For some matters connected with this, see my notes of February the 12th

and 14th, 1801, made at the moment. But the following transactions took

place about the same time, that is to say, while the Presidential election

was in suspense in Congress, which, though I did not enter at the time,

they made such an impression on my mind, that they are now as fresh,

as to their principal circumstances, as if they had happened yesterday.

Coming out of the Senate chamber one day, I found Gouverneur Morris on

the steps. He stopped me, and began a conversation on the strange and

portentous state of things then existing, and went on to observe, that the

reasons why the minority of States was so opposed to my being elected,

were, that they apprehended that, 1, I would turn all federalists out

of office; 2, put down the navy; 3, wipe off the public debt. That I

need only to declare, or authorize my friends to declare, that I would

not take these steps, and instantly the event of the election would be

fixed. I told him, that I should leave the world to judge of the course

I meant to pursue by that which I had pursued hitherto, believing it

to be my duty to be passive and silent during the present scene; that

I should certainly make no terms; should never go into the office of

President by capitulation, nor with my hands tied by any conditions which

should hinder me from pursuing the measures which I should deem for the

public good. It was understood that Gouverneur Morris had entirely the

direction of the vote of Lewis Morris of Vermont, who, by coming over to

Matthew Lyon, would have added another vote, and decided the election.

About the same time, I called on Mr. Adams. We conversed on the state of

things. I observed to him, that a very dangerous experiment was then in

contemplation, to defeat the Presidential election by an act of Congress

declaring the right of the Senate to name a President of the Senate,

to devolve on him the government during any interregnum; that such a

measure would probably produce resistance by force, and incalculable

consequences, which it would be in his power to prevent by negativing

such an act. He seemed to think such an act justifiable, and observed,

it was in my power to fix the election by a word in an instant, by

declaring I would not turn out the federal officers, nor put down the

navy, nor spunge the national debt. Finding his mind made up as to the

usurpation of the government by the President of the Senate, I urged it

no further, observed the world must judge as to myself of the future by

the past, and turned the conversation to something else. About the same

time, Dwight Foster of Massachusetts called on me in my room one night,

and went into a very long conversation on the state of affairs, the

drift of which was to let me understand, that the fears above mentioned

were the only obstacle to my election, to all of which I avoided giving

any answer the one way or the other. From this moment he became most

bitterly and personally opposed to me, and so has ever continued. I do

not recollect that I ever had any particular conversation with General

Samuel Smith on this subject. Very possibly I had, however, as the general

subject and all its parts were the constant themes of conversation in

the private _tête à têtes_ with our friends. But certain I am, that

neither he nor any other republican ever uttered the most distant hint

to me about submitting to any conditions, or giving any assurances to

anybody; and still more certainly, was neither he nor any other person

ever authorized by me to say what I would or would not do. * * * * *

FOOTNOTES:

[6] [These are the volumes containing the celebrated

Anas, up to the time of the author's retirement from the

Secretaryship of State. Some of his friends have regretted

that they were ever published. However that may be, they

_have_ been published, and it was manifestly the purpose

of Mr. Jefferson that they should be. Late in life, "when

the passions of the times had passed away," he carefully

revised them for publication. "At this day," he says,

"after the lapse of twenty-five years, or more, from their

dates, I have given to the whole a calm revisal, when the

passions of the times are passed away, and the reasons

of the transactions act alone upon the judgment. Some of

the informations I had recorded, are now cut out from the

rest, because I have seen that they were incorrect, or

doubtful, or merely personal or private, with which we

have nothing to do. I should, perhaps, not have thought the

rest worth preserving, but for their testimony against the

only history of that period, which pretends to have been

compiled from authentic and unpublished documents." Under

these circumstances, the Editor has not felt himself at

liberty to exclude the Anas from a publication professing

to be a complete edition of the writings of Jefferson.

They are accordingly inserted just in the form in which

he left them after his last revisal.--ED.]

[7] [The opinions here alluded to will be found

in Book III., devoted to Official Papers.--ED.]

[8] See conversation with General Washington,

October 1, 1792.

[9] There had been a previous consultation at

the President's (about the first week in November) on the

expediency of suspending payments to France, under her

present situation. I had admitted that the late constitution

was dissolved by the dethronement of the King; and the

management of affairs surviving to the National Assembly

only, this was not an integral Legislature, and therefore not

competent to give a legitimate discharge for our payments:

that I thought, consequently, that none should be made till

some legitimate body came into place; and that I should

consider the National Convention called, but not met as we

had yet heard, to be a legitimate body. Hamilton doubted

whether it would be a legitimate body, and whether, if

the King should be re-established, he might not disallow

such payments on good grounds. Knox, for once, dared to

differ from Hamilton, and to express, very submissively,

an opinion, that a convention named by the whole body of

the nation, would be competent to do anything. It ended

by agreeing, that I should write to Gouverneur Morris to

suspend payment generally till further orders.

[10] [In the margin is written, by Mr. Jefferson,

"Impossible as to Hamilton he was far above that."]

[11] He said that Mr. Morris, taking a family

dinner with him the other day, went largely, and of his

own accord, into this subject; advised this appeal, and

promised, if the President adopted it, that he would

support it himself, and engage for all his connections.

The President repeated this twice, and with an air of

importance. Now, Mr. Morris has no family connections: he

engaged then for his political friends. This shows that

the President has not confidence enough in the virtue and

good sense of mankind, to confide in a government bottomed

on them, and thinks other props necessary.

[12] He observed, that eight or ten years ago, he

gave only fifty dollars to a common laborer for his farm,

finding him food and lodging. Now he gives one hundred

and fifty dollars, and even two hundred dollars to one.

[13] J. Rutledge, junior.

PART VI.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS.

I.

_Extract from Diary relative to the invasion of Virginia in 1780, 1781._

Saturday, December the 31st, 1780, eight o'clock, A. M. Received first

intelligence that twenty-seven sail were, on the morning of December

the 29th, just below Willoughby's Point. Sent off General Nelson, with

full powers.

1781. January the 1st. No intelligence.

January the 2d, ten o'clock, A. M. Information from N. Burwell, that

their advance was at Warrasqueak Bay. Gave orders for militia, a quarter

from some, and half from other counties. Assembly rose.

Wednesday, January the 3d, eight o'clock, P. M. Received a letter from

E. Archer, Swan's Point, that at twelve o'clock that day they were at

anchor a little below Jamestown. At five o'clock, P. M., of the same

day, I had received a letter from R. Andrews for General Nelson, that

they were at Jamestown the evening of the 2d.

Thursday, January the 4th, five o'clock, A. M. Mr. Eppes and family, &c.,

came and informed me from the Speaker, that they had passed Kennon's and

Hood's the evening before; the tide having made for them at one o'clock,

P. M., of the 3d, and the wind shifted to the east strong. They had not,

however, passed Hood's, but anchored at Kennon's. Called whole militia

from adjacent counties. I was then anxious to know whether they would

pass Westover, or not, as that would show the side they would land.

Five o'clock, P. M. Learned by Captain De Ponthiere, that at two o'clock,

P. M., they were drawn up at Westover. Then ordered arms, and stores,

&c., (which till then had been carrying to Westham,) to be thrown across

the river at Richmond; and at half-past seven o'clock, P. M., set out

to the foundry and Westham, and set Captain Brush, Captain Irish, and

Mr. Hylton, to see everything wagoned from the magazine and laboratory

to Westham, and there thrown over; to work all night. The enemy encamped

at Four-Mile Creek. I went to Tuckahoe and lodged.

January the 5th. Went early over the river with my family; sent them

up to Fine Creek; went myself to Westham; gave orders for withdrawing

ammunition and arms (which lay exposed on the bank to the effect of

artillery from opposite shore), behind a point. Then went to Manchester;

had a view of the enemy. My horse sunk under me with fatigue; borrowed

one, went to Chetwood's, appointed by Baron Steuben as a rendezvous and

head-quarters; but finding him not there, and understanding he would go

to Colonel Henry's, I proceeded there for quarters. The enemy arrived in

Richmond at one o'clock, P. M. One regiment of infantry and thirty horse

proceeded, without stopping, to the foundry; burned that and the magazine

and Ballendine's house, and went as far as Westham. They returned that

evening to Richmond. Sent me a proposition to compound for property.

Refused.

January the 6th. In the morning they burned certain houses and stores, and

at twelve o'clock of that day left Richmond, and encamped at Four-Mile

Creek. I went to Westham, ordered books and papers particularly from

magazine. In the evening I went up to Fine Creek.

January the 7th. I returned to Westham, and then came down to Manchester,

where I lodged. The enemy encamped at Westover and Berkley. It had rained

excessively the preceding night, and continued to do so till about noon.

Gibson has one thousand; Steuben, eight hundred; Davis, two hundred;

Nelson, two hundred and fifty.

January the 8th, at half-past seven o'clock, A. M. I returned to Richmond.

The wind gets, about this time, to north-west; a good gale; in the

afternoon becomes easterly. The enemy remain in their last encampment.

General Nelson at Charles City C. H. Colonel Nicholas with three hundred

men at the Forest.

January the 9th, eleven o'clock. The wind is south-east, but almost

nothing. The enemy remain in their last encampment, except embarking

their horse.

January the 10th, at one o'clock, P. M. They embark infantry, and fall

down the river, the wind having shifted a little north of west, and

pretty fresh. Baron Steuben gets to Bland's Mills to-night, nine miles

short of Hood's.

January the 11th, eight o'clock, A. M. The wind due west, and strong.

_Loss sustained by the public._

The papers and books of the Council since the revolution. The papers of

the auditors, but not their books. Five brass field-pieces, four pounders,

which had been sunk in the river, but were weighed by the enemy. About

one hundred and fifty arms in the Capitol loft. About one hundred and

fifty in a wagon on the Brook road. About five tons of powder, and some

made ammunition at magazine. Some small proportion of the linens, cloths,

&c., in the public store. Some quarter-masters' stores; the principal

articles was one hundred and twenty sides of leather. Some of the tools

in the artificers' shops. Foundry, magazine, four artificers' shops,

public store, quarter-masters' store, one artificers' shop, three wagons.

* * * * *

The legislature was sitting when the entrance of the enemy into James

river was made known. They were informed, without reserve, of the

measures adopted. Every suggestion from the members was welcomed and

weighed, and their adjournment on the 2d of January furnished the most

immediate and confidential means of calling for the militia of their

several counties. They accordingly became the bearers of those calls,

and they were witnesses themselves, that every preparation was making

which the exhausted and harassed state of the country admitted.

They met again at Richmond in May, and adjourned to Charlottesville,

where they made a house on the 28th. My office of Governor expired on

the 2d of June, being the fifth day of the session; and no successor

had been appointed, when an enterprise on the 4th by Tarleton's cavalry

drove them thence, and they met again at Staunton on the 7th. Some

members attended there who had not been at Richmond at the time of

Arnold's enterprise. One of these, George Nicholas, a very honest and

able man, then, however, young and ardent, supposing there had been some

remissness in the measures of the Executive on that occasion, moved for

an inquiry into them, to be made at the succeeding session. The members

who had been present and privy to the transactions, courted the inquiry

on behalf of the executive. Mr. Nicholas, as a candid and honorable man,

sent me, through a friend, a copy of the topics of inquiry he proposed

to go into; and I communicated to him, with the same frankness, the

justifications I should offer, that he might be prepared to refute them

if not founded in fact. The following is a copy of both:--

_1st Objection._--That General Washington's information was, that an

embarcation was taking place, destined for this State.

_Answer._--His information was, that it was destined for the Southward,

as was _given out_ at New York. Had similar informations from General

Washington, and Congress, been considered as sufficient ground at all

times for calling the militia into the field, there would have been a

standing army of militia kept up; because there has never been a time,

since the invasion expected in December, 1779, but what we have had

those intimations hanging over our heads. The truth is, that General

Washington always considered as his duty to convey every rumor of an

embarkation; but we (for some time past, at least) never thought anything

but actual invasion should induce us to the expense and harassment of

calling the militia into the field: except in the case of December,

1799, when it was thought proper to do this in order to convince the

French of our disposition to protect their ships. Inattention to this

necessary economy, in the beginning, went far towards that ruin of our

finances which followed.

_2d Objection._--Where were the post-riders, established last summer?

_Answer._--They were established at Continental expense, to convey

speedy information to Congress of the arrival of the French fleet, then

expected here. When that arrived at Rhode Island, these expenses were

discontinued. They were again established on the invasion in October,

and discontinued when that ceased. And again on the first intimation

of the invasion of December. But it will be asked, why were they not

established on General Washington's letters? Because those letters were

no more than we had received upon many former occasions, and would have

led to a perpetual establishment of post-riders.

_3d Objection._--If a proper number of men had been put into motion on

Monday, for the relief of the lower country, and ordered to march to

Williamsburg, that they would at least have been in the neighborhood of

Richmond on Thursday.

_Answer._--The order could not be till Tuesday, because we then received

our first certain information. Half the militia of the counties round

about Richmond were then ordered out, and the whole of them on the

4th, and ordered not to wait to come in a body, but in detachments as

they could assemble. Yet were there not on Friday more than two hundred

collected, and they were principally of the town of Richmond.

_4th Objection._--That we had not the signals.

_Answer._--This, though a favorite plan of some gentlemen, and perhaps

a practicable one, has hitherto been thought too difficult.

_5th Objection._--That we had not look-outs.

_Answer._--There had been no cause to order look-outs more than has been

ever existing. This is only in fact asking why we do not always keep

look-outs.

_6th Objection._--That we had not heavy artillery on travelling carriages.

_Answer._--The gentlemen, who acted as members of the Board of War a

twelvemonth can answer this question, by giving the character of the

artificers whom, during that time, they could never get to mount the heavy

artillery. The same reason prevented their being mounted from May, 1780,

to December. We have even been unable to get those heavy cannon moved

from Cumberland by the whole energy of government. A like difficulty

which occurred in the removal of those at South Quay, in their day, will

convince them of the possibility of this.

