GODWIN'S TEACHING
1.--GENERAL
1. William Godwin was born in 1756 at Wisbeach, Cambridgeshire. He
studied theology at Hoxton, beginning in 1773. In 1778 he became
preacher at Ware, Hertfordshire; in 1780, preacher at Stowmarket,
Suffolk. In 1782 he gave up this position. From this time on he lived in
London as an author. He died there in 1836.
Godwin published numerous works in the departments of philosophy,
economics, and history; also stories, tragedies, and juvenile books.
2. Godwin's teaching about law, the State, and property is contained
mainly in the two-volume work "An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness" (1793).
"The printing of this treatise," says Godwin himself, "was commenced
long before the composition was finished. The ideas of the author became
more perspicuous and digested as his inquiries advanced. This
circumstance has led him into some inaccuracies of language and
reasoning, particularly in the earlier part of the work. He did not
enter upon the subject without being aware that government by its very
nature counteracts the improvement of individual intellect; but he
understood the proposition more completely as he proceeded, and saw more
distinctly into the nature of the remedy."[25] Godwin's teaching is
here presented exclusively in the developed form which it shows in the
second part of the work.
3. Godwin does not call his teaching about law, the State, and property
"Anarchism." Yet this word causes him no terror. "Anarchy is a horrible
calamity, but it is less horrible than despotism. Where anarchy has
slain its hundreds, despotism has sacrificed millions upon millions,
with this only effect, to perpetuate the ignorance, the vices, and the
misery of mankind. Anarchy is a short-lived mischief, while despotism is
all but immortal. It is unquestionably a dreadful remedy, for the people
to yield to all their furious passions, till the spectacle of their
effects gives strength to recovering reason: but, though it be a
dreadful remedy, it is a sure one."[26]
2.--BASIS
_According to Godwin, our supreme law is the general welfare._
What is the general welfare? "Its nature is defined by the nature of
mind."[27] It is unchangeable; as long as men are men it remains the
same.[28] "That will most contribute to it which expands the
understanding, supplies incitements to virtue, fills us with a generous
consciousness of our independence, and carefully removes whatever can
impede our exertions."[29]
The general welfare is our supreme law. "Duty is that mode of action on
the part of the individual, which constitutes the best possible
application of his capacity to the general benefit."[30] "Justice is the
sum of all moral duty;"[31] "if there be such a thing, I am bound to do
for the general weal everything in my power."[32] "Virtue is a desire to
promote the benefit of intelligent beings in general, the quantity of
virtue being as the quantity of desire;"[33] "the last perfection of
this feeling consists in that state of mind which bids us rejoice as
fully in the good that is done by others, as if it were done by
ourselves."[34]
"The truly wise man"[35] strives only for the welfare of the whole. He
is "actuated neither by interest nor ambition, the love of honor nor the
love of fame. [He knows no jealousy. He is not disquieted by the
comparison of what he has attained with what others have attained, but
by the comparison with what ought to be attained.] He has a duty indeed
obliging him to seek the good of the whole; but that good is his only
object. If that good be effected by another hand, he feels no
disappointment. All men are his fellow laborers, but he is the rival of
no man."[36]
3.--LAW
I. _Looking to the general good, Godwin rejects law, not only for
particular local and temporary conditions, but altogether._
"Law is an institution of the most pernicious tendency."[37] "The
institution once begun, can never be brought to a close. No action of
any man was ever the same as any other action, had ever the same degree
of utility or injury. As new cases occur, the law is perpetually found
deficient. It is therefore perpetually necessary to make new laws. The
volume in which justice records her prescriptions is for ever
increasing, and the world would not contain the books that might be
written."[38] "The consequence of the infinitude of law is its
uncertainty. Law was made that a plain man might know what he had to
expect, and yet the most skilful practitioners differ about the event of
my suit."[39] "A farther consideration is that it is of the nature of
prophecy. Its task is to describe what will be the actions of mankind,
and to dictate decisions respecting them."[40]
"Law we sometimes call the wisdom of our ancestors. But this is a
strange imposition. It was as frequently the dictate of their passion,
of timidity, jealousy, a monopolizing spirit, and a lust of power that
knew no bounds. Are we not obliged perpetually to revise and remodel
this misnamed wisdom of our ancestors? to correct it by a detection of
their ignorance, and a censure of their intolerance?"[41] "Legislation,
as it has been usually understood, is not an affair of human competence.
