LAW, THE STATE, PROPERTY
1.--GENERAL
_In this discussion we are to get determinate concepts of law, the
State, and property in general, not of the law, State, and property of a
particular legal system or of a particular family of legal systems. The
concepts of law, State, and property are therefore to be determined as
concepts of general jurisprudence, not as concepts of any particular
jurisprudence._
1. By the concepts of law, State, and property one may understand,
first, the concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a
particular legal system.
These concepts of law, State, and property contain all the
characteristics that belong to the substance of a particular legal
system. They embrace only the substance of this system. They may,
therefore, be called concepts of the science of this system. For we may
designate as the science of a particular legal system that part of
jurisprudence which concerns itself exclusively with the norms of a
particular legal system.
The concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a legal
system are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property
in the sciences of other legal systems by this characteristic,--that
they are concepts of norms of this particular system. From this
characteristic we may deduce all the characteristics that result from
the special substance of this system of law in contrast to other such
systems. The concepts of property in the present laws of the German
empire, of France, and of England are distinguished by the fact that
they are concepts of norms of these three different legal systems.
Consequently they are as different as are the norms of the present
imperial-German, French, and English law on the subject of property. The
concepts of law, State, and property in different legal systems are to
each other as species-concepts which are subordinate to one and the same
generic concept.
2. Second, one may understand by the concepts of law, State, and
property the concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a
particular family of laws.
These concepts of law, State, and property contain all the
characteristics that belong to the common substance of the different
legal systems of this family. They embrace only the common substance of
the different systems of this family. They may, therefore, be called
concepts of the science of this family of laws. For we may designate as
the science of a particular family of laws that part of jurisprudence
which deals exclusively with the norms of a particular family of legal
systems, so far as these are not already dealt with by the sciences of
the particular legal systems of this family.
The concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a family of
laws are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in
the sciences of the legal systems that form the family by lacking the
characteristic of being concepts of norms of these systems, and
consequently lacking also all the characteristics which may be deduced
from this characteristic according to the special substance of one or
another legal system. The concept of the State in the science of present
European law is distinguished from the concepts of the State in the
sciences of present German, Russian, and Belgian law by not being a
concept of norms of any one of these systems, and consequently by
lacking all the characteristics that result from the special substance
of the constitutional norms in force in Germany, Russia, and Belgium.
Its relation to the concepts of the State in the science of these
systems is that of a generic concept to subordinate species-concepts.
The concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a family of
laws are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in
the sciences of other such families by this characteristic,--that they
are concepts of norms of this particular family. From this
characteristic we may deduce all the characteristics that are peculiar
to the common substance of the different legal systems of this family in
contrast to the common substance of the different legal systems of other
families. The concept of the State in the science of present European
law and the concept of the State in the science of European law in the
year 1000 are distinguished by the fact that the one is a concept of
constitutional norms that are in force in Europe to-day, the other of
such as were in force in Europe then; consequently they are different in
the same way as what the constitutional norms in force in Europe to-day
have in common is different from what was common to the constitutional
norms in force in Europe then. These concepts are to each other as
species-concepts which are subordinate to one and the same generic
concept.
3. Third, one may understand by the concepts of law, State, and property
the concepts of law, State, and property in general jurisprudence.
These concepts of law, State, and property contain all the
characteristics that belong to the common substance of the most
different systems and families of laws. They embrace only what the norms
of the most different systems and families of laws have in common. They
may, therefore, be called concepts of general jurisprudence. For that
part of jurisprudence which treats of legal norms without limitation to
any particular system or family of laws, so far as these norms are not
already treated by the sciences of the particular systems and families,
may be designated as general jurisprudence.
The concepts of law, State, and property in general jurisprudence are
distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in the
particular jurisprudences by lacking the characteristic of being
concepts of norms of one of these systems or at least one of these
families of systems, and consequently lacking also all the
characteristics which may be deduced from this characteristic according
to the special substance of some system or family of laws. The concept
of law _per se_ is distinguished from the concept of law in present
European law and from the concept of law in the present law of the
German empire by not being a concept of norms of that family of laws,
not to say that particular system, and consequently by lacking all the
characteristics that might belong to any peculiarities which might be
common to all legal norms at present in force in Europe or in Germany.
Its relation to the concepts of law in these particular jurisprudences
is that of a generic concept to subordinate species-concepts.
