THE RECOGNITION OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS
The struggle of the South American peoples for independence was viewed
from the first with feelings of profound satisfaction and sympathy in
the United States. From the commencement of the revolution South
American vessels were admitted into the ports of the United States under
whatever flag they bore. It does not appear that any formal declaration
according belligerent rights to the said provinces was ever made, though
a resolution to that effect was introduced into the House by committee
as early as December 10, 1811.[37] Such formal action was apparently not
deemed necessary and, as there was no Spanish minister resident in the
United States at that time to protest, our ports were probably thrown
open, as a matter of course.[38] The fact that they were accorded full
belligerent rights from the first was afterwards stated by President
Monroe in his annual messages of 1817 and 1818 and in his special
message of March 8, 1822.[39]
At an early date of the revolution commissioners arrived in Washington
seeking recognition of independence, and agents were forthwith
dispatched to South America to obtain information in regard to the
state of the revolutionary governments and to watch the movements of
England and other European powers. Joel R. Poinsett was sent to Buenos
Aires in 1811, and the following year Alexander Scott was sent to
Venezuela.[40] In 1817 Caesar A. Rodney, Theodorick Bland, and John
Graham were dispatched as special commissioners to South America. They
proceeded to Buenos Aires, where they arrived in February, 1818, and
remained until the last of April. Rodney and Graham then returned to the
United States while Bland proceeded across the continent to Chile. Their
reports were transmitted to Congress November 17, 1818.[41] In 1820
Messrs. J. B. Prevost and John M. Forbes were sent as commercial agents
to Chile and Buenos Aires. Reports from them on the state of the
revolutions were transmitted to Congress, March 8 and April 26,
1822.[42]
In the meantime a strong sentiment in favor of the recognition of South
American independence had arisen in the United States. The struggling
colonies found a ready champion in Henry Clay, who, for a period of ten
years labored almost incessantly in their behalf, pleading for their
recognition first with his own countrymen and then, as secretary of
state under the Adams administration, with the governments of Europe.
His name became a household word in South America and his speeches were
translated and read before the patriot armies.
In spite of the fact that our own political interests were so closely
identified with the struggling republics, the President realized the
necessity of following a neutral course, and in view of the aid the
colonies were receiving from citizens of the United States, called upon
Congress for the enactment of a more stringent neutrality law. Clay
delivered a vigorous speech in opposition to this measure in January,
1817. His greatest effort in behalf of South America, however, was his
speech of March 25, 1818, on the general appropriation bill. He moved an
amendment appropriating $18,000 for the outfit and year's salary of a
minister to the United Provinces of the Plate. Without waiting to hear
the report of the three commissioners who had been sent to inquire into
the state of the revolutionary governments, he urged that a minister be
regularly accredited to Buenos Aires at once. In a speech, three hours
in length, he concluded the arguments he had begun the day before.
Painting with even more than his usual fire and enthusiasm the beauties
and resources of the Southern continent, he said:
Within this vast region, we behold the most sublime and
interesting objects of creation; the loftiest mountains, the
most majestic rivers in the world; the richest mines of the
precious metals; and the choicest productions of the earth.
We behold there a spectacle still more interesting and
sublime--the glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of
people struggling to burst their chains and be free.[43]
He went on to say that in the establishment of the independence of the
South American states the United States had the deepest interest. He had
no hesitation in asserting his firm belief that there was no question in
the foreign policy of this country, which had ever arisen, or which he
could conceive as ever occurring, in the decision of which we had so
much at stake. This interest concerned our politics, our commerce, our
navigation. There could be no doubt that Spanish America, once
independent, whatever might be the form of the governments established
in its several parts, those governments would be animated by an American
feeling and guided by an American policy. They would obey the laws of
the system of the new world, of which they would compose a part, in
contradistinction to that of Europe.[44] The House turned a deaf ear to
his brilliant rhetoric. The motion was defeated by a vote of 115 to 45,
but Clay did not abandon the cause of South America.
Two years later he reopened the question in a direct attack on the
policy of the administration, which greatly disturbed President Monroe.
On May 20, 1820, he again introduced a resolution declaring it expedient
to send ministers to the "governments in South America which have
established and are maintaining their independence of Spain." His
arraignment of the administration became more violent than ever:
If Lord Castlereagh says we may recognize, we do; if not, we
do not. A single expression of the British minister to the
present secretary of state, then our minister abroad, I am
ashamed to say, has molded the policy of our government
toward South America.
A charge of dependence upon Great Britain in affairs of diplomacy was as
effective a weapon then as it has been since in matters financial.
