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THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
by
JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE
PH. D., LL. D.
Professor of American History and Dean of the
College Faculty in the Johns Hopkins University
Author of "From Isolation to Leadership,"
"America as a World Power," etc.
[Illustration]
Garden City New York
Doubleday, Page & Company
1920
Copyright, 1920, by
Doubleday, Page & Company
All Rights Reserved, Including That of Translation
into Foreign Languages, Including the Scandinavian
[Illustration: SOUTH AMERICA]
TO THE MEMORY OF
MY FATHER
WHOSE DAILY COMMENTS ON PUBLIC QUESTIONS
WERE MY FIRST LESSONS IN THE STUDY
OF POLITICS
AND TO
MY MOTHER
WHO IMPARTED TO ME A LOVE OF HISTORY
AND WHOSE APPROVAL IS STILL THE RICHEST
REWARD OF MY EFFORTS
PREFACE
This book is based on a smaller volume issued by the Johns Hopkins Press
in 1900 under the title "The Diplomatic Relations of the United States
and Spanish America," which contained the first series of Albert Shaw
Lectures on Diplomatic History. That volume has been out of print for
several years, but calls for it are still coming in, with increasing
frequency of late. In response to this demand and in view of the
widespread interest in our relations with our Southern neighbors I have
revised and enlarged the original volume, omitting much that was of
special interest at the time it was written, and adding a large amount
of new matter relating to the events of the past twenty years.
Chapters I, II and V are reprinted with only minor changes; III, IV and
VI have been rewritten and brought down to date; VII, VIII and IX are
wholly new.
J. H. L.
BALTIMORE,
May 7, 1920.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I THE REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 3
II THE RECOGNITION OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN
REPUBLICS 48
III THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES IN
REGARD TO CUBA 83
IV THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE PANAMA
CANAL 144
V FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 193
VI THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 238
VII THE ADVANCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN
THE CARIBBEAN 261
VIII PAN AMERICANISM 292
IX THE MONROE DOCTRINE 320
INDEX 335
MAPS
SOUTH AMERICA _Frontispiece_
THE CARIBBEAN _Facing page 262_
THE UNITED STATES
AND
LATIN AMERICA
THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
CHAPTER I
THE REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES
The English colonies of North America renounced allegiance to their
sovereign more through fear of future oppression than on account of
burdens actually imposed. The colonies of Spain in the southern
hemisphere, on the other hand, labored for generations under the burden
of one of the most irrational and oppressive economic systems to which
any portion of the human race has ever been subjected, and remained
without serious attempt at revolution until the dethronement of their
sovereign by Napoleon left them to drift gradually, _in spite of
themselves_, as Chateaubriand expressed it, into the republican form of
government. To carry the contrast a step further, when the conditions
were ripe for independence, the English colonies offered a united
resistance, while the action of the Spanish colonies was spasmodic and
disconcerted. The North American revolution gave birth to a federal
republic, that of the South to a number of separate and independent
republics, whose relations with one another have at times been far from
amicable. The causes for these striking differences are to be explained
not alone by race psychology, but by a comparison of the English and
Spanish colonial systems and of the two revolutions as well. The history
of the English colonies and of their revolt has been pretty well
exploited, but information in regard to the Spanish-American revolution
and its causes, although the sources are abundant, is not easily
accessible to English-speaking people.
By virtue of the celebrated Bull of Pope Alexander VI, the
Spanish-American colonies were looked upon as possessions of the crown,
and not as colonies of Spain. Their affairs were regulated by the king,
with the assistance of a board called the Council of the Indies. This
council, which was on a footing of equality with the Council of Castile,
was established by Ferdinand as early as 1511, and was modified by
Charles V in 1524. It was to take cognizance of all ecclesiastical,
civil, military, and commercial affairs relating to the colonies. From
it proceeded the so-called Laws of the Indies, and all colonial offices
in the gift of the crown were conferred by it. In the course of time,
however, the personnel of this council became merged with that of
Castile, and for all practical purposes the colonies became dependencies
of the Spanish nation.
There were from the first establishment of Spanish rule in America, two
viceroyalties on the continent. The viceroy of New Spain ruled over
Mexico and Central America, whilst all South America subject to Spanish
control was for about two centuries under the viceroy of Peru. In
regions too remote to be under his immediate control, _audiencias_, or
courts of justice, were established, the president of the _audiencia_
being known by the title of captain-general. Thus _audiencias_ were
established at Quito in 1542, at Charcas (in modern Bolivia) in 1559, in
New Granada in 1564, in Chile in 1568, and later at Caracas and at
Buenos Aires. In 1740, New Granada was raised to the rank of a
viceroyalty, with its capital at Bogota; and in 1776 the same dignity
was conferred on Buenos Aires. There were thus on the southern continent
three viceroyalties widely separated: one on the Main, one on the
Atlantic, and one on the Pacific.
The powers of the viceroy, or captain-general, as the case might be,
were limited only by the _audiencia_, consisting of from three to five
members, always of Spanish birth, whose functions were largely advisory,
but who had the privilege of corresponding directly with the Council of
the Indies, and who in case of emergency sometimes went so far as to
depose the viceroy.
It should be borne in mind that in Spanish America the native Indian
races were not driven beyond the frontier of civilization, as they were
by the English settlers, but became, and remain to this day, an integral
part of the population. There was thus in the Spanish colonies an
unusual admixture of races. There were (1) European Spaniards; (2)
Creoles, or children born in America of Spanish parents; (3) Indians,
the indigenous race; (4) Negroes of African race; (5) Mestizos, children
of whites and Indians; (6) Mulattoes, children of whites and negroes;
and (7) Zambos, children of Indians and negroes.
The maladministration of Spain's colonies may be summarized under two
heads: (1) acts of oppression against the native Indian race, and (2)
regulations of a commercial and political character, which acted in
restraint of the economic and social development of her own offspring in
America.
Under the first head may be mentioned the _mita_, or forced labor in
mines, farms, and factories, and the _repartimiento_, or _encomienda_,
which was an allotment to Spaniards of territory including the native
inhabitants as peons or vassals. In spite of humane restrictions placed
by law upon them, these institutions degenerated into systems of fearful
oppression, which led, in 1781, to the heroic but unsuccessful efforts
of Tupac Amaru, the last of the Incas, to free the land of his fathers
from the cruel rule of the Spaniard. So deep-seated was the
dissatisfaction and so formidable the revolt, that it was not suppressed
for more than two years. The unfortunate Inca and most of his family
were cruelly put to death.
The economic and commercial restrictions imposed upon the colonies
require fuller notice. The whole object of Spain's colonial policy was
to extract gold and silver from America and to force Spanish
manufactures and products upon that country. Commerce was confined to
Spain and to Spanish vessels.
No South American could own a ship, nor could a cargo be
consigned to him; no foreigner was allowed to reside in the
country unless born in Spain; and no capital, not Spanish,
was permitted in any shape to be employed in the colonies.
Orders were given that no foreign vessel, on any pretence
whatever, should touch at a South American port. Even ships
in distress were not to be received with common hospitality,
but were ordered to be seized as prizes, and the crews
imprisoned.[1]
As late as 1816, when the United States protested against the blockade
established by General Morillo, as contrary to international law, M.
Onis, the Spanish minister, replied that the object of the blockade was
to maintain the laws of the Indies, which during the Napoleonic wars had
been somewhat relaxed, adding:
You are aware that, agreeably to those laws, no foreign
vessel was allowed to trade with the dominions of his
majesty on that continent without a special license, and
that vessels found near or evidently shaping a course
towards them were liable to confiscation as interlopers.
