a crowd of cosmopolitan admirers, the most important of whom was Madame
de Stael, who regarded him as the one man who could restore France to
prosperity. His flatterers likened him to Henry IV. and harped on the
fact that he also came from Bearn. But in France men cursed the
traitorous Frenchman who was going to turn his sword against his
country, and his name was expunged from the list of the Marshals and
from the rolls of the Senate, while the Emperor bitterly regretted that
he had not sent him to learn Swedish at Vincennes, the great military
prison. When, in accordance with his treaty obligations, early in 1813
the Crown Prince of Sweden landed at Stralsund to take part in the war
against Napoleon, his position was a difficult one. The one object of
the Allies was to overthrow Napoleon, the one object of the Crown Prince
was to become King of France on Napoleon's fall. The Allies therefore
had to beat the French troops, but the Crown Prince would ruin his hopes
if French soldiers were beaten by the troops under his command. It was
clear that Napoleon could only be overcome by the closest co-operation
of all the Allies. Accordingly the Czar and the King of Prussia summoned
the Crown Prince to a conference at Trachenberg in Silesia and did their
best to gratify his pride. The plan of campaign was then arranged, and
the Prince returned to command the allied forces in Northern Germany. At
St. Helena the Emperor declared that it was Bernadotte who showed the
Allies how to win by avoiding all conflict with himself and defeating
the Marshals in detail. With great bitterness he added, "He gave our
enemies the key to our policy, the tactics of our armies, and showed
them the way to the sacred soil of France." Be this as it may, his
conduct during the campaign justified the suspicion with which he was
regarded by friend and foe. Only three times did the Prince's army come
in contact with the forces of the Emperor. At Grosbeeren and Dennewitz,
where his divisional officers fought and won, the Prince kept
discreetly in the rear. At Leipzig he held back so long that the French
army very nearly escaped. It was the taunt of his chief of the staff,
"Do you know that the soldiers say you are afraid and do not dare to
advance?" which at last forced him into battle. But while thus he
offended his allies, he gained no respect from his former countrymen. He
had always believed that his presence alone was sufficient to bring over
the French troops to his side, but his first attempt ought to have
shattered this delusion. At Stettin, during the armistice, he entered
the fortress and tried to seduce the governor, an ex-Jacobin and
erstwhile friend. As he left the town a cannon was fired and a ball
whistled past his ear. He at once sent a flag of truce to demand an
explanation for this breach of the etiquette of war, whereon his friend
the ex-Jacobin replied, "It was simply a police affair. We gave the
signal that a deserter was escaping and the mainguard fired." In spite
of this warning and many other indications, Bernadotte failed to
understand how completely he had lost his influence in France, and while
the Allies were advancing on Paris his secret agents were busy,
especially in Southern France, trying to win the people to his cause.
Keeping well in the rear of the invading armies, he entirely neglected
his military duties and passed his time listening to the reports of
worthless spies. The result of his intrigues was that he quite lost
touch with the trend of events at the front, and when Paris fell,
instead of being on the spot, he was far away. The Czar, long disgusted
with his delays, no longer pressed his suit, and finding an apparent
desire for a Bourbon restoration, accepted the return of that house. So
when the Crown Prince came to Paris he found nothing for it but to make
his best bow to the Bourbons and slink away home to gain what comfort he
could in the conquest of Norway. Thus once again was Sieyes' saying
proved correct: "He is a blackbird who thinks himself an eagle."
On his return home his Swedish subjects gave their Crown Prince a very
warm welcome. They knew of none of his intrigues or tergiversations,
they only saw in him the victorious conqueror of Napoleon, who, by his
successful campaigns, was bringing peace and prosperity to Sweden, by
his diplomacy had acquired Norway, and by his clever huckstering had
gained twenty million francs for ceding to France the isle of
Guadaloupe, of which Sweden had never taken possession, and another
twelve millions for parting with the lost Pomeranian provinces. But in
spite of his popularity at home the Crown Prince had much to make him
anxious abroad. At the Congress of Vienna a strong party backed the
claims of the deposed Gustavus IV., and it was only the generous aid of
the Czar which defeated this conspiracy. Further, the attitude of the
Powers clearly showed him how precarious was the position of an intruder
among the hereditary rulers of Europe. Consequently, when Napoleon
returned from Elba the Prince exclaimed: "The cause of the Bourbons is
for ever lost," and for a moment thought of throwing in his lot with the
Emperor. But the sudden defeat of Murat came as a warning, and he
hastened to offer the aid of twenty-six thousand troops to the Allies.
