CHAPTER III

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD TO CUBA

The Cuban question had its origin in the series of events that have been

narrated in the two preceding chapters--the Napoleonic invasion of Spain

and the resulting paralysis of Spanish power in America. The declaration

of President Monroe, enforced by the well-known attitude of England,

dealt the death-blow to Spanish hopes of recovering the Southern

continent. Hence the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, which had remained

loyal to the king, were clung to with all the greater tenacity as the

sole remains of the imperial possessions over which the successors of

Ferdinand and Isabella had ruled for three centuries. The "Ever-faithful

Island of Cuba" was rewarded for her loyalty by the concession of

certain liberties of trade and invited to send representatives to the

Spanish Cortes--a privilege which was subsequently withdrawn. Spain was

now too weak to protect her two West Indian dependencies--the remains of

her former glory, but her very weakness secured their possession to her.

The naval and commercial importance of Cuba, "the pearl of the

Antilles," made it a prize too valuable to be acquired by any one of the

great maritime powers without exciting the jealousy and opposition of

the others. Henceforth, to borrow the figure of a contemporary

journalist, Cuba was to be the trans-Atlantic Turkey, trembling to its

fall, but sustained by the jealousies of those who were eager to share

the spoils.

The strategic importance of Cuba, commanding to a large extent the

commerce of the West Indies and of the Central American states, and,

what was of vital interest to us, the traffic of the Mississippi valley,

attracted at an early period the attention of American as well as of

European statesmen. In a letter to President Madison in 1809, Jefferson,

in speaking of Napoleon's policy in regard to the Spanish-American

colonies, said:

That he would give up the Floridas to withhold intercourse

with the residue of those colonies cannot be doubted. But

that is no price; because they are ours in the first moment

of the first war; and until a war they are of no particular

necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will

consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our

aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a

price, and I would immediately erect a column on the

southern-most limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a _ne plus

ultra_ as to us in that direction.[77]

President Madison expressed his views on the Cuban question in a letter

to William Pinkney, October 30, 1810:

The position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an

interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although

they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied

spectator at its falling under any European government,

which might make a fulcrum of that position against the

commerce and security of the United States.[78]

This was the first statement in the evolution of a Cuban policy

consistently adhered to by the United States until the successes of the

Mexican war super-induced larger ideas of the mission and destiny of the

Union.

As early as 1817 fears as to the fate of Cuba were raised in the minds

of the American public by newspaper reports to the effect that England

had proposed a relinquishment of her claim against Spain for the

maintenance of the British army during the Peninsular campaign,

amounting to L15,000,000, in return for the cession of the island.[79]

Reports of this nature were circulated for several months on both sides

of the Atlantic, but the question did not assume any very great

importance until 1819, when the treaty for the cession of the Floridas

to the United States was being negotiated with Spain. It was then

insisted by the British press that the acquisition of the Floridas would

give the United States such a preponderating influence in West Indian

affairs as to render necessary the occupation of Cuba by Great Britain

as the natural and only offset.[80] The Florida treaty was ratified

after some delay, which, however, does not appear to have been caused by

the British government, as was supposed at the time. The British papers,

nevertheless, continued to condemn in strong terms the treaty as well as

the inaction of their government in not making it a pretext for the

seizure of Cuba.

As the preparations of France for the invasion of Spain in 1823

progressed the fate of Cuba became a question of absorbing interest in

America. There was little hope that the island would continue a

dependency of Spain. It was rumored that Great Britain had engaged to

supply the constitutional government of Spain with money in her struggle

with France and would occupy Cuba as a pledge for its repayment. Both

Spanish and French journals spoke of British occupation of Cuba as a

matter no longer to be doubted, and the presence in the West Indies of a

large British squadron, sent nominally for the purpose of suppressing

piracy, seemed to lend color to the reports.[81] The British press was

clamoring for the acquisition of Cuba. The _Packet_ declared: "The

question then comes to this, shall England occupy Cuba, or by permitting

its acquisition by the United States (which they have long desired)

sacrifice her whole West India trade? There can be no hesitation as to

the answer."

The British government, however, officially disclaimed all designs upon

Cuba, but this disclaimer did not fully reassure the American

government, and our representatives abroad were instructed to exercise a

close scrutiny upon all negotiations between Spain and England. In the

spring of 1823 Mr. Forsyth was succeeded by Mr. Nelson at the court of

Madrid. In his instructions to the new minister, which went much beyond

the usual length and were occupied almost exclusively with a discussion

of the Cuban question, John Quincy Adams used the following remarkable

words:

"In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short

period of half a century, it seems scarcely possible to resist the

conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be

indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." We

were not then prepared for annexation, he continued, "but there are laws

of political as well as physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed

by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the

ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with

Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the

North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her

off from its bosom."[82]

President Monroe consulted Jefferson on the subject of Spanish-American

affairs and the entanglements with European powers likely to arise

therefrom. Jefferson replied, June 11, 1823:

Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us.

Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great

calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in

guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except

Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own.

But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war

for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it

to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do

so.[83]

During the summer of 1825 a large French squadron visited the West

Indies and hovered for several weeks about the coasts of Cuba. This

action on the part of the French government, without explanation,

excited the alarm of both England and the United States and drew forth

strong protests from Mr. Canning and from Mr. Clay. Canning wrote to

Granville, the British minister at Paris, that he could not consent to

the occupation of Havana by France, even as a measure of protection

against possible attacks from Mexico and Colombia.[84] Again some two

months later he wrote:

As to Cuba you cannot too soon nor too amicably, of course,

represent to Villele the impossibility of our allowing

France (or France us, I presume) to meddle in the internal

affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with

the mother-country. Next to that I wish it independent,

either singly or in connection with Mexico. But what cannot

or must not be, is that any great maritime power should get

possession of it. The Americans (Yankees, I mean) think of

this matter just as I do.[85]

The expressions of the United States, as to the designs of France, were

as emphatic as those of England. Mr. Clay declared "that we could not

consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power

than Spain under any contingency whatever."[86]

In this connection Canning wished to bring about the signature, by

England, France, and the United States, of "ministerial notes, one

between France and the United States, and one between France and Great

Britain, or one tripartite note signed by all, disclaiming each for

themselves, any intention to occupy Cuba, and protesting against such

occupation by either of the others."[87] The government of the United

States held this proposal under advisement, but on France declining, it

was dropped.[88] In 1826 when an attack upon Portugal was feared

Canning advised, in case of such an attack, the immediate seizure of

Cuba by Great Britain as more effective than half a dozen Peninsular

campaigns.[89]

The Cuban question was involved in the long debate on the proposal of

the executive of the United States to send delegates to the congress of

Spanish-American republics assembled at Panama in 1826. This debate

occupied the attention of Congress during the winter and spring of 1826,

and was engaged in with great earnestness. One of the chief objections

to the proposed mission was the fact that the question of Cuba and Porto

Rico would come up and that the United States government had already

committed itself to the foreign powers on that subject. The report of

the Senate committee on foreign relations declared that,

The very situation of Cuba and Porto Rico furnishes the

strongest inducement to the United States not to take a

place at the contemplated congress, since, by so doing, they

must be considered as changing the attitude in which they

hitherto have stood as impartial spectators of the passing

scenes, and identifying themselves with the new

republics.[90]

The Southern members were united in their opposition to the Panama

mission, and in fact to any closer alliance with the new republics, for

the reason that the latter had adopted the principle of emancipation and

any further extension of their influence would jeopardize the

institution of slavery in the United States. For the same reason they

were opposed to the transfer of Cuba to any other European power. If a

change from its connection with Spain were necessary they favored

annexation by the United States, and meantime they were strongly opposed

to the government entering into any engagement with foreign powers or in

any way committing itself on the Cuban question.[91]

The declaration of Mr. Clay against the interference of England and

France in the affairs of Cuba was consistently adhered to under the

administrations of Jackson and Van Buren.

In 1838-39, the British government dispatched special commissioners to

Cuba and Porto Rico to report on the condition of the slave trade. The

presence of these agents in Cuba gave rise to reports that Great Britain

contemplated revolutionizing the island, or at least occupying it for

the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. The United States gave Spain

to understand that we would not consent to British control in whatever

way it might be brought about. Mr. Forsyth wrote to Mr. Vail, our

representative at Madrid, July 15, 1840:

You are authorized to assure the Spanish government, that in

case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from

her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend

upon the military and naval resources of the United States

to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[92]

Again, Mr. Webster in January, 1843, wrote to Mr. Campbell, United

States consul at Havana:

The Spanish government has long been in possession of the

policy and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba,

which have never changed, and has repeatedly been told that

the United States never would permit the occupation of that

island by British agents or forces upon any pretext

whatever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest it

from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval and

military resources of this country to aid her in preserving

or recovering it.[93]

A copy of this letter was also sent to Washington Irving, our

representative at Madrid to make such use of as circumstances might

require.[94]

During the first period of our Cuban diplomacy the efforts of this

government were directed toward preventing the acquisition of the

island, or the establishment of a protectorate over it, by Great Britain

or France. With the Mexican war, however, and the growing conviction of

"manifest destiny," our foreign policy assumed a much bolder and more

aggressive character, and during the next fifteen years all manner of

schemes for the southward extension of our territory were suggested and

many of them actually undertaken. Cuba became an object of desire, not

only in the eyes of the slave-holding population of the South as an

acquisition to slave territory, but of a large part of the nation,

because of its strategic importance in relation to the inter-oceanic

transit routes of Central America, which seemed the only feasible line

of communication with our rapidly developing interests in California.

Consequently various attempts were made to annex the island to the

United States, both by purchase from Spain and forcibly by filibustering

expeditions.

