IMPEACHMENT.
$The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment.--_Const. U. S._ Art. I. Sec. 3.$
* * * * *
$The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When
sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside;
and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
the members present. Judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend
further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States.
But the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.--_Const.
U. S._ Art. I. Sec. 3.
The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United
States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction
of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.--_Const.
U. S._ Art. II. Sec. 4.
The trial of crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury.--_Const. U. S._ Art. III. Sec. 2.$
These are the provisions of the Constitution of the United States on
the subject of impeachments. The following is a sketch on some of the
principles and practices of England on the same subject.
_Jurisdiction._--The Lords cannot impeach any to themselves, nor join in
the accusation, because they are judges.--_Seld. Judic. in Parl._ 12,
63. Nor can they proceed against a commoner, but on complaint of the
Commons.--_Ib._ 84. The Lords may not, by the law, try a commoner for
capital offence, on the information of the King, or a private person;
because the accused is entitled to a trial by his peers generally; but
on accusation by the House of Commons, they may proceed against the
delinquent, of whatsoever degree, and whatsoever be the nature of the
offence; for there they do not assume to themselves trial at common
law. The Commons are then instead of a jury, and the judgment is given
on their demand, which is instead of a verdict. So the Lords do only
judge but not try the delinquent.--_Ib._ 6, 7. But Wooddeson denies that
a commoner can now be charged capitally before the Lords, even by the
Commons; and cites Fitzharris's case, 1681, impeached of high treason,
where the Lords remitted the prosecution to the inferior court.--8
_Grey's Deb._ 325, 6, 7; 2 _Wooddeson_, 601, 576; 3 _Seld._ 1610, 1619,
1641; 4 _Black._ 257; 3 _Seld._ 1604, 1618, 9. 1656.
_Accusation._--The Commons, as the grand inquest of the nation, become
suitors for penal justice.--2 _Woodd._ 597; 6 _Grey_, 356. The general
course is to pass a resolution, containing a criminal charge against
the supposed delinquent, and then to direct some member to impeach him
by oral accusation, at the bar of the House of Lords, in the name of
the Commons. The person signifies, that the articles will be exhibited,
and desires that the delinquent may be sequestered from his seat, or be
committed, or that the Peers will take order for his appearance.--_Sachev.
Trial._ 325; 2 _Woodd._ 602, 605; _Lords' Jour._ 3 June, 1701; 1 _Wms._
616; _Grey_, 324.
_Process._--If the party do not appear, proclamations are to be issued
giving him a day to appear. On their return they are strictly examined.
If any error be found in them, a new proclamation issues, giving a
short day. If he appear not, his goods may be arrested, and they may
proceed.--_Seld. Jud._ 98, 99.
_Articles._--The accusation (article) of the Commons, is substituted
in place of an indictment. Thus, by the usage of Parliament, an
impeachment for writing or speaking the particular words, need not be
specified.--_Sach. Tr._ 325; 2 _Woodd._ 602, 605; _Lords' Journ._ 3
June, 1701; 1 _Wms._ 616.
_Appearance._--If he appears, and the case be capital, he answers
in custody; though not if the accusation be general. He is not to
be committed but on special accusations. If it be for a misdemeanor
only, he answers a Lord in his place, a Commoner at the bar, and not
in custody, unless, on the answer, the Lords find cause to commit him
till he find sureties to attend, and lest he should fly.--_Seld. Jud._
98, 99. A copy of the articles is given him, and a day fixed for his
answer.--_T. Ray_; 1 _Rushw._ 268; _Fost._ 232; 1 _Clar. Hist. of the
Reb._ 379. On a misdemeanor, his appearance may be in person, or he may
answer in writing, or by attorney.--_Seld. Jud._ 100. The general rule
on accusation for a misdemeanor is, that in such a state of liberty or
restraint as the party is when the Commons complain of him, in such he is
to answer. _Seld. Jud._ 101. If previously committed by the Commons, he
answers as a prisoner. But this may be called, in some sort, _judicium
parium suorum_.--_Seld. Jud._ In misdemeanors, the party has a right to
counsel by the common law; but not in capital cases.--_Seld. Jud._ 102-5.
_Answer._--The answer need not observe great strictness of form. He may
plead guilty as to part, and defend as to the residue; or, saving all
exceptions, deny the whole, or give a particular answer to each article
separately.--1 _Rush._ 274; 2 _Rush._ 1374; 12 _Parl. Hist._ 442; 3
_Lords' Journ._ 13 Nov. 1643; 2 _Wood._ 607. But he cannot plead a pardon
in bar to the impeachment.--2 _Wood._ 618; 2 _St. Tr._ 735.
_Replication, rejoinder, &c._--There may be a replication, rejoinder,
&c.--_Seld. Jud._ 114; 8 _Grey's Deb._ 233; _Sach. Tr._ 15; _Journ.
House of Commons_, 6 March, 1640, 1.
_Witnesses._--The practice is to swear the witnesses in open House, and
then examine them there: or a committee may be named, who shall examine
them in committee either on interrogatories agreed on in the House, or
such as the committee, in their discretion, shall demand.--_Seld. Jud._
120, 123.
_Jury._--In the case of Alice Pierce, 1 _R._ 2. a jury was empannelled
for her trial before a committee.--_Seld. Jud._ 123. But this was on
a complaint, not an impeachment by the Commons.--_Seld. Jud._ 163. It
must also have been for a misdemeanor only, as the Lords Spiritual
sat in the case, which they do on misdemeanors, but not in capital
cases.--_Seld. Jud._ 148. The judgment was a forfeiture of all her lands
and goods.--_Seld. Jud._ 188. This, Selden says, is the only jury he
finds recorded in Parliament for misdemeanors; but he makes no doubt
if the delinquent doth put himself on the trial of his country, a jury
ought to be empannelled: and he adds, that it is not so on impeachment
by the Commons; for they are in _oco proprio_, and here no jury ought to
be empannelled.--_Ib._ 124. The Lord Berkley, 6 _E._ 3, was arranged for
the murder of, _L._ 2, on an information on the part of the King, and
not on impeachment of the Commons; for then they had been _patria sua_.
He waived his peerage, and was tried by a jury of Gloucestershire and
Warwickshire.--_Ib._ 125. In one, 1 _H._ 7, the Common protest that they
are not to be considered as parties to any judgment given, or hereafter
to be given in Parliament.--_Ib._ 133. They have been generally, and
more justly considered, as is before stated, as the grand jury. For the
conceit of Selden is certainly not accurate, that they are the _patria
sua_ of the accused, and that the Lords do only judge, but not try. It
is undeniable that they do try. For they examine witnesses as to the
facts, and acquit or condemn according to their own belief of them. And
Lord Hale says, "the Peers are judges of law as well as of fact."--2
_Hale_, _P. C._ 275. Consequently of fact as well as of law.
_Presence of Commons._--The Commons are to be present at the examination
of witnesses.--_Seld. Jud._ 124. Indeed, they are to attend throughout,
either as a committee of the whole House; or otherwise, at discretion,
appoint managers to conduct the proofs.--_Rushw. Tr. of Straff._ 37;
_Com. journ._ 4 Feb. 1709, 10; 2 _Wood._ 614. And judgment is not to
be given till they demand it.--_Seld. Jud._ 124. But they are not to be
present on impeachment when the Lords consider of the answer or proofs,
and determine of their judgment. Their presence, however, is necessary
at the answer and judgment in cases capital.--_Ib._ 58, 159; as well as
not capital, 162. The Lords debate the judgment among themselves. Then
the vote is first taken on the question of guilty or not guilty; and if
they convict, the question, or particular sentence, is out of that which
seemeth to be most generally agreed on.--_Seld. Jud._ 167; 2 _Wood._ 612.
_Judgment._--Judgments in Parliament, for death, have been strictly
guided _per legem terræ_, which they cannot alter; and not at all
according to their discretion. They can neither admit any part of the
legal judgment, nor add to it. Their sentence must be _secundum, non
ultra legem_.--_Seld. Jud._ 168, 169, 170, 171. This trial, though it
varies in external ceremony, yet differs not in essentials from criminal
prosecutions before inferior courts. The same rules of evidence, the
same legal notions of crimes and punishments, prevail. For impeachments
were not framed to alter the law, but to carry it into more effectual
execution against two powerful delinquents. The judgment, therefore, is
to be such as is warranted by legal principles or precedents.--6 _Stra.
Tr._ 14; 2 _Wood._ 611. The Chancellor gives judgments in misdemeanors;
the Lord High Steward, formerly, in cases of life and death.--_Seld.
Jud._ 180. But now the Steward is deemed not necessary.--_Fost._ 144; 1
_Woodd._ 613. In misdemeanors, the greatest corporal punishment hath been
imprisonment.--_Seld. Jud._ 184. The King's assent is necessary in capital
judgments, (but 2 _Woodd._ 614. contra.) but not in misdemeanors.--_Seld.
Jud._ 136.
_Continuance._--An impeachment is not discontinued by the dissolution
of Parliament; but may be resumed by the new Parliament.--_T. Ray._ 383;
5 _Com. jour._ 23 Dec. 1790; _Lord's jour._ May 16, 1791; 2 _Wood._ 618.
FOOTNOTES:
[1]
[JUDGE WYTHE.] PHILADELPHIA,
February 28, 1800.
MY DEAR SIR:--I know how precious your time is, and how
exclusively you devote it to the duties of your office, yet
I venture to ask a few hours or minutes of it on motives of
public service, as well as private friendship. I will explain
the occasion of the application. You recollect enough of
the old Congress to remember that their mode of managing
the business of the House was not only unparliamentary,
but that the forms were so awkward and inconvenient that
it was impossible sometimes to get at the true sense of
the majority. The House of Representatives of the United
States are now pretty much in the same situation. In the
Senate it is in our power to get into a better way; our
ground is this: The Senate have established a few rules
for their government, and have subjected the decisions on
these and on _all other points of order_ without debate,
and without appeal, to the judgment of their President, he,
for his own sake, as well as theirs, must prefer recurring
to some system of rules ready formed; and there can be
no question that the Parliamentary rules are the best
known to us for managing the debates, and obtaining the
sense of a deliberative body. I have therefore made them
my rule of decision, rejecting those of the old Congress
altogether, and it gives entire satisfaction to the Senate;
insomuch that we shall not only have a good system there,
but probably, by the example of its effects, produce a
conformity in the other branch. But in the course of this
business I find perplexities, having for twenty years been
out of deliberative bodies, and become rusty as to many
points of proceeding; and so little has the Parliamentary
branch of the law been attended to, that I not only find
no person here, but not even a book to aid me. I had, at
an early period of life, read a good deal on the subject,
and common-placed what I read. This common-place has been
my pillar; but there are many questions of practice on
which that is silent, some of them are so minute indeed,
and belong too much to every-day's practice, that they
have never been thought worthy of being written down, yet
from desuetude they have slipped my memory. You will see
by the enclosed paper what they are. I know with what pain
you write: therefore I have left a margin in which you
can write a simple negative or affirmative opposite every
position, or perhaps, with as little trouble, correct the
text by striking out or interlining. This is what I have
earnestly to solicit from you, and I would not have given
you the trouble if I had had any other resource. But you
are, in fact, the only spark of Parliamentary science now
remaining to us. I am the more anxious, because I have
been forming a manual of Parliamentary law which I mean to
deposit with the Senate as the standard by which I judge,
and am willing to be judged. Though I should be opposed to
its being printed, yet it may be done perhaps without my
consent; and in that case I should be sorry indeed should it
go out with errors that a Tyro should not have committed.
And yet it is precisely those to which I am most exposed.
I am less afraid as to important matters, because for them
I have printed authorities; but it is those small matters
of daily practice, which twenty years ago were familiar to
me, but have in that time escaped my memory. I hope under
these circumstances you will pardon the trouble I propose
to you in the enclosed paper. I am not pressed in time,
so that your leisure will be sufficient for me. Accept
the salutations of grateful and sincere friendship and
attachment, and many prayers for your health and happiness
from, Dear Sir,
Yours affectionately.
[2] Order of the House of Commons, 1663, July 16.
[3] Elsynge, 217; 1 Hats. 21; 1 Grey's Deb. 133.
[4] In a case of division of the question, and
a decision against striking out, I advance, doubtingly,
the opinion here expressed. I find no authority either
way; and I know it may be viewed under a different aspect.
It may be thought, that having decided separately not to
strike out the passage, the same question for striking
out cannot be put over again, though with a view to a
different insertion. Still I think it more reasonable and
convenient to consider the striking out and insertion as
forming one proposition; but should readily yield to any
evidence that the contrary is the practice in Parliament.
[5] Noes.--9 Grey, 365.
PART V.
THE ANAS.
_Explanation of the three volumes bound in marbled paper._[6]
In these three volumes will be found copies of the official opinions[7]
given in writing by me to General Washington, while I was Secretary
of State, with sometimes the documents belonging to the case. Some of
these are the rough draughts, some press copies, some fair ones. In the
earlier part of my acting in that office, I took no other note of the
passing transactions; but after awhile, I saw the importance of doing
it in aid of my memory. Very often, therefore, I made memorandums on
loose scraps of paper, taken out of my pocket in the moment, and laid
by to be copied fair at leisure, which, however, they hardly ever were.
These scraps, therefore, ragged, rubbed, and scribbled as they were, I
had bound with the others by a binder who came into my cabinet, did it
under my own eye, and without the opportunity of reading a single paper.