_7th Objection._--That there was not a body of militia thrown into

Portsmouth, the great bridge, Suffolk.

_Answer._--In the summer of 1780, we asked the favor of General Nelson, to

call together the County Lieutenants of the lower counties, and concert

the general measures which should be taken for instant opposition,

on any invasion, until aid could be ordered by the Executive; and the

County Lieutenants were ordered to obey his call; he did so the first

moment, to wit, on Saturday, December the 31st, at 8 o'clock A. M., of

our receiving information of the appearance of a fleet in the bay. We

asked the favor of General Nelson to go down, which he did, with full

powers to call together the militia of any counties he thought proper, to

call on the keepers of any public arms or stores, and to adopt for the

instant such measures as exigencies required, till we could be better

informed.

_Query._--Why were not General Nelson, and the brave officers with him,

particularly mentioned?

_Answer._--What should have been said of them? The enemy did not land,

nor give them an opportunity of doing what nobody doubts they would have

done; that is, something worthy of being minutely recited.

_Query._--Why publish Arnold's letter without General Nelson's answer?

_Answer._--Ask the printer. He got neither from the Executive.

_Objection._--As to the calling out a few militia, and that late.

_Answer._--It is denied that they were few or late. Four thousand and

seven hundred men (the number required by Baron Steuben) were called

out the moment an invasion was known to have taken place, that is on

Tuesday, January 2d.

_Objection._--The abandonment of York and Portsmouth fortifications.

_Answer._--How can they be kept without regulars, on the large scale on

which they were formed? Would it be approved of to harass the militia

with garrisoning them?

To place me on equal ground for meeting the inquiry, one of the

representatives of my county resigned his seat, and I was unanimously

elected in his place. Mr. Nicholas, however, before the day, became

better satisfied as to what had been done, and did not appear to bring

forward the inquiry; and in a publication, several years after, he made

honorable acknowledgment of the erroneous views he had entertained on

those transactions. I therefore read in my place the inquiries he had

proposed to make, and stated the justifications of the Executive. And

nearly every member present having been a witness to their truth, and

conscious all was done which could have been done, concurred at once in

the following resolution:

"The following resolution was _unanimously_ agreed to by both houses of

the General Assembly of Virginia, December the 19th, 1781.

"_Resolved_, That the sincere thanks of the General Assembly be given

to our former Governor, Thomas Jefferson, Esquire, for his impartial,

upright, and attentive administration whilst in office. The Assembly

wish in the strongest manner to declare the high opinion they entertain

of Mr. Jefferson's ability, rectitude, and integrity as Chief Magistrate

of this Commonwealth, and mean, by thus publicly avowing their opinion,

to obviate and to remove all unmerited censure."

And here it is but proper to notice the parody of these transactions which

General Lee has given as their history. He was in a distant State at the

time, and seems to have made up a random account from the rumors which

were afloat where he then was. It is a tissue of errors from beginning

to end.

The nonsense which has been uttered on the _coup de main_ of Tarleton on

Charlottesville is really so ridiculous, that it is almost ridiculous

seriously to notice it. I will briefly, however, notice facts and

dates. It has been said before, that the legislature was driven from

Charlottesville by an incursion of the enemy's cavalry. Since the

adjournment from Richmond, their force in this country had been greatly

augmented by reinforcements under Lord Cornwallis and General Phillips;

and they had advanced up into the country as far as Elk Island, and

the Fork of James river. Learning that the legislature was in session

at Charlottesville, they detached Colonel Tarleton with his legion of

horse to surprise them. As he was passing through Louisa on the evening

of the 3d of June, he was observed by a Mr. Gouett, who, suspecting the

object, set out immediately for Charlottesville, and knowing the byways

of the neighborhood, passed the enemy's encampment, rode all night,

and before sunrise of the 4th, called at Monticello with notice of what

he had seen, and passed on to Charlottesville to notify the members of

the legislature. The Speakers of the two houses, and some other members

were lodging with us. I ordered a carriage to be ready to carry off my

family; we breakfasted at leisure with our guests, and after breakfast

they had gone to Charlottesville; when a neighbor rode up full speed

to inform me that a troop of horse was then ascending the hill to the

house. I instantly sent off my family, and after a short delay for some

pressing arrangements, I mounted my horse; and knowing that in the public

road I should be liable to fall in with the enemy, I went through the

woods, and joined my family at the house of a friend, where we dined.

Would it be believed, were it not known, that this flight from a troop

of horse, whose whole legion, too, was within supporting distance, has

been the subject, with party writers, of volumes of reproach on me,

serious or sarcastic? That it has been sung in verse, and said in humble

prose, that forgetting the noble example of the hero of La Mancha, and

his wind-mills, I declined a combat singly against a troop, in which

victory would have been so glorious? Forgetting, themselves, at the same

time, that I was not provided with the enchanted arms of the Knight, nor

even with his helmet of Mambrino. These closet heroes, forsooth, would

have disdained the shelter of a wood, even singly and unarmed, against

a legion of armed enemies.

Here, too, I must note another instance of the want of that correctness

in writing history, without which it becomes romance. General Lee says

that Tarleton, in another enterprise some time after, penetrated up the

south side of James river to New London, in Bedford county. To that

neighborhood precisely, where I had a possession, I had carried my

family, and was confined there several weeks by the effects of a fall

from my horse; and I can assure the readers of General Lee's history,

that no enemy ever came within forty miles of New London.

II.

_Memorandum relative to invasion of Virginia in 1780, 1781._

Among the manuscripts of Mr. Jefferson, and _in his own hand

writing_, is the following paper in relation to the invasion

of Virginia in 1780-1781. It is, therefore, inserted here, in

connection with the foregoing extract from his diary.

Richmond, 1780. Dec. 31st, at 8 A. M. The Governor received the first

intelligence that twenty-seven sail of ships had entered Chesapeake Bay,

and were in the morning of the 29th just below Willoughby's point, [the

southern cape of James river,] their destination unknown.

1781. January 2, at 10 A. M. Information received that they had entered

James river, their advance being at Warrasqueak Bay. Orders were

immediately given for calling in the militia, one-fourth from some, and

half from other counties. The members of the legislature, which rises

this day, are the bearers of the orders to their respective counties.

The Governor directs the removal of the records into the country, and

the transportation of the military stores from Richmond to Westham, [on

the river seven miles above,] there to be carried across the river.

January 3d. 8 P. M. The enemy are said to be a little below Jamestown;

convenient for landing, if Williamsburg is their object.

January 4th, at 5 A. M. Information is received that they had passed

Kennon's and Hoods the evening before with a strong easterly wind, which

determines their object to be either Petersburg or Richmond. The Governor

now calls in the whole militia from the adjacent counties.

At 5 P. M. Information that at 2 P. M. they were landed and drawn up at

Westover, [on the north side of the river, and twenty-five miles below

Richmond,] and consequently Richmond was their destination. Orders are

now given to discontinue wagoning the military stores from Richmond to

Westham, and to throw them across directly at Richmond.

The Governor having attended to this till an hour and a half in the

night, then rode up to the foundry, [one mile below Westham,] ordered

Captains Brush and Irish, and Mr. Hylton to continue all night wagoning

to Westham the arms and stores still at the foundry, to be thrown across

the river at Westham, then proceeded to Westham to urge the pressing

the transportation there across the river, and thence went to Tuckahoe

[eight miles above, and on the same side of the river] to see after his

family, which he had sent that far in the course of the day. He arrived

there at 1 o'clock in the night.

Early in the morning he carried his family across the river there, and

sending them to Teine creek, [eight miles higher up,] went himself to

Breton's on the south side of the river, [opposite to Westham,] finding

the arms, &c., in a heap near the shore, and exposed to be destroyed by

cannon from the north bank. He had them removed under cover of a point

of land near by. He proceeded to Manchester [opposite to Richmond]. The

enemy had arrived at Richmond at 1 P. M. Having found that nearly the

whole arms had been got there from Richmond, he set out for Chetwood's

to meet with Baron Steuben, who had appointed that place as a rendezvous

and head-quarters; but not finding him there, and understanding that he

would be at Colonel Fleming's, [six miles above Breton's,] he proceeded

thither. The enemy had now a detachment at Westham, and sent a deputation

from the city of Richmond to the Governor at Colonel Fleming's to propose

terms for ransoming the safety of the city, which terms he rejected. The

Governor returned to Breton's, had measures taken more effectually to

secure the books and papers there. The enemy having burnt some houses and

stores, left Richmond, after twenty-four hours stay there, and encamped

at Four-Mile Creek, [eight or ten miles below,] and the Governor went

to look to his family at Fine Creek.

He returned to Breton's to see further to the arms there, exposed on

the ground to heavy rains which had fallen the night before, and then

proceeded to Manchester, and lodged there. The enemy encamped at Westover.

At half-past 7 A. M. he crossed over to Richmond, and resumed his

residence there. The enemy are still retained in their encampment at

Westover by an easterly wind. Col. John Nicholas has now three hundred

militia at the Forest, [six miles off from Westover,] General Nelson

two hundred at Charles City Court House, [eight miles below Westover,]

Gibson one thousand, and Baron Steuben eight hundred on the south side

the river.

January 9th. The enemy are still encamped at Westover.

January 10th. At 1 P. M. they embark; and the wind having shifted a little

to the north of the west, and pretty fresh, they fall down the river.

Baron Steuben marches for Hood's, where their passage may be checked.

He reaches Bland's Mills in the evening, within nine miles of Hood's.

January 11th. At 8 A. M. the wind due west and strong, they may make

good their retreat. During this period time and place have been minutely

cited, in order that those who think there was any remissness in the

movements of the Governor, may lay their finger on the point, and say

when and where it was. Hereafter less detail will suffice.

Soon after this General Phillips having joined Arnold with a reinforcement

of two thousand men, they advanced again up to Petersburg, and about

the last of April to Manchester. The Governor had remained constantly

in and about Richmond, exerting all his powers collecting militia, and

providing such means for the defence of the State as its exhausted

resources admitted. Never assuming a guard, and with only the river

between him and the enemy, his lodgings were frequently within four,

five, or six miles of them.

M. de la Fayette, about this time, arrived at Richmond with some

Continental troops, with which, and the militia collected, he continued

to occupy that place, and the north bank of the river, while Phillips

and Arnold held Manchester and the south bank. But Lord Cornwallis, about

the middle of May, joining the main southern armies, M. de la Fayette was

obliged to retire. The enemy crossed the river, and advanced up into the

country about fifty miles, and within thirty miles of Charlottesville, at

which place the legislature being to meet in June, the Governor proceeded

to his seat at Monticello, two or three miles from it. His office was

now near expiring, the country under invasion by a powerful army, no

services but military of any avail, unprepared by his line of life and

education for the command of armies, he believed it right not to stand

in the way of talents better fitted than his own to the circumstances

under which the country was placed. He therefore himself proposed to

his friends in the legislature that General Nelson, who commanded the

militia of the State, should be appointed Governor, as he was sensible

that the union of the civil and military power in the same hands at

this time, would greatly facilitate military measures. This appointment

accordingly took place on the 12th of June, 1781.

This was the state of things when, his office having actually expired,

and no successor as yet in place, Colonel Tarleton, with his regiment

of horse, was detached by Lord Cornwallis to surprise Mr. Jefferson

(whom they thought still in office) and the legislature now sitting in

Charlottesville. The Speakers of the two houses, and some other members of

the legislature, were lodging with Mr. Jefferson at Monticello. Tarleton,

early in the morning, when within ten miles of that place, detached a

company of horse to secure him and his guests, and proceeded himself

rapidly with his main body to Charlottesville, where he hoped to find

the legislature unapprized of his movement. Notice of it, however, had

been brought, both to Monticello and Charlottesville, about sun-rise. The

Speakers with their colleagues, returned to Charlottesville, and with the

other members of the legislature, had barely time to get out of his way.

Mr. Jefferson sent off his family to secure them from danger, and was

himself still at Monticello making arrangements for his own departure,

when a Lieutenant Hudson arrived there at half speed, and informed him

that the enemy were then ascending the hill of Monticello. He departed

immediately, and knowing that he would be pursued if he took the high

road, he plunged into the woods of the adjoining mountain, where being

at once safe, he proceeded to overtake his family. This is the famous

adventure of Carter's mountain, which has been so often resounded through

the slanderous chronicles of federalism. But they have taken care never

to detail the facts, lest these should show that this favorite charge

amounted to nothing more than that he did not remain in his house, and

there singly fight a whole troop of horse, or suffer himself to be taken

prisoner. Having accompanied his family one day's journey, he returned

to Monticello. Tarleton had retired after eighteen hours' stay in

Charlottesville. Mr. Jefferson then rejoined his family, and proceeded

with them to an estate he had in Bedford, about eighty miles south-west,

where, riding on his farm some time after, he was thrown from his horse,

and disabled from riding on horseback for a considerable time. But Mr.

Turner finds it more convenient to give him this fall in his retreat

before Tarleton, which had happened some weeks before, as a proof that

he withdrew from a troop of horse with a precipitancy which Don Quixotte

would not have practiced.

The facts here stated most particularly, with date of time and place, are

taken from the notes made by the writer hereof for his own satisfaction

at the time. The others are from memory, but so well recollected that

he is satisfied there is no material fact mis-stated. Should any person

undertake to contradict any particular on evidence which may at all merit

the public respect, the writer will take the trouble (though not at all

in the best situation for it) to produce the proof in support of it. He

finds, indeed, that of the persons whom he recollects to have been present

on these occasions, few have survived the intermediate lapse of four

and twenty years. Yet he trusts that some, as well as himself, are yet

among the living; and he is positively certain that no man can falsify

any material fact here stated. He well remembers, indeed, that there

were then, as there are at all times, some who blamed everything done

contrary to their own opinion, although their opinions were formed on a

very partial knowledge of facts. The censures which have been heralded by

such men as Wm. Turner, are nothing but revivals of these half-informed

opinions. Mr. George Nicholas, then a very young man, but always a very

honest one, was prompted by these persons to bring specific charges

against Mr. Jefferson; the heads of these in writing were communicated

through a mutual friend to Mr. Jefferson, who committed to writing also

the heads of justification on each of them. I well remember this paper,

and believe the original of it still exists; and though framed when

every real fact was fresh in the knowledge of every one, this fabricated

flight from Richmond was not among the charges stated in this paper,

nor any charge against Mr. Jefferson for not fighting singly the troop

of horse. Mr. Nicholas candidly relinquished further proceeding. The

House of Representatives of Virginia pronounced an honorable sentence

of entire approbation of Mr. Jefferson's conduct, and so much the more

honorable as themselves had been witness to it. And Mr. George Nicholas

took a conspicuous occasion afterwards, of his own free will, and when the

matter was entirely at rest, to retract publicly the erroneous opinions

he had been led into on that occasion, and to make just reparation by

a candid acknowledgment of them.

