Antwerp a stupendous and colossal bulwark; and that it would have been a
whole province in itself. Adverting to this superb establishment, he
observed, that it had been one of the causes of his exile to St. Helena;
that the demand for the cession of Antwerp was one of the circumstances
which led him to reject the conditions of peace proposed at Chatillon.
If the Allies had agreed to leave him in possession of Antwerp, he would
in all probability have concluded peace; and he questioned whether he
had not done wrong in refusing to sign the proposed ultimatum. “At that
period,” said he, “I had doubtless many resources and chances; but yet,
how much may be said in favour of the resolution I adopted! I did
right,” added he, “in refusing to sign the ultimatum, and I fully
explained my reasons for that refusal; therefore, even here, on this
rock, amidst all my misery, I have nothing to repent of. I am aware,
that few will understand me; but, in spite of the fatal turn of events,
even the common mass of mankind must now be convinced that duty and
honour left me no other alternative. If the Allies had thus far
succeeded in degrading me, would they have stopped there? Were their
offers of peace and reconciliation sincere? I knew them too well to put
faith in their professions. Would they not have availed themselves of
the immense advantages afforded them by the treaty, to finish by
intrigue what they had commenced by force of arms? Then where would have
been the safety, independence, and future welfare of France? Where would
have been my honour, my vows? Would not the Allies have ruined me in the
estimation of the people as effectually as they ruined me on the field
of battle? They would have found public opinion too ready to receive the
impression which it would have been their aim to give to it! How would
France have reproached me for suffering foreigners to parcel out the
territory that had been intrusted to my care! How many faults would have
been attributed to me by the unjust and the unfortunate! Could the
French people, full of the recollections of their glory, have patiently
endured the burdens that would inevitably have been imposed on them?
Hence would have arisen fresh commotions, anarchy, and desolation! I
preferred risking the last chances of battle, determining to abdicate in
case of necessity.”[1]
Footnote 1:
These remarks of Napoleon are confirmed by the following:—
_Letter from M. de Caulaincourt, to the Editor of the Constitutionel._
(_Inserted in that Journal on the 21st of January 1820._)
“SIR,—A work by M. Koch, entitled “_Campagne de 1814_,” contains
several fragments of letters written by me to the Emperor and to the
Prince of Neufchâtel, during the sitting of the Congress at Chatillon.
“I think it incumbent on me to declare that this correspondence has
been obtained and published without my knowledge. The high sources
whence the author affirms he has derived his materials confers a
degree of historical importance on his work; and therefore in so far
as I am concerned, I cannot allow myself to sanction, by my silence,
the errors it contains. Most of the details relative to the
negotiations which took place subsequently to the 31st of March, are
incorrect.
“With regard to the Congress of Chatillon, if events have justified
the desire I entertained for the establishment of peace, it would be
wrong to withhold from France and history the motives of national
interest and honour which prevented the Emperor from subscribing to
the conditions which foreigners wished to impose on us.
“I therefore fulfil the first of duties, that of acting justly and
candidly, in developing these motives, by the following extract from
the Emperor’s orders to me.
“_Paris, January 19, 1814._
“.... The point on which the Emperor most urgently insists is the
necessity of France retaining her natural limits: this is my _sine qua
non_. All the powers of Europe, even England, acknowledged these
limits at Frankfort. France, if reduced to her old limits, would not
now possess two thirds of the relative power which she had twenty
years ago. The territory she has acquired in the direction of the
Rhine does not balance what Russia, Prussia, and Austria have acquired
merely by the dismemberment of Poland; all these states have increased
in magnitude. To restore France to her old limits would be to humble
and degrade her. France without the departments of the Rhine, without
Belgium, Ostend, and Antwerp, would be nothing. The plan of limiting
France to her old frontiers is inseparable from the restoration of the
Bourbons; for they alone can offer a guarantee for the maintenance of
such a system. England knows this; with any other government, peace on
such a basis would be impossible, and could not endure. Neither the
Emperor nor the Republic (should revolution again restore it), would
ever subscribe to such a condition. As far as regards his Majesty, his
determination is irrecoverably fixed: he will not leave France less
than he found her. Should the Allies wish to alter the bases that have
been proposed and accepted,—namely, that France should preserve her
natural limits, the Emperor finds only three courses open to him: to
fight and conquer; to fight and perish gloriously; or, finally, if the
nation should not support him, to abdicate. The Emperor attaches but
little importance to sovereignty; he will never purchase it by
degradation.”