Reason is [our sole legislator, and her decrees are unchangeable and
everywhere the same.]"[42] "Men cannot do more than declare and
interpret law; nor can there be an authority so paramount, as to have
the prerogative of making that to be law, which abstract and immutable
justice had not made to be law previously to that interposition."[43]
To be sure, "it must be admitted that we are imperfect, ignorant, and
slaves of appearances."[44] But "whatever inconveniences may arise from
the passions of men, the introduction of fixed laws cannot be the
genuine remedy."[45] "As long as a man is held in the trammels of
obedience, and habituated to look to some foreign guidance for the
direction of his conduct, his understanding and the vigor of his mind
will sleep. Do I desire to raise him to the energy of which he is
capable? I must teach him to feel himself, to bow to no authority, to
examine the principles he entertains, and render to his mind the reason
of his conduct."[46]
II. _The general welfare requires that in future it itself should be
men's rule of action in place of the law._
"If every shilling of our property, [every hour of our time,] and every
faculty of our mind, have received their destination from the principles
of unalterable justice,"[47] that is, of the general good,[48] then no
other decree can any longer control it. "The true principle which ought
to be substituted in the room of law, is that of reason exercising an
uncontrolled jurisdiction upon the circumstances of the case."[49]
"To this principle no objection can arise on the score of wisdom. It is
not to be supposed that there are not men now existing, whose
intellectual accomplishments rise to the level of law. But, if men can
be found among us whose wisdom is equal to the wisdom of law, it will
scarcely be maintained, that the truths they have to communicate will
be the worse for having no authority, but that which they derive from
the reasons that support them."[50]
"The juridical decisions that were made immediately after the abolition
of law, would differ little from those during its empire. They would be
the decisions of prejudice and habit. But habit, having lost the centre
about which it revolved, would diminish in the regularity of its
operations. Those to whom the arbitration of any question was entrusted
would frequently recollect that the whole case was committed to their
deliberation, and they could not fail occasionally to examine
themselves, respecting the reason of those principles which had hitherto
passed uncontroverted. Their understandings would grow enlarged, in
proportion as they felt the importance of their trust, and the unbounded
freedom of their investigation. Here then would commence an auspicious
order of things, of which no understanding man at present in existence
can foretell the result, the dethronement of implicit faith, and the
inauguration of unclouded justice."[51]
4.--THE STATE
I. _Since Godwin unconditionally rejects law, he necessarily has to
reject the State as unconditionally. Nay, he regards it as a legal
institution peculiarly repugnant to the general welfare._
Some base the State on force, others on divine right, others on
contract.[52] But "the hypothesis of force appears to proceed upon the
total negation of abstract and immutable justice, affirming every
government to be right, that is possessed of power sufficient to enforce
its decrees. It puts a violent termination upon all political science,
and is calculated for nothing farther than to persuade men, to sit down
quietly under their present disadvantages, whatever they may be, and not
exert themselves to discover a remedy for the evils they suffer. The
second hypothesis is of an equivocal nature. It either coincides with
the first, and affirms all existing power to be alike of divine
derivation; or it must remain totally useless, till a criterion can be
found, to distinguish those governments which are approved by God, from
those which cannot lay claim to that sanction."[53] The third hypothesis
would mean that one "should make over to another the control of his
conscience and the judging of his duties."[54] "But we cannot renounce
our moral independence; it is a property that we can neither sell nor
give away; and consequently no government can derive its authority from
an original contract."[55]
"All government corresponds in a certain degree to what the Greeks
denominated a tyranny. The difference is, that in despotic countries
mind is depressed by a uniform usurpation; while in republics it
preserves a greater portion of its activity, and the usurpation more
easily conforms itself to the fluctuations of opinion."[56] "By its very
nature positive institution has a tendency to suspend the elasticity and
progress of mind."[57] "We should not forget that government is,
abstractedly taken, an evil, a usurpation upon the private judgment and
individual conscience of mankind."[58]
II. _The general welfare demands that a social human life based solely
on its precepts should take the place of the State._
1. Men are to live together in society even after the abolition of the
State. "A fundamental distinction exists between society and government.
Men associated at first for the sake of mutual assistance."[59] It was
not till later that restraint appeared in these associations, in
consequence of the errors and perverseness of a few. "Society and
government are different in themselves, and have different origins.
Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness.
Society is in every state a blessing; government even in its best state
but a necessary evil."[60]
But what is to hold men together in "society without government"?[61]
Not a promise,[62] at any rate. No promise can bind me; for either what
I have promised is good, then I must do it even if there had been no
promise; or it is bad, then not even the promise can make it my
duty.[63] "The fact that I have committed an error does not oblige me to
make myself guilty of a second also."[64] "Suppose I had promised a sum
of money for a good and worthy object. In the interval between the
promise and its fulfilment a greater and nobler object presents itself
to me, and imperiously demands my co-operation. To which shall I give
the preference? To the one that deserves it. My promise can make no
difference. I must be guided by the value of things, not by an external
and alien point of view. But the value of things is not affected by my
having taken upon me an obligation."[65]
"Common deliberation regarding the general good"[66] is to hold men
together in societies hereafter. This is highly in harmony with the
general welfare. "That a nation should exercise undiminished its
function of common deliberation, is a step gained, and a step that
inevitably leads to an improvement of the character of individuals. That
men should agree in the assertion of truth, is no unpleasing evidence of
their virtue. Lastly, that an individual, however great may be his
imaginary elevation, should be obliged to yield his personal pretensions
to the sense of the community, at least bears the appearance of a
practical confirmation of the great principle, that all private
considerations must yield to the general good."[67]
2. The societies are to be small, and to have as little intercourse with
each other as possible.
Small territories are everywhere to administer their affairs
independently.[68] "No association of men, so long as they adhered to
the principles of reason, could possibly have any interest in extending
their territory."[69] "Whatever evils are included in the abstract idea
of government, are all of them extremely aggravated by the
extensiveness of its jurisdiction, and softened under circumstances of
an opposite species. Ambition, which may be no less formidable than a
pestilence in the former, has no room to unfold itself in the latter.
Popular commotion is like the waves of the sea, capable where the
surface is large of producing the most tragical effects, but mild and
innocuous when confined within the circuit of a humble lake. Sobriety
and equity are the obvious characteristics of a limited
circle."[70]--"The desire to gain a more extensive territory, to conquer
or to hold in awe our neighboring States, to surpass them in arts or
arms, is a desire founded in prejudice and error. Power is not
happiness. Security and peace are more to be desired than a name at
which nations tremble. Mankind are brethren. We associate in a
particular district or under a particular climate, because association
is necessary to our internal tranquillity, or to defend us against the
wanton attacks of a common enemy. But the rivalship of nations is a
creature of the imagination."[71]
The little independently-administered territories are to have as little
to do with each other as possible. "Individuals cannot have too frequent
or unlimited intercourse with each other; but societies of men have no
interests to explain and adjust, except so far as error and violence may
render explanation necessary. This consideration annihilates at once the
principal objects of that mysterious and crooked policy which has
hitherto occupied the attention of governments. Before this principle
officers of the army and the navy, ambassadors and negotiators, and all
the train of artifices that has been invented to hold other nations at
bay, to penetrate their secrets, to traverse their machinations, to form
alliances and counter-alliances, sink into nothing."[72]
3. But how are the functions that the State performs at present to be
performed in the future societies? "Government can have no more than two
legitimate purposes, the suppression of injustice against individuals
within the community" (which includes the settling of controversies
between different districts[73]), "and the common defence against
external invasion."[74]
"The first of these purposes, which alone can have an uninterrupted
claim upon us, is sufficiently answered by an association of such an
extent as to afford room for the institution of a jury, to decide upon
the offences of individuals within the community, and upon the questions
and controversies respecting property which may chance to arise."[75]
This jury would decide not according to any system of law, but according
to reason.[76]--"It might be easy indeed for an offender to escape from
the limits of so petty a jurisdiction; and it might seem necessary at
first that the neighboring parishes or jurisdictions should be governed
in a similar manner, or at least should be willing, whatever was their
form of government, to co-operate with us in the removal or reformation
of an offender whose present habits were alike injurious to us and to
them. But there will be no need of any express compact, and still less
of any common centre of authority, for this purpose. General justice and
mutual interest are found more capable of binding men than signatures
and seals."[77]
The second function would present itself to us only from time to time.
