Sieyes, the inveterate constitution-monger, who saw the necessity of "a
man with a head and a sword," greeted him joyfully; the banishment of
Pichegru, the death of Hoche, the disgrace of Moreau, and the absence of
Bonaparte had left Bernadotte for the moment the most important of the
political soldiers of the Revolution. Acting on Sieyes's advice,
Bernadotte refused all posts offered him either in the army or in the
Government and awaited developments. Meanwhile he became very intimate
with Joseph Bonaparte, who introduced him to his sister-in-law, Desire
Clary. The Clarys were merchants of Marseilles, and Desire had for some
time been engaged to Napoleon Bonaparte, who had jilted her on meeting
Josephine. Desire, very bitter at this treatment, accepted Bernadotte,
as she said in later life, "because I was told that he was a man who
could hold his own against Napoleon." This marriage was a master-stroke
of policy; it at once gave Bernadotte the support of the Bonaparte
family, for Bonaparte in his way was still fond of Desire, and at the
same time it gave Bernadotte a partner who at bottom hated Napoleon with
a rancour equal to his own. After the disasters in Italy and on the
Danube, on July 2, 1799, Bernadotte, thinking the time was come,
accepted the post of Minister of War. He speedily put in the field a
new army of one hundred thousand men, and by his admirable measures for
the instruction of conscripts and for the collection of war material he
was in no small way responsible, not only for Massena's victory of
Zurich, but, as Napoleon himself confessed, for the triumph of Marengo.
His term of office, however, was short, for his colleagues intrigued
against him. Sieyes desired a man who would overthrow the Directory and
establish a dictatorship: Barras was coquetting with the Bourbons.
Bernadotte himself talked loudly of the safety of the Republic, but had
not the courage to jump with Sieyes or to crouch with Barras. Oppressed
by doubt, his imagination paralysed his action, and his personality,
which only blazed when in movement, became dull. Still trusting his
reputation and thinking that he was indispensable to the Directory, he
tendered his resignation, hoping thus to check the intrigues of Sieyes
and Barras. To his surprise it was at once accepted, and he found
himself a mere nonentity.
On September 14th Bernadotte resigned, on October 9th Napoleon landed at
Frejus. During the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire Bernadotte remained
in the background. Desiring the safety of France by the reorganisation
of the Directory, hating the idea of a dictatorship, jealous of the
success of his rival, he refused to join the stream of generals which
hurried to the feet of the conqueror of Italy and Egypt. Bonaparte, who
could read his soul like a book, attempted to draw his rival into his
net, but, as ever, the Gascon could not make up his mind. At first he
was inclined to join in the conspiracy, but at last he refused, and told
Bonaparte that, if the Directory commanded him, he would take up arms
against those who plotted against the Republic. Still, even on the
eventful day he hesitated, and appeared in the morning among the other
conspirators at Bonaparte's house, but not in uniform, thinking thus to
serve both parties.
During the years which succeeded the establishment of the Consulate,
Bernadotte waged an unending subterranean war against Napoleon. Scarcely
a year passed in which his name was not connected with some conspiracy
to overthrow the First Consul. Of these Napoleon was well advised, but
Bernadotte was too cunning to allow himself to be compromised
absolutely. However much he might sympathise with the conspirators and
lend them what aid he could, he always refused to sign his name to any
document. Accordingly, although on one occasion a bundle of seditious
proclamations was found in the boot of his aide-de-camp's carriage, the
charge could not be brought home. On another occasion, when it was
proved that he had advanced twelve thousand francs to the conspirator
Cerrachi, he could prove that it was the price he had paid the artist
for a bust. In spite of the fact that no definite proof could be brought
against him, the First Consul could easily, if he chose, have produced
fraudulent witnesses or have had him disposed of by a court-martial, as
he got rid of the Duc d'Enghien. Napoleon waited his time. He was afraid
of a Jacobin outbreak if he made a direct attack against him. Further,
Bernadotte had a zealous friend and ally in Joseph Bonaparte. So when
pressed to take stern measures against his enemy, Napoleon always
refused to do so, partly from policy, partly because of his former love
for Desire, and partly from the horror of a scandal in his family, which
might weaken his position when he seized the imperial throne.