At this day, after the lapse of twenty-five years, or more, from their
dates, I have given to the whole a calm revisal, when the passions of
the time are passed away, and the reasons of the transactions act alone
on the judgment. Some of the informations I had recorded, are now cut
out from the rest, because I have seen that they were incorrect, or
doubtful, or merely personal or private, with which we have nothing to
do. I should perhaps have thought the rest not worth preserving, but for
their testimony against the only history of that period, which pretends
to have been compiled from authentic and unpublished documents.
* * * * *
But a short review of facts * * * * * will show, that the contests of
that day were contests of principle, between the advocates of republican,
and those of kingly government, and that had not the former made the
efforts they did, our government would have been, even at this early day,
a very different thing from what the successful issue of those efforts
have made it.
The alliance between the States under the old Articles of Confederation,
for the purpose of joint defence against the aggression of Great Britain,
was found insufficient, as treaties of alliance generally are, to enforce
compliance with their mutual stipulations; and these, once fulfilled,
that bond was to expire of itself, and each State to become sovereign
and independent in all things. Yet it could not but occur to every one,
that these separate independencies, like the petty States of Greece,
would be eternally at war with each other, and would become at length
the mere partisans and satellites of the leading powers of Europe. All
then must have looked forward to some further bond of union, which would
insure eternal peace, and a political system of our own, independent
of that of Europe. Whether all should be consolidated into a single
government, or each remain independent as to internal matters, and the
whole form a single nation as to what was foreign only, and whether that
national government should be a monarchy or republic, would of course
divide opinions, according to the constitutions, the habits, and the
circumstances of each individual. Some officers of the army, as it has
always been said and believed, (and Steuben and Knox have ever been
named as the leading agents,) trained to monarchy by military habits, are
understood to have proposed to General Washington to decide this great
question by the army before its disbandment, and to assume himself the
crown on the assurance of their support. The indignation with which he
is said to have scouted this parricide proposition was equally worthy of
his virtue and wisdom. The next effort was, (on suggestion of the same
individuals, in the moment of their separation,) the establishment of
an hereditary order under the name of the Cincinnati, ready prepared by
that distinction to be ingrafted into the future frame of government,
and placing General Washington still at their head. The General wrote
to me on this subject, while I was in Congress at Annapolis, and an
extract from my letter is inserted in 5th Marshall's history, page 28.
He afterwards called on me at that place on his way to a meeting of the
society, and after a whole evening of consultation, he left that place
fully determined to use all his endeavors for its total suppression. But
he found it so firmly riveted in the affections of the members, that,
strengthened as they happened to be by an adventitious occurrence of the
moment, he could effect no more than the abolition of its hereditary
principle. He called again on his return, and explained to me fully
the opposition which had been made, the effect of the occurrence from
France, and the difficulty with which its duration had been limited to
the lives of the present members. Further details will be found among my
papers, in his and my letters, and some in the Encyclopedie Methodique et
Dictionnaire d'Economie Politique, communicated by myself to M. Meusnier,
its author, who had made the establishment of this society the ground,
in that work, of a libel on our country.
The want of some authority which should procure justice to the public
creditors, and an observance of treaties with foreign nations, produced,
some time after, the call of a convention of the States at Annapolis.
Although, at this meeting, a difference of opinion was evident on the
question of a republican or kingly government, yet, so general through
the States was the sentiment in favor of the former, that the friends
of the latter confined themselves to a course of obstruction only, and
delay, to everything proposed; they hoped, that nothing being done,
and all things going from bad to worse, a kingly government might be
usurped, and submitted to by the people, as better than anarchy and
wars internal and external, the certain consequences of the present
want of a general government. The effect of their manœuvres, with the
defective attendance of Deputies from the States, resulted in the measure
of calling a more general convention, to be held at Philadelphia. At
this, the same party exhibited the same practices, and with the same
views of preventing a government of concord, which they foresaw would be
republican, and of forcing through anarchy their way to monarchy. But
the mass of that convention was too honest, too wise, and too steady,
to be baffled and misled by their manœuvres. One of these was a form of
government proposed by Colonel Hamilton, which would have been in fact
a compromise between the two parties of royalism and republicanism.
According to this, the executive and one branch of the legislature were
to be during good behavior, _i. e._ for life, and the governors of the
States were to be named by these two permanent organs. This, however,
was rejected; on which Hamilton left the convention, as desperate, and
never returned again until near its final conclusion. These opinions and
efforts, secret or avowed, of the advocates for monarchy, had begotten
great jealousy through the States generally; and this jealousy it was
which excited the strong opposition to the conventional constitution;
a jealousy which yielded at last only to a general determination to
establish certain amendments as barriers against a government either
monarchical or consolidated. In what passed through the whole period
of these conventions, I have gone on the information of those who were
members of them, being absent myself on my mission to France.
I returned from that mission in the first year of the new government,
having landed in Virginia in December, 1789, and proceeded to New
York in March, 1790, to enter on the office of Secretary of State.
Here, certainly, I found a state of things which, of all I had ever
contemplated, I the least expected. I had left France in the first year of
her revolution, in the fervor of natural rights, and zeal for reformation.
My conscientious devotion to these rights could not be heightened, but it
had been aroused and excited by daily exercise. The President received
me cordially, and my colleagues and the circle of principal citizens
apparently with welcome. The courtesies of dinner parties given me, as a
stranger newly arrived among them, placed me at once in their familiar
society. But I cannot describe the wonder and mortification with which
the table conversations filled me. Politics were the chief topic, and a
preference of kingly over republican government was evidently the favorite
sentiment. An apostate I could not be, nor yet a hypocrite; and I found
myself, for the most part, the only advocate on the republican side of
the question, unless among the guests there chanced to be some member of
that party from the legislative Houses. Hamilton's financial system had
then passed. It had two objects; 1st, as a puzzle, to exclude popular
understanding and inquiry; 2d, as a machine for the corruption of the
legislature; for he avowed the opinion, that man could be governed by
one of two motives only, force or interest; force, he observed, in this
country was out of the question, and the interests, therefore, of the
members must be laid hold of, to keep the legislative in unison with
the executive. And with grief and shame it must be acknowledged that
his machine was not without effect; that even in this, the birth of our
government, some members were found sordid enough to bend their duty to
their interests, and to look after personal rather than public good.
It is well known that during the war the greatest difficulty we
encountered was the want of money or means to pay our soldiers who
fought, or our farmers, manufacturers and merchants, who furnished the
necessary supplies of food and clothing for them. After the expedient of
paper money had exhausted itself, certificates of debt were given to the
individual creditors, with assurance of payment so soon as the United
States should be able. But the distresses of these people often obliged
them to part with these for the half, the fifth, and even a tenth of
their value; and speculators had made a trade of cozening them from the
holders by the most fraudulent practices, and persuasions that they would
never be paid. In the bill for funding and paying these, Hamilton made
no difference between the original holders and the fraudulent purchasers
of this paper. Great and just repugnance arose at putting these two
classes of creditors on the same footing, and great exertions were used
to pay the former the full value, and to the latter, the price only
which they had paid, with interest. But this would have prevented the
game which was to be played, and for which the minds of greedy members
were already tutored and prepared. When the trial of strength on these
several efforts had indicated the form in which the bill would finally
pass, this being known within doors sooner than without, and especially,
than to those who were in distant parts of the Union, the base scramble
began. Couriers and relay horses by land, and swift sailing pilot boats
by sea, were flying in all directions. Active partners and agents were
associated and employed in every State, town, and country neighborhood,
and this paper was bought up at five shillings, and even as low as two
shillings in the pound, before the holder knew that Congress had already
provided for its redemption at par. Immense sums were thus filched
from the poor and ignorant, and fortunes accumulated by those who had
themselves been poor enough before. Men thus enriched by the dexterity
of a leader, would follow of course the chief who was leading them to
fortune, and become the zealous instruments of all his enterprises.
This game was over, and another was on the carpet at the moment of
my arrival; and to this I was most ignorantly and innocently made to
hold the candle. This fiscal manœuvre is well known by the name of
the Assumption. Independently of the debts of Congress, the States had
during the war contracted separate and heavy debts; and Massachusetts
particularly, in an absurd attempt, absurdly conducted, on the British
post of Penobscot: and the more debt Hamilton could rake up, the more
plunder for his mercenaries. This money, whether wisely or foolishly
spent, was pretended to have been spent for general purposes, and ought,
therefore, to be paid from the general purse. But it was objected, that
nobody knew what these debts were, what their amount, or what their
proofs. No matter; we will guess them to be twenty millions. But of
these twenty millions, we do not know how much should be reimbursed
to one State, or how much to another. No matter; we will guess. And
so another scramble was set on foot among the several States, and some
got much, some little, some nothing. But the main object was obtained,
the phalanx of the Treasury was reinforced by additional recruits. This
measure produced the most bitter and angry contest ever known in Congress,
before or since the Union of the States. I arrived in the midst of it.
But a stranger to the ground, a stranger to the actors on it, so long
absent as to have lost all familiarity with the subject, and as yet
unaware of its object, I took no concern in it. The great and trying
question, however, was lost in the House of Representatives. So high were
the feuds excited by this subject, that on its rejection business was
suspended. Congress met and adjourned from day to day without doing any
thing, the parties being too much out of temper to do business together.
The eastern members particularly, who, with Smith from South Carolina,
were the principal gamblers in these scenes, threatened a secession and
dissolution. Hamilton was in despair. As I was going to the President's
one day, I met him in the street. He walked me backwards and forwards
before the President's door for half an hour. He painted pathetically
the temper into which the legislature had been wrought; the disgust of
those who were called the creditor States; the danger of the _secession_
of their members, and the separation of the States. He observed that
the members of the administration ought to act in concert; that though
this question was not of my department, yet a common duty should make
it a common concern; that the President was the centre on which all
administrative questions ultimately rested, and that all of us should
rally around him, and support, with joint efforts, measures approved by
him; and that the question having been lost by a small majority only, it
was probable that an appeal from me to the judgment and discretion of
some of my friends, might effect a change in the vote, and the machine
of government, now suspended, might be again set into motion. I told
him that I was really a stranger to the whole subject; that not having
yet informed myself of the system of finances adopted, I knew not how
far this was a necessary sequence; that undoubtedly, if its rejection
endangered a dissolution of our Union at this incipient stage, I should
deem that the most unfortunate of all consequences, to avert which
all partial and temporary evils should be yielded. I proposed to him,
however, to dine with me the next day, and I would invite another friend
or two, bring them into conference together, and I thought it impossible
that reasonable men, consulting together coolly, could fail, by some
mutual sacrifices of opinion, to form a compromise which was to save
the Union. The discussion took place. I could take no part in it but an
exhortatory one, because I was a stranger to the circumstances which
should govern it. But it was finally agreed, that whatever importance
had been attached to the rejection of this proposition, the preservation
of the Union and of concord among the States was more important, and
that therefore it would be better that the vote of rejection should be
rescinded, to effect which, some members should change their votes. But
it was observed that this pill would be peculiarly bitter to the southern
States, and that some concomitant measure should be adopted, to sweeten
it a little to them. There had before been propositions to fix the seat
of government either at Philadelphia, or at Georgetown on the Potomac;
and it was thought that by giving it to Philadelphia for ten years, and
to Georgetown permanently afterwards, this might, as an anodyne, calm
in some degree the ferment which might be excited by the other measure
alone. So two of the Potomac members (White and Lee, but White with a
revulsion of stomach almost convulsive,) agreed to change their votes,
and Hamilton undertook to carry the other point. In doing this, the
influence he had established over the eastern members, with the agency
of Robert Morris with those of the middle States, effected his side of
the engagement; and so the Assumption was passed, and twenty millions
of stock divided among favored States, and thrown in as a pabulum to the
stockjobbing herd. This added to the number of votaries to the Treasury,
and made its chief the master of every vote in the legislature, which
might give to the government the direction suited to his political views.
I know well, and so must be understood, that nothing like a majority in
Congress had yielded to this corruption. Far from it. But a division,
not very unequal, had already taken place in the honest part of that
body, between the parties styled republican and federal. The latter being
monarchists in principle, adhered to Hamilton of course, as their leader
in that principle, and this mercenary phalanx added to them, insured him
always a majority in both Houses: so that the whole action of legislature
was now under the direction of the Treasury. Still the machine was not
complete. The effect of the funding system, and of the Assumption, would
be temporary; it would be lost with the loss of the individual members
whom it has enriched, and some engine of influence more permanent must be
contrived, while these myrmidons were yet in place to carry it through
all opposition. This engine was the Bank of the United States. All that
history is known, so I shall say nothing about it. While the government
remained at Philadelphia, a selection of members of both Houses were
constantly kept as directors who, on every question interesting to that
institution, or to the views of the federal head, voted at the will of
that head; and, together with the stockholding members, could always make
the federal vote that of the majority. By this combination, legislative
expositions were given to the constitution, and all the administrative
laws were shaped on the model of England, and so passed. And from this
influence we were not relieved, until the removal from the precincts of
the bank, to Washington.
Here then was the real ground of the opposition which was made to the
course of administration. Its object was to preserve the legislature
pure and independent of the executive, to restrain the administration
to republican forms and principles, and not permit the constitution to
be construed into a monarchy, and to be warped, in practice, into all
the principles and pollutions of their favorite English model. Nor was
this an opposition to General Washington. He was true to the republican
charge confided to him; and has solemnly and repeatedly protested to me,
in our conversations, that he would lose the last drop of his blood in
support of it; and he did this the oftener and with the more earnestness,
because he knew my suspicions of Hamilton's designs against it, and wished
to quiet them. For he was not aware of the drift, or of the effect of
Hamilton's schemes. Unversed in financial projects and calculations and
budgets, his approbation of them was bottomed on his confidence in the
man.