In June, 1848, under the administration of President Polk, Mr. Buchanan,

secretary of state, wrote to our minister at Madrid, directing him to

open negotiations with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cuba.

After referring to the dangers of British occupation and to the

advantages of annexation, he said: "Desirable, however, as this island

may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free

will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor would

be too dearly purchased." He stated that the President would stipulate

for the payment of $100,000,000, as a maximum price.[95] This offer was

rejected by the Spanish government. The minister of state after several

months' delay finally replied "that it was more than any minister dare

to entertain any such proposition; that he believed such to be the

feeling of the country, that sooner than see the island transferred to

any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean."

Under the Whig administration of Taylor and Fillmore no effort was made

for the purchase of Cuba. On August 2, 1849, Mr. Clayton wrote to Mr.

Barringer that the government did not desire to renew the negotiation

for the purchase of Cuba made by the late administration, since the

proposition had been considered by the Spanish government as a national

indignity; that should Spain desire to part with Cuba, the proposal must

come from her.

About this time active preparations were going on for the invasion of

Cuba by an armed expedition under the Cuban patriot Narciso Lopez. On

August 11, 1849, President Taylor issued a proclamation warning all

citizens of the United States against taking part in such expedition and

saying, "No such persons must expect the interference of this government

in any form on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be

reduced in consequence of their conduct."[96] A few days later the

entire force of Lopez was arrested by the United States marshal just as

it was on the point of leaving New York.

Nothing daunted, Lopez traveled through the southern and southwestern

states secretly enlisting men and making arrangements for their

transportation to Cuba. Many men of prominence at the South were in open

and avowed sympathy with the enterprise. In the spring of 1850, Lopez

called upon Gen. John A. Quitman, governor of Mississippi, who had

served with great distinction in the Mexican war, and offered him, in

the name of his compatriots, the leadership of the revolution and the

supreme command of the army. Quitman's sympathies were thoroughly

enlisted in the movement, but he declined the honor on account of the

serious aspect of political affairs, particularly what he considered the

encroachments of the federal government upon the rights of the states.

He made liberal contributions of money, however, and gave Lopez sound

advice about his undertaking, insisting that he must have an advance

column of at least 2,000 men to maintain a footing on the island until

reinforcements could go to their aid.[97]

Unfortunately for Lopez he did not follow the advice of Quitman. A

company of volunteers altogether inadequate for the successful

accomplishment of the enterprise was collected at New Orleans. There

Lopez chartered a steamer, the _Creole_, and two barks, the _Georgiana_

and the _Susan Loud_. Three-fourths of the volunteers had served in the

Mexican war. The first detachment comprising 250 men left New Orleans in

the bark _Georgiana_, April 25, 1850, under the command of Col. Theodore

O'Hara. They proceeded to the island of Contoy off the coast of Yucatan

in the territory of Mexico. There they were joined three weeks later by

Lopez and 450 followers in the _Creole_. The entire command, with the

exception of the crews of the two barks and a few others to guard the

stores, embarked in the _Creole_ and effected a landing at Cardenas, but

the natives did not come to the aid of Lopez and after holding the town

for twelve hours he reluctantly reembarked and headed for Key West. The

_Creole_ was pursued by the _Pizarro_, a Spanish war vessel, which

steamed into the harbor just as she cast anchor. For a few moments the

Spaniards seemed to be on the point of preparing to open fire on the

_Creole_, but when they saw the United States custom-house officers

take possession of her they changed their minds and left the harbor.

The two barks, which had been left with a small guard at the island of

Contoy, were captured by Spanish warships, taken to Havana, condemned as

prizes and the men put on trial for participation in the Lopez

expedition. As these men had committed no act of hostility against

Spain, and had, moreover, been seized on neutral territory, the United

States government at once issued its protest and demanded their release.

The Spanish government replied that these men had been described as

pirates by the President of the United States in his proclamation

warning citizens against joining the expedition and were, therefore,

beyond the pale of the protection of the United States. After heated

negotiations which lasted several months and seriously threatened the

peace of the two countries, the prisoners were released, but it was

declared to be an act of grace on the part of the Queen and not a

concession to the demands of the United States.[98]

Lopez was prosecuted by the United States government for violation of

the neutrality laws, but escaped conviction and at once set about

organizing another expedition. On August 3, 1851, the third and last

expedition of Lopez, consisting of over 400 men, left New Orleans. After

touching at Key West the steamer proceeded to the coast of Cuba and

landed the expedition at Bahia Honda. The main body under Lopez

proceeded into the country where they had been led to expect a general

uprising of the Cubans. Col. W. S. Crittenden, who had served with

bravery in the Mexican war, was left in command of a smaller body to

bring up the baggage. This detachment was attacked on the 13th and

forced to retreat to the place where they had landed, where about fifty

of them obtained boats and tried to escape. They were, however,

intercepted off the coast, taken to Havana, sentenced before a military

court, and executed on the 16th.

The main body under Lopez was overcome and dispersed by Spanish troops

on the 24th. Lopez was taken prisoner, tried, and executed. Many of his

followers were killed or died of hunger and fatigue and the rest made

prisoners. Upon receipt of this news Commodore Parker was at once

ordered to proceed in a frigate to Havana to inquire into the charges

against the prisoners executed, and the circumstances of their capture,

trial, and sentence. To these inquiries the captain-general replied that

he considered those executed as pirates, that they had been so denounced

by the President of the United States in his proclamation, that he was

not at liberty to furnish a copy of the court records, but would send

them to Madrid and to the Spanish minister at Washington.[99]

When the news of the executions at Havana reached New Orleans the

excitement was intense. The office of the Spanish consul was broken

into, portraits of the Queen and Captain-General of Cuba defaced, the

Spanish flag torn in pieces, and the consul burned in effigy in

LaFayette Square. The consul had to flee from the city for safety and

the property of certain Spaniards residing in New Orleans was destroyed.

A long correspondence ensued between the two governments. The United

States agreed to pay an indemnity for injuries to the public property

of Spain, but not for the destruction of property belonging to Spanish

residents, who were entitled only to the same protection afforded our

own citizens.[100]

A few weeks after the last Lopez expedition the British and French

representatives at Washington notified our government that orders had

been issued to their squadrons in the West Indies to repel by force any

attempts at the invasion of Cuba from any quarter. Our government

replied that such action on the part of England and France could "not

but be regarded by the United States with grave disapproval, as

involving on the part of European sovereigns combined action of

protectorship over American waters."[101]

In order to allay the uneasiness caused by the attempts of filibusters,

supposed to be encouraged or at least connived at by the government of

the United States, the Spanish government requested Great Britain and

France, in January, 1852, to secure the signature by the American

government in conjunction with them of an abnegatory declaration with

respect to Cuba.[102] Accordingly in April, 1852, the British and French

ministers at Washington brought the subject to the attention of this

government in notes of the same date, suggesting a tripartite convention

for the guarantee of Cuba to Spain.[103]

To this proposal Mr. Webster replied in part as follows:

It has been stated and often repeated to the government of

Spain by this government, under various administrations, not

only that the United States have no design upon Cuba

themselves, but that, if Spain should refrain from a

voluntary cession of the island to any other European power,

she might rely on the countenance and friendship of the

United States to assist her in the defense and preservation

of that island. At the same time it has always been declared

to Spain that the government of the United States could not

be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to an

European power.

He reminded them, furthermore, that "the policy of the United States has

uniformly been to avoid, as far as possible, alliances or agreements

with other states, and to keep itself free from national obligations,

except such as affect directly the interests of the United States

themselves."[104]

The matter was again urged upon the United States by the British and

French governments in notes to Mr. Webster, dated July 9, 1852, in which

the indefensibility of the Spanish title to the island and its bearings

upon the neutrality of the proposed Central American canals were dwelt

upon. The death of Mr. Webster postponed for some time the answer of the

United States, but the proposal was finally rejected in a notable

dispatch prepared by Webster's successor, Edward Everett.

With the growth of the slavery conflict, which had now become paramount

to all other questions, the annexation of Cuba had become a party issue,

and the return of the Democratic party to power, in 1853, was hailed by

the southern extremists as a signal for the acquisition of the long

coveted prize. This expectation was further heightened by the

declaration of President Pierce, in his inaugural address, that the

policy of his administration would "not be controlled by any timid

forebodings of evil from expansion," and that the acquisition of certain

possessions not within our jurisdiction was "eminently important for our

protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of the

rights of commerce and the peace of the world."

William L. Marcy, of New York, was appointed secretary of state and for

the mission to Spain the President selected Pierre Soule of Louisiana, a

Frenchman by birth and education, who had been exiled for political

reasons. His appointment under the circumstances created unfavorable

comment both in this country and in Europe, and his sojourn of several

days at Paris on the way to his post at Madrid caused the French

government some annoyance. Louis Napoleon advised the court of Madrid

not to receive him, as his views on the Cuban question were well known

to be of a radical character.

In his instructions to Mr. Soule, July 23, 1853, Mr. Marcy emphasized

the importance of our relations with Spain in view of the rumors of

contemplated changes in the internal affairs of Cuba and of the recent

interposition of England and France. He directed him to try to negotiate

a commercial treaty with Spain favorable to our trade with Cuba, and

pointed out the urgent necessity of allowing a "qualified diplomatic

intercourse between the captain-general of that island and our consul at

Havana, in order to prevent difficulties and preserve a good

understanding between the two countries."[105] The difficulty of

settling disputes arising in Cuba had been the subject of frequent

remonstrances on the part of the United States. The captain-general was

clothed with almost "unlimited powers for aggression, but with none for

reparation." He exercised no diplomatic functions and was in no way

subject to the authority of the Spanish minister at Washington.