Accordingly he attempted in every way to conciliate his rebellious
subject, and at the same time to place him in positions where he could
do no political harm. Together with Brune and Marmont, he made him a
Senator. He offered him the command of the Army of Italy, and, when
Bernadotte refused and demanded employment at home, he posted him to the
command of the division in Brittany, with headquarters at Rennes. But
the First Consul found that Rennes, far off as it was, was too close to
Paris; accordingly he tried to tempt his Jacobin general by important
posts abroad. He proposed in succession the embassy at Constantinople,
the captain-generalcy at Guadaloupe, and the governorship of Louisiana,
but Bernadotte refused to leave France. At last, early in 1803 Napoleon
nominated him minister to the United States. Three times the squadron of
frigates got ready to accompany the new minister, but each time the
minister postponed his departure. Meanwhile war broke out with England,
and Bernadotte was retained in France as general on the unattached list,
owing to the efforts of Joseph.
On the establishment of the Empire Napoleon included Bernadotte's name
among the number of the Marshals, partly to please his brother Joseph
and to maintain the prestige of his family and partly, as in the case of
Augereau, Massena and Jourdan, to win over the staunch republicans and
Jacobins to the imperial regime. For the moment the Emperor achieved his
object. The ex-Jacobin, proud of his new title and luxuriating in his
lately acquired estate of Grosbois, was actually grateful; but still,
Gascon-like, he wanted more and complained he had not enough to maintain
his proper state. Napoleon, hearing of this from Fouche, exclaimed:
"Take from the public treasury enough to put this right. I want
Bernadotte to be content. He is just beginning to say he is full of
attachment for my person; this may attach him more." But a few days
later the Marshal revealed his true feelings when, talking of Napoleon
to Lucien, he said, "There will be no more glory save in his presence
and by his side and through his means, and unfortunately all for him."
Though the Emperor had promoted him to honour, it was no part of his
scheme to allow to remain in Paris a man who, as Talleyrand said, "was
capable of securing four cut-throats and making away with Napoleon
himself if necessary, a furious beast, a grenadier capable of all and
everything, a man to be kept at a distance at all cost." Accordingly the
Marshal very soon found himself sent to replace Mortier in command of
the "Army of Hanover."
For fifteen months Bernadotte administered Hanover, and the subtle
courtesy he showed to friend and foe alike made him as usual the adored
of all with whom he came in contact. But whatever he did, the Emperor
still suspected him, and gave the cue to all, that Bernadotte was not to
be trusted and was no soldier. Napoleon always took care that Bernadotte
should never have under his command French soldiers. His troops in 1805
were Bavarians; in 1807, Poles; in 1808, a mixture of Dutch and
Spaniards; and in 1809, of Poles and Saxons. Berthier, working out the
Emperor's ideas, and himself also hating Bernadotte, took care that in
the allotment of duties the disagreeable and unimportant tasks should
fall to the Marshal. In spite of the inferiority of his troops,
Bernadotte as usual distinguished himself in the hour of battle. At
Austerlitz, at the critical moment, he saw that unless the centre was
heavily supported Napoleon's plan of trapping the Russians must fail, so
without waiting orders he detached a division towards the northern
slopes of the plateau, and thus materially assisted in winning the day.
But though quickwitted and alert on the battlefield, he never shone in
strategy. In the movements which led up to a battle he was always slow
and inclined to hesitate, and his detractors seized on this fault to
declare, with Napoleon's connivance, that he was a traitor to the
Emperor and to France. An incident of the campaign of 1806 gave the
Marshal's enemies an excellent opening for showing their dislike.
Napoleon, thinking he had cornered the whole Prussian army at Jena on
the night of October 13th, sent orders to Bernadotte to fall back from
Naumburg and get across the Prussian line of retreat. In pursuance of
these orders the Marshal left Naumburg at dawn on the morning of the
14th and marched in the direction of Apolda, which he reached, in spite
of the badness of the roads, by 4 p.m., and thereby captured about a
thousand prisoners. But Napoleon had been mistaken in his calculations;
the main Prussian force was not at Jena, but at Auerstaedt, where it was
most pluckily engaged and beaten by Davout, who at once sent to ask aid
of Bernadotte; but the Marshal, according to Napoleon's definite orders,
pursued his way to Apolda. The Emperor, to vent his dislike against
Bernadotte and to cover up his own mistake, asserted that he had sent
him orders to go to Davout's assistance, but a careful examination of
the French despatches proves that no such document existed; in fact, the
official despatches completely exonerate Bernadotte. Before the campaign
was finished, Napoleon had to give the Marshal the praise he merited,
when, aided by Soult and Murat, he at last forced Bluecher to surrender
with twenty-five thousand men and all the Prussian artillery at Luebeck.
At Eylau Bernadotte's ill luck once again pursued him, for the staff
officers sent to order him to march to the field of battle were taken by
the enemy. This misfortune gave another opportunity to his detractors,
and again the Emperor lent his authority to their false accusations.