“I hope. Sir, that your impartiality will induce you to grant this
letter a place in your Journal, and I take this opportunity of
presenting to you assurances of my respect,” &c.
“CAULAINCOURT,
Duke of Vicenza.”
I acknowledged the justice of the Emperor’s observations. He had lost
the throne, it is true, but voluntarily; and, because he chose rather to
renounce it than compromise our welfare and his own honour. History will
appreciate this sublime sacrifice. Power and life are transitory; but
glory endures and is immortal.
“But, after all,” said the Emperor, “the historian will, perhaps, find
it difficult to do me justice; the world is so overwhelmed with libels
and falsehoods, my actions have been so misrepresented, my character so
darkened and misunderstood.” To this, some one present replied that
doubt could exist only during his life; that injustice would be confined
solely to his contemporaries; that, as he had himself already remarked,
the clouds would disperse in proportion as his memory advanced in
posterity; that his character would rise daily and become the noblest
subject for the pen of history; and that, though the first catastrophe
might have proved fatal to his memory, owing to the outcry that was then
raised against him, yet the prodigies of his return, the acts of his
brief government, and his exile to St. Helena, now left him crowned with
glory in the eyes of nations and posterity. “That is very true,” replied
the Emperor, with an air of satisfaction, “and my fate may be said to be
the very opposite of others. A fall usually has the effect of lowering a
man’s character, but, on the contrary, my fall has elevated me
prodigiously. Every succeeding day divests me of some portion of my
_tyrant’s skin_.”
After a few moment’s silence, the conversation was resumed, on the
subject of Antwerp and the English expedition. “The English Government
and its General” said the Emperor, “seemed to vie with each other in
want of skill. If Lord Chatham, to whom our soldiers gave the nickname
of _Milord J’attends_, had resolved to make an energetic movement, he
might, doubtless, have destroyed our valuable establishment by a _coup
de main_, but, the first moment being lost, and our fleet having got in,
the place was secure. There was a great deal of exaggeration respecting
the efforts and measures taken for the safety of Antwerp. The zeal of
the citizens was excited only for secret and criminal designs.”
On mentioning some facts, of which I had been a witness, I happened to
observe that it was generally marshals who reviewed armies; but that
here the rule had been reversed, and armies reviewed their marshals,
three of whom had succeeded each other in a very short time. “Political
circumstances,” said the Emperor, “called for this change. I sent
Bessieres to Antwerp, because the crisis demanded a firm and
confidential man; but, as soon as the critical period was expired, I
sent another to succeed Bessieres, because I wished to have the latter
near me.”
The maritime works of Antwerp, notwithstanding their immense extent, are
but a small portion of those which were executed by Napoleon. Having
been attached, as a member of the Council of State, to the department of
the marine, I possess, _ex officio_, an account of these works, a list
of which I will here insert, in geographical order, proceeding from
South to North.
1. Fort Boyard, constructed for the purpose of enlarging and defending
the anchorage of the Isle of Aix, whence, by dint of perseverance and
intrepidity, a passage had been discovered out of sight of the enemy,
between Oleron and the main-land, by which even ships of the line could
reach the anchoring grounds of the Gironde and its outlets.
2. The extensive and superb works of Cherbourg. The dike, which was
commenced under Louis XVI., and which had suffered considerable injury
during the Revolution, was repaired; the central part being elevated
nine feet above the highest level of the sea, and along an extent of 100
toises, for the purpose of mounting a battery of twenty guns of the
largest calibre. This work was executed in less than two years, from
1802 to 1804, and with such success that, though it has been neglected
since 1813, it has suffered no decay, and still retains all its original
strength.