Though outwardly in accord with them, the Crown Prince secretly hoped
for the victory of Napoleon; to his intimates he proclaimed that
"Napoleon was the first captain of all ages, the greatest human being
who had ever lived, superior to Hannibal, to Caesar, and even to Moses."
Whereat the Crown Princess, who had at last rejoined her husband in
Sweden, replied: "You ought to exclude Moses, who was the envoy of God,
whereas Napoleon is the envoy of the Devil."
The news of Waterloo once again drove the Prince's ideas into their old
current. Surely France must now recognise that he alone could save her;
but the second restoration dashed his hopes to the ground. Yet hope
springs eternal in the human breast, and Bernadotte, year by year,
watched the trend of French politics with an anxious eye. Even as late
as the Revolution of 1830 he still thought it was possible that France
might call him to be her ruler, and he never lost the chance of doing
the Bourbons an ill-turn. In spite of these intrigues, save for an
appeal lodged in 1818 against the high-handed conduct of the Quadruple
Alliance in interfering between Sweden and Denmark, Bernadotte's
European career really ended with the fall of Napoleon. As Charles XIV.
he ascended the Swedish throne on February 18, 1818, on the death of his
adoptive father. As King he pursued the same policy as Crown Prince,
alliance with Russia. His internal policy was based on the principle of
maintaining his dynasty at all costs. With this object, in Sweden he
ruled more or less as a benevolent despot, consulting his States General
as little as possible, paying the greatest attention to commerce and
industry, and opening up the mines and waterways of the country. In
Norway, however, where the Storthing had long enjoyed great powers, he
ruled as a liberal constitutional monarch, and with such good fortune
did he and his successors pursue their policy that of all the diplomatic
expedients arranged at the Congress of Vienna, the cession of Norway to
Sweden stood the test of time the longest, and it was not till 1906 that
the principle of nationality was at last enforced in Scandinavia.
Though Charles XIV. made no attempt to interfere in European politics,
the princes of Europe could never shake off their dislike of him,
standing as he did as the one survival of Napoleon's system. When the
time came for his son Oscar to seek a bride, the Swedish proposals were
met with scorn in Denmark and Prussia, and even in Mecklenburg-Anhalt
and Hesse-Cassel. As the Austrian envoy at the Swedish court whispered
to his English colleague, "All Europe would see the fall of these people
here without regret." Consequently the Swedish King was driven to seek a
bride for his son from Napoleon's family, and eventually the young
Prince married the daughter of Eugene Beauharnais, the old ex-Viceroy of
Italy, Napoleon's stepson.
Charles XIV., a man of regrets, spent the remainder of his life buried
in the memories of the past. He seldom got up till late in the day,
dictating his letters and receiving his ministers in bed. When he was
dressed, he spent some hours going over his private affairs and revising
his investments, for he feared to the end that he might be deprived of
his crown. In the evening he entertained the foreign representatives and
held his courts, after which he passed the small hours of the night with
his particular cronies fighting and re-fighting his battles, and proving
how he alone could have saved Europe from the misery of the Napoleonic
wars. He died on March 3rd, 1844, at the age of eighty, having given his
subjects the precious boon of twenty-five years of peace.
In spite of his brilliant career, Bernadotte must ever remain one of the
most pathetic figures in history. He stands convicted as a mere
opportunist, a man who never once possessed his soul in peace and who
was incapable of understanding his own destiny. So much was this the
case that in his latter days the old Jacobin, now a crowned King, really
believed he was speaking the truth when he said that along with
Lafayette he was the only public man, save the Count of Artois, who had
never changed since 1789. He saw no inconsistency between the
declaration of his youth, "that royalty was a monster which must be
mutilated in its own interest," and his speech as an old man to the
French ambassador, "If I were King of France with an army of two or
three hundred thousand men I would put my tongue out at your Chamber of
Deputies." He was Gascon to the backbone, and his tongue too often
betrayed his most secret and his most transient thoughts. For the moment
he would believe and declare that "Napoleon was not beaten by mere men
... he was greater than all of us ... the greatest captain who has
appeared since Julius Caesar.... If, like Henry IV., he had had a Sully
he would have governed empires." Then, thinking of himself as Sully, he
would gravely add, "Bonaparte was the greatest soldier of our age, but I
surpassed him in powers of organisation, of observation and
calculation." Yet with it all he had many of the qualities which go to
make a man great. His personal magnetism was irresistible, he had
consummate tact, a keen eye for intrigue, a clear vision to pierce the
mazes of political tangles, and considerable strength of purpose backed
by an intensely fiery nature. Frank and generous, he inclined naturally
to a liberal policy, but his innate selfishness too often conquered his
generous principles. It was this conflict between his liberal ideas and
his personal interest which caused that fatal hesitation which again and
again threatened to spoil his career and which made him so immensely
inferior to Napoleon. To gain his crown he willingly threw over his
religion and became a Lutheran; to keep his crown he was ready to
sacrifice his honour. As a Swedish monarch he thought more of the
interests of his dynasty than of the interests of his subjects, but he
was far too wily to show this in action. Posing as a patriot King and
boasting of his love for his adopted country, he ever remained at heart
a Frenchman.
