June the 7th, 1793. Mr. Beckley, who has returned from New York within

a few days, tells me that while he was there, Sir John Temple, Consul

General of the northern States for Great Britain, showed him a letter

from Sir Gregory Page Turner, a member of Parliament for a borough in

Yorkshire, who, he said, had been a member for twenty-five years, and

always confidential for the ministers, in which he permitted him to

read particular passages of the following purport: "that the government

was well apprized of the predominancy of the British interest in the

United States; that they considered Colonel Hamilton, Mr. King, and Mr.

W. Smith of South Carolina, as the main supports of that interest; that

particularly, they considered Colonel Hamilton, and not Mr. Hammond, as

their effective minister here; that if the anti-federal interest (that

was his term), at the head of which they considered Mr. Jefferson to be,

should prevail, these gentlemen _had secured_ an asylum to themselves

in England." Beckley could not understand whether they had secured it

_themselves_,[10] or whether they were only notified that it was secured

to them. So that they understand that they may go on boldly in their

machinations to change the government, and if they should be overset

and choose to withdraw, they will be secure of a pension in England, as

Arnold, Deane, &c., had. Sir John read passages of a letter (which he did

not put into Beckley's hand, as he did the other) from Lord Grenville,

saying nearly the same things. This letter mentions to Sir John, that

though they had divided the Consul Generalship, and given the southern

department to Bond, yet he, Sir John, was to retain his whole salary.

[By this it would seem, as if, wanting to use Bond, they had covered

his employment with this cloak.] Mr. Beckley says that Sir John Temple

is a strong republican. I had a proof of his intimacy with Sir John in

this circumstance. Sir John received his new commission of Consul for

the northern department, and instead of sending it through Mr. Hammond,

got Beckley to enclose it to me for his exequatur. I wrote to Sir John

that it must come through Mr. Hammond, enclosing it back to him. He

accordingly then sent it to Mr. Hammond.

In conversation with the President to-day, and speaking about General

Greene, he said that he and General Greene had always differed in opinion

about the manner of using militia. Greene always placed them in his

front: himself was of opinion, they should always be used as a reserve to

improve any advantage, for which purpose they were the _finest fellows_

in the world. He said he was on the ground of the battle of Guilford,

with a person who was in the action, and who explained the whole of it

to him. That General Greene's front was behind a fence at the edge of

a large field, through which the enemy were obliged to pass to get at

them; and that in their passage through this, they must have been torn

all to pieces, if troops had been posted there who would have stood their

ground; and that the retreat from that position was through a thicket,

perfectly secure. Instead of this, he posted the North Carolina militia

there, who only gave one fire and fell back, so that the whole benefit

of their position was lost. He thinks that the regulars, with their

field pieces, would have hardly let a single man get through that field.

* * * * *

_Eodem die_ (June the 7th). Beckley tells me that he has the following

fact from Governor Clinton. That before the proposition for the present

General Government, _i. e._ a little before Hamilton conceived a plan

for establishing a monarchial government in the United States, he wrote a

draught of a circular letter, which was to be sent to about ---- persons,

to bring it about. One of these letters, in Hamilton's handwriting, is

now in possession of an old militia General up the North River, who,

at that time, was thought _orthodox_ enough to be entrusted in the

execution. This General has given notice to Governor Clinton that he

has this paper, and that he will deliver it into his hands, and no one's

else. Clinton intends, the first interval of leisure, to go for it, and

he will bring it to Philadelphia. Beckley is a man of perfect truth as

to what he affirms of his own knowledge, but too credulous as to what

he hears from others.

* * * * *

June the 10th, 1793. Mr. Brown gives me the following specimen of the

phrenzy which prevailed at New York on the opening of the new government.

The first public ball which took place after the President's arrival

there, Colonel Humphreys, Colonel W. S. Smith and Mrs. Knox were to

arrange the ceremonials. These arrangements were as follows: a sofa at

the head of the room, raised on several steps, whereon the President

and Mrs. Washington were to be seated. The gentlemen were to dance in

swords. Each one, when going to dance, was to lead his partner to the

foot of the sofa, make a low obeisance to the President and his lady,

then go and dance, and when done, bring his partner again to the foot

of the sofa for new obeisances, and then to retire to their chairs. It

was to be understood, too, that gentlemen should be dressed in bags.

Mrs. Knox contrived to come with the President, and to follow him and

Mrs. Washington to their destination, and she had the design of forcing

an invitation from the President to a seat on the sofa. She mounted up

the steps after them unbidden, but unfortunately the wicked sofa was so

short, that when the President and Mrs. Washington were seated, there was

not room for a third person; she was obliged, therefore, to descend in

the face of the company, and to sit where she could. In other respects

the ceremony was conducted rigorously according to the arrangements,

and the President made to pass an evening which his good sense rendered

a very miserable one to him.

* * * * *

June the 12th. Beckley tells me that Klingham has been with him to day,

and relates to him the following fact: A certificate of the old Congress

had been offered at the treasury and refused payment, and so indorsed

in red ink as usual. This certificate came to the hands of Francis,

(the quondam clerk of the treasury, who, on account of his being dipped

in the infamous case of the Baron Glaubec, Hamilton had been obliged

to dismiss, to save appearances, but with an assurance of all future

service, and he accordingly got him established in New York.) Francis

wrote to Hamilton that such a ticket was offered him, but he could not

buy it unless he would inform him and give him his certificate that it

was good. Hamilton wrote him a most friendly letter, and sent him the

certificate. He bought the paper, and came on here and got it recognized,

whereby he made twenty-five hundred dollars. Klingham saw both the letter

and certificate.

Irving, a clerk in the treasury, an Irishman, is the author of the

pieces now coming out under the signature of Veritas, and attacking the

President. I have long suspected this detestable game was playing by

the fiscal party, to place the President on their side.

* * * * *

June the 17th, 1793. At a meeting of the Heads of department at the

President's this day, on summons from him, a letter from Mr. Genet of

the 15th inst. (addressed to the Secretary of State on the subject of

the seizure of a vessel by the Governor of New York, as having been

armed, equipped and manned in that port, with a design to cruize on the

enemies of France), was read, as also the draught of an answer prepared

by the Secretary of State, which was approved.

Read, also, a letter of June 14th from Mr. Hammond to the Secretary of

State, desiring to know whether the French privateers, the Citizen Genet,

and Sans Culottes, are to be allowed to return or send their prizes into

the ports of the United States. It is the opinion that he be informed that

they were required to depart to the dominions of their own sovereign, and

nothing expressed as to their ulterior proceedings; and that in answer

to that part which states that the Sans Culottes had increased its force

in the port of Baltimore, and remained there in the avowed intention of

watching the motions of a valuable ship now lying there, it be answered

that we expect the speedy departure of those privateers will obviate

the inconveniences apprehended, and that it will be considered whether

any practical arrangements can be adopted to prevent the augmentations

of the force of armed vessels.

THOMAS JEFFERSON.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

HENRY KNOX.

* * * * *

June the 20th, 1793. At a meeting this day of the Heads of department

at the President's, on summons from him, a letter from Messrs. Viar and

Jaudenes, dated June 18th, and addressed to the Secretary of State, was

read; whereupon it is the opinion that a full detail of the proceedings

of the United States with respect to the southern Indians and the

Spaniards be prepared, and a justification as to the particular matters

charged in the said letter; that this be sent, with all the necessary

documents, to our commissioners at the court of Madrid, leaving to

them a discretion to change expressions in it which to them may appear

likely to give offence in the circumstances under which they may be at

the time of receiving it; and that a copy be sent to Mr. Pinckney for

his information, and to make such use of the matter it contains as to

him should seem expedient; that an answer be written to Messrs. Viar

and Jaudenes informing them that we shall convey our sentiments on the

subject to their court through our commissioners at Madrid, and letting

them see that we are not insensible to the style and manner of their

communications.

A draught of a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Hammond, asking

when an answer to his letter of May 29th, 1792, might be expected, was

read and approved.

THOMAS JEFFERSON.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

HENRY KNOX.

* * * * *

July the 5th, 1793. A meeting desired by Alexander Hamilton at my office.

Himself, Knox, and myself met accordingly. He said that according to what

had been agreed on in presence of the President, in consequence of Mr.

Genet's declining to pay the $45,000 at his command in the treasury, to

the holders of the St. Domingo bills, we had agreed to pay the holders out

of other moneys to that amount; that he found, however, that these bills

would amount to $90,000, and the question was whether he should assume

$90,000 to be paid out of the September instalment. This, he said, would

enable holders to get discounts at the banks, would therefore be equal

to ready money, and save them from bankruptcy. Unanimously agreed to. We

also agreed to a letter written by General Knox to Governor Mifflin, to

have a particular inquiry made whether the Little Sarah is arming, &c.,

or not. I read also Governor Lee's letter about the Governor of South

Carolina's proclamation respecting pestilential disease in West Indies.

We are all of opinion the evidence is too slight for interference, and

doubt the power to interfere. Therefore let it lie.

Mr. Genet called on me, and read to me very rapidly instructions he

had prepared for Michaud, who is going to Kentucky; an address to the

inhabitants of Louisiana, and another to those of Canada. In these papers

it appears that, besides encouraging those inhabitants to insurrection,

he speaks of two generals in Kentucky who have proposed to him to go

and take New Orleans, if he will furnish the expense, about £3,000

sterling. He declines advancing it, but promises that sum ultimately

for their expenses; proposes that officers shall be commissioned by

himself in Kentucky and Louisiana; that they shall rendezvous _out of

the territories of the United States_,--suppose in Louisiana, and there

making up a battalion to be called the ---- ---- of inhabitants of

Louisiana and Kentucky, and getting what Indians they could, to undertake

the expedition against New Orleans, and then Louisiana to be established

into an independent State, connected in commerce with France and the

United States; that two frigates shall go into the river Mississippi, and

co-operate against New Orleans. The address to Canada was to encourage

them to shake off English yoke, to call Indians to their assistance,

and to assure them of the friendly dispositions of their neighbors of

the United States.

He said he communicated these things to me, not as Secretary of State,

but as Mr. Jefferson. I told him that his enticing officers and soldiers

from Kentucky to go against Spain, was really putting a halter about

their necks; for that they would assuredly be hung if they commenced

hostilities against a nation at peace with the United States. That leaving

out that article I did not care what insurrections should be excited

in Louisiana. He had about a fortnight ago sent me a communication for

Michaud as consul of France at Kentucky, and desired an Exequatur. I

told him this could not be given, that it was only in the _ports_ of the

United States they were entitled to consuls, and that if France should

have a consul at Kentucky, England and Spain would soon demand the same,

and we should have all our interior country filled with foreign agents.

He acquiesced, and asked me to return the commission and his note, which

I did; but he desired I would give Michaud a letter of introduction for

Governor Shelby. I sent him one a day or two after. He now observes to

me that in that letter I speak of him only as a person of botanical

and natural pursuits, but that he wished the Governor to view him as

something more; as a French citizen possessing his confidence. I took

back the letter and wrote another.

_Memorandum of a Meeting at the State House, Philadelphia relative to

the case of the Little Sarah._

July the 8th, 1793. At a meeting at the State House of the City of

Philadelphia,

Present: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the

Secretary of War.

It appears that a brigantine, called the Little Sarah, has been fitted out

at the port of Philadelphia, with fourteen cannon and all other equipment,

indicating that she is intended to cruise under the authority of France,

and that she is now lying in the river Delaware, at some place between

this city and Mud Island; that a conversation has been had between the

Secretary of State and the Minister Plenipotentiary of France, in which

conversation the Minister refused to give any explicit assurance that

the brigantine would continue until the arrival of the President, and

his decision in the case, but made declarations respecting her not being

ready to sail within the time of the expected return of the President,

from which the Secretary of State infers with confidence, that she will

not sail till the President will have an opportunity of considering

and determining the case; that in the course of the conversation, the

Minister declared that the additional guns which had been taken in by

the Little Sarah were French property, but the Governor of Pennsylvania

declared that he has good ground to believe that two of her cannon were

purchased here of citizens of Philadelphia.

The Governor of Pennsylvania asks advice what steps, under the

circumstances, he shall pursue?

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War are of opinion,

that it is expedient that immediate measures should be taken provisionally

for establishing a battery on Mud Island, under cover of a party of

militia, with direction that if the brig Sarah should attempt to depart

before the pleasure of the President shall be known concerning her,

military coercion be employed to arrest and prevent her progress.

The Secretary of State dissents from this opinion.

_Reasons for his Dissent._

I am against the preceding opinion of the Secretaries of the Treasury

and War, for ordering a battery to be erected on Mud Island, and firing

on the Little Sarah, an armed vessel of the Republic of France:

Because I am satisfied, from what passed between Mr. Genet and myself at

our personal interview yesterday, that the vessel will not be ordered to

sail till the return of the President, which, by a letter of this day's

post, we may certainly expect within eight and forty hours from this time.

Because the erecting a battery and mounting guns to prevent her passage

might cause a departure not now intended, and produce the fact it is

meant to prevent.

Because were such battery and guns now in readiness and to fire on her,

in the present ardent state of her crew just in the moment of leaving

port, it is morally certain that bloody consequences would follow. No one

could say how many lives would be lost on both sides, and all experience

has shown, that blood once seriously spilled between nation and nation,

the contest is continued by subordinate agents, and the door of peace is

shut. At this moment, too, we expect in the river twenty of their ships

of war, with a fleet of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty of

their private vessels, which will arrive at the scene of blood in time

to continue it, if not to partake in it.

