Now, if any reader thinks that the scientific heresy I sketched above

is too irrational for moderns to have held, I have the pleasure of

informing him that moderns are now about to announce, or have already

announced, a new heresy somewhat analogous but much less rationalistic

and much less rational. There is a new religion; that is a new fault

being found with the old religion. There is a new plan for a new

universe, which may be expected to last for many a long month to come.

It is the view that seems to have satisfied Mr. Wells, or, at any rate,

Mr. Britling. It is the view which has been more than once suggested

by Mr. Shaw, and is repeated in the skeleton of certain lectures he

is delivering. It is much more supernatural and even superstitious

than my imaginary thesis; for instead of giving to man more of the

powers of God, it arbitrarily imagines a God and then limits him with

the impotence of man. He is not limited, as in the theologies, by his

own reason or justice or desire for the freedom of man. He is limited

by unreason and injustice and the impossibility of freedom even for

himself. But I do not make this note upon the new development with any

intention of discussing it thoroughly in its theological aspect; though

there is one aspect of that aspect which may respectfully be called

amusing. When I was a boy, Christianity was blamed by the freethinkers

for its anthropomorphic demigod, substituted by savages for the Unknown

God who made all things. Now Christianity is blamed for the flat

contrary; because its God is unknown and not anthropomorphic enough.

Thirty years ago we only needed the First Person of the Trinity; and

thirty years later we have discovered that we only need the Second.

This sort of fashion-plate philosophy will no doubt go on as usual. In

a few decades we may be told that our fathers were profoundly right

when they believed in the Archangel Gabriel, but made an inexplicable

mistake when they believed in the Archangel Raphael. We shall learn

that the Seraphim are an exploded superstition, but the Cherubim a

most valuable and novel discovery. And as my note is not concerned

with the theological, neither is it directly concerned with the purely

logical side of it. Here again, it seems obvious that all the doubts

which legitimately attach to the idea of a progressive humanity are

absolutely fatal to the idea of a progressive divinity. A man may be

progressing towards God; but what is a God progressing towards? And

how does he know which of two developments in consciousness is the

better (_e.g._, an imaginative compassion or an imaginative cruelty)

if there be no aboriginal standard in his own nature? I am here only

concerned to note the failure of this fancy where it is parallel to the

failure of the fancy I mentioned first. And it is the weakness which

would instantly be discovered in both of them, not only by every poet

but by every child. It is that unless the sky is beautiful, nothing

is beautiful. Unless the background of all things is good, it is no

substitute to make the foreground better: it may be right to do so for

other reasons, but not for the reason that is the root of religion.

Materialism says the universe is mindless; and faith says it is ruled

by the highest mind. Neither will be satisfied with the new progressive

creed, which declares hopefully that the universe is half-witted.

George Wyndham ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

I believe more and more that there are no trivialities but only truths

neglected; but the things I myself neglect accumulate in mountains.

I have made a note of one of them found in turning over the recent

files of the _Nation_. Elsewhere was a reminder about a book I had

long admired and enjoyed, but which had been crowded out of my mind by

less pleasant things; the book of recollections about George Wyndham,

recently written by Mr. Charles Gatty and published by Mr. Murray.[1]

Even now I cannot do justice to the book; but I know Mr. Gatty will

approve of my saying a word to correct an injustice to the subject of

the book.

[Footnote 1: _George Wyndham: Recognita_, by C. T. Gatty. Murray. 7s.

6d. net.]

Some time ago the _Nation_ dismissed Mr. Gatty’s volume, not with

disrespect, but with a certain distance and indifference evidently

founded on a very mistaken idea. It implied that Wyndham was after all

an intellectual aristocrat, whose culture was that of a clique, and who

did not test it enough in popular and practical politics. The point is

interesting; chiefly because it is the precise reverse of the truth.