"However irrational might be the controversy of parish with parish in
such a state of society, it would not be the less possible. Such
emergencies can only be provided against by the concert of several
districts, declaring and, if needful, enforcing the dictates of
justice."[78] Foreign invasions too would make such a concert necessary,
and would to this extent resemble those controversies.[79] Therefore it
would be "necessary upon certain occasions to have recourse to national
assemblies, or in other words assemblies instituted for the joint
purpose of adjusting the differences between district and district, and
of consulting respecting the best mode of repelling foreign
invasion."[80]--But they "ought to be employed as sparingly as the
nature of the case will admit."[81] For, in the first place, the
decision is given by the number of votes, and "is determined, at best,
by the weakest heads in the assembly, but, as it not less frequently
happens, by the most corrupt and dishonorable intentions."[82] In the
second place, as a rule the members are guided in their decisions by
all sorts of external reasons, and not solely by the results of their
free reflection.[83] In the third place, they are forced to waste their
strength on petty matters, while they cannot possibly let themselves be
quietly influenced by argument.[84] Therefore national assemblies should
"either never be elected but upon extraordinary emergencies, like the
dictator of the ancient Romans, or else sit periodically, one day for
example in a year, with a power of continuing their sessions within a
certain limit. The former is greatly to be preferred."[85]
But what would be the authority of these national assemblies and those
juries? Mankind is so corrupted by present institutions that at first
the issuing of commands, and some degree of coercion, would be
necessary; but later it would be sufficient for juries to recommend a
certain mode of adjusting controversies, and for national assemblies to
invite their constituencies to co-operate for the common advantage.[86]
"If juries might at length cease to decide and be contented to invite,
if force might gradually be withdrawn and reason trusted alone, shall we
not one day find that juries themselves, and every other species of
public institution, may be laid aside as unnecessary? Will not the
reasonings of one wise man be as effectual as those of twelve? Will not
the competence of one individual to instruct his neighbors be a matter
of sufficient notoriety, without the formality of an election? Will
there be many vices to correct and much obstinacy to conquer? This is
one of the most memorable stages of human improvement. With what
delight must every well-informed friend of mankind look forward to the
auspicious period, the dissolution of political government, of that
brute engine, which has been the only perennial cause of the vices of
mankind, and which has mischiefs of various sorts incorporated with its
substance, and no otherwise to be removed than by its utter
annihilation!"[87]
5.--PROPERTY
I. _In consequence of his unconditional rejection of law, Godwin
necessarily has to reject property also without any limitation. Nay,
property, or, as he expresses himself, "the present system of
property,"_[88]--_that is, the distribution of wealth at present
established by law,--appears to him to be a legal institution that is
peculiarly injurious to the general welfare._ "The wisdom of law-makers
and parliaments has been applied to creating the most wretched and
senseless distribution of property, which mocks alike at human nature
and at the principles of justice."[89]
The present system of property distributes commodities in the most
unequal and most arbitrary way. "On account of the accident of birth, it
piles upon a single man enormous wealth. If one who has been a beggar
becomes a well-to-do man, we usually know that he has not precisely his
honesty or usefulness to thank for this change. It is often hard enough
for the most diligent and industrious member of society to preserve his
family from starvation."[90] "And if I receive the reward of my work,
they give me a hundred times more food than I can eat, and a hundred
times more clothes than I can wear. Where is the justice in this? If I
am the greatest benefactor of the human race, is that a reason for
giving me what I do not need, especially when my superfluity might be of
the greatest use to thousands?"[91]
This unequal distribution of commodities is altogether opposed to the
general welfare. It hampers intellectual progress. "Accumulated property
treads the powers of thought in the dust, extinguishes the sparks of
genius, and reduces the great mass of mankind to be immersed in sordid
cares, beside depriving the rich of the most salubrious and effectual
motives to activity."[92] And the rich man can buy with his superfluity
"nothing but glitter and envy, nothing but the dismal pleasure of
restoring to the poor man as alms that to which reason gives him an
undeniable right."[93]
But the unequal distribution of commodities is also a hindrance to moral
perfection. In the rich it produces ambition, vanity, and ostentation;
in the poor, oppression, servility, and fraud, and, in consequence of
these, envy, malice, and revenge.[94] "The rich man stands forward as
the principal object of general esteem and deference. In vain are
sobriety, integrity, and industry, in vain the sublimest powers of mind
and the most ardent benevolence, if their possessor be narrowed in his
circumstances. To acquire wealth and to display it, is therefore the
universal passion."[95] "Force would have died away as reason and
civilization advanced, but accumulated property has fixed its
empire."[96] "The fruitful source of crimes consists in this
circumstance, one man's possessing in abundance that of which another
man is destitute."[97]
II. _The general welfare demands that a distribution of commodities
based solely on its precepts should take the place of property._ When
Godwin uses the expression "property" for that portion of commodities
which is assigned to an individual by these precepts, he does so only in
a transferred sense; only a portion assigned by law can be designated as
property in the strict sense.