Because the actual commencement of hostilities against a nation, for such

this act may be, is an act of too serious consequence to our countrymen

to be brought on their heads by subordinate officers, not chosen by

them nor clothed with their confidence; and too presumptuous on the

part of those officers, when the chief magistrate, into whose hands the

citizens have commited their safety, is within eight and forty hours of

his arrival here, and may have an opportunity of judging for himself and

them, whether the buying and carrying away two cannon, (for according

to information, the rest are the nation's own property,) is sufficient

cause of war between Americans and Frenchmen.

Because, should the vessel, contrary to expectation, depart before the

President's arrival, the adverse powers may be told the truth of the case:

that she went off contrary to what we had a right to expect; that we shall

be justifiable in future cases to measure our confidence accordingly;

that for the present we shall demand satisfaction from France, which,

with the proof of good faith we have already given, ought to satisfy

them. Above all, Great Britain ought not to complain: for, since the date

of the order forbidding that any of the belligerent powers should equip

themselves in our ports with our arms, these two cannon are all that

have escaped the vigilance of our officers on the part of their enemies,

while their vessels have carried off more than ten times the number,

without any impediment; and if the suggestion be true (and as yet it is

but suggestion) that there are fifteen or twenty Americans on board the

Little Sarah, who have gone with their own consent, it is equally true

that more than ten times that number of Americans are at this moment

on board English ships of war, who have been taken forcibly from our

merchant vessels at sea or in port, wherever met with, and compelled to

bear arms against the friends of their country. And is it less a breach

of our neutrality towards France to suffer England to strengthen herself

with our force, than towards England to suffer France to do so? And are

we equally ready and disposed to sink the British vessels in our ports

by way of reprisal for this notorious and avowed practice?

Because it is inconsistent for a nation which has been patiently bearing

for ten years the grossest insults and injuries from their late enemies,

to rise at a feather against their friends and benefactors; and that, too,

in a moment when circumstances have kindled the most ardent affections

of the two people towards each other; when the little subjects of

displeasure which have arisen are the acts of a particular individual,

not yet important enough to have been carried to his government as

causes of complaint; are such as nations of moderation and justice

settle by negociation, not making war their first step; are such as

that government would correct at a word, if we may judge from the late

unequivocal demonstrations of their friendship towards us; and are very

slight shades of the acts committed against us by England, which we have

been endeavoring to rectify by negociation, and on which they have never

condescended to give any answer to our minister.

Because I would not gratify the combination of kings with the spectacle

of the two only republics on earth destroying each other for two cannon;

nor would I, for infinitely greater cause, add this country to that

combination, turn the scale of contest, and let it be from our hands

that the hopes of man received their last stab.

It has been observed that a general order has been already given to

stop by force vessels arming contrary to rule in our ports, in which I

concurred. I did so because it was highly presumeable that the destination

of such a vessel would be discovered in some early stage, when there

would be few persons on board, these not yet disposed nor prepared to

resist, and a small party of militia put aboard would stop the procedure

without a marked infraction of the peace. But it is a much more serious

thing when a vessel has her full complement of men, (here said to be one

hundred and twenty,) with every preparation and probably with disposition

to go through with their enterprise. A serious engagement is then a

certain consequence. Besides, an act of force, committed by an officer

in a distant port, under general orders, given long ago, to take effect

on all cases, and with less latitude of discretion in him, would be

a much more negociable case than a recent order, given by the general

government itself (for that is the character we are to assume) on the

spot, in the very moment, pointed at this special case, professing full

discretion and not using it. This would be a stubborn transaction, not

admitting those justifications and explanations which might avert a war,

or admitting such only as would be entirely humiliating to the officers

giving the order, and to the government itself.

On the whole, respect to the chief magistrate, respect to our countrymen,

their lives, interests, and affection, respect to a most friendly nation,

who, if we give them the opportunity, will answer our wrongs by correcting

and not by repeating them; respect to the most sacred cause that ever

man was engaged in, poising maturely the evils which may flow from the

commitment of an act which it would be in the power and probably in the

temper of subordinate agents to make an act of continued war, and those

which may flow from an eight and forty hours suspension of the act, are

motives with me for suspending it eight and forty hours, even should we

thereby lose the opportunity of committing it altogether.

_Copy of a minute given to the President._

July the 12th, 1793. At a meeting of the Heads of the departments at

the President's, on summons from him, and on consideration of various

representations from the Minister Plenipotentiary of France and Great

Britain, on the subject of vessels arming and arriving in our ports,

and of prizes;--it is their opinion that letters be written to the

said ministers, informing them that the executive of the United States

is desirous of having done what shall be strictly conformable to the

treaties of the United States; and the laws respecting the said cases has

determined to refer the questions arising therein to persons learned in

the laws; that as this reference will occasion some delay, it is expected

that, in the meantime, the Little Sarah, or Little Democrat, the ship

Jane, and the ship William, in the Delaware, the Citoyen Genet and her

prizes, the brigs Lovely-Lass and Prince William Henry, and the brig in

the Chesapeake, do not depart till the further order of the President.

That letters be addressed to the judges of the Supreme Court of the

United States, requesting their attendance at this place on Thursday the

18th instant, to give their advice on certain matters of public concern,

which will be referred to them by the President.

That the Governor be desired to have the ship Jane attended to with

vigilance, and if she be found augmenting her force and about to depart,

that he cause her to be stopped.

THOMAS JEFFERSON.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

HENRY KNOX.

_A recapitulation of questions whereon we have given opinions._

Does the treaty with France leave us free to prohibit her from

arming vessels in our ports? Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton, Knox, and

Randolph--unanimous--it does. As the treaty obliges us to prohibit the

enemies of France from arming in our ports, and leaves us free to prohibit

France, do not the laws of neutrality oblige us to prohibit her? Same

persons answer they do.

How far may a prohibition now declared be retrospective to the vessels

armed in Charleston before the prohibition, to wit, the Citoyen Genet

and Sans Culottes, and what is to be done with these prizes? Thomas

Jefferson,--It cannot be retrospective at all; they may sell their

prizes, and continue to act freely as other armed vessels of France.

Hamilton and Knox,--The prizes ought to be given up to the English,

and the privateers suppressed. Randolph,--They are free to sell their

prizes, and the privateers should be ordered away, not to return here

till they shall have been to the dominions of their own sovereign, and

thereby purged the illegality of their origin. This last opinion was

adopted by the President.

Our citizens who have joined in these hostilities against nations at

peace with the United States, are they punishable? E. Randolph gave an

official opinion--they were. Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton and Knox joined

in the opinion. All thought it our duty to have prosecutions instituted

against them, that the laws might pronounce on their case. In the first

instance, two only were prosecuted merely to try the question, and to

satisfy the complaint of the British men; and because it was thought they

might have offended unwittingly. But a subsequent armament of a vessel

at New York taking place with full knowledge of this prosecution, all

the persons engaged in it, citizens and foreigners, were ordered to be

prosecuted.

May the prohibition extend to the means of the party arming, or are they

only prohibited from using our means for the annoyance of their enemies?

Thomas Jefferson of opinion they are free to use their own means, _i. e._,

to mount their own guns, &c. Hamilton and Knox of opinion they are not

to put even their own implements or means into a posture of annoyance.

The President has as yet not decided this.

May an armed vessel arriving here be prohibited to employ their own

citizens found here as seamen or mariners? Thomas Jefferson,--They cannot

be prohibited to recruit their own citizens. Hamilton and Knox,--They

may and ought to be prohibited. No decision yet by the President.

It appears to me the President wished the Little Sarah had been stopped

by military coercion, that is, by firing on her; yet I do not believe

he would have ordered it himself had he been here, though he would

be glad if we had ordered it. The United States being a ship-building

nation, may they sell ships, prepared for war, to both parties? Thomas

Jefferson,--They may sell such ships in their ports to both parties,

or carry them for sale to the dominions of both parties. E. Randolph

of opinion they could not sell them here; and that if they attempted to

carry them to the dominions of the parties for sale, they might be seized

by the way as _contraband_. Hamilton of same opinion, except that he did

not consider them as seizable for contraband, but as the property of a

power, making itself a party in the _war_ by an aid of such a nature,

and consequently that it would be a breach of neutrality.

Hamilton moves that the government of France be desired to recall Mr.

Genet. Knox adds that he be in the meantime suspended from his functions.

Thomas Jefferson proposes that his correspondence be communicated to

his government, with friendly observations. President silent.

* * * * *

July the 15th. Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton and Knox met at the President's.

Governor Mifflin had applied to Knox for the loan of four cannon to

mount at Mud Island. He informed him he should station a guard of

thirty-five militia there, and asked what arrangement for rations the

general government had taken. Knox told him nothing could be done as to

rations, and he would ask the President for the cannon. In the meantime,

he promised him to put the cannon on board a boat, ready to send off as

soon as permission was obtained. The President declared his own opinion

_first_ and fully, that when the orders were given to the government to

stop vessels arming, &c., in our ports, even by military force, he took

for granted the government would use such diligence as to stop those

projects in embryo, and stop them when no force was requisite, or a very

small party of militia would suffice; that here was a demand from the

government of Pennsylvania to land four cannon under pretext of executing

orders of the general government; that if this was granted, we should

be immediately applied to by every other governor, and that not for one

place only, but for several, and our cannon would be dispersed all over

the United States; that for this reason we would refuse the same request

to the governors of South Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island; that

if they erected batteries, they must establish men for them, and would

come on us for this too. He did not think the executive had a power to

establish permanent guards: he had never looked to anything permanent

when the orders were given to the governors, but only an occasional call

on small parties of militia in the moments requiring it. These sentiments

were so entirely my own, that I did little more than combat on the same

grounds the opinions of Hamilton and Knox. The latter said he would be

ready to lend an equal number to every government to carry into effect

orders of such importance; and Hamilton, that he would be willing to

lend them in cases where they happened to be as near the place where

they were to be mounted.

Hamilton submitted the purchase of a large quantity of salt-petre, which

would outrun the funds destined to objects of that class by Congress. We

were unanimous we ought to venture on it, and to the procuring supplies

of military stores in the present circumstances, and take on us the

responsibility to Congress, before whom it should be laid.

The President was fully of the same opinion.

In the above case of the cannon, the President gave no final order while

I remained; but I saw that he was so impressed with the disagreeableness

of taking them out of the boat again, that he would yield. He spoke

sharply to Knox for having put them in that position without consulting

him, and declared that, but for that circumstance, he would not have

hesitated one moment to refuse them.

* * * * *

July the 18th, 1793. Lear calls on me. I told him that Irving, an

Irishman, and a writer in the treasury, who, on a former occasion, had

given the most decisive proofs of his devotion to his principal, was

the author of the pieces signed Veritas; and I wished he could get at

some of Irving's acquaintances and inform himself of the fact, as the

person who told me of it would not permit the name of his informer to be

mentioned; [_Note._--Beckley told me of it, and he had it from Swaine,

the printer to whom the pieces were delivered;] that I had long before

suspected this excessive foul play in that party, of writing themselves

in the character of the most exaggerated democrats, and incorporating

with it a great deal of abuse on the President, to make him believe

it was that party who were his enemies, and so throw him entirely into

the scale of the monocrats. Lear said he no longer ago than yesterday,

expressed to the President his suspicions of the artifices of that party

to work on him. He mentioned the following fact as a proof of their

writing in the character of their adversaries; to wit, the day after

the little incident of Richet's toasting "the man of the people," (see

the gazettes,) Mrs. Washington was at Mrs. Powel's, who mentioned to her

that when the toast was given, there was a good deal of disapprobation

appeared in the audience, and that many put on their hats and went out;

on inquiry, he had not found the fact true, and yet it was put into

----'s paper, and written under the character of a republican, though he

is satisfied it is altogether a slander of the monocrats. He mentioned

this to the President, but he did not mention to him the following fact,

which he knows; that in New York, the last summer, when the parties of

Jay and Clinton were running so high, it was an agreed point with the

former, that if any circumstances should ever bring it to a question,

whether to drop Hamilton or the President, they had decided to drop the

President. He said that lately one of the loudest pretended friends to

the government, damned it, and said it was good for nothing, that it

could not support itself, and it was time to put it down and set up a

better; and yet the same person, in speaking to the President, puffed

off that party as the only friends to the government. He said he really

feared, that by their artifices and industry, they would aggravate the

President so much against the republicans, as to separate him from the

body of the people. I told him what the same cabals had decided to do,

if the President had refused his assent to the bank bill; also what

Brockhurst Livingston said to ----, that Hamilton's life was much more

precious to the community than the President's.

* * * * *

July the 29th, 1793. At a meeting at the President's on account of the

British letter-of-marque, ship Jane, said to have put up waste boards, to

have pierced two port holes, and mounted two cannon (which she brought

in) on new carriages which she did not bring in, and consequently

having sixteen, instead of fourteen, guns mounted, it was agreed that a

letter-of-marque, or vessel armé en guerre, and en marchandise, is not

a privateer, and therefore not to be ordered out of our ports. It was

agreed by Hamilton, Knox, and myself, that the case of such a vessel does

not depend on the treaties, but on the law of nations. Edmund Randolph

thought, as she had a mixed character of merchant vessel and privateer,

she might be considered under the treaty; but this being overruled, the

following paper was written

Rules proposed by Attorney General:

1st. That all equipments purely for the accommodation of vessels, as

merchantmen, be admitted. [Agreed.]

2d. That all equipments, doubtful in their nature, and applicable equally

to commerce or war, be admitted, as producing too many minutia. [Agreed.]