A large elliptical tower of granite was built in the centre, and within
the dike, which it supports, and by which, it is, in its turn, covered.
The massive foundations of this tower, which, being constructed in the
open sea, of course presented enormous difficulties, were completed at
the end of 1812, and raised to the height of six feet above the level of
the highest tides. The solidity which it has preserved since that
period, though in a state of neglect, and exposed to the violent action
of the waves, is a manifest proof of the strength of the defensive works
that were projected on this artificial rock, when the time should arrive
for the full completion of the plan. This plan consisted in raising, at
the height of one story, a barrack, capable of containing the garrison,
a powder magazine, reservoir, &c.; this was to be surmounted by an
arched platform, bomb-proof, and capable of receiving a casemated
battery of nineteen thirty-six pounders, and above this was to be a
second platform, capable of receiving mounted guns, if necessary; the
whole crowning the central battery, already existing on the dike itself.
Thus the enemy’s attack would have been resisted by four ranges of
batteries one above another.
In less than eight years, a military port was excavated in the solid
rock. It was capable of containing forty-five ships of the line, a
proportionate number of frigates, three slips for building, &c. This
asylum, so necessary for ships of the line, owing to the natural
situation of the roads of Cherbourg, which are too much exposed to the
violence of the waves, was dug thirty feet beneath the level of the sea,
at the lowest ebb tide, in order to afford, at all times, a secure
station for the largest ships. When it was opened in 1813, the moles and
dikes were fully completed along its whole extent. At that time, the
Empress Maria Louisa and all her Court witnessed the magnificent and
sublime spectacle of the sudden irruption of the sea, which was
admitted, simply by the spontaneous rupture of the immense dam that had
hitherto repelled its efforts. The largest vessels immediately entered
the enclosure, which has since afforded a convenient station for
shipping, together with the requisite accommodations for building,
repairing, and fitting out: in short, it possesses every advantage that
might be expected in so important a creation of art, and is justly
considered to be one of the noblest monuments of Napoleon’s reign.
According to the Emperor’s plan, this stupendous work was intended only
as a first or outward port; he had determined on constructing, in a
lateral direction, at a little distance within it, a second or inner
port, which was to be commenced immediately, and which would have been
speedily completed, owing to the precautions that were previously
adopted. It was to be large enough to receive twenty-five ships of the
line, and behind these two ports, and extending along their whole
length, in a semicircular form, there were to be built thirty covered
docks, where the same number of ships of the line might be kept in
constant readiness to put to sea. Such were the immense works executed
or planned at Cherbourg alone.
3. The numerous works occasioned by the flotilla for the invasion of
England.—It was necessary to provide anchorages, to render the
preparations simultaneous, and to execute every offensive and defensive
operation. All this required, at various points, the construction of
forts of stone and wood, quays, basins, jetties, dams, sluices, &c.
Boulogne was chosen as the central point of assemblage; and Vimereux,
Ambleteuse, and Etaples, were the secondary points. Boulogne itself was
rendered capable of receiving 2,000 ships of different kinds. Besides
its natural port, an artificial basin was formed, by means of a dam,
closed in the middle by a sluice, twenty-four feet wide. This basin was
capable of containing 8 or 900 ships afloat, and in a constant state of
readiness; and the sluice, from the preceding retention, had the
advantage of producing currents of water, which increased the depth of
the real port, and cleared its entrance of sand-banks, by which it was
liable to be obstructed. Vimereux, Etaples, and Ambleteuse, were
simultaneously rendered capable of receiving a proportionate number of
ships: all these undertakings were completed in the space of two years.