When, later in the year, a United States commissioner was sent to
Cartagena to reclaim American vessels so seized, the Spanish viceroy
gave him to understand that he did not pretend to be acquainted with the
law of nations.[2]
Not only were the colonists prohibited from engaging in manufactures
which interfered with those of Spain, but restrictions were even placed
on agriculture in the interests of the Spanish producer. Thus the
cultivation of flax, hemp, and saffron was forbidden under severe
penalty; the cultivation of tobacco was not allowed; and grapes and
olives could be raised only for table use, so that oil and wine had to
be imported from Spain. Upon one occasion (in 1803) orders were sent "to
root up all the vines in certain provinces, because the Cadiz merchants
complained of a diminution in the consumption of Spanish wines."[3]
The carrying out of this commercial system in all its details was
entrusted to the _Casa de Contratacion_, or House of Trade, which
was located at Seville until 1717, when it was transferred to
Cadiz. The India House, as it was called, was established by warrant
of Queen Joanna in 1503.[4] To this house were to be brought all
merchandise for the colonies and all products from them of whatever
character. The colonial trade was thus limited to one Spanish port. The
affairs of the house were in charge of three commissioners or judges,
who had jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over all cases arising out of
the trade with America. Their authority was subordinated to no other
court or council but that of the Indies.
Not only were no foreigners allowed to go to the Spanish colonies, but
careful restrictions were placed on the movement of Spaniards to and
from America. In 1511 King Ferdinand had by a special order permitted
all subjects of Spain without distinction to go over to the Indies upon
entering their names at the India House; but in the years 1518, 1522,
1530, and 1539 several orders were passed "that no person reconciled, or
newly converted to our holy Catholic faith, from Judaism or
Mahometanism, nor the children of such, nor the children or grandsons of
any that had worn the St. Andrew's Cross of the Inquisition, or been
burnt or condemned as heretics, or for any heretical crime, either by
male or female line, might go over to the Indies, upon pain of
forfeiting all their goods, of an hundred lashes, perpetual banishment
from the Indies, and their bodies to be at the king's disposition."[5]
The commissioners might "grant passes to merchants to go over, or return
if they came from thence, including married merchants, provided they
have leave from their wives, and give 1,000 ducats security to return
within three years."[6]
There were also strict rules about passing from one province in America
to another. This could not be done without special leave from the
king.[7] "The inhabitants of the Indies may not come to Spain without
leave from the viceroys, presidents or governors of the places of their
habitation, in which they are to express the causes of their coming, and
whether it is to stay here or return."[8] "In the Indies, the
magistrates are directed to apprehend any persons they find are gone
over without leave, to imprison them till they can send them back into
Spain, upon pain of losing their employments."[9] In 1594 and 1602 it
was decreed that persons going over without leave should be sent to the
galleys for four years. In 1622 King Philip IV decreed that a person
simply going aboard a ship bound for the Indies without leave should be
immediately sent to the galleys for eight years.[10] Other decrees
equally severe were issued from time to time.
In order to keep the trade strictly under control and to properly
protect it, intercourse with the colonies was held only once a year. Two
squadrons, consisting of merchant ships and convoys under command of an
admiral and vice-admiral, made the trip each year. The fleet for New
Spain (Mexico) sailed in the spring, and that for the mainland in the
early fall. The first touched at some of the islands and then went to
Vera Cruz; the latter touched first at Cartagena and passed on thence to
Porto Bello, where the fair was held about the middle of March. This
fair was the great event of the year, and lasted forty days from the
time of the arrival of the fleet. From this point goods were distributed
by way of Panama to Peru, Chile, and even across the continent to Buenos
Aires. The gold bullion was sent in turn to this point by the viceroy of
Peru. It came in fifteen days from Potosi to Arica, thence by sea in
eight days to Callao, and in twenty days from Callao to Panama. The
viceroy of Peru was to take care to have the plate at Panama by the
middle of March. At Porto Bello it was taken aboard the galleons. About
the middle of June the galleons met the fleet from New Spain at Havana,
and from that point the two fleets with their convoys proceeded in
greater safety to Spain. Thus for two centuries all intercourse between
Spain and her colonies at one end of the line was limited at first to
Seville, and then to Cadiz; and at the other to Vera Cruz and Porto
Bello.[11] At a later period this arrangement was modified to some
extent, and Buenos Aires was made a port of entry. The reason for not
permitting trade with Buenos Aires during the earlier period was the
fear that the British and Dutch would smuggle through that port.
While the relations of the colonies with Spain were kept under the
strictest control, intercourse with foreign nations, although
absolutely prohibited under the severest penalties, could not be
entirely prevented. In speaking of Spain's restrictive policy, a British
naval officer, who was on the South American station during the
revolution, says:
Unfortunately, however, for that system, the South
Americans, notwithstanding the network of chains by which
they were enveloped, had still some sparks of humanity left,
and, in spite of all their degradation, longed earnestly for
the enjoyments suitable to their nature; and finding that
the Spaniards neither could nor would furnish them with an
adequate supply, they invited the assistance of other
nations. To this call the other nations were not slow to
listen; and, in process of time, there was established one
of the most extraordinary systems of organized smuggling
which the world ever saw. This was known under the name of
the contraband or forced trade, and was carried on in armed
vessels, well manned, and prepared to fight their way to the
coast, and to resist, as they often did with effect, the
_guarda costas_, or coast blockades of Spain. This singular
system of warlike commerce was conducted by the Dutch,
Portuguese, French, English, and latterly by the North
Americans. In this way goods to an immense value were
distributed over South America; and although the prices were
necessarily high, and the supply precarious, that taste for
the comforts and luxuries of European invention was first
encouraged, which afterwards operated so powerfully in
giving a steady and intelligible motive to the efforts of
the Patriots in their struggle with the mother-country.
Along with the goods which the contraband trade forced into
the colonies, no small portion of knowledge found entrance,
in spite of the increased exertions of the Inquisition and
church influence, aided by the redoubled vigilance of
government, who enforced every penalty with the utmost
rigor. Many foreigners, too, by means of bribes and other
arts, succeeded in getting into the country, so that the
progress of intelligence was gradually encouraged, to the
utter despair of the Spaniards, who knew no other method of
governing the colonies but that of mere brute force,
unsupported by the least shadow of opinion, or of good
will.[12]
The trade carried on by foreign interlopers grew to such alarming
proportions that before the middle of the eighteenth century Spain found
it necessary to relax the restrictions upon the private trade of her own
subjects. This led, about 1748, to the discontinuance of the annual
fleets or galleon trade.
The political administration of the country was absolutely in the hands
of Spaniards, who as a rule were not allowed to marry, acquire property,
or form any permanent ties in America. In the summary of charges against
Spain appearing in the Argentine Manifesto of 1817, one of the
specifications is, that of one hundred and sixty viceroys who had
governed in America, four natives of the country alone were numbered;
and of six hundred and two captains-general, all but fourteen had been
Spaniards.
The monopoly of Spanish trade in South America was partially surrendered
by the treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, at the close of the War of the
Spanish Succession. By this treaty England agreed to recognize Philip V
as king of Spain and the Indies, and in turn was granted the _assiento_,
or contract for supplying the Spanish colonies with African slaves.[13]
The importation of negroes into the Spanish possessions had been carried
on under contract from the very first. The _assiento_, which had been
previously granted to Spanish subjects, was, in 1696, granted to the
Portuguese Company of Guinea, and in 1702 to the Royal Guinea Company
of France; but in 1713 England secured this lucrative monopoly and
became the great slave-trading power of the world.
The _assiento_ of 1713, which was very carefully drawn up in 42
articles, granted to an English company the sole right of supplying
slaves to the Spanish West Indies and to South America for the period of
thirty years from May 1, 1713. By it the Queen of England undertook to
see that the company chartered by her should introduce into the Spanish
West Indies, including South America, 144,000 negroes of both sexes and
all ages within thirty years, at the rate of 4,800 a year. The company
was to pay a duty of 33-1/3 pieces of eight (dollars) for each negro
imported. In addition to the 4,800 a year, other negroes might be
imported at a duty of 16-2/3 dollars each, thus encouraging larger
importations. The negroes could be brought in either Spanish or English
vessels, manned with English or Spanish sailors, provided only no cause
of offense be given to the Catholic religion. The majority of the
negroes were to be taken to Cuba and Porto Rico, and to the ports on the
Main; but of the 4,800, the company had the right to take 1,200 to
Buenos Aires, 800 to be sold there and 400 to be carried to the
provinces up the Plata and to the kingdom of Chile. They were also
allowed to carry negroes across the isthmus from Porto Bello to Panama,
and there re-ship them to Peru. Either Englishmen or Spaniards could be
employed in the business, provided that there were not more than four or
six Englishmen in any port, and that these should be amenable to the
laws in all respects as Spanish subjects. By no means the least
remarkable provision of this treaty was that their British and Catholic
majesties were each to receive one-fourth of the profits of this
traffic.