III.

_Instructions to the Ministers Plenipotentiary appointed to negotiate

treaties of commerce with the European nations. May 7, 1784._

Whereas, instructions bearing date the 29th day of October, 1783, were

sent to the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the United States of America

at the Court of Versailles, empowered to negotiate a peace, or to any

one or more of them, for concerting drafts or propositions for treaties

of amity and commerce with the commercial powers of Europe:

_Resolved_, That it will be advantageous to these United States to

conclude such treaties with Russia, the Court of Vienna, Prussia, Denmark,

Saxony, Hamburg, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Genoa, Tuscany, Rome,

Naples, Venice, Sardinia, and the Ottoman Porte.

_Resolved_, That in the formation of these treaties the following points

be carefully stipulated:

1st. That each party shall have a right to carry their own produce,

manufactures, and merchandise, in their own bottoms to the ports of the

other, and thence the produce and merchandise of the other, paying, in

both cases, such duties only as are paid by the most favored nation,

freely, where it is freely granted to such nation, or paying the

compensation where such nation does the same.

2. That with the nations holding territorial possessions in America,

a direct and similar intercourse be admitted between the United States

and such possessions; or if this cannot be obtained, then a direct and

similar intercourse between the United States and certain free ports

within such possessions; that if this neither can be obtained, permission

be stipulated to bring from such possessions, in their own bottoms, the

produce and merchandise thereof to their States directly; and for these

States to carry in their own bottoms their produce and merchandise to

such possessions directly.

3. That these United States be considered in all such treaties, and in

every case arising under them, as one nation, upon the principles of

the federal constitution.

4. That it be proposed, though not indispensably required, that if war

should hereafter arise between the two contracting parties, the merchants

of either country, then residing in the other, shall be allowed to remain

nine months to collect their debts and settle their affairs, and may

depart freely, carrying off all their effects, without molestation or

hinderance; and all fishermen, all cultivators of the earth, and all

artisans or manufacturers, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns,

villages or places, who labor for the common subsistence and benefit of

mankind, and peaceably following their respective employments, shall be

allowed to continue the same, and shall not be molested by the armed force

of the enemy, in whose power, by the events of war, they may happen to

fall; but if anything is necessary to be taken from them, for the use of

such armed force, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price; and

all merchants and traders, exchanging the products of different places,

and thereby rendering the necessaries, conveniences, and comforts of

human life more easy to obtain and more general, shall be allowed to

pass free and unmolested; and neither of the contracting powers shall

grant or issue any commission to any private armed vessels empowering

them to take or destroy such trading ships, or interrupt such commerce.

5. And in case either of the contracting parties shall happen to be

engaged in war with any other nation, it be further agreed, in order to

prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings that usually arise

respecting the merchandise heretofore called contraband, such as arms,

ammunition and military stores of all kinds, that no such articles,

carrying by the ships or subjects of one of the parties to the enemies of

the other, shall, on any account, be deemed contraband, so as to induce

confiscation, and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it

shall be lawful to stop such ships and detain them for such length of

time as the captors may think necessary, to prevent the inconvenience

or damage that might ensue, from their proceeding on their voyage,

paying, however, a reasonable compensation for the loss such arrest

shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall be further allowed to

use in the service of the captors, the whole or any part of the military

stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to

be ascertained by the current price at the place of its destination.

But if the other contracting party will not consent to discontinue the

confiscation of contraband goods, then that it be stipulated, that if

the master of the vessel stopped, will deliver out the goods charged to

be contraband, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not

in that case be carried into any port; but shall be allowed to proceed

on her voyage.

6. That in the same case, when either of the contracting parties

shall happen to be engaged in war with any other power, all goods, not

contraband, belonging to the subjects of that other power, and shipped in

the bottoms of the party hereto, who is not engaged in the war, shall be

entirely free. And that to ascertain what shall constitute the blockade

of any place or port, it shall be understood to be in such predicament,

when the assailing power shall have taken such a station as to expose to

imminent danger any ship or ships, that would attempt to sail in or out

of the said port; and that no vessel of the party, who is not engaged

in the said war, shall be stopped without a material and well-grounded

cause; and in such cases justice shall be done, and an indemnification

given, without loss of time to the persons aggrieved, and thus stopped

without sufficient cause.

7. That no right be stipulated for aliens to hold real property within

these States, this being utterly inadmissible by their several laws and

policy; but when on the death of any person holding real estate within

the territories of one of the contracting parties, such real estate would

by their laws descend on a subject or citizen of the other, were he not

disqualified by alienage, then he shall be allowed a reasonable time to

dispose of the same, and withdraw the proceeds without molestation.

8. That such treaties be made for a term not exceeding ten years from

the exchange of ratification.

9. That these instructions be considered as supplementary to those of

October 29th, 1783; and not as revoking, except when they contradict

them. That where in treaty with a particular nation they can procure

particular advantages, to the specification of which we have been

unable to descend, our object in these instructions having been to form

outlines only and general principles of treaty with many nations, it is

our expectation they will procure them, though not pointed out in these

instructions; and where they may be able to form treaties on principles

which, in their judgment, will be more beneficial to the United States

than those herein directed to be made their basis, they are permitted to

adopt such principles. That as to the duration of treaties, though we

have proposed to restrain them to the term of ten years, yet they are

at liberty to extend the same as far as fifteen years with any nation

which may pertinaciously insist thereon. And that it will be agreeable

to us to have supplementary treaties with France, the United Netherlands

and Sweden, which may bring the treaties we have entered into with them

as nearly as may be to the principles of those now directed; but that

this be not pressed, if the proposal should be found disagreeable.

_Resolved_, That treaties of amity, or of amity and commerce, be entered

into with Morocco, and the Regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, to

continue for the same term of ten years, or for a term as much longer

as can be procured.

That our Ministers, to be commissioned for treating with foreign nations,

make known to the Emperor of Morocco the great satisfaction which Congress

feel from the amicable disposition he has shown towards these States,

and his readiness to enter into alliance with them. That the occupations

of the war, and distance of our situation have prevented our meeting his

friendship so early as we wished. But the powers are now delegated to

them for entering into treaty with him, in the execution of which they

are ready to proceed, and that as to the expenses of his Minister, they

do therein what is for the honor and interest of the United States.

_Resolved_, That a commission be issued to Mr. J. Adams, Mr. B. Franklin,

and Mr. T. Jefferson, giving powers to them, or the greater part of them,

to make and receive propositions for such treaties of amity and commerce,

and to negotiate and sign the same, transmitting them to Congress for

their final ratification; and that such commission be in force for a

term not exceeding two years.

IV.

_Report of a conference with the Count de Vergennes on the subject

of the Commerce of the United States with France._[14]

The next levee day at Versailles, I meant to bring again under the view

of the Count de Vergennes, the whole subject of our commerce with France;

but the number of audiences of ambassadors and other ministers, which

take place, of course, before mine, and which seldom, indeed, leave me

an opportunity of audience at all, prevented me that day. I was only

able to ask the Count de Vergennes, as a particular favor, that he would

permit me to wait on him some day that week. He did so, and I went to

Versailles the Friday following, (the 9th of December.) M. de Reyneval

was with the Count. Our conversation began with the usual topic; that

the trade of the United States had not yet learned the way to France,

but continued to centre in England, though no longer obliged by law

to go there. I observed, that the real cause of this, was to be found

in the difference of the commercial arrangements in the two countries;

that merchants would not, and could not trade but where there was to be

some gain; that the commerce between two countries could not be kept

up, but by an exchange of commodities; that, if an American merchant

was forced to carry his produce to London, it could not be expected he

would make a voyage from thence to France, with the money, to lay it

out here; and, in like manner, that if he could bring his commodities,

with advantage, to this country, he would not make another voyage to

England, with the money, to lay it out there, but would take in exchange

the merchandise of this country. The Count de Vergennes agreed to this,

and particularly that where there was no exchange of merchandise, there

could be no durable commerce; and that it was natural for merchants to

take their returns in the port where they sold their cargo. I desired

his permission then, to take a summary view of the productions of the

United States, that we might see which of them could be brought here to

advantage.

1. Rice. France gets from the Mediterranean a rice not so good indeed,

but cheaper than ours. He said that they bought of our rice, but that

they got from Egypt also, rice of a very fine quality. I observed that

such was the actual state of their commerce, in that article, that they

take little from us. 2. Indigo. They make a plenty in their own colonies.

He observed that they did, and that they thought it better than ours. 3.

Flour, fish, and provisions of all sorts, they produce for themselves.

That these articles might, therefore, be considered as not existing,

for commerce, between the United States and the kingdom of France.

I proceeded to those capable of becoming objects of exchange between

the two nations. 1. Peltry and furs. Our posts being in the hands of the

English, we are cut off from that article. I am not sure even, whether

we are not obliged to buy of them, for our own use. When these posts are

given up, if ever they are, we shall be able to furnish France with skins

and furs, to the amount of two millions of livres, in exchange for her

merchandise; but at present, these articles are to be counted as nothing.

2. Potash. An experiment is making whether this can be brought here. We

hope it may, but at present it stands for nothing. He observed that it was

much wanted in France, and he thought it would succeed. 3. Naval stores.

Trials are also making on these, as subjects of commerce with France.

They are heavy, and the voyage long. The result, therefore, is doubtful.

At present, they are as nothing in our commerce with this country. 4.

Whale oil. I told him I had great hopes that the late diminution of duty

would enable us to bring this article, with advantage, to France; that

a merchant was just arrived (Mr. Barrett) who proposed to settle at

L'Orient, for the purpose of selling the cargoes of this article, and

choosing the returns. That he had informed me, that in the first year,

it would be necessary to take one-third in money, and the remainder

only in merchandise; because the fishermen require, indispensably, some

money. But he thought that after the first year, the merchandise of

the preceding year, would always produce money for the ensuing one, and

that the whole amount would continue to be taken annually afterwards, in

merchandise. I added, that though the diminution of duty was expressed

to be but for one year, yet I hoped they would find their advantage in

renewing and continuing it; for that if they intended really to admit it

for one year only, the fishermen would not find it worth while to rebuild

their vessels, and to prepare themselves for the business. The Count

expressed satisfaction on the view of commercial exchange held up by this

article. He made no answer as to the continuance of it; and I did not

choose to tell him, at that time, that we should claim its continuance

under their treaty with the Hanseatic towns, which fixes this duty for

them, and our own treaty, which gives, us the rights of the most favored

nation. 5. Tobacco. I recalled to the memory of the Count de Vergennes,

the letter I had written to him on this article; and the object of the

present conversation being, how to facilitate the exchange of commerciable

articles between the two countries, I pressed that of tobacco, in this

point of view; observed that France, at present, paid us two millions

of livres for this article; that for such portions of it as were bought

in London, they sent the money directly there, and for what they bought

in the United States, the money was still remitted to London, by bills

of exchange; whereas, if they would permit our merchants to sell this

article freely, they would bring it here, and take the returns on the

spot, in merchandise, not money. The Count observed, that my proposition

contained what was doubtless useful, but that the King received on this

article, at present, a revenue of twenty-eight millions, which was so

considerable, as to render them fearful of tampering with it; that the

collection of this revenue by way of Farm, was of very ancient date, and

that it was always hazardous to alter arrangements of long standing,

and of such infinite combinations with the fiscal system. I answered,

that the simplicity of the mode of collection proposed for this article,

withdrew it from all fear of deranging other parts of their system; that

I supposed they would confine the importation to some of their principal

ports, probably not more than five or six; that a single collector in

each of these, was the only new officer requisite; that he could get rich

himself on six livres a hogshead, and would receive the whole revenue,

and pay it into the treasury, at short hand. M. de Reyneval entered

particularly into this part of the conversation, and explained to the

Count, more in detail, the advantages and simplicity of it, and concluded

by observing to me, that it sometimes happened that useful propositions,

though not practicable at one time, might become so at another. I told

him that that consideration had induced me to press the matter when I

did, because I had understood the renewal of the Farm was then on the

carpet, and that it was the precise moment when I supposed that this

portion might be detached from the mass of the Farms. I asked Count de

Vergennes whether, if the renewal of the Farm was pressing, this article

might not be separated, merely in suspense, till government should have

time to satisfy themselves on the expediency of renewing it. He said no

promises could be made.

In the course of this conversation, he had mentioned the liberty we

enjoyed of carrying our fish to the French islands. I repeated to him

what I had hinted in my letter, of November the 20th, 1785, that I

considered as a prohibition the laying such duties on our fish, and

giving such premiums on theirs, as made a difference between their and

our fishermen of fifteen livres the quintal, in an article which sold

for but fifteen livres. He said it would not have that effect, for two

reasons: 1. That their fishermen could not furnish supplies sufficient

for their islands, and, of course, the inhabitants must, of necessity,

buy our fish. 2. That from the constancy of our fishery, and the short

season during which theirs continued, and also from the economy and

management of ours, compared with the expense of theirs, we had always

been able to sell our fish, in their islands, at twenty-five livres the

quintal, while they were obliged to ask thirty-six livres. (I suppose he

meant the livre of the French islands.) That thus, the duty and premium

had been a necessary operation on their side, to place the sale of their

fish on a level with ours, and that without this, theirs could not bear

the competition.