Clay's resolution passed the House by a vote of 80 to 75, but still the
executive arm of the government did not move. In 1817 and 1818 the
question of South American independence was continually before the
cabinet for discussion. President Monroe seemed strongly inclined toward
recognition, but in this he was opposed by Adams and Calhoun, who were
unwilling to act in the matter without some understanding with England,
and if possible with France. Our relations with Spain in regard to the
Indian troubles in Florida were in a very strained condition and any
action taken at that time in recognition of South America would have
involved us in war with Spain and almost inevitably with other European
powers. The President, therefore, as a matter of expediency postponed
the action which his sympathy prompted, and, in his annual message of
November 16, 1818, expressed his satisfaction at the course the
government had hitherto pursued and his intention of adhering to it for
the time being.[45] Under the President's direction, however, efforts
were made to secure the cooperation of Great Britain and France in
promoting the independence of South America.[46]
In 1819 an amicable adjustment of our differences with Spain seemed to
have been reached by the negotiation of a treaty providing for the
cession of the Floridas to the United States and the settlement of
long-standing claims of American citizens against Spain. An unforeseen
difficulty arose, however, which proved embarrassing to the
administration. The Spanish monarch very shrewdly delayed ratifying the
treaty for two years and thus practically tied the hands of the
administration during that time as far as the South American question
was concerned.
In spite of the awkward position in which the administration found
itself, Clay, who was opposed to the treaty on account of its
unwarranted surrender of our claims to Texas, continued to plead the
cause of South America. Early in the year, 1821, a declaration of
interest in the South American struggle, introduced by him, was carried
by an overwhelming majority (134 to 12), but the administration held
back another year until the _de facto_ independence of the colonies no
longer admitted of reasonable doubt. Meanwhile the Florida treaty had
been ratified. On March 8, 1822, President Monroe, in a special message
to Congress, expressed the opinion that the time had come for
recognition and asked for the appropriations necessary for carrying it
into effect. The President's recommendation was received with approval,
and in due course the sum of $100,000 was appropriated for "such
missions to the independent nations on the American continent as the
President of the United States may deem proper." In accordance with this
act Mr. R. C. Anderson of Kentucky was appointed minister to Colombia,
Mr. C. A. Rodney of New Jersey to the Argentine Republic, and Mr. H.
Allen of Vermont to Chile, in 1824, and Mr. Joel R. Poinsett of South
Carolina to Mexico in 1826.
While the United States government was concerning itself with the
political interests of the Spanish provinces, Great Britain was quietly
reaping all the commercial advantages to be derived from the situation
and was apparently well satisfied to let things follow the drift they
had taken. By the destruction of the combined fleets of France and
Spain at Trafalgar, in 1805, Nelson had won for Great Britain undisputed
control of the Atlantic and laid open the route to South America. Ever
since the _assiento_ of 1713 had placed the slave trade in her hands,
Great Britain had realized the possibilities of South American commerce,
and the intercourse, which had been kept up with that country after the
termination of the slave monopoly by smugglers, now that the danger was
removed, became more regular and profitable. During the changes of
ministry that followed the death of Pitt, the policy of England in
regard to South America was weak and vacillating. We have already called
attention to the political indecision that marked the attack upon the
provinces of the Plate. With Napoleon's invasion of Spain and the
national uprising it occasioned, British policy became once more
intelligible. It was wisely deemed of more importance to spare the
colonies and to win Spain over to the European alliance against
Napoleon, than to take her colonies at the cost of driving her
permanently into the arms of France. Meanwhile British commerce with the
South American states was steadily growing and that too with the
connivance of Spain.
At the close of the Napoleonic wars, Spain, fearing that England,
through her desire to keep this trade, would secretly furnish aid to the
colonies in their struggle for independence, proposed to the British
government to bind itself to a strict neutrality. This England agreed
to, and when the treaty was signed, there was, according to Canning, "a
distinct understanding with Spain that our commercial intercourse with
the colonies was not to be deemed a breach of its stipulations."[47]
Notwithstanding this tacit compact, British commerce suffered greatly at
the hands of Spanish privateers and even Spanish war vessels. Numbers of
British merchantmen were captured by Spanish ships, carried into the few
ports left to Spain on the Main, and condemned as prizes for trading
with the insurgent colonies. Thus at the time of the acknowledgment of
South American independence by the United States, a long list of
grievances had accumulated in the hands of the British ambassador at
Madrid, and in spite of urgent and repeated remonstrances, remained
unredressed.
Canning was deterred from making final demands upon the government of
Madrid by the consideration that he did not wish to hamper the
constitutional government of Spain, which had come into being by the
revolution of March, 1820, and against which the other powers of Europe
were preparing to act. The condition of affairs on the Spanish Main was,
however, critical and demanded instant redress. He decided, therefore,
to take matters into his own hands without harassing the government of
Spain, and to dispatch a squadron to the West Indies to make reprisals.