3d. That all equipments, solely adapted to military objects, be

prohibited. [Agreed.]

Rules proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury:

1st. That the original arming and equipping of vessels for military

service, offensive or defensive, in the ports of the United States, be

considered as prohibited to all. [Agreed.]

2d. That vessels which were armed before their coming into our ports,

shall not be permitted to augment these equipments in the ports of the

United States, but may repair or replace any military equipments which

they had when they began their voyage for the United States; that this,

however, shall be with the exception of privateers of the parties opposed

to France, who shall not refit or repair. [Negatived--the Secretary of

the Treasury only holding the opinion.]

3d. That for convenience, vessels armed and commissioned before they come

into our ports, may engage their own citizens, not being inhabitants of

the United States. [Agreed.]

I subjoined the following:

I concur in the rules proposed by the Attorney General, as far as respects

materials or means of annoyance furnished by us; and I should be for an

additional rule, that as to means or materials brought into this country,

and belonging to themselves, they are free to use them.

* * * * *

August the 1st. Met at the President's, to consider what was to be

done with Mr. Genet. All his correspondence with me was read over.

The following propositions were made: 1. That a full statement of Mr.

Genet's conduct be made in a letter to G. Morris, and be sent with his

correspondence, to be communicated to the Executive Council of France;

the letter to be so prepared, as to serve for the form of communication

to the Council. Agreed unanimously. 2. That in that letter his recall be

required. Agreed by all, though I expressed a preference of expressing

that desire with great delicacy; the others were for peremptory terms.

3. To send him off. This was proposed by Knox; but rejected by every

other. 4. To write a letter to Mr. Genet, the same in substance with that

written to G. Morris, and let him know we had applied for his recall. I

was against this, because I thought it would render him extremely active

in his plans, and endanger confusion. But I was overruled by the other

three gentlemen and the President. 5. That a publication of the whole

correspondence, and statement of the proceedings, should be made by way

of appeal to the people. Hamilton made a jury speech of three-quarters

of an hour, as inflammatory and declamatory as if he had been speaking

to a jury. E. Randolph opposed it. I chose to leave the contest between

them. Adjourned to next day.

* * * * *

August the 2d. Met again. Hamilton spoke again three-quarters of an

hour. I answered on these topics. _Object_ of the appeal.--The democratic

society; this the great circumstance of alarm; afraid it would extend its

connections over the continent; chiefly meant for the local object of the

ensuing election of Governor. If left alone, would die away after that

is over. If opposed, if proscribed, would give it importance and vigor;

would give it a new object, and multitudes would join it merely to assert

the right of voluntary associations. That the measure was calculated to

make the President assume the station of the head of a party, instead

of the head of the nation. _Plan_ of the appeal.--To consist of _facts_

and the _decisions_ of the President. As to facts we are agreed; but as

to the decisions, there have been great differences of opinion among

us. Sometimes as many opinions as persons. This proves there will be

ground to attack the decisions. Genet will appeal also; it will become

a contest between the President and Genet--anonymous writers--will

be same difference of opinion in _public_, as in our cabinet--will be

same difference in _Congress_, for it must be laid before them--would,

therefore, work very unpleasantly _at home_. How would it work _abroad_?

France--unkind--after such proofs of her friendship, should rely on that

friendship, and her justice. Why appeal to the world? Friendly nations

always negotiate little differences in private. Never appeal to the

world, but when they appeal to the sword. Confederacy of Pilnitz was to

overthrow the government of France. The interference of France to disturb

other governments and excite insurrections, was a measure of reprisal.

Yet these Princes have been able to make it believed to be the system

of France. Colonel Hamilton supposes Mr. Genet's proceedings here are

in pursuance of that system; and we are so to declare it to the world,

and to add our testimony to this base calumny of the Princes. What a

triumph to them to be backed by our testimony. What a fatal stroke at the

cause of liberty; _et tu Brute_. We indispose the French government, and

they will retract their offer of the treaty of commerce. The President

manifestly inclined to the appeal to the people.[11] Knox, in a foolish

incoherent sort of a speech, introduced the pasquinade lately printed,

called the funeral of George W--n, and James W--n, King and Judge, &c.,

where the President was placed on a guillotine. The President was much

inflamed; got into one of those passions when he cannot command himself;

ran on much on the personal abuse which had been bestowed on him; defied

any man on earth to produce one single act of his since he had been in

the government, which was not done on the purest motives; that he had

never repented but once the having slipped the moment of resigning his

office, and that was every moment since; that _by God_ he had rather

be in his grave than in his present situation; that he had rather be

on his farm than to be made _Emperor of the world_; and yet that they

were charging him with wanting to be a King. That that _rascal Freneau_

sent him three of his papers every day, as if he thought he would become

the distributor of his papers; that he could see in this, nothing but

an impudent design to insult him: he ended in this high tone. There

was a pause. Some difficulty in resuming our question; it was, however,

after a little while, presented again, and he said there seemed to be no

necessity for deciding it now; the propositions before agreed on might

be put into a train of execution, and perhaps events would show whether

the appeal would be necessary or not. He desired we would meet at my

office the next day, to consider what should be done with the vessels

armed in our ports by Mr. Genet, and their prizes.

* * * * *

August the 3d. We met. The President wrote to take our opinions, whether

Congress should be called. Knox pronounced at once against it. Randolph

was against it. Hamilton said his judgment was against it, but that if any

two were for it, or against it, he would join them to make a majority. I

was for it. We agreed to give separate opinions to the President. Knox

said we should have had fine work, if Congress had been sitting these

two last months. The fool thus let out the secret. Hamilton endeavored

to patch up the indiscretion of this blabber, by saying "he did not

know; he rather thought they would have strengthened the executive arm."

It is evident they do not wish to lengthen the session of the _next

Congress_, and probably they particularly wish it should not meet till

Genet is gone. At this meeting I received a letter from Mr. Remson at

New York, informing me of the event of the combat between the Ambuscade

and the Boston. Knox broke out into the most unqualified abuse of Captain

Courtany. Hamilton, with less fury, but with the deepest vexation, loaded

him with censures. Both showed the most unequivocal mortification at

the event.

* * * * *

August the 6th, 1793. The President calls on me at my house in the

country, and introduces my letter of July the 31st, announcing that I

should resign at the close of the next month. He again expressed his

repentance at not having resigned himself, and how much it was increased

by seeing that he was to be deserted by those on whose aid he had counted;

that he did not know where he should look to find characters to fill

up the offices; that mere talents did not suffice for the department of

State, but it required a person conversant in foreign affairs, perhaps

acquainted with foreign courts; that without this, the best talents would

be awkward and at a loss. He told me that Colonel Hamilton had three

or four weeks ago written to him, informing him that private as well as

public reasons had brought him to the determination to retire, and that

he should do it towards the close of the next session. He said he had

often before intimated dispositions to resign, but never as decisively

before; that he supposed he had fixed on the latter part of next session,

to give an opportunity to Congress to examine into his conduct; that

our going out at times so different, increased his difficulty; for if

he had both places to fill at once, he might consult both the particular

talents and geographical situation of our successors. He expressed great

apprehensions at the fermentation which seemed to be working in the mind

of the public; that many descriptions of persons, actuated by different

causes, appeared to be uniting; what it would end in he knew not; a new

Congress was to assemble, more numerous, perhaps of a different spirit;

the first expressions of their sentiments would be important; if I would

only stay to the end of that, it would relieve him considerably.

I expressed to him my excessive repugnance to public life, the particular

uneasiness of my situation in this place, where the laws of society

oblige me always to move exactly in the circle which I know to bear me

peculiar hatred; that is to say, the wealthy aristocrats, the merchants

connected closely with England, the new created paper fortunes; that

thus surrounded, my words were caught, multiplied, misconstrued, and even

fabricated and spread abroad to my injury; that he saw also, that there

was such an opposition of views between myself and another part of the

administration, as to render it peculiarly unpleasing, and to destroy

the necessary harmony. Without knowing the views of what is called the

republican party here, or having any communication with them, I could

undertake to assure him, from my intimacy with that party in the late

Congress, that there was not a view in the republican party as spread

over the United States, which went to the frame of the government; that

I believed the next Congress would attempt nothing material, but to

render their own body independent; that that party were firm in their

dispositions to support the government; that the manœuvres of Mr. Genet

might produce some little embarrassment, but that he would be abandoned

by the republicans the moment they knew the nature of his conduct; and

on the whole, no crisis existed which threatened anything.

He said he believed the views of the republican party were perfectly

pure, but when men put a machine into motion, it is impossible for them

to stop it exactly where they would choose, or to say where it will

stop. That the constitution we have is an excellent one, if we can keep

it where it is; that it was, indeed, supposed there was a party disposed

to change it into a monarchical form, but that he could conscientiously

declare there was not a man in the United States who would set his

face more decidedly against it than himself. Here I interrupted him, by

saying, "No rational man in the United States suspects you of any other

disposition; but there does not pass a week, in which we cannot prove

declarations dropping from the monarchical party that our government is

good for nothing, is a milk and water thing which cannot support itself,

we must knock it down, and set up something of more energy." He said if

that was the case, he thought it a proof of their insanity, for that

the republican spirit of the Union was so manifest and so solid, that

it was astonishing how any one could expect to move it.

He returned to the difficulty of naming my successor; he said Mr.

Madison would be his first choice, but that he had always expressed to

him such a decision against public office, that he could not expect he

would undertake it. Mr. Jay would prefer his present office. He said

that Mr. Jay had a great opinion of the talents of Mr. King; that there

was also Mr. Smith of South Carolina, and E. Rutledge; but he observed,

that name whom he would, some objections would be made, some would be

called speculators, some one thing, some another; and he asked me to

mention any characters occurring to me. I asked him if Governor Johnson

of Maryland had occurred to him? He said he had; that he was a man of

great good sense, an honest man, and he believed, clear of speculations;

but this, says he, is an instance of what I was observing; with all

these qualifications, Governor Johnson, from a want of familiarity with

foreign affairs, would be in them like a fish out of water; everything

would be new to him, and he awkward in everything. I confessed to him

that I had considered Johnson rather as fit for the Treasury Department.

Yes, says he, for that he would be the fittest appointment that could be

made; he is a man acquainted with figures, and having as good a knowledge

of the resources of this country as any man. I asked him if Chancellor

Livingston had occurred to him? He said yes; but he was from New York,

and to appoint him while Hamilton was in, and before it should be known

he was going out, would excite a newspaper conflagration, as the ultimate

arrangement would not be known. He said McLurg had occurred to him as

a man of first-rate abilities, but it is said that he is a speculator.

He asked me what sort of a man Wolcott was. I told him I knew nothing

of him myself; I had heard him characterized as a cunning man. I asked

him whether some person could not take my office _par interim_, till he

should make an appointment, as Mr. Randolph, for instance. Yes, says

he, but there you would raise the expectation of keeping it, and I do

not know that he is fit for it, nor what is thought of Mr. Randolph.

I avoided noticing the last observation, and he put the question to me

directly. I then told him, I went into society so little as to be unable

to answer it: I knew that the embarrassments in his private affairs had

obliged him to use expedients, which had injured him with the merchants

and shop-keepers, and affected his character of independence; that

these embarrassments were serious, and not likely to cease soon. He

said if I would only stay in till the end of another quarter (the last

of December) it would get us through the difficulties of this year,

and he was satisfied that the affairs of Europe would be settled with

this campaign; for that either France would be overwhelmed by it, or

the confederacy would give up the contest. By that time, too, Congress

will have manifested its character and view. I told him that I had set

my private affairs in motion in a line which had powerfully called for

my presence the last spring, and that they had suffered immensely from

my not going home; that I had now calculated them to my return in the

fall, and to fail in going then, would be the loss of another year, and

prejudicial beyond measure. I asked him whether he could not name Governor

Johnson to my office, under an express arrangement that at the close of

the session he should take that of the Treasury. He said that men never

chose to descend; that being once in a higher department, he would not

like to go into a lower one. He asked me whether I could not arrange my

affairs by going home. I told him I did not think the public business

would admit of it; that there never was a day now in which the absence

of the Secretary of State would not be inconvenient to the public. And

he concluded by desiring that I would take two or three days to consider

whether I could not stay in till the end of another quarter, for that

like a man going to the gallows, he was willing to put it off as long

as he could; but if I persisted, he must then look about him and make

up his mind to do the best he could; and so he took leave.