Upon the arrival of Mr. Soule in Spain, he found that Mr. Calderon, the

head of the cabinet, was strongly opposed to any commercial treaty or

agreement which would promote intercourse between the United States and

the dependencies of Spain, and equally averse to allowing the

captain-general any diplomatic powers.[106] Mr. Soule was by nature

hot-headed and impetuous and could suffer anything sooner than enforced

inactivity. Whatever may have been the intentions of the executive in

sending him, he had come to Madrid for the purpose of consummating the

long cherished scheme of acquiring Cuba. Accordingly, on February 23,

1854, he wrote to Mr. Marcy that the affairs of the Spanish government

were about to reach a crisis, that a change of ministry was imminent,

and that contingencies involving the fate of Cuba were likely to arise

which might be of great interest to the United States. He, therefore,

asked for definite instructions. Relying upon these representations and

upon Mr. Soule's judgment, Mr. Marcy transmitted in due time the

necessary powers, authorizing him to negotiate with Spain for the

purchase of Cuba, or for its independence, if such an arrangement would

be more agreeable to Spanish pride, in which event the United States

would be willing to contribute substantial aid to the result.

In the meantime, however, the _Black Warrior_ affair had strained the

relations of the two countries almost to the point of rupture. This

case, involving the seizure of an American steamer by Spanish officials

at Havana for an unintentional violation or neglect of custom-house

regulations, was of an unusually exasperating character.

As soon as the department at Washington was fully informed of this

outrage, Mr. Marcy forwarded all the documents in the case to Mr. Soule

and directed him to demand of the Spanish government a prompt disavowal

of the act and the payment of an indemnity to the owners of the vessel

and of the cargo, the extent of the injury being estimated at $300,000.

On April 8 Mr. Soule presented a formal demand on the part of his

government. No answer to this note having been received, on the 11th he

repeated his demands much more emphatically, calling for an indemnity of

$300,000, insisting that all persons, whatever their rank or importance,

who were concerned in the perpetration of the wrong, be dismissed from

her majesty's service, and finally declaring that non-compliance with

these demands within forty-eight hours would be considered by the

government of the United States as equivalent to a declaration that her

majesty's government was determined to uphold the conduct of its

officers.

Mr. Calderon replied, on the 12th, that whenever her majesty's

government should have before it the authentic and complete data, which

it then lacked, a reply would be given to the demand of the United

States conformable to justice and right; that the peremptory tone of Mr.

Soule's note suggested to the government of her majesty "a suspicion

that it was not so much the manifestation of a lively interest in the

defense of pretended injuries, as an incomprehensible pretext for

exciting estrangement, if not a quarrel between two friendly powers." To

this note Mr. Soule replied that the suggestion made as to the motives

of the United States in seeking redress was "but little creditable to

the candor of her Catholic majesty's government, and comes in very bad

grace from one who, like your excellency, cannot but be aware that the

records of this legation, as well as those of her Catholic majesty's

department of state, are loaded with reclamations bearing on grievances

most flagrant, which have never been earnestly attended to and were met

at their inception with precisely the same dilatory excuses through

which the present one is sought to be evaded."

Meanwhile the aspects of the case were altogether changed by a private

agreement between the Havana officials and the owners of the _Black

Warrior_, by which the ship and her cargo were released. Mr. Soule

continued, however, according to instructions from Washington, to demand

compensation for the damages sustained by the owners and passengers not

compensated for by the return of the ship and cargo, and also reparation

for the insult to the United States flag. The Spanish government,

however, refused to recognize any ground for reparation after the

restitution of the ship and cargo, and persisted in contradicting,

without the support of any evidence whatever, the facts as presented by

the United States, although they were all certified to in proper legal

form.

On June 24 Mr. Marcy wrote that the President was far from satisfied

with the manner in which our demands were treated by the Spanish

government, but that before resorting to extreme measures he was

determined to make a final appeal to Spain for the adjustment of past

difficulties and for the guarantee of more friendly relations in the

future. Although satisfied with the spirited manner in which Mr. Soule

had performed the duties of his mission, the President was considering

the expediency of reinforcing the demands of the United States by the

appointment of an extraordinary commission of two distinguished citizens

to act in conjunction with him. He instructed him, therefore, not to

press the affair of the _Black Warrior_, but to wait until the question

of the special commission could be laid before Congress.

During the summer there was a change of ministry in the Spanish

government, which, as was not infrequently the case, was attended with

more or less serious disorders. In August Mr. Marcy wrote that in view

of the unsettled condition of affairs in Spain and for other reasons not

stated, the purpose of sending a special mission had, for the present at

least, been abandoned. Without pressing matters Mr. Soule was,

nevertheless, to avail himself of any opportunity which might be

presented, of settling the affairs in dispute and of negotiating for the

purchase of Cuba.

Under the same date he proposed to Mr. Soule the plan of consulting with

Mr. Mason and Mr. Buchanan, our ministers at Paris and London, for the

purpose of overcoming any obstacles that England and France might

interpose. This suggestion led to the celebrated meeting at Ostend and

the so-called manifesto.

In accordance with the instructions of the President, Messrs. Soule,

Mason, and Buchanan proceeded to make arrangements for the proposed

conference, which was held at Ostend, in Belgium, October 9, 10, 11,

1854. They then adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle for a week, where the

reports of their proceedings were prepared.

The greater part of the report is taken up with an enumeration of the

advantages that would accrue to the United States from the acquisition

of Cuba, and an elaborate exposition of the ways in which the interests

of Spain would be promoted by the sale. The only specific recommendation

of the report was that a proposal should be made through the proper

diplomatic channel to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble,

to purchase Cuba from Spain, the maximum price to be $120,000,000. The

report then proceeds to discuss the question, what ought to be the

course of the American government should Spain refuse to sell Cuba? The

ministers declared:

After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far

beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused,

it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in

the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal

peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then,

by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in

wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this

upon the very same principle that would justify an

individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor

if there were no other means of preventing the flames from

destroying his own home.

The report also recommended that all proceedings in reference to the

negotiations with Spain "ought to be open, frank, and public." This

recommendation, together with the general character of the report,

indicates that its authors were rather bent on making political capital

of the affair at home than on seriously furthering negotiations at

Madrid. As a matter of fact the Ostend Manifesto made Buchanan an

acceptable presidential candidate to the southern wing of the Democratic

party and played no small part in securing for him the nomination in

1856.[107]

The objectionable features of the report were politely but firmly

repudiated by the administration in Marcy's reply to Soule and Soule

promptly resigned his mission. This fact was generally overlooked at the

time, while the unfortunate publicity given to the proceedings at Ostend

brought endless censure upon President Pierce and Secretary Marcy.

In spite of the "jingo" policy attributed to the Pierce administration,

the complications arising out of the seizure of the _Black Warrior_ were

not made a _casus belli_, as might easily have been done. After Mr.

Soule's return to the United States the negotiations were continued by

his successor. The conduct of the officials concerned in the seizure was

disavowed, and the indemnity claimed by the American citizens concerned

was paid. The administration closed on terms of comparative friendship

with Spain, although there were numbers of claims still unadjusted. The

Cuban question figured conspicuously in the campaign of 1856. The

platform of the Democratic party was strongly in favor of acquisition,

while the new Republican platform stigmatized the Ostend manifesto as

the highwayman's plea.

Until the Buchanan administration all negotiations for the purchase of

Cuba had been undertaken on the authority of the executive alone. An

effort was now made to get the two houses of Congress to concur in an

appropriation for this purpose. It was thought that united action on the

part of the legislative and executive branches of the government would

produce some impression on Spain. Accordingly, in his second, third and

fourth annual messages, President Buchanan brought the matter to the

attention of Congress, but his appeal met with little encouragement. In

January, 1859, Senator Slidell, the chairman of the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations, reported a bill carrying $30,000,000, to be placed at

the disposal of the President as a preliminary sum for the purchase of

Cuba.[108]

This report created violent opposition, and in February the bill was

withdrawn by Mr. Slidell at the urgent request of his friends.

The annexationist and filibustering schemes of the decade immediately

preceding the War of Secession were prompted by two motives. The one was

the extension of slave territory, or at least the thwarting of the

schemes of emancipation for Cuba which Great Britain was urging upon the

Spanish government. The other was to secure, by the occupation of this

strong strategic position, undisputed control over the proposed

interoceanic canal routes of Central America and communication by this

means with the new states on the Pacific coast. These motives for

annexation were removed, the one by the abolition of slavery in the

United States, and the other by the construction of the great

transcontinental railroads which established direct overland

communication with the Pacific states. During the period following the

civil war, therefore, our policy was mainly concerned in urging upon the

Spanish government the abolition of slavery in Cuba, the establishment

of a more liberal form of government through independence or autonomy,

and the promotion of more untrammelled commercial intercourse with the

United States.

The abolition of slavery in the southern states left the Spanish

Antilles in the enjoyment of a monopoly of slave labor, which in the

production of sugar, especially, gave them advantages which overcame all

competition. This led to the formation of a strong Spanish party, for

whom the cause of slavery and that of Spanish dominion were identical.

These were known as Peninsulars or Spanish immigrants. They were the

official class, the wealthy planters and slave-owners and the real

rulers of Cuba. On the other hand there was a party composed of Creoles,

or native Cubans, whose cry was "Cuba for the Cubans!" and who hoped to

effect the complete separation of the island from Spain, either through

their own efforts or through the assistance of the United States. Not

infrequently in the same family, the father, born and brought up in the

Peninsula, was an ardent loyalist, while the son, born in Cuba, was an

insurgent at heart, if not actually enlisted in the ranks.