While secretly countenancing every attack on the Marshal, the Emperor,
for family reasons, was loth to come to an open breach. On June 5, 1806,
he had created him Prince of Ponte Corvo, a small principality in Italy
wedged in between the kingdom of Naples and the Papal States; his reason
for so doing he explained in a letter to his brother Joseph, the King of
Naples. "When I gave the title of duke and prince to Bernadotte, it was
in consideration of you, for I have in my armies many generals who have
served me better and on whose attachment I can count more. But I thought
it proper that the brother-in-law of the Queen of Naples should hold a
distinguished position in your country." It was for this reason also
that, after the treaty of Tilsit, the Emperor presented the Prince with
vast domains in Poland and Hanover.
During the interval between the peace of Tilsit and the outbreak of the
war with Austria in 1809, the Prince of Ponte Corvo returned to his duty
of administering Hanover. Pursuing his former policy of ingratiating
himself with everybody, he renewed his old friendships with all classes,
and gained the goodwill of his neighbours in Denmark and Swedish
Pomerania, showing a suavity which was in marked contrast to rigid
disciplinarians of the school of Davout. Such conduct, however, did not
gain the approval of the Emperor, whose policy was, by enforcing the
continental system, to squeeze to death the Hanseatic towns, which were
England's best customers.
The Marshal was so keenly aware of the displeasure of the Emperor and
the hatred of many of his advisers, especially of Berthier, the chief of
the staff, that he actually asked to be placed on half pay at the
commencement of the campaign of 1809, but the Emperor refused his
request. He had determined to end the unceasing struggle between himself
and Bernadotte. The battle of Wagram gave him his opportunity. On the
first day of the battle, the Marshal had severely criticised, in the
hearing of some of his officers, the methods the Emperor had adopted for
crossing the Danube and attacking the Archduke Charles, boasting that if
he had been in command he would by a scientific manoeuvre have
compelled the Archduke to lay down his arms almost without a blow. Some
enemy told the Emperor of this boast. On the next day Bernadotte's corps
was broken by the Austrian cavalry and only saved from absolute
annihilation by the personal exertion of the Marshal and his staff, who,
by main force, stopped and re-formed the crowd of fugitives. The Emperor
arrived on the scene at the moment the Marshal had just succeeded in
staying the rout, and sarcastically inquired, "Is that the scientific
manoeuvre by which you were going to make the Archduke lay down his
arms?" and before the Marshal could make reply continued, "I remove you,
sir, from the command of the army corps which you handle so badly.
Withdraw at once and leave the Grand Army within twenty-four hours; a
bungler like you is no good to me." Such treatment was more than the
Marshal's fiery temperament could stand, and accordingly, contrary to
all military regulations and etiquette, he issued a bulletin without the
authority of the Emperor praising the Saxon troops, and thus magnifying
his own importance. The Emperor was furious, and sent a private
memorandum to the rest of the Marshals declaring that, "independently of
His Majesty having commanded his army in person, it is for him alone to
award the degree of glory each has merited. His Majesty owes the success
of his arms to the French troops and to no foreigners.... To Marshal
Macdonald and his troops is due the success which the Prince of Ponte
Corvo takes to himself." It seemed as if Bernadotte's career was
finished.
The Emperor found he had no longer any reason to fear him, and for the
moment determined to crush him completely. So when he heard that Clarke
had despatched the Prince to organise the resistance to the English at
Flushing, he at once superseded him by Bessieres. But the prospect of an
alliance by marriage with either Russia or Austria once again caused the
Emperor to reflect on the necessity of avoiding scandal and discord in
his own family; accordingly he determined to try and propitiate the
Marshal by sending him as his envoy to Rome. To a born intriguer like
Bernadotte, Rome seemed to spell absolute exile, and accordingly, in the
lowest of spirits, he set about to find excuse to delay his journey,
little thinking that fortune had turned and was at last about to raise
him to those heights of which he had so long dreamed. Long before, in
1804, at the time of the establishment of the Empire, he had secretly
visited the famous fortune-teller, Mademoiselle Lenormand, who had told
him that he also should be a king and reign, but his kingdom would be
across the sea. His boundless ambition, stimulated by Southern
superstition, had fed itself on this prophecy, even when the breach with
Napoleon seemed to close the door to all hope.
In May, 1809, a revolution in Sweden had deposed the incapable Gustavus
IV. and set up as King his uncle Charles, Duke of Sudermania. The new
King, Charles XIII., was old and childless. Accordingly the question of
the succession filled all men's minds. With Russia pressing in on the
east and Denmark hostile on the west, it was important to find some one
round whom all might rally, by preference a soldier. It was of course
obvious that France, the traditional ally of Sweden, dominated Europe.