Now, according to the decrees of the general welfare, every man should
have the means for a good life.
1. "How is it to be decided whether an object that may be used for the
benefit of man shall be my property or yours? There is only one answer;
according to justice."[98] "The laws of different countries dispose of
property in a thousand different ways; but only one of them can be most
consonant with justice."[99]
Justice demands in the first place that every man have the means for
life. "Our animal needs, it is well known, consist in food, clothing,
and shelter. If justice means anything, nothing can be more unjust than
that any man lacks these and at the same time another has too much of
them. But justice does not stop here. So far as the general stock of
commodities holds out, every one has a claim not only to the means for
life, but to the means for a good life. It is unjust that a man works to
the point of destroying his health or his life, while another riots in
superfluity. It is unjust that a man has not leisure to cultivate his
mind, while another does not move a finger for the general
welfare."[100]
2. Such a "state of equality"[101] would advance the general welfare in
the highest degree. In it labor would become "so light, as rather to
assume the appearance of agreeable relaxation, and gentle
exercise."[102] "Every man would have a frugal, yet wholesome diet;
every man would go forth to that moderate exercise of his corporal
functions that would give hilarity to the spirits; none would be made
torpid with fatigue, but all would have leisure to cultivate the kindly
and philanthropical affections, and to let loose his faculties in the
search of intellectual improvement."[103]
"How rapid would be the advances of intellect, if all men were admitted
into the field of knowledge! It is to be presumed that the inequality of
mind would in a certain degree be permanent; but it is reasonable to
believe that the geniuses of such an age would far surpass the greatest
exertions of intellect that are at present known."[104]
And the moral progress would be as great as the intellectual. The vices
which are inseparably joined to the present system of property "would
inevitably expire in a state of society where men lived in the midst of
plenty, and where all shared alike the bounties of nature. The narrow
principle of selfishness would vanish. No man being obliged to guard his
little store, or provide with anxiety and pain for his restless wants,
each would lose his individual existence in the thought of the general
good. No man would be an enemy to his neighbor, for they would have no
subject of contention; and of consequence philanthropy would resume the
empire which reason assigns her."[105]
3. But how could such a distribution of commodities be effected in a
particular case?
"As soon as law was abolished, men would begin to inquire after equity.
In this situation let us suppose a litigated succession brought before
them, to which there were five heirs, and that the sentence of their old
legislation had directed the division of this property into five equal
shares. They would begin to inquire into the wants and situation of the
claimants. The first we will suppose to have a fair character and be
prosperous in the world: he is a respectable member of society, but
farther wealth would add little either to his usefulness or his
enjoyments. The second is a miserable object, perishing with want, and
overwhelmed with calamity. The third, though poor, is yet tranquil; but
there is a situation to which his virtue leads him to aspire and in
which he may be of uncommon service, but which he cannot with propriety
accept, without a capital equal to two-fifths of the whole succession.
One of the claimants is an unmarried woman past the age of
child-bearing. Another is a widow, unprovided, and with a numerous
family depending on her succor. The first question that would suggest
itself to unprejudiced persons having the allotment of this succession
referred to their unlimited decision, would be, what justice is there in
the indiscriminate partition which has hitherto prevailed?"[106] And
their answer could not be doubtful.
6.--REALIZATION.
_The change which is called for by the general welfare should, according
to Godwin, be effected by those who have recognized the truth persuading
others how necessary the change is for the general welfare, so that law,
the State, and property would spontaneously disappear and the new
condition would take their place._
I. The sole requirement is to convince men that the general welfare
demands the change.