But Hamilton was not only a monarchist, but for a monarchy bottomed on
corruption. In proof of this, I will relate an anecdote, for the truth of
which I attest the God who made me. Before the President set out on his
southern tour in April, 1791, he addressed a letter of the fourth of that
month, from Mount Vernon, to the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War,
desiring that if any serious and important cases should arise during his
absence, they would consult and act on them. And he requested that the
Vice President should also be consulted. This was the only occasion on
which that officer was ever requested to take part in a cabinet question.
Some occasion for consultation arising, I invited those gentlemen (and
the Attorney General, as well as I remember,) to dine with me, in order
to confer on the subject. After the cloth was removed, and our question
agreed and dismissed, conversation began on other matters, and by some
circumstance, was led to the British constitution, on which Mr. Adams
observed, "purge that constitution of its corruption, and give to its
popular branch equality of representation, and it would be the most
perfect constitution ever devised by the wit of man." Hamilton paused and
said, "purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality
of representation, and it would become an _impracticable_ government:
as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it is the most
perfect government which ever existed." And this was assuredly the exact
line which separated the political creeds of these two gentlemen. The one
was for two hereditary branches and an honest elective one: the other,
for an hereditary King, with a House of Lords and Commons corrupted to
his will, and standing between him and the people. Hamilton was, indeed,
a singular character. Of acute understanding, disinterested, honest,
and honorable in all private transactions, amiable in society, and duly
valuing virtue in private life, yet so bewitched and perverted by the
British example, as to be under thorough conviction that corruption was
essential to the government of a nation. Mr. Adams had originally been
a republican. The glare of royalty and nobility, during his mission to
England, had made him believe their fascination a necessary ingredient
in government; and Shay's rebellion, not sufficiently understood where he
then was, seemed to prove that the absence of want and oppression, was not
a sufficient guarantee of order. His book on the American constitutions
having made known his political bias, he was taken up by the monarchical
federalists in his absence, and on his return to the United States, he
was by them made to believe that the general disposition of our citizens
was favorable to monarchy. He here wrote his Davila, as a supplement to
a former work, and his election to the Presidency confirmed him in his
errors. Innumerable addresses too, artfully and industriously poured in
upon him, deceived him into a confidence that he was on the pinnacle of
popularity, when the gulf was yawning at his feet, which was to swallow
up him and his deceivers. For when General Washington was withdrawn,
these _energumeni_ of royalism, kept in check hitherto by the dread
of his honesty, his firmness, his patriotism, and the authority of his
name, now mounted on the car of State and free from control, like Phaeton
on that of the sun, drove headlong and wild, looking neither to right
nor left, nor regarding anything but the objects they were driving at;
until, displaying these fully, the eyes of the nation were opened, and
a general disbandment of them from the public councils took place.
Mr. Adams, I am sure, has been long since convinced of the treacheries
with which he was surrounded during his administration. He has since
thoroughly seen, that his constituents were devoted to republican
government, and whether his judgment is re-settled on its ancient basis,
or not, he is conformed as a good citizen to the will of the majority,
and would now, I am persuaded, maintain its republican structure with
the zeal and fidelity belonging to his character. For even an enemy
has said, "he is always an honest man, and often a great one." But in
the fervor of the fury and follies of those who made him their stalking
horse, no man who did not witness it can form an idea of their unbridled
madness, and the terrorism with which they surrounded themselves. The
horrors of the French revolution, then raging, aided them mainly, and
using that as a raw head and bloody bones, they were enabled by their
stratagems of X. Y. Z. in which * * * * * was a leading mountebank, their
tales of tub-plots, ocean massacres, bloody buoys, and pulpit lyings
and slanderings, and maniacal ravings of their Gardeners, their Osgoods
and parishes, to spread alarm into all but the firmest breasts. Their
Attorney General had the impudence to say to a republican member, that
deportation must be resorted to, of which, said he, "you republicans
have set the example;" thus daring to identify us with the murderous
Jacobins of France. These transactions, now recollected but as dreams
of the night, were then sad realities; and nothing rescued us from
their liberticide effect, but the unyielding opposition of those firm
spirits who sternly maintained their post in defiance of terror, until
their fellow citizens could be aroused to their own danger, and rally
and rescue the standard of the constitution. This has been happily done.
Federalism and monarchism have languished from that moment, until their
treasonable combinations with the enemies of their country during the
late war, their plots of dismembering the Union, and their Hartford
convention, have consigned them to the tomb of the dead; and I fondly
hope, "we may now truly say, we are all republicans, all federalists,"
and that the motto of the standard to which our country will forever
rally, will be, "federal union, and republican government;" and sure I
am we may say, that we are indebted for the preservation of this point
of ralliance, to that opposition of which so injurious an idea is so
artfully insinuated and excited in this history.
Much of this relation is notorious to the world; and many intimate proofs
of it will be found in these notes. From the moment where they end, of my
retiring from the administration, the federalists[8] got unchecked hold
of General Washington. His memory was already sensibly impaired by age,
the firm tone of mind for which he had been remarkable, was beginning
to relax, its energy was abated, a listlessness of labor, a desire for
tranquillity had crept on him, and a willingness to let others act,
and even think for him. Like the rest of mankind, he was disgusted with
atrocities of the French revolution, and was not sufficiently aware of
the difference between the rabble who were used as instruments of their
perpetration, and the steady and rational character of the American
people, in which he had not sufficient confidence. The opposition too of
the republicans to the British treaty, and the zealous support of the
federalists in that unpopular but favorite measure of theirs, had made
him all their own. Understanding, moreover, that I disapproved of that
treaty, and copiously nourished with falsehoods by a malignant neighbor
of mine, who ambitioned to be his correspondent, he had become alienated
from myself personally, as from the republican body generally of his
fellow-citizens; and he wrote the letters to Mr. Adams and Mr. Carroll,
over which, in devotion to his imperishable fame, we must forever weep
as monuments of mortal decay.
February 4th, 1818.
* * * * *
August the 13th, 1791. Notes of a conversation between Alexander
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Th: Jefferson mentioned to him a letter
received from John Adams, disavowing Publicola, and denying that he ever
entertained a wish to bring this country under an hereditary executive,
or introduce an hereditary branch of Legislature, &c. See his letter.
Alexander Hamilton condemning Mr. Adams' writings, and most particularly
Davila, as having a tendency to weaken the present government, declared
in substance as follows: "I own it is my own opinion, though I do not
publish it in Dan or Bersheba, that the present government is not that
which will answer the ends of society, by giving stability and protection
to its rights, and that it will probably be found expedient to go into
the British form. However, since we have undertaken the experiment, I
am for giving it a fair course, whatever my expectations may be. The
success, indeed, so far, is greater than I had expected, and therefore,
at present, success seems more possible than it had done heretofore,
and there are still other and other stages of improvement which, if the
present does not succeed, may be tried, and ought to be tried, before
we give up the republican form altogether; for that mind must be really
depraved, which would not prefer the equality of political rights,
which is the foundation of pure republicanism, if it can be obtained
consistently with order. Therefore, whoever by his writings disturbs the
present order of things, is really blameable, however pure his intentions
may be, and he was sure Mr. Adams' were pure." This is the substance
of a declaration made in much more lengthy terms, and which seemed to
be more formal than usual for a private conversation between two, and
as if intended to qualify some less guarded expressions which had been
dropped on former occasions. Th: Jefferson has committed it to writing
in the moment of A. Hamilton's leaving the room.
* * * * *
December the 25th, 1791, Colonel Gunn (of Georgia) dining the other
day with Colonel Hamilton, said to him, with that plain freedom he
is known to use, "I wish, Sir, you would advise your friend King, to
observe some kind of consistency in his votes. There has been scarcely a
question before the Senate on which he has not voted both ways. On the
representation bill, for instance, he first voted for the proposition
of the Representatives, and ultimately voted against it." "Why," says
Colonel Hamilton, "I'll tell you as to that, Colonel Gunn, that it never
was intended that bill should pass." Gunn told this to Butler, who told
it to Th: Jefferson.
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT.
February the 28th, 1792. I was to have been with him long enough before
three o'clock, (which was the hour and day he received visits,) to have
opened to him a proposition for doubling the velocity of the post riders,
who now travel about fifty miles a day, and might, without difficulty,
go one hundred, and for taking measures (by way bills) to know where
the delay is, when there is any. I was delayed by business, so as to
have scarcely time to give him the outlines. I run over them rapidly,
and observed afterwards, that I had hitherto never spoken to him on the
subject of the post office, not knowing whether it was considered as a
revenue law, or a law for the general accommodation of the citizens: that
the law just passed seemed to have removed the doubt, by declaring that
the whole profits of the office should be applied to extending the posts,
and that even the past profits should be refunded by the treasury for
the same purpose: that I therefore conceive it was now in the department
of the Secretary of State: that I thought it would be advantageous so
to declare it for another reason, to wit: that the department of the
Treasury possessed already such an influence as to swallow up the whole
executive powers, and that even the future Presidents (not supported by
the weight of character which himself possessed,) would not be able to
make head against this department. That in urging this measure I had
certainly no personal interest, since, if I was supposed to have any
appetite for power, yet as my career would certainly be exactly as short
as his own, the intervening time was too short to be an object. My real
wish was to avail the public of every occasion, during the residue of
the President's period, to place things on a safe footing. He was now
called on to attend his company, and he desired me to come and breakfast
with him the next morning.
February the 29th. I did so; and after breakfast we retired to his room,
and I unfolded my plan for the post office, and after such an approbation
of it as he usually permitted himself on the first presentment of any
idea, and desiring me to commit it to writing, he, during that pause of
conversation which follows a business closed, said in an affectionate
tone, that he had felt much concern at an expression which dropped from
me yesterday, and which marked my intention of retiring when he should.
That as to himself, many motives obliged him to it. He had, through
the whole course of the war, and most particularly at the close of it,
uniformly declared his resolution to retire from public affairs, and
never to act in any public office; that he had retired under that firm
resolution: that the government, however, which had been formed, being
found evidently too inefficacious, and it being supposed that his aid
was of some consequence towards bringing the people to consent to one
of sufficient efficacy for their own good, he consented to come into the
convention, and on the same motive, after much pressing, to take a part in
the new government, and get it under way. That were he to continue longer,
it might give room to say, that having tasted the sweets of office, he
could not do without them: that he really felt himself growing old, his
bodily health less firm, his memory, always bad, becoming worse, and
perhaps the other faculties of his mind showing a decay to others of which
he was insensible himself; that this apprehension particularly oppressed
him: that he found, moreover, his activity lessened, business therefore
more irksome, and tranquility and retirement become an irresistible
passion. That however he felt himself obliged, for these reasons, to
retire from the government, yet he should consider it as unfortunate,
if that should bring on the retirement of the great officers of the
government, and that this might produce a shock on the public mind of
dangerous consequence.
I told him that no man had ever had less desire of entering into public
offices than myself; that the circumstance of a perilous war, which
brought every thing into danger, and called for all the services which
every citizen could render, had induced me to undertake the administration
of the government of Virginia; that I had both before and after refused
repeated appointments of Congress to go abroad in that sort of office,
which, if I had consulted my own gratification, would almost have been
the most agreeable to me; that at the end of two years, I resigned the
government of Virginia, and retired with a firm resolution never more to
appear in public life; that a domestic loss, however, happened, and made
me fancy that absence and a change of scene for a time might be expedient
for me; that I therefore accepted a foreign appointment, limited to two
years; that at the close of that, Doctor Franklin having left France,
I was appointed to supply his place, which I had accepted, and though
I continued in it three or four years, it was under the constant idea
of remaining only a year or two longer; that the revolution in France
coming on, I had so interested myself in the event of that, that when
obliged to bring my family home, I had still an idea of returning and
awaiting the close of that, to fix the era of my final retirement; that
on my arrival here I found he had appointed me to my present office;
that he knew I had not come into it without some reluctance; that it
was, on my part, a sacrifice of inclination to the opinion that I might
be more serviceable here than in France, and with a firm resolution in
my mind, to indulge my constant wish for retirement at no very distant
day; that when, therefore, I had received his letter, written from Mount
Vernon, on his way to Carolina and Georgia, (April the 1st, 1791) and
discovered, from an expression in that, that he meant to retire from
the government ere long, and as to the precise epoch there could be no
doubt, my mind was immediately made up; to make that the epoch of my
own retirement from those labors of which I was heartily tired. That,
however, I did not believe there was any idea in any of my brethren in
the administration of retiring; that on the contrary, I had perceived at
a late meeting of the trustees of the sinking fund, that the Secretary
of the Treasury had developed the plan he intended to pursue, and that
it embraced years in its view.
He said, that he considered the Treasury department as a much more
limited one, going only to the single object of revenue, while
that of the Secretary of State, embracing nearly all the objects of
administration, was much more important, and the retirement of the officer
therefore, would be more noticed: that though the government had set
out with a pretty general good will of the public, yet that symptoms of
dissatisfaction had lately shown themselves far beyond what he could have
expected, and to what height these might arise, in case of too great a
change in the administration, could not be foreseen.
