for the systematic conquest of the whole Peninsula. The pivot of the
whole scheme rested on the supposed ability of Soult to overrun Portugal
and drive the British out of Lisbon by February 16, 1809. Unfortunately,
Napoleon left one factor out of his calculations, and that the most
important, namely, the feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese
populations. The Duke of Dalmatia very soon perceived the Emperor's
mistake, but, anxious not to be accused of shirking his task and of
allowing himself to be stopped by what were termed bands of ill-armed
peasants, he started on his expedition to conquer the kingdom of
Portugal with but three thousand rounds for his guns and five hundred
thousand cartridges for his infantry, carried on the backs of mules, for
owing to the state of the roads in the north-west corner of the
Peninsula wheel traffic was impossible. In spite of the difficulties of
transport and the murmurs of many of his officers, the indefatigable
Marshal hurled all obstacles aside and with sixteen thousand troops
forced his way into Oporto on March 29th, six weeks behind his scheduled
time. But there he had to call a halt, for he had not the men nor the
material for a further advance on Lisbon. The situation was by no means
reassuring. To reach Oporto he had been obliged to cut himself adrift
from his base, and he had no tidings of what was happening in the rest
of the Peninsula. During April he set himself to conciliate the people
of Portugal and at the same time to try and get into touch with the
other French corps in Spain. The Marshal's attempt at conciliation was
on the whole successful, but his kindness resulted in an unsuspected
turn in the situation. A movement was started among a certain section of
the Portuguese nobility and officials to offer the crown of Portugal to
the Marshal. The Duke of Dalmatia, greedy and ambitious but ever
cautious, was of opinion that though the Emperor might disapprove of the
idea, he would accept a fait accompli. Accordingly he secretly
sanctioned the movement, and allowed placards to appear in Oporto
stating that "the Prince Regent, by his departure to Brazil, had
formally resigned the crown, and that the only salvation of Portugal
would be that the Duke of Dalmatia, the most distinguished of the pupils
of the great Napoleon, should ascend the vacant throne." Further, he
actually, on April 19th, ordered his chief of the staff to send a
circular to commanding officers inviting their co-operation in his
seizure of the crown, stating that by so doing they would in no way be
disloyal to the Emperor. Luckily for the Marshal, the arrival of Sir
Arthur Wellesley and the English army, before the plot could succeed,
once and for all blew aside this cloudy attempt at kingship. For the
Emperor, on hearing of the affair, although he pardoned the Marshal,
saying, "I remember nothing but Austerlitz," still wrote in the same
despatch "that it would have been a crime, clear lese majeste, an attack
on the imperial dignity," and added that it was no wonder that the army
grew discontented, since the Marshal was working, not for France, but
for himself, and that disobedience to the Marshal's orders was quite
justified. For once, then, the Marshal, usually so clever and cautious,
had allowed ambition to run away with prudence. Meanwhile the military
situation grew day by day more disquieting. In the French army there was
a section of the officers ready to declare against the Empire whenever a
chance occurred, and one of them, Argenton by name, actually entered
into a treasonable negotiation with Sir Arthur Wellesley. It was thanks
to the discovery of this plot that the Marshal first got information of
his enemies' projected advance.
With thirty thousand English marching against him and Spanish and
Portuguese forces across the main line of retreat, it was impossible to
expect to hold Oporto, and accordingly the Marshal began preparations
for withdrawal. But having secured, as he thought, all the boats on the
Douro, he concluded that he could only be attacked by a force ferried
across at the river mouth by the boats of the English fleet.