I have here brought together the substance of what was said on the

preceding subjects, not pretending to give it verbatim, which my memory

does not enable me to do. I have, probably, omitted many things which were

spoken, but have mentioned nothing which was not. It was interrupted, at

times, with collateral matters. One of these was important. The Count

de Vergennes complained, and with a good deal of stress, that they did

not find a sufficient dependence on arrangements taken with us. This

was the third time too, he had done it; first, in a conversation at

Fontainebleau, when he first complained to me of the navigation acts of

Massachusetts and New Hampshire; secondly, in his letter of October the

30th, 1785, on the same subject; and now, in the present conversation,

wherein he added, as another instance, the case of the Chevalier de

Mezieres, heir of General Oglethorpe, who, notwithstanding that the 11th

article of the treaty provides, that the subjects or citizens of either

party shall succeed, _ab intestato_, to the lands of their ancestors,

within the dominions of the other, had been informed from Mr. Adams,

and by me also, that his right of succession to the General's estate in

Georgia was doubtful. He observed too, that the administration of justice

with us was tardy, insomuch that their merchants, when they had money

due to them within our States, considered it as desperate; and that our

commercial regulations, in general, were disgusting to them. These ideas

were new, serious and delicate. I decided, therefore, not to enter into

them at that moment, and the rather, as we were speaking in French, in

which language I did not choose to hazard myself. I withdrew from the

objections of the tardiness of justice with us, and the disagreeableness

of our commercial regulations, by a general observation, that I was not

sensible they were well founded. With respect to the case of the Chevalier

de Mezieres, I was obliged to enter into some explanations. They related

chiefly to the legal operation of our Declaration of Independence, to the

undecided question whether our citizens and British subjects were thereby

made aliens to one another, to the general laws as to conveyances of

land to aliens, and the doubt whether an act of the Assembly of Georgia

might not have been passed, to confiscate General Oglethorpe's property,

which would of course prevent its devolution on any heir. Mr. Reyneval

observed, that in this case, it became a mere question of fact, whether a

confiscation of these lands had taken place before the death of General

Oglethorpe, which fact might be easily known by inquiries in Georgia,

where the possessions lay. I thought it very material, that the opinion

of this court should be set to rights on these points. On my return,

therefore, I wrote the following observations on them, which, the next

time I went to Versailles, (not having an opportunity of speaking to

the Count de Vergennes,) I put into the hands of M. Reyneval, praying

him to read them, and to ask the favor of the Count to do the same.

_Explanations on some of the subjects of conversation which I had

the honor of having with his Excellency, the Count de Vergennes,

when I was last at Versailles._

The principal design of that conversation was, to discuss those articles

of commerce which the United States could spare, which are wanted in

France, and if received there on a convenient footing, would be exchanged

for the productions of France. But in the course of the conversation,

some circumstances were incidentally mentioned by the Count de Vergennes,

which induced me to suppose he had received impressions, neither favorable

to us, nor derived from perfect information.

The case of the Chevalier de Mezieres was supposed to furnish an instance

of our disregard to treaties; and the event of that case was inferred

from opinions supposed to have been given by Mr. Adams and myself. This

is ascribing a weight to our opinions, to which they are not entitled.

They will have no influence on the decision of the case. The judges in

our courts, would not suffer them to be read. Their guide is the law of

the land, of which law its treaties make a part. Indeed, I know not what

opinion Mr. Adams may have given on the case. And, if any be imputed

to him derogatory of our regard to the treaty with France, I think

his opinion has been misunderstood. With respect to myself, the doubts

which I expressed to the Chevalier de Mezieres, as to the success of his

claims, were not founded on any question whether the treaty between France

and the United States would be observed. On the contrary, I venture to

pronounce that it will be religiously observed, if his case comes under

it. But I doubted whether it would come under the treaty. The case, as

I understand it, is this: General Oglethorpe, a British subject, had

lands in Georgia. He died since the peace, having devised these lands

to his wife. His heirs are the Chevalier de Mezieres, son of his elder

sister, and the Marquis de Bellegarde, son of his younger sister. This

case gives rise to legal questions, some of which have not yet been

decided, either in England or America, the laws of which countries are

nearly the same.

1. It is a question under the laws of those countries, whether persons

_born before their separation_, and once completely invested, in both,

with the character of natural subjects, can ever become aliens in either?

There are respectable opinions on both sides. If the negative be right,

then General Oglethorpe having never become an alien, and having devised

his lands to his wife, who, on this supposition, also, was not an alien,

the devise has transferred the lands to her, and there is nothing left

for the treaty to operate on.

2. If the affirmative opinion be right, and the inhabitants of Great

Britain and America, _born before the Revolution_, are become aliens to

each other, it follows by the laws of both, that the lands which either

possessed, within the jurisdiction of the other, became the property of

the State in which they are. But a question arises, whether the transfer

of the property took place on the Declaration of Independence, or not

till an office, or an act of Assembly, had declared the transfer. If the

property passed to the State on the Declaration of Independence, then

it did not remain in General Oglethorpe, and, of course, at the time of

his death, he having nothing, there was nothing to pass to his heirs,

and so, nothing for the treaty to operate on.

3. If the property does not pass till declared by an office found by

jury, or an act passed by the Assembly, the question then is, whether

an office had been found, or an act of Assembly been passed for that

purpose, before the peace? If there was, the lands had passed to the

State during his life, and nothing being left in him, there is nothing

for his heirs to claim under the treaty.

4. If the property had not been transferred to the State before the

peace, either by the Declaration of Independence, or an office, or an act

of Assembly, then it remained in General Oglethorpe at the epoch of the

peace; and it will be insisted, no doubt, that, by the sixth article of

the treaty of peace, between the United States and Great Britain, which

forbids future confiscations, General Oglethorpe acquired a capacity of

holding and of conveying his lands. He has conveyed them to his wife.

But she being an alien, it will be decided by the laws of the land,

whether she took them for her own use, or for the use of the State. For

it is a general principle of our law, that conveyances to aliens pass

the lands to the State; and it may be urged, that though, by the treaty

of peace, General Oglethorpe could convey, yet that treaty did not mean

to give him a greater privilege of conveyance than natives hold, to wit:

a privilege of transferring the property to persons incapable, by law,

of taking it. However, this would be a question between the State of

Georgia and the widow of General Oglethorpe, in the decision of which

the Chevalier de Mezieres is not interested, because, whether she takes

the land by the will, for her own use, or for that of the State, it is

equally prevented from descending to him: there is neither a conveyance

to him, nor a succession _ab intestato_ devolving on him, which are the

cases provided for by our treaty with France. To sum up the matter in

a few words; if the lands had passed to the State before the epoch of

peace, the heirs of General Oglethorpe cannot say they have descended

on them, and if they remained in the General at that epoch, the treaty

saving them to him, he could convey them away from his heirs, and he

has conveyed them to his widow, either for her own use, or for that of

the State.

Seeing no event in which, according to the facts stated to me, the treaty

could be applied to this case, or could give any right whatever, to the

heirs of General Oglethorpe, I advised the Chevalier de Mezieres not to

urge his pretensions on the footing of right, nor under the treaty, but

to petition the Assembly of Georgia for a grant of these lands. If, in

the question between the State and the widow of General Oglethorpe, it

should be decided that they were the property of the State, I expected

from their generosity, and the friendly disposition in America towards

the subjects of France, that they would be favorable to the Chevalier

de Mezieres. There is nothing in the preceding observations which would

not have applied against the heir of General Oglethorpe, had he been a

native citizen of Georgia, as it now applies against him, being a subject

of France. The treaty has placed the subjects of France on a footing

with natives, as to conveyances and descent of property. There was no

occasion for the Assemblies to pass laws on this subject; the treaty

being a law, as I conceive, superior to those of particular Assemblies,

and repealing them, when they stand in the way of its operations.

The supposition that the treaty was disregarded on our part, in the

instance of the acts of Assembly of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, which

made a distinction between natives and foreigners, as to the duties to

be paid on commerce, was taken notice of in the letter of November the

20th, which I had the honor of addressing to the Count de Vergennes. And

while I express my hopes that, on a revision of these subjects, nothing

will be found in them derogatory from either the letter or spirit of our

treaty, I will add assurances that the United States will not be behind

hand in going beyond both, whenever occasions shall offer of manifesting

their sincere attachment to this country.

I will pass on to the observation, that our commercial regulations

are difficult, and repugnant to the French merchants. To detail these

regulations minutely, as they exist in every State, would be beyond my

information. A general view of them, however, will suffice, because the

States differ little in their several regulations. On the arrival of a

ship in America, her cargo must be reported at the proper office. The

duties on it are to be paid. These are commonly from two and a half to

five per cent. on its value. On many articles, the value of which is

tolerably uniform, the precise sum is fixed by law. A tariff of these is

presented to the importer, and he can see what he has to pay, as well

as the officer. For other articles, the duty is such a per cent. on

their value. That value is either shown by the invoice, or by the oath

of the importer. This operation being once over, and it is a very short

one, the goods are considered as entered, and may then pass through

the whole thirteen States without their being ever more subject to a

question, unless they be reshipped. Exportation is still more simple;

because, as we prohibit the exportation of nothing, and very rarely

lay a duty on any article of export, the State is little interested in

examining outward-bound vessels. The captain asks a clearance for his

own purposes. As to the operations of internal commerce, such as matters

of exchange, of buying, selling, bartering, &c., our laws are the same

as the English. If they have been altered in any instance, it has been

to render them more simple.

Lastly, as to the tardiness of the administration of justice with us,

it would be equally tedious and impracticable for me to give a precise

account of it in every State. But I think it probable that it is much

on the same footing through all the States, and that an account of it

in any one of them may found a general presumption of it in the others.

Being best acquainted with its administration in Virginia, I shall

confine myself to that. Before the Revolution, a judgment could not be

obtained under eight years in the supreme court, where the suit was

in the department of the common law, which department embraces about

nine-tenths of the subject of legal contestation. In that of the chancery,

from twelve to twenty years were requisite. This did not proceed from

any vice in the laws, but from the indolence of the judges appointed by

the King; and these judges holding their office during his will only, he

could have reformed the evil at any time. This reformation was among the

first works of the legislature after our independence. A judgment can

now be obtained in the supreme court in one year at the common law, and

in about three years in the chancery. But more particularly to protect

the commerce of France, which, at that moment, was considerable with us,

a law was passed, giving all suits wherein a foreigner was a party, a

privilege to be tried immediately, on the return of his process, without

waiting till those of natives, which stand before them, shall have been

decided on. Out of this act, however, the British stand excluded by a

subsequent one. This, with its causes, must be explained. The British

army, after ravaging the State of Virginia, had sent off a very great

number of slaves to New York. By the seventh article of the treaty of

peace, they stipulated not to carry away any of these. Notwithstanding

this, it was known, when they were evacuating New York, that they were

carrying away the slaves. General Washington made an official demand of

Sir Guy Carleton, that he should cease to send them away. He answered,

that these people had come to them under promise of the King's protection,

and that that promise should be fulfilled in preference to the stipulation

in the treaty. The State of Virginia, to which nearly the whole of these

slaves belonged, passed a law to forbid the recovery of debts due to

British subjects. They declared, at the same time, they would repeal

the law, if Congress were of opinion they ought to do it. But, desirous

that their citizens should be discharging their debts, they afterwards

permitted British creditors to prosecute their suits, and to receive

their debts in seven equal and annual payments; relying that the demand

for the slaves would be either admitted or denied in time to lay their

hands on some of the latter payments for reimbursement. The immensity of

this debt was another reason for forbidding such a mass of property to

be offered for sale under execution at once, as, from the small quantity

of circulating money, it must have sold for little or nothing, whereby

the creditor would have failed to receive his money, and the debtor would

have lost his whole estate without being discharged of his debt. This

is the history of the delay of justice in that country in the case of

British creditors. As to all others, its administration is as speedy as

justice itself will admit. I presume it is equally so in all the other

States, and can add, that it is administered in them all, with a purity

and integrity of which few counties afford an example.

I cannot take leave altogether of the subjects of this conversation

without recalling the attention of the Count de Vergennes to what had

been its principal drift. This was to endeavor to bring about a direct

exchange between France and the United States (without the intervention

of a third nation), of those productions with which each could furnish

the other. We can furnish to France (because we have heretofore furnished

to England), of whale oil and spermaceti, of furs and peltry, of ships

and naval stores, and of potash, to the amount of fifteen millions of

livres; and the quantities will admit of increase. Of our tobacco, France

consumes the value of ten millions more. Twenty-five millions of livres,

then, mark the extent of that commerce of exchange, which is, at present,

practicable between us. We want, in return, productions and manufactures,

not money. If the duties on our produce are light, and the sale free,

we shall undoubtedly bring it here, and lay out the proceeds on the

spot in the productions and manufactures which we want. The merchants of

France will, on their part, become active in the same business. We shall

no more think, when we shall have sold our produce here, of making an

useless voyage to another country to lay out the money, than we think

at present, when we have sold it elsewhere, of coming here to lay out

the money. The conclusion is, that there are commodities which form a

basis of exchange to the extent of a million of guineas annually; it is

for the wisdom of those in power to contrive that the exchange shall be

made.

Having put this paper into the hands of Monsieur Reyneval, we entered

into conversation again, on the subject of the Farms, which were now

understood to be approaching to a conclusion. He told me, that he was

decidedly of opinion, that the interest of the State required the Farm

of tobacco to be discontinued, and that he had, accordingly, given every

aid to my proposition, which laid within his sphere; that the Count

de Vergennes was very clearly of the same opinion, and had supported

it strongly with reasons of his own, when he transmitted it to the

Comptroller General; but that the Comptroller, in the discussions of

this subject which had taken place, besides the objections which the

Count de Vergennes had repeated to me, and which are before mentioned,

had added, that the contract with the Farmers General was now so far

advanced, that the article of tobacco could not be withdrawn from it,

without unravelling the whole transaction. Having understood that, in this

contract, there was always reserved to the crown a right to discontinue

it at any moment, making just reimbursements to the Farmers, I asked

M. Reyneval, if the contract should be concluded in its present form,

whether it might still be practicable to have it discontinued, as to the

article of tobacco, at some future moment. He said it might be possible.