I told him, that in my opinion, there was only a single source of these
discontents. Though they had indeed appeared to spread themselves over
the War department also, yet I considered that as an overflowing only
from their real channel, which would never have taken place, if they
had not first been generated in another department, to wit, that of
the Treasury. That a system had there been contrived, for deluging the
States with paper money instead of gold and silver, for withdrawing our
citizens from the pursuits of commerce, manufactures, buildings, and other
branches of useful industry, to occupy themselves and their capitals in
a species of gambling, destructive of morality, and which had introduced
its poison into the government itself. That it was a fact, as certainly
known as that he and I were then conversing, that particular members
of the legislature, while those laws were on the carpet, had feathered
their nests with paper, had then voted for the laws, and constantly
since lent all the energy of their talents, and instrumentality of
their offices, to the establishment and enlargement of this system; that
they had chained it about our necks for a great length of time, and in
order to keep the game in their hands had, from time to time, aided in
making such legislative constructions of the constitution, as made it
a very different thing from what the people thought they had submitted
to; that they had now brought forward a proposition far beyond any one
ever yet advanced, and to which the eyes of many were turned, as the
decision which was to let us know, whether we live under a limited or
an unlimited government. He asked me to what proposition I alluded? I
answered, to that in the report on manufactures, which, under color of
giving _bounties_ for the encouragement of particular manufactures, meant
to establish the doctrine, that the power given by the constitution to
collect taxes to provide for the _general welfare_ of the United States,
permitted Congress to take everything under their management which _they_
should deem for the _public welfare_, and which is susceptible of the
application of money; consequently, that the subsequent enumeration of
their powers was not the description to which resort must be had, and
did not at all constitute the limits of their authority; that this was
a very different question from that of the bank, which was thought an
incident to an enumerated power; that, therefore, this decision was
expected with great anxiety; that, indeed, I hoped the proposition would
be rejected, believing there was a majority in both Houses against it,
and that if it should be, it would be considered as a proof that things
were returning into their true channel; and that, at any rate, I looked
forward to the broad representation which would shortly take place,
for keeping the general constitution on its true ground; and that this
would remove a great deal of the discontent which had shown itself. The
conversation ended with this last topic. It is here stated nearly as
much at length as it really was; the expressions preserved where I could
recollect them, and their substance always faithfully stated.
March 1, 1792.
* * * * *
On the 2d of January, 1792, Messrs. Fitzsimmons and Gerry (among others)
dined with me. These two staid, with a Mr. Larned of Connecticut,
after the company was gone. We got on the subject of references by the
legislature to the Heads of departments, considering their mischief in
every direction. Gerry and Fitzsimmons clearly opposed to them.
Two days afterwards (January the 4th), Mr. Bourne from Rhode Island
presented a memorial from his State, complaining of inequality in the
Assumption, and moved to refer it to the Secretary of the Treasury.
Fitzsimmons, Gerry and others opposed it; but it was carried.
January the 19th. Fitzsimmons moved, that the _President of the United
States_ be requested to direct the Secretary of the Treasury, to
lay before the House information to enable the legislature to judge
of the additional revenue necessary on the increase of the military
establishment. The House, on debate, struck out the words, "President
of the United States."
March the 7th. The subject resumed. An animated debate took place on the
tendency of references to the Heads of departments; and it seemed that a
great majority would be against it; the House adjourned. Treasury greatly
alarmed, and much industry supposed to be used before next morning,
when it was brought on again, and debated through the day, and on the
question, the Treasury carried it by thirty-one to twenty-seven; but
deeply wounded, since it was seen that all Pennsylvania, except Jacobs,
voted against the reference; that Tucker of South Carolina voted for it,
and Sumpter absented himself, debauched for the moment only, because of
the connection of the question with a further Assumption which South
Carolina favored; but showing that they never were to be counted on
among the Treasury votes. Some others absented themselves. Gerry changed
sides. On the whole, it showed that Treasury influence was tottering.
Committed to writing this 10th of March, 1792.
* * * * *
March the 11th, 1792. Consulted verbally by the President, on whom a
committee of the Senate (Izard, Morris, and King) are to wait to-morrow
morning, to know whether he will think it proper to redeem our Algerine
captives, and make a treaty with the Algerines, on the single vote of
the Senate, without taking that of the Representatives.
My opinions run on the following heads:
We must go to Algiers with cash in our hands. Where shall we get it? By
loan? By converting money now in the treasury?
Probably a loan might be obtained on the President's authority; but as
this could not be repaid without a subsequent act of legislature, the
Representatives might refuse it. So if money in the treasury be converted,
they may refuse to sanction it.
The subsequent approbation of the Senate being necessary to validate a
treaty, they expect to be consulted beforehand, if the case admits.
So the subsequent act of the Representatives being necessary where money
is given, why should not they expect to be consulted in like manner, when
the case admits. A treaty is a law of the land. But prudence will point
out this difference to be attended to in making them; viz. where a treaty
contains such articles only as will go into execution of themselves, or
be carried into execution by the judges, they may be safely made; but
where there are articles which require a law to be passed afterwards by
the legislature, great caution is requisite.
For example; the consular convention with France required a very small
legislative regulation. This convention was unanimously ratified by the
Senate. Yet the same identical men threw by the law to enforce it at
the last session, and the Representatives at this session have placed it
among the laws which they may take up or not, at their own convenience,
as if that was a higher motive than the public faith.
Therefore, against hazarding this transaction without the sanction of
both Houses.
The President concurred. The Senate express the motive for this
proposition, to be a fear that the Representatives would not keep the
secret. He has no opinion of the secrecy of the Senate. In this very
case, Mr. Izard made the communication to him, sitting next to him at
table, on one hand, while a lady (Mrs. McLane) was on his other hand,
and the French minister next to her; and as Mr. Izard got on with his
communication, his voice kept rising, and his stutter bolting the words
out loudly at intervals, so that the minister might hear if he would.
He said he had a great mind at one time to have got up, in order to put
a stop to Mr. Izard.
* * * * *
March the 11th, 1792. Mr. Sterret tells me, that sitting round a fire
the other day with four or five others, [Mr. Smith of South Carolina
was one], somebody mentioned that the murderers of Hogeboom, sheriff of
Columbia county, New York, were acquitted. "Aye," says Smith, "this is
what comes of your damned _trial by jury_."
* * * * *
1791. Towards the latter end of November, Hamilton had drawn Ternant into
a conversation on the subject of the treaty of commerce recommended by
the National Assembly of France to be negotiated with us, and, as he had
no ready instructions on the subject, he led him into a proposal that
Ternant should take the thing up as a volunteer with me, that we should
arrange conditions, and let them go for confirmation or refusal. Hamilton
communicated this to the President, who came into it, and proposed it to
me. I disapproved of it, observing, that such a volunteer project would
be binding on us, and not them; that it would enable them to find out
how far we would go, and avail themselves of it. However, the President
thought it worth trying, and I acquiesced. I prepared a plan of treaty
for exchanging the privileges of native subjects, and fixing all duties
forever as they now stood. Hamilton did not like this way of fixing the
duties, because, he said, many articles here would bear to be raised,
and therefore, he would prepare a tariff. He did so, raising duties for
the French, from twenty-five to fifty per cent. So they were to give
us the privileges of native subjects, and we, as a compensation, were
to make them pay higher duties. Hamilton, having made his arrangements
with Hammond to pretend that though he had no powers to conclude a
treaty of commerce, yet his general commission authorized him to enter
into the discussion of one, then proposed to the President at one of
our meetings, that the business should be taken up with Hammond in the
same informal way. I now discovered the trap which he had laid, by first
getting the President into that step with Ternant. I opposed the thing
warmly. Hamilton observed, if we did it with Ternant we should also
with Hammond. The President thought this reasonable. I desired him to
recollect, I had been against it with Ternant, and only acquiesced under
his opinion. So the matter went off as to both. His scheme evidently
was, to get us engaged first with Ternant, merely that he might have
a pretext to engage us on the same ground with Hammond, taking care,
at the same time, by an extravagant tariff, to render it impossible we
should come to any conclusion with Ternant: probably meaning, at the same
time, to propose terms so favorable to Great Britain, as would attach
us to that country by treaty. On one of those occasions he asserted,
that our commerce with Great Britain and her colonies was put on a much
more favorable footing than with France and her colonies. I therefore
prepared the tabular comparative view of the footing of our commerce
with those nations, which see among my papers. See also my project of
a treaty and Hamilton's tariff.
Committed to writing March the 11th, 1792.
* * * * *
It was observable, that whenever, at any of our consultations, anything
was proposed as to Great Britain, Hamilton had constantly ready something
which Mr. Hammond had communicated to him, which suited the subject and
proved the intimacy of their communications; insomuch, that I believe
he communicated to Hammond all our views, and knew from him, in return,
the views of the British court. Many evidences of this occurred; I will
state some. I delivered to the President my report of instructions
for Carmichael and Short, on the subject of navigation, boundary and
commerce, and desired him to submit it to Hamilton. Hamilton made several
just criticisms on different parts of it. But where I asserted that the
United States had no right to alienate an inch of the territory of any
State, he attacked and denied the doctrine. See my report, his note, and
my answer. A few days after came to hand Kirkland's letter, informing
us that the British, at Niagara, expected to run a new line between
themselves and us; and the reports of Pond and Stedman, informing us it
was understood at Niagara, that Captain Stevenson had been sent here by
Simcoe to settle that plan with Hammond. Hence Hamilton's attack of the
principle I had laid down, in order to prepare the way for this new line.
See minute of March the 9th. Another proof. At one of our consultations,
about the last of December, I mentioned that I wished to give in my
report on commerce, in which I could not avoid recommending a commercial
retaliation against Great Britain. Hamilton opposed it violently; and
among other arguments, observed, that it was of more importance to us
to have the posts than to commence a commercial war; that this, and
this alone, would free us from the expense of the Indian wars; that it
would therefore be the height of imprudence in us, while treating for
the surrender of the posts, to engage in anything which would irritate
them; that if we did so, they would naturally say, "these people mean
war, let us therefore hold what we have in our hands." This argument
struck me forcibly, and I said, "if there is a hope of obtaining the
posts, I agree it would be imprudent to risk that hope by a commercial
retaliation. I will, therefore, wait till Mr. Hammond gives me in his
assignment of breaches, and if that gives a glimmering of hope that they
mean to surrender the posts, I will not give in my report till the next
session." Now, Hammond had received my assignment of breaches on the
15th of December, and about the 22d or 23d had made me an apology for
not having been able to send me his counter-assignment of breaches; but
in terms which showed I might expect it in a few days. From the moment
it escaped my lips in the presence of Hamilton, that I would not give in
my report till I should see Hammond's counter-complaint, and judge if
there was a hope of the posts, Hammond never said a word to me on any
occasion, as to the time he should be ready. At length the President
got out of patience, and insisted I should jog him. This I did on the
21st of February, at the President's assembly: he immediately promised
I should have it in a few days, and accordingly, on the 5th of March I
received it.
Written March the 11th, 1792.
* * * * *
March the 12th, 1792. Sent for by the President, and desired to bring
the letter he had signed to the King of France. Went. He said the House
of Representatives had, on Saturday, taken up the communication he had
made of the King's letter to him, and come to a vote in their own name;
that he did not expect this when he sent this message and the letter,
otherwise he would have sent the message without the letter, as I had
proposed. That he apprehended the legislature would be endeavoring to
invade the executive. I told him, I had understood the House had resolved
to request him to join their congratulations to his on the completion
and acceptance of the constitution; on which part of the vote, there
were only two dissentients, (Barnwell and Benson;) that the vote was
thirty-five to sixteen on that part which expressed an approbation of
the wisdom of the constitution; that in the letter he had signed, I had
avoided saying a word in approbation of the constitution, not knowing
whether the King, in his heart, approved it. Why, indeed, says he, I
begin to doubt very much of the affairs of France; there are papers from
London as late as the 10th of January, which represent them as going
into confusion. He read over the letter he had signed, found there was
not a word which could commit his judgment about the constitution, and
gave it to me back again. This is one of many proofs I have had, of his
want of confidence in the event of the French revolution. The fact is,
that Governeur Morris, a high-flying monarchy man, shutting his eyes and
his faith to every fact against his wishes, and believing everything he
desires to be true, has kept the President's mind constantly poisoned
with his forebodings. That the President wishes the revolution may be
established, I believe from several indications. I remember, when I
received the news of the King's flight and capture, I first told him of
it at his assembly. I never saw him so much dejected by any event in my
life. He expressed clearly, on this occasion, his disapprobation of the
legislature referring things to the Heads of departments.
Written March the 12th.
* * * * *
_Eodem die._ Ten o'clock, A. M. The preceding was about nine o'clock.
The President now sends Lear to me, to ask what answer he shall give
to the committee, and particularly, whether he shall add to it, that,
"in making the communication, it was not his expectation that the House
should give any answer." I told Mr. Lear that I thought the House had
a right, independently of legislation, to express sentiments on other
subjects. That when these subjects did not belong to any other branch
particularly, they would publish them by their own authority; that in
the present case, which respected a foreign nation, the President being
the organ of our nation with other nations, the House would satisfy
their duty, if, instead of a direct communication, they should pass
their sentiments through the President; that if expressing a sentiment
were really an invasion of the executive power, it was so faint a one,
that it would be difficult to demonstrate it to the public, and to a
public partial to the French revolution, and not disposed to consider
the approbation of it from any quarter as improper. That the Senate,
indeed, had given many indications of their wish to invade the executive
power: the Representatives had done it in one case, which was indeed
mischievous and alarming; that of giving orders to the Heads of the
executive departments, without consulting the President; but that the
late vote for directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report ways
and means, though carried, was carried by so small a majority, and
with the aid of members so notoriously under a local influence on that
question, as to give a hope that the practice would be arrested, and
the constitutional course be taken up, of asking the President to have
information laid before them. But that in the present instance, it was
so far from being clearly an invasion of the executive, and would be
so little approved by the general voice, that I could not advise the
President to express any dissatisfaction at the vote of the House; and
I gave Lear, in writing, what I thought should be his answers. See it.