* * * * *

August the 20th. We met at the President's to examine by paragraphs the

draught of a letter I had prepared to Gouverneur Morris on the conduct of

Mr. Genet. There was no difference of opinion on any part of it, except

on this expression, "An attempt to embroil both, to add still another

nation to the enemies of his country, and to draw on both a reproach which

it is hoped will never stain the history of either, that of _liberty

warring on herself_." Hamilton moved to strike out these words, "that

of liberty warring on herself." He urged generally that it would give

offence to the combined powers; that it amounted to a declaration that

they were warring on liberty; that we were not called on to declare

that the cause of France was that of liberty; that he had at first been

with them with all his heart, but that he had long since left them, and

was not for encouraging the idea here, that the cause of France was the

cause of liberty in general, or could have either connection or influence

in our affairs. Knox, according to custom, jumped plump into all his

opinions. The President, with a good deal of positiveness, declared in

favor of the expression; that he considered the pursuit of France to be

that of liberty, however they might sometimes fail of the best means

of obtaining it; that he had never at any time entertained a doubt of

their ultimate success, if they hung well together; and that as to their

dissensions, there were such contradictory accounts given, that no one

could tell what to believe. I observed that it had been supposed among

us all along that the present letter might become public; that we had

therefore three parties to attend to,--1st, France; 2d, her enemies 3d,

the people of the United States; that as to the enemies of France, it

ought not to offend them, because the passage objected to, only spoke of

an attempt to make the United States, a _free nation_, war on France,

a _free nation_, which would be liberty warring against liberty; that

as to France, we were taking so harsh a measure (desiring her to recall

her minister) that a precedent for it could scarcely be found; that we

knew that minister would represent to his government that our executive

was hostile to liberty, leaning to monarchy, and would endeavor to parry

the charges on himself, by rendering suspicions the source from which

they flowed; that, therefore, it was essential to satisfy France, not

only of our friendship to her, but our attachment to the general cause

of liberty, and to hers in particular; that as to the people of the

United States, we knew there were suspicions abroad that the executive,

in some of its parts, was tainted with a hankering after monarchy, an

indisposition towards liberty, and towards the French cause; and that it

was important, by an explicit declaration, to remove these suspicions,

and restore the confidence of the people in their government. Randolph

opposed the passage on nearly the same ground with Hamilton. He added,

that he thought it had been agreed that this correspondence should contain

no expressions which could give offence to either party. I replied that

it had been my opinion in the beginning of the correspondence, that

while we were censuring the conduct of the French minister, we should

make the most cordial declarations of friendship to them; that in the

first letter or two of the correspondence, I had inserted expressions

of that kind, but that himself and the other two gentlemen had struck

them out; that I thereupon conformed to their opinions in my subsequent

letters, and had carefully avoided the insertion of a single term of

friendship to the French nation, and the letters were as dry and husky

as if written between the generals of two enemy nations; that on the

present occasion, how ever, it had been agreed that such expressions

ought to be inserted in the letter now under consideration, and I had

accordingly charged it pretty well with them; that I had further thought

it essential to satisfy the French and our own citizens of the light in

which we viewed their cause, and of our fellow feeling for the general

cause of liberty, and had ventured only four words on the subject; that

there was not from beginning to end of the letter one other expression

or word in favor of liberty, and I should think it singular, at least,

if the single passage of that character should be struck out.

The President again spoke. He came into the idea that attention was

due to the two parties who had been mentioned, France and the United

States; that as to the former, thinking it certain their affairs would

issue in a government of some sort--of considerable freedom--it was the

only nation with whom our relations could be counted on; that as to the

United States, there could be no doubt of their universal attachment

to the cause of France, and of the solidity of their republicanism. He

declared his strong attachment to the expression, but finally left it

to us to accommodate. It was struck out, of course, and the expressions

of affection in the context were a good deal taken down.

* * * * *

August the 23d, 1793. In consequence of my note of yesterday to the

President, a meeting was called this day at his house to determine what

should be done with the proposition of France to treat. The importance

of the matter was admitted; and being of so old a date as May 22d, we

might be accused of neglecting the interests of the United States, to

have left it so long unanswered, and it could not be doubted Mr. Genet

would avail himself of this inattention. The President declared it had

not been inattention, that it had been the subject of conversation often

at our meetings, and the delay had proceeded from the difficulty of the

thing.

If the struggles of France should end in the old despotism, the formation

of such a treaty with the present government would be a matter of offence;

if it should end in any kind of free government, he should be very

unwilling, by inattention to their advances, to give offence, and lose

the opportunity of procuring terms so advantageous to our country. He

was, therefore, for writing to Mr. Morris to get the powers of Mr. Genet

renewed to his successor. [As he had expressed this opinion to me the

afternoon before, I had prepared the draught of a letter accordingly.]

But how to explain the delay? The Secretary of the Treasury observed on

the letter of the National Convention, that as it did not seem to require

an answer, and the matters it contained would occasion embarrassment

if answered, he should be against answering it; that he should be for

writing to Mr. Morris, mentioning our readiness to treat with them, and

suggesting a renewal of Mr. Genet's powers to his successor, but not

in as strong terms as I had done in my draught of the letter--not as

a thing anxiously wished for by us, lest it should suggest to them the

asking a price; and he was for my writing to Mr. Genet _now_, an answer

to his letter of May 22d, referring to the meeting of the Senate the

entering on the treaty. Knox concurred with him, the Attorney General

also,--except that he was against suggesting the renewal of Mr. Genet's

powers, because that would amount to a declaration that we would treat

with that government, would commit us to lay the subject before the

Senate, and his principle had ever been to do no act, not unavoidably

necessary, which, in the event of a counter revolution, might offend the

future governing powers of that country. I stated to them that having

observed from our conversations that the propositions to treat might not

be acceded to immediately, I had endeavored to prepare Mr. Genet for it,

by taking occasion in conversations to apprize him of the control over

treaties which our constitution had given to the Senate; that though

this was indirectly done, (because not having been authorized to say

anything official on the subject, I did not venture to commit myself

directly,) yet, on some subsequent conversation, I found it had struck

him exactly as I had wished; for, speaking on some other matter, he

mentioned incidentally his propositions to treat, and said, however, as

I know now that you cannot take up that subject till the meeting of the

Senate, I shall say no more about it now, and so proceeded with his other

subject, which I do not now recollect. I said I thought it possible by

recalling the substance of these conversations to Mr. Genet, in a letter

to be written now, I might add that the Executive had at length come

to a conclusion, that on account of the importance of the matter, they

would await the meeting of the Senate; but I pressed strongly the urging

Mr. Morris to procure a renewal of Genet's powers, that we might not

lose the chance of obtaining so advantageous a treaty. Edmund Randolph

had argued against our acceding to it, because it was too advantageous;

so much so that they would certainly break it, and it might become the

cause of war. I answered that it would be easy, in the course of the

negociation, to cure it of its inequality by giving some compensation;

but I had no fear of their revoking it, that the islanders themselves

were too much interested in the concessions ever to suffer them to be

revoked; that the best thinkers in France had long been of opinion that

it would be for the interest of the mother country to let the colonies

obtain subsistence wherever they could cheapest; that I was confident

the present struggles in France would end in a free government of some

sort, and that such a government would consider itself as growing out of

the present one, and respect its treaties. The President recurred to the

awkwardness of writing a letter now to Mr. Genet, in answer to his of May

22d; that it would certainly be construed as merely done with a design

of exculpation of ourselves, and he would thence inculpate us. The more

we reflected on this, the more the justice of the observation struck us.

Hamilton and myself came into it--Knox still for the letter--Randolph

half for it, half against it, according to custom.

It was at length agreed I should state the substance of my verbal

observations to Mr. Genet, in a letter to Mr. Morris, and let them be

considered as the answer intended; for being from the Secretary of State,

they might be considered as official, though not in writing.

It is evident that taking this ground for their future justification to

France and to the United States, they were sensible they had censurably

neglected these overtures of treaty; for not only what I had said to

Mr. Genet was without authority from them, but was never communicated

to them till this day. To rest the justification of delay on answers

given, it is true in time; but of which they had no knowledge till now,

is an ostensible justification only.

* * * * *

September the 4th, 1793. At a meeting held some days ago, some letters

from the Governor of Georgia were read, in which a consultation of

officers, and a considerable expedition against the Creeks was proposed.

We were all of opinion no such expedition should be undertaken. My reasons

were that such a war might bring on a Spanish, and even an English war;

that for this reason the aggressions of the Creeks had been laid before

the last Congress, and they had not chosen to declare war, therefore the

Executive should not take on itself to do it; and that according to the

opinions of Pickens and Blount, it was too late in the season.

I thought, however, that a temperate and conciliatory letter should be

written to the Governor, in order that we might retain the disposition

of the people of the State to assist in an expedition when undertaken.

The other gentlemen thought a strong letter of disapprobation should be

written. Such a one was this day produced, strong and reprehendatory

enough, in which I thought were visible the personal enmities of Knox

and Hamilton, against Telfair, Gun, and Jackson--the two last having

been of the council of officers. The letter passed without objection,

being of the complexion before determined.

Wayne's letter was read, proposing that six hundred militia should

set out from Fort Pitt to attack certain Miami towns, while he marched

against the principal towns. The President disapproved it, because of

the difficulty of concerted movements at six hundred miles distance;

because these six hundred men might, and probably would have the whole

force of the Indians to contend with; and because the object was not

worth the risking such a number of men. We all concurred. It appeared

to me, further, that to begin an expedition from Fort Pitt, the very

first order for which is to be given now, when we have reason to believe

Wayne advanced as far as Fort Jefferson, would be either too late for

his movements, or would retard them very injuriously. [_Note._--The

letters from the Commissioners were now read, announcing the refusal of

the Indians to treat, unless the Ohio were made the boundary; and that

they were on their return.]

A letter from Governor Clinton read, informing of his issuing a warrant

to arrest Governor Galbaud, at the request of the French Consul, and

that he was lead to interfere because the judge of the district lived at

Albany. It was proposed to write to the judge of the district, that the

place of his residence was not adapted to his duties; and to Clinton,

that Galbaud was not liable to arrest. Hamilton said, that by the laws

of New York, the Governor has the powers of a justice of peace, and had

issued the warrant as such.

I was against writing letters to judiciary officers. I thought them

independent of the Executive, not subject to its coercion, and, therefore,

not obliged to attend to its admonitions.

The other three were for writing the letters. They thought it the duty

of the President to see that the laws were executed; and if he found a

failure in so important an officer, to communicate it to the legislature

for impeachment.

Edmund Randolph undertook to write the letters, and I am to sign them

as if mine. The President brought forward the subject of the ports, and

thought a new demand of answer should be made to Mr. Hammond. As we had

not Mr. Hammond's last answer (of June 20th) on that subject, agreed to

let it lie over to Monday.

Hammond proposed, that on Monday we should take into consideration the

fortification of the rivers and ports of the United States, and that

though the Executive could not undertake to do it, preparatory surveys

should be made to be laid before Congress, to be considered on Monday.

The letters to Genet covering a copy of mine to Gov. Morris--of ---- to

the French consuls, threatening the revocation of their Exequaturs--to

Mr. Pinckney on the additional instructions of Great Britain to their

navy for shipping our corn, flour, &c., and to Gov. Morris on the similar

order of the French National Assembly, are to be ready on Monday.

My letter to Mr. Hammond, in answer to his of August 30th, was read

and approved. Hamilton wished not to narrow the ground of compensation

so much as to cases after August 7th. Knox joined him, and by several

observations showed he did not know what the question was. He could not

comprehend that the letter of August 7th, which promised compensation

(because we had not used all the means in our power for restricting),

would not be contradicted by a refusal to compensate in cases after

August 7th, where we should naturally use all the means in our power

for restriction, and these means should be insufficient. The letter was

agreed to on Mr. Randolph's opinion and mine; Hamilton acquiescing, Knox

opposing.

* * * * *

At sundry meetings of the Heads of departments and Attorney General,

from the 1st to the 28th of November, 1793, at the President's, several

matters were agreed upon, as stated in the following letters from the

Secretary of State, to wit:--

November the 8th. Circular letter to the representatives of France,

Great Britain, Spain, and the United Netherlands, fixing provisionally

the extent of our jurisdiction into the sea at a sea league.

10th. Circular letter to the district attorneys, notifying the same,

and committing to them the taking depositions in those cases.

10th. Circular to the foreign representatives, notifying how depositions

are to be taken in those cases.

The substance of the preceding letters was agreed to by all; the rough

drafts were submitted to them and approved.

November the 14th. To Mr. Hammond, that the United States are not bound

to restore the Roehampton. This was agreed by all. The rough draught was

submitted to and approved by Colonel Hamilton and Mr. Randolph. General

Knox was on a visit to Trenton.

10th. Letters to Mr. Genet and Hammond, and the 14th to Mr. Hollingsworth,

for taking depositions in the cases of the Conningham and Pilgrim.

13th. Ditto, to Mr. Genet, Hammond, and Bowle, for depositions in the

case of the William.

14th. Ditto, to Hollingsworth, to ascertain whether Mr. Moissonier had

passed sentenced on the Rochampton and Pilgrim.

These last-mentioned letters of the 10th, 13th, and 14th were, as to

their substance, agreed to by all, the draughts were only communicated

to Mr. Randolph, and approved by him.

November the 13th. To Mr. Hammond, inquiring when we shall have an

answer on the inexecution of the treaty. The substance agreed by all.

The letter was sent off without communication, none of the gentlemen

being at Germantown.

22d. To Mr. Genet, returning the commissions of Pennevert and Chervi,

because not addressed to the President.

22d. To Mr. Genet, inquiring whether the Lovely-Lass, Prince William

Henry, and Jane, of Dublin, have been given up; and if not, requiring

that they be restored to owners. These were agreed to by all, as to their

matter, and the letters themselves were submitted before they were sent

to the President, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney-General.

22d. To Mr. Gore, for authentic evidence of Dannery's protest on the

President's revocation of Duplaine's Exequatur. The substance agreed by

all. The letter sent off before communication.

THOMAS JEFFERSON.

HENRY KNOX.

EDMUND RANDOLPH.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

November 23d, 1793.

* * * * *

November the 5th, 1793. E. Randolph tells me, that Hamilton, in

conversation with him yesterday, said, "Sir, if all the people in America

were now assembled, and to call on me to say whether I am a friend to

the French revolution, I would declare that _I have it in abhorrence_."