Upon the whole, the true obstacle to this proposition has penetrated,

in various ways, through the veil which covers it. The influence of the

Farmers General has been heretofore found sufficient to shake a minister

in his office. Monsieur de Calonnes' continuance or dismission, has been

thought, for some time, to be on a poise. Were he to shift this great

weight, therefore, out of his own scale into that of his adversaries,

it would decide their preponderance. The joint interests of France and

America would be insufficient counterpoise in his favor.

It will be observed that these efforts to improve the commerce of the

United States, have been confined to that branch only which respects

France itself, and that nothing passed on the subject of our commerce

with the West Indies, except an incidental conversation as to our fish.

The reason of this, was no want of a due sense of its importance. Of

that, I am thoroughly sensible. But efforts in favor of this branch

would, at present, be desperate. To nations with which we have not yet

treated, and who have possessions in America, we may offer a free vent

of their manufactures in the United States, for a full or modified

admittance into those possessions. But to France, we are obliged to

give that freedom for a different compensation; to wit, for her aid in

effecting our independence. It is difficult, therefore, to say what we

have now to offer her, for an admission into her West Indies. Doubtless,

it has its price. But the question is, what this would be, and whether

worth our while to give it. Were we to propose to give to each other's

citizens all the rights of natives, they would, of course, count what

they should gain by this enlargement of right, and examine whether it

would be worth to them as much as their monopoly of their West India

commerce. If not, that commercial freedom which we wish to preserve, and

which, indeed, is so valuable, leaves us little to offer. An expression

in my letter to the Count de Vergennes, of November the 20th, wherein

I hinted that both nations might, perhaps, come into the opinion, that

the condition of _natives_ might be a better ground of intercourse for

their citizens, than that of the _most favored_ nation, was intended

to furnish an opportunity to the minister of parleying on that subject,

if he was so disposed, and to myself, of seeing whereabouts they would

begin, that I might communicate it to Congress, and leave them to judge of

the expediency of pursuing the subject. But no overtures have followed;

for I have no right to consider as coming from the minister, certain

questions which were, very soon after, proposed to me by an individual.

It sufficiently accounts for these questions, that that individual had

written a memorial on the subject, for the consideration of the minister,

and might wish to know what we would be willing to do. The idea that I

should answer such questions to him, is equally unaccountable, whether we

suppose them originating with himself, or coming from the minister. In

fact, I must suppose them to be his own; and I transmit them, only that

Congress may see what one Frenchman, at least, thinks on the subject.

If we can obtain from Great Britain reasonable conditions of commerce,

(which, in my idea, must forever include an admission into her islands,)

the freest ground between these two nations would seem to be the best.

But if we can obtain no equal terms from her, perhaps Congress might

think it prudent, as Holland has done, to connect us unequivocally with

France. Holland has purchased the protection of France. The price she

pays, is _aid in time of war_. It is interesting for us to purchase a

free commerce with the French islands. But whether it is best to pay for

it, by _aids in war, or by privileges in commerce, or not to purchase

it at all_, is the question.

FOOTNOTE:

[14]

TO JOHN JAY.

PARIS, January 2d, 1786.

SIR,--Several conferences and letters having passed

between the Count de Vergennes and myself, on the subject

of the commerce of this country with the United States,

I think them sufficiently interesting to be communicated

to Congress. They are stated in the form of a report, and

are herein enclosed. The length of this despatch, perhaps,

needs apology. Yet I have not been able to abridge it,

without omitting circumstances which I thought Congress

would rather choose to know. Some of the objects of these

conferences present but small hopes for the present, but

they seem to admit a possibility of success at some future

moment.

* * * * *

I am Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant.

[The above extract from the report referred to in the

preceding letter embraces everything interesting therein,

not communicated to the reader in the previous correspondence.]

V.

_Answers by Mr. Jefferson, to questions addressed to him by Monsieur

de Meusnier, author of that part of the Encyclopedie Methodique, entitled

Economie politique et diplomatique_.

1. What has led Congress to determine, that the concurrence of seven votes

is requisite in questions which, by the Confederation, are submitted to

the decision of a majority of the United States, in Congress assembled?

The ninth article of Confederation, section six, evidently establishes

three orders of questions in Congress. 1. The greater ones, which

relate to making peace or war, alliances, coinage, requisitions for

money, raising military force, or appointing its commander-in-chief.

2. The lesser ones, which comprehend all other matters submitted by the

Confederation to the federal head. 3. The single question of adjourning

from day to day. This gradation of questions is distinctly characterized

by the article.

In proportion to the magnitude of these questions, a greater concurrence

of the voices composing the Union was thought necessary. Three degrees

of concurrence, well distinguished by substantial circumstances, offered

themselves to notice. 1. A concurrence of a _majority of the people_ of

the Union. It was thought that this would be insured, by requiring the

voices of nine States; because, according to the loose estimates which

had been made of the inhabitants, and the proportion of them which were

free, it was believed that even the nine smallest would include a majority

of the free citizens of the Union. The voices, therefore, of nine States

were required in the greater questions. 2. A concurrence of the _majority

of the States_. Seven constitute that majority. This number, therefore,

was required in the lesser questions. 3. A concurrence of the _majority

of Congress_, that is to say, of the States actually present in it. As

there is no Congress, when there are not seven States present, this

concurrence could never be of less than four States. But these might

happen to be the four smallest, which would not include one-ninth part

of the free citizens of the Union. This kind of majority, therefore,

was entrusted with nothing but the power of adjourning themselves from

day to day.

Here then are three kind of majorities. 1. Of the people. 2. Of the

States. 3. Of the Congress: each of which is entrusted to a certain

length.

Though the paragraph in question be clumsily expressed, yet it strictly

announces its own intentions. It defines with precision, the _greater_

questions, for which nine votes shall be requisite. In the _lesser_

questions, it then requires a _majority of the United States in Congress

assembled_: a term which will apply either to the number seven, as being

a _majority of the States_, or to the number four as being a _majority

of Congress_. Which of the two kinds of majority, was meant? Clearly,

that which would leave a still smaller kind, for the decision of the

question of adjournment. The contrary construction would be absurd.

This paragraph, therefore, should be understood, as if it had been

expressed in the following terms: "The United States, in Congress

assembled, shall never engage in war, &c., but with the consent of nine

States: nor determine any other question, but with the consent of a

majority of the whole States, except the question of adjournment from

day to day, which may be determined by a majority of the States actually

present in Congress."

2. How far is it permitted, to bring on the reconsideration of a question

which Congress has once determined?

The first Congress which met, being composed mostly of persons who had

been members of the legislatures of their respective States, it was

natural for them to adopt those rules in their proceedings, to which

they had been accustomed in their legislative houses; and the more so,

as these happened to be nearly the same, as having been copied from the

same original, those of the British parliament. One of those rules of

proceeding was, that "a question once determined, cannot be proposed, a

second time, in the same session." Congress, during their first session,

in the autumn of 1774, observed this rule strictly. But before their

meeting in the spring of the following year, the war had broken out.

They found themselves at the head of that war, in an executive as well

as legislative capacity. They found that a rule, wise and necessary for

a legislative body, did not suit an executive one, which, being governed

by events, must change their purposes as those change. Besides, their

session was then to become of equal duration with the war; and a rule,

which should render their legislation immutable, during all that period,

could not be submitted to. They, therefore, renounced it in practice,

and have ever since continued to reconsider their questions freely.

The only restraint as yet provided against the abuse of this permission

to reconsider, is, that when a question has been decided, it cannot be

proposed for reconsideration, but by some one who voted in favor of the

former decision, and declares that he has since changed his opinion.

I do not recollect accurately enough, whether it be necessary that his

vote should have decided that of his State, and the vote of his State

have decided that of Congress.

Perhaps it might have been better, when they were forming the federal

constitution, to have assimilated it, as much as possible, to the

particular constitutions of the States. All of these have distributed the

legislative, executive and judiciary powers, into different departments.

In the federal constitution, the judiciary powers are separated from the

others; but the legislative and executive are both exercised by Congress.

A means of amending this defect has been thought of. Congress having a

power to establish what committees of their own body they please, and to

arrange among them the distribution of their business, they might, on

the first day of their annual meeting, appoint an executive committee,

consisting of a member from each State, and refer to them all executive

business which should occur during their session; confining themselves to

what is of a legislative nature, that is to say, to the heads described

in the ninth article, as of the competence of nine States only, and to

such other questions as should lead to the establishment of general

rules. The journal of this committee, of the preceding day, might be

read the next morning in Congress, and considered as approved, unless a

vote was demanded on a particular article, and that article changed. The

sessions of Congress would then be short, and when they separated, the

Confederation authorizes the appointment of a committee of the States,

which would naturally succeed to the business of the executive committee.

The legislative business would be better done, because the attention of

the members would not be interrupted by the details of execution; and

the executive business would be better done, because, business of this

nature is better adapted to small, than great bodies. A monarchical head

should confide the execution of its will to departments, consisting, each,

of a plurality of hands, who would warp that will, as much as possible,

towards wisdom and moderation, the two qualities it generally wants.

But, a republican head, founding its decrees, originally, in these two

qualities, should commit them to a single hand for execution, giving

them, thereby, a promptitude which republican proceedings generally

want. Congress could not, indeed, confide their executive business to a

smaller number than a committee consisting of a member from each State.

This is necessary to insure the confidence of the Union. But it would

be gaining a great deal, to reduce the executive head to thirteen, and

to relieve themselves of those details. This, however, has as yet been

the subject of private conversations only.

3. A succinct account of paper money in America?

Previous to the Revolution, most of the States were in the habit, whenever

they had occasion for more money than could be raised immediately by

taxes, to issue paper notes or bills, in the name of the State, wherein

they promised to pay to the bearer the sum named in the note or bill. In

some of the States no time of payment was fixed, nor tax laid to enable

payment. In these, the bills depreciated. But others of the States named

in the bill the day when it should be paid, laid taxes to bring in money

enough for that purpose, and paid the bills punctually, on or before the

day named. In these States, paper money was in as high estimation as gold

and silver. On the commencement of the late Revolution, Congress had no

money. The external commerce of the States being suppressed, the farmer

could not sell his produce, and, of course, could not pay a tax. Congress

had no resource then but in paper money. Not being able to lay a tax for

its redemption, they could only promise that taxes should be laid for

that purpose, so as to redeem the bills by a certain day. They did not

foresee the long continuance of the war, the almost total suppression of

their exports, and other events, which rendered the performance of their

engagement impossible. The paper money continued for a twelvemonth equal

to gold and silver. But the quantities which they were obliged to emit

for the purpose of the war, exceeded what had been the usual quantity

of the circulating medium. It began, therefore, to become cheaper, or,

as we expressed it, it depreciated, as gold and silver would have done,

had they been thrown into circulation in equal quantities. But not

having, like them, an intrinsic value, its depreciation was more rapid

and greater than could ever have happened with them. In two years, it

had fallen to two dollars of paper money for one of silver; in three

years, to four for one; in nine months more, it fell to ten for one; and

in the six months following, that is to say, by September, 1779, it had

fallen to twenty for one.

Congress, alarmed at the consequences which were to be apprehended,

should they lose this resource altogether, thought it necessary to

make a vigorous effort to stop its further depreciation. They therefore

determined, in the first place, that their emissions should not exceed

two hundred millions of dollars, to which term they were then nearly

arrived; and though they knew that twenty dollars of what they were

then issuing, would buy no more for their army than one silver dollar

would buy, yet they thought it would be worth while to submit to the

sacrifice of nineteen out of twenty dollars, if they could thereby stop

further depreciation. They, therefore, published an address to their

constituents, in which they renewed their original declarations, that

this paper money should be redeemed at dollar for dollar. They proved

the ability of the States to do this, and that their liberty would be

cheaply bought at that price. The declaration was ineffectual. No man

received the money at a better rate; on the contrary, in six months more,

that is, by March, 1780, it had fallen to forty for one. Congress then

tried an experiment of a different kind. Considering their former offers

to redeem this money at par, as relinquished by the general refusal to

take it, but in progressive depreciation, they required the whole to

be brought in, declared it should be redeemed at its present value, of

forty for one, and that they would give to the holders new bills, reduced

in their denomination to the sum of gold or silver, which was actually

to be paid for them. This would reduce the nominal sum of the mass in

circulation to the present worth of that mass, which was five millions;

a sum not too great for the circulation of the States, and which, they

therefore hoped, would not depreciate further, as they continued firm

in their purpose of emitting no more. This effort was as unavailing as

the former. Very little of the money was brought in. It continued to

circulate and to depreciate, till the end of 1780, when it had fallen

to seventy-five for one, and the money circulated from the French army,

being, by that time, sensible in all the States north of the Potomac,

the paper ceased its circulation altogether in those States. In Virginia

and North Carolina it continued a year longer, within which time it fell

to one thousand for one, and then expired, as it had done in the other

States, without a single groan. Not a murmur was heard on this occasion,

among the people. On the contrary, universal congratulations took place

on their seeing this gigantic mass, whose dissolution had threatened

convulsions which should shake their infant confederacy to its centre,

quietly interred in its grave. Foreigners, indeed, who do not, like

the natives, feel indulgence for its memory, as of a being which has

vindicated their liberties, and fallen in the moment of victory, have

been loud, and still are loud in their complaints. A few of them have

reason; but the most noisy are not the best of them. They are persons

who have become bankrupt by unskilful attempts at commerce with America.