The Spanish revolution of September, 1868, was the signal for an

uprising of the native or Creole party in the eastern part of the

island. This movement was not at first ostensibly for independence, but

for the revolution in Spain, the cries being "Hurrah for Prim!" "Hurrah

for the Revolution!" Its real character was, however, apparent from the

first and its supporters continued for a period of ten years, without

regard to the numerous vicissitudes through which the Spanish government

passed--the provisional government, the regency, the elective monarchy,

the republic, and the restored Bourbon dynasty--to wage a dogged, though

desultory warfare against the constituted authorities of the island.

This struggle was almost coterminous with President Grant's

administration of eight years.

At an early stage of the contest the Spanish authorities conceived it to

be necessary to issue certain decrees which were contrary to public law

and, in so far as they affected citizens of the United States, in

violation of treaty obligations. On March 24, 1869, the captain-general

issued a decree authorizing the capture on the high seas of vessels

carrying men, arms, munitions, or effects in aid of the insurgents, and

declaring that "all persons captured in such vessels without regard to

their number will be immediately executed."[109] By another decree the

estates of American citizens suspected of sympathy with the insurgents

were confiscated.[110] Secretary Hamilton Fish protested against these

decrees so far as they affected citizens of the United States, as they

were in violation of the provisions of the treaty of 1795.

On July 7, 1869, the captain-general issued another decree closing

certain ports, declaring voyages with arms, ammunition, or crew for the

insurgents illegal, and directing cruisers on the high seas to bring

into port all vessels found to be enemies. On July 16 Mr. Fish called

the attention of the Spanish minister to this decree, saying that it

assumed powers over the commerce of the United States that could be

permitted only in time of war; that the United States would not yield

the right to carry contraband of war in time of peace, and would not

permit their vessels to be interfered with on the high seas except in

time of war; that if Spain was at war she should give notice to the

United States to that effect, and that a continuance of the decree or

any attempt to enforce it would be regarded as a recognition by Spain of

a state of war in Cuba. This declaration produced a prompt modification

of the decree so far as it concerned the search of vessels on the high

seas.

As our commercial interests at large, as well as the interests of

individual citizens, were deeply affected by the condition of the

island, President Grant determined at the beginning of his

administration to offer to mediate between Spain and the insurgents.

General Daniel E. Sickles was appointed minister to Spain and his

instructions, under date of June 29, 1869, directed him to offer to the

cabinet at Madrid the good offices of the United States for the purpose

of bringing to a close the civil war then ravaging the island and

establishing the independence of Cuba. Mr. Fish instructed General

Sickles to explain to the Spanish government that he used the term civil

war advisedly, not as implying any public recognition of belligerent

rights, but a condition of affairs that might not justify withholding

much longer those rights from the insurgents.[111] In reply Spain

agreed to accept the good offices of the United States, but on

conditions that were impracticable and unsatisfactory. At the same time

the Spanish government allowed the purport of General Sickles's note

tendering the good offices of the United States to get out, and it was

accepted by the press as indicating the purpose of the United States to

recognize the Cubans as belligerents if its offer of mediation were

refused. No Spanish cabinet could possibly endure the odium of having

made a concession to the Cubans under a threat from an outside power.

The Spanish government therefore requested the withdrawal of the

American note.

After the rejection of the offer of mediation President Grant decided to

recognize the Cuban insurgents and in August, 1869, while on his way

from New York to New England on the Fall River boat he signed a

proclamation of Cuban belligerency which he forwarded to Washington with

a note to Secretary Fish, requesting him to sign, seal, and issue it.

Mr. Fish disapproved of this step, and while he affixed the seal and

signed the document, he did not issue it, but kept it in a safe place to

await further developments. Grant's attention was diverted by Wall

Street speculations in gold and the crisis that followed on "Black

Friday." He failed to notice at the time that the secretary of state did

not carry out his instructions, and later he thanked Mr. Fish for having

saved him from a serious mistake.[112]

For some time the United States had been urging upon Spain the

importance of abolishing slavery in Cuba as a necessary condition to

the complete pacification of the island. During the fall of 1869 Spain

gave repeated assurances to the United States of her readiness to effect

emancipation in Cuba as soon as hostilities should cease, but the

Spanish government could never be brought to enter into any definite

engagement on the subject. In fact as regarded the slavery question the

cabinet of Madrid found itself unable to choose between the horns of the

dilemma. The United States and Great Britain were urging the immediate

abolition of slavery, while the most influential upholders of Spanish

rule in Porto Rico as well as in Cuba were the slaveholders themselves.

The insurgents on the other hand had abolished slavery by a decree of

the assembly of February 26, 1869, promising indemnity to the owners in

due time and providing for the enrolment of liberated slaves in the

army.[113] On January 26, 1870, Mr. Fish wrote to General Sickles:

It becomes more apparent every day that this contest cannot

terminate without the abolition of slavery. This government

regards the government at Madrid as committed to that

result.... You will, therefore, if it shall appear that the

insurrection is regarded as suppressed, frankly state that

this government, relying upon the assurances so often given,

will expect steps to be taken for the emancipation of the

slaves in the Spanish colonies.

The British representative at Madrid, Mr. Layard, was instructed to

second the suggestions of the United States minister in regard to the

abolition of slavery in the Spanish colonies.

From the outbreak of the insurrection the Cuban patriots had the

sympathy of the great mass of the American people, and that of the

administration, although the latter was kept within the bounds of public

law and treaty obligation, so as to avoid giving offense to Spain. The

government did all that treaty obligations demanded of it to prevent the

violation of the neutrality laws. Numbers of filibustering expeditions

did, however, escape from American ports, and those that were arrested

at the instance of the Spanish government through its representatives in

this country usually escaped conviction in our courts for want of

evidence.

In June, 1870, the question of granting belligerent rights to the Cubans

was brought before Congress in the form of a joint resolution introduced

into the House. Personally General Grant sympathized with the Cubans and

was disposed to grant them the rights of belligerents, but his judgment

was again overruled by the counsels of Mr. Fish. On June 13, during the

heat of the debate on the question of belligerency, the President sent

to Congress a message embodying the views of the executive. At Mr.

Fish's instance the message took the ground that the facts did not

justify the recognition of a state of war, although Mr. Fish himself had

made use of the term civil war in his instructions to General Sickles.

The Secretary had almost to force the President to sign this message,

though General Grant was afterwards satisfied as to the wisdom of the

measure.[114] The message said in part:

The question of belligerency is one of fact not to be

decided by sympathies with or prejudices against either

party. The relations between the parent state and the

insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of

international law. Fighting, though fierce and protracted,

does not alone constitute war; there must be military forces

acting in accordance with the rules and customs of

war--flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners,

etc.,--and to justify belligerency there must be, above all,

a _de facto_ political organization of the insurgents

sufficient in character and resources to constitute it, if

left to itself, a state among nations capable of discharging

the duties of a state, and of meeting the just

responsibilities it may incur as such toward other powers in

the discharge of its international duties.

This message provoked a long and animated discussion in the House next

day and sharp criticism on the part of the Cuban sympathizers of the

President's conduct in thus "intruding himself into the House for the

purpose of controlling their deliberations." The debate continued until

June 16, when the resolution passed the House by a vote of 80 to

68.[115] It was taken up by the Senate, discussed and amended, but

finally lost.

The conclusion of an agreement on February 12, 1871, for the submission

to a mixed commission of claims of American citizens arising in

Cuba,[116] took away all our pressing grievances against Spain and for

more than two years our diplomatic relations were on a comparatively

friendly basis. Good feeling between the two countries was further

promoted by the proclamation of the Spanish republic in 1873 and by the

prompt action of General Sickles in extending to it the recognition of

the United States. After striving in vain for more than two years to

reconcile and unite the contending factions of Spain, King Amadeus on

February 11, 1873, abdicated the royal authority and returned to the

nation the powers with which he had been intrusted. The Cortes at once

proclaimed a republic. General Sickles had on January 30 telegraphed to

Washington for instructions in case the republicans should succeed in

their efforts. On the day after the abdication, he received directions

to recognize the republican government when it was fully established and

in possession of the power of the nation. Three days later, in the

uniform of a major-general of the United States army he was given an

audience by the president of the assembly and formally recognized the

republic.

On March 6, Congress by joint resolution, in behalf of the American

people, tendered its congratulations to the people of Spain. It seemed

at last as if our relations with Spain were on a good footing. General

Sickles urged upon the new republican government the abolition of

slavery and the concession of self-government to Cuba.

But such cordial relations did not long continue. On October 31, 1873,

the steamer _Virginius_, sailing under American colors and carrying a

United States registry, was captured on the high seas by the _Tornado_,

a Spanish war vessel, and on the afternoon of the first of November

taken into the port of Santiago de Cuba. The men and supplies she bore

were bound for the insurgents, but the capture did not occur in Cuban

waters. General Burriel, the commandant of the city, summoned a

court-martial, and in spite of the protests of the American consul,

condemned to death at the first sitting four of the passengers, General

W. A. C. Ryan, an Irish patriot and three Cubans. They were shot on the

morning of November 4. On the 7th twelve other passengers were executed

and on the 8th, Captain Fry and his entire crew, numbering thirty-six,

making the total number of executions fifty-three. As soon as news of

the capture reached Madrid, General Sickles called upon President

Castelar and represented to him the difficulties that might arise in

case the ship had been taken on the high seas bearing United States

colors. Upon General Sickles's suggestion the President of the Spanish

republic at once telegraphed to the captain-general to await orders

before taking any steps in regard to the captured vessel and crew.