When in 1840 the remains of the great Emperor were transferred to Paris,
he mournfully exclaimed to his representative: "Tell them that I who was
once a Marshal of France am now only a King of Sweden."
V
JEAN DE DIEU NICOLAS SOULT, MARSHAL, DUKE OF DALMATIA
Of all the Marshals of Napoleon, perhaps none is better known to
Englishmen than Jean de Dieu Soult. His long service in the Peninsula,
ending with the stern fighting in the Pyrenees and the valley of the
Garonne, and the prominent part he took in French politics during the
years of the Orleanist monarchy, made his name a household word in
England. The son of a small notary of St. Amand, a little-known town in
the department of the Tarn, Soult was possessed of all the fervour of
the South and the cunning and tenacity of a Gascon. Born on March 29,
1769, he early distinguished himself by his precocity and his quickness
of perception. Although handicapped by a club-foot he determined to be a
soldier, and at the age of sixteen he enlisted in the Royal Infantry
regiment. His intelligence marked him out for the rank of sergeant, and
in 1791 he was sent as sub-lieutenant and drill instructor to a
battalion of volunteers of the Haut Rhin. In spite of his lameness and
his slight frame, the young sub-lieutenant was possessed of a physique
capable of withstanding the greatest fatigue and hardship, and spurred
on by ambition, he never shirked a task which might add to his
reputation. Consequently, he was soon chosen captain by his comrades,
and once war broke out he speedily rose. At the battle of
Kaiserslautern, the storm of the lines of Weissenburg and the siege of
Fort Louis, he forced himself to the front by his gallantry and his
rapid coup d'oeil. But it was the battle of Fleurus which once and for
all established his reputation. Soult was by then colonel and chief of
the staff to General Lefebvre. The gallant Marceau's battalions were
hurled back in rout by the enemy, and their chief in agony rushed up to
Lefebvre crying out for four battalions of the reserve that he might
regain the ground he had lost. "Give them to me," he exclaimed, "or I
will blow out my brains." Soult quietly observed that he would thereby
only the more endanger his troops. Marceau, indignant at being rebuked
by a young staff officer, roughly asked, "And who are you?" "Whoever I
am," replied Soult, "I am calm, which you are not: do not kill yourself,
but lead your men to the charge and you shall have the four battalions
as soon as we can spare them." Scarcely had he uttered these words than
the Austrians fell with fury on Lefebvre's division. For hours the issue
hung in the balance, and at last even the stubborn Lefebvre began to
think of retreat. But Soult, calmly casting a rapid glance over the
field, called out, "If I am not mistaken from what I judge of the
enemy's second line, the Austrians are preparing to retreat." A few
moments later came the order to advance from Jourdan, the
commander-in-chief, and thanks to Soult's soundness of judgment, the
divisions of Marceau and Lefebvre were charging the enemy instead of
fighting a rear-guard action to cover a rout. After the battle, the
generous Marceau sought out Soult. "Colonel," said he, "forgive the
past: you have this day given me a lesson I shall never forget. It is
you in fact who have gained the battle." Soult had not long to wait for
his reward, for in 1794 he was promoted general of brigade.
During the campaign of 1795 Soult was entrusted with a light column of
three battalions of infantry and six squadrons of cavalry, and was
constantly employed as an advance or rear guard. On one occasion, while
covering the retreat at Herborn, his small force was surrounded by four
thousand Austrian cavalry. Summoned to surrender, he indignantly
refused, and forming his infantry in two columns with the cavalry in the
interval between them, during five hours he beat off repeated charges of
the enemies' horse and fought his way back to the main body without
losing a single gun or a single colour. Ten days later he added to this
triumph by inflicting the loss of two thousand men on the enemy in the
mountain combat at Ratte Eig, when both sides struggled to gain the
heights knee-deep in snow. During the campaigns of 1796 and 1797, Soult
increased his reputation amid the marches and counter-marches and
battles in the valleys of the Rhine and the Danube. But it was in
Switzerland that he laid most firmly the foundation of his future
success, for there he gained the friendship and goodwill of Massena, and
it was the conqueror of Zurich who first called Bonaparte's attention to
the sterling qualities of the future Duke of Dalmatia, telling the First
Consul that "for judgment and courage Soult had scarcely a superior." In
1800 Massena took his trusty subordinate with him to Italy as
lieutenant-general of the centre of the army. During the fierce struggle
which ended in the Austrians driving the French into Genoa, the
lieutenant-general was seen at his best, exposing his person in a way he
seldom did later, and showing that strategic insight and power of
organisation for which he was so celebrated. On one occasion, when
cornered by Bellegarde, he was summoned to surrender. The Austrian
parlementaire pointed out that it was hopeless to continue the struggle
as he had neither provisions nor ammunition. To this Soult replied:
"With bayonets and men who know how to use them, one lacks nothing," and
in spite of every effort of the enemy, with the "white arm" alone he cut
his way into Genoa. During the siege he was Massena's right hand, ever
ready with shrewd advice, the soul of every sortie, till unluckily he
was wounded at the combat of Monte Cretto, and captured by the
Austrians, whose prisoner he remained till after Marengo.