That they may have some pretext to offer to their creditors, they have

bought up great masses of this dead money in America, where it is to be

had at five thousand for one, and they show the certificates of their

paper possessions, as if they had all died in their hands, and had been

the cause of their bankruptcy. Justice will be done to all, by paying

to all persons what this money actually cost them, with an interest of

six per cent. from the time they received it. If difficulties present

themselves in the ascertaining the epoch of the receipt, it has been

thought better that the State should lose, by admitting easy proofs,

than that individuals, and especially foreigners, should, by being held

to such as would be difficult, perhaps impossible.

4. Virginia certainly owed two millions sterling to Great Britain at

the conclusion of the war. Some have conjectured the debt as high as

three millions. I think that State owed near as much as all the rest put

together. This is to be ascribed to peculiarities in the tobacco trade.

The advantages made by the British merchants, on the tobaccos consigned

to them, were so enormous, that they spared no means of increasing those

consignments. A powerful engine for this purpose, was the giving good

prices and credit to the planter, till they got him more immersed in debt

than he could pay, without selling his lands or slaves. They then reduced

the prices given for his tobacco, so that let his shipments be ever

so great, and his demand of necessaries ever so economical, they never

permitted him to clear off his debt, These debts had become hereditary

from father to son, for many generations, so that the planters were a

species of property, annexed to certain mercantile houses in London.

5. The members of Congress are differently paid by different States.

Some are on fixed allowances, from four to eight dollars a day. Others

have their expenses paid, and a surplus for their time. This surplus is

of two, three, or four dollars a day.

6. I do not believe there has ever been a moment, when a single whig, in

any one State, would not have shuddered at the very idea of a separation

of their State from the confederacy. The tories would, at all times,

have been glad to see the confederacy dissolved, even by particles at

a time, in hopes of their attaching themselves again to Great Britain.

7. The 11th article of Confederation admits Canada to accede to the

Confederation at its own will, but adds, "no other colony shall be

admitted to the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States."

When the plan of April, 1784, for establishing new States was on the

carpet, the committee who framed the report of that plan, had inserted

this clause, "provided nine States agree to such admission, according to

the reservation of the 11th of the articles of Confederation." It was

objected, 1. That the words of the confederation, "no other colony,"

could refer only to the residuary possessions of Great Britain, as the

two Floridas, Nova Scotia, &c., not being already parts of the Union;

that the law for "admitting" a new member into the Union, could not be

applied to a territory which was already in the Union, as making part of

a State which was a member of it. 2. That it would be improper to allow

"nine" States to receive a new member, because the same reasons which

rendered that number proper now, would render a greater one proper, when

the number composing the Union should be increased. They therefore struck

out this paragraph and inserted a proviso, that "the consent of so many

States, in Congress, shall be first obtained, as may, at the time, be

competent;" thus leaving the question, whether the 11th article applies to

the admission of new States, to be decided when that admission shall be

asked. See the Journal of Congress of April 20, 1784. Another doubt was

started in this debate, viz.: whether the agreement of the nine States,

required by the Confederation, was to be made by their legislatures, or

by their delegates in Congress? The expression adopted, viz.: "so many

States, in Congress, is first obtained," show what was their sense of

this matter. If it be agreed that the 11th article of the Confederation

is not to be applied to the admission of these new States, then it is

contended that their admission comes within the 13th article, which

forbids "any alteration, unless agreed to in a Congress of the United

States, and afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State."

The independence of the new States of Kentucky and Franklin, will soon

bring on the ultimate decision of all these questions.

8. Particular instances whereby the General Assembly of Virginia have

shown that they considered the ordinance called their constitution, as

every other ordinance, or act of the legislature, subject to be altered

by the legislature for the time being.

1. The convention which formed that constitution, declared themselves to

be the House of Delegates, during the term for which they were originally

elected, and in the autumn of the year met the Senate, elected under

the new constitution, and did legislative business with them. At this

time, there were malefactors in the public jail, and there was as yet no

court established for their trial. They passed a law, appointing certain

members by name, who were then members of the Executive Council, to

be a court for the trial of these malefactors, though the constitution

had said, in express words, that no person should exercise the powers

of more than one of the three departments, legislative, executive and

judiciary at the same time. This proves that the very men who had made

that constitution understood that it would be alterable by the General

Assembly. This court was only for that occasion. When the next General

Assembly met, after the election of the ensuing year, there was a new

set of malefactors in the jail, and no court to try them. This Assembly

passed a similar law to the former, appointing certain members of the

Executive Council to be an occasional court for this particular case.

Not having the journals of Assembly by me, I am unable to say whether

this measure was repealed afterwards. However, they are instances of

_executive_ and _judiciary_ powers exercised by the same persons, under

the authority of a law, made in contradiction to the constitution.

2. There was a process depending in the ordinary courts of justice,

between two individuals of the names of Robinson and Fauntleroy, who

were relations, of different descriptions, to one Robinson, a British

subject, lately dead. Each party claimed a right to inherit the lands of

the decedent according to the laws. Their right should by the constitution

have been decided by the judiciary courts; and it was actually depending

before them. One of the parties petitioned the Assembly (I think it was

in the year 1782), who passed a law deciding the right in his favor. In

the following year, a Frenchman, master of a vessel, entered into port

without complying with the laws established in such cases, whereby he

incurred the forfeitures of the law to any person who would sue for them.

An individual instituted a legal process to recover these forfeitures

according to the law of the land. The Frenchman petitioned the Assembly,

who passed a law deciding the question of forfeiture in his favor. These

acts are occasional repeals of that part of the constitution which forbids

the same persons to exercise _legislative_ and _judiciary_ powers at

the same time.

The Assembly is in the habitual exercise, during their sessions, of

directing the Executive what to do. There are few pages of their journals

which do not show proofs of this, and consequently instances of the

_legislative_ and _executive_ powers exercised by the same persons at

the same time. These things prove that it has been the uninterrupted

opinion of every Assembly, from that which passed the ordinance called

the constitution down to the present day, that their acts may control

that ordinance, and, of course, that the State of Virginia has no fixed

constitution at all.

[The succeeding observations were made by Mr. Jefferson on an

article entitled "Etats Unis," prepared for the Encyclopedie

Methodique, and submitted to him before its publication.]

Page 8. The malefactors sent to America were not sufficient in number to

merit enumeration, as one class out of three which peopled America. It

was at a late period of their history that this practice began. I have no

book by me which enables me to point out the date of its commencement.

But I do not think the whole number sent would amount to two thousand,

and being principally men, eaten up with disease, they married seldom and

propagated little. I do not suppose that themselves and their descendants

are at present four thousand, which is little more than one thousandth

part of the whole inhabitants.

Indented servants formed a considerable supply. These were poor Europeans,

who went to America to settle themselves. If they could pay their passage,

it was well. If not, they must find means of paying it. They were at

liberty, therefore, to make an agreement with any person they chose,

to serve him such a length of time as they agreed on, upon condition

that he would repay to the master of the vessel the expenses of their

passage. If, being foreigners, unable to speak the language, they did

not know how to make a bargain for themselves, the captain of the vessel

contracted for them with such persons as he could. This contract was by

deed indented, which occasioned them to be called indented servants.

Sometimes they were called redemptioners, because by their agreement

with the master of the vessel, they could _redeem_ themselves from his

power by paying their passage, which they frequently effected by hiring

themselves on their arrival, as is before mentioned. In some States I

know that these people had a right of marrying themselves without their

master's leave, and I did suppose they had that right everywhere. I did

not know that in any of the States they demanded so much as a week for

every day's absence without leave. I suspect this must have been at a

very early period, while the governments were in the hands of the first

emigrants, who, being mostly laborers, were narrow-minded and severe. I

know that in Virginia the laws allowed their servitude to be protracted

only two days for every one they were absent without leave. So mild was

this kind of servitude, that it was very frequent for foreigners, who

carried to America money enough not only to pay their passage, but to

buy themselves a farm, to indent themselves to a master for three years

for a certain sum of money, with a view to learn the husbandry of the

country. I will here make a general observation. So desirous are the poor

of Europe to get to America, where they may better their condition, that

being unable to pay their passage, they will agree to serve two or three

years on their arrival here, rather than not go. During the time of that

service, they are better fed, better clothed, and have lighter labor,

than while in Europe. Continuing to work for hire a few years longer,

they buy a farm, marry, and enjoy all the sweets of a domestic society

of their own. The American governments are censured for permitting this

species of servitude, which lays the foundation of the happiness of

these people. But what should these governments do? Pay the passage of

all those who choose to go into their country? They are not able; nor

were they able, do they think the purchase worth the price? Should they

exclude these people from their shores? Those who know their situations

in Europe and America, would not say that this is the alternative which

humanity dictates. It is said that these people are deceived by those

who carry them over. But this is done in Europe. How can the American

governments prevent it? Should they punish the deceiver? It seems more

incumbent on the European government, where the act is done, and where a

public injury is sustained from it. However, it is only in Europe that

this deception is heard of. The individuals are generally satisfied in

America with their adventure, and very few of them wish not to have made

it. I must add that the Congress have nothing to do with this matter.

It belongs to the legislatures of the several States.

Page 26. "Une puissance, en effet," &c. The account of the settlement of

the colonies, which precedes this paragraph, shows that that settlement

was not made by public authority, or at the public expense of England;

but by the exertions, and at the expense of individuals. Hence it

happened, that their constitutions were not formed systematically, but

according to the circumstances which happened to exist in each. Hence,

too, the principles of the political connection between the old and new

countries, were never settled. That it would have been advantageous to

have settled them, is certain; and, particularly, to have provided a body

which should decide, in the last resort, all cases wherein both parties

were interested. But it is not certain that that right would have been

given, or ought to have been given to the Parliament; much less, that it

resulted to the Parliament, without having been given to it expressly.

Why was it necessary that there should have been a body to decide in the

last resort? Because, it would have been for the good of both parties.

But this reason shows it ought not to have been the Parliament, since

that would have exercised it for the good of one party only.

Page 105. As to the change of the 8th article of Confederation, for

quoting requisitions of money on the States.

By a report of the Secretary of Congress, dated January the 4th, 1786,

eight States had then acceded to the proposition; to wit, Massachusetts,

Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,

and North Carolina.

Congress, on the 18th of April, 1783, recommended to the States to invest

them with a power, for twenty-five years, to levy an impost of five per

cent. on all articles imported from abroad. New Hampshire, Massachusetts,

Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina,

and South Carolina, had complied with this, before the 4th of January,

1786. Maryland had passed an act for the same purpose; but, by a mistake

in referring to the date of the recommendation of Congress, the act

failed of its effect. This was therefore to be rectified. Since the 4th

of January, the public papers tell us that Rhode Island has complied

fully with this recommendation.

It remains still for New York and Georgia to do it. The exportations

of America, which are tolerably well known, are the best measure for

estimating the importations. These are probably worth about twenty

millions of dollars, annually. Of course, this impost will pay the

interest of a debt to that amount. If confined to the foreign debt,

it will pay the whole interest of that, and sink half a million of the

capital, annually. The expenses of collecting this impost, will probably

be six per cent. on its amount, this being the usual expense of collection

in the United States. This will be sixty thousand dollars.

On the 30th of April, 1784, Congress recommended to the States, to invest

them with a power, for fifteen years, to exclude from their ports the

vessels of all nations, not having a treaty of commerce with them; and

to pass, as to all nations, an act on the principles of the British

navigation act. Not that they were disposed to carry these powers into

execution, with such as would meet them in fair and equal arrangements

of commerce; but that they might be able to do it against those who

should not. On the 4th of January, 1786, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,

Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,

and North Carolina, had done it. It remained for New Jersey, Delaware,

South Carolina, and Georgia, to do the same.

In the meantime, the general idea has advanced before the demands of

Congress, and several States have passed acts, for vesting Congress with

the whole regulation of their commerce, reserving the revenue arising

from these regulations, to the disposal of the State in which it is

levied. The States which, according to the public papers, have passed

such acts, are New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey,

Delaware, and Virginia; but the Assembly of Virginia, apprehensive that

this disjointed method of proceeding may fail in its effect, or be much

retarded, passed a resolution on the 21st of January, 1786, appointing

commissioners to meet others from the other States, whom they invite into

the same measure, to digest the form of an act, for investing Congress

with such powers over their commerce, as shall be thought expedient,

which act is to be reported to their several Assemblies, for their

adoption. This was the state of the several propositions relative to the

impost, and regulation of commerce, at the date of our latest advices

from America.

Page 125. The General Assembly of Virginia, at their session in 1785,

passed an act, declaring that the district, called Kentucky, shall be a

separate and independent State, on these conditions. 1. That the people

of that district shall consent to it. 2. That Congress shall consent to

it, and shall receive them into the federal Union. 3. That they shall

take on themselves a proportionable part of the public debt of Virginia.

4. That they shall confirm all titles to lands within their district,

made by the State of Virginia, before their separation.

Page 139. It was in 1783, and not in 1781, that Congress quitted

Philadelphia.

Page 140. "Le Congres qui se trouvoit à la portée des rebelles fut

effrayé." I was not present on this occasion, but I have had relations

of the transaction from several who were. The conduct of Congress was

marked with indignation and firmness. They received no propositions

from the mutineers. They came to the resolutions, which may be seen in

the journals of June the 21st, 1783, then adjourned regularly, and went

through the body of the mutineers to their respective lodgings. The

measures taken by Dickinson, the President of Pennsylvania, for punishing

this insult, not being satisfactory to Congress, they assembled, nine

days after, at Princeton, in Jersey. The people of Pennsylvania sent

petitions declaring their indignation at what had passed, their devotion

to the federal head, and their dispositions to protect it, and praying

them to return; the legislature, as soon as assembled, did the same

thing; the Executive, whose irresolution had been so exceptionable, made

apologies. But Congress were now removed; and, to the opinion that this

example was proper, other causes were now added, sufficient to _prevent_

their return to Philadelphia.

Page 155. l. 2. Omit "La detta actuelle," &c.