* * * * *

November the 8th, 1793. At a conference at the President's, where I

read several letters of Mr. Genet; on finishing one of them, I asked

what should be the answer? The President thereupon took occasion to

observe, that Mr. Genet's conduct continued to be of so extraordinary a

nature, that he meant to propose to our serious consideration, whether

he should not have his functions discontinued, and be ordered away? He

went lengthily into observations on his conduct, to raise against the

executive, 1, the people; 2, the State governments; 3, the Congress.

He showed he felt the venom of Genet's pen, but declared he would not

choose his insolence should be regarded any further, than as might be

thought to affect the honor of the country. Hamilton and Knox readily

and zealously argued for dismissing Mr. Genet. Randolph opposed it with

firmness, and pretty lengthily. The President replied to him lengthily,

and concluded by saying he did not wish to have the thing hastily decided,

but that we should consider of it, and give our opinions on his return

from Reading and Lancaster.

Accordingly, November the 18th, we met at his house; read new volumes

of Genet's letters, received since the President's departure; then took

up the discussion of the subjects of communication to Congress. 1. The

Proclamation. E. Randolph read the statement he had prepared; Hamilton

did not like it; said much about his own views; that the President had a

right to declare his opinion to our citizens and foreign nations; that

it was not the interest of this country to join in the war, and that

we were under no obligation to join in it; that though the declaration

would not legally bind Congress, yet the President had a right to give

his opinion of it, and he was against any explanation in the speech,

which should yield that he did not intend that foreign nations should

consider it as a declaration of neutrality, future as well as present;

that he understood it as meant to give them that sort of assurance and

satisfaction, and to say otherwise now, would be a deception on them. He

was for the President's using such expressions, as should neither affirm

his right to make such a declaration to foreign nations, nor yield it.

Randolph and myself opposed the right of the President to declare anything

future on the question, shall there or shall there not be war, and that

no such thing was intended; that Hamilton's construction of the effect

of the proclamation, would have been a determination of the question of

the _guarantee_, which we both denied to have intended, and I had at the

time declared the executive incompetent to. Randolph said he meant that

foreign nations should understand it as an intimation of the President's

opinion, that neutrality would be our interest. I declared my meaning to

have been, that foreign nations should understand no such thing; that on

the contrary, I would have chosen them to be doubtful, and to come and

bid for our neutrality. I admitted the President, having received the

nation at the close of Congress in a state of peace, was bound to preserve

them in that state till Congress should meet again, and might proclaim

anything which went no farther. The President declared he never had an

idea that he could bind Congress against declaring war, or that anything

contained in his proclamation could look beyond the first day of their

meeting. His main view was to keep our people in peace; he apologized

for the use of the term neutrality in his answers, and justified it, by

having submitted the first of them (that to the merchants, wherein it

was used) to our consideration, and we had not objected to the term. He

concluded in the end, that Colonel Hamilton should prepare a paragraph

on this subject for the speech, and it should then be considered. We

were here called to dinner.

After dinner, the _renvoi_ of Genet was proposed by himself. I opposed

it on these topics. France, the only nation on earth sincerely our

friend. The measure so harsh a one, that no precedent is produced

where it has not been followed by war. Our messenger has now been gone

eighty-four days; consequently, we may hourly expect the return, and

to be relieved by their revocation of him. Were it now resolved on, it

would be eight or ten days before the matter on which the order should

be founded, could be selected, arranged, discussed, and forwarded. This

would bring us within four or five days of the meeting of Congress.

Would it not be better to wait and see how the pulse of that body, new

as it is, would beat. They are with us now, probably, but such a step

as this may carry many over to Genet's side. Genet will not obey the

order, &c., &c. The President asked me what I would do if Genet sent the

accusation to us to be communicated to Congress, as he threatened in the

letter to Moultrie? I said I would not sent it to Congress; but either

put it in the newspapers, or send it back to him to be published if he

pleased. Other questions and answers were put and returned in a quicker

altercation than I ever before saw the President use. Hamilton was for

the _renvoi_; spoke much of the dignity of the nation; that they were

now to form their character; that our conduct now would tempt or deter

other foreign ministers from treating us in the same manner; touched

on the President's personal feelings; did not believe France would make

it a cause of war; if she did, we ought to do what was right, and meet

the consequences, &c. Knox on the same side, and said he thought it

very possible Mr. Genet would either declare us a department of France,

or levy troops here and endeavor to reduce us to obedience. Randolph

of my opinion, and argued chiefly on the resurrection of popularity to

Genet, which might be produced by this measure. That at present he was

dead in the public opinion, if we would but leave him so. The President

lamented there was not unanimity among us; that as it was, we had left

him exactly where we found him; and so it ended.

* * * * *

November the 21st. We met at the President's. The manner of explaining

to Congress the intentions of the proclamation, was the matter of

debate. Randolph produced his way of stating it. This expressed its

views to have been, 1, to keep our citizens quiet; 2, to intimate to

foreign nations that it was the President's opinion, that the interests

and dispositions of this country were for peace. Hamilton produced his

statement, in which he declared his intention to be, to say nothing

which could be laid hold of for any purpose; to leave the proclamation

to explain itself. He entered pretty fully into all the argumentation

of Pacificus; he justified the right of the President to declare his

opinion for a _future neutrality_, and that there existed no circumstances

to oblige the United States to enter into the war on account of the

guarantee; and that in agreeing to the proclamation, he meant it to be

understood as conveying both those declarations; viz. neutrality, and

that the _casus fœderis_ on the guarantee did not exist. He admitted

the Congress might declare war, notwithstanding these declarations of

the President. In like manner, they might declare war in the face of a

treaty, and in direct infraction of it. Among other positions laid down

by him, this was with great positiveness; that the constitution having

given power to the President and Senate to make treaties, they might

make a treaty of neutrality which should take from Congress the right to

declare war in that particular case, and that under the form of a treaty

they might exercise any powers whatever, even those exclusively given by

the constitution to the House of Representatives. Randolph opposed this

position, and seemed to think that where they undertook to do acts by

treaty, (as to settle a tariff of duties,) which were exclusively given

to the Legislature, that an act of the Legislature would be necessary

to confirm them, as happens in England, when a treaty interferes with

duties established by law. I insisted that in giving to the President

and Senate a power to make treaties, the constitution meant only to

authorize them to carry into effect, by way of treaty, any powers they

might constitutionally exercise. I was sensible of the weak points in

this position, but there were still weaker in the other hypothesis; and

if it be impossible to discover a rational measure of authority to have

been given by this clause, I would rather suppose that the cases which my

hypothesis would leave unprovided, were not thought of by the convention,

or if thought of, could not be agreed on, or were thought of and deemed

unnecessary to be invested in the government. Of this last description,

were treaties of neutrality, treaties offensive and defensive, &c. In

every event, I would rather construe so narrowly as to oblige the nation

to amend, and thus declare what powers they would agree to yield, than

too broadly, and indeed, so broadly as to enable the executive and

Senate to do things which the constitution forbids. On the question,

which form of explaining the principles of the proclamation should be

adopted, I declared for Randolph's, though it gave to that instrument

more objects than I had contemplated. Knox declared for Hamilton's. The

President said he had had but one object, the keeping our people quiet

till Congress should meet; that nevertheless, to declare he did not mean

a declaration of neutrality, in the technical sense of the phrase, might

perhaps be crying _peccavi_ before he was charged. However, he did not

decide between the two draughts.

* * * * *

November the 23d. At the President's. Present, Knox, Randolph, and Th:

Jefferson. Subject, the heads of the speech. One was, a proposition

to Congress to fortify the principal harbors. I opposed the expediency

of the General Government's undertaking it, and the expediency of the

President's proposing it. It was amended, by substituting a proposition

to adopt means for enforcing respect to the jurisdiction of the United

States within its waters. It was proposed to recommend the establishment

of a military academy. I objected that none of the specified powers

given by the constitution to Congress, would authorize this. It was,

therefore, referred for further consideration and inquiry. Knox was for

both propositions. Randolph against the former, but said nothing as to

the latter. The President acknowledged he had doubted of the expediency

of undertaking the former; and as to the latter, though it would be a

good thing, he did not wish to bring on anything which might generate

heat and ill humor. It was agreed that Randolph should draw the speech

and the messages.

* * * * *

November the 28th. Met at the President's. I read over a list of the

papers copying, to be communicated to Congress on the subject of Mr.

Genet. It was agreed that Genet's letter of August the 13th to the

President, mine of August the 16th, and Genet's of November to myself

and the Attorney General, desiring a prosecution of Jay and King should

not be sent to the legislature: on a general opinion, that the discussion

of the fact certified by Jay and King had better be left to the channel

of the newspapers, and in the private hands in which it now is, than

for the President to meddle in it, or give room to a discussion of it

in Congress.

Randolph had prepared a draught of the speech. The clause recommending

fortifications was left out; but that for a military academy was inserted.

I opposed it, as unauthorized by the constitution. Hamilton and Knox

approved it without discussion. Randolph was for it, saying that the

words of the constitution authorizing Congress to lay taxes, &c., _for

the common defence_, might comprehend it. The President said he would

not choose to recommend anything against the constitution, but if it

was _doubtful_, he was so impressed with the necessity of this measure,

that he would refer it to Congress, and let them decide for themselves

whether the constitution authorized it or not. It was, therefore, left

in. I was happy to see that Randolph had, by accident, used the expression

"our republic," in the speech. The President, however, made no objection

to it, and so, as much as it had disconcerted him on a former occasion

with me, it was now put into his own mouth to be pronounced to the two

Houses of legislature.

No material alterations were proposed or made in any part of the draught.

After dinner, I produced the draught of messages on the subject of France

and England, proposing that that relative to Spain should be subsequent

and secret.

Hamilton objected to the draught _in toto_; said that the contrast drawn

between the conduct of France and England amounted to a declaration of

war; he denied that France had ever done us favors; that it was mean

for a nation to acknowledge favors; that the dispositions of the people

of this country towards France, he considered as a serious calamity;

that the executive ought not, by an echo of this language, to nourish

that disposition in the people; that the offers in commerce made us

by France, were the offspring of the moment, of circumstances which

would not last, and it was wrong to receive as permanent, things merely

temporary; that he could demonstrate that Great Britain showed us more

favors than France. In complaisance to him I whittled down the expressions

without opposition; struck out that of "favors ancient and recent" from

France; softened some terms, and omitted some sentiments respecting Great

Britain. He still was against the whole, but insisted that, at any rate,

it should be a secret communication, because the matters it stated were

still depending. These were, 1, the inexecution of the treaty; 2, the

restraining our commerce to their own ports and those of their friends.

Knox joined Hamilton in everything. Randolph was for the communications;

that the documents respecting the first should be given in as public; but

that those respecting the second should not be given to the legislature

at all, but kept secret. I began to tremble now for the whole, lest all

should be kept secret. I urged, especially, the duty now incumbent on

the President, to lay before the legislature and the public what had

passed on the inexecution of the treaty, since Mr. Hammond's answer of

this month might be considered as the last we should ever have; that,

therefore, it could no longer be considered as a negotiation pending. I

urged that the documents respecting the stopping our corn ought also to

go, but insisted that if it should be thought better to withhold them, the

restrictions should not go to those respecting the treaty; that neither

of these subjects was more in a state of _pendency_ than the recall of

Mr. Genet, on which, nevertheless, no scruples had been expressed. The

President took up the subject with more vehemence than I have seen him

show, and decided without reserve, that not only what had passed on the

inexecution of the treaty should go in as public, (in which Hamilton

and Knox had divided in opinion from Randolph and myself,) but also that

those respecting the stopping our corn should go in as public, (wherein,

Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph had been against me.) This was the first

instance I had seen of his deciding on the opinion of one against that

of three others, which proved his own to have been very strong.

* * * * *

December the 1st, 1793. Beckley tells me he had the following fact from

Lear. Langdon, Cabot, and some others of the Senate, standing in a knot

before the fire after the Senate had adjourned, and growling together

about some measure which they had just lost; "Ah!" said Cabot, "things

will never go right till you have a President for life, and an hereditary

Senate." Langdon told this to Lear, who mentioned it to the President.

The President seemed struck with it, and declared he had not supposed

there was a man in the United States who could have entertained such an

idea.

* * * * *

March the 2d, 1797. I arrived at Philadelphia to qualify as

Vice-President, and called instantly on Mr. Adams, who lodged at

Francis's, in Fourth street. The next morning he returned my visit at Mr.

Madison's, where I lodged. He found me alone in my room, and shutting the

door himself, he said he was glad to find me alone, for that he wished

a free conversation with me. He entered immediately on an explanation

of the situation of our affairs with France, and the danger of rupture

with that nation, a rupture which would convulse the attachments of

this country; that he was impressed with the necessity of an immediate

mission to the Directory; that it would have been the first wish of

his heart to have got me to go there, but that he supposed it was out

of the question, as it did not seem justifiable for him to send away

the person destined to take his place in case of accident to himself,

nor decent to remove from competition one who was a rival in the public

favor. That he had, therefore, concluded to send a mission, which, by

its dignity, should satisfy France, and by its selection from the three

great divisions of the continent, should satisfy all parts of the United

States; in short, that he had determined to join Gerry and Madison to

Pinckney, and he wished me to consult Mr. Madison for him. I told him

that as to myself, I concurred in the opinion of the impropriety of my

leaving the post assigned me, and that my inclinations, moreover, would

never permit me to cross the Atlantic again; that I would, as he desired,

consult Mr. Madison, but I feared it was desperate, as he had refused

that mission on my leaving it, in General Washington's time, though it

was kept open a twelvemonth for him. He said that if Mr. Madison should

refuse, he would still appoint him, and leave the responsibility on him.