If anything could narrow a man like Wyndham, it was being political

like the _Nation_; what broadened him to a universal brotherhood was

getting far from politics--like the nation. His private life was much

larger than his public life; though that in turn was larger than most

public lives in the parliamentary decline. Being a politician, he

had to be a parliamentarian; and being a parliamentarian, he had to

be an oligarch. In so far as he did hold the aristocratic theory, it

was exactly that aristocratic theory that forced him into political

practice. He knew well enough, I think, that the English parliament

is an aristocracy. He took the high ground of the responsibility of

privilege; but he was far too sincere to deny that it was privilege. He

said to a friend of mine, who thus lamented his laborious parliamentary

botherations, “You see, I was born paid.” It was the aristocracy the

_Nation_ reproves that necessitated the parliamentarism the _Nation_

desires or demands. Personally, I should not desire either; and I

think the real Wyndham was in a larger world outside both. It was

precisely where he was most domestic that he was most democratic. He

was a poet among poets exactly as he might have been a pedestrian

among pedestrians or, as he would have preferred to put it, a tramp

among tramps. The sympathy with tramps might be taken literally; for I

remember him defending the gipsies, when a more modern spirit wanted

them taught the meaning of progress by being moved on by the police.

He may have been right to work in cabinets and committees; but it was

there, if anywhere, that he was in a clique. He may have been right

not to follow his tastes, but it was his tastes that were popular and

what many cliques would call vulgar. He may have been right not to be

one of the idle rich, but he might have been even more superior to the

limits of the rich, if he had been idler.

The beauty of Mr. Gatty’s book is that it is a brilliant scrap-book,

the very variegated nature of which expresses this almost vagabond

liberality. Even when it merely notes down such things as single lines

of Shakespeare over which Wyndham lingered, or reproduces corners of

carving or painting which arrested his eye, the method seems to me to

work rightly; it seems somehow natural to talk of every other subject

besides the subject himself; as he was always ready to talk of every

other subject. And this aspect, by itself, accentuates the feeling

that his holidays were his most useful days. In this mood one may well

wish that he had never been near what he himself called the cesspool

of politics; and one might well accept the _Nation’s_ suggestion of

his aloofness from its own favourite parliamentary business with a

somewhat dry assent. Wyndham certainly had little to do with the

internal constructive legislation praised in progressive papers. He can

claim none of the glory of the great social reforms of the period just

before the War. He is not responsible for the permission to drag away

a poor man’s child as a raving maniac, if his teacher thinks he is a

little too stupid to learn, or his teacher is a little too stupid to

teach him. He has not the honour of having abolished the Habeas Corpus

Act, in order to allow amateur criminologists to keep a tramp in prison

until they have invented a science of criminology. He did not establish

the Labour Exchanges, and probably did not want to establish them,

any more than the Labour Exchanges vividly described in _Uncle Tom’s

Cabin_. It was not he who created by statute a servant class, of men

made to spend their own wages on doctors they might never want, instead

of on tools or tram-tickets they urgently wanted. He was largely

detached from all this; and when reading a real record like Mr. Gatty’s

one is moved to wish that he had been even more detached from it.

Considering the liberty of his philosophical friendships, one respects

but regrets the loyalty of his political friendships; and is sorry that

common sense must be sacrificed to practical politics.

But when a book like Mr. Gatty’s has moved a reviewer to this mood of

mere regret for a poet wasted in politics, there returns upon him after

all one answer which is itself unanswerable. Judged by one ultimate

test, he was after all right to remain in politics; even in the last

putrefaction of parliamentary politics. At the price of nobody knows

what pain and patience and contempt and concessions, he alone among

modern politicians did leave not merely a name but a thing, that will

remain after him as a scientific engine or a geographical discovery

remains. He achieved a work which has changed the whole destiny of

Western Europe; the resurrection of Ireland. There he established

the free peasant; a work organically different from all the modern

reforms that are merely imposed, whether right or wrong, whether

servile or socialist. It is the difference between planting a tree and

building a tower; once planted, the tree lives by its own life. He

and his admirers, myself among the number, might well be content to

contemplate such a work without afterthoughts; if there were not laid

upon us like a load of memories, and almost like a living chain, the

love of England.

For England, alas! has made to-day the worst possible compromise

between aristocracy and democracy. It has kept the aristocracy and lost

the aristocrats. The country is still as much ruled by squires, but

not so much by country gentlemen; and the reform of the House of Lords

seems to mean eliminating gentlemen and carefully preserving noblemen.