Consequently he kept no watch up stream. So complete was the surprise
that an hour after the enemy had effected a landing above the town the
Marshal, who had been up all night, was still in bed; his staff were
quietly breakfasting when an officer galloped up with the news of the
crossing. Soult could do nothing else but give the order to retreat by
whatever means possible, and it was fortunate for the French that the
pursuit was not pushed harder. But once he had grasped the situation he
made amends for his previous neglect of supervision and showed himself
the Soult of Austerlitz and Eylau. Sacrificing his baggage, his guns,
and his military chest, guided by a Spanish pedlar, he made a most
astounding march through the rugged region of Tras os Montes. Crossing
lofty passes, forcing gorges in the teeth of hostile bands of peasantry
and guerillas, by hard fighting and magnificent marching he brought his
troops to safety. The campaign of Oporto did not add to the Marshal's
reputation; his political ambition was the cause of all the disaster,
for it prevented him from supervising his subordinates' operations. It
was his fault that there was no proper road for retreat and that he was
surprised by the English army. Still, though he had committed great
faults, he had shown a surprising ability in extricating himself from
their consequences.
When Soult reached Lugo, in Spain, he found his rival Ney, from whom he
begged stores and equipments, and with whom he was bound to confer on
the general situation. Ney at first magnanimously granted the Marshal's
requests. But unfortunately the men of Ney's corps greeted the armed
rabble which followed Soult's standards with jeers and execrations, and
the quarrel spread from the men to the officers and at last to the
Marshals; so fierce were Ney's taunts that Soult actually drew his sword
and a duel was with difficulty averted. Thereafter Soult, while
promising to co-operate with Ney in the pacification of Galicia,
actually did nothing and seriously compromised his rival, whereon Ney
refused to obey any orders given by the Duke of Dalmatia. Such was the
situation when a summons from Madrid called the two Marshals to the
succour of Joseph, who was threatened by the combined armies of Cuesta
and Sir Arthur Wellesley in the valley of the Tagus. The Marshals
arrived in time to save Madrid, but not in time to surround the Allies,
who escaped south across the Tagus, and the one chance of success the
Spanish offered them was lost, since Soult, eager for personal
aggrandisement, attacked Albuquerque before Marshal Victor had time to
arrive on the scene of action. The consequence of this was far-reaching,
for Victor, like Ney, refused in future to work in conjunction with
Soult. Moreover, when a council was held to decide on the next
operations, and Soult, wisely, no doubt, insisted that at Lisbon lay the
key to the situation, all the other Marshals voted against his scheme,
as each one determined that he would not be made subordinate to the Duke
of Dalmatia. Soult accordingly had to content himself with occupying the
valley of the Tagus, while the other Marshals returned to the districts
which had been allotted to them before the allied advance on Madrid.
While contemplating this unsatisfactory situation the Duke of Dalmatia
was rejoiced to receive a despatch from the Emperor appointing him
major-general of the forces in Spain in place of Jourdan and entrusting
him with the invasion of Andalusia. Before setting out for the South,
Soult had the satisfaction of completely routing the Spaniards at Ocana.
It was early in 1810 that he entered Andalusia and seized Seville,
Granada, and Malaga. The Marshal found himself in the congenial position
of absolute ruler of the richest provinces of Spain. But though the
important towns fell easily, and with them the accumulated riches of
centuries, the people remained sullenly hostile, and bands of armed
peasantry hung ever on the rear and flanks of the French columns, and
stragglers and despatch-riders were found by the roadside with their
throats cut. To meet this situation, at the Emperor's orders Soult
issued a proclamation setting forth that whereas Joseph Bonaparte was
King of Spain and no Spanish Government existed, all Spaniards taken in
arms were rebels against his Catholic Majesty and would be immediately
shot. The Cortes from Cadiz replied by at once issuing a
counter-proclamation stating that for every Spaniard executed and for
every house burned three Frenchmen should be hung. Still, in spite of
this war of reprisals, the French gradually tightened their grip on
Southern Spain, and soon Cadiz remained the only important fortress
still in the hands of the enemy. The Marshal found it was impossible to
take this important position by storm, and contented himself with
masking it by a strong corps under Marshal Victor. Meanwhile he was
busily engaged in organising the new government of Andalusia, and so
successful were his efforts that neither the Spanish Government at Cadiz
or the constant incursions of Spanish and British armies were able to
shake his hold on that province. But wise and successful as were his
methods, the glory of his rule was darkened by his harshness and greed.
The churches and convents were ruthlessly despoiled of their treasures,
and many a fine Murillo and Velasquez was despatched to Paris to
decorate his salons.