[Illustration: JEAN DE DIEU SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA
FROM A LITHOGRAPH BY DELPECH AFTER THE PAINTING BY ROUILLARD]
On the establishment of the Consulate, Soult, whose politics rested
solely on personal ambition and not on principle, at once divined the
aims of Bonaparte. Thanks to Massena's warm introduction and his own
reputation, he found himself cordially received by the First Consul.
Honours were showered upon him. He was one of the four trusted
commandants of the Consular Guard, and when Napoleon began to organise
his forces for the struggle with England, he entrusted Soult with the
command of the important army corps at Boulogne. The First Consul could
have made no better selection. Under his rough exterior Soult hid great
powers of business, a keen perspicacity, and much tact. Quick-witted,
with a subtle, restless spirit, he had great strength of character, and
his ambition spurred him on to a diligence which knew neither mental nor
physical fatigue. But in spite of his cold air and self-restraint, he
loved the pleasures of the table, and was passionately fond of women,
while his wife exercised a complete domination over him, and before her
he quailed like a child. In war he had the keen imagination and quick
penetration of a great strategist. His special forte was the planning of
vigorous enterprises. But he preferred to direct rather than to lead.
Though his courage was undoubted, as he grew older he was chary of
risking his person, and had not the dashing qualities of Lannes and Ney.
As an administrator he was the equal of Davout. Once entrusted with the
command of the army corps at Boulogne, the young general of thirty-five
laid aside all thoughts of personal pleasure and ease and set himself to
manufacture a fighting machine which should be the most perfect of its
time. Never was such attention shown to details of administration and
instruction, and the discipline of the corps at Boulogne was the
severest that French troops had ever undergone. As might be expected,
there were many grumbles, and soon rumours and complaints reached the
First Consul, who himself remonstrated with his lieutenant, telling him
that the troops would sink under such treatment; but he was greeted with
the reply, "Such as cannot withstand the fatigue which I myself undergo
will remain at the depots: but those who do stand it will be fit to
undertake the conquest of the world." Soult was right in his estimate,
for in spite of the demands he made on their endurance, he had won their
love and admiration; the weak and the grumblers fell out, and when war
was declared his corps marched to the front, a body of picked men with
absolute confidence in their leader. In spite of the fact that he had
never held an independent command, there was no surprise when he was
included among the number of the Marshals, for his brilliant record, his
selection as commandant of the Guard, his success at Boulogne, and the
favour which the First Consul had long shown to him, had marked him out
as one of the coming men. The campaign of 1805 bore witness to the
justness of the Emperor's choice. It has often been said, and indeed
Wellington himself lent credit to the dictum, that Soult was primarily a
strategist and no tactician, but at Austerlitz he showed that calm
capacity to read the signs of the conflict, and that knowledge of when
and where to strike, which had first brought him to the front in the
days of Fleurus. Entrusted with the command of the centre, in spite of
the entreaties of his subordinates and even the commands of the Emperor,
he refused to open his attack until he saw that the Russian left was
hopelessly compromised. Thanks to his clearness of foresight, when once
he launched his attack he not only put the issue out of doubt, but
completely overwhelmed the Russians. Their left was surrounded and
annihilated while the centre and right were driven from the field in
complete rout. At the moment when the Marshal was directing the movement
which wrested from the enemy the key of the position, Napoleon and his
staff arrived on the scene. The Marshal explained his manoeuvre and
asked the Emperor for orders. "Carry on, carry on, my dear Marshal,"
said the Emperor; "you know quite as well as I do how to finish the
affair." Then, stretching out his arms to embrace him, he cried out, "My
dear Marshal, you are the finest tactician in Europe." After the treaty
of Pressburg Soult's corps remained as part of the army of occupation in
the valley of the Danube, and in 1806 formed one of the corps of the
Grand Army during the Prussian War. At Jena he had the satisfaction of
playing an important part in the battle, for when Ney's rash advance had
compromised the situation, it was he who checked the victorious rush of
the enemy. But later the Marshal had bitter cause to repent these