* * * * *
March the 31st. A meeting at the President's; present, Thomas Jefferson,
Alexander Hamilton, Henry Knox and Edmond Randolph. The subject was
the resolution of the House of Representatives, of March the 27th, to
appoint a committee to inquire into the causes of the failure of the late
expedition under Major General St. Clair, with the power to call for
such persons, papers and records, as may be necessary to assist their
inquiries. The committee had written to Knox for the original letters,
instructions, &c. The President had called us to consult, merely because
it was the first example, and he wished that so far as it should become
a precedent, it should be rightly conducted. He neither acknowledged nor
denied, nor even doubted the propriety of what the House were doing,
for he had not thought upon it, nor was acquainted with subjects of
this kind: he could readily conceive there might be papers of so secret
a nature, as that they ought not to be given up. We were not prepared,
and wished time to think and inquire.
* * * * *
April the 2d. Met again at the President's, on the same subject. We
had all considered, and were of one mind, first, that the House was an
inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries. Second, that it might
call for papers generally. Third, that the executive ought to communicate
such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to refuse those,
the disclosure of which would injure the public: consequently were to
exercise a discretion. Fourth, that neither the committee nor House
had a right to call on the Head of a department, who and whose papers
were under the President alone; but that the committee should instruct
their chairman to move the House to address the President. We had
principally consulted the proceedings of the Commons in the case of Sir
Robert Walpole, 13 Chandler's Debates. For the first point, see pages
161, 170, 172, 183, 187, 207; for the second, pages 153, 173, 207; for
the third, 81, 173, appendix page 44; fourth, page 246. Note; Hamilton
agreed with us in all these points, except as to the power of the House
to call on Heads of departments. He observed, that as to his department,
the act constituting it had made it subject to Congress in some points,
but he thought himself not so far subject, as to be obliged to produce
all the papers they might call for. They might demand secrets of a very
mischievous nature. [Here I thought he began to fear they would go on to
examining how far their own members and other persons in the government
had been dabbling in stocks, banks, &c., and that he probably would
choose in this case to deny their power; and, in short, he endeavored to
place himself subject to the House, when the executive should propose
what he did not like, and subject to the executive, when the House
should propose anything disagreeable.] I observed here a difference
between the British parliament and our Congress; that the former was a
legislature, an inquest, and a council (S. C. page 91.) for the King.
The latter was, by the constitution, a legislature and an inquest, but
not a council. Finally agreed, to speak separately to the members of
the committee, and bring them by persuasion into the right channel. It
was agreed in this case, that there was not a paper which might not be
properly produced; that copies only should be sent, with an assurance,
that if they should desire it, a clerk should attend with the originals
to be verified by themselves. The committee were Fitzsimmons, Steele,
Mercer, Clarke, Sedgwick, Giles and Vining.
* * * * *
April the 9th, 1792. The President had wished to redeem our captives at
Algiers, and to make peace with them on paying an annual tribute. The
Senate were willing to approve this, but unwilling to have the lower House
applied to previously to furnish the money; they wished the President to
take the money from the treasury, or open a loan for it. They thought
that to consult the Representatives on one occasion, would give them a
handle always to claim it, and would let them into a participation of the
power of making treaties, which the constitution had given exclusively
to the President and Senate. They said too, that if the particular
sum was voted by the Representatives, it would not be a secret. The
President had no confidence in the secrecy of the Senate, and did not
choose to take money from the treasury or to borrow. But he agreed he
would enter into provisional treaties with the Algerines, not to be
binding on us till ratified here. I prepared questions for consultation
with the Senate, and added, that the Senate were to be apprized, that on
the return of the provisional treaty, and after they should advise the
ratification, he would not have the seal put to it till the two Houses
should vote the money. He asked me, if the treaty stipulating a sum and
ratified by him, with the advice of the Senate, would not be good under
the constitution, and obligatory on the Representatives to furnish the
money? I answered it certainly would, and that it would be the duty of
the Representatives to raise the money; but that they might decline to
do what was their duty, and I thought it might be incautious to commit
himself by a ratification with a foreign nation, where he might be left
in the lurch in the execution: it was possible too, to conceive a treaty,
which it would not be their duty to provide for. He said that he did
not like throwing too much into democratic hands, that if they would not
do what the constitution called on them to do, the government would be
at an end, and must _then assume another form_. He stopped here; and I
kept silence to see whether he would say anything more in the same line,
or add any qualifying expression to soften what he had said; but he did
neither.
I had observed, that wherever the agency of either, or both Houses would
be requisite subsequent to a treaty, to carry it into effect, it would be
prudent to consult them previously, if the occasion admitted. That thus
it was, we were in the habit of consulting the Senate previously, when
the occasion permitted, because their subsequent ratification would be
necessary. That there was the same reason for consulting the lower House
previously, where they were to be called on afterwards, and especially in
the case of money, as they held the purse strings, and would be jealous
of them. However, he desired me to strike out the intimation that the
seal would not be put till both Houses should have voted the money.
* * * * *
April the 6th. The President called on me before breakfast, and first
introduced some other matter, then fell on the representation bill,
which he had now in his possession for the tenth day I had before
given him my opinion in writing, that the method of apportionment was
contrary to the constitution. He agreed that it was contrary to the
common understanding of that instrument, and to what was understood at
the time by the makers of it; that yet it would bear the construction
which the bill put, and he observed that the vote for and against the
bill was perfectly geographical, a northern against a southern vote, and
he feared he should be thought to be taking side with a southern party.
I admitted the motive of delicacy, but that it should not induce him to
do wrong; urged the dangers to which the scramble for the fractionary
members would always lead. He here expressed his fear that there would,
ere long, be a separation of the Union; that the public mind seemed
dissatisfied and tending to this. He went home, sent for Randolph, the
Attorney General, desired him to get Mr. Madison immediately and come
to me, and if we three concurred in opinion that he should negative the
bill, he desired to hear nothing more about it, but that we would draw
the instrument for him to sign. They came. Our minds had been before
made up. We drew the instrument. Randolph carried it to him, and told
him we all concurred in it. He walked with him to the door, and as if
he still wished to get off, he said, "and you say you approve of this
yourself." "Yes Sir," says Randolph, "I do upon my honor." He sent it
to the House of Representatives instantly. A few of the hottest friends
of the bill expressed passion, but the majority were satisfied, and both
in and out of doors it gave pleasure to have, at length, an instance of
the negative being exercised.
Written this the 9th of April.
* * * * *
July the 10th, 1792. My letter of ---- to the President, directed to
him at Mount Vernon, had not found him there, but came to him here. He
told me of this, and that he would take an occasion of speaking with
me on the subject. He did so this day. He began by observing that he
had put it off from day to day because the subject was painful, to wit,
his remaining in office, which that letter solicited. He said that the
declaration he had made when he quitted his military command, of never
again entering into public life, was sincere. That, however, when he
was called on to come forward to set the present government in motion,
it appeared to him that circumstances were so changed as to justify a
change in his resolution: he was made to believe that in two years all
would be well in motion, and he might retire. At the end of two years
he found some things still to be done. At the end of the third year,
he thought it was not worth while to disturb the course of things, as
in one year more his office would expire, and he was decided then to
retire. Now he was told there would still be danger in it. Certainly,
if he thought so, he would conquer his longing for retirement. But he
feared it would be said his former professions of retirement had been
mere affectation, and that he was like other men, when once in office
he could not quit it. He was sensible, too, of a decay of his hearing,
perhaps his other faculties might fall off and he not be sensible of
it. That with respect to the existing causes of uneasiness, he thought
there were suspicions against a particular party, which had been
carried a great deal too far; there might be _desires_, but he did not
believe there were _designs_ to change the form of government into a
monarchy; that there might be a few who wished it in the higher walks
of life, particularly in the great cities, but that the main body of
the people in the eastern States were as steadily for republicanism as
in the southern. That the pieces lately published, and particularly in
Freneau's paper, seemed to have in view the exciting opposition to the
government. That this had taken place in Pennsylvania as to the excise
law, according to information he had received from General Hand. That
they tended to produce a separation of the Union, the most dreadful of
all calamities, and that whatever tended to produce anarchy, tended, of
course, to produce a resort to monarchical government. He considered
those papers as attacking him directly, for he must be a fool indeed
to swallow the little sugar plums here and there thrown out to him.
That in condemning the administration of the government, they condemned
him, for if they thought there were measures pursued contrary to his
sentiments, they must conceive him too careless to attend to them, or
too stupid to understand them. That though, indeed, he had signed many
acts which he did not approve in all their parts, yet he had never put
his name to one which he did not think, on the whole, was eligible. That
as to the bank, which had been an act of so much complaint, until there
was some infallible criterion of reason, a difference of opinion must
be tolerated. He did not believe the discontents extended far from the
seat of government. He had seen and spoken with many people in Maryland
and Virginia in his late journey. He found the people contented and
happy. He wished, however, to be better informed on this head. If the
discontents were more extensive than he supposed, it might be that the
desire that he should remain in the government was not general.
My observations to him tended principally to enforce the topics of my
letter. I will not, therefore, repeat them, except where they produced
observations from him. I said that the two great complaints were, that
the national debt was unnecessarily increased, and that it had furnished
the means of corrupting both branches of the legislature; that he must
know, and everybody knew, there was a considerable squadron in both,
whose votes were devoted to the paper and stock-jobbing interest, that
the names of a weighty number were known, and several others suspected
on good grounds. That on examining the votes of these men, they would
be found uniformly for every Treasury measure, and that as most of these
measures had been carried by small majorities, they were carried by these
very votes. That, therefore, it was a cause of just uneasiness, when we
saw a legislature legislating for their own interests, in opposition
to those of the people. He said not a word on the corruption of the
legislature, but took up the other point, defended the Assumption, and
argued that it had not increased the debt, for that all of it was honest
debt. He justified the excise law, as one of the best laws which could
be passed, as nobody would pay the tax who did not choose to do it.
With respect to the increase of the debt by the Assumption, I observed
to him that what was meant and objected to was, that it increased the
debt of the General Government, and carried it beyond the possibility of
payment. That if the balances had been settled, and the debtor States
directed to pay their deficiencies to the creditor States, they would
have done it easily, and by resources of taxation in their power, and
acceptable to the people; by a direct tax in the south, and an excise
in the north. Still, he said, it would be paid by the people. Finding
him decided, I avoided entering into argument with him on those points.
* * * * *
Sept. the 30th, 1792. The constitution as agreed to till a fortnight
before the Convention rose, was such a one as he would have set his hand
and heart to. 1st. The President was to be elected for seven years. Then
ineligible for seven years more. 2d. Rotation in the Senate. 3d. A vote
of two-thirds in the legislature on particular subjects, and expressly
on that of navigation. The three New England States were constantly with
us in all questions (Rhode Island not there, and New York seldom), so
that it was these three States, with the five southern ones, against
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.
With respect to the importation of slaves, it was left to Congress.
This disturbed the two southernmost States, who knew that Congress
would immediately suppress the importation of slaves. These two States,
therefore, struck up a bargain with the three New England States. If they
would join to admit slaves for some years, the southernmost States would
join in changing the clause which required two-thirds of the legislature
in any vote. It was done. These articles were changed accordingly, and
from that moment the two southernmost States, and the three northern ones,
joined Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, and made the majority eight
to three against us, instead of eight to three for us, as it had been
through the whole Convention. Under this coalition, the great principles
of the constitution were changed in the last days of the Convention.
Anecdote. Yates, Lawsing and Hamilton represented New York. Yates and
Lawsing never voted in one single instance with Hamilton, who was so
much mortified at it that he went home. When the season for courts came
on, Yates, a judge, and Lawsing, a lawyer, went to attend their courts.
Then Hamilton returned.
Anecdote. The constitution as agreed at first was, that amendments
might be proposed either by Congress or the legislatures. A committee
was appointed to digest and redraw. Governeur Morris and King were of
the committee. One morning Governeur Morris moved an instrument for
certain alterations (not one-half the members yet come in). In a hurry
and without understanding, it was agreed to. The committee reported so
that Congress should have the exclusive power of proposing amendments.
George Mason observed it on the report, and opposed it. King denied
the construction. Mason demonstrated it, and asked the committee by
what authority they had varied what had been agreed. Governeur Morris
then imprudently got up, and said, by authority of the Convention, and
produced the blind instruction before mentioned, which was unknown by
one-half of the House, and not till then understood by the other. They
then restored it, as it originally stood.
He said he considered Hamilton as having done us more injury than Great
Britain and all her fleets and armies. That his (Mason's) plan of settling
our debts would have been something in this way. He would have laid as
much tax as could be paid without oppressing the people;--particularly
he would have laid an impost of about the amount of the first, laid by
Congress, but somewhat different in several of its articles. He would
have suspended all application of it one year, during which an office
should have been open to register unalienated certificates. At the end of
the year he would have appropriated his revenue. 1st. To pay the civil
list. 2d. The interest of these certificates. 3d. Instalments of the
principal. 4th. A surplus to buy up the alienated certificates, still
avoiding to make any other provision for these last. By the time the
unalienated certificates should have been all paid, he supposed half the
alienated ones would have been bought up at market. He would then have
proceeded to redeem the residue of them.