In the eyes of the Duke of Dalmatia, Andalusia was a vast reservoir of
wealth which might be used as a base from which a well-equipped force
could threaten Lisbon, the real focus of all the opposition to the
French domination of the Peninsula. It was in pursuance of this plan
that he conciliated the municipal authorities, strengthened the police,
and built up huge reserve magazines by a system of imposts so carefully
arranged that they should not unduly press on the Spanish population.
But unfortunately for the Duke's schemes they ran counter to those of
King Joseph. For the Marshal determined to use the wealth of his rich
provinces for the special object of an attack on the British power at
Lisbon, but Joseph desired that the revenue thus acquired should be sent
to assist him to maintain his kingly state. Soult, strong in his
position as major-general and backed by the Emperor's approval, refused
to listen to the demands of the King, and there began a struggle which
did more than anything else to bring about the fall of the Napoleonic
kingdom of Spain. In spite of the fact that the Marshal gradually wore
down the guerillas, actually raised and trained large bodies of Spanish
troops, built up vast magazines and arsenals at Seville, exploited the
lead mines at Linares and the copper mines of the Rio Tinto, established
foundries for military accessories, and fitted out privateers, the
jealousy of Joseph brought the Marshal's great schemes to nought.
The continual and vexatious demands of the King acted in a most
unfortunate way on Soult's character, for this stupid opposition so
irritated his hard and egotistical nature that he saw in every scheme
not planned by himself a desire to belittle his glory. Unfortunately for
his own reputation and the success of the French arms, he allowed this
feeling to obscure his judgment, and he refused to give more than a
half-hearted co-operation to any measures not actually suggested by
himself. Thus it was that, in spite of the commands of the Emperor and
the entreaties of Joseph, he refused to make any attempt to co-operate
with Massena in his advance on Portugal until it was too late. Then,
when he actually did advance, he showed all his old energy and skill,
for in fifty days he mastered four fortresses and invested a fifth, he
captured twenty thousand prisoners and killed or dispersed ten thousand
men; but he disregarded the main objective, the expulsion of the English
from Lisbon, and contented himself with the siege of Badajoz, and thus,
while winning a fortress, he lost a kingdom. From want of his
co-operation Massena was forced to retreat, and the grip of the English
on the Peninsula was more firmly established than ever.
Badajoz was soon to prove itself a place of ill omen for Soult, for a
few months later, when an Anglo-Portuguese army under Beresford laid
siege to it, he was forced to come to its rescue. It was in the attempt
to relieve this fortress that the terrible battle of Albuera was fought.
At the commencement of the fight the Marshal, by a masterly manoeuvre,
threw himself across the allied right flank and seized the hill that
dominated the position, and it looked as if the allied lines were bound
to be crumpled up. But a brigade of English infantry stood firm amid the
rout, and with measured volleys checked the victorious advance of the
elated French. Soult, by every effort of voice and gesture, attempted to
force his veterans to face the foe, but in vain. "Nothing could conquer
that astounding infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no
nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of their order: their flashing
eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front, their measured tread
shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every
formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the discordant cries that
broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd as slowly, and with a
horrid carnage, it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to
the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserve mix with
the struggling multitude to sustain the fight: their efforts only
increased the immediate confusion, and the mighty mass, breaking off
like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the steep. The rain flowed
after in a stream discoloured by blood: and eighteen hundred unwounded
men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood
triumphant on the fatal hill." Thus Napier describes the battle of
Albuera. So nearly a magnificent victory for the French: turned by
British valour into a defeat. But it was not only the valour of the
enemy which cost Soult his success, it was his own errors. The
commencement of the attack was a magnificent conception, but the Marshal
failed to understand the tactics of his enemy, and it was his blind
attempt to crush the line with heavy columns which allowed the English
musket fire to annihilate his dense masses. After the cessation of the
combat he committed another great fault. Though his attack had been
beaten back, it was known that the Allies had suffered much more
severely than the French, and on the strength of this he claimed a
"signal victory"! But instead of holding his ground he withdrew a day
later, whereas if he had shown a confident front Beresford would have
been bound to retire, and Badajoz would have been relieved. After the
battle of Albuera, Soult was reinforced by the Army of Portugal under
Marmont; but discord soon broke out between the two Marshals, the Duke
of Dalmatia maintaining that the way to attack Lisbon was from his own
base in the south, and the Duke of Ragusa advocating the northern route.
