Fretting under the enforced
delay, he wrote to Commodore Chauncey, July 13, a letter that led to
much comment:[61]--
“I have looked for your fleet with the greatest anxiety since
the 10th. I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the
field, and to march in any direction over his country, your
fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies.... There is not a
doubt resting in my mind but that we have between us the command
of sufficient means to conquer Upper Canada within two months,
if there is a prompt and zealous co-operation and a vigorous
application of these means.”
Brown, like Andrew Jackson, with the virtues of a militia general,
possessed some of the faults. His letter to Chauncey expressed his
honest belief; but he was mistaken, and the letter tended to create
a popular impression that Chauncey was wholly to blame. Brown could
not, even with Chauncey’s help, conquer Upper Canada. He was in danger
of being himself destroyed; and even at Queenston he was not safe.
Riall had already received, July 9, a reinforcement of seven hundred
regulars;[62] at his camp, only thirteen miles from Brown, he had
twenty-two hundred men; in garrison at Fort George and Niagara he
left more than a thousand men; Lieutenant-General Drummond was on his
way from Kingston with the Eighty-ninth regiment four hundred strong,
under Colonel Morrison, who had won the battle of Chrystler’s Field,
while still another regiment, DeWatteville’s, was on the march. Four
thousand men were concentrating on Fort George, and Chauncey, although
he might have delayed, could not have prevented their attacking Brown,
or stopping his advance.
Brown was so well aware of his own weakness that he neither tried to
assault Fort George nor to drive Riall farther away, although Ripley
and the two engineer officers McRee and Wood advised the attempt.[63]
After a fortnight passed below Queenston, he suddenly withdrew to
Chippawa July 24, and camped on the battle-field. Riall instantly
left his camp at eleven o’clock in the night of July 24, and followed
Brown’s retreat with about a thousand men, as far as Lundy’s Lane, only
a mile below the Falls of Niagara. There he camped at seven o’clock on
the morning of July 25, waiting for the remainder of his force, about
thirteen hundred men, who marched at noon, and were to arrive at sunset.
The battle of Chippawa and three weeks of active campaigning had told
on the Americans. According to the army returns of the last week in
July, Brown’s army at Chippawa, July 25, numbered twenty-six hundred
effectives.[64]
_Strength of Major-General Brown’s Army, Chippawa, July 25, 1814._
PRESENT FOR DUTY. AGGREGATE
Non-com. Officers Present and
and Privates. absent.
Scott’s Brigade 1072 1422
Ripley’s Brigade 895 1198
Porter’s Brigade 441 538
Artillery 236 260
----- -----
Total 2644 3418
Thus Brown at Chippawa bridge, on the morning of July 25, with
twenty-six hundred men present for duty, had Riall within easy reach
three miles away at Lundy’s Lane, with only a thousand men; but Brown
expected no such sudden movement from the enemy, and took no measures
to obtain certain information. He was with reason anxious for his
rear. His position was insecure and unsatisfactory except for attack.
From the moment it became defensive, it was unsafe and needed to be
abandoned.
The British generals were able to move on either bank of the river.
While Riall at seven o’clock in the morning went into camp within a
mile of Niagara Falls, Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond with the
Eighty-ninth regiment disembarked at Fort George, intending to carry
out a long-prepared movement on the American side.[65]
Gordon Drummond, who succeeded Major-General de Rottenburg in
the command of Upper Canada in December, 1813, and immediately
distinguished himself by the brilliant capture of Fort Niagara and
the destruction of Buffalo, was regarded as the ablest military
officer in Canada. Isaac Brock’s immediate successors in the civil and
military government of Upper Canada were Major-Generals Sheaffe and De
Rottenburg. Neither had won distinction; but Gordon Drummond was an
officer of a different character. Born in 1772, he entered the army in
1789 as an ensign in the First regiment, or Royal Scots, and rose in
1794 to be lieutenant-colonel of the Eighth, or King’s regiment. He
served in the Netherlands, the West Indies, and in Egypt, before being
ordered to Canada in 1808. In 1811 he became lieutenant-general. He was
at Kingston when his subordinate officer, Major-General Riall, lost the
battle of Chippawa and retired toward Burlington Heights. Having sent
forward all the reinforcements he could spare, Drummond followed as
rapidly as possible to take command in person.
No sooner did Drummond reach Fort George than, in pursuance of orders
previously given, he sent a detachment of about six hundred men across
the river to Lewiston. Its appearance there was at once made known
to Brown at Chippawa, only six or seven miles above, and greatly
alarmed him for the safety of his base at Fort Schlosser, Black Rock,
and Buffalo. Had Drummond advanced up the American side with fifteen
hundred men, as he might have done, he would have obliged Brown to
re-cross the river, and might perhaps have destroyed or paralyzed him;
but Drummond decided to join Riall, and accordingly, recalling the
detachment from Lewiston at four o’clock in the afternoon, he began his
march up the Canadian side with eight hundred and fifteen rank-and-file
to Lundy’s Lane.[66]
At five o’clock, July 25, the British army was nearly concentrated.