Ships engaged in this trade were to be searched on arrival at port, and
all merchandise found on board was to be confiscated and heavy penalties
inflicted. On condition, however, that the company should not attempt
any unlawful trade, his Catholic Majesty granted them the privilege,
during thirty years, of sending annually a ship of 500 tons to the fair
at Porto Bello. The Spanish king was to be concerned one-fourth in the
profits.[14] It seems that the company stretched this privilege to the
utmost. The ship always stopped at Jamaica, took on all the goods she
could, and carried along with her five or six smaller vessels laden with
goods. When she got near Porto Bello, all her provisions were put in the
tenders and the goods these bore taken aboard. She then entered the
harbor laden down to the water's edge. Thus this single ship was made to
carry more than five or six of the largest galleons.[15]
Thirty years before the Spanish colonies began their war of
independence, the British government had entertained the idea of
revolutionizing and separating them from Spain. This idea seems to have
arisen in 1779, during the administration of Lord North, when Spain
joined France in the alliance with the American colonies against Great
Britain.[16] It was suggested at first, no doubt, as a measure of
retaliation, but was frequently agitated in later years with the avowed
object of opening up South America to British commerce. The same idea
was the basis of Miranda's scheme for the liberation of his native
land.
Francisco de Miranda[17] (1754-1816), a native of Caracas, Venezuela,
was the first Spanish-American patriot. He was with the American army
for a time during the Revolutionary War, but in what capacity is not
quite settled. It is stated by some writers that he held a commission
under LaFayette. The success of our war inspired him with the hope of
freeing his own country from Spanish control. He confided his views to
his friends in the United States, particularly to Alexander Hamilton,
"upon whom he fixed his eyes as a coadjutor in the great purpose of his
life." Shortly after Miranda had returned to his native land his schemes
were discovered. He fled to the United States, and later to England,
where he had repeated conferences with Pitt. Finding no help for his
revolutionary schemes in England, he went to the continent and traveled
through France, Germany, Turkey, and Russia. At the Russian court he was
warmly received, but was soon dismissed at the demand of the Spanish
minister. At news of the dispute between England and Spain about Nootka
Sound in 1790, he hastened to England and communicated his scheme to the
British ministry. Pitt lent a ready ear to his views as long as the
dispute lasted, with the intention of making use of him in the event of
a rupture with Spain. But when the dispute was peaceably settled,
Miranda's hopes fell to the ground and he left England. His scheme was
only temporarily abandoned, however. He considered himself to have been
ill-used by Pitt on this occasion, as he subsequently stated to Rufus
King, the American minister to England.
The French Revolution was now well under way, and the wars upon which
the republic was entering offered an attractive field for a soldier of
republican ideas. In April, 1792, Miranda went to Paris with
introductions to Petion and the leading Girondists, hoping that the
revolutionary party might help him in his plans. He was given a
commission as brigadier-general in the French army, and served in
responsible posts under Dumouriez on the eastern frontier. He conducted
the siege of Maestricht and commanded the left wing of the French army
at the disastrous battle of Neerwinden, March, 1793, in which Belgium
was reconquered by the Austrians. Dumouriez now declared against the
Convention, but his troops having refused to follow him, he went over to
the Austrians in company with the Duke of Chartres, Louis Philippe.
Miranda fell under suspicion of treason and was forced to undergo a
court-martial, but was acquitted. For some unexplained reason he was
shortly after thrown into prison. He soon secured his release, but for
several years disappears from public view. His services in behalf of the
republic received in time due recognition. His name appears on the Arc
de Triomphe in Paris in the list of the heroes of the Revolution.
In January, 1798, Miranda returned to England. As Spain was now the
close ally of France, he hoped to secure the cooperation of Great
Britain in his scheme. He also hoped to secure aid from the United
States. The people of Kentucky and Tennessee were far from satisfied
with the provisions of the Spanish treaty of 1795 in regard to the
navigation of the Mississippi River. Then, too, just at this time, war
between the United States and France seemed inevitable, on account of
the resentment by France of the Jay treaty and her treatment of the
American representatives. Washington had been called from his retirement
at Mt. Vernon to assume the post of commander-in-chief of the army,
while the active command was to be given to Hamilton. Hamilton had
expressed great interest in Miranda's projects and was a man of known
ambition. His appointment, therefore, as the virtual commander-in-chief
of the American army made Miranda hopeful of his cooperation.
Mr. King, the American minister at London, entered heartily into the
plans of General Miranda, and his correspondence on that subject, during
the year 1798, with his government and with Hamilton is quite
voluminous.[18] For a time it seemed as if Great Britain and the United
States would cooperate for the purpose of revolutionizing Spanish
America. The plan, as entertained by Miranda and Hamilton, was for
England to supply the naval force and the United States the land forces.
Miranda believed that six or eight vessels of the line and four or five
thousand troops would be sufficient,[19] though Hamilton thought it
would require ten thousand troops. England's participation in the scheme
depended upon the relations between France and Spain. Mr. King wrote to
his government, February 26, 1798:
Two points have within a fortnight been settled in the
English cabinet respecting South America. If Spain is able
to prevent the overthrow of her present government and to
escape being brought under the entire control of France,
England (between whom and Spain, notwithstanding the war, a
certain understanding appears to exist) will at present
engage in no scheme to deprive Spain of her possessions in
South America. But if, as appears probable, the army
destined against Portugal, and which will march through
Spain, or any other means which may be employed by France,
shall overthrow the Spanish government, and thereby place
the resources of Spain and of her colonies at the disposal
of France, England will immediately commence the execution
of a plan long since digested and prepared for the complete
independence of South America. If England engages in this
plan, she will at Philadelphia propose to the United States
to cooperate in its execution, Miranda will be detained
here, under one pretense or another, until events shall
decide the conduct of England.[20]
England's policy in regard to South America for the next twenty years
substantially confirmed the interpretation of her motives here given by
Mr. King.
During the summer of 1798 Mr. King had several conferences with the
British ministry in regard to the Spanish-American question, but it was
always understood that they were personal and wholly unauthorized. What
occurred at these interviews was, of course, always communicated to the
American government, but as they were unofficial and communicated merely
in the nature of information, the State Department preferred to keep the
matter on the same basis and did not refer to the matter in its
dispatches to Mr. King. This caused him no little annoyance.[21] In the
same way no notice was taken of General Miranda's letter to President
Adams.
Hamilton, however, was very frank in the expression of his views both to
General Miranda and to Mr. King. Under date of August 22, 1798, he wrote
to the latter:
I have received several letters from General Miranda. I have
written answers to some of them, which I send you to deliver
or not, according to your estimate of what is passing in the
scenes where you are. Should you deem it expedient to
suppress my letter, you may do it and say as much as you
think fit on my part in the nature of a communication
through you. With regard to the enterprise in question, I
wish it much to be undertaken, but I should be glad that the
principal agency was in the United States--they to furnish
the whole land force necessary. The command in this case
would very naturally fall upon me, and I hope I should
disappoint no favorable anticipation.
The United States, however, succeeded in coming to an understanding with
France, while England was unwilling to deal such a serious blow to Spain
as long as there was a chance of arraying her against Napoleon. The
communication of the views of the British government at Philadelphia, to
which Mr. King referred as a preliminary, was never made. Miranda's
hopes finally fell through at the reestablishment of peace in Europe by
the treaty of Amiens, which lasted until 1803. He lingered in Europe
some time longer, until, wearied out by years of fruitless negotiation
with the British government, he, for the time being, gave up all hope
of success in that quarter and returned once more to the United States.