* * * * *
Bladensburg, October the 1st, 1792. This morning, at Mount Vernon, I had
the following conversation with the President. He opened it by expressing
his regret at the resolution in which I appeared so fixed, in the letter I
had written him, of retiring from public affairs. He said, that he should
be extremely sorry that I should do it, as long as he was in office, and
that he could not see where he should find another character to fill my
office. That, as yet, he was quite undecided whether to retire in March
or not. His inclinations led him strongly to do it. Nobody disliked
more the ceremonies of his office, and he had not the least taste or
gratification in the execution of its functions. That he was happy at
home alone, and that his presence there was now peculiarly called for by
the situation of Major Washington, whom he thought irrecoverable, and
should he get well, he would remove into another part of the country,
which might better agree with him. That he did not believe his presence
necessary; that there were other characters who would do the business
as well or better. Still, however, if his aid was thought necessary to
save the cause to which he had devoted his life principally, he would
make the sacrifice of a longer continuance. That he therefore reserved
himself for future decision, as his declaration would be in time if made
a month before the day of election. He had desired Mr. Lear to find out
from conversation, without appearing to make the inquiry, whether any
other person would be desired by any body. He had informed him, he judged
from conversations that it was the universal desire he should continue,
and he believed that those who expressed a doubt of his continuance, did
it in the language of apprehension, and not of desire. But this, says
he, is only from the north; it may be very different in the south. I
thought this meant as an opening to me to say what was the sentiment in
the south, from which quarter I came. I told him, that as far as I knew,
there was but one voice there, which was for his continuance. That as
to myself, I had ever preferred the pursuits of private life to those
of public, which had nothing in them agreeable to me. I explained to
him the circumstances of the war which had first called me into public
life, and those following the war, which had called me from a retirement
on which I had determined. That I had constantly kept my eye on my own
home, and could no longer refrain from returning to it. As to himself,
his presence was important; that he was the only man in the United States
who possessed the confidence of the whole; that government was founded
in opinion and confidence, and that the longer he remained, the stronger
would become the habits of the people in submitting to the government,
and in thinking it a thing to be maintained; that there was no other
person who would be thought anything more than the head of a party. He
then expressed his concern at the difference which he found to subsist
between the Secretary of the Treasury and myself, of which he said he
had not been aware. He knew, indeed, that there was a marked difference
in our political sentiments, but he had never suspected it had gone so
far in producing a personal difference, and he wished he could be the
mediator to put an end to it. That he thought it important to preserve
the check of my opinions in the administration, in order to keep things
in their proper channel, and prevent them from going too far. That as
to the idea of transforming this government into a monarchy, he did not
believe there were ten men in the United States whose opinions were worth
attention, who entertained such a thought. I told him there were many
more than he imagined. I recalled to his memory a dispute at his own
table, a little before we left Philadelphia, between General Schuyler
on one side and Pinckney and myself on the other, wherein the former
maintained the position, that hereditary descent was as likely to produce
good magistrates as election. I told him, that though the people were
sound, there were a numerous sect who had monarchy in contemplation; that
the Secretary of the Treasury was one of these. That I had heard him say
that this constitution was a shilly shally thing, of mere milk and water,
which could not last, and was only good as a step to something better.
That when we reflected, that he had endeavored in the convention, to
make an English constitution of it, and when failing in that, we saw all
his measures tending to bring it to the same thing, it was natural for
us to be jealous; and particularly, when we saw that these measures had
established corruption in the legislature, where there was a squadron
devoted to the nod of the Treasury, doing whatever he had directed, and
ready to do what he should direct. That if the equilibrium of the three
great bodies, legislative, executive and judiciary, could be preserved,
if the legislature could be kept independent, I should never fear the
result of such a government; but that I could not but be uneasy, when I
saw that the executive had swallowed up the legislative branch. He said,
that as to that interested spirit in the legislature, it was what could
not be avoided in any government, unless we were to exclude particular
descriptions of men, such as the holders of the funds, from all office.
I told him, there was great difference between the little accidental
schemes of self-interest, which would take place in every body of men,
and influence their votes, and a regular system for forming a corps of
interested persons, who should be steadily at the orders of the Treasury.
He touched on the merits of the funding system, observed there was a
difference of opinion about it, some thinking it very bad, others very
good; that experience was the only criterion of right which he knew, and
this alone would decide which opinion was right. That for himself, he had
seen our affairs desperate and our credit lost, and that this was in a
sudden and extraordinary degree raised to the highest pitch. I told him,
all that was ever necessary to establish our credit, was an efficient
government and an honest one, declaring it would sacredly pay our debts,
laying taxes for this purpose, and applying them to it. I avoided going
further into the subject. He finished by another exhortation to me not to
decide too positively on retirement, and here we were called to breakfast.
* * * * *
October the 31st, 1792. I had sent to the President, Viar and Jaudenes's
letter of the 29th instant, whereupon he desired a consultation of
Hamilton, Knox, E. Randolph, and myself, on these points: 1. What notice
was to be taken hereof to Spain? 2. Whether it should make part of the
communication to the legislature? I delivered my opinion, that it ought
to be communicated to both Houses, because the communications intended to
be made, being to bring on the question, whether they would declare war
against any, and which of the nations or parts of the nations of Indians
to the south, it would be proper this information should be before them,
that they might know how far such a declaration would lead them. There
might be some who would be for war against the Indians, if it were to
stop there, but who would not be for it, if it were to lead to a war
against Spain. I thought it should be laid before both Houses, because it
concerned the question of declaring war, which was the function equally
of both Houses. I thought a simple acknowledgment of the receipt of the
letter should be made by me to the Spanish Chargés, expressing that it
contained some things very unexpected to us, but that we should refer
the whole, as they had proposed, to the negotiators at Madrid. This would
secure to us a continuation of the suspension of Indian hostilities, which
the Governor of New Orleans said he had brought about till the result
of the negotiation at Madrid should be known; would not commit us as to
running or not running the line, or imply any admission of doubt about
our territorial right; and would avoid a rupture with Spain, which was
much to be desired, while we had similar points to discuss with Great
Britain.
Hamilton declared himself the advocate for peace. War would derange
our affairs greatly; throw us back many years in the march towards
prosperity; be difficult for us to pursue, our countrymen not being
disposed to become soldiers; a part of the Union feeling no interest in
the war, would with difficulty be brought to exert itself; and we had
no navy. Ho was for everything which would procrastinate the event. A
year, even, was a great gain to a nation strengthening as we were. It
laid open to us, too, the chapter of accidents, which, in the present
state of Europe, was a very pregnant one. That while, however, he was
for delaying the event of war, he had no doubt it was to take place
between us for the object in question; that jealousy and perseverance
were remarkable features in the character of the Spanish government,
with respect to their American possessions; that so far from receding
as to their claims against us, they had been strengthening themselves
in them. He had no doubt the present communication was by authority
from the court. Under this impression, he thought we should be looking
forward to the day of rupture, and preparing for it. That if we were
unequal to the contest ourselves, it behoved us to provide allies for
our aid. That in this view, but two nations could be named, France and
England. France was too intimately connected with Spain in other points,
and of too great mutual value, ever to separate for us. Her affairs too,
were such, that whatever issue they had, she could not be in a situation
to make a respectable mediation for us. England alone, then, remained.
It would not be easy to affect it with her; however, he was for trying
it, and for sounding them on the proposition of a defensive treaty of
alliance. The inducements to such a treaty, on their part, might be,
1. The desire of breaking up our former connections, which we knew they
had long wished. 2. A continuance of the _statu quo_ in commerce for ten
years, which he believed would be desirable to them. 3. An admission to
some navigable part of the Mississippi, by some line drawn from the Lake
of the Woods to such navigable part. He had not, he said, examined the
map to see how such a line might be run, so as not to make too great a
sacrifice. The navigation of the Mississippi being a joint possession,
we might then take measures in concert for the joint security of it. He
was, therefore, for immediately sounding them on this subject through
our ministers at London; yet so as to keep ourselves unengaged as long
as possible, in hopes a favorable issue with Spain might be otherwise
effected. But he was for sounding immediately, and for not letting slip
an opportunity of securing our object.
E. Randolph concurred, in general, with me. He objected that such an
alliance could not be effected without pecuniary consideration probably,
which we could not give. And what was to be their aid? If men, our
citizens would see their armies get foothold in the United States, with
great jealousy; it would be difficult to protect them. Even the French,
during the distress of the late war, excited some jealous sentiments.
Hamilton said, money was often, but not always demanded, and the aid he
should propose to stipulate would be in ships. Knox _non dissentiente_.
The President said the remedy would be worse than the disease, and stated
some of the disagreeable circumstances which would attend our making
such overtures.
* * * * *
November, 1792. Hamilton called on me to speak about our furnishing
supplies to the French colony of St. Domingo. He expressed his opinion,
that we ought to be cautious, and not go too far in our application
of money to their use, lest it should not be recognized by the mother
country. He did not even think that some kinds of government they might
establish could give a sufficient sanction.[9] I observed, that the
National Convention was now met, and would certainly establish a form
of government; that as we had recognized the former government because
established by authority of the _nation_, so we must recognize any other
which should be established by the authority of the nation. He said we
had recognized the former, because it contained an important member of
the ancient, to wit: the King, and wore the appearance of his consent;
but if, in any future form, they should omit the King, he did not know
that we could with safety recognize it, or pay money to its order.
* * * * *
November the 19th, 1792. Beckley brings me the pamphlet written by
Hamilton, before the war, in answer to Common Sense. It is entitled
"Plain Truth." Melancthon Smith sends it to Beckley, and in his letter
says, it was not printed in New York by Loudon, because prevented by a
mob, and was printed in Philadelphia, and that he has these facts from
Loudon.
* * * * *
November the 21st, 1792. Mr. Butler tells me, that he dined last winter
with Mr. Campbell from Denmark, in company with Hamilton, Lawrence, Dr.
Shippen, T. Shippen, and one other person whom he cannot recollect. That
after dinner political principles became the subject of conversation;
that Hamilton declared openly, that "there was no stability, no security
in any kind of government but a monarchy." That Lawrence took him up,
and entered the lists of argument against him; that the dispute continued
long, and grew warm, remarkably so as between them; that T. Shippen, at
length, joined Lawrence in it; and in fine, that it broke up the company.
Butler recommended to the company, that the dispute having probably gone
farther than was intended, it ought to be considered as confined to the
company.
* * * * *
December the 10th, 1792. Present: Alexander Hamilton, General Knox,
Edmund Randolph, and Th: Jefferson, at the President's.
It was agreed to reject meeting the Indians at the proposed treaty, rather
than to admit a _mediation_ by Great Britain; but to admit the presence
of Governor Simcoe, not as a _party_ (if that was insisted on); and that
I should make a verbal communication to Mr. Hammond, in substance, as
on the back hereof, which I previously read to the President.
* * * * *
December the 12th. I made the communication to Mr. Hammond. He said the
attendance of Governor Simcoe was a circumstance only mentioned by him,
but not desired; that he would decline it without difficulty; declared
it to be their most ardent wish that peace should take place, for their
fur-trade was entirely interrupted; and he urged as decisive proof of
the sincerity of their wish,--1st. That they had kept the late Indian
council together six weeks at a very great expense, waiting for the Six
Nations. 2d. That the Indians at that council were so perfectly satisfied
of their desire that they should make peace, that they had not so much
as mentioned in council the applying to the British for any supplies.
I immediately communicated this to the President.
* * * * *
December the 13th, 1792. The President called on me to see the model
and drawings of some mills for sawing stone. After showing them, he
in the course of a subsequent conversation asked me if there were not
some good manufactories of porcelain in Germany; that he was in want
of table china, and had been speaking to Mr. Shaw, who was going to the
East Indies to bring him a set, but he found that it would not come till
_he should no longer be in a situation to want it_. He took occasion a
second time to observe that Shaw said it would be two years at least,
before he could have the china here, before which time he said he should
be where he should not need it. I think he asked the question about
the manufactories in Germany merely to have an indirect opportunity of
telling me he meant to retire, and within the limits of two years.
* * * * *
December the 17th. Hammond says the person is here to whom the Six Nations
delivered the invitation for Simcoe to attend, who says they insisted on
it, and would consider his non-attendance as an evidence that he does
not wish for peace; but he says that Simcoe has not the least idea of
attending; that this gentleman says we may procure in Upper Canada any
quantity of provisions, which the people will salt up express during
winter; and that he will return and carry our request whenever we are
ready.
* * * * *
Thursday, December the 27th, 1792. I waited on the President on some
current business. After this was over, he observed to me, that he thought
it was time to endeavor to effect a stricter connection with France,
and that Gouverneur Morris should be written to on this subject. He
went into the circumstances of dissatisfaction between Spain and Great
Britain, and us, and observed, there was no nation on whom we could rely,
at all times, but France; and that, if we did not prepare in time some
support, in the event of rupture with Spain and England, we might be
charged with a criminal negligence. [I was much pleased with the tone
of these observations. It was the very doctrine which had been my polar
star, and I did not need the successes of the republican arms in France,
lately announced to us, to bring me to these sentiments. For it is to be
noted, that on Saturday last (the 22d) I received Mr. Short's letters of
October the 9th and 12th, with the Leyden gazettes to October the 13th,
giving us the first news of the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick, and the
capture of Spires and Worms by Custine, and that of Nice by Anselme.]
