The difficulty with Dickens is not any failure in Dickens, nor even

in the popularity of Dickens. On the contrary, he has recaptured his

creative reputation and fascination far more than any of the other

great Victorians. Macaulay, who was really great in his way, is

rejected; Cobbett, who was much greater, is forgotten. Dickens is not

merely alive: he is risen from the dead. But the difficulty is in the

failing under his feet, as it were, of that firm historic platform on

which he had performed his Christmas pantomimes: a platform of which

he was quite as unconscious as we, most of us, are of the floor we

walk about on. The fact is that the fun of Christmas is founded on the

seriousness of Christmas; and to pull away the latter support even from

under a Christmas clown is to let him down through a trap-door. And

even clowns do not like the trap-doors that they do not expect. Thus

it is unfortunately true that so glorious a thing as a Pickwick party

tends to lose the splendid quality of a mere Mummery, and become that

much more dull and conventional thing, a Covent Garden Ball. We are not

ourselves living in the proper spirit of Pickwick. We are pretending to

be old Dickens characters, when we ought to be new Dickens characters

in reality.

The conditions are further complicated by the fact that while reading

Dickens may make a man Dickensian, studying Dickens makes him quite

the reverse. One might as well expect the aged custodian of a museum

of sculpture to look (and dress) like the Apollo Belvedere, as expect

the Pickwickian qualities in those literary critics who are attracted

by the Dickens fiction as the materials for a biography or the subject

of a controversy; as a mass of detail; as a record and a riddle. Those

who study such things are a most valuable class of the community, and

they do good service to Dickens in their own way. But their type and

temperament are not, in the nature of things, likely to be full of

the festive magic of their master. Take, for example, these endless

discussions about the proper ending of _Edwin Drood_. I thought

Mr. William Archer’s contributions to the query some time ago were

particularly able and interesting; but I could not, with my hand on my

heart, call Mr. William Archer a festive gentleman, or one supremely

fitted to follow Mr. Swiveller as Perpetual Grand of the Glorious

Apollos. Or again, I see that Sir William Robertson Nicoll has been

writing on the same Drood mystery; and I know that his knowledge of

Victorian literature is both vast and exact. But I hardly think that a

Puritan Scot with a sharp individualistic philosophy would be the right

person to fall off the coach. Sir William Nicoll, if I remember right,

once forcibly described his individualist philosophy as “firing out the

fools.” And certainly the spirit of Dickens could be best described

as the delight in firing them in. It is exactly because Christmas is

not only a feast of children, but in some sense a feast of fools, that

Dickens is in touch with its mystery.

Taffy

I do not understand Welshmen. When we say we do not understand

such-and-such a person, we usually mean that he has been making himself

a nuisance. He has been bothering us in some way; and the puzzle of his

motives and further intentions has become a practical one. I do not

mean anything of the kind here: I mean barely what I say. The distant

Trojans never injured me. Taffy never came to my house or stole any

part of the provisions. On the contrary, historically speaking, I went

to Taffy’s house and took away a good deal of what belonged to him. I

do not think that Taffy is a thief; I do not even know enough about him

to be sure of the preliminary statement that he is a Welshman. I mean,

quite simply and ingenuously, that I know nothing about Wales--not even

(for certain) that there is such a place. I went, indeed, a few weeks

ago to a curious place full of rocks; and the people there _said_ it

was Wales. But, then, other people said that these people were very

sly, and that you could not believe anything they said. But, then,

as I did not believe the second people who did not believe the first

people, it all came back to the same comfortable condition as before,

which is one of blank and disinterested nescience. It is a condition I

am in with regard to a large number of things in this world. I keep my

faith for the things of another world. About this world I am a complete

agnostic.

But in this particular case of ignorance I rather fancy that I am

not alone. I think that the great majority of Englishmen have no

real notion of the Welsh type or spirit, whatever it is. They have

conceptions of the Scot and the Irishman, false conceptions, but always

containing some lines of a true tradition. The Englishman does, so

to speak, understand the Scotchman even when he misunderstands him.