I consulted Mr. Madison, who declined as I expected. I think it was on

Monday the 6th of March, Mr. Adams and myself met at dinner at General

Washington's, and we happened, in the evening, to rise from table and

come away together. As soon as we got into the street, I told him the

event of my negotiation with Mr. Madison. He immediately said, that,

on consultation, some objections to that nomination had been raised

which he had not contemplated; and was going on with excuses which

evidently embarrassed him, when we came to Fifth street, where our road

separated, his being down Market street, mine off along Fifth, and we

took leave; and he never after that said one word to me on the subject,

or ever consulted me as to any measures of the government. The opinion

I formed at the time on this transaction, was, that Mr. Adams, in the

first moments of the enthusiasm of the occasion, (his inauguration,)

forgot party sentiments, and as he never acted on any system, but was

always governed by the feeling of the moment, he thought, for a moment,

to steer impartially between the parties; that Monday, the 6th of March,

being the first time he had met his cabinet, on expressing ideas of this

kind, he had been at once diverted from them, and returned to his former

party views.

* * * * *

July, 1797. Murray is rewarded for his services by an appointment to

Amsterdam; W. Smith of Charleston, to Lisbon.

* * * * *

August the 24th. About the time of the British treaty, Hamilton and

Talleyrand, bishop of Autun, dined together, and Hamilton drank freely.

Conversing on the treaty, Talleyrand says, "mais vraiment Monsieur

Hamilton, ce n'est pas _bien honnete_, after making the Senate ratify

the treaty, to advise the President to reject it." "The treaty," says

Hamilton, "is an execrable one, and Jay was an old woman for making it;

but the whole credit of saving us from it must be given to the President."

After circumstances had led to a conclusion that the President also must

ratify it, he said to the same Talleyrand, "though the treaty is a most

execrable one, yet when once we have come to a determination on it, we

must carry it through thick and thin, right or wrong." Talleyrand told

this to Volney, who told it to me.

There is a letter now appearing in the papers, from Pickering to Monroe,

dated July the 24th, 1797, which I am satisfied is written by Hamilton.

He was in Philadelphia at that date.

* * * * *

December the 26th, 1797. Langdon tells me, that at the second election

of President and Vice-President of the United States, when there was a

considerable vote given to Clinton in opposition to Mr. Adams, he took

occasion to remark it in conversation in the Senate chamber with Mr.

Adams, who, gritting his teeth, said, "damn 'em, damn 'em, damn 'em, you

see that an elective government will not do." He also tells me that Mr.

Adams, in a late conversation, said, "republicanism must be disgraced,

Sir." The Chevalier Yruho called on him at Braintree, and conversing on

French affairs, and Yruho expressing his belief of their stability, in

opposition to Mr. Adams, the latter lifting up and shaking his finger

at him, said, "I'll tell you what, the French republic will not last

three months." This I had from Yruho.

Harper, lately in a large company, was saying that the best thing the

friends of the French could do, was to pray for the restoration of

their monarch. "Then," says a bystander, "the best thing we could do,

I suppose, would be to pray for the establishment of a monarch in the

United States." "Our people," says Harper, "are not yet ripe for it, but

it is the best thing we can come to, and we shall come to it." Something

like this was said in presence of Findlay. He now denies it in the public

papers, though it can be proved by several members.

* * * * *

December the 27th. Tenche Coxe tells me, that a little before Hamilton

went out of office, or just as he was going out, taking with him his

last conversation, and among other things, on the subject of their

differences, "for my part," says he, "I avow myself a monarchist; I have

no objection to a trial being made of this thing of a republic, but," &c.

* * * * *

January the 5th. 1798. I receive a very remarkable fact indeed in our

history, from Baldwin and Skinner. Before the establishment of our present

government, a very extensive combination had taken place in New York and

the eastern States, among that description of people who were partly

monarchical in principle, or frightened with Shay's rebellion and the

impotence of the old Congress. Delegates in different places had actually

had consultations on the subject of seizing on the powers of a government,

and establishing them by force; had corresponded with one another, and

had sent a deputy to General Washington to solicit his co-operation. He

refused to join them. The new convention was in the meantime proposed by

Virginia and appointed. These people believed it impossible the States

should ever agree on a government, as this must include the impest and

all the other powers which the States had, a thousand times, refused to

the general authority. They therefore let the proposed convention go on,

not doubting its failure, and confiding that on its failure would be a

still more favorable moment for their enterprise. They therefore wished

it to fail, and especially, when Hamilton, their leader, brought forward

his plan of government, failed entirely in carrying it, and retired in

disgust from the convention. His associates then took every method to

prevent any form of government being agreed to. But the well-intentioned

never ceased trying, first one thing, then another, till they could get

something agreed to. The final passage and adoption of the constitution

completely defeated the views of the combination, and saved us from an

attempt to establish a government over us by force. This fact throws a

blaze of light on the conduct of several members from New York and the

eastern States in the convention of Annapolis, and the grand convention.

At that of Annapolis, several eastern members most vehemently opposed

Madison's proposition for a more general convention, with more general

powers. They wished things to get more and more into confusion, to

justify the violent measure they proposed. The idea of establishing a

government by reasoning and agreement, they publicly ridiculed as an

Utopian project, visionary and unexampled.

* * * * *

February the 6th, 1798. Mr. Baldwin tells me that in a conversation

yesterday with Goodhue, on the state of our affairs, Goodhue said, "I'll

tell you what, I have made up my mind on this subject; I would rather the

old ship should go down than not;" (meaning the Union of the States.) Mr.

Hillhouse coming up, "well," says Mr. Baldwin, "I'll tell my old friend

Hillhouse what you say;" and he told him. "Well," says Goodhue, "I repeat

that I would rather the old ship should go down, if we are to be always

kept pumping so." "Mr. Hillhouse," says Baldwin, "you remember when we

were learning logic together at school, there was the case _categorical_

and the case _hypothetical_. Mr. Goodhue stated it to me first as the

case categorical. I am glad to see that he now changes it to the case

hypothetical, by adding, 'if we are always to be kept pumping so.'"

Baldwin went on then to remind Goodhue what an advocate he had been for

our tonnage duty, wanting to make it one dollar instead of fifty cents;

and how impatiently he bore the delays of Congress in proceeding to

retaliate on Great Britain before Mr. Madison's propositions came on.

Goodhue acknowledged that his opinions had changed since that.

* * * * *

February the 15th, 1798. I dined this day with Mr. Adams, (the President.)

The company was large. After dinner I was sitting next to him, and our

conversation was first on the enormous price of labor,[12] house rent,

and other things. We both concurred in ascribing it chiefly to the floods

of bank paper now afloat, and in condemning those institutions. We then

got on the constitution; and in the course of our conversation he said,

that no republic could ever last which had not a Senate, and a Senate

deeply and strongly rooted, strong enough to bear up against all popular

storms and passions; that he thought our Senate as well constituted

as it could have been, being chosen by the legislatures; for if these

could not support them, he did not know what could do it; that perhaps

it might have been as well for them to be chosen by the State at large,

as that would insure a choice of distinguished men, since none but such

could be known to a whole people; that the only fault in our Senate

was, that it was not durable enough; that hitherto, it had behaved very

well; however, he was afraid they would give way in the end. That as to

trusting to a popular assembly for the preservation of our liberties, it

was the merest chimera imaginable; they never had any rule of decision

but their own will; that he would as lieve be again in the hands of our

old committees of safety, who made the law and executed it at the same

time; that it had been observed by some writer, (I forget whom he named,)

that anarchy did more mischief in one night, than tyranny in an age; and

that in modern times we might say with truth, that in France, anarchy

had done more harm in one night, than all the despotism of their Kings

had ever done in twenty or thirty years. The point in which he views

our Senate, as the colossus of the constitution, serves as a key to the

politics of the Senate, who are two-thirds of them in his sentiments,

and accounts for the bold line of conduct they pursue.

* * * * *

March the 1st. Mr. Tazewell tells me, that when the appropriations

for the British treaty were on the carpet, and very uncertain in the

lower House, there being at that time a number of bills in the hands

of committees of the Senate, none reported, and the Senate idle for

want of them, he, in his place, called on the committees to report, and

particularly on Mr. King, who was of most of them. King said that it

was true the committees kept back their reports, waiting the event of

the question about appropriation; that if that was not carried, they

considered legislation as at an end; that they might as well break up

and consider the Union as dissolved. Tazewell expressed his astonishment

at these ideas, and called on King to know if he had misapprehended him.

King rose again and repeated the same words. The next day, Cabot took

an occasion in debate, and so awkward a one as to show it was a thing

agreed to be done, to repeat the same sentiments in stronger terms, and

carried further, by declaring a determination on their side to break up

and dissolve the government.

* * * * *

March the 11th. In conversation with Baldwin, and Brown of Kentucky,

Brown says that in a private company once, consisting of Hamilton, King,

Madison, himself, and some one else making a fifth, speaking of the

"_federal government_;" "Oh!" says Hamilton, "say the _federal monarchy_,

let us call things by their right names, for a monarchy it is."

Baldwin mentions at table the following fact: When the bank bill was

under discussion in the House of Representatives, Judge Wilson came in,

and was standing by Baldwin. Baldwin reminded him of the following fact

which passed in the grand convention: Among the enumerated powers given

to Congress, was one to erect corporations. It was, on debate, struck

out. Several particular powers were then proposed. Among others, Robert

Morris proposed to give Congress a power to establish a national bank.

Gouverneur Morris opposed it, observing that it was extremely doubtful

whether the constitution they were framing could ever be passed at all

by the people of America; that to give it its best chance, however, they

should make it as palatable as possible, and put nothing into it not

very essential, which might raise up enemies; that his colleague (Robert

Morris) well knew that "a bank" was, in their State, (Pennsylvania,)

the very watch-word of party; that _a bank_ had been the great bone of

contention between the two parties of the State from the establishment

of their constitution, having been erected, put down, and erected again,

as either party preponderated; that therefore, to insert this power,

would instantly enlist against the whole instrument, the whole of the

anti-bank party in Pennsylvania. Whereupon it was rejected, as was every

other special power, except that of giving copyrights to authors, and

patents to inventors; the general power of incorporating being whittled

down to this shred. Wilson agreed to the fact.

Mr. Hunter, of South Carolina, who lodges with Rutledge,[13] tells me

that Rutledge was explaining to him the plan they proposed to pursue as

to war measures when Otis came in. Rutledge addressed Otis. Now, sir,

says he, you must come forward with something liberal for the southern

States, fortify their harbors, and build gallies, in order to obtain

their concurrence. Otis said, we insist on convoys for our European

trade, and _guarda costas_, on which condition alone we will give them

gallies and fortifications. Rutledge observed, that in the event of war,

McHenry and Pickering must go out; Wolcott, he thought, might remain,

but the others were incapable of conducting a war. Otis said the eastern

people would never abandon Pickering, he must be retained; McHenry might

go. They considered together whether General Pinckney would accept the

office of Secretary of War. They apprehended he would not. It was agreed

in this conversation that Sewall had more the ear of the President than

any other person.

* * * * *

March the 12th. When the bill for appropriations was before the

Senate, Anderson moved to strike out a clause recognizing (by way

of appropriation) the appointment of a committee by the House of

Representatives to sit during their recess to collect evidence on Blount's

case, denying they had power, but by a law, to authorize a committee to

sit during recess. Tracy advocated the motion, and said, "We may as well

speak out. The committee was appointed by the House of Representatives to

take care of the British minister, to take care of the Spanish minister,

to take care of the Secretary of State, in short, to take care of the

President of the United States. They were afraid the President and

Secretary of State would not perform the office of collecting evidence

faithfully; that there would be collusion, &c. Therefore, the House

appointed a committee of their own. We shall have them next sending

a committee to Europe to make a treaty, &c. Suppose that the House of

Representatives should resolve, that after the adjournment of Congress,

they should continue to sit as a committee of the whole House during

the whole recess." This shows how the appointment of that committee has

been viewed by the President's friends.

* * * * *

April the 5th. Doctor Rush tells me he had it from Mrs. Adams, that not

a scrip of a pen has passed between the late and present President since

he came into office.

* * * * *

April the 13th. New instructions of the British government to their

armed ships now appear, which clearly infringe their treaty with us,

by authorizing them to take our vessels carrying produce of the French

colonies from those colonies to Europe, and to take vessels bound to a

blockaded port. See them in Brown's paper, of April the 18th, in due form.

The President has sent a government brig to France, probably to carry

despatches. He has chosen as the bearer of these one Humphreys, the son

of a ship carpenter, ignorant, under age, not speaking a word of French,

most abusive of that nation, whose only merit is, the having mobbed and

beaten Bache on board the frigate built here, for which he was indicted

and punished by fine.

* * * * *

April the 25th. At a dinner given by the bar to the federal judges, Chase

and Peters, present about twenty-four lawyers, and William Tilghman in

the chair, this toast was given, "Our _King_ in old England." Observe

the double _entendre_ on the word King. Du Ponceau, who was one of the

bar present, told this to Tenche Coxe, who told me in presence of H.

Tazewell. Dallas was at the dinner; so was Colonel Charles Sims, of

Alexandria, who is here on a lawsuit _vs._ General Irving.