In accordance with instructions from Mr. Fish, General Sickles on

November 14 protested by note against the executions as brutal and

barbarous and stated that ample reparation would be demanded. The next

day he received from the minister of state an ill-tempered reply,

rejecting the protest as inadmissible when neither the cabinet at

Washington nor that of Madrid had sufficient data upon which to ground a

complaint. On the day this reply was received General Sickles, following

out telegraphic instructions from Washington, made a formal demand by

note for the restoration of the _Virginius_, the surrender of the

survivors, a salute to the United States flag, and the punishment of the

guilty officials. In case of a refusal of satisfactory reparation within

twelve days, General Sickles was instructed by his government, at the

expiration of that period, to close the legation and leave Madrid.

The formal reply to General Sickles's demand for reparation was received

November 18. The Spanish government declared that it would make no

reparation until satisfied that an offense had been committed against

the flag of the United States, and that when so convinced through her

own sources of information or by the showing of the United States, due

reparation would be made.

The representations made at Washington by the Spanish minister were of a

much more satisfactory character than those made to General Sickles at

Madrid. Mr. Fish, therefore, instructed General Sickles to remain at his

post until the 26th, and if no accommodation were reached by that time

he could demand his passports. By the time this dispatch reached Madrid

General Sickles had already asked for his passports, but had not

received the reply of the Spanish government. On the 26th he received a

note from the Spanish minister asking for a postponement to December 25

and promising that if by that time Spain could not show that she had the

right on her side--i.e., that the _Virginius_ was not entitled to sail

under the United States flag--she would comply with the demands of the

United States. General Sickles replied that he could not accept such a

proposal, but that he would inform his government of it and take the

responsibility of deferring his departure.

Meanwhile the Spanish minister at Washington had proposed arbitration,

but Mr. Fish declined to submit to arbitration the question of an

indignity to the United States flag. The minister then asked for a

delay, but Mr. Fish told him that delay was impossible in view of the

approaching meeting of Congress. Unless settled beforehand the question

would have to be referred to Congress. This firm stand brought the

Spanish minister to time and on November 27 a proposition was submitted

and accepted by Mr. Fish, by the terms of which Spain stipulated to

restore the vessel forthwith, to surrender the survivors of her

passengers and crew, and on the 25th of December to salute the flag of

the United States. If, however, before that date Spain should prove to

the satisfaction of the United States that the _Virginius_ was not

entitled to carry the flag of the United States, the salute should be

dispensed with, but in such case the United States would expect a

disclaimer of intent of indignity to its flag.

The Spanish envoy submitted to the state department a large number of

documents and depositions to show that the _Virginius_ had no right to

sail under the United States flag. These were referred to the

attorney-general, and on December 17 he gave his opinion that the

evidence was conclusive that the _Virginius_, although registered in New

York on September 26, 1870, in the name of one Patterson, who made oath

as required by law that he was the owner, was in fact the property of

certain Cubans and was controlled by them. In conclusion the

attorney-general said:

Spain, no doubt, has a right to capture a vessel, with an

American register, and carrying the American flag, found in

her own waters assisting, or endeavoring to assist, the

insurrection in Cuba, but she has no right to capture such a

vessel on the high seas upon an apprehension that, in

violation of the neutrality or navigation laws of the United

States, she was on her way to assist said rebellion. Spain

may defend her territory and people from the hostile attacks

of what is, or appears to be, an American vessel; but she

has no jurisdiction whatever over the question as to whether

or not such vessel is on the high seas in violation of any

law of the United States. Spain cannot rightfully raise that

question as to the _Virginius_, but the United States may,

and, as I understand the protocol, they have agreed to do

it, and, governed by that agreement and without admitting

that Spain would otherwise have any interest in the

question, I decide that the _Virginius_, at the time of her

capture, was without right, and improperly carrying the

American flag.[117]

This decision was communicated to the Spanish authorities and, according

to the agreement, the salute to the United States flag was dispensed

with, and on January 3, 1874, the Spanish minister, on behalf of his

government, expressed a disclaimer of an intent of indignity to the flag

of the United States. Spain later paid indemnities to Great Britain and

the United States for the families of those who had been executed.

Meanwhile General Sickles offered his resignation by cable in

consequence of certain reports that his conduct had been disapproved.

Mr. Fish replied that such reports were unauthorized, that no

dissatisfaction had been expressed or intimated and that it was deemed

important that he remain at his post. Ten days later, General Sickles

requested that the telegram tendering his resignation and the reply be

published. Mr. Fish declined to do so, as the resignation was

hypothetical. On December 20, General Sickles again tendered his

resignation and it was accepted.

After the settlement of the _Virginius_ affair the government of the

United States addressed itself once more to the task of forcing a

settlement of the Cuban question in general. In his instructions to Mr.

Cushing, who succeeded General Sickles, Secretary Fish expressed the

policy of the administration at considerable length. After reviewing the

main facts of the insurrection which had then lasted more than five

years, with little or no change in the military situation, and after

referring to the rejection by Spain of the offers of mediation made by

the United States at an early day of the trouble, he said:

In these circumstances, the question what decision the

United States shall take is a serious and difficult one, not

to be determined without careful consideration of its

complex elements of domestic and foreign policy, but the

determination of which may at any moment be forced upon us

by occurrences either in Spain or in Cuba.

Withal the President cannot but regard independence, and

emancipation, of course, as the only certain, and even the

necessary, solution of the question of Cuba. And, in his

mind, all incidental questions are quite subordinate to

those, the larger objects of the United States in this

respect.

It requires to be borne in mind that, in so far as we may

contribute to the solution of these questions, this

government is not actuated by any selfish or interested

motive. The President does not meditate or desire the

annexation of Cuba to the United States, but its elevation

into an independent republic of freemen, in harmony with

ourselves and with the other republics of America.[118]

For some months Mr. Cushing was occupied with the settlement of the

indemnities in the _Virginius_ case. After nearly two years had elapsed

since the instructions above quoted, the Grant administration

determined, in view of the unchanged condition of the Cuban struggle,

to bring matters to an issue and to force, if need be, the hand of the

Spanish government. On November 5, 1875, Mr. Fish addressed a long

letter of instruction to Mr. Cushing. After reviewing the course of the

insurrection, the interests of the United States affected thereby, the

numerous claims arising therefrom, many of them still unsettled, the

persistent refusal of Spain to redress these grievances and the general

neglect on her part of treaty obligations, he concluded:

In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the war,

or of any change in the manner in which it has been

conducted on either side, he (the President) feels that the

time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments

to intervene, solely with a view to bringing to an end a

disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace

in the island of Cuba. No government is more deeply

interested in the order and peaceful administration of this

island than is that of the United States, and none has

suffered as the United States from the condition which has

obtained there during the past six or seven years. He will,

therefore, feel it his duty at an early day to submit the

subject in this light, and accompanied by an expression of

the views above presented, for the consideration of

Congress.

Mr. Cushing was instructed to read this note to the Spanish minister of

state. At the same time a copy was sent to General Robert C. Schenck,

United States minister at London, with instructions to read the same to

Lord Derby, and to suggest to him that it would be agreeable to the

United States if the British government would support by its influence

the position assumed by the Grant administration. In the course of a

few days copies of this note were sent to our representatives at Paris,

Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Lisbon, and St. Petersburg, with instructions to

communicate its purport orally, or by reading the note, to the

governments to which they were accredited and to ask their intervention

with Spain in the interests of terminating the state of affairs existing

in Cuba.

As the result of Mr. Cushing's friendly representations and in view of

the President's message discountenancing recognition of either

independence or belligerency, the Spanish minister, Mr. Calderon,

received the communication of November 5 threatening intervention, in

good part, and expressed his intention of answering it after he should

have had time to consider it carefully.

The reply of Great Britain was given to General Schenck in an interview

with Lord Derby on January 25, 1876. It was in substance that he was

convinced that Spain would not listen to mediation, and that the British

government was not prepared to bring pressure to bear upon her in case

she refused; that the Spanish government hoped to finish the Carlist war

in the spring and would then be in a position to put forth its whole

military strength for the reduction of Cuba; in conclusion, therefore,

Lord Derby thought "that if nothing were contemplated beyond an amicable

interposition, having peace for its object, the time was ill-chosen and

the move premature." The answers of the other powers were unsatisfactory

or evasive, none of them being willing to bring pressure to bear upon

the government of young Alfonso, while the Carlist war was on his hands.

The answer of Spain was finally given in the form of a note dated

February 3, 1876, addressed to the representatives of Spain in other

countries, including the United States, communicated to Mr. Cushing

February 19. This answer, written by Mr. Calderon was in good temper. He

stated that the insurrection was supported and carried on largely by

negroes, mulattoes, Chinese, deserters, and adventurers; that they

carried on a guerrilla warfare from their mountain retreats, that Spain

had sufficient forces in the island to defeat them in the field; that

the triumph of Spain would soon be followed by the total abolition of

slavery and the introduction of administrative reforms. The number of

vessels of war and troops in Cuba was enumerated to show that Spain was

putting forth a reasonable effort to bring the rebellion to a close, and

statistics were quoted to show that the trade between Cuba and the

United States, as well as the general trade of the island, had actually

increased largely since the outbreak of the insurrection. Finally he

declared that while individual foreigners had suffered, Spain had done

justice to all claims presented.

In conversation with Mr. Cushing, Mr. Calderon intimated that Spain,

although she would resist to the uttermost armed intervention, might be

willing under certain circumstances to accept the mediation of the

United States in Cuba, and he invited a frank statement of what the

United States would advise or wish Spain to do with regard to Cuba. In

reply to this suggestion, Mr. Fish, after disclaiming on the part of the

United States all intention of annexing Cuba, stated the following

points as the wish of his government:

(1) The mutual and reciprocal observance of treaty obligations, and a

full, friendly, and liberal understanding and interpretation of all

doubtful treaty provisions, wherever doubt or question might exist.