The Englishman does know what the Irish are, even while he demands

indignantly of heaven why they are. The stingy Puritan in plaid

trousers is a very crude and unjust version of that queer blend that

makes the Scot--the combination of a certain coarseness of fibre with

great intellectual keenness for abstract and even mystical things.

Still, it is a version; the prose and poetry of the Scot remain in

the caricature. The picture of Paddy at Donnybrook leaves out all the

subtlety and self-tormenting irony that are mixed up with the pugnacity

of the Irish. Still, the Irish are pugnacious; the Englishman has got

the leading feature right. He knows that, for all his economics, the

Scotchman often has a bee in his bonnet, and he knows that the Irishman

generally has a wasp in his--a thing that will sting itself or anyone

else merely for fun or glory.

In these cases, the caricature, though stiff, highly coloured,

antiquated, and largely false, tells the remains of several truths. But

who on earth has ever seen a caricature of a Welshman? In _Punch_ and

such papers we never see anything but pictures of a Welshwoman--as

if there were no males in that peculiar country with the rocks. Even

the woman is only marked as Welsh by wearing an extraordinary costume,

rather like that of Cinderella’s supernatural godmother. Without the

artist suggesting any costume at all, one would recognize the very

silly portraits of Irishmen with long upper lips, in the style of apes.

Without any plaid trousers to assist the mind, one could spot the stiff

beards and rocky cheek-bones of the Scotchmen of Charles Keene. But

if you took away the Welshwoman’s extraordinary hat, there would be

nothing whatever to show that she was a Welshwoman. We have not in our

minds a Welsh type to make fun of. It is interesting to remember that

apparently Shakespeare had.

This state of entire non-understanding (as distinct from

misunderstanding) of the Welsh seems to me just now to be not only

unique, but important and rather serious. For, unless I am very much

mistaken, Wales is going to play some peculiar, and perhaps dominant,

part in the developments of our extraordinary time. If the Welsh begin

to influence us without our having yet even begun to imagine them,

we shall have the whole Irish business over again; the gradual or

imperfect understanding of a thing in the process of wrestling with it

in the dark. The indications of such a movement in Wales (wherever it

is), the suggestion of the growing influence of Welshmen (whoever they

may be), is something that comes to us rather by widely distributed

happenings and hints than in any theatrical example. Some, however,

would call Mr. Lloyd George a theatrical example; he has been called

even more extraordinary things. And in that degree the thing is true.

Mr. Lloyd George is very much more genuine and sincere and formidable

in his capacity as leader of the little Welsh nation than he is in

any of the other capacities in which he is foolishly praised and

ridiculously reviled. But to anyone who really has an eye for history

in action, the smallest strike secretary in a Welsh railway or colliery

bulks much bigger in the present picture than Mr. Lloyd George. And it

has been in Wales that many of the most dramatic and effective labour

revolts have happened: above all it was in Wales that they presented

peculiar features of their own, bad or good, which marked them out

from the whole temper and habit of England in recent times. The modern

theory of animals was challenged in the episode of the ponies in

the mines. The modern theory of Jews was challenged in the violent

Anti-Semite riots of the last few weeks. Things fierce and unfamiliar,

things lost since the Middle Ages, are coming upon us out of the West.

As the curious incident of the quarrels between Welshmen and Jews

has been mentioned, I will take the opportunity here of correcting

a curious mistake that clings to the minds of numbers of my

correspondents. There is in particular a gloomy gentleman in America

who keeps on asking me how my Anti-Semite prejudice is getting on, and

generally displaying a curiosity about how many Hebrew teeth I have

pulled out this week, and how often a Pogrom is held in front of my

house. He appears to base it all on some statement of mine that Jews

were tyrants and traitors. Upon this basis his indignation is eloquent,

lengthy and (in my opinion) just. The only weakness affecting this

superstructure is the curious detail that I never did say that Jews

were tyrants and traitors. I said that a particular kind of Jew tended

to be a tyrant and another particular kind of Jew tended to be a

traitor. I say it again. Patent facts of this kind are permitted in

the criticism of every other nation on the planet: it is not counted

illiberal to say that a certain kind of Frenchman tends to be sensual.