It is as if there were a complaint of martial law; and it were met by

keeping the whole machinery of militarism, but giving the arbitrary

power to spies instead of soldiers. Or it is as if reactionaries

erected a despotism, and then called themselves reformers because they

did not care what dirty fellow was despot. But remote as Wyndham was

from the sham gentry of the twentieth century, it would also be an

error merely to merge him with the genuine gentry of the eighteenth.

It would be to mark the type so as to miss the man. What distinguished

him, as an individual, from good and bad squires, was something far

older than squirarchy; the true sense of the squire expectant, eager

to spring into the saddle of knighthood. His courage was far less

static than that of a country gentleman. It was the thing in which a

philologist might recognize that “courage” really means rushing; or

from which a professor will probably some day prove that courage really

means running away. He had that spiritual ambition which is itself the

ascending flame of humility; and which has been wanting to the English

since the squire grew greater than the knight. He seemed to await an

adventure that never quite came to him on earth; and his life and death

were swift, as if he were struck by lightning as with an accolade, or

had won spurs that were wings upon the wind.

Four Stupidities ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

I have just seen a newspaper paragraph which, whether it refers to a

fact or merely a suggestion, seems to me to go down pretty well into

that depth of mindlessness which calls itself the modern mind. It is

said that influence is being brought to bear on the American Government

to induce them to break a bottle of water instead of a bottle of

champagne when they christen a battleship. Now it is not easy to deal

adequately with the rich stupidity of that. It is about five follies

thick, stupidity obscuring stupidity until one reader can hardly

see more than one of the jokes at a time. There is something almost

fascinating in the idea of trying to disentangle them.

First Stupidity. Note the notion that there is something so

intrinsically and supernaturally evil about an intoxicant that the

pure temperance man will not touch it even when it cannot intoxicate

anybody. It is as if a man were to insist on having a teetotal

boot-polish or a teetotal printing-ink. A cup of tea, or even of hot

milk, becomes diabolic if you have boiled the kettle with methylated

spirit. Eau-de-Cologne is a blackguard indulgence, though you use it

only to scent your handkerchief. A liquor containing alcohol (such as

ginger-beer) is simply and superstitiously an accursed thing, which

is not only not to be touched with the lips, but not to be touched

with the hands. After this case, the more intemperate “Temperance”

people cannot pretend any longer that their proposal is merely a social

reform; it is obviously and literally a mystical taboo. I do not see

what right such people have to mock at the savage’s fear of a fetish,

still less at the peasant’s respect for the relic of a saint. There

might surely be such a thing as holy water, if it be so certain that

there is such a thing as unholy water.

Second Stupidity. The extraordinary confusion by which it becomes not

only wicked to possess wine (though you never drink it), but becomes

wicked even to destroy it. This goes, I think, much further than this

queer materialist madness has yet gone. If a champagne bottle is

smashed to smithereens over the prow of a ship, I should have thought

the most logical teetotaller would merely have been glad that there

was one champagne bottle less in the world. As he would probably not

be a person with any special sympathy with the old ceremonials of

revelry, that is the only possible way in which I can imagine the

thing affecting him. We in England used to think we could trace a

slight streak of fanaticism in good Mrs. Carrie Nation, who used to go

about breaking other people’s wine and spirit bottles with her little

hatchet. But now it would appear that Mrs. Carrie Nation was a wobbler,

one weakly compromising with the fiend of fermented drink, perhaps

nobbled by the Liquor Trade--or, worse still, verging on the loathly

state of a moderate drinker. She ought to have been summoned before a

tribunal of these New Teetotallers and condemned for ever having gone

near enough to a bottle to touch it, even with a hatchet; condemned for

having so much as hung about the hellish tavern, where the very fumes

of its fiery poisons might have mounted to her head. The principle is

an interesting one, and might be extended to many cases. Thus, when the

common hangman burned a book of treason or heresy, he may be supposed

to have been infected by the intellectual errors it contained. Thus

when a censor blacks out a paragraph in a newspaper, he may be held

to have sinned even in looking to see where the paragraph was. This,

apparently, is the new barbaric fancy: that certain vegetable drinks

are so demonic that we not only are wrong when we drink them, but are

wrong when we do our best to render them undrinkable.