1. Every other way is to be rejected. "Our judgment will always suspect
those weapons that can be used with equal prospect of success on both
sides. Therefore we should regard all force with aversion. When we enter
the lists of battle, we quit the sure domain of truth and leave the
decision to the caprice of chance. The phalanx of reason is
invulnerable; it moves forward with calm, sure step, and nothing can
withstand it. But, when we lay aside arguments, and have recourse to the
sword, the case is altered. Amidst the clamorous din of civil war, who
shall tell whether the event will be prosperous or adverse? We must
therefore distinguish carefully between instructing the people and
exciting them. We must refuse indignation, rage, and passion, and desire
only sober reflection, clear judgment, and fearless discussion."[107]
2. The point is to convince men as generally as possible. Only when this
is accomplished can acts of violence be avoided. "Why did the revolution
in France and America find all sorts and conditions of men almost
unanimous, while the resistance to Charles the First divided our nation
into two equal parties? Because the latter occurred in the seventeenth
century, the former at the end of the eighteenth. Because at the time of
the revolutions in France and America philosophy had already developed
some of the great truths of political science, and under the influence
of Sydney and Locke, of Montesquieu and Rousseau, a number of strong and
thoughtful minds had perceived what an evil force is. If these
revolutions had taken place still later, not a drop of civic blood would
have been shed by civic hands, not in a single case would force have
been used against persons or things."[108]
3. The means to convince men as generally as possible of the necessity
of a change consist in "proof and persuasion. The best warrant of a
happy outcome lies in free, unrestricted discussion. In this arena truth
must always be victor. If, therefore, we would improve the social
institutions of mankind, we must seek to convince by spoken and written
words. This activity has no limits; this endeavor admits of no
interruption. Every means must be used, not so much to draw men's
attention and bring them over to our opinion by persuasion, as rather to
remove every barrier to thought and to open to everybody the temple of
science and the field of study."[109]
"Therefore the man who has at heart the regeneration of his species
should always bear in mind two principles, to regard hourly progress in
the discovery and dissemination of truth as essential, and calmly to let
years pass before he urges the carrying into effect of his teaching.
With all his prudence, it may be that the boisterous multitude will
hurry ahead of the calm, quiet progress of reason; then he will not
condemn the revolution that takes place some years before the time set
by wisdom. But if he is ruled by strict prudence he can without doubt
frustrate many over-hasty attempts, and considerably prolong the general
quietness."[110]
"This does not mean, as one might think, that the changing of our
conditions lies at an immeasurable distance. It is the nature of human
affairs that great alterations take place suddenly, and great
discoveries are made unexpectedly, as it were accidentally. When I
cultivate a young person's mind, when I exert myself to influence that
of an older person, it will long seem as if I had accomplished little,
and the fruits will show themselves when I least expect them. The
kingdom of truth comes quietly. The seed of virtue may spring up when it
was fancied to be lost."[111] "If the true philanthropist but tirelessly
proclaims the truth and vigilantly opposes all that hinders its
progress, he may look forward, with heart at rest, to a speedy and
favorable outcome."[112]
II. As soon as the conviction that the general welfare demands a change
in our condition has made itself generally felt, law, the State, and
property will disappear spontaneously and give way to the new condition.
"Reform, under this meaning of the term, can scarcely be considered as
of the nature of action. [It is a general enlightenment.] Men feel their
situation; and the restraints that shackled them before, vanish like a
deception. When such a crisis has arrived, not a sword will need to be
drawn, not a finger to be lifted up in purposes of violence. The
adversaries will be too few and too feeble, to be able to entertain a
serious thought of resistance against the universal sense of
mankind."[113]
In what way may the change of our conditions take place?
1. "The opinion most popular in France at the time that the national
convention entered upon its functions, was that the business of the
convention extended only to the presenting a draft of a constitution, to
be submitted in the sequel to the approbation of the districts, and then
only to be considered as law."[114]
"The first idea that suggests itself respecting this opinion is, that,
if constitutional laws ought to be subjected to the revision of the
districts, then all laws ought to undergo the same process. [But if the
approbation of the districts to any declarations is not to be delusive,
the discussion of these declarations in the districts must be unlimited.