I therefore expressed to the President my cordial approbation of these
ideas; told him I had meant on that day (as an opportunity of writing
by the British packet would occur immediately) to take his orders for
removing the suspension of payments to France, which had been imposed by
my last letter to Gouverneur Morris, but was meant, as I supposed, only
for the interval between the abolition of the late constitution by the
dethronement of the King, and the meeting of some other body, invested
by the will of the nation with powers to transact their affairs; that
I considered the National Convention, then assembled, as such a body;
and that, therefore, we ought to go on with the payments to them, or
to any government they should establish; that, however, I had learned
last night, that some clause in the bill for providing reimbursement
of the loan made by the bank to the United States, had given rise to
a question before the House of Representatives yesterday, which might
affect these payments; a clause in that bill proposing, that the money
formerly borrowed in Amsterdam, to pay the French debt, and appropriated
by law (1690, August 4th, c. 34, s. 2) to that purpose, lying dead as
was suggested, should be taken to pay the bank, and the President be
authorized to borrow two millions of dollars more, out of which it should
be replaced; and if this should be done, the removal of our suspension
of payments, as I had been about to propose, would be premature. He
expressed his disapprobation of the clause above mentioned; thought it
highly improper in the Legislature to change an appropriation once made,
and added, that no one could tell in what that would end. I concurred,
but observed, that on a division of the House, the ayes for striking out
the clause were twenty-seven, the noes twenty-six; whereon the Speaker
gave his vote against striking out, which divides the House: the clause
for the disappropriation remained of course. I mentioned suspicions, that
the whole of this was a trick to serve the bank under a great existing
embarrassment; that the debt to the bank was to be repaid by instalments;
that the first instalment was of two hundred thousand dollars only, or
rather one hundred and sixty thousand dollars, (because forty thousand
of the two hundred thousand dollars would be the United States' own
dividend of the instalment.) Yet here were two millions to be paid them
at once, and to be taken from a purpose of gratitude and honor, to which
it had been appropriated.
* * * * *
December the 30th, 1792. I took the occasion furnished by Pinckney's
letter of September the 19th, asking instructions how to conduct himself
as to the French revolution, to lay down the catholic principal of
republicanism, to wit, that every people may establish what form of
government they please, and change it as they please; the will of the
nation being the only thing essential. I was induced to do this, in order
to extract the President's opinion on the question which divided Hamilton
and myself in the conversation of November, 1792, and the previous one
of the first week of November, on the suspension of payments to France;
and if favorable to mine, to place the principles of record in the
letter books of my office. I therefore wrote the letter of December the
30th, to Pinckney, and sent it to the President, and he returned me his
approbation in writing, in his note of the same date, which see.
* * * * *
February the 7th, 1793. I waited on the President with letters and
papers from Lisbon. After going through these, I told him that I had
for some time suspended speaking with him on the subject of my going out
of office, because I had understood that the bill for intercourse with
foreign nations was likely to be rejected by the Senate, in which case,
the remaining business of the department would be too inconsiderable to
make it worth while to keep it up. But that the bill being now passed,
I was freed from the considerations of propriety which had embarrassed
me. That &c. [nearly in the words of a letter to Mr. T. M. Randolph,
of a few days ago,] and that I should be willing, if he had taken no
arrangements to the contrary, to continue somewhat longer, how long I
could not say, perhaps till summer, perhaps autumn. He said, so far from
taking arrangements on the subject, he had never mentioned to any mortal
the design of retiring which I had expressed to him, till yesterday,
when having heard that I had given up my house, and that it was rented by
another, he thereupon mentioned it to Mr. E. Randolph, and asked him, as
he knew my retirement had been talked of, whether he had heard any persons
suggested in conversation to succeed me. He expressed his satisfaction
at my change of purpose, and his apprehensions that my retirement would
be a new source of uneasiness to the public. He said Governor Lee had
that day informed him of the general discontent prevailing in Virginia,
of which he never had had any conception, much less sound information.
That it appeared to him very alarming. He proceeded to express his
earnest wish that Hamilton and myself could coalesce in the measures
of the government, and urged here the general reasons for it which he
had done to me in two former conversations. He said he had proposed the
same thing to Hamilton, who expressed his readiness, and he thought
our coalition would secure the general acquiescence of the public. I
told him my concurrence was of much less importance than he seemed to
imagine; that I kept myself aloof from all cabal and correspondence
on the subject of the government, and saw and spoke with as few as I
could. That as to a coalition with Mr. Hamilton, if by that was meant
that either was to sacrifice his general system to the other, it was
impossible. We had both, no doubt, formed our conclusions after the
most mature consideration; and principles conscientiously adopted,
could not be given up on either side. My wish was, to see both Houses
of Congress cleansed of all persons interested in the bank or public
stocks; and that a pure legislature being given us, I should always be
ready to acquiesce under their determinations, even if contrary to my
own opinions; for that I subscribe to the principle, that the will of
the majority, honestly expressed, should give law. I confirmed him in
the fact of the great discontents to the south; that they were grounded
on seeing that their judgments and interests were sacrificed to those
of the eastern States on every occasion, and their belief that it was
the effect of a corrupt squadron of voters in Congress, at the command
of the Treasury; and they see that if the votes of those members who
had any interest distinct from, and contrary to the general interest of
their constituents, had been withdrawn, as in decency and honesty they
should have been, the laws would have been the reverse of what they are
on all the great questions. I instanced the new Assumption carried in
the House of Representatives by the Speaker's vote. On this subject he
made no reply. He explained his remaining in office to have been the
effect of strong solicitations after he returned here; declaring that
he had never mentioned his purpose of going out but to the Heads of
departments and Mr. Madison; he expressed the extreme wretchedness of
his existence while in office, and went lengthily into the late attacks
on him for levees &c., and explained to me how he had been led into them
by the persons he consulted at New York; and that if he could but know
what the sense of the public was, he would most cheerfully conform to it.
* * * * *
February the 16th, 1793. E. Randolph tells J. Madison and myself, a
curious fact which he had from Lear. When the President went to New
York, he resisted for three weeks the efforts to introduce levees. At
length he yielded, and left it to Humphreys and some others to settle
the forms. Accordingly, an ante-chamber and presence room were provided,
and when those who were to pay their court were assembled, the President
set out, preceded by Humphreys. After passing through the anti-chamber,
the door of the inner room was thrown open, and Humphreys entered first,
calling out with a loud voice, "the President of the United States." The
President was so much disconcerted with it, that he did not recover from
it the whole time of the levee, and when the company was gone, he said
to Humphreys, "Well, you have taken me in once, but by God you shall
never take me in a second time."
* * * * *
There is reason to believe that the rejection of the late additional
Assumption by the Senate, was effected by the President through Lear,
operating on Langdon. Beckley knows this.
* * * * *
February the 20th, 1793. Colonel W. S. Smith called on me to communicate
intelligence from France. He had left Paris November the 9th. He says the
French ministers are entirely broken with Gouverneur Morris; shut their
doors to him, and will never receive another communication from him. They
wished Smith to be the bearer of a message from the President, to this
effect, but he declined; and they said in that case they would press it
through their own minister here. He says they are sending Genet here
with full powers to give us all the privileges we can desire in their
countries, and particularly in the West Indies; that they even contemplate
to set them free the next summer; that they propose to emancipate South
America, and will send forty-five ships of the line there next spring,
and Miranda at the head of the expedition; that they desire our debt to
be paid them in provisions, and have authorized him to negotiate this.
In confirmation of this, he delivers a letter to the President from Le
Brun, minister for foreign affairs, in which Le Brun says that Colonel
Smith will communicate plans worthy of his (the President's) great mind,
and he shall be happy to receive his opinion as to the means the most
suitable to effect it.
I had, five or six days ago, received from Ternant, extracts from the
lives of his ministers, complaining of both Gouverneur Morris and Mr.
Short. I sent them this day to the President with an extract from a
private letter of Mr. Short, justifying himself, and I called this evening
on the President. He said he considered the extracts from Ternant very
serious--in short, as decisive; that he saw that Gouverneur Morris could
be no longer continued there consistent with the public good; that the
moment was critical in our favor, and ought not to be lost; that he
was extremely at a loss what arrangement to make. I asked him whether
Gouverneur Morris and Pinckney might not change places. He said that
would be a sort of remedy, but not a radical one. That if the French
ministry conceived Gouverneur Morris to be hostile to them; if they
would be jealous merely on his proposing to visit London, they would
never be satisfied with us at placing him at London permanently. He then
observed, that though I had unfixed the day on which I had intended to
resign, yet I appeared fixed in doing it at no great distance of time;
that in this case, he could not but wish that I would go to Paris; that
the moment was important: I possessed the confidence of both sides, and
might do great good; that he wished I could do it, were it only to stay
there a year or two. I told him that my mind was so bent on retirement
that I could not think of launching forth again in a new business; that
I could never again cross the Atlantic; and that as to the opportunity
of doing good, this was likely to be the scene of action, as Genet was
bringing powers to do the business here; but that I could not think of
going abroad. He replied that I had pressed him to continue in the public
service, and refused to do the same myself. I said the case was very
different; he united the confidence of all America, and was the only
person who did so: his services therefore were of the last importance;
but for myself, my going out would not be noted or known. A thousand
others could supply my place to equal advantage, therefore I felt myself
free; and that as to the mission to France, I thought perfectly proper.
He desired me then to consider maturely what arrangement should be made.
Smith, in speaking of Morris, said, that at his own table, in presence
of his company and servants, he cursed the French ministers, as a set of
damned rascals; said the king would still be replaced upon his throne.
He said he knew they had written to have him recalled, and expected to be
recalled. He consulted Smith to know whether he would bring his furniture
here duty free. Smith has mentioned the situation of Gouverneur Morris
freely to others here. Smith said also that the ministers told him they
meant to begin their attack at the mouth of the Mississippi, and to
sweep along the Bay of Mexico southwardly, and that they would have no
objection to our incorporating into our government the two Floridas.
* * * * *
February the 25th, 1793. The President desires the opinions of the heads
of the three departments, and of the Attorney-General, on the following
question, to wit: Mr. Ternant having applied for money equivalent to three
millions of livres, to be furnished on account of our debt to France at
the request of the executive of that country, which sum is to be laid
out in provisions within the United States, to be sent to France. Shall
the money be furnished?
The Secretary of the Treasury stated it as his opinion, that making
a liberal allowance for the depreciation of assignats, (no rule of
liquidation having been yet fixed,) a sum of about three hundred and
eighteen thousand dollars may not exceed the arrearages equitably due
to France to the end of 1792, and that the whole sum asked for may be
furnished within periods capable of answering the purpose of Mr. Ternant's
application, without a derangement of the Treasury.
Whereupon the Secretaries of State and War, and the Attorney General,
are of opinion that the whole sum asked for by Mr. Ternant ought to be
furnished: the Secretary of the Treasury is of opinion that the supply
ought not exceed the above-mentioned sum of three hundred and eighteen
thousand dollars.
The President having required the attendance of the heads of the three
departments, and of the Attorney General, at his house, on Monday the
25th of February, 1793, the following questions were proposed, and
answers given:
1. The Governor of Canada having refused to let us obtain provisions
from that province, or to pass them along the water communication to the
place of treaty with the Indians; and the Indians having refused to let
them pass peaceably along what they call the bloody path, the Governor
of Canada at the same time proposing to furnish the whole provisions
necessary, ought the treaty to proceed? Answer unanimously, it ought to
proceed.
2. Have the Executive, or the Executive and Senate together, authority
to relinquish to the Indians the right of soil of any part of the land
north of the Ohio, which has been validly obtained by former treaties?
The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary at War, and Attorney
General, are of opinion that the Executive and Senate have such authority,
provided that no grants to individuals, nor reservations to States, be
thereby infringed. The Secretary of State is of opinion they have no
such authority to relinquish.
3. Will it be expedient to make any such relinquishments to the Indians,
if essential to peace?
The Secretaries of the Treasury and War, and the Attorney General, are of
opinion it will be expedient to make such relinquishments if essential to
peace, provided it do not include any lands sold or received for special
purposes (the reservations for trading places excepted). The Secretary
of State is of opinion that the Executive and Senate have authority to
stipulate with the Indians, and that if essential to peace, it will be
expedient to stipulate that we will not settle any lands between those
already sold, or reserved for special purposes, and the lines heretofore
validly established with the Indians.
Whether the Senate shall be previously consulted on this point. The
opinion unanimously is, that it will be better not to consult them
previously.
* * * * *
February the 26th, 1793. Notes on the proceedings of yesterday. [See
the formal opinions given to the President in writing, and signed.]
First question. We are all of opinion that the treaty should proceed
merely to gratify the public opinion, and not from an expectation of
success. I expressed myself strongly, that the event was so unpromising,
that I thought the preparations for a campaign should go on without the
least relaxation, and that a day should be fixed with the commissioners
for the treaty, beyond which they should not permit the treaty to be
protracted, by which day orders should be given for our forces to enter
into action. The President took up the thing instantly, after I had said
this, and declared that he was so much in the opinion that the treaty
would end in nothing, that he then, in the presence of us all, gave
orders to General Knox, not to slacken the preparations for the campaign
in the least, but to exert every nerve in preparing for it. Knox said
something about the ultimate day for continuing the negotiations. I
acknowledged myself not a judge on what day the campaign should begin,
but that whatever it was, that day should terminate the treaty. Knox said
he thought a winter campaign was always the most efficacious against the
Indians. I was of opinion, since Great Britain insisted on furnishing
provisions, that we should offer to repay. Hamilton thought we should not.
Second question. I considered our right of pre-emption of the Indian
lands, not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship
whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the extinguishment
of a present right, which gave us no present right whatever, but of
preventing other nations from taking possession, and so defeating our
expectancy; that the Indians had the full, undivided and independent
sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and that this might be
forever; that as fast as we extend our rights by purchase from them, so
fast we extend the limits of our society, and as soon as a new portion
became encircled within our line, it became a fixed limit of our society;
that the executive, with either or both branches of the legislature,
could not alien any part of our territory; that by the law of nations
it was settled, that the unity and indivisibility of the society was
so fundamental, that it could not be dismembered by the constituted
authorities, except, 1, where _all power_ was delegated to them (as
in the case of despotic governments), or, 2, where it was expressly
delegated; that neither of these delegations had been made to our General
Government, and therefore, that it had no right to dismember or alienate
any portion of territory once ultimately consolidated with us; and that
we could no more cede to the Indians than to the English or Spaniards,
as it might, according to acknowledged principles, remain as irrevocably
and eternally with the one as the other. But I thought, that as we had
a right to sell and settle lands once comprehended within our lines, so
we might forbear to exercise that right, retaining the property till
circumstances should be more favorable to the settlement, and this I
agreed to do in the present instance, if necessary for peace.