Third Stupidity. The curious deadness of the mind in such men is

illustrated at the next stage; that of clinging convulsively to a mere

form; and not only not knowing, but not so much as wondering--first,

whether the idea is worth preserving; and, secondly, whether they are

preserving it. The mark of this dead and broken traditionalism is

always two-fold. It can be seen in these two facts: that men alter a

thing as if it had no sense in it; and yet they never have the sense to

abolish what is for them a senseless thing. I can see much dignity in

absolute austerity and the refusal of symbol; I can see some dignity

even in dingy utilitarianism and the refusal of art. I could respect

the perfect plainness of an early Quaker like Penn when he would not

take his hat off in the palace, because it was an idle form. I do

not despise him because he came afterwards (I believe) to see that

keeping your hat on is just as much of a form as taking it off; and

took off his hat like other people. But if Penn had strictly confined

himself, say, to taking off his hatband with laborious care, every

time he entered the Royal presence, I should say that he had lost both

his Quakerism and his sociability. He would have lost the independence

that refuses recognition to the world, and he would not have gained

the disputable substitute of good manners. Similarly, I could respect

(though I could not envy) the flinty old Manchester manufacturers

who regarded all expenditure on arms, especially on drums, flags, or

trumpets, as so much babyish waste of money. But I should not even

have respected them if they had proposed that the British Army should

fly the White Flag in every battle because it was cheaper than a

coloured one. Why have a flag at all, if it comes to that? Or, again,

I can understand the unconverted Scrooge with his bowl of gruel; and I

like the converted Scrooge with his bowl of punch. But if Scrooge had

insisted every Christmas on having a punch-bowl with no punch in it, I

should not understand at all.

Fourth Stupidity. Besides this general deadness, there is a strange

special deadness to the human sentiment behind that special sort

of ceremony. Don’t express the sentiment if you think it a silly

sentiment; but don’t so express it as to prove that you haven’t got

it. That sentiment is the ancient sentiment of sacrifice. The thing

sacrificed may be anything: wine, as on the battleship; gold, as when

the Doge threw his ring into the sea; an ox or a sheep, as among the

ancient pagans; and very occasionally, when tribes savage or civilized

are seized with Satanist panic, a man. But it must be something

_valuable_, or the particular thrill, wholesome or unwholesome, is

not obtained. It was generally the best sheep or the best ox; and

in the rare cases of human sacrifice, generally somebody like the

King’s daughter. Like all human appetites, it is both good and evil;

it has many roots, a gesture of generosity, an appeal to the unknown,

a guarantee against arrogance, a dim idea of not taking all one’s

advantage from fortune: but they all depend on the _value_, and these

men evidently understand none of them, when they fill the bottle with

water.

On Historical Novels ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

It is very easy, of course, to smile at such schoolboy fiction as the

novels of Mr. Henty, in which the same very English and modern young

gentleman from Rugby or Harrow turns up again and again as a Young

Greek, a Young Carthaginian, a Young Scandinavian, a Young Gaul, a

Young Visigoth, a Young Ancient Briton, and almost everything short

of a Young Negro. But Mr. Henty had the merits of his industry and

fecundity; and one of them was that he did take a boy’s imagination

into many and varied parts of human history, however conventional the

figure he followed through them might be. The English boy will not find

out as much about the soul of Carthage from the _Young Carthaginian_ as

a lover of letters may from _Salammbô_; but at least he will know that

Carthage was conquered--and that is (for various reasons) a good thing

for English people to know. And since the Henty period our historical

novels have fallen with terrible sameness into two or three grooves. We

might almost say that a man is not allowed to write an historical novel

except about four different historical periods, about six different

historical characters; and even about them he is not allowed to take

any view except that taken by the other romances on the same subject.

Now, considering the countless millions of marvellous, amusing, unique,

and picturesque things that have thronged on top of each other through

all our wonderful three thousand years of European history, this state

of affairs is as Byzantine and benighted as if no landscape painter

ever painted anything but a larch tree, or as if none of our sculptors

could model anything except the left leg.