triumphs won over his rival. Already the enemy of Berthier, and
consequently often misrepresented to the Emperor, Soult now incurred the
bitter hatred of Ney; and what the enmity of Berthier and Ney meant he
found to his cost during the Peninsular War. Immediately after Jena the
Marshal was detached in pursuit of the Prussians, and on the day
following defeated Marshal Kalkreuth at Greussen and proceeded to
blockade Magdeburg. From Magdeburg he hurried off to join in the pursuit
of Bluecher, and aided by Bernadotte he cornered the crafty old Prussian
at Luebeck. But brilliant as his performance was, he did not gain the
credit he deserved, for on the day of the action Murat arrived and took
over the command, arrogating to himself all the honours of the
surrender. The Marshal was justly indignant, but, bitterly as he
resented the injustice, he was too politic to storm at the Emperor like
Marshal Lannes. In the terrible campaign in Poland the Marshal added to
his laurels. At Eylau, when Augereau had been routed, Davout checked,
and Ney and Bernadotte not yet arrived on the field, it was he who
warned the Emperor against showing any signs of retreat. "Beware of
doing so, Sire," he exclaimed; "let us remain the last on the field and
we shall have the honour of the day: from what I have seen I expect the
enemy will retreat in the night." The advice was sound, and the Marshal,
during the night following the battle, had the pleasure of being the
first to perceive that the enemy was retreating, and it was his
aide-de-camp who carried the news to headquarters. Well it was for the
Emperor that he accepted Soult's advice, for the terrible carnage in the
snow had taken the heart out of the troops, and a retreat would have
soon degenerated into a rout. So shaken was the French morale, that
when, on the next day, the Emperor rode down the lines, instead of being
greeted with cries of "Long live the Emperor," he was received with
murmurs of "Peace and France," and even "Peace and Bread." During the
final advance Soult had his share of the hard fighting at Heilsberg, but
he escaped from the horrors of Friedland, as he had been detached to
occupy Koenigsberg. After the peace of Tilsit, the Marshal's corps was
cantonned round Stettin, and it was there that in 1808 he received the
title of Duke of Dalmatia. The selection of this name caused the Duke
much annoyance, for instead of receiving a title which should recall one
of his great exploits, as had Ney, Davout, Lannes, Kellermann, and
Massena, his designation was chosen from a country with which he had not
the smallest connection, and thus he found himself on a par with
Bessieres, Maret and Caulaincourt. What he hankered after was the title
of Duke of Austerlitz, but the Emperor refused to share the glories of
that day. In spite of the huge dotation he received, the Marshal added
this supposed slight to the many grudges he bore his master.
From Stettin the Duke of Dalmatia was summoned in September, 1808, to
attend the Conference at Erfurt, and from there he was hurriedly
despatched to Spain. The Emperor was much displeased with many of his
corps commanders, and so on the arrival of the Duke he ordered him to
take over from Marshal Bessieres the command of the second corps. Soult
was delighted at the prospect of service. Full of zeal, he set out for
his new command, and pushing on in spite of all obstacles, he arrived at
his headquarters alone on a jaded post-horse twenty-four hours before
his aides-de-camp. A few days later he dashed to pieces the semblance of
a Spanish army at Gamoral and occupied Burgos, where he was unable to
prevent his new command from sacking the town and inflicting every
possible horror on the inhabitants. From Burgos the Emperor despatched
him to the north-west, and thus it was that the cavalry of Sir John
Moore's army surprised Soult's outpost at Sahagun. The Emperor could
scarcely believe that an English army had actually dared to advance
against his troops, but he at once ordered Soult to co-operate with the
divisions he led in person from Madrid, and when he found that the
English were bound to escape, he handed over the command to the Marshal.
The French suffered almost as much as the English in the terrible
pursuit, and it was the tried soldiers of both armies who at last met
face to face at Corunna. After the battle Soult wrote to the Emperor
that without fresh reinforcements he could effect nothing against the
English, but when later he found that the enemy had evacuated Corunna,
he claimed that he had won a victory. With a generosity that must be
placed to his credit, he took great care of the grave of his adversary,
Sir John Moore, and erected a monument with the inscription, "Hic
cecidit Johannes Moore dux exercitus Britannici in pugna Januarii xvi.
1809, contra Gallos a duce Dalmatiae ductos."