In a memorandum to the cabinet on this subject, November 15, 1822, in
which he outlines his policy, he commends the course of the United
States in recognizing the _de facto_ independence of the colonies,
claiming a right to trade with them and avenging the attempted
interruption of that right by making reprisals, as a more
straightforward and intelligible course than that of Great Britain,
forbearing for the sake of Spain to recognize the colonies, trading with
them in faith of the connivance of Spain and suffering depredations
without taking redress. It was not necessary, he thought, to declare war
against Spain, for "she has perhaps as little direct and available power
over the colonies which she nominally retains as she has over those
which have thrown off her yoke. Let us apply, therefore, a local remedy
to a local grievance, and make the ships and harbors of Cuba, Porto
Rico, and Porto Cabello answerable for the injuries which have been
inflicted by those ships, and the perpetrators of which have found
shelter in those harbors." In conclusion, he says that the tacit
compact, which subsisted for years, by which Spain was to forbear from
interrupting British trade with the South American colonies having been
renounced by Spain, and the old colonial system having been revived in
as full vigor as if she had still a practical hold over her colonies and
a navy to enforce her pretensions, "no man will say that under such
circumstances our recognition of those states can be indefinitely
postponed."[48]
While Great Britain was thus considering the expediency of following the
example of the United States in the recognition of Spain's revolted
colonies, the powers of central Europe had taken upon them the task of
solving the difficulties of that unfortunate country both at home and in
America. The restored rule of the Bourbons in Spain had been far from
satisfactory to the great mass of the people. In March, 1820, the army
which Ferdinand had assembled at Cadiz to be sent against the rebellious
colonies, suddenly turned against the government, refused to embark, and
demanded the restoration of the constitution of 1812. The action of the
army was everywhere approved and sustained by the mass of the people,
and the king was forced to proclaim the constitution and to swear to
uphold it. The March revolution in Spain was followed in July by a
constitutional movement in Naples, and in August of the same year by a
similar movement in Portugal; while the next year saw the outbreak of
the Greek struggle for independence. Thus in all three of the peninsulas
of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the right of
self-government. The movement in Greece was, it is true, of an
altogether different character from the others, but it was a revolt
against constituted authority and therefore incurred the ill-will of the
so-called legitimists. The powers of Europe at once took alarm at the
rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for
the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. The
principle of joint intervention on the part of allied governments in the
internal affairs of European states had been developed in the years
immediately following the overthrow of Napoleon and was the outcome of
the wholly anomalous condition in which he had left the politics of
Europe. In the hands of Prince Metternich, the genius of reaction
against French revolutionary ideas, this principle had become the most
powerful weapon of absolutism and now threatened the subversion of
popular institutions throughout Europe.
The rapid development of this doctrine of intervention in the seven
years immediately following the second fall of Napoleon not only
seriously menaced the liberties of Europe, but also threatened to
control the destiny of the new world. At the Congress of Vienna
Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia had formed a close
union and had signed the treaty upon which the peace of Europe rested
for the next half century. The agreement made at Vienna was reaffirmed
with some minor changes, after the second overthrow of Napoleon, at
Paris, November 20, 1815. France was now practically excluded from the
alliance. This treaty undertook especially to guard against any further
disturbance of the peace of Europe by Napoleon or France. One of the
most significant features of the treaty, or what was to prove so, was
the agreement definitely laid down in the sixth article, providing for
meetings of the powers at fixed periods.
The first conference held in accordance with this understanding was that
at Aix-la-Chapelle in October, 1818. France was readmitted as a member
of the alliance and her territory evacuated by the allied armies. The
quintuple alliance thus formed declared that it had no other object than
the maintenance of peace; that the repose of the world was its motive
and its end. The language of the declaration had been in a large measure
neutralized to suit the views of the British government. Lord Liverpool
had said to Castlereagh before the meeting of the conference: "The
Russian must be made to feel that we have a parliament and a public, to
which we are responsible, and that we cannot permit ourselves to be
drawn into views of policy which are wholly incompatible with the spirit
of our government." The members of the British cabinet, except Canning,
did not object seriously to the system of congresses at fixed intervals,
but to the declarations publicly set forth by them. Canning, on the
other hand, objected to the declarations and to the conferences
themselves, "meetings for the government of the world," as he somewhat
contemptuously termed them.
It had been generally supposed that the question of the Spanish colonies
would come up for discussion at Aix-la-Chapelle. Castlereagh assured the
United States, through Bagot, the British minister at Washington, that
while England would act with the allied powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in
mediation between Spain and her colonies, her mediation would be limited
entirely to the employment of her influence and good offices and that
she would not take any measures that might assume a character of
force.[49]
The revolutions that took place in Spain, Naples, and Portugal in 1820
presented an occasion for another meeting of the allies. In November the
representatives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia met in conference at
Troppau, and issued a circular setting forth what they had already done
for Europe in overthrowing the military tyranny of Napoleon and
expressing the determination "to put a curb on a force no less
tyrannical and no less detestable, that of revolt and crime." The
conference then adjourned to Laybach, where they could, with greater
dispatch, order the movements they had decided to take against the
revolutionists of Naples. Austria, being more intimately concerned with
the political condition of the Italian peninsula than either of the
other two powers, was entrusted with the task of suppressing the
Neapolitan revolution. The Austrian army entered Naples March 23, 1821,
overthrew the constitutional government that had been inaugurated, and
restored Ferdinand II to absolute power. The revolution which had broken
out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a detachment of the Austrian
army.
England held aloof from all participation in the proceedings at Troppau
and Laybach--though Sir Charles Stuart was present to watch the
proceedings. In a circular dispatch of January 21, 1821, the British
government expressed its dissent from the principles set forth in the
Troppau circular.