* * * * *

May the 3d. The President some time ago appointed Steele, of Virginia, a

commissioner to the Indians, and recently Secretary of the Mississippi

Territory. Steele was a Counsellor of Virginia, and was voted out by

the Assembly because he turned tory. He then offered for Congress, and

was rejected by the people. Then offered for the Senate of Virginia,

and was rejected. The President has also appointed Joseph Hopkinson

commissioner to make a treaty with the Oneida Indians. He is a youth

of about twenty-two or twenty-three, and has no other claims to such

an appointment than extreme toryism, and the having made a poor song to

the tune of the President's March.

* * * * *

October the 13th, 1798. Littlepage, who has been on one or two missions

from Poland to Spain, said that when Gardoqui returned from America, he

settled with his court an account of secret service money of six hundred

thousand dollars. _Ex-relatione_ Colonel Monroe.

* * * * *

January, 1799. In a conversation between Dr. Ewen and the President, the

former said one of his sons was an aristocrat, the other a democrat. The

President asked if it was not the youngest who was the democrat. "Yes,"

said Ewen. "Well," said the President, "a boy of fifteen who is not a

democrat is good for nothing, and he is no better who is a democrat at

twenty." Ewen told Hurt, and Hurt told me.

* * * * *

January the 14th. Logan tells me that in his conversation with Pickering

on his arrival, the latter abused Gerry very much; said he was a traitor

to his country, and had deserted the post to which he was appointed; that

the French temporized at first with Pinckney, but found him too much

of a man for their purpose. Logan observing, that notwithstanding the

pacific declarations of France, it might still be well to keep up the

military ardor of our citizens, and to have the militia in good order;

"the militia," said Pickering, "the militia never did any good to this

country, except in the single affair of Bunker Hill; that we must have a

standing army of fifty thousand men, which being stationed in different

parts of the continent, might serve as rallying points for the militia,

and so render them of some service." In his conversation with Mr. Adams,

Logan mentioned the willingness of the French to treat with Gerry. "And

do you know why," said Mr. Adams. "Why, sir?" said Logan. "Because,"

said Mr. Adams, "they know him to have been an anti-federalist, against

the constitution."

* * * * *

January the 2d, 1800. Information from Tenche Coxe. Mr. Liston had

sent two letters to the Governor of Canada by one Sweezy. He had sent

copies of them, together with a third (original) by one Cribs. Sweezy

was arrested (being an old horse thief), and his papers examined. T.

Coxe had a sight of them. As soon as a rumor got out that there were

letters of Mr. Liston disclosed, but no particulars yet mentioned, Mr.

Liston suspecting that _Cribs_ had betrayed him, thought it best to

bring all his _three_ letters, and lay them before Pickering, Secretary

of State. Pickering thought them all very innocent. In his office they

were seen by a Mr. Hodgen of New Jersey, commissary of military stores,

and the intimate friend of Pickering. It happens that there is some land

partnership between Pickering, Hodgen and Coxe, so that the latter is

freely and intimately visited by Hodgen, who, moreover, speaks freely

with him on political subjects. They were talking the news of the day,

when Mr. Coxe observed that these intercepted letters of Liston were

serious things; (nothing being yet out but a general rumor.) Hodgen

asked which he thought the most serious. Coxe said the second; (for he

knew yet of no other.) Hodgen said he thought little of any of them,

but that the third was the most exceptionable. This struck Coxe, who,

not betraying his ignorance of a third letter, asked generally what

part of that he alluded to. Hodgen said to that wherein he _assured the

Governor of Canada, that if the French invaded Canada, an army would

be marched from these States to his assistance_. After this it became

known that it was Sweezy who was arrested, and not Cribs; so that Mr.

Liston had made an unnecessary disclosure of his third letter to Mr.

Pickering, who, however, keeps his secret for him. In the beginning of

the conversation between Hodgen and Coxe, Coxe happened to name Sweezy

as the bearer of the letters. "That's not his name," says Hodgen (for

he did not know that two of the letters had been sent by Sweezy also),

"his name is Cribs." This put Coxe on his guard, and sent him fishing

for the new matter.

* * * * *

January the 10th. Doctor Rush tells me that he had it from Samuel Lyman,

that during the X Y Z Congress, the federal members held the largest

caucus they have ever had, at which he was present, and the question was

proposed and debated, whether they should declare war against France,

and determined in the negative. Lyman was against it.

He tells me, that Mr. Adams told him, that when he came on in the fall to

Trenton, he was there surrounded constantly by the opponents of the late

mission to France. That Hamilton pressing him to delay it, said, "Why,

sir, by Christmas, Louis the XVIII. will be seated on his throne." Mr.

A. "By whom?" H. "By the coalition." Mr. A. "Ah! then farewell to the

independence of Europe. If a coalition moved by the finger of England,

is to give a government to France, there is an end to the independence

of every country."

* * * * *

January the 12th. General Samuel Smith says that Pickering, Wolcott,

and McHenry, wrote a joint letter from Trenton to the President, then at

Braintree, dissuading him from the mission to France. Stoddard refused

to join in it. Stoddard says the instructions are such, that if the

Directory have any disposition to reconciliation, a treaty will be made.

He observed to him, also, that Ellsworth looks beyond this mission to

the Presidential chair. That with this view, he will endeavor to make

a treaty, and a good one. That Davie has the same vanity and views. All

this communicated by Stoddard to S. Smith.

* * * * *

January the 13th. Baer and Harrison G. Otis told J. Nicholas, that in

the caucus mentioned ante 10th, there wanted but five votes to produce

a declaration of war. Baer was against it.

* * * * *

January the 19th. W. C. Nicholas tells me, that in a conversation with

Dexter three or four days ago, he asked Dexter whether it would not be

practicable for the States to agree on some uniform mode of choosing

electors of President. Dexter said, "I suppose you would prefer an

election by districts." "Yes," said Nicholas, "I think it would be

best; but would nevertheless agree to any other consistent with the

constitution." Dexter said he did not know what might be the opinion of

his State, but his own was, that no mode of _election_ would answer any

good purpose; that he should prefer one _for life_. "On that reasoning,"

said Nicholas, "you should prefer an hereditary one." "No," he said,

"we are not ripe for that yet. I suppose," added he, "this doctrine is

not very popular with you." "No," said Nicholas, "it would effectually

damn any man in my State." "So it would in mine," said Dexter; "but

I am under no inducement to belie my sentiment, I have nothing to ask

from anybody; I had rather be at home than here, therefore I speak my

sentiments freely." Mr. Nicholas, a little before or after this, made

the same proposition of a uniform election to Ross, who replied that he

saw no good in any kind of election. "Perhaps," said he, "the present

one may last awhile." On the whole, Mr. Nicholas thinks he perceives in

that party, a willingness and a wish to let everything go from bad to

worse, to amend nothing, in hopes it may bring on confusion, and open a

door to the kind of government they wish. In a conversation with Gunn,

who goes with them, but thinks in some degree with us, Gunn told him

that the very game which the minority of Pennsylvania is now playing with

McKean, (see substitute of minority in lower House, and address of Senate

in upper,) was meditated by the same party in the federal government,

in case of the election of a republican President; and that the eastern

States would in that case throw things into confusion, and break the

Union. That they have in a great degree got rid of their paper, so as no

longer to be creditors, and the moment they cease to enjoy the plunder

of the immense appropriations now exclusively theirs, they would aim at

some other order of things.

* * * * *

January the 24th. Mr. Smith, a merchant of Hamburg, gives me the following

information: The St. Andrew's Club of New York, (all of Scotch tories,)

gave a public dinner lately. Among other guests, Alexander Hamilton was

one. After dinner, the first toast was, "The President of the United

States." It was drank without any particular approbation. The next

was, "George the Third." Hamilton started up on his feet, and insisted

on a bumper and three cheers. The whole company accordingly rose and

gave the cheers. One of them, though a federalist, was so disgusted

at the partiality shown by Hamilton to a foreign sovereign over his

own President, that he mentioned it to a Mr. Schwarthouse, an American

merchant of New York, who mentioned it to Smith.

Mr. Smith also tells me, that calling one evening on Mr. Evans, then

Speaker of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, and asking

the news, Evans said, Harper had been just there, and speaking of the

President's setting out to Braintree, said, "he prayed to God that his

horses might run away with him, or some other accident happen to break

his neck before he reached Braintree." This was indignation at his having

named Murray, &c., to negotiate with France. Evans approved of the wish.

* * * * *

February the 1st. Doctor Rush tells me that he had it from Asa Green,

that when the clergy addressed General Washington on his departure from

the government, it was observed in their consultation, that he had never,

on any occasion, said a word to the public which showed a belief in the

Christian religion, and they thought they should so pen their address,

as to force him at length to declare publicly whether he was a Christian

or not. They did so. However, he observed, the old fox was too cunning

for them. He answered every article of their address particularly except

that, which he passed over without notice. Rush observes, he never did

say a word on the subject in any of his public papers, except in his

valedictory letter to the Governors of the States, when he resigned his

commission in the army, wherein he speaks of "the benign influence of

the Christian religion."

I know that Gouverneur Morris, who pretended to be in his secrets and

believed himself to be so, has often told me that General Washington

believed no more of that system than he himself did.

* * * * *

March, 1800. Heretical doctrines maintained in Senate, on the motion

against the Aurora. That there is in every legal body of men a right of

self-preservation, authorizing them to do whatever is necessary for that

purpose: by Tracy, Read, and Lawrence. That the common law authorizes

the proceeding proposed against the Aurora, and is in force here: by

Read. That the privileges of Congress are and ought to be indefinite:

by Read.

Tracy says, he would not say exactly that the common law of England in

all its extent is in force here; but common sense, reason and morality,

which are the foundations of the common law, are in force here, and

establish a common law. He held himself so nearly half way between the

common law of England and what everybody else has called natural law,

and not common law, that he could hold to either the one or the other,

as he should find expedient.

Dexter maintained that the common law, as to crimes, is in force in the

United States.

Chipman says, that the principles of common right are common law.

* * * * *

March the 11th. Conversing with Mrs. Adams on the subject of the writers

in the newspapers, I took occasion to mention that I never in my life

had, directly or indirectly, written one sentence for a newspaper; which

is an absolute truth. She said that Mr. Adams, she believed, had pretty

well ceased to meddle in the newspapers, since he closed the pieces on

Davila. This is the first direct avowal of that work to be his, though

long and universally understood to be so.

* * * * *

March the 14th. Freneau, in Charleston, had the printing of the laws

in his paper. He printed a pamphlet of Pinckney's letters on Robbins'

case. Pickering has given the printing of the laws to the tory paper of

that place, though not of half the circulation. The printing amounted

to about one hundred dollars a year.

* * * * *

March the 24th. Mr. Perez Morton of Massachusetts tells me that Thatcher,

on his return from the war Congress, declared to him he had been for a

declaration of war against France, and many others also; but that on

counting noses they found they could not carry it, and therefore did

not attempt it.

* * * * *

March the 27th. Judge Breckenridge gives me the following information:

He and Mr. Ross were originally very intimate; indeed, he says, he found

him keeping a little Latin school, and advised and aided him in the

study of law, and brought him forward. After Ross became a Senator, and

particularly at the time of the western insurrection, they still were in

concert. After the British treaty, Ross, on his return, informed him there

was a party in the United States who wanted to overturn the government,

who were in league with France; that France, by a secret article of treaty

with Spain was to have Louisiana; and that Great Britain was likely to be

our best friend and dependence. On this information, he, Breckenridge,

was induced to become an advocate for the British treaty. During this

intimacy with Ross, he says, that General Collot, in his journey to the

western country, called on him, and he frequently led Breckenridge into

conversations on their grievances under the government, and particularly

the western expedition; that he spoke to him of the advantages that

country would have in joining France when she should hold Louisiana;

showed him a map he had drawn of that part of the country; pointed out

the passes in the mountain, and the facility with which they might hold

them against the United States, and with which France could support

them from New Orleans. He says, that in these conversations, Collot let

himself out with common prudence. He says, Michaud, (to whom I, at the

request of Genet, had given a letter of introduction to the Governor of

Kentucky as a botanist, which was his real profession,) called on him;

that Michaud had a commissary's commission for the expedition, which

Genet had planned from that quarter against the Spaniards; that ----, the

late Spanish commandant of St. Genevieve, with one Powers, an Englishman,

called on him. That from all these circumstances, together with Ross'

stories, he did believe that there was a conspiracy to deliver our

country, or some part of it at least, to the French; that he made notes

of what passed between himself and Collot and the others, and lent them

to Mr. Ross, who gave them to the President, by whom they were deposited

in the office of the Board of War; that when he complained to Ross of

this breach of confidence, he endeavored to get off by compliments on

the utility and importance of his notes. They now cooled towards each

other; and his opposition to Ross's election as Governor has separated

them in truth, though not entirely to appearance.

Doctor Rush tells me, that within a few days he has heard a member

of Congress lament our separation from Great Britain, and express his

sincere wishes that we were again dependent on her.

* * * * *

December the 25th, 1800. Colonel Hitchburn tells me what Col. Monroe

had before told me of, as coming from Hitchburn. He was giving me the

characters of persons in Massachusetts. Speaking of Lowell, he said he

was, in the beginning of the Revolution, a timid whig, but as soon as he

found we were likely to prevail, he became a great office hunter. And

in the very breath of speaking of Lowell, he stopped: says he, I will

give you a piece of information which I do not venture to speak of to

others. There was a Mr. Hale in Massachusetts, a reputable, worthy man,

who becoming a little embarrassed in his affairs, I aided him, which

made him very friendly to me. He went to Canada on some business. The

Governor there took great notice of him. On his return, he took occasion

to mention to me that he was authorized by the Governor of Canada to give

from three to five thousand guineas each to himself and some others,

to induce them, not to do anything to the injury of their country, but

to befriend a good connection between England and it. Hitchburn said he

would think of it, and asked Hale to come and dine with him to-morrow.