4. In which of the senses here distinguished the concepts of law, State,
and property should be defined in a particular case, and what matters
should accordingly be taken into consideration in defining them, depends
on the purpose of one's study.
If, for example, the point is to describe scientifically the
constitutional norms of the present law of the German empire, then the
concept of the State as defined on this occasion must be a concept of
the science of this particular legal system. For scientific work on the
norms of a particular legal system requires that concepts be formed of
the norms of just this system. Consequently the material to be taken
into consideration will be only the constitutional norms of the present
law of the German empire.--That the concepts defined in the scientific
description of a system of law are in fact concepts of the science of
this system may indeed seem obscure. For every concept of the science of
any particular system of law may be defined as the concept of a species
under the corresponding generic concept of general jurisprudence. We
define this generic concept, say the concept of the State in general
jurisprudence, and add the distinctive characteristic of the
species-concept, that it is a concept of norms of this particular system
of law, say of the present law of the German empire. And then we often
leave this additional characteristic unexpressed, where we think we may
assume (as is the case in the scientific description of the norms of any
particular system of law) that everybody will regard it as tacitly
added. The consequence is that the definition given in the scientific
description of a particular system of law looks, at a superficial
glance, like the definition of a concept of general jurisprudence.
Or, if the point is to compare scientifically the norms of present
European law regarding property, the concept of property as defined on
this occasion must be a concept of the science of this particular family
of laws. For the scientific comparison of norms of different legal
systems demands that concepts of the sciences of these different legal
systems be subordinately arranged under the corresponding concept of the
science of the family of laws which is made up of these systems.
Consequently the material to be taken into consideration will be only
the norms of this family of laws.--Here again, indeed, it may seem
obscure that the concepts defined are really concepts of the science of
this family of laws. For the concepts that belong to the science of a
family of laws may likewise be defined by defining the corresponding
concepts of general jurisprudence and tacitly adding the characteristic
of being concepts of norms of this particular family of laws.
Finally, if it comes to pass that the point is to compare scientifically
what the norms of the most diverse systems of law have in common, the
concept of law as defined on this occasion must be a concept of general
jurisprudence. For the scientific comparison of norms of the most
diverse systems and families of laws demands that concepts which belong
to the sciences of the most diverse systems and families of laws be
subordinately arranged under the corresponding concept of general
jurisprudence. Consequently the material to be taken into consideration
will be the norms of the most diverse systems and families of laws.
Here,--where the point is to take the first step toward a scientific
comprehension of teachings which pass judgment on law, the State, and
property in general, not only on the law, State, or property of a
particular system or family of laws,--the concepts of law, State, and
property must necessarily be defined as concepts of general
jurisprudence. For a scientific comprehension of teachings which deal
with the common substance of the most diverse systems and families of
laws demands that concepts of this common substance--consequently
concepts belonging to general jurisprudence--be formed. Therefore we
have to take into consideration, as our material, the norms (especially
regarding the State and property) of the most diverse systems and
families of laws.
2.--LAW
_Law is the body of legal norms. A legal norm is a norm which is based
on the fact that men have the will to see a certain procedure generally
observed within a circle which includes themselves._
1. A legal norm is a norm.
A norm is the idea of a correct procedure. A correct procedure means one
that corresponds either to the final purpose of all human procedure
(unconditionally correct procedure,--for instance, respect for another's
life), or at any rate to some accidental purpose (conditionally correct
procedure,--for instance, the skilled handling of a picklock). And the
idea of a correct procedure means that the unconditionally or
conditionally correct procedure is to be thought of not as a fact but as
a task, not as something real but as something to be realized; it does
not mean that I shall in fact spare my enemy's life, but that I am to
spare it--not how the thief really did use the picklock, but how he
should have used it. The idea of a correct procedure is what we
designate as an "ought": when I think of an "ought," I think of what has
to be done in order to realize either the final purpose of all human
procedure or some accidental personal purpose. All passing of judgment
on past procedure is conditioned upon the idea of a correct
procedure--only with regard to this idea can past procedure be described
as good or bad, expedient or inexpedient; and so is all deliberation on
future procedure--only with regard to this idea does one inquire whether
it will be right, or at any rate expedient, to proceed in a given
manner.
Every legal norm represents a procedure as correct, declares that it
corresponds to a particular purpose. And it represents this correct
procedure as an idea, designates it not as a fact but as a task, does
not say that any one does proceed so but that one is to proceed so.