The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822, at
Verona. Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and, in particular, Spain
came up for consideration. At this Congress all five powers of the
alliance were represented. France was uneasy about the condition of
Spain, and England had to send a delegate out of self-defense, as her
interests were largely involved. Castlereagh was preparing to depart for
the congress, when his mind gave way under the stress of work and more
remotely of dissipation, and he committed suicide. Canning then became
secretary for foreign affairs, and Wellington was sent to Verona.
The congress which now assembled at Verona was devoted largely to a
discussion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been instructed to use all
his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in Spain.
When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step and that
his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress. The four
remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, November 22, 1822,
as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the "Treaty of the
Holy Alliance." This treaty of the Holy Alliance, signed at Paris,
September 26, 1815, by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, is one of the most
remarkable political documents extant. It sprang from the erratic brain
of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Madame Crudner, who was
both an adventuress and a religious enthusiast. Its object was to uphold
the divine right of kings and to counteract the spirit of French
revolutionary ideas by introducing "the precepts of justice, of charity,
and of peace" into the internal affairs of states and into their
relations with one another. No one had taken it seriously except the
Czar himself and it had been without influence upon the politics of
Europe. The agreement reached at Verona gave retrospective importance to
the Holy Alliance, and revived the name, so that it became the usual
designation of the combined powers. The following alleged text of the
secret treaty of Verona soon became current in the press of Europe and
America. Although it has never been officially acknowledged and its
authenticity has been called in question, it states pretty accurately
the motives and aims of the powers. The first four articles are as
follows:
The undersigned, specially authorized to make some additions
to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having exchanged
their respective credentials, have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I. The high contracting parties being
convinced that the system of representative government is
equally incompatible with the monarchical principles as the
maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine
right, engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, to
use all their efforts to _put an end_ to the system of
_representative_ _governments_, in whatever country it may
exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in
those countries where it is not yet known.
ART. II. As it cannot be doubted that the _liberty
of the press_ is the most powerful means used by the
pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the
detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting parties
promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to
suppress it not only in their own states, but also, in the
rest of Europe.
ART. III. Convinced that the principles of religion
contribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of
passive obedience which they owe to their Princes, the high
contracting parties declare it to be their intention to
sustain, in their respective states, those measures which
the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their own
interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of
the authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in
offering their thanks to the Pope, for what he has already
done for them, and solicit his constant cooperation in their
views of submitting the nations.
ART. IV. The situation of Spain and Portugal unites
unhappily all the circumstances to which this treaty has
particular reference. The high contracting parties, in
confiding to France the care of putting an end to them,
engage to assist her in the manner which may the least
compromise them with their own people and the people of
France, by means of a subsidy on the part of the two
empires, of twenty millions of francs every year, from the
date of the signature of this treaty to the end of the war.
Signed by Metternich for Austria, Chateaubriand for France,
Bernstet for Prussia, and Nesselrode for Russia.[50]
Such was the code of absolutism against which England protested and
against which President Monroe delivered his declaration.
The Congress broke up about the middle of December, and the following
April, the Duc d'Angouleme led a French army across the Pyrenees. By
October the constitutional party had been overthrown and absolutism
reigned supreme once more in western Europe. In England alone was there
still any semblance of constitutional government.
The Congress of Verona was the last of the joint-meetings of the powers
for the discussion of the internal affairs of states. It marked the
final withdrawal of England from the European alliance. Henceforth she
took up a position distinctly hostile to the principles advocated by her
former allies and her policy in relation to Spanish America practically
coincided with that of the United States.
The great majority of the English people sympathized deeply with the
constitutional movement in Spain and were ready to take up arms in
support of the Spanish people. The protest of England having been
disregarded by the powers at Verona, it became necessary for the
cabinet, in view of the preparations going on in France for the invasion
of the Peninsula, to say what they contemplated doing. In February,
1823, Lord Liverpool circulated among his colleagues a minute prepared
by Canning, which gave at length the reasons, military and other, why it
would be unwise for England to undertake the defense of Spain. In the
first place, the war against Spain was unpopular in France, and if Great
Britain should take part in the war, the French government would avail
itself of the fact to convert it into an English war and thus render it
popular. Second, England would have to undertake the defense of Spain
against invasion by land, and her naval superiority would not
materially aid the Spaniards or baffle the French. Third, the
continental powers were committed to the support of France. Fourth,
there was a possibility that the invasion of Spain would be
unsuccessful. Fifth, on the other hand, it might meet with success, in
which event France might assist Spain to recover her American colonies.