4. Important local repairs and improvements in all the ports of the
coast.—Havre was rendered accessible to frigates, by destroying, by
means of a strong sluice, the banks of gravel that obstructed its
entrance. Improvements were made at St. Valery, Dieppe, Calais,
Gravelines, and Dunkirk; the port of the latter was cleared, and the
marsh that covered the town was drained. A second flotilla was to be
assembled at Ostend, to which a free entrance had been effected by
clearing its channel.
5. The works of Flushing.—This town having momentarily fallen into the
hands of the English, they destroyed all its military establishments
when they evacuated it. The Emperor ordered the re-construction of the
works on a much more extensive scale than before. Fully appreciating the
important geographical situation of the place, he ordered the basin to
be re-dug and enlarged, as well as its entrance. The channel was also to
be deepened, so that the basin might be rendered capable of admitting
even eighty-gun ships, and affording a winter station for a squadron of
twenty ships, always ready to put to sea in one or two tides. This
advantage was to be procured by means of a very ingenious plan,
suggested by the naval Commandant of the place, and which consisted
simply in confining the water at high tide, in the ditches of the town.
The basin was a most important acquisition, as it afforded the means of
making naval preparations, free from all the inconveniences of the
Scheldt. Our ships would have been enabled to sail directly to the coast
of England; and the English would thus have been compelled to keep
cruisers constantly on the watch; whereas, hitherto, as soon as they
knew that our ships were disarmed in Flushing, or had returned to
Antwerp, on the approach of winter, they quietly went into port, having
nothing to apprehend until the return of spring. But it was necessary to
render the fortifications of Flushing equal to the protection of a whole
squadron: consequently, defensive works were multiplied on various
points; magazines and other establishments were re-constructed; and
orders were issued for rendering them bomb-proof, and surmounting them
with batteries. Flushing would have been thickly planted with cannon on
all points, and would, in short, have been rendered impregnable.
6. Works commenced at Terneuse.—The importance of the western mouth of
the Scheldt, for enabling our fleet to sail in and out, and the
inconveniences attending the return of our ships to Antwerp, every year
during the winter season, suggested to the Emperor the idea of forming a
still greater arsenal than Flushing near the mouth of the river.
Terneuse, on the left bank of the Scheldt, three leagues from the mouth
of the river, was the point fixed on, and the works were immediately
commenced. They were, however, suspended, on account of the great length
of time, as well as the enormous expense, that would have been requisite
for their completion.
7. The immense works at Antwerp.—This town, which is nearly twenty
leagues distant from the sea, from which it is separated by a winding
and very difficult channel, seemed to be destitute of every desirable
advantage for the formation of a maritime arsenal; and it had hitherto
presented only petty commercial establishments. A fleet built at Antwerp
would, with difficulty, have been able to descend the river, and would
have been but ill defended against the inclemencies of the weather, or
the attempts of the enemy. It would have been useless during one third
of the year; for the approach of winter forced the ships to come higher
up, to avoid the current and ice of the river; there being no wet docks.
But these numerous difficulties seemed as nothing in the eyes of
Napoleon. In his impatience to make the English feel the dangers of the
Scheldt, which they had themselves so frequently acknowledged to be
formidable, he speedily concerted his plans, and, in less than eight
years, Antwerp assumed the aspect of an important maritime arsenal, and
a considerable fleet was already riding in the Scheldt. Every thing was
done thoroughly and completely. Magazines, quays, dock-yards, &c. were
newly constructed. A provisional asylum was found for the shipping
against the ice of the river, at Rupel, while two great wet docks were
dug in the town of Antwerp, capable of receiving vessels of all sizes
with all their guns on board. Twenty slips for building were raised all
in a line, as if by enchantment, and twenty vessels, lying in these
slips at once, presented to the traveller, arriving by the Tête de
Flandres, the imposing and singular spectacle of twenty vessels of the
line ranged as a squadron. Most of these works, however, Napoleon
regarded merely as a temporary provision borrowed from commerce. He
intended to establish a complete and much larger arsenal facing Antwerp,
on the bank of the river, opposite to the Tête de Flandres. He at first
conceived the bold design of throwing a bridge across the Scheldt; but
he at length determined in favour of flying-bridges, of a very ingenious
construction. The Emperor, as I have already observed, had formed the
grandest ideas respecting the improvements at Antwerp, and the details
of his plan extended as far as the sea. He used to say that he intended
to make Antwerp a province, a little kingdom, in itself. To this object
he devoted himself with that degree of interest which he might be
expected to evince in the execution of one of his most favourite
projects. He made several journeys to Antwerp, for the purpose of
personally inspecting the works in their most trivial details.