Hence a legal norm is a norm.
2. A legal norm is a norm based on a human will.
A norm based on a human will is a norm by virtue of which one must
proceed in a certain way in order that he may not put himself in
opposition to the will of some particular men, and so be apprehended by
the power which is at the service of these men. Such a norm, therefore,
represents a procedure only as conditionally correct; to wit, as a means
to the end (which we are perhaps pursuing or perhaps despising) of
remaining in harmony with the will of certain men, and so being spared
by the power which serves this will.
Every legal norm tells us that we must proceed in a certain way in order
that we may not contravene the will of some particular men and then
suffer under their power. Therefore it represents a procedure only as
conditionally correct, and instructs us not as to what is good but only
as to what is prescribed. Hence a legal norm is a norm based on a human
will.
3. A legal norm is a norm based on the fact that men will to have a
certain procedure for themselves and others.
A norm is based on the fact that men will to have a certain procedure
for themselves and others when the will on which the norm is based has
reference not only to others who do not will, but also, at the same
time, to the willers themselves also; when, therefore, these not only
will that others be subject to the norm but also will to be subject to
it themselves.
Every legal norm, and of all norms only the legal norm, has the
characteristic that the will on which it is based reaches beyond those
whose will it is, and yet embraces them too. The rule, "Whoever takes
from another a movable thing that is not his own, with the intent to
appropriate it illegally, is punished with imprisonment for theft," is
not only based on the will of men, but each of these men is also
conscious that, while on the one hand the rule applies to other men, on
the other hand it applies to himself.
Here it might be alleged that, after all, the mere fact of men's will to
have a certain procedure for themselves and others does not always
establish law; for example, the efforts of the Bonapartists do not
establish the empire in France. But it is not when this bare will exists
that law is established, but only when a norm is based on this will;
that is, when it has in its service so great a power that it is
competent to affect the behavior of the men to whom it relates. As soon
as Bonapartism spreads so widely and in such circles that this takes
place, the republic will fall and the empire will indeed become law in
France.
One might further appeal to the fact that in unlimited monarchies (in
Russia, for instance) the law is based solely on the will of one man,
who is not himself subject to it. But Russian law is not based on the
czar's will at all; the czar is a weak individual man, and his will in
itself is totally unqualified to affect many millions of Russians in
their procedure. Russian law is based rather on the will of all those
Russians--peasants, soldiers, officials--who, for the most various
reasons--patriotism, self-interest, superstition--will that what the
czar wills shall be law in Russia. Their will is qualified to affect the
procedure of the Russians; and, if they should ever grow so few that it
would no longer have this qualification, then the czar's will would no
longer be law in Russia, as the history of revolutions proves.
4. It has been asserted that legal norms have still other qualities.
It has been said, first, that it belongs to the essence of a legal norm
to be enforceable, or even to be enforceable in a particular way, by
judicial procedure, governmental force.
If by this we are to understand that conformity can always be enforced,
we are met at once by the great number of cases in which this cannot be
done. When a debtor is insolvent, or a murder has been committed,
conformity to the violated legal norms cannot now be enforced after the
fact, but their validity is not impaired by this.
If by enforceability we mean that conformity to a legal norm must be
insured by other legal norms providing for the case of its violation, we
need only go on from the insured to the insuring norms for a while, to
come to norms for which conformity is not insured by any further legal
norms. If one refuses to recognize these norms as legal norms, then
neither can the norms which are insured by them rank as legal norms, and
so, going back along the series, one has at last no legal norms left.
Only if one would understand by the enforceability of the legal norm
that a will must have at its disposal a certain power in order that a
legal norm may be based on it, one might certainly say in this sense
that enforceability belongs to the essence of a legal norm. But this
quality of the legal norm would be only such a quality as would be
derivable from its quality of being a norm, and would therefore have no
claim to be added as a further quality.
Again, it has been named an essential quality of a legal norm that it
should be based on the will of a State. But even where we cannot speak
of a State at all, among nomads for instance, there are yet legal norms.
Besides, every State is itself a legal relation, established by legal
norms, which consequently cannot be based on its will. And lastly, the
norms of international law, which are intended to bind the will of
States, cannot be based on the will of a State.