It is as plain as a pikestaff that the Parisian tradition of life and

letters has a marked element of sensuality. It is also as plain as a

pikestaff that those who are creditors will always have a temptation

to be tyrants, and that those who are cosmopolitans will always have

a temptation to be spies. This has nothing to do with alleging that

the majority of any people falls into its typical temptations. In this

respect I should imagine that Jews varied in their moral proportions

as much as the rest of mankind. Rehoboam was a tyrant; Jehoshaphat was

not. In what is perhaps the most celebrated collection of Jews in human

history, the proportion of traitors was one in twelve. But I cannot see

why the tyrants should not be called tyrants and the traitors traitors;

why Rehoboam should not cause a rebellion or Judas become an object of

dislike, merely because they happen to be members of a race persecuted

for other reasons and on other occasions. Those are my views on Jews.

They are more reasonable than those of the people that wreck their

shops; and much more reasonable than those of the people who justify

them on all occasions.

“Ego et Shavius Meus”

Accident has cut me off this week from many current publications; and

left me much to my own devices. It is therefore my immutable purpose to

write an article about myself, under the thin pretence of noticing a

book about Mr. Bernard Shaw.

This is all the more fun because it is exactly what Mr. Bernard Shaw

would do himself; nor should I blame him. I like Mr. Shaw’s type of

Egoism; because, if he talks big, it is at least about big things;

things bound to be bigger than himself.

I revolt, not against the loud egoist, but the gentle egoist; who

talks tenderly of trifles; who says, “A sunbeam gilds the amber of my

cigarette-holder; I find I cannot live without a cigarette-holder.”

I resist this arrogance simply because it is more arrogant. For even

so complete a fool cannot really suppose we are interested in his

cigarette-holder; and therefore must suppose that we are interested

in him. But I defend a dogmatic egoist precisely because he deals in

dogmas.

The Apostles’ Creed is not regarded as a pose of foppish vanity; yet

the word “I” comes before even the word “God.” The believer comes

first; but he is soon dwarfed by his beliefs, swallowed in the

creative whirlwind and the trumpets of the resurrection. And if a man

says he believes in the Superman or the Socialist State, I think him

equally modest; only not so sensible.

Mr. Herbert Skimpole’s book, _Bernard Shaw: the Man and His Work_,

contains many suggestive and valuable things to which I cannot do

justice, including allusions to myself mostly only too flattering,

and in one case both amusing and mystifying. The passage suggests

that all the active figures in my idle fictions are made as fat as I

am; though I cannot recall that any of them are fat at all; except

a semi-supernatural monster in a nightmare called _The Man Who Was

Thursday_.

Let there be no alarm, however, that I shall talk about such

nightmares, or any of my own tales; like Shaw, I am egoistic about

things that matter. Mr. Skimpole says that while Shaw and I agree

that the world should be adapted to the man, “Chesterton includes our

present institutions among the parts of a man’s soul which cannot be

altered.” Now there is here a potential mistake, which I will not

apologize for taking more seriously than any fancy about the figures in

my very amateurish romances.

I need not say I do not mind being called fat; for deprived of that

jest, I should be almost a serious writer. I do not even mind being

supposed to mind being called fat. But being supposed to be contented,

and contented with the present institutions of modern society, is a

mortal slander I will not take from any man.

Whatever are the institutions I defend, they are not primarily those of

the present. They have been attempted in the past; and I hope they may

be achieved in the future; but they are not present, but conspicuous by

their absence. Mr. Skimpole truly says that I defend domesticity and

piety and patriotism, but these are not the typical institutions of

to-day.

The typical institutions of to-day are a Divorce Court cutting up

families with the speed of a sausage machine; a Science which preaches

the destiny without the divinity of Calvinism; and a Finance that

crosses all frontiers with the same enlightened indifference that is

shown by cholera.