After dinner he drew Hale fully out. He told him he had his doubts, but

particularly, that he should not like to be alone in such a business. On

that, Hale named to him four others who were to be engaged, two of whom,

said Hitchburn, are now dead, and two living. Hitchburn, when he had got

all he wanted out of Hale, declined in a friendly way. But he observed

those four men, from that moment, to espouse the interests of England

in every point and on every occasion. Though he did not name the men

to me, yet as the speaking of Lowell was what brought into his head to

tell me this anecdote, I concluded he was one. From other circumstances

respecting Stephen Higginson, of whom he spoke, I conjectured him to be

the other living one.

* * * * *

December the 26th. In another conversation, I mentioned to Colonel

Hitchburn, that though he had not named names, I had strongly suspected

Higginson to be one of Hale's men. He smiled and said, if I had strongly

suspected any man wrongfully from his information, he would undeceive

me; that there were no persons he thought more strongly to be suspected

himself, than Higginson and Lowell. I considered this as saying they

were the men. Higginson is employed in an important business about our

navy.

* * * * *

February the 12th, 1801. Edward Livingston tells me, that Bayard applied

to-day or last night to General Samuel Smith, and represented to him

the expediency of his coming over to the States who vote for Burr, that

there was nothing in the way of appointment which he might not command,

and particularly mentioned the Secretaryship of the Navy. Smith asked

him if he was authorized to make the offer. He said he was authorized.

Smith told this to Livingston, and to W. C. Nicholas who confirms it

to me. Bayard in like manner tempted Livingston, not by offering any

particular office, but by representing to him his, Livingston's, intimacy

and connection with Burr; that from him he had everything to expect, if he

would come over to him. To Doctor Linn of New Jersey, they have offered

the government of New Jersey. See a paragraph in Martin's Baltimore

paper of February the 10th, signed, "A LOOKER ON," stating an intimacy

of views between Harper and Burr.

* * * * *

February the 14th. General Armstrong tells me, that Gouverneur Morris,

in conversation with him to-day on the scene which is passing, expressed

himself thus. "How comes it," says he, "that Burr who is four hundred

miles off, (at Albany,) has agents here at work with great activity,

while Mr. Jefferson, who is on the spot, does nothing?" This explains

the ambiguous conduct of himself and his nephew, Lewis Morris, and that

they were holding themselves free for a prize; _i. e._, some office,

either to the uncle or nephew.

* * * * *

February the 16th. See in the Wilmington Mirror of February the 14th, Mr.

Bayard's elaborate argument to prove that the common law, as modified

by the laws of the respective States at the epoch of the ratification

of the constitution, attached to the courts of the United States.

* * * * *

June the 23d, 1801. Andrew Ellicot tells me, that in a conversation

last summer with Major William Jackson of Philadelphia, on the subject

of our intercourse with Spain, Jackson said we had managed our affairs

badly; that he himself was the author of the papers against the Spanish

ministers signed Americanus; that his object was irritation; that he

was anxious, if it could have been brought about, to have plunged us in

a war with Spain, that the people might have been occupied with that,

and not with the conduct of the administration, and other things they

had no business to meddle with.

* * * * *

December the 13th, 1803. The Reverend Mr. Coffin of New England, who

is now here soliciting donations for a college in Greene county, in

Tennessee, tells me that when he first determined to engage in this

enterprise, he wrote a paper recommendatory of the enterprise, which

he meant to get signed by clergymen, and a similar one for persons in

a civil character, at the head of which he wished Mr. Adams to put his

name, he being then President, and the application going only for his

name, and not for a donation. Mr. Adams, after reading the paper and

considering, said, "he saw no possibility of continuing the union of

the States; that their dissolution must necessarily take place; that he

therefore saw no propriety in recommending to New England men to promote

a literary institution in the south; that it was in fact giving strength

to those who were to be their enemies; and, therefore, he would have

nothing to do with it."

* * * * *

December the 31st. After dinner to-day, the pamphlet on the conduct of

Colonel Burr being the subject of conversation, Matthew Lyon noticed

the insinuations against the republicans at Washington, pending the

Presidential election, and expressed his wish that everything was spoken

out which was known; that it would then appear on which side there was

a bidding for votes, and he declared that John Brown of Rhode Island,

urging him to vote for Colonel Burr, used these words: "What is it you

want, Colonel Lyon? Is it office, is it money? Only say what you want,

and you shall have it."

* * * * *

January the 2d, 1804. Colonel Hitchburn of Massachusetts, reminding me

of a letter he had written me from Philadelphia, pending the Presidential

election, says he did not therein give the details. That he was in company

at Philadelphia with Colonel Burr and * * * * * that in the course of

the conversation on the election, Colonel Burr said, "we must have a

President, and a constitutional one, in some way." "How is it to be

done," says Hitchburn; "Mr. Jefferson's friends will not quit him, and

his enemies are not strong enough to carry another." "Why," says Burr,

"our friends must join the federalists, and give the President." The next

morning at breakfast, Colonel Burr repeated nearly the same, saying, "we

cannot be without a President, our friends must join the federal vote."

"But," says Hitchburn, "we shall then be without a Vice-President; who

is to be our Vice-President?" Colonel Burr answered, "Mr. Jefferson."

* * * * *

January the 26th. Colonel Burr, the Vice-President, calls on me in the

evening, having previously asked an opportunity of conversing with me.

He began by recapitulating summarily, that he had come to New York a

stranger, some years ago; that he found the country in possession of two

rich families (the Livingstons and Clintons); that his pursuits were not

political, and he meddled not. When the crisis, however, of 1800 came

on, they found their influence worn out, and solicited his aid with the

people. He lent it without any views of promotion. That his being named

as a candidate for Vice-President was unexpected by him. He acceded to

it with a view to promote my fame and advancement, and from a desire to

be with me, whose company and conversation had always been fascinating

to him. That since, those great families had become hostile to him,

and had excited the calumnies which I had seen published. That in this

Hamilton had joined, and had even written some of the pieces against him.

That his attachment to me had been sincere, and was still unchanged,

although many little stories had been carried to him, and he supposed

to me also, which he despised; but that attachments must be reciprocal

or cease to exist, and therefore he asked if any change had taken place

in mine towards him; that he had chosen to have this conversation with

myself directly, and not through any intermediate agent. He reminded me

of a letter written to him about the time of counting the votes, (say

February, 1801,) mentioning that his election had left a chasm in my

arrangements; that I had lost him from my list in the administration, &c.

He observed, he believed it would be for the interest of the republican

cause for him to retire; that a disadvantageous schism would otherwise

take place; but that were he to retire, it would be said he shrunk from

the public sentence, which he never would do; that his enemies were using

my name to destroy him, and something was necessary from me to prevent

and deprive them of that weapon, some mark of favor from me which would

declare to the world that he retired with my confidence.

I answered by recapitulating to him what had been my conduct previous

to the election of 1800. That I had never interfered directly or

indirectly with my friends or any others, to influence the election

either for him or myself; that I considered it as my duty to be merely

passive, except that in Virginia, I had taken some measures to procure

for him the unanimous vote of that State, because I thought any failure

there might be imputed to me. That in the election now coming on, I was

observing the same conduct, held no councils with anybody respecting

it, nor suffered any one to speak to me on the subject, believing it my

duty to leave myself to the free discussion of the public; that I do

not at this moment know, nor have ever heard, who were to be proposed

as candidates for the public choice, except so far as could be gathered

from the newspapers. That as to the attack excited against him in the

newspapers, I had noticed it but as the passing wind; that I had seen

complaints that Cheetham, employed in publishing the laws, should be

permitted to eat the public bread and abuse its second officer; that as

to this, the publishers of the laws were appointed by the Secretary of

the State, without any reference to me; that to make the notice general,

it was often given to one republican and one federal printer of the

same place; that these federal printers did not in the least intermit

their abuse of me, though receiving emoluments from the governments

and that I have never thought it proper to interfere for myself, and

consequently not in the case of the Vice-President. That as to the letter

he referred to, I remembered it, and believed he had only mistaken the

date at which it was written; that I thought it must have been on the

first notice of the event of the election of South Carolina; and that I

had taken that occasion to mention to him, that I had intended to have

proposed to him one of the great offices, if he had not been elected;

but that his election in giving him a higher station had deprived me

of his aid in the administration. The letter alluded to was, in fact,

mine to him of December the 15th, 1800. I now went on to explain to him

verbally, what I meant by saying I had lost him from my list. That in

General Washington's time, it had been signified to him that Mr. Adams,

the Vice-President, would be glad of a foreign embassy; that General

Washington mentioned it to me, expressed his doubts whether Mr. Adams was

a fit character for such an office, and his still greater doubts, indeed

his conviction, that it would not be justifiable to send away the person

who, in case of his death, was provided by the constitution to take his

place; that it would moreover appear indecent for him to be disposing of

the public trusts, in apparently buying off a competitor for the public

favor. I concurred with him in the opinion, and, if I recollect rightly,

Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph were consulted and gave the same opinions.

That when Mr. Adams came to the administration, in his first interview

with me, he mentioned the necessity of a mission to France, and how

desirable it would have been to him if he could have got me to undertake

it; but that he conceived it would be wrong in him to send me away, and

assigned the same reasons General Washington had done; and therefore,

he should appoint Mr. Madison, &c. That I had myself contemplated his

(Colonel Burr's) appointment to one of the great offices, in case he

was not elected Vice-President; but that as soon as that election was

known, I saw it could not be done, for the good reasons which had led

General Washington and Mr. Adams to the same conclusion; and therefore,

in my first letter to Colonel Burr, after the issue was known, I had

mentioned to him that a chasm in my arrangements had been produced by

this event. I was thus particular in rectifying the date of this letter,

because it gave me an opportunity of explaining the grounds on which

it was written, which were, indirectly, an answer to his present hints.

He left the matter with me for consideration, and the conversation was

turned to indifferent subjects. I should here notice, that Colonel Burr

must have thought that I could swallow strong things in my own favor,

when he founded his acquiescence in the nomination as Vice-President, to

his desire of promoting my honor, the being with me, whose company and

conversation had always been fascinating with him, &c. I had never seen

Colonel Burr till he came as a member of Senate. His conduct very soon

inspired me with distrust. I habitually cautioned Mr. Madison against

trusting him too much. I saw afterwards, that under General Washington's

and Mr. Adams' administrations, whenever a great military appointment

or a diplomatic one was to be made, he came post to Philadelphia to

show himself, and in fact that he was always at market, if they had

wanted him. He was indeed told by Dayton in 1800, he might be Secretary

at War; but this bid was too late. His election as Vice-President was

then foreseen. With these impressions of Colonel Burr, there never had

been an intimacy between us, and but little association. When I destined

him for a high appointment, it was out of respect for the favor he had

obtained with the republican party, by his extraordinary exertions and

successes in the New York election in 1800.

* * * * *

April the 15th, 1806. About a month ago, Colonel Burr called on me, and

entered into a conversation, in which he mentioned, that a little before

my coming into office, I had written to him a letter intimating that I

had destined him for a high employ, had he not been placed by the people

in a different one; that he had signified his willingness to resign as

Vice-President, to give aid to the administration in any other place,

that he had never asked an office, however; he asked aid of nobody, but

could walk on his own legs and take care of himself; that I had always

used him with politeness, but nothing more; that he aided in bringing on

the present order of things; that he had supported the administration;

and that he could do me much harm; he wished, however, to be on different

ground; he was now disengaged from all particular business--willing

to engage in something--should be in town some days, if I should have

anything to propose to him. I observed to him, that I had always been

sensible that he possessed talents which might be employed greatly to

the advantage of the public, and that as to myself, I had a confidence

that if he were employed, he would use his talents for the public good;

but that he must be sensible the public had withdrawn their confidence

from him, and that in a government like ours it was necessary to embrace

in its administration as great a mass of public confidence as possible,

by employing those who had a character with the public, of their own,

and not merely a secondary one through the executive. He observed, that

if we believed a few newspapers, it might be supposed he had lost the

public confidence, but that I knew how easy it was to engage newspapers

in anything. I observed, that I did not refer to that kind of evidence

of his having lost the public confidence, but to the late Presidential

election, when, though in possession of the office of Vice-President,

there was not a single voice heard for his retaining it. That as to any

harm he could do me, I knew no cause why he should desire it, but, at the

same time, I feared no injury which any man could do me; that I never

had done a single act, or been concerned in any transaction, which I

feared to have fully laid open, or which could do me any hurt, if truly

stated; that I had never done a single thing with a view to my personal

interest, or that of any friend, or with any other view than that of the

greatest public good; that, therefore, no threat or fear on that head

would ever be a motive of action with me. He has continued in town to

this time; dined with me this day week, and called on me to take leave

two or three days ago.

I did not commit these things to writing at the time, but I do it now,

because in a suit between him and Cheetham, he has had a deposition of

Mr. Bayard taken, which seems to have no relation to the suit, nor to any

other object than to calumniate me. Bayard pretends to have addressed to

me, during the pending of the Presidential election in February, 1801,

through General Samuel Smith, certain conditions on which my election

might be obtained, and that General Smith, after conversing with me, gave

answers from me. This is absolutely false. No proposition of any kind

was ever made to me on that occasion by General Smith, nor any answer

authorized by me. And this fact General Smith affirms at this moment.