Finally, it has been asserted that it was essential to a legal norm that
it should correspond to the moral law. If this were so, then among the
different legal norms which to-day are in force one directly after the
other in the same territory, or at the same time in different
territories under the same circumstances, only one could in each case be
regarded as a legal norm; for under the same circumstances there is only
one moral right. Nor could one speak then of unrighteous legal norms,
for if they were unrighteous they would not be legal norms. But in
reality, even when legal norms determine conduct quite differently under
the same circumstances, they are all nevertheless recognized as legal
norms; nor is it doubted that there are bad legal norms as well as good.
5. As a norm based on the fact that men have the will to see a certain
procedure generally observed within a circle which includes themselves,
the legal norm is distinguished from all other objects, even from those
that most resemble it.
By being based on the will of men it is distinguished from the moral law
(the commandment of morality); this is not based on men's willing a
certain procedure, but on the fact that this procedure corresponds to
the final purpose of all human procedure. The maxim, "Love your enemies,
bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, pray for those
who abuse and persecute you," is a moral law; so is the maxim, "Act so
that the maxims of your will might at all times serve as the principles
of a general legislation." For the correctness of such a procedure is
not founded on the fact that other men will have it, but on the fact
that it corresponds to the final purpose of all human procedure.
By being based on the will of men the legal norm is distinguished also
from good manners; these are not based on the fact that men will a
certain procedure, but on the fact that they themselves proceed in a
certain way. It is manners that one goes to a ball in a dress coat and
white gloves, uses his knife at table only for cutting, begs the
daughter of the house for a dance or at least one round, takes leave of
the master and mistress of the house, and lastly presses a tip into the
servant's hand; for the correctness of such a behavior is not based on
the fact that other men ask this of us,--to those who start a new
fashion it is often actually unpleasant to find that the fashion is
spreading to more extensive circles,--but solely on the fact that other
men themselves behave so, and that we want "not to be peculiar," "not to
make ourselves conspicuous," "to do like the rest," etc.
By being based on a will which relates at once to those whose will it is
and to others whose will it is not, it is distinguished on the one hand
from an arbitrary command, in which one's will applies only to others,
and on the other from a resolution, in which it applies only to himself.
It is an arbitrary command when Cortes with his Spaniards commands the
Mexicans to bring out their gold, or when a band of robbers forbids a
frightened peasantry to betray their hiding-place; here a human will
decides, indeed, but a will that relates only to other men, and not at
the same time to those whose will it is. A resolution is presented when
I have decided to get up at six every morning, or to leave off smoking,
or to finish a piece of work within a specified time--here a human will
is indeed the standard, but it relates only to him whose will it is, not
at all to others.
6. What is briefly summed up in the definition of the legal norm may, if
one takes into account the explanations which have been given with this
definition, be expanded as follows:
Men will that a given procedure be generally observed within a circle
which includes themselves, and their power is so great that their will
is competent to affect the men of this circle in their procedure. When
such is the condition of things, a legal norm exists.
3.--THE STATE
_The State is a legal relation by virtue of which a supreme authority
exists in a certain territory._
1. The State is a legal relation.
A legal relation is the relation, determined by legal norms, of an
obligated party, one to whom a procedure is prescribed, to an entitled
party, one for whose sake it is prescribed. Thus, for instance, the
legal relation of a loan is a relation of the borrower, who is bound by
the legal norms concerning loans, to the lender, for whose sake he is
bound.
The State is the legal relation of all the men who by legal norms are
subjected to a supreme territorial authority, to all those for whose
sake they are subjected to it. Here the circle of the entitled and the
obligated is one and the same; the State is a bond upon all in favor of
all.
To this it might perhaps be objected that the State is not a legal
relation but a person. But the two propositions, that an association of
men is a person in the legal sense and that it is a legal relation, are
quite compatible; nay, its attribute of personality is based mainly on
its attribute of being a legal relation of a particular kind; law, in
viewing the association in its outward relationships as a person, starts
from the fact that men are bound together by a particular legal
relation. A joint-stock corporation is a person not although, but
because, it is a legal relation of a peculiar kind. And similarly, the
fact that the State is a person is not only reconcilable with its being
a legal relation, but is founded on its being a peculiar legal relation.
2. As to the conditions of its existence, this legal relation is
involuntary.