Arriving in New York from England in November, 1805, Miranda proceeded
to lay his cause once more before Mr. King, who had so warmly befriended
him in London, and to solicit his cooperation in fitting out an
expedition for South America. While expressing his full sympathy with
the cause, Mr. King stated emphatically that he could render him no
assistance, nor could any individuals safely do so, without the
countenance of the government. He, therefore, advised Miranda to go to
Washington and lay his plans before the administration. This Miranda
did. He was admitted to informal conferences both with President
Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison. Upon his return to New York he
represented to those interested in his schemes that he had secured from
the government a secret sanction of his project, and that the
administration, though unwilling to take the initiative, would support
the undertaking so soon as the standard of revolution should once have
been raised on the Spanish Main. Miranda's chief supporter was Colonel
Smith, surveyor of the port of New York, whose influence as a public
official in close touch with the administration was decisive in
persuading many adventurous spirits to join the expedition with the
belief that it was really secretly backed by the government of the
United States.
Miranda left New York in the early part of February, 1806, in the
_Leander_, with an imperfectly equipped force of about 200 men, most of
whom were commissioned as officers and promised commands in the South
American army, which was expected to spring from the soil at the magic
touch of Miranda's step upon the shores of his native land. The ship
proceeded to Jacquemel, San Domingo, where Miranda expected to get the
necessary supplies and reinforcements. Here disappointments awaited him,
disputes with the ship's captain ensued, and over a month was
fruitlessly spent, while the Spanish authorities on the Main had time to
put themselves on the alert. It was not until the last of April that the
expedition, reinforced by two schooners, appeared off the coast of
Venezuela near Porto Cabello. They were attacked by two Spanish vessels,
which captured the schooners with about sixty men and large stores,
while the _Leander_ ignominiously took to flight.
Miranda then sailed for Barbados, where he solicited aid from the
British admiral, Lord Cochrane, in command on the West Indian station.
Lord Cochrane, without definite instructions from his government, but
acquainted with its general policy in regard to South America, and
knowing of the close relations in which Miranda had stood for years with
the British ministry, decided to assist him in landing. With this
understanding he signed with Miranda an agreement to the effect that in
the event of the success of the expedition, Great Britain should always
be held on a footing with the most favored nation, and that British
ships should receive a deduction of ten per cent. upon duties paid by
all other nations, except the United States.[22] On the twentieth of
June, the expedition left Barbados under convoy of a part of Admiral
Cochrane's squadron, and on August 2, 1806, effected a landing near
Coro, Venezuela. They easily took possession of the town, the unarmed
inhabitants fleeing before them. Here Miranda remained about ten days,
issuing proclamations and vainly waiting for the natives to join him.
His position, meanwhile, was becoming unsafe, so he abandoned it and
took possession of the little island of Aruba off the coast. Lord
Cochrane, seeing that the expedition was a failure, and not wishing
further to compromise his government, sent no reinforcements and finally
ordered the withdrawal of the ships that had accompanied the expedition.
Miranda was offered a convoy back to Trinidad, which he accepted,
leaving Aruba, September 27, 1806. At Trinidad the members of the
expedition dispersed.[23]
The Americans who had taken part in the expedition and survived were
prosecuted in the United States courts for violation of the neutrality
laws. They claimed that they had enlisted in the undertaking with the
connivance of the government at Washington. Jefferson's enemies made
great political capital of the affair. Members of the cabinet were
summoned as witnesses, but refused to appear. Privately Jefferson and
Madison both denied most emphatically having in any way committed the
government to Miranda's undertaking, or having acted in any way in
disregard of our obligations to Spain.[24]
Aside from accomplishing nothing, the expedition of 1806 was a great
injury to Miranda's cause. He himself lost prestige as a military leader
and brought his character into question as having misrepresented his
connection both with the British and United States governments.
However, upon the occupation of Spain by Napoleon in 1808, Miranda again
hastened to England and urged upon the ministry the claims of his
country, in whose interests he had now been laboring incessantly as an
exile for more than twenty years. We cannot but admire his tenacity of
purpose in the face of the most disheartening failures.
Not only did the British government lend its encouragement, through Lord
Cochrane, to the filibustering expedition from the United States with
which Miranda hoped to revolutionize Venezuela, but about the same time
it sent an expedition against the provinces of the Plate. This attack,
like the assistance given to Miranda, was ill-timed and not properly
followed up. The policy seems to have been outlined by Pitt, but was put
into execution after his death by the short-lived ministry of Grenville
and Fox. The government of the Duke of Portland, which succeeded after a
few months, and in which Castlereagh and Canning were the most
conspicuous figures, did not deem it expedient to follow up the
undertaking.[25] In fact, the fate of the expedition was already sealed
when Portland came into power.
The victory of Trafalgar had given the English control of the Atlantic.
A force of some 6,000 men was dispatched to the South Atlantic without
its destination being known. It proceeded to Rio Janeiro, Portugal then
being in alliance with England. The viceroy of the Plate became alarmed
and prepared to defend Montevideo, which he thought would be the first
point of attack. The expedition, however, passed by and proceeded to the
Cape of Good Hope, which it wrested from the Dutch. In 1806 a dash was
made from the Cape for the river Plate. Sir Home Popham commanded the
fleet, and General Beresford the land force, which amounted to 1,635
men. On June 6 the squadron arrived at the mouth of the Plate. The ships
had some difficulty in ascending the river, but on the 25th they came to
anchor at a point fifteen miles below Buenos Aires. The city was
captured with little or no resistance, the inhabitants having been led
to believe that the British had come to liberate them. The contents of
the public treasury were handed over to the invaders. The inhabitants
were required to swear allegiance to George III, private property was
respected, the free exercise of their religion was allowed, and all
officials who took the oath were continued in office. When Beresford
refused to proclaim the independence of the province, or to give any
assurance for their future independence, the inhabitants, who had now
learned how insignificant the invading force really was, began to
prepare for resistance. A leader was readily found in the person of
Jacques Liniers, a Frenchman, who had been for thirty years in the
service of Spain. He and Juan Martin de Puyrredon began an organized
movement for the expulsion of the English. On the 12th of August,
Beresford, who had remained all this time without reinforcements, was
compelled to surrender. Troops ordered to his support from the Cape did
not arrive until later.
Sobremonte, the viceroy, had deserted Buenos Aires and established
himself at Montevideo. The people of Buenos Aires, therefore, deposed
him and chose Liniers in his place.
During the fall other English reinforcements arrived, and in January,
1807, Montevideo was taken by assault. As soon as the defeat of
Beresford was known, General Whitelocke was sent to take command of the
united English forces of the Plate, now some twelve thousand in number.
He arrived in the spring. The reconquest of Buenos Aires now seemed an
easy matter. It had been taken in the first instance by sixteen hundred
men; there were now ten thousand available. On June 28 the British
landed at the small port of Ensenada, forty-eight miles below Buenos
Aires. The fighting continued on the outskirts of the city in a
desultory manner and without any decisive action for several days. But
finally, owing to the bad generalship and incompetency of Whitelocke,
his troops got into such a muddle that half the force was captured or
disabled. On July 6, Liniers decided to send a flag of truce with the
proposal to surrender all the English prisoners, including those taken
with Beresford, provided Whitelocke would evacuate the territory of
Buenos Aires. One of Liniers' associates, Alzaga, insisted that the
terms of surrender should include Montevideo. This demand seemed
preposterous, but the clause was finally inserted, and to their surprise
agreed to, so complete was the demoralization of the English. On July 7
the terms of capitulation were signed.[26] Thus through a lack of
decision in the cabinet and a display of incapacity in the field,
without parallel in British annals, the empire of the Plate was
lost.[27]
With Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808, the Spanish-American
question came to the front once more. Miranda returned to London and was
detained there by the cabinet, as before by Pitt, with a view to using
him if occasion should require. At the same time Castlereagh, now
Foreign Secretary, had other solutions of the question in view. It was
proposed, and the matter seriously discussed in the cabinet, to alienate
the colonies from Spain, if possible, without revolution; and, instead
of establishing republics according to Miranda's plans, to unite them
all under a prince of the House of Bourbon. Louis Philippe, Duke of
Orleans, was suggested as the most suitable person for the new crown.