(2) Peace, order, and good government in Cuba, which involved prompt and

effective measures to restore peace, and the establishment of a

government suited to the spirit and necessities of the age.

(3) Gradual but effectual emancipation of slaves.

(4) Improvement of commercial facilities and the removal of the

obstructions then existing in the way of trade and commerce.

In reply to these suggestions Mr. Calderon handed Mr. Cushing a note,

dated April 16, 1876, in which he represented that his majesty's

government was in full accord with Mr. Fish's suggestions.

This assurance on the part of the Spanish government completely thwarted

Mr. Fish's plans, and, together with Lord Derby's reply, put all further

attempts at intervention out of the question.

The substance of Mr. Fish's note threatening intervention appeared

unofficially in the press of Europe and America in December, 1875, and

attracted such general attention that in January the House asked for the

correspondence. In reply Mr. Fish submitted to the President for

transmission the note of November 5, together with a few carefully

chosen extracts from the correspondence between himself and Mr.

Cushing,[119] but nothing was given that might indicate that the United

States had appealed to the powers of Europe to countenance intervention.

As rumors to this effect had, however, appeared in the press, the House

called the next day for whatever correspondence had taken place with

foreign powers in regard to Cuba. Mr. Fish replied that "no

correspondence has taken place during the past year with any European

government, other than Spain, in regard to the island of Cuba," but that

the note of November 5 had been orally communicated to several European

governments by reading the same.[120] This was putting a very strict and

a very unusual construction upon the term "correspondence," to say the

least. The dispatches, notes, and telegrams that pass between a

government and its representatives abroad are the generally recognized

means of communicating with foreign powers, and are always spoken of as

the correspondence with those powers. The whole affair reveals a curious

lack of candor and of courage on the part of Mr. Fish. He was trying to

shield either the administration or himself, and did not wish the

American public to know that he had reversed the time-honored policy of

the state department by appealing to the powers of Europe to intervene

in what had been uniformly treated, from the days of John Quincy Adams

and Henry Clay, as a purely American question.

This correspondence was suppressed for twenty years. On March 24, 1896,

the Senate called for "copies of all dispatches, notes, and telegrams in

the department of state, from and after the note from Secretary Fish to

Mr. Cushing of November 5, 1875, and including that note, until the

pacification of Cuba in 1878, which relate to mediation or intervention

by the United States in the affairs of that island, together with all

correspondence with foreign governments relating to the same topic." On

April 15 President Cleveland transmitted the "correspondence" called

for, which forms a document of 137 pages.[121]

The Cuban struggle continued for two years longer. In October, 1877,

several leaders surrendered to the Spanish authorities and undertook the

task of bringing over the few remaining ones. Some of these paid for

their efforts with their lives, being taken and condemned by

court-martial by order of the commander of the Cuban forces. Finally, in

February, 1878, the terms of pacification were made known. They embraced

representation in the Spanish Cortes, oblivion of the past in respect of

political offenses committed since the year 1868, and the freedom of

slaves in the insurgent ranks.[122] In practice, however, the Cuban

deputies were never truly representative, but were men of Spanish birth

designated usually by the captain-general. By gradual emancipation

slavery ceased to exist in the island in 1885. The powers of the

captain-general, the most objectionable feature of Spanish rule,

continued uncurtailed.

In February, 1895, the final insurrection against Spanish rule in Cuba

began, and soon developed the same features as the "Ten Years' War." The

policy of Maximo Gomez, the insurrectionary chief, was to fight no

pitched battles but to keep up incessant skirmishes, to destroy sugar

plantations and every other source of revenue with the end in view of

either exhausting Spain or forcing the intervention of the United

States. With the opening of the second year of the struggle, General

Weyler arrived in Havana as governor and captain-general, and

immediately inaugurated his famous "Reconcentration" policy. The

inhabitants of the island were directed by proclamation to assemble

within a week in the towns occupied by Spanish troops under penalty, if

they refused, of being treated as rebels. The majority of those who

obeyed the proclamation were women and children who, as a result of

being cooped up in crowded villages under miserable sanitary conditions

and without adequate food, died by the thousands.[123] In the province

of Havana alone 52,000 perished.

Public opinion in the United States was thoroughly aroused by the

execution of policies which not only excited sympathy for the

unfortunate inhabitants of Cuba, but which paralyzed the industries of

the island and destroyed its commerce. American citizens owned at least

fifty millions of property in the island, and American commerce at the

beginning of the insurrection amounted to one hundred millions annually.

Furthermore, numbers of persons claiming American citizenship were

thrown into prison by Weyler's orders. Some of them were native

Americans, but the majority were Cubans who had sought naturalization in

the United States in order to return to Cuba and claim American

protection.

Other Cubans, including many who were still Spanish subjects,

established themselves in American ports and furnished the insurgents

with arms and supplies. On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland issued a

proclamation calling attention to the Cuban insurrection and warning all

persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against doing any

of the acts prohibited by the American neutrality laws. Notwithstanding

all the efforts of the administration, illegal expeditions were

continually being fitted out in the United States, and while the great

majority of them were stopped by port officials or intercepted by the

navy, some of them succeeded in reaching the coasts of Cuba. President

Cleveland's proclamation recognized insurgency as a status distinct from

belligerency. It merely put into effect the neutrality laws of the

United States. It did not recognize a state of belligerency and

therefore did not bring into operation any of the rules of neutrality

under international law. President Cleveland consistently refused to

recognize the Cubans as belligerents. In February, 1896, Congress passed

a joint resolution, by a vote of 64 to 6 in the Senate and 246 to 27 in

the House, recognizing a state of war in Cuba, and offering Spain the

good offices of the United States for the establishment of Cuban

independence. Notwithstanding the overwhelming majority which this

resolution had received, the President ignored it, for it is a well

recognized principle that Congress has no right to force the hand of the

President in a matter of this kind. It amounted merely to an expression

of opinion by Congress.

In April, 1896, Secretary Olney addressed a note to the Spanish minister

in which the United States offered to mediate between Spain and the

insurgents for the restoration of peace on the basis of autonomy. Spain

rejected this offer, claiming that Cuba already enjoyed "one of the most

liberal political systems in the world," and suggesting that the United

States could contribute greatly to the pacification of the island by

prosecuting "the unlawful expeditions of some of its citizens to Cuba

with more vigor than in the past."[124] In his last annual message to

Congress, President Cleveland reviewed the Cuban situation at length

and, in conclusion, declared:

When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the

insurgents has become manifest and it is demonstrated that

her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its

rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its

reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means

nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and

the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the

conflict, a situation will be presented in which our

obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded

by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to

recognize and discharge.

The McKinley administration, which began March 4, 1897, soon directed

its attention to the Cuban question. It was unfortunate that with this

question rapidly approaching a crisis the State Department was in feeble

hands. John Sherman, the veteran senator from Ohio, was appointed

secretary of state by McKinley in order to make a place in the Senate

for Mark Hanna, who had so successfully conducted McKinley's campaign.

General Woodford was sent to Madrid to succeed Hannis Taylor, and he was

instructed to tender again the good offices of the United States, to

remind Spain of the resolution passed by the previous Congress, and to

warn her that another Congress was soon to assemble.[125] Six days after

the receipt of General Woodford's note the Spanish ministry resigned,

and on October 14 the liberal ministry of Sagasta assumed office. Its

first act was to recall General Weyler, and to appoint General Blanco

to succeed him as governor and captain-general of Cuba. The new ministry

promised to grant autonomy to Cuba, and President McKinley in his

message of December 6, 1897, declared his intention of allowing time for

the new policy to be tested.

It was soon evident that the grant of autonomy had come too late. The

Cubans would no longer be satisfied with anything short of independence.

On January 13, 1898, there was serious rioting in Havana, deliberately

planned as a demonstration against the autonomy scheme, and

Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee cabled his government that it was evident

that autonomy would prove a failure, that he doubted whether Blanco

could control the situation, and that it might be necessary to send

warships for the protection of Americans in Havana. The suggestion as to

warships met with a prompter response than General Lee had expected. The

United States battleship _Maine_ was immediately dispatched to Havana,

where she arrived January 25 and was assigned an anchorage by the port

officials.[126] While she was lying quietly at anchor in Havana harbor,

attention was suddenly diverted from Cuba to Washington by the Dupuy de

Lome incident. On February 9, 1898, the New York _Journal_ published in

facsimile a letter from the Spanish minister at Washington to a friend

in Cuba which severely criticized President McKinley's policy and

referred to him as "a would-be politician who tries to leave a door open

behind him while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party."

The letter was genuine, though surreptitiously acquired, and was of such

a character that it could not be overlooked. When called on for an

explanation, Senor de Lome admitted having written the letter but

questioned the accuracy of the translation. He claimed that the language

which he had used was permissible under the seal of private

correspondence. When General Woodford, acting under instructions from

Washington, informed the Spanish minister of foreign affairs that the

President expected the immediate recall of Senor de Lome, he was

informed that the latter's resignation had already been accepted by

cable.[127]

Before the excitement over this incident had subsided, the battleship

_Maine_ was suddenly blown up in Havana harbor on the night of February

15, and two of her officers and two hundred and fifty-eight of her crew

were killed. After a careful examination of witnesses and of the wreck,

an American naval court of inquiry reported that the destruction of the

ship was due to a submarine mine.[128] A Spanish board of inquiry, after

examining a number of witnesses who had seen or heard the explosion,

made a brief report the following day to the effect that the ship had

been destroyed by an explosion in the forward magazine. It is generally

admitted that the American report was correct, but the responsibility

for the mine has never been disclosed.