Accordingly the Swedes determined to seek their Crown Prince from the
hands of Napoleon. Now, of all the Marshals, Bernadotte had had most to
do with the Swedes. At Hamburg he had had constant questions to settle
with the Pomeranians. At the time of Bluecher's surrender at Luebeck he
had treated with great courtesy certain Swedish prisoners. It seemed
therefore to the Swedish King's advisers that the Prince of Ponte Corvo,
the brother-in-law of King Joseph, the hero of Austerlitz, was the most
suitable candidate they could find. Napoleon, however, was furious when
he heard that a deputation had arrived to offer the position of Crown
Prince of Sweden to Bernadotte. Too diplomatic to refuse to allow the
offer to be made, he set to work at once secretly to undermine the
Marshal's popularity in Sweden, and while pretending to leave the
decision to Bernadotte himself, assured his friends that the Marshal
would never dare to accept the responsibility. But Napoleon had
miscalculated. Some kind friend informed the Marshal of what the Emperor
had said, and, as Bernadotte himself admitted, it was the taunt, "He
will never dare," which decided him to accept the Swedish offer. Before
the Crown Prince elect quitted France the Emperor attempted to place on
him the condition that he should never bear arms against him; but
Bernadotte, foreseeing the future, refused to give any such promise,
and at last the Emperor gave in with the angry words, "Go; our destinies
will soon be accomplished!"
The Crown Prince took with him to Sweden his eldest son, who had
curiously, by the whim of his godfather, Napoleon, been named Oscar. But
his wife, Desire, could not tear herself away from Paris, where she had
collected a coterie of artists and writers; her salon was greatly
frequented by restless intriguers like Talleyrand and Fouche. Woman of
pleasure as she was, the gaiety of Paris was the breath of her nostrils.
Accordingly the Crown Princess remained behind, as it were the hostage
for the Prince's good behaviour, but in reality a spy and secret
purveyor of news hostile to Napoleon.
On landing in Sweden the Crown Prince took all by storm. His good looks,
his affability, his great prestige and his apparent love for his new
country created an enthusiasm almost beyond belief. But while everything
seemed so favourable the crafty Gascon from the first foresaw the
dangers which beset his path. Napoleon hated him. Russia looked on him
with distrust and desired to absorb Sweden. England and the other Powers
mistrusted him as the tool of the Emperor. Accordingly, the moment he
landed at Gothenburg the Prince clearly defined the line he intended to
pursue, exclaiming, "I refuse to be either the prefect or the
custom-house officer of Napoleon." This decision meant a complete
reversal of Swedish foreign policy and a breach with France. Fortunately
for Bernadotte the old King, Charles XIII., was only too glad to leave
everything to his adopted son. Since it was impossible to make a
complete volte face in a moment, the Crown Prince was content to allow
the Swedes to taste to the full the misery of trying to enforce the
continental system. For he knew what disastrous effect a war with
England would have on Swedish trade, and he foresaw that his subjects
would soon be glad to accept any policy whereby their sea-borne commerce
might be saved. While the Swedes were learning the folly of fighting
the mistress of the sea, the Crown Prince had time to make his plans, so
that when the moment arrived he might step forward as the saviour of the
country. It was quite clear that a breach with France must mean the loss
of Pomerania and all hope of regaining the lost provinces on the
southern shores of the Baltic. But Bernadotte determined to find in
Norway a _quid pro quo_ for Pomerania. To force Russia, the hereditary
foe of Sweden, to make her hereditary ally, Denmark, grant Norway to
Sweden, would be a master-stroke of diplomacy, while an alliance with
Russia would guarantee the Swedish frontiers and would bring peace with
England, because Russia was on the point of breaking with the
continental system. The Swedes would thus gain Norway and recover their
sea-borne trade, while the Crown Prince would be acknowledged as the
legitimate heir of the royal house of Vasa and no longer regarded as an
interloper, a mere puppet of Napoleon.
Success crowned the efforts of the elated Gascon. The Czar, with the
prospect of a French invasion at his door, was delighted beyond measure
to find in Sweden an ally instead of a foe. In August, 1812, he invited
the Crown Prince to Russia and the treaty of Aboe was signed, whereby
Russia promised to lend her aid to Sweden to gain Norway as the price of
her help against France; a little later a treaty was concluded between
England and Sweden. The Crown Prince returned from Aboe full of relief;
not only was he now received into the inner circle of legitimate
sovereigns, but the Czar had actually volunteered that if Napoleon fell
"I would see with pleasure the destinies of France in your hands."
Alexander had kindled a flame which never died as long as Bernadotte
lived. The remainder of his life might be summed up as an effort to gain
the crown of France, followed by a period of vain regrets at the failure
of his hopes.