Some thirty years prior to this, immediately upon the recognition by
Spain of the independence of the United States, Count de Aranda had
advised Charles III to forestall the movement for independence, which
must inevitably come in his own provinces, by establishing among them
three great empires--one in Mexico, one in Peru, and one on the
Main--each to be ruled by a prince of the royal family of Spain.[28]
Chateaubriand brought forward a similar plan several years later at the
Congress of Verona. The present scheme was suggested by General
Dumouriez in the interests of his friend, the Duke of Orleans. Several
memorials on the subject, both by Dumouriez and the duke, were presented
to the British government in 1807 and 1808.[29]
Napoleon's invasion of Spain constitutes at once the most contemptible
and the most disastrous chapter in his career. In 1807, under the terms
of an agreement with Godoy, the unworthy favorite of the queen and the
virtual ruler of Spain, a French army was introduced into the kingdom
for the nominal purpose of punishing Portugal for her refusal to join
the continental system. The Portuguese royal family, fully appreciating
the danger in which they stood, fled to America and founded the empire
of Brazil, which in 1815 was declared independent of Portugal. The
Spanish rulers attempted to follow their example, but their intended
flight became known and they were prevented by the populace from leaving
the capital. In the meantime a disgraceful quarrel having arisen between
the old king, Charles IV, and Prince Ferdinand, Napoleon, whose troops
were now firmly established in Spain, stepped in as arbiter between
father and son and summoned them both to meet him on the northern
frontier. Having purposely lingered in France beyond the appointed time,
he succeeded in enticing them over the border to Bayonne, where he
compelled both to renounce forever the crown of Spain and the Indies,
which he forthwith bestowed upon his brother Joseph. When the truth
dawned upon them, the Spanish nation rose to a man. Napoleon had
unwittingly aroused the latent principle of nationality; he had put into
action a force which was new and one which the statesmen of Europe had
hitherto left out of account, but which was to prove the most potent
factor in the new epoch of political history introduced by the French
Revolution.
Provisional juntas were rapidly organized in the various provinces of
the kingdom of Spain and affairs administered in the name of Ferdinand
VII. The Junta, or as it is better known, the Regency of Cadiz, rapidly
gained a position of national importance and became the chief executive
body of the Spanish nation. The American provinces, which had long been
restive under Spanish rule, now claimed the same right of
self-government that the provinces of the Peninsula had assumed, and
began to depose the Spanish governors and to set up juntas of their own,
still acting in the name of Ferdinand VII. The Americans claimed that
they were not politically a part of Spain, but connected only through
the sovereign, and that with the removal of the sovereign the connection
ceased. The Regency of Cadiz, on the other hand, maintained that the
colonies were integral parts of Spain, and claimed, therefore, the right
to govern them in the absence of the sovereign.
The first throes of revolution were felt in 1809, almost simultaneously
in Upper Peru, Quito, and Mexico. These movements were quickly
suppressed with great cruelty. In the year 1810 the revolution opened
upon a vast scale. All the Spanish colonies on the mainland, with the
exception of Lower Peru, revolted at the same time and proclaimed their
independence of Spain, although still professing allegiance to Ferdinand
VII, the dethroned king.
The colonial authorities were deposed in most cases by force of public
opinion and without violence. The revolution was municipal in character,
that is to say, the _cabildos_, or town councils, the only popularly
constituted political bodies in the colonies, assumed the initiative in
the work of revolution and named the juntas. The junta of the capital
city in each province was usually recognized as the chief executive body
for that province, and assumed for the time being all the functions of
government. National conventions were then called in many cases to
decide upon the form of government. These in most cases entrusted the
executive power to regencies or triumvirates, almost all of which
rapidly gave way to military dictatorships.
The Regency of Cadiz had anticipated trouble from the colonies and had
recognized their rights as freemen by inviting them to send deputies to
the national Cortes, but at the same time had abridged those rights by
allowing them only a very limited representation, absurdly out of
proportion to their population and commercial importance. Upon the
establishment of the provisional governments or juntas in the colonies,
the Regency refused them the freedom of trade that had been promised,
declined the proffered mediation of England, and proceeded to stigmatize
the Americans as rebels and to declare them guilty of high treason,
although they had been guilty only of the same conduct that the
Spaniards themselves were pursuing at home.
Venezuela then (1811) declared herself independent of both the Spanish
nation and of the Spanish monarch, and adopted a republican
constitution. The promulgation of the Spanish constitution of 1812
further encouraged the spirit of independence in the colonies, but when
Ferdinand was restored in 1814, the colonies were still governed in his
name, for the revolution of Venezuela, which alone had declared for
independence, had been crushed out. Had Ferdinand acted with any
moderation or judgment, his American possessions would have been saved
to his crown. But the refusal of the colonies, which had now enjoyed
practical self-government for several years, to take upon them without
conditions the yoke of absolute authority, was met with the proclamation
of a war of reconquest. Reconciliation was thereafter no longer
possible, and independence only a question of time. By the close of 1815
the revolution had been put down in all the provinces except La Plata.
There it was never suppressed. For this reason we shall first trace
rapidly the course of the revolution in the south, of which San Martin
was the directing power.
Jose de San Martin was born in 1778 in Paraguay, his father being the
governor of Misiones. When eight years of age, his family went to Spain
and he was entered as a pupil in the Seminary of Nobles at Madrid. At
the age of twelve, he joined a regiment as cadet and saw his first
service in Africa. He served in the Spanish army for more than twenty
years, and won promotion as well as special distinction for bravery. In
the battle of Baylen, where a detachment of Napoleon's disciplined
troops was beaten by an army of recruits inspired by patriotism, San
Martin, then a captain, won a gold medal and a commission as
lieutenant-colonel for his conduct. Hearing of the struggle for liberty
in his native land, he resigned his commission and returned to America.
He was almost unknown personally, but his reputation as a brave soldier
and a skilful tactician procured for him immediate employment. At this
time the Argentine Republic had two armies in the field, the one
operating near at home against the Portuguese in Uruguay and the Spanish
in Montevideo, and the other in Upper Peru (Bolivia) against the forces
sent by the viceroy of Peru to suppress the Argentine revolution. San
Martin was soon given the command of this army in the north, succeeding
General Belgrano. He soon placed his army in an excellent state of
discipline and put a check to the advances of the Peruvian army.[30]
On May 16, 1814, the Argentine naval force, under command of an Irishman
named Brown, defeated and almost entirely destroyed the Spanish squadron
stationed at Montevideo, and that city soon after surrendered to the
besieging army of Alvear, San Martin's old comrade in the Spanish army.
Alvear, whose political influence was much greater than San Martin's,
now aspired to the conquest of Peru, and therefore desired the command
in the north. This San Martin willingly relinquished to him. He had
other plans in mind, and the state of his health demanded rest. Upper
Peru had been the high-road from Peru to Buenos Aires in times of peace,
and was, therefore, naturally looked upon as the line of advance for the
liberating army. San Martin, however, after a careful study of the
question, had become convinced that this was not the strategic line of
approach, that the Argentine Republic would never succeed in conquering
Peru from this quarter. His idea was to carry the war to the west, to
cross the Andes, occupy Chile, and, having secured a naval base there,
to attack Peru from the coast, continuing military operations in the
north merely as a diversion. The success of this plan depended upon the
performance of two apparently impossible tasks--the passage of the Andes
and the creation of a navy on the Pacific. San Martin was by far too
shrewd a man to advocate such an undertaking before maturing his plans.
He, therefore, confided it only to a few of his intimate friends, and,
taking advantage of his ill health, asked, as a favor for himself, the
government of the obscure province of Cuyo, where from its capital of
Mendoza he could place himself in communication with the Chilean
patriots.
On August 10, 1814, San Martin was appointed governor of Cuyo, and at
once devoted himself to the development of the plans which led to the
emancipation of half a continent and gave him his place in the world's
history. The revolutionary movement in Chile had just been crushed out.
It was begun in 1810 and the general course of events had been somewhat
similar to the Argentine movement, but it had fallen a victim first to
disputes between the Patriot leaders and finally to the troops of the
viceroy of Peru. It would require more space than we can give to trace
the varying fortunes of the cause in Chile through the stirring events
that marked the leadership of Dr. Rosas, of the Carrera brothers, and of
Bernardo O'Higgins. After the final collapse, O'Higgins, with a number
of other Patriots, fled over the Andes to Mendoza and readily entered
into the plans of San Martin. It took the latter two years to organize
and equip an army and to convince the government of Buenos Aires of the
practicability of his plan.