As soon as the report of the court of inquiry was made public, the

American people, who had displayed great self-control, threw aside all

restraint and the country witnessed an outburst of patriotic fervor such

as had not been seen since 1861. "Remember the _Maine_" became a

watchword, and the demand for war was overwhelming. President McKinley

decided, however, to make one more effort at a diplomatic settlement. He

proposed an armistice between Spain and the insurgents pending

negotiations for a permanent adjustment through the friendly offices of

the President of the United States. In reply the Spanish government made

counter-propositions to the effect that the questions arising out of the

destruction of the _Maine_ be submitted to arbitration and that the

pacification of the island be left to a Cuban parliament. Meanwhile, the

governor-general would be authorized to accept a suspension of

hostilities, provided the insurgents should ask for it and agree to

disarm. This was simply an invitation to the insurgents to submit, in

which case Spain would consider what degree of autonomy was needed or

practicable. The President considered the Spanish reply as a rejection

of his proposal and determined to submit the entire question to

Congress.[129] This meant war, for public feeling in America was at the

highest pitch of excitement, the "yellow" press was clamoring for war,

and it was with the greatest difficulty that the President, who really

wanted peace, had held Congress in check. The message to Congress was

held back a few days in consequence of a telegram from General Lee, who

urged that he be given time to get Americans safely out of Havana.

During this period of delay the representatives of Germany,

Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia made a formal

appeal to the President for peace, and the Pope persuaded the Queen of

Spain to authorize General Blanco to suspend hostilities. This

concession did not meet fully the American ultimatum and seemed too much

like another play for time. The Spanish minister was, therefore, simply

informed that the President would notify Congress of this latest

communication. President McKinley was later severely criticized for not

giving greater consideration to this note and for merely alluding to it

in his message instead of transmitting it in full. Had he given it

greater consideration, war might have been delayed a few months, but it

would not have been averted, for Spain was not willing to make

concessions that the Cubans at this late date would have regarded as

satisfactory.

In his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, President McKinley

referred to the _Maine_ only incidentally as "a patent and impressive

proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable." He suggested

forcible intervention as the only solution of the question and declared

that it was justified, not only on grounds of humanity, but as a measure

for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens in

Cuba, and for the purpose of putting a stop to a conflict which was a

constant menace to our peace.[130] Two days later the House passed a

resolution by vote of 324 to 19, directing the President to intervene at

once to stop the war in Cuba with the purpose of "establishing by the

free action of the people thereof a stable and independent government of

their own in the island." On the same day the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations reported a resolution demanding the immediate

withdrawal of Spain from the Island of Cuba, but the minority report

urging in addition the immediate recognition of the Cuban republic as

then organized was at first embodied in the Senate resolution by a vote

of 67 to 21. It was feared by members of the Senate that if we liberated

Cuba without first recognizing the so-called republic of Cuba, the

island would inevitably be annexed by the United States. After two days

of hot debate, the Senate reconsidered, and the House resolution

prevailed. On April 19, the anniversary of the battle of Lexington and

of the first bloodshed of the Civil War in the streets of Baltimore, the

fateful resolutions were adopted in the following terms:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States in Congress assembled,

_First_, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of

right ought to be, free and independent.

_Second_, That it is the duty of the United States to

demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby

demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its

authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw

its land and naval forces from Cuban waters.

_Third_, That the President of the United States be, and he

hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and

naval forces of the United States, and to call into the

actual service of the United States the militia of the

several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry

these resolutions into effect.

_Fourth_, That the United States hereby disclaims any

disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty,

jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the

pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when

that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of

the island to its people.[131]

As soon as these resolutions were approved by the President, the Spanish

minister asked for his passports, thus severing diplomatic relations,

and Woodford was directed to leave Madrid. The North Atlantic Squadron,

then at Key West under command of Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, was

immediately ordered to blockade the northern coast of Cuba, and

Commodore George Dewey was ordered from Hong Kong to Manila Bay for the

purpose of capturing or destroying the Spanish fleet. During the war

that followed, foreign public opinion, outside of England, was decidedly

hostile to the United States, but in the face of the victories of

Santiago and Manila Bay this sentiment underwent a marked change, and

Spain abandoned whatever hopes she had cherished of European

intervention. By the end of July, 1898, the American as well as the

European press was beginning to ask why the war should not be brought to

a close.

After the surrender of Santiago General Miles embarked for Porto Rico

with a force of 16,000 men, and in a two-weeks' campaign overran most of

that island with the loss of three killed and forty wounded. A large

number of troops had also been sent to the Philippines. It was evident,

therefore, that while the war had been undertaken for the liberation of

Cuba, the United States did not feel under any obligation to confine its

military operations to that island. Having met all the demands of honor,

Spain asked the French government to authorize the French ambassador at

Washington to arrange with the President of the United States the

preliminary terms of peace. The negotiations begun on July 26 resulted

in the protocol of August 12, in which Spain agreed to the following

demands: first, the immediate evacuation of Cuba and the relinquishment

of Spanish sovereignty; second, the cession of Porto Rico and one of

the Ladrones by way of indemnity; and third, the occupation by the

United States of "the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the

conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control,

disposition, and government of the Philippines."[132]

By the terms of the protocol Paris was selected as the place of meeting

for the peace commissioners, and here negotiations were opened on

October 1. The United States delegation was composed of William R. Day,

who resigned the office of Secretary of State to head the mission;

Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations;

William P. Frye, President _pro tem_ of the Senate; Senator George Gray

of Delaware; and Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York _Tribune_; with

John Bassett Moore, Assistant Secretary of State, as Secretary. An

entire month was taken up with the Cuban question, the Spanish

commissioners striving in vain to saddle the Cuban debt either on the

United States or on the people of Cuba. The Philippine question occupied

most of the next month. When the commissioners were appointed, President

McKinley had not fully made up his mind on this important question. His

first intention seems to have been to retain the bay and city of Manila

as a naval base and a part or possibly the whole of Luzon. Public

sentiment in the United States in favor of acquiring the whole group

made rapid headway, and after an extended trip through the South and

West, during which he sounded opinion on this question, the President

instructed the commissioners to demand the entire group. The

commissioners were later authorized to offer $20,000,000 for the

cession. This offer, which was recognized by the Spanish commissioners

as an ultimatum, was finally accepted under protest. On other points the

United States secured what had been demanded in the protocol, and the

treaty was signed December 10, 1898.[133]

The treaty was submitted to the Senate January 4, 1899, and precipitated

a memorable debate which lasted until February 6. The principal

opposition came from Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, who declared that

the proposal to acquire and govern the Philippine Islands was in

violation of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the

whole spirit of American institutions. The treaty could not be ratified

without the aid of Democrats, and the result was in doubt when Bryan

went to Washington and advised his friends in the Senate to vote for

ratification, saying that the status of the Philippines could be

determined in the next presidential campaign. The outbreak of

hostilities between the Filipinos and the American troops occupying

Manila put an end to the debate, and on February 6 the treaty was

ratified.

When the United States demanded the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba, it

was with the declaration that "The United States hereby disclaims any

disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or

control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and

asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the

government and control of the island to its people." Never has a pledge

made by a nation under such circumstances been more faithfully carried

out. The administration of Cuba during the period of American military

occupation was a model of its kind. General Leonard Wood, the military

governor, and his associates found the cities and towns crowded with

refugees and reconcentrados, and governmental affairs in a state of the

utmost confusion. They established order, relieved distress, organized

hospitals and charitable institutions, undertook extensive public works,

reorganized the system of public schools, and put Havana, Santiago, and

other cities in a sanitary condition. In a hospital near Havana Major

Walter Reed, a surgeon in the United States army, demonstrated the fact

that yellow fever is transmitted by the bite of a mosquito. This

discovery was at once put to the test in Havana, and the city was

rendered free from yellow fever for the first time in one hundred and

forty years.[134]

In the organization of a government for the island, the first step was

to take a census of the inhabitants, determine the proper basis of

suffrage, and hold municipal elections for the purpose of organizing

local government. This work having been successfully accomplished, a

constitutional convention, summoned by General Wood, convened in the

city of Havana, November 5, 1900. By February 21, 1901, the convention

had agreed upon a constitution modelled in general after that of the

United States. The new constitution provided for the recognition of the

public debts contracted by the insurgent government, but was silent on

the subject of future relations with the United States. This subject had

been brought to the attention of the convention early in February by

General Wood, who had submitted for incorporation in the constitution

certain provisions which had been drafted in Washington. The convention

objected to these proposals on the ground that they impaired the

independence and sovereignty of the island, and that it was their duty

to make Cuba "independent of every other nation, the great and noble

American nation included."

The United States, however, had no intention of withdrawing from the

island until this matter was satisfactorily adjusted. A provision, known

as the Platt Amendment, was therefore inserted in the army appropriation

bill of March 2, 1901, directing the President to leave the control of

the island to its people so soon as a government should be established

under a constitution which defined the future relations with the United

States substantially as follows:

I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any

treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers

which will impair or tend to impair the independence of

Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign

power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or

naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any

portion of said island.

II. That said government shall not assume or contract any

public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make

reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge

of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after

defraying the current expenses of government shall be

inadequate.

III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United

States may exercise the right to intervene for the

preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a

government adequate for the protection of life, property,

and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations

with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the

United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the

government of Cuba.

IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its

military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and

all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained

and protected.

V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as

necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans

to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities

of the island....

VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the

proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title

thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.

VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the

independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as

well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will

sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for

coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be

agreed upon with the President of the United States.

VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of

Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent

treaty with the United States.[135]

These articles, with the exception of the fifth, which was proposed by

General Leonard Wood, were carefully drafted by Elihu Root, at that time

Secretary of War, discussed at length by President McKinley's cabinet,

and entrusted to Senator Platt of Connecticut, who offered them as an

amendment to the army appropriation bill. In order to allay doubts

expressed by members of the convention in regard to the third article,

General Wood was authorized by Secretary Root to state officially that

the intervention described in this article did not mean intermeddling in

the affairs of the Cuban government, but formal action on the part of

the United States, based upon just and substantial grounds. With this

assurance the convention adopted the Platt amendment June 12, 1901, and

added it as an appendix to the constitution.

On May 20, 1902, Tomas Estrada Palma was inaugurated as first president

of the Republic of Cuba, and General Wood handed over to him the

government of the island.[136] The Americans left a substantial balance

in the Cuban treasury. The total receipts for the entire period were

$57,197,140.80, and the expenditures $55,405,031.28. The customs

service, which furnished the principal part of the revenues during the

period of military occupation, was ably administered by General Tasker

H. Bliss.[137]

While the Platt amendment determined the political relations that were

to exist between Cuba and the United States, there had been no agreement

on the subject of commercial relations. The sugar industry, which had

been almost destroyed by the insurrection, was dependent upon the

willingness of the United States to arrange for a reduction of its

tariff in favor of the Cuban product. Otherwise Cuban sugar could not

compete with the bounty-fed beet sugar of Europe or with the sugars of

Porto Rico and Hawaii, which were now admitted to the American market

free of duty. President Roosevelt had hoped to settle this question

before the withdrawal of American troops, and he had urged upon Congress

the expediency of providing for a substantial reduction in tariff duties

on Cuban imports into the United States, but a powerful opposition,

composed of the beet-sugar growers of the North and West and of the

cane-sugar planters of Louisiana, succeeded in thwarting for two years

the efforts of the administration to do justice to Cuba. All attempts to

get a bill through Congress failed.[138]

In the meantime a reciprocity convention was agreed upon in the ordinary

diplomatic way December 11, 1902, under which Cuban products were to be

admitted to the United States at a reduction of twenty per cent. As the

Senate failed to act on this treaty before the 4th of March, 1903,

President Roosevelt convened an extra session of the Senate which

ratified the treaty with amendments, and with the very unusual provision

that it should not go into effect until approved by Congress. As the

House was not then in session, this meant that the treaty had to go over

until the fall. The Cuban situation grew so bad that the President

finally convened Congress in extra session November 9, 1903. In a

special message he urged prompt action on the treaty on the ground that

the Platt amendment had brought the island of Cuba within our system of

international policy, and that it necessarily followed that it must also

to a certain degree come within the lines of our economic policy. The

House passed the bill approving the treaty November 19 by the

overwhelming vote of 335 to 21, but the Senate, although it had already

ratified the treaty, permitted the extra session to expire without

passing the measure which was to give the treaty effect. When the new

session began December 7, the Cuban treaty bill was made the special

order in the Senate until December 16, when the final vote was taken

and it passed. Under the reciprocity treaty commercial relations with

Cuba were established on a firm basis and the volume of trade increased

rapidly.

In August, 1906, President Palma was reelected for another term, but the

Cubans had not learned the primary lesson of democracy, submission to

the will of the majority, and his opponents at once began an

insurrectionary movement which had for its object the overthrow of his

government. About the middle of September President Roosevelt sent

Secretary Taft to Havana for the purpose of reconciling the contending

factions, but Mr. Taft's efforts proved unavailing and President Palma

resigned. When the Cuban Congress assembled, it was found impossible to

command a quorum. Under these circumstances Secretary Taft assumed

control of affairs on September 29 and proclaimed a provisional

government for the restoration of order and the protection of life and

property. A body of United States troops under command of General

Franklin Bell was sent to Cuba to preserve order and to uphold the

provisional government. On October 3, 1906, Secretary Taft was relieved

of the duties of provisional governor in order that he might resume his

duties in Washington, and Charles E. Magoon was appointed to take his

place at Havana.[139] In his message to Congress December 3, 1906,

President Roosevelt declared that while the United States had no desire

to annex Cuba, it was "absolutely out of the question that the island

should continue independent" if the "insurrectionary habit" should

become "confirmed." The second period of American occupation lasted a

little over two years, when the control of the government was again

restored to the people of the island and the American troops were

withdrawn.

FOOTNOTES:

[77] H. A. Washington, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 443.

[78] "Madison's Works," Vol. II, p. 488.

[79] Niles's "Register," under date November 8, 1817.

[80] For a full discussion of the question see the pamphlet by J.

Freeman Rattenbury, entitled, "The Cession of the Floridas to the United

States of America and the Necessity of Acquiring the Island of Cuba by

Great Britain." London, 1819.

[81] Niles's "Register," March and April, 1823.

[82] H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also Brit.

and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, pp. 114-236.

[83] H. A. Washington, "Writings of Jefferson," Vol. VII, p. 288.

[84] "Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. I, p. 265.

[85] _Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 275.

[86] Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 855. Also "Wharton's Digest,"

Sec. 60.

[87] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. III, p. 154.

[88] Mr. Clay to Mr. King, October 25, "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60.

[89] Canning to Earl of Liverpool, October 6, 1826.

[90] Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 863.

[91] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VIII, pp. 427, 428, and Vol. IX, pp.

90, 218.

[92] H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also

"Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60.

[93] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60.

[94] Mr. Upshur, who succeeded Mr. Webster as secretary of state, wrote

to Mr. Irving to the same effect, October 10, 1843.

[95] Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders, June 17, 1848. H. Ex. Doc. No. 121,

Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol.

XXVI.

[96] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. V, p. 7.

[97] J. F. H. Claiborne, "Life and Corresp. of John A. Quitman," Vol.

II. pp. 55-56, and Appendix, p. 385.

In June the Grand Jury of the United States Circuit Court at New Orleans

found a bill against John A. Quitman, John Henderson, Governor of

Louisiana, and others, for setting on foot the invasion of Cuba.

Quitman's view of state sovereignty did not admit the right of the

United States Courts to proceed against the chief executive of a

sovereign state. He sought the advice of friends throughout the South as

to what course he should pursue. None of them admitted the right of the

United States Courts to indict him and several of them advised him that

it was his duty to assert the principle of state sovereignty even to the

point of calling out the state militia to protect him against arrest.

Others advised him to submit under protest so as to avoid an open

breach. This course was finally adopted, and when the United States

marshal appeared on the 3rd of February, 1851, to take him into custody,

he yielded, causing at the same time an address to be issued to the

people of Mississippi, in which he resigned the office of governor.

After proceedings which lasted two months, Henderson was acquitted and

the charges against Quitman and the others dismissed.

[98] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 41, Thirty-first Cong., Second Sess.

[99] H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also 2d Annual

Message of Fillmore, December 2, 1851. "Messages and Papers of the

Presidents" Vol. V, p. 113.

[100] H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.

[101] Mr. Crittenden to Comte de Sartiges, October 22, 1851. See also

Pres. Fillmore to Mr. Webster and Mr. Webster's reply. 2 Curtis's "Life

of Webster," p. 551.

[102] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, Lord Howden to Earl Granville,

January 9, 1852.

[103] Comte de Sartiges to Mr. Webster, April 23, 1852. Sen. Ex. Doc.

No. 13, Thirty-second Cong., Second Sess.

[104] Mr. Webster to Comte de Sartiges, April 29, 1852. To Mr. Crampton,

same date, to same effect.

[105] H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-third Cong., Second Sess., p. 3.

[106] Mr. Soule to Mr. Marcy, November 10, and December 23, 1853, and

January 20, 1854.

[107] The correspondence relating to the _Black Warrior_ case and to the

Ostend conference is contained in H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-third

Cong., Second Sess.

[108] Sen. Report No. 351, Thirty-fifth Cong., Second Sess., Vol. I.

[109] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 7, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess.

[110] _Ibid._

[111] House Ex. Doc. No. 160, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess.

[112] C. F. Adams, "The Treaty of Washington," in "Lee at Appomattox and

Other Papers," p. 119.

[113] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 113, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess.

[114] Private journal of Mr. Fish, quoted by Prof. J. B. Moore in the

_Forum_, May, 1896.

[115] Congressional Globe, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess., p. 4438.

[116] "Treaties and Conventions of the United States" (Malloy's Ed.),

Vol. II, p. 1661.

[117] The correspondence relating to the case of the _Virginius_ is in

Foreign Relations for the years 1874, 1875, and 1876.

[118] Foreign Relations, 1874-75, p. 859.

[119] House Ex. Doc. No. 90, Forty-fourth Cong., First Sess.

[120] House Ex. Doc. No. 100, Forty-fourth Cong., First Sess.

[121] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 213, Fifty-fourth Cong., First Sess.

[122] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 79, Forty-fifth Cong., Second Sess.

[123] Sen. Doc. No. 25, p. 125, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess.

[124] Spanish Dipl. Corresp. and Docs. (translation, Washington, 1905),

pp. 7, 8.

[125] Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 568.

[126] Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 1025.

[127] Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1007-1020.

[128] Sen. Doc. No. 207, Fifty-fifth Cong., Second Sess.

[129] Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 731.

[130] Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. X, p.

147.

[131] "U. S. Statutes at Large," Vol. XXX, p. 738.

[132] Spanish Dipl. Corresp. and Docs., p. 206; Foreign Relations, 1898,

p. 819.

[133] Senate Doc. No. 62, Fifty-Fifth Cong., Third Sess.

[134] Report of the Military Governor of Cuba, 8 vols., 1901.

[135] U. S. Statues at Large, Vol. XXXI, p. 897.

[136] Documentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government,

in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, Appendix A.

[137] Documentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government,

in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, Appendix B.

[138] Senate Docs. Nos. 405 and 679, Fifty-Seventh Cong., First Sess.

[139] Secretary Taft's report on the Cuban situation was sent to

Congress December 17, 1906.