The advance under Riall at Lundy’s Lane numbered nine hundred and
fifty rank-and-file, with the three field-pieces which had been in the
battle of Chippawa, and either two or three six-pounders.[67] Drummond
was three miles below with eight hundred and fifteen rank-and-file,
marching up the river; and Colonel Scott of the One Hundred-and-third
regiment, with twelve hundred and thirty rank-and-file and two more
six-pound field-pieces, was a few miles behind Drummond.[68] By nine
o’clock in the evening the three corps, numbering three thousand
rank-and-file, with eight field-pieces, were to unite at Lundy’s Lane.
At a loss to decide on which bank the British generals meant to
move, Brown waited until afternoon, and then, in great anxiety for
the American side of the river, ordered Winfield Scott to march his
brigade down the road toward Queenston on the Canadian side, in the
hope of recalling the enemy from the American side by alarming him for
the safety of his rear. Scott, always glad to be in motion, crossed
Chippawa bridge, with his brigade and Towson’s battery, soon after
five o’clock, and to his great surprise, in passing a house near the
Falls, learned that a large body of British troops was in sight below.
With his usual audacity he marched directly upon them, and reaching
Lundy’s Lane, deployed to the left in line of battle. Jesup, Brady,
Leavenworth, and McNeil placed their little battalions, numbering at
the utmost a thousand rank-and-file, in position, and Towson opened
with his three guns. The field suited their ambition. The sun was
setting at the end of a long, hot, midsummer day. About a mile to their
right the Niagara River flowed through its chasm, and the spray of the
cataract rose in the distance behind them.
[Illustration:
PLAN OF THE
BATTLE
OF
LUNDY’S LANE
AT SUNSET
STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]
At the first report that the American army was approaching, Riall
ordered a retreat, and his advance was already in march from the field
when Drummond arrived with the Eighty-ninth regiment, and countermanded
the order.[69] Drummond then formed his line, numbering according to
his report sixteen hundred men, but in reality seventeen hundred and
seventy rank-and-file,[70]--the left resting on the high road, his
two twenty-four-pound brass field-pieces, two six-pounders, and a
five-and-a-half-inch howitzer a little advanced in front of his centre
on the summit of the low hill, and his right stretching forward so as
to overlap Scott’s position in attacking. Lundy’s Lane, at right angles
with the river, ran close behind the British position. Hardly had he
completed his formation, when, in his own words, “the whole front was
warmly and closely engaged.”
With all the energy Scott could throw into his blow, he attacked the
British left and centre. Drummond’s left stopped slightly beyond the
road, and was assailed by Jesup’s battalion, the Twenty-fifth regiment,
while Scott’s other battalions attacked in front. So vigorous was
Jesup’s assault that he forced back the Royal Scots and Eighty-ninth,
and got into the British rear, where he captured Major-General Riall
himself, as he left the field seriously wounded. “After repeated
attacks,” said Drummond’s report, “the troops on the left were
partially forced back, and the enemy gained a momentary possession
of the road.” In the centre also Scott attacked with obstinacy; but
the British artillery was altogether too strong and posted too high
for Towson’s three guns, which at last ceased firing.[71] There
the Americans made no impression, while they were overlapped and
outnumbered by the British right.
From seven till nine o’clock Scott’s brigade hung on the British left
and centre, charging repeatedly close on the enemy’s guns; and when at
last with the darkness their firing ceased from sheer exhaustion, they
were not yet beaten. Brady’s battalion, the Ninth and Twenty-second,
and McNeil’s, the Eleventh, were broken up; their ammunition was
exhausted, and most of their officers were killed or wounded. The
Eleventh and Twenty-second regiments lost two hundred and thirty men
killed, wounded, and missing, or more than half their number; many of
the men left the field, and only with difficulty could a battalion
be organized from the debris.[72] McNeil and Brady were wounded,
and Major Leavenworth took command of the remnant. With a small and
exhausted force which could not have numbered more than six hundred
men, and which Drummond by a vigorous movement might have wholly
destroyed, Scott clung to the enemy’s flank until in the darkness
Ripley’s brigade came down on the run. The American line was also
reinforced by Porter’s brigade; by the First regiment, one hundred and
fifty strong, which crossed from the American side of the river; and by
Ritchie’s and Biddle’s batteries.