Here, he says, England's naval superiority would tell, "and I should
have no difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by every means
in our power, perhaps Spain from sending a single Spanish regiment to
South America, after the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but
certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or assistance for that
purpose." Sixth, in case of the invasion of Portugal by France and
Spain, he thought England would be in honor bound to defend her, in case
she asked for aid. The military defense of Portugal would not be so
difficult as a land war in Spain.[51]
In accordance with this determination Canning dispatched a letter to Sir
Charles Stuart, British ambassador at Paris, March 31, 1823, in which he
spoke of recognition of the colonies as a matter to be determined by
time and circumstances, and, disclaiming all designs on the part of the
British government on the late Spanish provinces, intimated that
England, although abstaining from interference in Spain, would not allow
France to acquire any of the colonies by conquest or cession. To this
note the French government made no reply and England took this silence
as a tacit agreement not to interfere with the colonies. The British
government continued, however, to watch closely the movements of
France.[52]
As the invasion of Spain drew near to a successful termination, the
British government had reason to suspect that the allied powers would
next direct their attention to the Spanish colonies with a view to
forcing them back to their allegiance or of otherwise disposing of them,
that is, by cession to some other European power. It was already in
contemplation to call another European congress for the discussion and
settlement of this question. As this was a subject of vital interest to
the United States, Canning invited the American minister, Mr. Rush, to a
conference, August 16, 1823, in which he suggested the expediency of an
understanding on this question between England and the United States. He
communicated to Mr. Rush the substance of his dispatch of March 31 to
Sir Charles Stuart. Mr. Rush said he understood the import of this note
to be that England would not remain passive to any attempt on the part
of France to acquire territory in Spanish America. Mr. Canning then
asked what the United States would say to going hand in hand with
England in such a policy. Mr. Rush replied that his instructions did not
authorize him to give an answer, but that he would communicate the
suggestion informally to his government. At the same time he requested
to be enlightened as to England's policy in the matter of recognizing
the independence of the colonies. Mr. Canning replied that England had
taken no steps in the matter of recognition whatever, but was
considering the question of sending commissioners to the colonies to
inquire into the condition of affairs. For the present these
commissioners would be sent to Mexico alone.[53]
Mr. Stapleton in his "Life of Canning" simply says that as Mr. Rush was
not authorized to enter into any formal agreement, Canning thought the
delay of communicating with Washington would render such proceeding of
no effect, and so the matter was dropped.[54] This, however, we learn
from Mr. Rush's dispatches, is not the whole truth. Several
communications passed between them after the conversation above given,
which throw a totally different light upon the affair.
In an unofficial and confidential letter to Mr. Rush, dated August 20,
1823, Canning asked again if the moment had not arrived when the two
governments might come to an understanding in regard to the
Spanish-American colonies. He stated the views of England as follows:
(1) That the recovery of the colonies by Spain was hopeless; (2) That
the question of their recognition as independent states was one of time
and circumstances; (3) That England was not disposed, however, to throw
any obstacle in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and the
mother-country by amicable negotiation; (4) That she aimed at the
possession of no portion of the colonies for herself; and (5) That she
could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any other power
with indifference. He added "that if the United States acceded to such
views, a declaration to that effect on their part, concurrently with
England, would be the most effectual and least offensive mode of making
known their joint disapprobation of contrary projects; that it would at
the same time put an end to all jealousies of Spain as to her remaining
colonies, and to the agitation prevailing in the colonies themselves by
showing that England and the United States were determined not to profit
by encouraging it."[55]
Prior to the formal recognition of South America, the United States had
repeatedly expressed the wish to proceed in the matter hand in hand with
Great Britain,[56] but that act placed the United States on an
altogether different footing from England. Canning seemed to forget in
the wording of his proposal that the United States had already, in the
most formal manner, acknowledged the independence of the Spanish
colonies. In reply Mr. Rush reminded him of this fact and of the desire
of the United States to see the colonies recognized by England. In other
respects, he believed that the views unfolded by Mr. Canning in his note
were shared by the United States, but he added that he had no authority
to avow these principles publicly in the manner suggested.
As soon as Rush's first dispatch was received President Monroe realized
fully the magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of an
Anglo-American alliance. Before submitting the matter to his cabinet he
transmitted copies of the dispatch to ex-Presidents Jefferson and
Madison and the following interesting correspondence took place. In his
letter to Jefferson of October 17th, the President said:
I transmit to you two despatches which were receiv'd from
Mr. Rush, while I was lately in Washington, which involve
interests of the highest importance. They contain two
letters from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the holy
alliance, against the Independence of So. America, &
proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U States,
in support of it, against the members of that alliance. The
project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of
opinion, somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is expected
by Mr. Canning, will have a great political effect, by
defeating the combination. By Mr. Rush's answers, which are
also enclosed, you will see the light in which he views the
subject, & the extent to which he may have gone. Many
important considerations are involved in this proposition.
1st Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European
politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others,
presuming that a concert, by agreement, of the kind
proposed, may lead to that result? 2d If a case can exist
in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is
not the present instance, precisely that case? 3d Has not
the epoch arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand,
either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the U
States, & in consequence, either in favor of Despotism or of
liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware of that
necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present
occurrence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to
announce & mark the commenc'ment of that career.
