CHAPTER XII

THE LAST WEEKS IN GERMAN TERRITORY

ON 24th October, the Governor of Chiwata, which had become the

centre of the Administration, arrived at my camp east of Lukuledi

for a conference. I firmly stated my opinion that, in spite of all

difficulties of supply which must shortly arise in German East Africa,

the war could and must be carried on. One possibility that offered was

to base the operations on Portuguese territory. This could only be done

by evacuating German East Africa and invading Portuguese East Africa.

The question of supplies was becoming very serious; we had in our

stores only about 500,000 kg. of supplies. That would last us about

six weeks. But it had been found that these figures were deceptive.

The piled-up sacks had to a great extent lost weight and the grain had

been eaten by insects. The new harvest could not be expected until

March at the earliest. If the operations were to be continued it was

necessary from this point of view alone to move south. I was still

reckoning with the possibility that Captain Tafel’s force might arrive

in the neighbourhood of Massassi and Chiwata, in which case I should

hand over to him the supplies at Chiwata, while I crossed the Makonda

hills in the direction of Lindi with part of the Chiwata force and

attacked the enemy’s main line of communication on the Lukuledi river.

In whichever way the situation might develop, the Chiwata district was,

on account of its fertility, of the greatest importance to us. Chiwata

was, however, not protected and was further threatened by the fact that

enemy operations were taking place in the north against Mnacho, and

enemy mounted forces had been seen on the Lukuledi-Lindi road in the

neighbourhood of Ndanda. Also enemy aircraft were paying our camp at

Chiwata increasing attention.

These were my reasons for withdrawing from Lukuledi at the end of

October with the main part of my forces. It could not be foreseen

whether another opportunity would offer of making another attack from

Chiwata on one of the enemy columns that would be passing before long.

For the next few weeks the enemy’s pressure was again directed against

Wahle. Quite fresh troops were appearing there, among them the Cape

Corps of South African half-castes. This corps had been stationed along

the Central railway and had been brought up to reinforce General Beves’

troops, apparently via Dar-es-Salaam and Lindi. Fortunately General

Beves had not waited for this reinforcement before his defeat at Mahiwa.

General Wahle was retiring step by step up the Lukuledi river. I was,

unfortunately, not able to send him any support, but even had to draw

on his forces to have troops in hand ready for a favourable opportunity

for an attack and to protect the supplies. In the almost daily

bush-fighting of General Wahle’s force heavy losses were apparently

inflicted on the enemy, and he was held severely in check. There was,

however, no defeat and no considerable capture of booty, and meanwhile

our supplies were getting lower and lower. On 6th November, I rode

from Chiwata to Nangoo, near Ndanda, where, close behind Wahle’s

force, I found a suitable point of attack for the Chiwata troops. On

7th November I rode back from Nangoo to Chiwata, making a détour south

across the Makonde hills. On the same day enemy troops were again

reported at Lukuledi, and on 9th November an affair of patrols took

place at Chigugu, just west of Chiwata.

At this critical time, when the heads of the enemy columns were nearing

Chiwata, it was urgently necessary for us to throw all our strength

against one of these columns as soon as possible before the others

could intervene. The first essential to make this blow effective

was to bring the whole strength of our all too weak forces to bear

simultaneously. This depended chiefly on the supply of ammunition.

Our whole supply had dwindled to about 400,000 rounds, a very scanty

allowance for our 25,000 rifles and 50 machine guns in a serious

engagement, after which it would only be possible to continue the

struggle if ammunition were captured. For this the nature of the ground

was unfavourable. In the thick bush there was a tendency for each

individual to fire many rounds and make few hits, so that the supply of

cartridges was quickly used up without producing the decisive results

we needed. What made a satisfactory solution of the ammunition question

still more impossible was that the cartridges were for the most part

the smoky ’71 type, whereas only about one-third of the troops were

armed with ’71 rifles; the other two-thirds had modern German, English

or Portuguese rifles, and for these the supply of cartridges was very

small. What there were were required for our most important weapon, the

machine gun. It was a difficult position. There was nothing else for it

but to make the attack with only those troops who were armed with the

’71 rifle and to hold in reserve the rest, who had only twenty rounds

of ammunition suitable for their modern rifles, the rest being the

smoky ’71 type. The two forces would then be interchanged so that the

first, armed with the ’71 rifles, could hand them over to the relieving

force, taking the modern weapons in exchange. This meant that at the

best only one-third of the available strength could be in action at

the same time and even then would have to be very sparing with their

ammunition.