These are the institutions of the instant, and even Mr. Skimpole has

realized them as those of the immediate future. In a somewhat innocent

passage he says that “it is of no use for Shaw to point out” to me

the hope of a cosmopolitan future; “that Internationalism, social

class-feeling, and Imperialism all point the same way he refuses to

see.”

It is indeed useless for Shaw to point out to me that I should follow

the lead of these things; since I happen to detest Imperialism,

disbelieve in Internationalism and distrust “social class-feeling,”

so far as I know what it means. I am well aware that an Imperial

Chancellor in Berlin, an international money-lender in Johannesburg,

and an anarchist spy in Petrograd, are “all pointing the same way”; and

that is why I feel pretty safe in going the other.

I warmly apologize to Mr. Skimpole for writing a personal explanation

instead of a review of his book, which contains many things well worth

writing and reviewing; notably the shrewd remark about Shaw’s style;

in which what is a paradox in spirit is seldom an epigram in form.

It takes our breath away rather by taking itself for granted than

by defining itself like a defiance. But I fancy Mr. Skimpole will

sympathize with me if I am primarily concerned with his convictions, as

he is with mine, and as we both are with Shaw’s.

And he has gone to the vital point in emphasizing this matter of the

things permanent in man. When I say that religion and marriage and

local loyalty are permanent in humanity, I mean that they recur when

humanity is most human; and only comparatively decline when society is

comparatively inhuman.

They have declined in the modern world. They may return through the

war; but anyhow, where we have the small farm and the free man and the

fighting spirit, there we shall have the salute to the soil and the

roof and to the altar.

To take a more casual case: I believe that when men are happy, they

sing; not only at the piano but at the plough, or at least in the

intervals of ploughing; at their work and in their walks abroad. I am

well aware that modern men do not sing in the street very much. I am

well aware that cosmopolitan money-lenders never sing, but die with all

their music in them. I know that the Song of the Happy Meat-Contractor

is not one of “our present institutions.”

I know that one can seldom come at dawn upon some solitary London

banker carolling more sweetly than the lark; and even his clerks do not

often sing in chorus over their ledgers. But I still think it is more

human to sing than not to sing; and that, being more human, it is more

permanent in humanity.

Some righteous revolution will teach the bankers and contractors that

little birds who can sing and won’t sing must be made to sing--or at

any rate made to squeal. In the interlude, the instinct of song takes

refuge in the lesser thing called poetry, or even prose; and to-morrow

the fever of personal sincerity may have passed; and I shall return,

with a lowly air, to literature.

The Plan for a New Universe

There is one theory of the Origin of Species which I have never seen

suggested. Probably this is because I have never read the numberless

and voluminous works in which it has been suggested. For I have read

much madder things, and nothing mad is likely to have been missed by

the modern mind. But since it shocked the respectability of agnostics

to suggest that all creatures had been made different by God, why did

nobody suggest that they had been made different by Man? Why not trace

the vast variety of animals as we can really trace the vast variety

of dogs? The dog is already almost a world in himself, with all the

appearance of distinct orders and types. A St. Bernard approaches the

size and surpasses the legendary virtues of a lion; while there is

a sort of Pekinese which a man might almost tread on as a somewhat

unpleasing insect. Yet all this world of evolution has presumably

had Man for its god. Suppose our sphere in space has itself been the

Island of Dr. Moreau. Suppose Man had some prehistoric civilization

so colossal and complete that all beasts were beasts of burden, or

all animals were domestic animals; that all rabbits were pet rabbits

or all fleas performing fleas. Suppose the tame bird came first, and

what we know as the wild bird afterwards. Mr. Bernard Shaw, in one of

his early anti-domestic diatribes, compared a woman in the home to a

parrot in the cage, saying that mere custom made us think the connexion

natural. The answer, it has always seemed to me, is strangely obvious.