And also, "Les details," &c., &c., to the end of the paragraph, "celles

des Etats Unis;" page 156. The reason is, that these passages seem to

suppose, that the several sums emitted by Congress, at different times,

amounting nominally to two hundred millions of dollars, had been actually

worth that at the time of emission, and, of course, that the soldiers

and others had received that sum from Congress. But nothing is further

from the truth. The soldier, victualler, or other persons who received

forty dollars for a service, at the close of the year 1779, received,

in fact, no more than he who received one dollar for the same service,

in the year 1775, or 1776; because, in those years, the paper money was

at par with silver; whereas, by the close of 1779, forty paper dollars

were worth but one of silver, and would buy no more of the necessaries

of life. To know what the monies emitted by Congress were worth to the

people, at the time they received them, we will state the date and amount

of every several emission, the depreciation of paper money at the time,

and the real worth of the emission in silver or gold.

+------------------+--------------+-------------+------------------+

| | | | Worth of the sum |

| Emission. | Sum Emitted.|Depreciation.|emitted, in silver|

| | | | dollars. |

+------------------+--------------+-------------+------------------+

|1775. June 23 | 2,000,000| .... | 2,000,000 |

| " November 29 | 3,000,000| .... | 3,000,000 |

|1776. Feb. 17 | 4,000,000| .... | 4,000,000 |

| " August 13 | 5,000,000| .... | 5,000,000 |

|1777. May 20 | 5,000,000| 2⅔ | 1,877,273 |

| " August 15 | 1,000,000| 3 | 333,333⅓ |

| " Nov. 7 | 1,000,000| 4 | 250,000 |

| " Dec. 3 | 1,000,000| 4 | 250,000 |

|1778. January 8 | 1,000,000| 4 | 250,000 |

| " January 22 | 2,000,000| 4 | 500,000 |

| " February 16 | 2,000,000| 5 | 400,000 |

| " March 5 | 2,000,000| 5 | 400,000 |

| " April 4 | 1,000,000| 6 | 166,666⅔ |

| " April 10 | 5,000,000| 6 | 833,333⅓ |

| " April 18 | 500,000| 6 | 83,333⅓ |

| " May 22 | 5,000,000| 5 | 1,000,000 |

| " June 20 | 5,000,000| 4 | 1,250,000 |

| " July 30 | 5,000,000| 4⅓ | 1,111,111 |

| " September 5 | 5,000,000| 5 | 1,000,000 |

| " September 26| 10,000,100| 5 | 2,000,020 |

| " November 4 | 10,000,100| 6 | 1,666,683⅓ |

| " December 14 | 10,000,100| 6 | 1,666,683⅓ |

|1779. January 14 |[15]24,447,620| 8 | 3,055,952½ |

| " February 3 | 5,000,160| 10 | 500,016 |

| " February 12 | 5,000,160| 10 | 500,016 |

| " April 2 | 5,000,160| 17 | 294,127 |

| " May 5 | 10,000,100| 21 | 416,670⅚ |

| " June 4 | 10,000,100| 20 | 500,005 |

| " July 17 | 15,000,280| 20 | 750,014 |

| " September 17| 15,000,260| 24 | 625,610⅚ |

| " October 14 | 5,000,180| 30 | 166,672⅔ |

| " November 17 | 10,050,340| 38½ | 261,053 |

| " November 29 | 10,000,140| 38½ | 259,743 |

| +--------------+-------------+------------------+

| | 200,000,000| | 36,367,719⅚ |

+------------------+--------------+-------------+------------------+

Thus, it appears, that the two hundred millions of dollars, emitted by

Congress, were worth, to those who received them, but about thirty-six

millions of silver dollars. If we estimate at the same value, the like

sum of two hundred millions, supposed to have been emitted by the States,

and reckon the Federal debt, foreign and domestic, at about forty-three

millions, and the State debts, at about twenty-five millions, it will

form an amount of one hundred and forty millions of dollars, or seven

hundred and thirty-five millions of livres, Tournois, the total sum which

the war has cost the inhabitants of the United States. It continued eight

years, from the battle of Lexington to the cessation of hostilities in

America. The annual expense, then, was about seventeen millions and five

hundred thousand dollars, while that of our enemies was a greater number

of guineas.

It will be asked, how will the two masses of Continental and of State

money have cost the people of the United States seventy-two millions of

dollars, when they are to be redeemed, now, with about six millions? I

answer, that the difference, being sixty-six millions, has been lost on

the paper bills, separately, by the successive holders of them. Every

one, through whose hands a bill passed, lost on that bill what it lost in

value, during the time it was in his hands. This was a real tax on him;

and, in this way, the people of the United States actually contributed

those sixty-six millions of dollars, during the war, and by a mode of

taxation the most oppressive of all, because the most unequal of all.

Page 166; bottom line. Leave out "Et c'est une autre economie," &c. The

reason of this, is, that in 1784, purchases of lands were to be made

of the Indians, which were accordingly made. But in 1785, they did not

propose to make any purchase. The money desired in 1785, five thousand

dollars, was probably to pay agents residing among the Indians, or

balances of the purchases of 1784. These purchases will not be made every

year; but only at distant intervals, as our settlements are extended;

and it may be regarded as certain, that not a foot of land will ever

be taken from the Indians, without their own consent. The sacredness of

their rights, is felt by all thinking persons in America, as much as in

Europe.

Page 170. Virginia was quotaed the highest of any State in the Union.

But during the war, several States appear to have paid more, because

they were free from the enemy, whilst Virginia was cruelly ravaged. The

requisition of 1784, was so quotaed on the several States, as to bring

up their arrearages; so that when they should have paid the sums then

demanded, all would be on an equal footing. It is necessary to give a

further explanation of this requisition. The requisitions of one million

and two hundred thousand dollars, of eight millions, and two millions,

had been made during the war, as an experiment, to see whether, in that

situation, the States could furnish the necessary supplies. It was found

they could not. The money was thereupon obtained by loans in Europe; and

Congress meant, by their requisition of 1784, to abandon the requisitions

of one million and two hundred thousand dollars, and of two millions,

and also one-half of the eight millions. But as all the States, almost,

had made some payments in part of that requisition, they were obliged to

retain such a proportion of it, as would enable them to call for equal

contributions from all the others.

Page 170. I cannot say how it has happened, that the debt of Connecticut

is greater than that of Virginia. The latter is the richest in

productions, and, perhaps, made greater exertions to pay for her supplies

in the course of the war.

Page 172. "Les Americains sevant aprés une banqueroute," &c. The

objections made to the United States, being here condensed together

in a short compass, perhaps, it would not be improper to condense

the answers in as small a compass, in some such form as follows. That

is, after the words "aucun espoir," add, "But to these charges it may

be justly answered, that those are no bankrupts who acknowledge the

sacredness of their debts, in their just and real amount, who are able,

within a reasonable time, to pay them, and who are actually proceeding

in that payment; that they furnish, in fact, the supplies necessary for

the support of their government; that their officers and soldiers are

satisfied, as the interest of their debt is paid regularly, and the

principal is in a course of payment; that the question, whether they

fought ill, should be asked of those who met them at Bunker's hill,

Bennington, Stillwater, King's mountain, the Cowpens, Guilford, and

the Eutaw. And that the charges of ingratitude, madness, infidelity and

corruption, are easily made by those to whom falsehoods cost nothing;

but that no instances, in support of them, have been produced, or can

be produced."

Page 187. "Les officiérs et les soldats ont eté payés," &c. The balances

due to the officers and soldiers have been ascertained, and a certificate

of the sum given to each; on these, the interest is regularly paid; and

every occasion is seized of paying the principal, by receiving these

certificates as money, whenever public property is sold, till a more

regular and effectual method can be taken, for paying the whole.

Page 191. "Quoique la loi dont nous parlons, ne s'observe plus en

Angleterre." "An alien born may purchase lands or other estates, but not

for his own use; for the King is thereupon entitled to them." "Yet an

alien may acquire a property in goods, money and other personal estate,

or may hire a house for his habitation. For this is necessary for the

advancement of trade." "Also, an alien may bring an action concerning

personal property, and may make a will, and dispose of his personal

estate." "When I mention these rights of an alien, I must be understood

of alien _friends_ only, or such whose countries are in peace with ours;

for alien _enemies_ have no rights, no privileges, unless by the King's

special favor, during the time of war." Blackstone, B. 1. c. 10, page

372. "An alien _friend_ may have personal actions, but not real; an

alien _enemy_ shall have neither real, personal, or mixed actions. The

reason why an alien _friend_ is allowed to maintain a personal action,

is, because he would otherwise be incapacitated to merchandise, which

may be as much to our prejudice as his." Cunningham's law dict. title,

Aliens. The above is the clear law of England, practiced from the

earliest ages to this day, and never denied. The passage quoted by M.

de Meuisnier from 2 Blackstone, c. 26, is from his chapter, "Of title

to things _personal by occupancy_." The word "personal," shows, that

nothing in this chapter relates to lands, which are _real_ estate; and,

therefore, this passage does not contract the one before quoted from

the same author, (1 Bl. c. 10.) which says, that the lands of an alien

belong to the King. The words, "of title by _occupancy_," show, that it

does not relate to _debts_, which, being a moral existence only, cannot

be the subject of _occupancy_. Blackstone, in this passage, (B. 2. c.

26.) speaks only of personal goods of an alien, which another may find,

and seize as prime occupant.

Page 193. "Le remboursement presentera des difficultés des sommes

considerables," &c. There is no difficulty nor doubt on this subject.

Every one is sensible how this is to be ultimately settled. Neither the

British creditor, nor the State, will be permitted to lose by these

payments. The debtor will be credited for what he paid, according to

what it was really worth at the time he paid it, and he must pay the

balance. Nor does he lose by this; for if a man who owed one thousand

dollars to a British merchant, paid eight hundred paper dollars into

the treasury, when the depreciation was at eight for one, it is clear

he paid but one hundred real dollars, and must now pay nine hundred. It

is probable, he received those eight hundred dollars for one hundred

bushels of wheat, which were never worth more than one hundred silver

dollars. He is credited, therefore, the full worth of his wheat. The

equivoque is in the use of the word "dollar."

Page 226. "Qu' on abolisse les privileges du clergé." This privilege,

originally allowed to the clergy, is now extended to every man, and

even to women. It is a right of exemption from capital punishment, for

the first offence, in most cases. It is, then, a pardon by the law. In

other cases, the Executive gives the pardon. But when laws are made as

mild as they should be, both those pardons are absurd. The principle of

Beccaria is sound. Let the legislators be merciful, but the executors of

the law inexorable. As the term "privileges du clergé" may be understood

by foreigners, perhaps, it will be better to strike it out here, and

substitute the word "pardon."

Page 239. "Les commissaries veulent," &c. Manslaughter is the killing a

man with design, but in a sudden gust of passion, and where the killer

has not had time to cool. The first offence is not punished capitally,

but the second is. This is the law of England and of all the American

States; and is not now a new proposition. Those laws have supposed that

a man, whose passions have so much dominion over him, as to lead him

to repeated acts of murder, is unsafe to society: that it is better

he should be put to death by the law, than others, more innocent than

himself, on the movements of his impetuous passions.

Ibid. "Mal-aisé d'indiquer la nuance precise," &c. In forming a scale

of crimes and punishments, two considerations have principal weight. 1.

The atrocity of the crime. 2. The peculiar circumstances of a country,

which furnish greater temptations to commit it, or greater facilities

for escaping detection. The punishment must be heavier to counterbalance

this. Were the first the only consideration, all nations would form

the same scale. But, as the circumstances of a country have influence

on the punishment, and no two countries exist precisely under the same

circumstances, no two countries will form the same scale of crimes and

punishments. For example; in America, the inhabitants let their horses

go at large, in the uninclosed lands, which are so extensive, as to

maintain them altogether. It is easy, therefore, to steal them, and easy

to escape. Therefore, the laws are obliged to oppose these temptations

with a heavier degree of punishment. For this reason, the stealing of a

horse in America, is punished more severely, than stealing the same value

in any other form. In Europe, where horses are confined so securely, that

it is impossible to steal them, that species of theft need not be punished

more severely than any other. In some countries of Europe, stealing

fruit from trees is punished capitally. The reason is, that it being

impossible to lock fruit trees up in coffers, as we do our money, it is

impossible to oppose physical bars to this species of theft. Moral ones

are, therefore, opposed by the laws. This, to an unreflecting American,

appears the most enormous of all the abuses of power; because, he has

been used to see fruits hanging in such quantities, that, if not taken

by men, they would rot: he has been used to consider them, therefore,

as of no value, and as not furnishing materials for the commission of

a crime. This must serve as an apology for the arrangements of crimes

and punishments, in the scale under our consideration. A different one

would be formed here; and still different ones in Italy, Turkey, China,

&c.

Page 240. "Les officiers Americains," &c., to page 264, "qui le

meritoient." I would propose to new model this section, in the following

manner. 1. Give a succinct history of the origin and establishment of

the Cincinnati. 2. Examine whether, in its present form, it threatens

any dangers to the State. 3. Propose the most practicable method of

preventing them.

Having been in America, during the period in which this institution

was formed, and being then in a situation which gave me opportunities

of seeing it, in all its stages, I may venture to give M. de Meusnier

materials for the first branch of the preceding distribution of the

subject. The second and third, he will best execute himself. I should

write its history in the following form:

When, on the close of that war, which established the independence of

America, its army was about to be disbanded, the officers, who, during

the course of it, had gone through the most trying scenes together, who,

by mutual aids and good offices, had become dear to one another, felt

with great oppression of mind, the approach of that moment which was to

separate them, never, perhaps, to meet again. They were from different

States, and from distant parts of the same State. Hazard alone could,

therefore, give them but rare and partial occasions of seeing each other.

They were, of course, to abandon altogether the hope of ever meeting

again, or to devise some occasion which might bring them together. And

why not come together on purpose, at stated times? Would not the trouble

of such a journey be greatly overpaid, by the pleasure of seeing each

other again, by the sweetest of all consolations, the talking over the

scenes of difficulty and of endearment they had gone through? This, too,

would enable them to know who of them should succeed in the world, who

should be unsuccessful, and to open the purses of all to every laboring

brother. This idea was too soothing, not to be cherished in conversation.