A voluntary legal relation exists when legal norms make entrance into
the relation conditional on actions of the obligated party, of which
actions the purpose is to bring about the legal relation; for instance,
entrance into the relation of tenancy is conditioned on agreeing to a
lease. _Per contra_, an involuntary legal relation exists when legal
norms do not make entrance into the relation conditional on any such
actions of the obligated party, as, for instance, a patent is not
conditioned on any action of those who are bound by it, and the sentence
of a criminal is at least not conditioned on any action whereby he
intended to bring it about.
If the State were a voluntary legal relation, a supreme authority could
exist only for those inhabitants of a territory who had acknowledged it.
But the supreme authority exists for all inhabitants of the territory,
whether they have acknowledged it or not; the legal relation is
therefore involuntary.
3. The substance of this legal relation is, that a supreme authority
exists in a territory.
An authority exists in a territory by virtue of a legal relation when,
according to the legal norms which found the relation, the will of some
men--or even merely of a man--is regulative for the inhabitants of this
territory. A supreme authority exists in a territory by virtue of a
legal relation when according to those norms the will of some men is
finally regulative for the inhabitants of the territory,--that is, is
decisive when authorities disagree. What we here designate as a supreme
authority, therefore, is not the men on whose will the legal norms in
force in a territory are based, but rather their highest agents, whose
will they would have finally regulative within the territory.
What men it is whose will is finally regulative for the inhabitants of a
territory by virtue of a legal relation--for instance, members of a
royal family according to a certain order of inheritance, or persons
elected according to a certain election law--depends on the legal norms
by which the legal relation is determined. On these legal norms, too,
depends the question within what limits the will of these men is
regulative. But this limited nature of the authority does not stand in
the way of its being a supreme authority; the highest agent need not be
an agent with unrestricted powers.
Here one might perhaps object that in federal States, in the German
empire for instance, the individual States have not supreme authority.
But in reality they have it. For, even if there are a multitude of
subjects in reference to which the highest authority of the individual
States of the German empire has to bow to the imperial authority, yet
there are also subjects enough about which the highest authority of the
individual States gives a final decision. As long as there are such
subjects, a supreme authority exists in the individual States; if some
day there should no longer be such, one could no longer speak of
individual States.
4. As a legal relation, by virtue of which a supreme authority exists in
a territory, the State is distinguished from all other objects, even
from those that most resemble it.
By being a legal relation it is distinguished on the one hand from
institutions such as would exist in a conceivable kingdom of God or of
reason, on the basis of the moral law, and on the other hand from the
dominion of a conqueror in the conquered country, which can never be
anything but an arbitrary dominion.
Being an involuntary legal relation, the State is distinguished from a
conceivable association of men who should set up a supreme authority
among themselves by an agreement, as well as from leagues under
international law, in which a supreme authority exists on the basis of
an agreement.
The fact that by virtue of a legal relation an authority over a
territory is given distinguishes the State from the tribal community of
nomads and from the Church; for in the former there is given an
authority over people of a certain descent, in the latter over people of
a certain faith, but in neither over people of a certain territory. And
finally, in the fact that this territorial authority is a supreme
authority lies the difference between the State and towns, counties, or
provinces; in the latter there is indeed a territorial authority
instituted, but one that by the very intent of its institution must bow
to a higher authority.
5. What is briefly summed up in the definition of the State may be
expanded as follows, if one takes into consideration on the one hand the
previous definition of a legal norm and on the other hand the above
explanations of the definition of the State:
Some inhabitants of a territory are so powerful that their will is
competent to affect the inhabitants of this territory in their
procedure, and these men will have it that for all the inhabitants of
the territory, for themselves as well as for the rest, the will of men
picked out in a certain way shall within certain limits be finally
regulative. When such is the condition of things, a State exists.
4.--PROPERTY
_Property is a legal relation, by virtue of which some one has, within a
certain group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of
a thing._
1. Property is a legal relation.
As has already been stated, a legal relation is the relation of an
obligated party, one to whom a procedure is prescribed by legal norms,
to an entitled party, one for whose sake it is prescribed.
Property is the legal relation of all the members of a group of men who
by legal norms are excluded from ultimately disposing of a thing, to
him--or to those--for whose sake they are excluded from it. Here the
circle of the obligated is much broader than that of the entitled; the
former embraces, say, all the inhabitants of a territory or all who
belong to a tribe, the latter only those among them in whom certain
further conditions (for instance, transfer, prescription, appropriation)
are fulfilled.