It is surely plain that the housewife is not the bird in the cage, but

the bird in the nest. But if, in that age of wild sceptics, anyone had

wished to outdo Mr. Shaw in paradox, he could have done it brilliantly

by this hypothesis that the colours of a parrot were actually produced

in a cage; and that an exiled bird only built himself a rude den of

sticks and mud as an outlaw does when driven from his home. Suppose,

in short, that Man has not only been a dog-fancier, but a wolf-fancier

and a hyena-fancier. Suppose he really fancied a rhinoceros. Suppose

some prehistoric squire kept a stud of giraffes; or his money-lender

got a peerage on the plea that he had improved the breed of crocodiles.

Then we have only to suppose this universal Zoo broken up like the

Roman Empire; and all we see is its neglect and riot. The tiger is a

stray cat; a specially large and handsome cat who took the prize (and

the prize-giver) and escaped to the jungle. A whale was some sort of

hornless cow sent into the sea like a Newfoundland dog, who suddenly

refused to come back again. This thesis accounts for the comparative

rapidity of the differentiation, over which the geologists fight with

the biologists. It accounts rationalistically for those evidences of

a creative purpose which are so distressing to a refined mind. It

accounts for the camel, who seems always to have been in captivity;

and accounting for a camel is something. Above all, it accounts for

that very vivid impression of something in various species at once

outrageous and exact. Jefferies found in the farcical outlines of fish

or bird the notion that they must have been produced without design.

To me this sounds like saying that the caricatures of Max Beerbohm

must have been produced without design. I could as easily believe, so

far as this mere æsthetic impression goes, that the face on a gargoyle

was merely moulded by the pouring rain. Artistically, the sun-fish or

the hornbill do not look in the least like accidents; but it might be

maintained that they look like fashions. There are some tropical birds

and fruits that really have the cut and colours of novelties in a shop

window. We might fancy that an elephant was designed in the same taste

as Babylonian architecture; or the leopard and the tiger to match the

tapestries of the East. There is probably somewhere a bird as sinister

and terrifying as a top-hat; and in some luxuriant jungle a plant as

preposterous as a pair of trousers. The monsters may be only antiquated

fashion-plates. For this is one of the numberless neglected fallacies

in the clotted folly of Eugenics. Even if we could in the abstract

breed humanity well, there would be a flutter of modes and crazes about

what was considered well-bred. The dog is bred with design; but surely

not always with discretion. The dachshund appears to have been pulled

out on the rack of some demoniac vivisectionist; and somebody seems to

have cut off the bull-dog’s nose, most emphatically to spite his face.

On the analogy of the things we do breed, the Eugenist may be expected

to produce a brood of hunchbacks or a pure race of Albinos.

It is, I hope, unnecessary to remark that I do not believe in this

theory; but there have been people who might well have believed in it.

There were people who could believe in Swinburne’s sentiment, “Glory

to Man in the highest; for Man is the master of things”; and it would

surely have completed this consciousness in the poet if he could have

thought that the birds of Putney Heath, where he walked, or the fishes

in the sea, where he was so fond of swimming, were doing tricks taught

to them as to performing dogs. Suppose that such a fancy had fitted in

with one of the humanitarian religions of that time, how far would it

have satisfied what was often called the religious sentiment? It would

not have satisfied any religious sentiment, not even Swinburne’s. He

would have cared as little as Shelley to claim the birds when he could

not claim the sky. He certainly would have been much annoyed with the

notion of loving the fishes, if he were not allowed to go on loving

the sea. And though he poisoned paganism with pessimism, a thing not

only more false but more frivolous, though he tried to love the sea as

a wanton or admire the sky as a tyrant, though this morbidity weakened

his love of Nature not only as compared with Virgil or Dante, but

as compared with Wordsworth or Whitman, yet he was like every poet

elemental, and what he loved were the elementary things. And this is an

essential of any poetry and any religion. It must appeal to the origins

and deal with the first things, however much or little it may say about

them. It must be at home in the homeless void, before the first star

was made. The one thing every man knows about the unknowable is that

it is the Indispensable.

The Uses of Diversity: A book of essays · 第 9 / 12 段