My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of
the British govt. & to make it known, that we would view an
interference on the part of the European powers, and
especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack
on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them,
they would extend it to us. I am sensible however of the
extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to
have yours, & Mr. Madison's opinions on it.[57]
Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, displays not only a
profound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision of
the possibilities involved. He said:
The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is
the most momentous which has ever been offered to my
contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a
nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we
are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And
never could we embark on it under circumstances more
auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never
to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second,
never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic
affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests
distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She
should therefore have a system of her own, separate and
apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to
become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely
be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most
of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to
lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her
proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty
weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a
continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long
in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which
can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and
with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With
her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial
friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our
affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in
the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at
the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which
the present proposition might engage us, should that be its
consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to
introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out
of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of
Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is
to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And
if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body
of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most
powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of
Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of
provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale
and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe
combined would not undertake such a war. For how would they
propose to get at either enemy without superior fleets? Nor
is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition
offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious
violations of the rights of nations, by the interference of
any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously
begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless
Alliance, calling itself Holy.[58]
Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting the
British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even further
and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the American
republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late invasion
of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks, who were then
struggling for independence from Turkey.[59] Monroe, it appears, was
strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took a
different view of the situation. From the diary of John Quincy Adams,
Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of
November was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals and
on Russia's aggressions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed any
alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The composition of the
President's message remained in doubt until the 21st, when the more
conservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of the
case, adopted. He advocated an independent course of action on the part
of the United States, without direct reference to Canning's proposals,
though substantially in accord with them. Adams defined his position as
follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest remonstrance
against the interference of the European powers by force with South
America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to
make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."[60] Adams's
dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly to the
influence of Clay, who advocated a Pan American system, partly to the
fact that the proposed cooperation with Great Britain would bind the
United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the Spanish
possessions, and partly to the fear that the United States as the ally
of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part. He
probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could be
accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that
the sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquest
of South America by the European powers. Monroe, as we have seen,
thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from
the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was
supported by his two predecessors in the presidency.
The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in favor of an alliance
with Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of
the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the
world, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridiculed by
others, but time and circumstances often bring about a complete change
in our point of view. Since our entrance into the great world conflict
several writers have raised the question as to whether the three elder
statesmen were not right and Adams and Clay wrong.[61] If the United
States and England had come out in favor of a general declaration
against intervention in the concerns of small states and established it
as a world-wide principle, the course of human history during the next
century might have been very different, but Adams's diary does not tell
the whole story. On his own statement of the case he might be justly
censured by posterity for persuading the President to take a narrow
American view of a question which was world-wide in its bearing. An
important element in the situation, however, was Canning's change of
attitude between the time of his conference with Rush in August and the
formulation of the President's message. Two days after the delivery of
his now famous message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of the
form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's zeal has much abated of
late." It appears from Rush's correspondence that the only thing which
stood in the way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's
unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the South American
republics. On August 27th, Rush stated to Canning that it would greatly
facilitate joint action if England would acknowledge at once the full
independence of the South American colonies. In communicating the
account of this interview to his government Mr. Rush concluded:
Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the
recognition be made by Great Britain without more delay, I
am on my part prepared to make a declaration, in the name of
my government, that it will not remain inactive under an
attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy
Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that I
will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before
the world.[62]
About three weeks later Canning, who was growing restless at the delay
in hearing from Washington, again urged Rush to act without waiting for
specific instructions from his government. He tried to show that the
proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the American policy
of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question at issue was American
as much as European, if not more. Rush then indicated his willingness to
act provided England would "immediately and unequivocally acknowledge
the independence of the new states." Canning did not care to extend full
recognition to the South American states until he could do so without
giving unnecessary offense to Spain and the allies, and he asked if Mr.
Rush could not give his assent to the proposal on a promise of future
recognition. Mr. Rush refused to accede to anything but immediate
acknowledgment of independence and so the matter ended.[63] As Canning
could not come to a formal understanding with the United States, he
determined to make a frank avowal of the views of the British cabinet to
France and to this end he had an interview with Prince Polignac, the
French ambassador at London, October 9, 1823, in which he declared that
Great Britain had no desire to hasten recognition, but that any foreign
interference, by force, or by menace, would be a motive for immediate
recognition; that England "could not go into a joint deliberation upon
the subject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with other powers,
whose opinions were less formed upon that question." This declaration
drew from Polignac the admission that he considered the reduction of the
colonies by Spain as hopeless and that France "abjured in any case, any
design of acting against the colonies by force of arms."[64] This
admission was a distinct victory for Canning, in that it prepared the
way for ultimate recognition by England, and an account of the interview
was communicated without delay to the allied courts. The interview was
not communicated to Rush until the latter part of November, and
therefore had no influence upon the formation of Monroe's message of
December 2.[65]
Before the close of the year the British government appointed consuls to
the South American states, and about the time of their departure, an
invitation was sent to the courts of St. Petersburg, Paris, and Vienna
to a conference to be held at Paris to "aid Spain in adjusting the
affairs of the revolted colonies." A copy of this invitation was also
handed to the British ambassador at Madrid, but in such a form as to
leave him in doubt as to whether his government was invited to the
conference or not.[66] While the discussion as to the proposed
conference was going on and before Canning had announced what action his
government would take in the matter, President Monroe's message arrived
in Europe.
Spanish America was not the only part of the western continent
threatened at this time by European aggression. On the 4th of
September, 1821, the emperor of Russia had issued an ukase, in which he
claimed the northwestern coast of North America down to the 51st degree.