2. As to the conditions of its existence, this legal relation is
involuntary.
As discussion has already shown, a voluntary legal relation exists when
legal norms make entrance into the relation conditional on actions of
the obligated party, of which actions the purpose is to bring about the
legal relation; _per contra_, an involuntary legal relation exists when
legal norms do not make entrance into the relation conditional on any
such actions of the obligated party.
If property were a voluntary legal relation, then there could be
excluded from ultimately disposing of a thing only those members of a
group of men who had consented to this exclusion. But all members of the
group--for instance, all the inhabitants of a territory, all who belong
to a tribe--are excluded, whether they have consented or not.
3. The substance of this legal relation consists in some one's having,
within a certain group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately
disposing of a thing.
Some one's having, within a certain group of men, the exclusive
privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing means that this group is
excluded from the thing in his favor; that is, they must not hinder him
from dealing with the thing according to his will, nor may they
themselves deal with it against his will. Now, the exclusive disposition
of a thing within a certain group of men may by virtue of a legal
relation belong to several, part by part, in this way: that some--or
one--of them have it in this or that particular respect (for instance,
as to the usufruct), and one--or some--in all other respects which are
not individually alienated. Whoever thus has, within a group of men, the
exclusive disposition of a thing in all those respects which are not
individually alienated, to him belongs, within that group, the exclusive
privilege of ultimately disposing of the thing.
To whom this belongs by virtue of the legal relation--whether, for
instance, it belongs among others to him who by labor has made a thing
into some new thing--depends on the legal norms by which the legal
relation is determined. On them also depends the question, within what
limits this belongs to him: the dispository authority of him to whom the
exclusive disposition of a thing within a group of men ultimately
belongs is limited not only by the dispository authority of those to
whom the exclusive disposition within the group proximately belongs, but
also by the limits within which such dispository authority is at all
allowed to anybody in the group. Especially, it depends on these legal
norms whether a privilege of exclusive ultimate disposition belongs to
individuals as well as to corporations, or only to corporations, and
whether it applies to every kind of things or only to one kind or
another.
4. As a legal relation by virtue of which some one has, within a certain
group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a
thing, property is distinguished from all other objects, even from those
which most resemble it.
By being a legal relation it is distinguished from all the relations in
which one has the exclusive ultimate disposition of a thing guaranteed
to him solely by the reasonableness of the men who surround him, or
solely by his own might, as might be the case in a conceivable kingdom
of God or of reason, and as is often the case in a conquered country.
Being an involuntary legal relation, it is distinguished from those
legal relations by virtue of which the exclusive privilege of ultimately
disposing of a thing belongs to some one solely on the ground of a
contract, and solely as against the other contracting parties.
That by virtue of this legal relation some one has, within a group of
men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing,
distinguishes property from copyright, by virtue of which some one has
exclusively, within a group of men, not the disposition of a thing, but
somewhat else; and furthermore from rights in the property of others, by
virtue of which some one has, within a group of men, the exclusive
privilege of disposing of a thing, but not of ultimately disposing of
it.
5. What is briefly summed up in the definition of property may be
expanded as follows, if one takes into consideration on the one hand the
previously given definition of a legal norm, and on the other the above
explanations of the definition of property.
Some men are so powerful that their will is able to affect in its
procedure a group of men which embraces them, and these men will have it
that no member of this group shall, within certain limits, hinder a
member picked out in a certain way from dealing with a thing according
to his will, nor, within these limits, himself deal with the thing
against the will of that member, so far as the will of another member is
not already in particular respects regulative with respect to that thing
equally with the will of that member. When such is the condition of
things, property exists.
* * * * *
[Distinguishing the State from arbitrary dominion as he here does
(p. 34), and then saying that Anarchism consists solely in the
negation of the State, Eltzbacher implies the unsound conclusion
that Anarchism does not involve the negation of arbitrary dominion.
This is because he incautiously takes the word of the learned
public that the only cardinal points of Anarchism are law, the
State, and property, without making sure that those who say this
are using the term "State" in the precise sense defined by him. But
are not many of his "arbitrary commands" law and State by his
definitions? Every robber in his band (p. 31) is as much required
to keep the secret as are the peasantry, and under the same
penalties. In restraining a subject population I restrict my
liberty of emigration or investment, and forbid myself to be an
accomplice in certain things.]