After lying together for some time the two armies separated, and Soult
moved south to complete his operations against Cadiz and Gibraltar. It
was while the Marshal was thus engaged, early in 1812, that the Duke of
Wellington suddenly captured Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and was thus
able, after defeating Marmont at Salamanca, to march in the summer on
Madrid. Soult replied to Joseph's summons to come to his help by telling
him that his best policy was to join him in Andalusia and make a
counter-stroke at Lisbon. But the King refused to listen to this wise
advice, so the Marshal was obliged to give up all his achievements and
go to Joseph's help. Meanwhile the King wrote complaining to the
Emperor, but Napoleon replied that Soult was the "only military head" in
Spain, and could not be moved. But after more bickering, early in 1813,
Joseph wrote to say that if the Marshal remained in Spain he himself
must leave the country, and the Emperor, anxious to regain his military
prestige, so weakened by the Russian campaign, was glad to summon the
Duke of Dalmatia to the Grand Army. But Soult's gloomy prophecy was soon
fulfilled that "the loss of Andalusia and the raising of the siege of
Cadiz are events that will be felt throughout the whole of Europe." The
Marshal's service at the head of the Imperial Guard was terminated by
the news of the fatal battle of Vittoria; for the Emperor immediately
hurried him back to try to prevent the English from forcing the barrier
of the Pyrenees.
The Duke of Dalmatia gladly accepted the mission, in spite of the
repugnance of the Duchess, who hated Spain, where, as she said, "nothing
is got but blows." So hearty was her dislike of the country that she
actually went to the Emperor saying her husband was too shattered in
health for the task. But she met with a stern rebuff: "Madam," said
Napoleon, "recollect I am not your husband; if I were, you should
conduct yourself very differently."
The campaign of the Pyrenees bore ample testimony to the wisdom of the
confidence the Emperor had placed in the power of his lieutenant. With
marvellous sagacity Soult reorganised the scattered relics of the French
armies, and within ten days of his arrival at headquarters he was ready
to assume the offensive, and actually all but surprised the Duke of
Wellington at Sorauren. But great as were his strategical powers and his
methods of organisation, he was no match for Wellington on the field of
battle, and step by step he was forced back into France. Round Bayonne
he showed his complete mastery of the art of war by the admirable way he
used his command of the inner lines always to oppose the enemy's attack
by superior force. Then, when retreat was inevitable, instead of falling
back towards Paris, he withdrew south, thus forcing his adversary to
divide up his army; for the English had to detach a strong division to
cover their communications at Bordeaux. During the retreat, again and
again Soult turned at bay, at Orthez and many another good position;
but Wellington ever outmanoeuvred him on the field, and even turned
him out of the seemingly impregnable position of Toulouse. Never was a
retreat more admirably carried out. Every opportunity afforded by the
ground, every advantage of position was seized on, to use to the full
the French dash in the attack. No more admirable illustration can be
found of the truth that the essence of defence lies in a vigorous local
offence. Wellington himself bore testimony to Soult's virtues,
maintaining that of the Marshals he was second only to Massena.
With the Restoration the Marshal at once accepted the change of
government and gave his adhesion to the Bourbons. His general reputation
and the high place he held in the opinion of Wellington and others
caused the King in the December of 1814 to appoint him Minister of War.
Such was his position when news arrived of Napoleon's landing at Frejus.
The Duke of Dalmatia did all in his power to organise resistance to the
Emperor's advance, but he had many enemies, and the King, listening to
their advice, replaced him as minister by Clarke, Duke of Feltre. Soult
then retired to his country estate at Villeneuve-l'Etang, near Saint
Cloud. On his arrival at Paris, the Emperor at once sent for him, but at
first he refused to go to court. Ultimately, finding the Emperor's cause
in the ascendant, he cast aside hesitation and threw in his lot with
him. It has been said that the Duke betrayed the Bourbons and was privy
to the Emperor's return, but this is a calumny. Napoleon at St. Helena
said, "Soult did not betray Louis, nor was he privy to my return. For
some days he thought that I was mad, and that I must certainly be lost.