Then] a transaction will be begun to which it is not easy to foresee a
termination. Some districts will object to certain articles; and, if
these articles be modeled to obtain their approbation, it is possible
that the very alteration introduced to please one part of the community
may render the code less acceptable to another."[115]
"This principle of a consent of districts has an immediate tendency, by
a salutary gradation perhaps, to lead to the dissolution of all
government."[116] It is indeed "desirable that the most important acts
of the national representatives should be subject to the approbation or
rejection of the districts whose representatives they are, for exactly
the same reason as it is desirable that the acts of the districts
themselves should, as speedily as practicability will admit, be in force
only so far as relates to the individuals by whom those acts are
approved."[117]
2. This system would have the effect, first, that the constitution would
be very short. The impracticability of obtaining the free approbation of
a great number of districts to an extensive code would speedily manifest
itself; and the whole constitution might consist of a scheme for the
division of the country into parts equal in their population, and the
fixing of stated periods for the election of a national assembly, not to
say that the latter of these articles may very probably be dispensed
with.[118]
A second effect would be, that it would soon be found a proceeding
unnecessarily circuitous to send laws to the districts for their
revision, unless in cases essential to the general safety, and that in
as many instances as possible the districts would be suffered to make
laws for themselves. "Thus, that which was at first a great empire with
legislative unity would speedily be transformed into a confederacy of
lesser republics, with a general congress or Amphictyonic council,
answering the purpose of a point of co-operation upon extraordinary
occasions."[119]
A third effect would consist in the gradual cessation of legislation. "A
great assembly collected from the different provinces of an extensive
territory, and constituted the sole legislator of those by whom the
territory is inhabited, immediately conjures up to itself an idea of the
vast multitude of laws that are necessary. A large city, impelled by the
principles of commercial jealousy, is not slow to digest the volume of
its by-laws and exclusive privileges. But the inhabitants of a small
parish, living with some degree of that simplicity which best
corresponds with nature, would soon be led to suspect that general laws
were unnecessary, and would adjudge the causes that came before them,
not according to certain axioms previously written, but according to the
circumstances and demands of each particular cause."[120]
A fourth effect would be that the abrogation of property would be
favored. "All equalization of rank and station strongly tends toward an
equalization of possessions."[121] So not only the lower orders, but
also the higher, would see the injustice of the present distribution of
property.[122] "The rich and great are far from callous to views of
general felicity, when such views are brought before them with that
evidence and attraction of which they are susceptible."[123] But even so
far as they might think only of their own emolument and ease, it would
not be difficult to show them that it is in vain to fight against truth,
and dangerous to bring upon themselves the hatred of the people, and
that it might be to their own interest to make up their minds to
concessions at least.[124]
FOOTNOTES:
[25] Godwin pp. IX-X [1. VI-VII].
[26] _Ib._ pp. 548-9 [2. 132-3].
[27] _Ib._ p. 90 [1, 120].
[28] _Ib._ p. 150 [1, 164].
[29] _Ib._ p. 90 [1, 120-21].
[30] Godwin p. 101 [1. 134].
[31] _Ib._ pp. 150, 80 [1. 120, 112].
[32] _Ib._ p. 81 [1. 117-18?].
[33] _Ib._ p. 254 [1. 253].
[34] _Ib._ pp. 360-61 [1. ?42].
[35] _Ib._ p. 361. [Not in ed. 2.]
[36] _Ib._ p. 361 [1. 342; bracketed words omitted in ed. 2]
[37] _Ib._ p. 771 [2. 294].
[38] Godwin pp. 766-7 [2. 290-91].
[39] _Ib._ p. 768 [2. 291].
[40] _Ib._ p. 769 [2. 292].
[41] _Ib._ p. 773 [2. 295].
[42] _Ib._ p. 166 [1. 182, except bracketed words].
[43] _Ib._ p. 381 [2. 3]
[44] Godwin p. 774 [2. 296].
[45] _Ib._ p. 775 [2. 296].
[46] _Ib._ p. 776 [2. 297].
[47] _Ib._ p. 151 [1. 165, except bracketed words].
[48] _Ib._ pp. 121, 81 [1. 145, 118].
[49] _Ib._ p. 773 [2. 295].
[50] Godwin pp. 773-4 [2. 295].
[51] _Ib._ p. 778 [2. 298-9].
[52] _Ib._ p. 140-1 [1. 156].
[53] Godwin p. 141 [2. 156]
[54] _Ib._ p. 148. [Not in ed. 2.]
[55] _Ib._ p. 149. [Not in ed. 2.]
[56] _Ib._ p. 572 [2. 149-50].
[57] _Ib._ p. 185 [1. 200].
[58] Godwin p. 380 [2. 2].