This claim was incompatible with the pretensions of both England and the
United States, and was stoutly opposed by them. This was a part of the
territory known as the Oregon country, which continued in dispute
between England and the United States until 1846. In July, 1823, Adams
declared to Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister to the United States,
"that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial
establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly
the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for
any new European colonial establishments." This language was
incorporated substantially in the President's message.
The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphs that
occur in the message of December 2, 1823. The first, relating to
Russia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the
beginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that the
American continents had assumed an independent condition and were no
longer open to European colonization. This may be regarded as a
statement of fact. No part of the continent at that time remained
unclaimed. The second paragraph relating to Spanish America and
occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the
extension to the American continents of the system of intervention
adopted by the Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular government
in Europe.
The language used by President Monroe is as follows:
1. At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made
through the minister of the emperor residing here, a full
power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister
of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by
amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of
the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A
similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to
the government of Great Britain, which has likewise been
acceded to. The government of the United States has been
desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the
great value which they have invariably attached to the
friendship of the emperor and their solicitude to cultivate
the best understanding with his government. In the
discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the
arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has
been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which
the rights and interests of the United States are involved,
that the American continents, by the free and independent
condition which they have assumed and maintain, are
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future
colonization by any European powers.[67]
2. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to
themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport
with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are
invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make
preparation for our defense. With the movements in this
hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected,
and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and
impartial observers. The political system of the allied
powers is essentially different in this respect from that of
America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in
their respective governments; and to the defense of our own,
which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and
treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most
enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed
unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe
it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations
existing between the United States and those powers to
declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to
extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as
dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing
colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not
interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments
who have declared their independence and maintained it, and
whose independence we have, on great consideration and on
just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any
interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any
European power in any other light than as the manifestation
of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In
the war between those new governments and Spain we declared
our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this
we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no
change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent
authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding
change on the part of the United States indispensable to
their security.[68]
The President's message reached England while the discussion in regard
to the proposed congress at Paris was still going on. It was received
with enthusiasm by the liberal members of Parliament. Lord Brougham
said:
The question with regard to South America is now, I believe,
disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently
happened than which none has ever dispersed greater joy,
exultation, and gratitude over all the free men of Europe;
that event, which is decisive on the subject, is the
language held with respect to Spanish America in the message
of the President of the United States.
Sir James Mackintosh said:
This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths (for
so I delight to call them; and I heartily pray that they may
be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty)
cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by every
enlightened citizen of the earth.[69]
They evidently had reference to the second clause alone, the one
relating to Spanish America. The other clause, the one against European
colonization in America, seems not to have attracted much attention.
Canning, however, saw the bearing of it and objected to the principle it
set forth, which was directed against England as much as against the
allies. He was evidently a little taken aback at the turn his proposal
had taken. The President's message really settled the question before
Canning had announced what action his government would take. Some little
chagrin is apparent in the tone of his letter to Sir William a Court,
British minister at Madrid, December 21, 1823.
While I was yet hesitating [he says], what shape to give to
the declaration and protest which ultimately was conveyed in
my conference with P. de Polignac, and while I was more
doubtful as to the effect of that protest and declaration, I
sounded Mr. Rush (the American minister here) as to his
powers and disposition to join in any step which we might
take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part of the
European powers against Spanish America. He had no powers;
but he would have taken upon himself to join with us if we
would have begun by recognizing the Spanish-American states.
This we could not do, and so we went on without. But I have
no doubt that his report to his government of this
_sounding_, which he probably represented as an overture,
had a great share in producing the explicit declaration of
the President.[70]
The conference with Prince Polignac here referred to was that of October
9th quoted above. It was not until after the receipt of President
Monroe's message in Europe that Canning framed his answer to the Spanish
communication informing him of the proposed meeting in Paris for the
discussion of the South American question. In that reply he stated to
the Spanish government very fully his views upon the question at issue.
He said that while England did not wish to precede Spain in the matter
of recognition, yet she reserved to herself the privilege of recognizing
the colonies when she deemed it best for her interests and right to
them. He said that these views had been communicated fully from time to
time to the powers invited to the congress and he concluded with the
statement: "It does not appear to the British cabinet at all necessary
to declare that opinion anew, even if it were perfectly clear (from the
tenor of M. Ofalia's instruction) that Great Britain was in fact
included in the invitation to the conference at Paris."[71]
While Canning and Monroe acted independently of each other, the
expression that each gave to the views of his government was rendered
more emphatic and of more effect by the knowledge of the other's
attitude in the matter. Another point to be noted is that Monroe's
message was made public, while Canning's answer was for some time known
only to the diplomatic corps.
The determination of both England and the United States to oppose the
intervention of the allies in South America had the desired effect.
Conferences in answer to the invitation of Spain were held in Paris, but
they were participated in only by the ordinary representatives of the
powers invited, resident in that capital, and their only result was to
advise Spain not to listen to the counsels of England.