Notwithstanding this, appearances were so against him, and without
intending it, his acts turned out to be so favourable to my project,
that, were I on his jury and deprived of what I know, I should have
condemned him for having betrayed Louis. But he really was not privy to
it." The Emperor joyfully accepted the Marshal's adherence and made him
one of his new peers, and when war was imminent, on the advice of
Davout, he created him major-general and chief of the staff. This
selection was unfortunate; good strategist and organiser, he was not the
man the Emperor required. Berthier, who had not half his military
ability, had made an excellent chief of the staff, because he had the
rare quality of effacing his own ideas and acting simply as the recorder
and expander of those of Napoleon. But Soult was accustomed to think for
himself, and his mind was unable to attune itself to the mind of the
Emperor. Further, from long experience, Berthier was accustomed to fill
up gaps in the Emperor's orders in the way he intended, but Soult had
never so far worked in close co-operation with Napoleon, and after years
of independent command was more accustomed to give orders to his own
chief of the staff than to work out minutiae for another. Consequently,
all through the Waterloo campaign the staff work was badly done. Orders
were faultily drafted, mistakes were made in their despatch, and the
Emperor was constantly bewailing the loss of "that brute Berthier." A
typical example of the friction which arose between the Emperor and his
new major-general occurred when, at Waterloo, Napoleon asked Soult if he
had sent to Grouchy intelligence of the approach of the Prussians; the
Marshal replied, "Yes, I have sent an officer." "One officer!" cried
Napoleon; "ah! if only my poor Berthier had been here, he would have
sent six." To add to these troubles, Soult was unfortunately hated by
the officers of the army, who regarded him with grave suspicion. But
though the Marshal must bear his share in the disaster of Waterloo, it
is only fair to add that the morning of the battle he, and he alone,
warned the Emperor of the magnitude of the coming struggle, and
entreated him to recall at least a portion of Grouchy's command. The
Emperor roughly rejected his advice with the words, "You think that
because Wellington defeated you he must be a great general. I tell you
that he is a bad general, that the English are bad troops, and that this
will be the affair of a dejeuner." The Marshal, with the memory of many
a battle with these "poor troops" from Oporto to Toulouse, could only
sorrowfully say, "I hope so."
On the second Restoration the Duke of Dalmatia found himself included
among the proscribed, and for three years he retired to the Duchy of
Berg, the home of his wife, during which time he occupied himself in the
composition of his Memoirs. But in May, 1819, he was recalled to France,
and soon found means of ingratiating himself with the Bourbons. In
January, 1820, his Marshal's baton and his other honours were restored
to him, and he entered the field of politics. With his vast income,
acquired from the spoils of nearly every country in Europe, he
maintained his high rank in lordly fashion. A visitor who in 1822 went
to see his famous collection of pictures thus describes him: "We were
received by the Marshal, a middle-sized though somewhat corpulent
personage of from fifty to sixty years of age, whose dark curling hair
rendered somewhat conspicuous the bald patch in the middle of his head,
while his sunburnt complexion accorded well with his dark intelligent
eye. His plain stock, plain dark coat and loose blue trousers, which,
capacious as they were, could not hide his bow-legged form, obviously
suggested the soldier rather than the courtier, the Marshal rather than
the Duke; though if I had encountered such a figure in London I should
rather have guessed him an honest East or West Indian captain." The
Marshal knew well how to win favour with the new Government, and when
the reactionaries attempted to restore the ancient position of the
Church, no one was more regular in his attendance at Church festivals
and processions than the Duke of Dalmatia, who always appeared with an
enormous breviary carried before him, though people were unkind enough
to say that it would be more to the purpose if he restored some of the
vast plunder of the churches and monasteries of Spain.