[59] _Ib._ p. 79 [1. 111].
[60] _Ib._ p. 79 [1. 111; credited to Paine's "Common Sense," p. 1].
[61] _Ib._ p. 788 [2. 305].
[62] _Ib._ p. 163 [1. 174-6? 180?].
[63] _Ib._ p. 151 [1. 164-5; but see _per contra_ p. 170].
[64] _Ib._ p. 156. [Not in ed. 2.]
[65] Godwin p. 151. [Not in ed. 2.]
[66] _Ib._ pp. 161-2 [1. 179].
[67] _Ib._ 164-5 [1. 181].
[68] _Ib._ p. 561 [2. 142].
[69] _Ib._ 566 [2. 145].
[70] Godwin p. 562 [2. 142].
[71] _Ib._ 559 [2. 140].
[72] Godwin p. 561 [2. 141. Obviously Eltzbacher has misunderstood this
passage. His German translation shows that he mistook "interests" for
"interest" in the sense of "incentive." Note also that Godwin expressly
restricts the application of this paragraph, even in its right sense, on
pp. 111, 145].
[73] _Ib._ p. 566 [2. 145].
[74] _Ib._ p. 564 [2. 144].
[75] _Ib._ p. 564-5 [2. 144].
[76] _Ib._ pp. 773, 778, 779-80 [2. 295, 298-300]
[77] Godwin p. 565 [2. 144].
[78] _Ib._ p. 566 [2. 145].
[79] _Ib._ p. 566 [2. 145].
[80] _Ib._ pp. 573-4 [2. 150-51].
[81] _Ib._ pp. 573-4 [2. 150-51].
[82] _Ib._ pp. 568-9, 571-2 [2. 146, 149].
[83] Godwin pp. 569-70 [2. 148].
[84] _Ib._ pp. 570-71 [2. 148-49].
[85] _Ib._ p. 574 [2. 151]
[86] _Ib._ pp. 576-8 [2. 152-3].
[87] Godwin pp. 578-9 [2. 154]
[88] _Ib._ p. 794 [2. 326].
[89] _Ib._ p. 803. [Not in ed. 2.]
[90] _Ib._ p. 794. [Not in ed. 2.]
[91] Godwin p. 795. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 2. 312].
[92] _Ib._ p. 806 [2. 335].
[93] _Ib._ p. 795. [Not in ed. 2.]
[94] _Ib._ pp. 811, 810 [2. 339, 338--but the words "in the poor" seem
to be added out of Eltzbacher's head].
[95] Godwin p. 802 [2. 332].
[96] _Ib._ p. 809 [2. 338]
[97] _Ib._ p. 809 [2. 337]
[98] _Ib._ p. 789. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 2. 306-7.]
[99] _Ib._ p. 790. [Not in ed. 2.]
[100] Godwin pp. 790-91. [Not in ed. 2.]
[101] _Ib._ p. 821 [2. 351].
[102] _Ib._ p. 821 [2. 352]
[103] _Ib._ p. 806 [2. 335].
[104] _Ib._ p. 807 [2. 336].
[105] Godwin p. 810 [2. 338].
[106] Godwin pp. 779-80 [2. 299-300].
[107] Godwin p. 203 [1, 223, only the two sentences beginning at "But"].
[108] _Ib._ pp. 203-4. [Not in ed. 2.]
[109] Godwin pp. 202-3. [Not in ed. 2.]
[110] _Ib._ p. 204. [Not in ed. 2.]
[111] _Ib._ p. 223. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 1. 226.]
[112] Godwin p. 225. [Not in ed. 2.]
[113] _Ib._ pp. 222-3 [1. 222, except bracketed words].
[114] _Ib._ pp. 657-8 [2. 210].
[115] Godwin pp. 658-9 [2. 211-12; bracketed words a paraphrase].
[116] _Ib._ pp. 659-60 [2. 212].
[117] _Ib._ p. 660 [2. 212].
[118] _Ib._ pp. 660-61 [2. 212-13].
[119] Godwin pp. 661-2 [2. 213-14].
[120] _Ib._ p. 662 [2. 214].
[121] Godwin p. 888 [cf. 2. 396].
[122] _Ib._ pp. 888-9 [2. 396].
[123] _Ib._ pp. 882-3 [2. 392].
[124] _Ib._ pp. 883-84 [2. 393].