All further discussion that took place between England and Spain in
reference to recognition of the colonies by Great Britain was confined
to the status of the revolutionary governments, and upon this point
their views were so divergent that Canning finally announced to the
Spanish government that, "His Majesty would, at his own time, take such
steps as he might think proper in respect to the several states of
Spanish America without further reference to the court of Madrid; but at
the same time without any feeling of alienation towards that court, or
of hostility towards the real interests of Spain."[72]
The French troops continuing to occupy Spain after the time stipulated
by treaty, Canning sought an explanation from France, but without
satisfactory results. He therefore determined at a cabinet meeting held
December 14, 1824, to recognize Mexico and Colombia forthwith. On
January 1, 1825, after the ministers had left England with instructions
and full powers, the fact of recognition was communicated officially to
the diplomatic corps and two days later it was made public. That this
recognition was a retaliatory measure to compensate England for the
French occupation of Spain was understood at the time and was distinctly
avowed by Canning two years later.[73] In a speech delivered December
12, 1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French
invasion of Spain, he said:
I looked another way--I sought for compensation in another
hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had
known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should
not be Spain _with the Indies_. I called the New World into
existence to redress the balance of the Old.
In spite of the great indebtedness of South America to Canning, this
boast falls somewhat flat when we remember that the Spanish colonies had
won their independence by their own valor and had been recognized as
independent governments by the United States two years before Great
Britain acted in the matter.
Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private secretary and biographer, says that the
recognition of Spanish-American independence was, perhaps, the most
important measure adopted by the British cabinet while Canning was at
the head of the foreign office. He sums up the reasons and results of
the act as follows:
First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British
interests; being especially calculated to benefit our
commerce. Next, it enabled this country to remain at peace,
since it compensated us for the continued occupation of
Spain by a French force, a disparagement to which,
otherwise, it would not have become us to submit. Lastly, it
maintained the balance between conflicting principles; since
it gave just so much of a triumph to popular rights and
privileges, as was sufficient to soothe the irritation felt
by their advocates at the victory, which absolute principles
had obtained by the overthrow of the constitutions of
Spain, Portugal, and Naples; and it dealt a death-blow to
the Holy Alliance, by disabusing its members of the strange
fancy, with which they were prepossessed, that the
differences between them and the British ministers (where
they did differ) were merely feints on the part of the
latter to avoid a conflict with public opinion.[74]
The United States government did not relax its efforts in behalf of the
South American states with the recognition of England, but continued to
exert itself in order to secure the acknowledgment of their independence
by the other powers of Europe, particularly Spain.[75] Mr. Clay tried to
get the other members of the alliance, especially the emperor of Russia,
to use their good offices with Spain for the purpose of inducing her to
recognize her late colonies, but the emperor of Russia, the head of the
alliance, continued to preach to Spain "not only no recognition of their
independence, but active war for their subjugation." To the request of
the United States he replied that, out of respect for "the indisputable
titles of sovereignty," he could not prejudge or anticipate the
determination of the king of Spain.[76] It was some ten years before
Spain could be persuaded to renounce her ancient claims.
FOOTNOTES:
[37] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. III, p. 538.
[38] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 69, and Moore's Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I,
p. 177.
[39] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, pp. 13, 58, and
116.
[40] Lyman, "Diplomacy of the United States." 2 Vols. Boston, 1828, Vol.
II, p. 432. Romero, "Mexico and the United States."
[41] Given in full in Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 217-270.
[42] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 818-851.
[43] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 139.
[44] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 142.
[45] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 44.
[46] "Adams's Diary," September, 1817, to December, 1818. "Letters and
Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, pp. 404 and 458.
[47] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 10.
[48] Stapleton, "Official Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 48 ff.
[49] Bagot to Castlereagh, October 31, 1818. Mem. of a Conversation with
Adams. "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII, p. 66.
[50] For the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laybach, and
Verona, see "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII; "Life of
Lord Liverpool," Vol. III; "Political Life and Official Correspondence
of Canning"; Chateaubriand's "Congres de Verone," and W. A. Phillips,
"The Confederation of Europe. 1813-1823." The text of the treaty of
Verona is published in Niles' Register, August 2, 1823, Vol. 24, p. 347,
and in Elliot's "American Diplomatic Code," Vol. II, p. 179.
[51] "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III, p. 231. "Official
Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 85.
[52] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 18.
[53] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 406.
[54] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 24.
[55] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 412.
[56] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, p. 458. Bagot's
reports of interviews with Adams.
[57] Hamilton, "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VI, pp. 323-325.
[58] Ford, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. X, pp. 277-278.
[59] Hamilton, "Writings of James Madison," Vol. IX, pp. 161-162.
[60] W. C. Ford, "Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," in Mass. Hist. Soc.
_Proceedings_, second series, Vol. XV, p. 392.
[61] See especially G. L. Beer, "The English-Speaking Peoples," p. 79.
[62] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 419.
[63] _Ibid._, pp. 429, 443.
[64] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 26.
[65] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 448.
[66] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 33.
[67] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 209.
[68] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 218.
[69] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 276.
[70] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 272.
[71] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 42.
[72] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 54.
[73] "Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. II, p. 242. Letter to
Granville. On the general question of recognition, see "Life of Lord
Liverpool," Vol. III, pp. 297-304.
[74] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 1.
[75] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, pp. 794-796, and Vol. VI, pp.
1006-1014.
[76] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 850 ff.