At length, on January 17, 1817, he began the passage of the Andes with
about 5,000 men, 1,600 horses, and 9,000 mules, the latter carrying the
field artillery, ammunition, and provisions. The summit of the Uspallata
Pass is 12,700 feet above the sea-level, 5,000 feet higher than the
Great St. Bernard, by which Napoleon led his army over the Alps. In many
other respects San Martin's achievement was more remarkable. Each piece
of artillery had to be carried suspended on a pole between two mules,
or, where the road was particularly dangerous, dragged by ropes. There
were chasms that could be crossed only by cable bridges. The march over
the Andes occupied three weeks. Both men and animals suffered greatly
from _soroche_, the illness caused by rarefied atmosphere.
At the foot of the mountain, at Chacabuco, the vanguard of San Martin's
army defeated a body of 4,000 Royalists, and thus opened the road to
Santiago, which San Martin entered February 14, 1817. The Chileans chose
him Supreme Director of their government, but he declined the office,
and O'Higgins was chosen.
San Martin's great object was to crush the colonial power of Spain in
its stronghold, Peru. Having by the successful passage of the Andes and
the victory of Chacabuco in a measure justified his plan of campaign, he
returned to Buenos Aires for reinforcements. The Royalists meanwhile
retreated to the south. On February 18, 1818, the independence of Chile
was proclaimed. A month later the Patriots were surprised at
Cancha-Rayada and almost routed, but within two weeks the army was again
ready for action, and on April 5, 1818, encountered the Royalists at
Maipo. This battle was a complete victory for the Patriots and decided
the fate of Chile. Only one or two fortresses in the south were now held
for Spain. Five days after the battle of Maipo, San Martin returned once
more to Buenos Aires and began organizing an expedition for the
liberation of Peru. Puyrredon, now Supreme Director, supported his
undertaking.
While San Martin was soliciting aid from the Argentine Republic, the
Chileans were not idle. They saw that the only way of insuring their
independence was by the creation of a navy. Through its agent in London,
the Chilean government secured the services of Lord Cochrane, an English
naval officer of great distinction and remarkable talents, who by a
curious turn of fortune had been brought into unmerited disgrace and
dismissed from the British service.[31] He reached Valparaiso in
November and hoisted his flag on board the _O'Higgins_, December 22,
1818. During the course of the next year, Cochrane made two attempts to
take Callao, the seaport of Peru, but without success beyond harassing
the enemy in some of the smaller coast towns. In February, 1820, by a
brilliant move, he captured Valdivia, a strongly fortified town still
held by the Spaniards in southern Chile.
San Martin returned to Chile in January, 1820, and began to assemble at
Valparaiso the army destined for the invasion of Peru. Of the 5,000 men,
two-thirds were from Buenos Aires, while nearly all of the officers were
Argentine or European volunteers. Of 65 foreign officers, 37 were
British and 3 were from the United States. There were, besides, 30
English officers in the Chilean navy. The expedition sailed on August
21, 1820, on board the fleet commanded by Cochrane. San Martin landed
his army at Pisco, to the south of Lima, and sent an expedition into the
interior under General Arenales, who had served the Patriots for years
in Upper Peru. In October, San Martin reembarked his troops and landed
them again at Huacho, a point seventy miles north of Lima. Meanwhile the
Spanish squadron, completely demoralized by the appearance on the
Pacific of Lord Cochrane, whose daring exploits were well known, was
lying under the guns of Callao Castle. On the night of November 5, 1820,
Lord Cochrane led a force of volunteers, consisting of 180 seamen and
100 marines, in open boats right under the batteries of Callao,
surprised and overpowered the crew of the _Esmeralda_, the largest
Spanish frigate, and, cutting her loose, carried her off to his own
squadron.
After Cochrane's exploit at Callao, the moral effect of which was very
great, he urged upon San Martin an immediate advance upon Lima, but San
Martin had two campaigns before him, the one military, the other
political. On first landing at Pisco he had issued an order to his army
in which he said, "Remember that you are come not to conquer, but to
liberate a people; the Peruvians are our brothers." And in spite of the
impatience and restlessness of his officers, he steadily adhered to his
plan, to the no small loss of his military prestige and ultimately to
his retirement from the scene of activity. His purpose was by the
presence of the liberating army to give the people of Peru a chance to
rise and throw off the yoke of Spain. To this end he scattered
proclamations and addresses of a revolutionary character broadcast
through the land and quietly awaited results. The contest in Peru, he
said, was not a war of conquest and glory, but entirely of opinion; it
was a war of new and liberal principles against prejudice, bigotry, and
tyranny.
People ask why I don't march to Lima at once; so I might,
and instantly would, were it suitable to my views, which it
is not. I do not want military renown; I have no ambition to
be the conqueror of Peru; I want solely to liberate the
country from oppression. Of what use would Lima be to me if
the inhabitants were hostile in political sentiment? How
could the cause of independence be advanced by my holding
Lima, or even the whole country, in military possession? Far
different are my views. I wish to have all men thinking with
me, and do not choose to advance a step beyond the gradual
march of public opinion. The capital is now ripe for
declaring its sentiments, and I shall give them the
opportunity to do so in safety. It was in sure expectation
of this movement that I have hitherto deferred advancing;
and to those who know the full extent of the means which
have been put in action, a sufficient explanation is
afforded of all the delays that have taken place. I have
been gaining, indeed, day by day, fresh allies in the hearts
of the people, the only certain allies in such a war. In the
secondary point of military strength, I have been, from the
same causes, equally successful in augmenting and improving
the liberating army; while that of the Spaniards has been
wasted by want and desertion. The country has now become
sensible of its true interests, and it is right the
inhabitants should have the means of expressing what they
think. Public opinion is an engine newly introduced into
this country; the Spaniards, who are utterly incapable of
directing it, have prohibited its use; but they shall now
experience its strength and importance.[32]
The campaign of Arenales in the interior was successful. In the presence
of the liberating army, the people everywhere rose in revolt. San
Martin's method of conducting the campaign was the correct one. Public
opinion was soon aroused in the capital itself, and the Royalists
finally decided to evacuate Lima. The viceroy retired with his forces to
Cuzco in the highlands. In response to an invitation from the city
authorities, the Patriots entered Lima July 6, 1821. San Martin himself
entered without ceremony after dark a few days later. The independence
of Peru was proclaimed July 28 with imposing ceremonies in the great
square of Lima. San Martin was proclaimed Protector of Peru. He
proceeded to organize a civil government, and established the celebrated
_Order of the Sun_, distinctively aristocratic in character.
San Martin had played a great part thus far, but he had reached the
zenith of his influence and power. Dissensions soon arose. The task he
had undertaken was difficult in the extreme. It was much easier to
acquire power than to use it. At the time of the evacuation of Lima by
the Spaniards, he said to Captain Hall:
For the last ten years I have been unremittingly employed
against the Spaniards; or rather in favor of this country,
for I am not against any one who is not hostile to the cause
of independence. All I wish is that this country should be
managed by itself, and by itself alone. As to the manner in
which it is to be governed, that belongs not at all to me. I
propose simply to give the people the means of declaring
themselves independent, and of establishing a suitable form
of government; after which I shall consider I have done
enough and leave them.[33]
When the time came he kept his word.
While San Martin was leading the army of liberation from the Argentine
Republic to Chile, and from Chile to Peru, Simon Bolivar, the liberator
of the north, was pursuing his chequered career in Venezuela and
Colombia, unfurling the standard of revolution wherever he could get a
foothold. He was a man, in every respect, the opposite of San Martin,
fiery, impetuous, wholly given over to personal ambition, neither a
statesman nor a soldier, but one of the greatest revolutionary leaders
of any age or country. His ignorance of military affairs led him into
undertakings from which an experienced soldier would have held back, but
his indomitable pluck carried him safely through all calamities, and his
wonderful enthusiasm fired his followers even in the midst of disaster.