On one of these occasions, he happened to fall in with a Captain or
Lieutenant-Colonel of Engineers, who was modestly assisting in the
fortifications of the place, and with whom he entered into the
discussion of certain points connected with the business in which he was
engaged. Shortly afterwards, the officer unexpectedly received a letter,
informing him that he was appointed Aide-de-camp to the Emperor, and
directing him to repair to the Tuileries to enter upon his duties. The
poor officer was filled with astonishment: he thought that he was
dreaming, or, that the letter had been misdirected. He was so extremely
diffident, and possessed so little knowledge of the world, that this
announcement of his promotion threw him into great perplexity. He
recollected having once seen me at Antwerp, and he begged I would render
him my assistance. Accordingly, on his arrival in Paris, he came and
assured me of his total ignorance of Court manners, and the
embarrassment he felt in presenting himself to the Emperor. However, I
soon succeeded in encouraging him; and, before he reached the gate of
the palace, he had mustered a tolerable degree of confidence. This
officer was General Bernard, whose great talents were brought into
notice by this circumstance, and who, at the time of our disasters,
proceeded to America, where he was placed at the head of the military
works of the United States.
Napoleon loved to take people thus by surprise. Whenever he discovered
talent, he never failed to raise it to its proper sphere, without
suffering himself to be swayed by any secondary considerations. This was
one of his striking characteristics.
8. The works in Holland.—No sooner had Holland fallen into the hands of
Napoleon, than his creative ardour was immediately directed to all the
different branches of her political economy. He repaired and enlarged
the arsenals of the Meuse, Rotterdam, and Helvoetsluys. Hitherto ships
of the line could not get up to Amsterdam, and could not get out from it
without vast expense and labour; it being necessary to drag them on
_camels_, unladen and without guns, to the opening of the Zuyderzee.
This operation did not suit the rapidity necessary in the great
enterprises of the period; and the Emperor determined to remove the
northern arsenal to a situation in which it would be exempt from these
disadvantages. He accordingly gave orders for the establishment or
improvement of the Nievendip, where, in a short time, twenty-five ships
of the line were provided with a safe winter station, and laid up beside
magnificent quays. This important point was defended by the military
establishments of the Helder, which formed the key of Holland.
Napoleon’s plan was to make the Nievendip the Antwerp of the Zuyderzee.
9. Works of the Weser, the Ems, and the Elbe.—When Napoleon joined
Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, to the Empire, his plans and works extended
with his dominion. He took measures for rendering the Elbe accessible to
ships of the line, and projected a maritime arsenal at Delfzyl at the
mouth of the Ems. But the object which particularly engrossed the
attention of Napoleon was the cutting of a line of canals which, with
the help of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, would have effected a
junction between Holland and the Baltic. We should thus have been
enabled to communicate safely, and by a simple system of inland
navigation, from Bordeaux and the Mediterranean, with the Powers of the
North. We should easily have obtained from them all kinds of naval
productions for our ports, and we should have been able to send out
against them, when we chose, our flotillas from the Channel, Holland,
&c.
All these important works were planned, and most of them executed, with
amazing rapidity. The creative genius of Napoleon conceived them, and
Decrès, the minister, indefatigably prosecuted the designs that were
suggested. The plans were drawn, and the works executed by Prosny,
Sganzin, Cachin, and others. The names attached to such monuments are
imperishable!