At about the same time the rest of Riall’s force, twelve hundred and
thirty rank-and-file, with two more six-pound guns, appeared on the
field, and were placed in a second line or used to prolong the British
right. If Scott had lost four hundred men from the ranks Drummond
had certainly lost no more, for his men were less exposed. Brown was
obliged to leave details of men for camp duty; Drummond brought three
thousand rank-and-file on the field. At nine o’clock Drummond could
scarcely have had fewer than twenty-six hundred men in Lundy’s Lane,
with seven field-pieces, two of which were twenty-four-pounders. Brown
could scarcely have had nineteen hundred, even allowing Porter to
have brought five hundred of his volunteers into battle.[73] He had
also Towson’s, Ritchie’s, and Biddle’s batteries,--seven twelve-pound
field-pieces in all.
As long as the British battery maintained its fire in the centre,
victory was impossible and escape difficult.[74] Ripley’s brigade alone
could undertake the task of capturing the British guns, and to it the
order was given. Colonel Miller was to advance with the Twenty-first
regiment against the British battery in front.[75] Ripley himself took
command of the Twenty-third regiment on the right, to lead it by the
road to attack the enemy’s left flank in Lundy’s Lane. According to
the story that for the next fifty years was told to every American
school-boy as a model of modest courage, General Brown gave to Miller
the order to carry the enemy’s artillery, and Miller answered, “I’ll
try!”[76]
The two regiments thus thrown on the enemy’s centre and left numbered
probably about seven hundred men in the ranks, according to Ripley’s
belief. The Twenty-first regiment was the stronger, and may have
contained four hundred and fifty men, including officers; the
Twenty-third could scarcely have brought three hundred into the field.
In a few minutes both battalions were in motion. The Twenty-third,
advancing along the road on the right, instantly attracted the enemy’s
fire at about one hundred and fifty yards from the hill, and was thrown
back. Ripley reformed the column, and in five minutes it advanced
again.[77] While the Twenty-third was thus engaged on the right, the
Twenty-first silently advanced in front, covered by shrubbery and the
darkness, within a few rods of the British battery undiscovered, and
with a sudden rush carried the guns, bayoneting the artillery-men where
they stood.
So superb a feat of arms might well startle the British general, who
could not see that less than five hundred men were engaged in it;
but according to the British account[78] the guns stood immediately
in front of a British line numbering at least twenty-six hundred men
in ranks along Lundy’s Lane. Drummond himself must have been near
the spot, for the whole line of battle was but five minutes’ walk;
apparently he had but to order an advance, to drive Miller’s regiment
back without trouble. Yet Miller maintained his ground until Ripley
came up on his right. According to the evidence of Captain McDonald
of Ripley’s staff, the battle was violent during fifteen or twenty
minutes:--
“Having passed the position where the artillery had been
planted, Colonel Miller again formed his line facing the enemy,
and engaged them within twenty paces distance. There appeared
a perfect sheet of fire between the two lines. While the
Twenty-first was in this situation, the Twenty-third attacked
the enemy’s flank, and advanced within twenty paces of it before
the first volley was discharged,--a measure adopted by command
of General Ripley, that the fire might be effectual and more
completely destructive. The movement compelled the enemy’s flank
to fall back immediately by descending the hill out of sight,
upon which the firing ceased.”[79]
Perhaps this feat was more remarkable than the surprise of the
battery. Ripley’s Twenty-third regiment, about three hundred men,
broke the British line, not in the centre but on its left, where
the Eighty-ninth, the Royal Scots, King’s, and the Forty-first
were stationed,[80] and caused them to retire half a mile from the
battle-field before they halted to reform.
When the firing ceased, Ripley’s brigade held the hill-top, with the
British guns, and the whole length of Lundy’s Lane to the high-road.
Porter then brought up his brigade on the left; Hindman brought up his
guns, and placed Towson’s battery on Ripley’s right, Ritchie’s on his
left, while Biddle’s two guns were put in position on the road near the
corner of Lundy’s Lane. Jesup with the Twenty-fifth regiment was put in
line on the right of Towson’s battery; Leavenworth with the remnants of
the Ninth, Eleventh, and Twenty-second formed a second line in the rear
of the captured artillery; and thus reversing the former British order
of battle, the little army stood ranked along the edge of Lundy’s Lane,
with the British guns in their rear.
[Illustration:
PLAN OF THE
BATTLE
OF
LUNDY’S LANE
10 O’CLOCK
STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y.]
The British force was then in much confusion, a part of it marching
into the American line by mistake, and suffering a destructive fire;
a part of it firing into the regiment on its own right, and keeping up
the fire persistently.[81] In order to recover their artillery they
must assault, without guns, a steep hill held by an enemy with several
field-pieces. Had Brown been able to put a reserve of only a few
hundred men into the field, his victory was assured; but the battle and
exhaustion were rapidly reducing his force. He had at ten o’clock not
more than fifteen hundred men in the ranks, and almost every officer
was wounded.