You may write a novel about the time of Henry of Navarre--in fact, it

might almost be said that you must write a novel about the time of

Henry of Navarre. If you go in for writing historical novels at all,

somebody--the publisher or the office-boy--makes you do this. In this

novel, Huguenots must be gallant gentlemen, with a touch of bluffness;

Catholics must also be gallant gentlemen, with a touch of slyness. All

important political questions must be settled by duels fought with long

rapiers at wayside inns. You must stick to one side of the quarrel;

but even in that you must not bring any of the charges that a person

of the period might really have brought. For instance, the Court must

be perpetually engaged in plotting to stab the bluff Huguenot: but you

must not insist that the Huguenot was a Puritan, and his objection

to the Court would largely be that it was a Renaissance Court. You

must not, however delicately, bring in that presence of florid pagan

sensuality and princely indecorum which we feel in Brantome or the

Tales of the Queen of Navarre. The Latins must stick to assassination.

There must be no people to speak of in Paris, though it was the people

of Paris who, for good or evil, changed the whole course of the

history. Men like Sully may be introduced; but their talents must be

entirely occupied in serving the Prince in his personal love-affairs

and in his duels in inns. Above all, slap in the very middle of the

Wars of Religion, nobody must seem to have any clear idea of what his

own religion is about. You may also write a novel about the time of

Richelieu. But it must be governed by the same principles. Richelieu

must be a sinister yet magnanimous enemy of the hero. He must try to

kill the hero, and unaccountably fail. At this stage of the writing of

historical novels, it is important to be an imitator of Dumas. There

are critics who maintain that Dumas was largely written by imitators

of Dumas. This is an exaggeration; but, at the worst, they were good

imitators. There are chapters in the triple tale of the Musketeers

of which I can only say that, if anyone but he wrote them, he could

hire hearts and heads as well as hands. But my warning to the young

writer of entirely useless historical novels is this: He must not go

outside France, or treat that country otherwise than as an insulated

elfland. He must not carry off General Monk in a box. Think what a

frightful mistake would have been made--from the English Puritan point

of view--if d’Artagnan had carried off General Cromwell by mistake!

All this happened in the time of Mazarin and not Richelieu, but the

principle will be found reliable. The principle is that neither

Richelieu nor anybody else should show the faintest interest in the

future of France.

You may write a novel about the French Revolution. You may do it

on your head, as the jolly habitual criminals say. The essential

principles of this sort of novel are: (1) That the populace of Paris

from 1790 to 1794 never had any meals, nor even sat down in a café.

They stood about in the street all night and all day, sufficiently

sustained by the sight of Blood, especially Blue Blood. (2) All power

during the Terror was in the hands of the public executioner and of

Robespierre; and these persons were subject to abrupt changes of mind,

and frequently redeemed their habit of killing people for no apparent

reason by letting them off at the last moment, for no apparent reason

either. (3) Aristocrats are of two kinds--the very wicked and the

entirely blameless; and both are invariably good-looking. Both also

appear rather to prefer being guillotined. (4) Such things as the

invasion of France, the idea of a Republic, the influence of Rousseau,

the nearness of national bankruptcy, the work of Carnot with the

armies, the policy of Pitt, the policy of Austria, the ineradicable

habit of protecting one’s property against foreigners, and the presence

of persons carrying guns at the Battle of Valmy--all these things had

nothing to do with the French Revolution, and should be omitted.

Now, considering the number of picturesque struggles there have been in

the world, it seems to me that these subjects might be given a rest.

There has been next to nothing written, for instance, about the other

Wars of Religion, those that accompanied the construction of Catholic

Europe, rather than its breaking up. There was the Iconoclast invasion

of Italy, which ends with the entrance of Charlemagne. There has been

next to nothing written about riots other than the Parisian; the many

riots of Edinburgh, especially of those few days when it was almost as

dangerous to be a doctor as to be a mad dog. Another advantage would

be that, coming fresh to his historical problem, the writer might even

read a little history.

On Monsters ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

I once saw in the newspapers this paragraph, of which I made a note:

“LEPRECHAUN” CAUGHT

Great excitement has been caused in Mullingar, in the west of Ireland,

by the report that the supposed “Leprechaun,” which several children

stated they had seen at Killough, near Delvin, during the past two

months, was captured. Two policemen found a creature of dwarfish

proportions in a wood near the town, and brought the little man to

Mullingar Workhouse, where he is now an inmate. He eats greedily, but

all attempts to interview him have failed, his only reply being a

peculiar sound between a growl and a squeal. The inmates regard him

with interest mixed with awe.

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