This remarkable man, whose reputation in the new world stands second to
that of Washington alone, was, like Miranda, a native of Caracas. Sprung
from a family of wealth and influence he had, like most young South
Americans of his class, received his education abroad, and had for
several years led a dissipated life in Paris. At first he held himself
aloof from the revolutionary leaders, but after the accomplishment of
the revolution of Caracas, April 19, 1810, he was persuaded to join the
Patriot cause, and was sent to London to solicit assistance from Great
Britain.[34]
The junta of Caracas, like those subsequently formed in the south,
professed to act in the name of Ferdinand VII, and fearing the influence
of Miranda, then in London, whose advocacy of absolute independence had
been open and avowed, they instructed Bolivar and their other agents not
to allow him to come to Venezuela. Miranda came in spite of them,
however, under an assumed name, and was everywhere received with
enthusiasm. Under his influence a congress was elected which, on July 5,
1811, declared Venezuela a republic, free and independent of all foreign
dominion. Miranda was appointed Director. This was the first South
American declaration of independence. The formal independence of the
Argentine Republic was not declared until July 9, 1816, although the
country had been self-governing for several years.
The Patriot cause was ruined, however, by the earthquake of March 25,
1812, which almost destroyed the city of Caracas and several towns of
importance. Twenty thousand people are supposed to have perished. As the
disaster occurred on Holy Thursday, the clergy were not slow to turn it
to political account and to persuade the people that it was a direct
chastisement of Heaven upon them for their rebellion against Spain. The
cause of the Patriots steadily lost ground until the fall of Porto
Cabello, through the inefficiency of Bolivar, caused its complete
collapse. Miranda was forced to sign with Monteverde the treaty of
Vittoria, July 26, 1812, on the basis of complete submission and a
general amnesty. It is hardly necessary to add that the Spanish general
did not abide by the terms of the capitulation. Miranda himself was
detained by Bolivar, as he was on the point of embarking for England,
accused of having received bribes from the Spaniards and of being
unwilling to share the fate of his followers, and treacherously handed
over to the Spaniards. He was sent to Spain and after languishing for
three years in a dungeon at Cadiz, died July 14, 1816. His fate was a
sad blot upon the reputation of Bolivar.
The revolution in New Granada, which had been inaugurated July 20, 1810,
was still holding out and thither Bolivar proceeded to offer his
services to the Patriots of that province. As soon as he had firmly
established himself in influence and power, he persuaded the government
that their only safety lay in the reconquest of Venezuela. He was
provided with troops, and in May, 1813 crossed the frontier and took
several important cities. He now assumed a new attitude and became a
self-appointed dictator. He proclaimed a war of extermination against
Spaniards and adopted a new system of dates: "3d year of Independence
and 1st of the War to the Death." He entered Caracas in triumph August
6, 1813. He proclaimed himself dictator with the title of Liberator.
Meanwhile Marino, another Patriot leader, had landed in the eastern part
of Venezuela near Cumana and declared himself dictator. There were thus
two dictators and no cordiality between them. Before they could come to
an agreement the enemy had recovered their position. In December, 1814,
the last Patriot force was defeated.
Bolivar and Marino retired once more to New Granada. Bolivar was made
captain-general of the forces of New Granada, his title of Liberator was
recognized, and another, that of Illustrious Pacificator, bestowed upon
him. A second time he undertook the conquest of Venezuela from the west.
Dissensions soon arose between Bolivar and the other leaders. He was
refused reinforcements and foolishly marched against the Patriot
garrison of Cartagena. He was now forced to give up his command, and
embarked for Jamaica, May, 1815.
Meanwhile Ferdinand had been restored to the throne of Spain, and an
army of 10,000 men, commanded by Marshal Morillo, the ablest Spanish
general of the time, had been sent to reduce the provinces on the Main.
This expedition reached Cumana in April, 1815, and before the end of the
year all the colonies, with the exception of the provinces of the River
Plate, were reduced to submission.
Far from giving up hope, however, Bolivar proceeded to Haiti, and from
that island, in May, 1816, made a descent upon the eastern part of
Venezuela, but was routed by the Spaniards in July, and soon returned to
Haiti. A few of the Patriots still kept the field, and towards the close
of the year Bolivar's partisans secured his recall. On December 21 he
left Haiti with a second expedition for the relief of his native land.
He determined now to direct all his efforts, not as hitherto, to the
support of the Patriot cause in the capital, but to the holding of the
great plains of the Orinoco. With this territory as a base, he carried
on, during the year 1817, in conjunction with the Llanero horsemen of
General Paez, a desperate struggle with the Spaniards. When the rainy
season of 1818 began, Bolivar's army had been cut almost to pieces, he
had lost prestige as a general, and his civil authority amounted to
nothing. Only the cavalry of Paez maintained the Patriot cause. Still
the position of the Spaniards was not much better. Morillo had 12,000
men scattered about, but neither money, arms, nor supplies. He reported
to the viceroy of Peru: "Twelve pitched battles, in which the best
officers and troops of the enemy have fallen, have not lowered their
pride or lessened the vigor of their attacks upon us."
In February, 1819, the second Congress of Venezuela convened at
Angostura. The Dictator resigned, but was unanimously elected President
and given absolute power in all provinces which were the actual theater
of war. The army was reorganized by the accession of foreign troops, in
particular the British legion, consisting of 2,000 well equipped men,
which achieved much of the success of the next year. Bolivar now
conceived the idea of crossing the Cordillera and reconquering New
Granada. General Paez was to attract the attention of Morillo on the
plains in front, and a demonstration was to be made on the coast near
Caracas, while Bolivar marched to the west. This movement changed the
whole face of affairs and had a similar effect to the passage of the
Andes by San Martin. New Granada was won by the battle of Boyaca, August
7, 1819. Morillo was now isolated in Venezuela. In December, 1819, a
congress of delegates from Venezuela and New Granada met and decreed the
union of the two provinces in the Republic of Colombia. Bolivar was
named provisional President. An armistice was signed by Bolivar and
Morillo in November, 1820, which gave the Patriots breathing time. The
Spanish troops remaining in Venezuela were defeated by Bolivar in the
battle of Carabobo, June 23, 1821. Only a few fortresses on the coast
were still held by the Spaniards.
Bolivar entered Caracas once more in triumph and tendered his
resignation, an act always considered by him necessary for giving the
proper dramatic setting to such occasions. Congress took no notice of
it, but drew up a constitution providing for a limited presidential term
of four years. The Liberator, "as he feared," was elected President. He
repeated his resignation, but added that he would yield if Congress
persisted. Congress did persist.
After the battle of Boyaca, Bolivar had sent General Sucre by sea to
Guayaquil, nominally to aid the new state against the Royalists, but in
reality to induce it to join the Republic of Colombia. Sucre met with
reverses, and had to call on San Martin for assistance from Peru.
Meanwhile Bolivar was advancing by land. On July 11, 1822, he entered
Guayaquil in triumph, and two days later, on his own responsibility,
announced its incorporation with Colombia. The junta resigned and took
refuge on board the Peruvian squadron in the harbor. On the 25th San
Martin arrived by sea, and Bolivar sent two of his aides to welcome him
"on Colombian soil." On the following day San Martin went ashore and he
and Bolivar met for the first and last time. They had two private
interviews, after which San Martin sent his baggage aboard his ship and
announced that he would sail after attending the ball to be given that
night in his honor. At the public banquet that evening Bolivar rose and
proposed a toast: "To the two greatest men of South America--General San
Martin and myself." San Martin also proposed a toast: "To the speedy
conclusion of the war; to the organization of the different republics of
the continent; and to the health of the Liberator of Colombia"--words
which well contrasted the personal and political aims of the two men.
San Martin and Bolivar had been unable to agree upon any plan for the
expulsion of the Spaniards from the highlands of Peru. The self-denying
patriot gave way before the man of ambition. To O'Higgins he wrote: "The
Liberator is not the man we took him to be."
Upon his return to Peru, San Martin wrote to Bolivar: "My decision is
irrevocable. I have convened the first Congress of Peru; the day after
its installation I shall leave for Chile, convinced that my presence is
the only obstacle which keeps you from coming to Peru with your army."
On the 20th of September, 1822, he laid his resignation before the
Congress, and issued an address to the nation. "The presence of a
fortunate soldier," he said, "however disinterested he may be, is
dangerous to a newly founded state. I have proclaimed the independence
of Peru. I have ceased to be a public man." These words, whether
intentionally so or not, were prophetic of Bolivar's subsequent career.