It was improved into that of a regular association, with an organized

administration, with periodical meetings, general and particular, fixed

contributions for those who should be in distress, and a badge, by which,

not only those who had not had occasion to become personally known,

should be able to recognize one another, but which should be worn by

their descendants, to perpetuate among them the friendships which had

bound their ancestors together.

General Washington was, at that moment, oppressed with the operation

of disbanding an army which was not paid, and the difficulty of this

operation was increased, by some two or three States' having expressed

sentiments, which did not indicate a sufficient attention to their

payment. He was sometimes present, when his officers were fashioning in

their conversations, their newly proposed society. He saw, the innocence

of its origin, and foresaw no effects less innocent. He was, at that

time, writing his valedictory letter to the States, which has been so

deservedly applauded by the world. Far from thinking it a moment to

multiply the causes of irritation, by thwarting a proposition which

had absolutely no other basis but that of benevolence and friendship,

he was rather satisfied to find himself aided in his difficulties by

this new incident, which occupied, and, at the same time, soothed the

minds of the officers. He thought, too, that this institution would

be one instrument the more for strengthening the federal bond, and for

promoting federal ideas. The institution was formed. They incorporated

into it the officers of the French army and navy, by whose sides they

had fought, and with whose aid they had finally prevailed, extending it

to such grades as they were told might be permitted to enter into it.

They sent an officer to France, to make the proposition to them, and to

procure the badges which they had devised for their order. The moment of

disbanding the army having come, before they could have a full meeting

to appoint their President, the General was prayed to act in that office

till their first general meeting, which was to be held at Philadelphia,

in the month of May following.

The laws of the society were published. Men who read them in their

closets, unwarmed by those sentiments of friendship which had produced

them, inattentive to those pains which an approaching separation

had excited in the minds of the institutors, politicians, who see in

everything only the dangers with which it threatens civil society, in

fine, the laboring people, who, shielded by equal laws, had never seen

any difference between man and man, but had read of terrible oppressions,

which people of their description experience in other countries, from

those who are distinguished by titles and badges, began to be alarmed

at this new institution. A remarkable silence, however, was observed.

Their solicitudes were long confined within the circles of private

conversation. At length, however, a Mr. Burke, Chief Justice of South

Carolina, broke that silence. He wrote against the new institution,

foreboding its dangers, very imperfectly indeed, because he had nothing

but his imagination to aid him. An American could do no more; for to

detail the real evils of aristocracy, they must be seen in Europe. Burke's

fears were thought exaggerations in America; while in Europe, it is known

that even Mirabeau has but faintly sketched the curses of hereditary

aristocracy as they are experienced here, and as they would have followed

in America, had this institution remained. The epigraph of Burke's

pamphlet, was, "Blow ye the trumpet in Zion." Its effect corresponded

with its epigraph. This institution became, first, the subject of

general conversation. Next, it was made the subject of deliberation in

the legislative Assemblies of some of the States. The Governor of South

Carolina censured it, in an address to the Assembly of that State. The

Assemblies of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, condemned

its principles. No circumstance, indeed, brought the consideration of

it expressly before Congress; yet it had sunk deep into their minds. An

offer having been made to them, on the part of the Polish order of Divine

Providence, to receive some of their distinguished citizens into that

order, they made that an occasion to declare, that these distinctions

were contrary to the principles of their Confederation.

The uneasiness excited by this institution, had very early caught the

notice of General Washington. Still recollecting all the purity of the

motives which gave it birth, he became sensible that it might produce

political evils, which the warmth of those motives had masked. Add to

this, that it was disapproved by the mass of citizens of the Union. This,

alone, was reason strong enough, in a country where the will of the

majority is the law, and ought to be the law. He saw that the objects

of the institution were too light, to be opposed to considerations as

serious as these; and that it was become necessary to annihilate it

absolutely. On this, therefore, he was decided. The first annual meeting

at Philadelphia was now at hand; he went to that, determined to exert all

his influence for its suppression. He proposed it to his fellow officers,

and urged it with all his powers. It met an opposition which was observed

to cloud his face with an anxiety, that the most distressful scenes of

the war had scarcely ever produced. It was canvassed for several days,

and, at length, it was no more a doubt what would be its ultimate fate.

The order was on the point of receiving its annihilation, by the vote of

a great majority of its members. In this moment, their envoy arrived from

France, charged with letters from the French officers, accepting with

cordiality the proposed badges of union, with solicitations from others

to be received into the order, and with notice that their respectable

Sovereign had been pleased to recognize it, and permit his officers to

wear its badges. The prospect now changed. The question assumed a new

form. After the offer made by them, and accepted by their friends, in

what words could they clothe a proposition to retract it, which would

not cover themselves with the reproaches of levity and ingratitude? which

would not appear an insult to those whom they loved? Federal principles,

popular discontent, were considerations whose weight was known and felt by

themselves. But would foreigners know and feel them equally? Would they

so far acknowledge their cogency, as to permit without any indignation,

the eagle and ribbon to be torn from their breasts, by the very hands

which had placed them there? The idea revolted the whole society. They

found it necessary, then, to preserve so much of their institution as

might continue to support this foreign branch, while they should prune

off every other, which would give offence to their fellow citizens: thus

sacrificing, on each hand, to their friends and to their country.

The society was to retain its existence, its name, its meetings, and

its charitable funds: but these last were to be deposited with their

respective legislatures. The order was to be no longer hereditary; a

reformation, which had been pressed even from this side the Atlantic; it

was to be communicated to no new members; the general meetings, instead

of annual, were to be triennial only. The eagle and ribbon, indeed,

were retained; because they were worn, and they wished them to be worn

by their friends who were in a country where they would not be objects

of offence; but themselves never wore them. They laid them up in their

bureaus with the medals of American Independence, with those of the

trophies they had taken, and the battles they had won. But through all

the United States, no officer is seen to offend the public eye, with

the display of this badge. These changes have tranquillized the American

States. Their citizens feel too much interest in the reputation of their

officers, and value too much, whatever may serve to recall to the memory

of their allies, the moments wherein they formed but one people, not

to do justice to the circumstance which prevented a total annihilation

of the order. Though they are obliged by a prudent foresight, to keep

out everything from among themselves, which might pretend to divide

them into orders, and to degrade one description of men below another,

yet they hear with pleasure, that their allies, whom circumstances have

already placed under these distinctions, are willing to consider it as

one, to have aided them in the establishment of their liberties, and to

wear a badge which may recall them to their remembrance; and it would

be an extreme affliction to them, if the domestic reformation which has

been found necessary, if the censures of individual writers, or if any

other circumstance should discourage the wearing their badge or lessen

its reputation.

This short but true history of the order of the Cincinnati, taken from

the mouths of persons on the spot, who were privy to its origin and

progress, and who knew its present state, is the best apology which can

be made for an insinuation, which appeared to be, and was really, so

heterogeneous to the governments in which it was erected.

It should be further considered, that in America no other distinction

between man and man had ever been known, but that of persons in office,

exercising powers by authority of the laws, and private individuals.

Among these last, the poorest laborer stood on equal ground with the

wealthiest millionnaire, and generally on a more favored one, whenever

their rights seemed to jar. It has been seen that a shoemaker or other

artisan, removed by the voice of his country from his work bench into a

chair of office, has instantly commanded all the respect and obedience

which the laws ascribe to his office. But of distinction by birth or

badge, they had no more idea than they had of the mode of existence in

the moon or planets. They had heard only that there were such, and knew

that they must be wrong. A due horror of the evils which flow from these

distinctions, could be excited in Europe only, where the dignity of man

is lost in arbitrary distinctions, where the human species is classed

into several stages of degradation, where the many are crushed under

the weight of the few, and where the order established, can present to

the contemplation of a thinking being, no other picture than that of God

Almighty and his angels, trampling under foot the host of the damned. No

wonder, then, that the institution of the Cincinnati should be innocently

conceived by one order of American citizens, should raise in the other

orders, only a slow, temperate, and rational opposition, and should be

viewed in Europe as a detestable parricide.

The second and third branches of this subject, no body can better execute

than M. de Meusnier. Perhaps it may be curious to him to see how they

strike an American mind at present. He shall, therefore, have the ideas

of one who was an enemy to the institution from the first moment of

its conception, but who was always sensible that the officers neither

foresaw nor intended the injury they were doing to their country.

As to the question, then, whether any evil can proceed from the

institution as it stands at present, I am of opinion their may. 1. From

the meetings. These will keep the officers formed into a body; will

continue a distinction between the civil and military, which it would

be for the good of the whole to obliterate, as soon as possible; and the

military assemblies will not only keep alive the jealousies and fears of

the civil government, but give ground for these fears and jealousies.

For when men meet together, they will make business if they have none;

they will collate their grievances, some real, some imaginary, all highly

painted; they will communicate to each other the sparks of discontent;

and these may engender a flame which will consume their particular, as

well as the general happiness. 2. The charitable part of the institution

is still more likely to do mischief, as it perpetuates the dangers

apprehended in the preceding clause. For here is a fund provided of

permanent existence. To whom will it belong? To the descendants of

American officers of a certain description. These descendants, then,

will form a body, having sufficient interest to keep up an attention to

their description, to continue meetings, and perhaps, in some moment,

when the political eye shall be slumbering, or the firmness of their

fellow citizens relaxed, to replace the insignia of the order and revive

all its pretensions. What good can the officers propose which may weigh

against these possible evils? The securing their descendants against

want? Why afraid to trust them to the same fertile soil, and the same

genial climate, which will secure from want the descendants of their

other fellow citizens? Are they afraid they will be reduced to labor

the earth for their sustenance? They will be rendered thereby both more

honest and happy. An industrious farmer occupies a more dignified place

in the scale of beings, whether moral or political, than a lazy lounger,

valuing himself on his family, too proud to work, and drawing out a

miserable existence, by eating on that surplus of other men's labor,

which is the sacred fund of the helpless poor. A pitiful annuity will

only prevent them from exerting that industry and those talents which

would soon lead them to better fortune.

How are these evils to be prevented? 1. At their first general meeting,

let them distribute the funds on hand to the existing objects of their

destination, and discontinue all further contributions. 2. Let them

declare, at the same time, that their meetings, general and particular,

shall thenceforth cease. 3. Let them melt up their eagles and add the

mass to the distributable fund, that their descendants may have no

temptation to hang them in their button holes.

These reflections are not proposed as worthy the notice of M. de Meusnier.

He will be so good as to treat the subject in his own way, and no body

has a better. I will only pray him to avail us of his forcible manner,

to evince that there is evil to be apprehended, even from the ashes of

this institution, and to exhort the society in America to make their

reformation complete; bearing in mind, that we must keep the passions

of men on our side, even when we are persuading them to do what they

ought to do.

Page 268. "Et en effet la population," &c. Page 270. "Plus de confiance."

To this we answer that no such census of the numbers was ever given out

by Congress, nor ever presented to them: and further, that Congress never

have, at any time, declared by their vote, the number of inhabitants in

their respective States. On the 22d of June, 1775, they first resolved

to emit paper money. The sum resolved on was two millions of dollars.

They declared, then, that the twelve confederate colonies (for Georgia

had not yet joined them) should be pledged for the redemption of these

bills. To ascertain in what proportion each State should be bound, the

members from each were desired to say, as nearly as they could, what

was the number of the inhabitants of their respective States. They were

very much unprepared for such a declaration. They guessed, however, as

well as they could. The following are the numbers, as they conjectured

them, and the consequent apportionment of the two millions of dollars.

Inhabitants. Dollars.

New Hampshire, 100,000 82,713

Massachusetts, 350,000 289,496

Rhode Island, 58,000 47,973

Connecticut, 200,000 165,426

New York, 200,000 165,426

New Jersey, 180,000 107,527

Pennsylvania, 300,000 248,139

Delaware, 30,000 24,813

Maryland, 250,000 206,783

Virginia, 400,000 330,852

North Carolina, 200,000 165,426

South Carolina, 200,000 165,426

--------- ---------

2,418,000 2,000,000

Georgia having not yet acceded to the measures of the other States, was

not quotaed; but her numbers were generally estimated at about thirty

thousand, and so would have made the whole two million four hundred

and forty-eight thousand persons, of every condition. But it is to

be observed, that though Congress made this census the basis of their

apportionment, yet they did not even give it a place on their journals;

much less publish it to the world with their sanction. The way it got

abroad was this: As the members declared from their seats the number of

inhabitants which they conjectured to be in their State, the secretary

of Congress wrote them on a piece of paper, calculated the portion of

two millions of dollars to be paid by each, and entered the sum only in

the journals. The members, however, for their own satisfaction, and the

information of their States, took copies of this enumeration and sent

them to their States. From thence they got into the public papers: and

when the English news writers found it answer their purpose to compare

this with the enumeration of 1783, as their principle is "to lie boldly

that they may not be suspected of lying," they made it amount to three

millions one hundred and thirty-seven thousand eight hundred and nine,

and ascribed its publication to Congress itself.

In April, 1785, Congress being to call on the States to raise a million

and a half of dollars annually for twenty-five years, it was necessary

to apportion this among them. The States had never furnished them with

their exact numbers. It was agreed, too, that in this apportionment five

slaves should be counted as three freemen only. The preparation of this

business was in the hands of a committee; they applied to the members

for the best information they could give them of the number of their

States. Some of the States had taken pains to discover their numbers.

Others had done nothing in that way, and, of course, were now where they

were in 1775, when their numbers were first called on to declare their

numbers. Under these circumstances, and on the principle of counting

three-fifths only of the slaves, the committee apportioned the money

among the States, and reported their work to Congress. In this they

had assessed South Carolina as having one hundred and seventy thousand

inhabitants The delegate for that State, however, prevailed on Congress

to assess them on the footing of one hundred and fifty thousand only, in

consideration of the state of total devastation in which the enemy had

left their country. The difference was then laid on the other States,

and the following was the result:--