Hamilton agreed to the doctrine of the law of nations, as laid down
in Europe, but that it was founded on the universality of settlement
there; consequently, that no lopping off of territory could be made
without a lopping off of citizens, which required their consent; but
that the law of nations for us must be adapted to the circumstance of
our unsettled country, which he conceived the President and Senate may
cede; that the power of treaty was given to them by the Constitution,
without restraining it to particular objects; consequently, that it
was given in as plenipotentiary a form as held by any sovereign in any
other society. Randolph was of opinion there was a difference between
a cession to Indians and to any others, because it only restored the
ceded part to the condition in which it was before we bought it, and
consequently, that we might buy it again hereafter; therefore, he thought
the executive and Senate could cede it. Knox joined in the main opinion.
The President discovered no opinion, but he made some efforts to get us
to join in some terms which could unite us all, and he seemed to direct
those efforts more towards me; but the thing could not be done.
Third question. We agreed in idea as to the line to be drawn, to wit,
so as to retain all lands appropriated, or granted, or reserved.
Fourth question. We all thought if the Senate should be consulted, and
consequently apprized of our line, it would become known to Hammond,
and we should lose all chance of saving anything more at the treaty than
our ultimatum.
The President, at this meeting, mentioned the declaration of some person,
in a paper of Fenno, that he would commence an attack on the character
of Dr. Franklin. He said the theme was to him excessively disagreeable on
other considerations, but most particularly so, as the party seemed to do
it as a means of defending him (the President) against the late attacks
on him; that such a mode of defence would be peculiarly painful to him,
and he wished it could be stopped. Hamilton and Randolph undertook to
speak to Fenno to suppress it, without mentioning it as the President's
wish. Both observed that they had heard this declaration mentioned in
many companies, and that it had excited universal horror and detestation.
The paper in Fenno must lie between two persons, viz., Adams and Izard,
because they are the only persons who could know such facts as are there
promised to be unfolded. Adams is an enemy to both characters, and might
choose this ground as an effectual position to injure both. Izard hated
Franklin with unparalleled bitterness, but humbly adores the President,
because he is in _loco regis_. If the paper proceeds, we shall easily
discover which of these two gentlemen is the champion. In the meantime,
the first paper leads our suspicions more towards Izard than Adams, from
the circumstance of style, and because he is quite booby enough not to
see the injury he would do to the President by such a mode of defence.
* * * * *
February the 28th. Knox, E. Randolph and myself met at Knox's, where
Hamilton was also to have met, to consider the time, manner and place of
the President's swearing in. Hamilton had been there before, and had left
his opinion with Knox, to wit, that the President should ask a judge to
attend him in his own house to administer the oath, in the presence of
the Heads of departments, which oath should be deposited in the Secretary
of State's office. I concurred in this opinion. Randolph was for the
President's going to the Senate's chamber to take the oath, attended by
the marshal of the United States, who should then make proclamation, &c.
Knox was for this, and for adding the House of Representatives to the
presence, as they would not yet be departed. Our individual opinions were
written, to be communicated to the President, out of which he might form
one. In the course of our conversation, Knox, stickling for parade, got
into great warmth, and swore that our government must either be entirely
new modeled, or it would be knocked to pieces in less than ten years;
and that as it is at present, he would not give a copper for it; that
it is the President's character, and not the written constitution, which
keeps it together.
Same day. Conversation with Lear. He expressed the strongest confidence
that republicanism was the universal creed of America, except of a very
few; that a republican administration must of necessity immediately
overbear the contrary faction; said that he had seen with extreme regret
that a number of gentlemen had for a long time been endeavoring to instil
into the President, that the noise against the administration of the
government was that of a little faction, which would soon be silent, and
which was detested by the people, who were contented and prosperous;
that this very party, however, began to see their error, and that the
sense of America was bursting forth to their conviction.
* * * * *
March the 2d, 1793. See in the papers of this date, Mr. Giles's
resolutions. He and one or two others were sanguine enough to believe
that the palpableness of these resolutions rendered it impossible the
House could reject them. Those who knew the composition of the House, 1,
of bank directors; 2 holders of bank stock; 3, stock jobbers; 4, blind
devotees; 5, ignorant persons who did not comprehend them; 6, lazy and
good-humored persons, who comprehended and acknowledged them, yet were
too lazy to examine, or unwilling to pronounce censure; the persons who
knew these characters, foresaw that the three first descriptions making
one-third of the House, the three latter would make one-half of the
residue; and, of course, that they would be rejected by a majority of
two to one. But they thought that even this rejection would do good, by
showing the public the desperate and abandoned dispositions with which
their affairs were conducted. The resolutions were proposed, and nothing
spared to present them in the fulness of demonstration. There were not
more than three or four who voted otherwise than had been expected.
* * * * *
March the 30th, 1793. At our meeting at the President's, February the
25th, in discussing the question, whether we should furnish to France the
three millions of livres desired, Hamilton, in speaking on the subject,
used this expression, "When Mr. Genet arrives, whether we shall receive
him or not, will then be a question for discussion," which expression I
did not recollect till E. Randolph reminded me of it a few days after.
Therefore, on the 20th instant, as the President was shortly to set out
for Mount Vernon, I observed to him, that as Genet might arrive in his
absence, I wished to know beforehand how I should treat him, whether
as a person who would or would not be received? He said he could see no
ground of doubt but that he ought to be received. On the 24th he asked
E. Randolph's opinion on the subject, saying he had consulted Colonel
Hamilton thereon, who went into lengthy considerations of doubt and
difficulty, and viewing it as a very unfortunate thing that the President
should have the decision of so critical a point forced on him; but, in
conclusion, said, since he was brought into that situation, he did not
see but that he must receive Mr. Genet. Randolph told the President he
was clear he should be received, and the President said he had never
had any doubt on the subject in his mind. Afterwards, on the same day,
he spoke to me again on it, and said Mr. Genet should unquestionably be
received; but he thought not with too much warmth or cordiality, so only
as to be satisfactory to him. I wondered at first at this restriction;
but when Randolph afterwards communicated to me his conversation of
the 24th, I became satisfied it was a small sacrifice to the opinion of
Hamilton.
* * * * *
March the 31st. Mr. Beckley tells me, that the merchants' bonds for
duties on six months' credit became due the 1st instant to a very great
amount, that Hamilton went to the bank on that day, and directed the bank
to discount for those merchants all their bonds at thirty days, and that
he would have the collectors credited for the money at the treasury.
Hence, the treasury lumping its receipts by the month in its printed
accounts, these sums will be considered by the public as only received
on the last day; consequently, the bank makes the month's interest out
of it. Beckley had this from a merchant who had a bond discounted, and
supposes a million of dollars were discounted at the bank here. Mr.
Brown got the same information from another merchant, who supposed only
six hundred thousand dollars discounted here. But they suppose the same
orders went to all the branch banks to a great amount.
_Eodem die._ Mr. Brown tells me he has it from a merchant, that during
the last winter the directors of the bank ordered the freest discounts.
Every man could obtain it. Money being so flush, the six per cents run
up to twenty-one and twenty-two shillings. Then the directors sold out
their private stocks. When the discounted notes were becoming due, they
stopped discounts, and not a dollar was to be had. This reduced six per
cents to eighteen shillings and three pence; then the same directors
bought in again.
* * * * *
April the 7th, 1793. Mr. Lear called on me, and introduced of himself
a conversation on the affairs of the United States. He laughed at the
cry of prosperity, and the deriving it from the establishment of the
treasury: he said, that so far from giving into this opinion, and that
we were paying off our national debt, he was clear the debt was growing
on us; that he had lately expressed this opinion to the President, who
appeared much astonished at it. I told him I had given the same hint
to the President last summer, and lately again had suggested, that we
were even depending for the daily subsistence of government on borrowed
money. He said, that was certain, and was the only way of accounting for
what was become of the money drawn over from Holland to this country.
He regretted that the President was not in the way of hearing full
information, declared he communicated to him everything he could learn
himself; that the men who vaunted the present government so much on
some occasions, were the very men who at other times declared it was a
poor thing, and such a one as could not stand, and he was sensible they
only esteemed it as a stepping stone to something else, and had availed
themselves of the first moments of the enthusiasm in favor of it, to
pervert its principles and make of it what they wanted; and that though
they raised the cry of anti-federalism against those who censured the
mode of administration, yet he was satisfied, whenever it should come to
be tried, that the very men whom they called anti-federalists, were the
men who would save the government, and he looked to the next Congress
for much rectification.
* * * * *
April the 18th. The President sends a set of questions to be considered,
and calls a meeting. Though those sent me were in his own hand writing,
yet it was palpable from the style, their ingenious tissue and suite,
that they were not the President's, that they were raised upon a prepared
chain of argument, in short, that the language was Hamilton's, and the
doubts his alone. They led to a declaration of the executive, that our
treaty with France is void. E. Randolph, the next day, told me that the
day before the date of these questions, Hamilton went with him through
the whole chain of reasoning of which these questions are the skeleton,
and that he recognized them the moment he saw them.
We met. The first question, whether we should receive the French
minister, Genet, was proposed, and we agreed unanimously that he should
be received; Hamilton, at the same time, expressing his great regret
that any incident had happened, which should oblige us to recognize
the government. The next question was, whether he should be received
absolutely, or with qualifications. Here Hamilton took up the whole
subject, and went through it in the order in which the questions sketch
it. See the chain of his reasoning in my opinions of April the 28th.
Knox subscribed at once to Hamilton's opinion that we ought to declare
the treaty void, acknowledging, at the same time, like a fool as he is,
that he knew nothing about it. I was clear it remained valid. Randolph
declared himself of the same opinion, but on Hamilton's undertaking to
present to him the authority in Vattel (which we had not present) and
to prove to him, that if the authority was admitted, the treaty might be
declared void, Randolph agreed to take further time to consider. It was
adjourned. We determined, unanimously, the last question, that Congress
should not be called. There having been an intimation by Randolph, that
in so great a question he should choose to give a written opinion, and
this being approved by the President, I gave in mine April the 28th.
Hamilton gave in his. I believe Knox's was never thought worth offering
or asking for. Randolph gave his May the 6th, concurring with mine.
The President told me, the same day, he had never had a doubt about the
validity of the treaty; but that since a question had been suggested,
he thought it ought to be considered; that this being done, I might
now issue passports to sea vessels in the form prescribed by the French
treaty. I had for a week past only issued the Dutch form; to have issued
the French, would have been presupposing the treaty to be in existence.
The President suggested, that he thought it would be as well that nothing
should be said of such a question having been under consideration.
Written May the 6th.
* * * * *
May the 6th, 1793. When the question was, whether the proclamation of
April the 22d should be issued, Randolph observed, that there should
be a letter written by me to the ministers of the belligerent powers,
to declare that it should not be taken as conclusive evidence against
our citizens in foreign courts of admiralty, for contraband goods. Knox
suddenly adopted the opinion, before Hamilton delivered his. Hamilton
opposed it pretty strongly. I thought it an indifferent thing, but
rather approved Randolph's opinion. The President was against it; but
observed that _as there were three for it, it should go_. This was the
first instance I had seen of an opportunity to decide by a mere majority,
including his own vote.
* * * * *
May the 12th. Lear called on me to-day. Speaking of the lowness of stocks,
(sixteen shillings,) I observed it was a pity we had not money to buy
on public account. He said, yes, and that it was the more provoking, as
two millions had been borrowed for that purpose, and drawn over here,
and yet were not here. That he had no doubt those would take notice of
the circumstance whose duty it was to do so. I suppose he must mean the
President.
* * * * *
May the 23d. I had sent to the President yesterday, draughts of a letter
from him to the Provisory Executive Council of France, and of one from
myself to Mr. Ternant, both on the occasion of his recall. I called on
him to-day. He said there was an expression in one of them, which he
had never before seen in any of our public communications, to wit, "our
republic." The letter prepared for him to the Council, began thus: "The
Citizen Ternant has delivered to me the letter wherein you inform me,
that yielding, &c., you had determined to recall him from his mission,
as your Minister Plenipotentiary to _our republic_." He had underscored
the words, _our republic_. He said that certainly ours was a republican
government, but yet we had not used that style in this way; that if any
body wanted to change its form into a monarchy, he was sure it was only a
few individuals, and that no man in the United States would set his face
against it more than himself; but that this was not what he was afraid
of; his fears were from another quarter; that there was more danger of
anarchy being introduced. He adverted to a piece in Freneau's paper of
yesterday; he said he despised all their attacks on him personally,
but that there never had been an act of the government, not meaning
in the executive line only, but in any line, which that paper had not
abused. He had also marked the word republic thus [Illustration], where
it was applied to the French republic. (See the original paper.) He was
evidently sore and warm, and I took his intention to be, that I should
interpose in some way with Freneau, perhaps withdraw his appointment
of translating clerk to my office. But I will not do it. His paper has
saved our constitution, which was galloping fast into monarchy, and has
been checked by no one means so powerfully as by that paper. It is well
and universally known, that it has been that paper which has checked the
career of the monocrats; and the President, not sensible of the designs
of the party, has not with his usual good sense and _sang froid_, looked
on the efforts and effects of this free press, and seen that, though
some bad things have passed through it to the public, yet the good have
preponderated immensely.
* * * * *