San Martin wrote to O'Higgins: "I am tired of hearing them call me
tyrant, that I wish to make myself king, emperor, the devil. On the
other hand, my health is broken, this climate is killing me. My youth
was sacrificed to the service of Spain; my manhood to my own country. I
think I have now the right to dispose of my old age."
Bolivar's jealousy of San Martin prolonged the war, which might have
been brought to a close in a few months, for nearly three years. After
the withdrawal of San Martin, Bolivar became Dictator of Peru. On
December 9, 1824, was fought the last battle for South American
independence. On the little plain of Ayacucho, 11,600 feet above the
sea, General Sucre defeated and captured the forces of the viceroy.
Upper Peru was organized as a separate republic, with the name of
Bolivia.
Bolivar had been proclaimed President of Peru for life, but the
unpopularity of this measure led him to leave the country in 1826, never
to return. That same year he summoned the Congress of Panama, but his
plans for the union of South America in one republic failed. San
Martin's idea finally triumphed. In 1829 Venezuela separated itself from
Colombia and passed a decree of perpetual banishment against Bolivar.
In April, 1830, through pressure of public opinion, Bolivar resigned the
presidency of Colombia and retired into private life. Congress voted him
an annual pension of $30,000. A month later Quito and Guayaquil
separated from Colombia and formed the independent state of Ecuador.
Even the name Colombia was dropped by the remaining state, and the old
name of New Granada adopted. In 1857 the name Colombia was assumed once
more.
Bolivar died in a small house near Santa Martha, December 17, 1831,
having witnessed the failure of his most cherished plans. San Martin had
retired to Europe in 1823 with his only child, a daughter named
Mercedes. They lived a retired life in Brussels. Once only, in 1828, he
returned to his native land, but was received with such denunciation by
the press of Buenos Aires that he quickly turned his face towards Europe
again. He died at Boulogne, August 17, 1850. Thirty years later the
Argentine people had his remains brought back to his native land. In
May, 1880, with imposing ceremonies, they were laid to rest in the
Cathedral of Buenos Aires.
Mexico was twice revolutionized. The first struggle began in 1809 and
1810, and was carried on spasmodically until 1817. The second revolution
broke out in 1820 on receipt of the news from Spain of the revolution of
March, 1820, and the re-adoption of the constitution of 1812. The old
revolutionists demanded the proclamation of this constitution in Mexico,
but the Viceroy Apodaca opposed them. Augustin de Iturbide, a native
Mexican, who in the first revolution had steadfastly adhered to the
cause of the king, now defected to the popular side with a large body
of troops which the viceroy had entrusted to his command. On February
24, 1821, he issued the celebrated document known as the Plan of Iguala,
from the town of that name. In it he proposed the maintenance of the
Roman Catholic religion to the exclusion of all others, the independence
of Mexico from Spain, and the establishment of a limited monarchy. The
Imperial Crown of Mexico was to be offered first to Ferdinand VII; in
the event of his declining, to the younger princes of his house; and in
the event of their refusal, the duty of naming an emperor was to fall to
the representative assembly of Mexico. The personal and property rights
of Spaniards in Mexico were carefully guaranteed. In securing the
interests of Spaniards and of the clergy, those who had most to lose,
this plan differed essentially from the revolutionary policy of the
other Spanish colonies. On the other hand, the Creole element was
satisfied with the promise of independence and a representative
government. The revolutionary army became known as "the Army of the
Three Guarantees," these being (1) the maintenance of the religious
establishment in its present form, (2) independence, and (3) the union
of Americans and Spaniards.[35] This ingenious document received
immediately the widest approval.
The Viceroy Apodaca had practically abdicated when his successor,
General O'Donaju, arrived from Spain. As the latter had come without
troops, there was nothing left but for him to recognize the revolution
as an accomplished fact and make the best terms for his country he
could. Accordingly he met Iturbide in conference at Cordova, and after
a brief discussion signed the treaty bearing that name, August 24, 1821.
It was agreed that a provisional junta should be appointed, that
O'Donaju should be a member, and that the junta should proceed to carry
into effect the plan of Iguala. O'Donaju then persuaded the Royalists to
open the gates of the capital, and on September 27, 1821, Iturbide
entered. Shortly thereafter O'Donaju died from the yellow fever, thus
leaving Iturbide free to carry out his plans. The Spanish government, of
course, repudiated the treaty of Cordova.
The Congress, which assembled in pursuance of the program of Iguala, was
divided between Imperialists and Republicans. In spite of the opposition
of the latter, Iturbide had himself proclaimed emperor and his family
ennobled. Congress soon fell into disputes with the emperor, who
finally, in October, 1822, dissolved it by force. A few months later
Santa Anna inaugurated a counter-revolution from Vera Cruz, which
resulted in the abdication of the emperor. Iturbide was allowed to leave
the country. He retired to Italy, where he resided until toward the
close of 1823, when he went to London. In May, 1824, at the solicitation
of certain of his partisans, he sailed again for Mexico,[36] ignorant of
the decree of perpetual banishment passed against him by the Congress a
few weeks before. He landed at Tampico July 12, but was seized and
executed a few days later. The new assembly then in session adopted a
constitution, and the Republic of Mexico was launched upon what was to
prove, for years to come, a career of turbulence and anarchy.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Hall's "Journal on Chili, Peru, and Mexico," 2 Vols. Edinburgh,
1824, Vol. I, p. 249.
[2] Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 156-159.
[3] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 296. See also Rodney's report on South
America, in Vol. IV, Am. St. Pap., For. Rel.
[4] A full history of the India House and an account of its regulations
is given by Veitia Linage in his "Norte de la Contratacion," Seville,
1672; translated into English by Captain John Stevens under the title,
"Spanish Rule of Trade to the West Indies," London, 1702. Linage was for
a number of years Treasurer and Comptroller of the India House. A good
summary of the history and regulations of the House is given by Prof.
Bernard Moses in his "Casa de Contratacion" in the Papers of the Am.
Hist. Ass. for 1894, and in the third chapter of his "Establishment of
Spanish Rule in America."
[5] Linage, "Norte de la Contratacion," p. 107.
[6] _Ibid._, p. 110.
[7] _Ibid._, p. 113.
[8] _Ibid._, p. 114.
[9] _Ibid._, p. 109.
[10] _Ibid._, p. 109.
[11] Linage, "Norte de la Contratacion," pp. 191-193.
[12] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, pp. 253-254.
[13] "The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great
Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America."
Printed by John Baskett, London, 1713.
[14] "The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great
Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America."
London, 1713.
[15] Ulloa, "Voyage to South America." English translation, London,
1806, Vol. I, p. 105.
[16] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 266 ff. This
volume is rich in information in regard to England's Spanish-American
policy.
[17] W. S. Robertson, "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of
Spanish America" (1909).
[18] "Life and Correspondence of Rufus King," New York, 1894, Vol. II,
App. 5. For further information regarding his relations with Miranda,
see extracts from his Memorandum Book, in Vol. III, App. 3.
[19] See Miranda's letter to President Adams, March 24, 1798. "Life and
Corresp. of King," Vol. II, p. 654.
[20] "Life and Corresp. of King," Vol. II, p. 650.
[21] See King's letter to Hamilton, March 4, 1799. "Life and Corresp.,"
p. 662.
[22] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII.
[23] See Sherman, "General Account of Miranda's Expedition," N. Y.,
1808.
[24] H. A. Washington, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 474;
"Madison's Writings," Vol. II, pp. 220, 225.
[25] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 314 ff.
[26] See Watson, "Spanish and Portuguese South America." 2 Vols. London,
1884, Vol. II, p. 271 ff.
[27] See "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 316 ff.
[28] Romero, "Mexico and the United States," Putnam, 1898, p. 287.
[29] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII.
[30] Mitre, "The Emancipation of South America." Translated by Pilling.
London, 1893.
[31] See Cochrane (Earl Dundonald), "Service in Chili." 2 Vols. London,
1859.
[32] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 181. Report of Conversation with San
Martin in Callao Roads.
[33] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 194.
[34] Holstein, "Life of Bolivar." Boston, 1829.
[35] Hall's "Journal," Vol. II, p. 188.
[36] See the statement of Iturbide in regard to his political life
published in the _Pamphleteer_, London, 1827.