After a long interval the British line was reformed, and brought to
the attack. General Drummond’s report said nothing of this movement,
but according to the American account the two lines were closely
engaged their whole length at a distance of ten or twelve yards. In
the darkness the troops could aim only at the flash of the muskets.
“We having much the advantage of the ground, the enemy generally
fired over our heads,” said Captain McDonald of Ripley’s staff; “but
the continual blaze of light was such as to enable us distinctly to
see their buttons.” After a sharp combat of some twenty minutes the
enemy retreated. Three times, at intervals of half an hour or more,
the British line moved up the hill, and after the exchange of a hot
fire retired; between the attacks, for half an hour at a time, all was
darkness and silence, hardly interrupted by a breath of air. Brown
and Scott were with Porter on the extreme left. In the centre, by
the captured cannon, Ripley sat on his horse, ten or twelve paces
in rear of his line. Two bullets passed through his hat, but he was
unhurt. Captain Ritchie was killed at his battery on the left; Jesup
was wounded on the right. Each attack sorely diminished the number
of men in the ranks, until at the close of the third about seven
hundred rank-and-file, with few officers, were believed to remain in
position.[82]
Scott, with Leavenworth’s consolidated battalion, after ranging
somewhat wildly the entire length of the line in the attempt to turn
the enemy’s flank, and receiving the fire of both armies, joined
Jesup’s Twenty-fifth regiment on the right, and was at last severely
wounded.[83] At about the same time Brown was wounded on the extreme
left,[84] where Porter’s volunteers held the line. Major Leavenworth,
with the remnants of the first brigade, moving from the left to
reinforce Jesup on the right after the third repulse of the enemy,
met Scott retiring from the field, and soon afterward was hailed by
General Brown, who was also returning to camp severely wounded. The
time was then about eleven o’clock, and every one felt that the army
must soon retreat.[85] Farther in the rear General Brown met Major
Hindman of the artillery, who was bringing up his spare ammunition
wagons. Brown ordered Hindman to collect his artillery as well as he
could, and retire immediately; “we shall all march to camp.” He said
that they had done as much as they could do; that nearly all their
officers were killed or wounded; that he was himself wounded, and he
thought it best to retire to camp. Hindman on arriving at the hill,
firing having wholly ceased, immediately began to withdraw the guns.
Ripley first learned the order to withdraw by discovering the artillery
to be already gone.[86] Next came a peremptory order to collect the
wounded and retire.[87] The order was literally obeyed. The enemy in
no way molested the movement; and at about midnight the wearied troops
marched for camp, in as good order and with as much regularity as they
had marched to the battle-field.[88]
Hindman withdrew his own guns, and having with some difficulty procured
horses to haul off the British pieces, on returning to the hill after
Ripley’s withdrawal found the enemy again in possession, and some men
and wagons captured.[89] He left the field at once, with the British in
possession of their guns, and followed the retreating column.
Lieutenant-General Drummond’s report of the battle, though silent as to
the repeated British repulses, declared that the Americans fought with
uncommon gallantry:--
“In so determined a manner were the attacks directed against
our guns that our artillery-men were bayoneted by the enemy in
the act of loading, and the muzzles of the enemy’s guns were
advanced within a few yards of ours. The darkness of the night
during this extraordinary conflict occasioned several uncommon
incidents; our troops having for a moment been pushed back, some
of our guns remained for a few minutes in the enemy’s hands.”
Drummond’s “few minutes” were three hours. According to the British
account, the One-Hundred-and-third regiment, with its two field-pieces,
arrived on the field just at nine, and “passed by mistake into the
centre of the American army now posted upon the hill.”[90] The regiment
“fell back in confusion” and lost its two field-pieces, which were
captured by Miller, with Riall’s five pieces. By British report, Miller
was at nine o’clock “in possession of the crest of the hill and of
seven pieces of captured artillery.”[91] Drummond admitted that in
retiring “about midnight” the Americans carried away one of his light
pieces, having limbered it up by mistake and leaving one of their own.
During the entire action after nine o’clock Drummond did not fire a
cannon, although, according to Canadian authority, the fighting was
desperate:--
“The officers of the army from Spain who have been engaged
in Upper Canada have acknowledged that they never saw such
determined charges as were made by the Americans in the late
actions.... In the action on the 25th July the Americans charged
to the very muzzles of our cannon, and actually bayoneted the
artillery-men who were at their guns. Their charges were not
once or twice only, but repeated and long, and the steadiness of
British soldiers alone could have withstood them.”[92]