Our artillery ammunition had already been exhausted with the exception

of a few rounds for the two mountain guns and some Portuguese

ammunition. Our last field-howitzer, as well as the English gun

captured at Mahiwa, had burst. The last two 10·5 cm. guns from the

_Königsberg_ had been destroyed a few days before. On the day after a

German mountain gun had been destroyed and sunk at Kitangari. We were

thus left with one German and one Portuguese mountain gun. During the

last few months the lack of artillery ammunition had been so serious

that we had rarely more than three hundred rounds all told. That was

about the allowance per engagement for one of the numerous English guns.

Under such circumstances an attack could only promise success if the

situation was exceptionally favourable. This was never the case. The

patrols were kept active, and the enemy harassed as much as possible,

but otherwise there was nothing left but for General Wahle’s force and

the 11th Field Company, which had been left at Mnacho to bring away the

supplies, gradually to give way before the pressure of the enemy and

retire to Chiwata. On 10th November the Ndanda mission, immediately in

the rear of General Wahle, who was at Nangoo, was surprised by a strong

enemy force and captured. The field-hospital quartered there, and part

of our stores, fell into the enemy’s hands. Lieberman’s force, south of

Ndanda, ensured the retreat of General Wahle’s force, which ascended to

the Makonda plateau, by the road south-east of Nangoo, the road I had

reconnoitred on 7th November, and, by crossing the plateau diagonally

to Chiwata, escaped from the enemy’s trap. The 11th Company also found

its way to Chiwata from Mnacho, so that, with the exception of Captain

Tafel’s Detachment and some small bodies of troops further south, the

whole force was concentrated at Chiwata. The gradual transport of our

supplies from Chiwata east to Nambindinga had begun, and with that

our march to Kitangari. Meanwhile I kept an anxious look-out for a

vulnerable point in one of the enemy columns. On the 14th November I

thought I had discovered one.

A strong enemy column, to which belonged the 10th South African

Mounted Infantry, had passed close to our position while marching from

Lukuledi via Massassi, and had attacked Mwiti, two hours’ march south

of Chiwata. In this place, which until then had been only weakly held,

Lieberman’s force (three companies) had arrived the day before. In

spite of the shortage of ammunition there was, I thought, a chance that

by unexpectedly throwing into the fight Koehl’s force from Chiwata,

this enemy might be defeated separately. I was, however, very busy with

the preparations for the withdrawal to Nambindinga and unfortunately

let the opportunity at Mwiti pass without taking advantage of it.

There was nothing for it, then, but to retire gradually to Nambindinga.

Through the evacuation of Chiwata the European prisoners, as well as

the Indians, who had been carried to the hospital, and the hospital

itself, full for the most part of seriously wounded, fell into

the enemy’s hands. The march to Nambindinga was carried out under

continuous fighting between the 15th and 17th November. I wanted to

make the enemy complete the concentric march of his columns, advancing

north-west and south, so as to effect a junction; then, when the

enemy’s masses were helplessly crowded on a narrow area, I could march

where I liked. On November 17th I had to take a fateful decision at

Nambindinga. The continual bush-fighting was threatening to consume all

our ammunition. It would have been madness to go on with this fighting,

which could not bring about a favourable decision. We had therefore to

withdraw.

The supply question pointed the same way. Only by a drastic reduction

of strength could we carry on with the stores in hand. Our supply area

had been narrowed, fresh requisitioning had been interfered with by the

enemy, and the produce of the land exhausted. The supply of quinine

would last the Europeans a month longer. After the consumption of this

the Europeans would certainly fall victims to malaria and its attendant

evils; they would no longer be able to contend with the rigours of

a tropical campaign. Only by reducing the number of Europeans to a

minimum could enough quinine be ensured for each man to enable us to

carry on the operations for months.

At the same time we had to reduce our total strength. Our large force

with little ammunition was of less value in the field than a smaller

number of picked men with plenty of ammunition. It amounted to the

reduction of our strength to about 2,000 rifles, including not more

than 2,000 Europeans. All above this number had to be left behind.

It could not be helped that among the several hundred Europeans and

600 Askari that we were compelled to leave behind in the hospital at

Nambindinga, there were men who would have liked to go on fighting

and were physically fit to do so. Unfortunately, it must be admitted

that among those who were left behind at Nambindinga, even among the

Europeans, there were many who were not unwilling to lay down their

arms. It is, however, worthy of mention that not only the majority

of the Europeans, but also many Askari, were bitterly disappointed

at having to remain. We had repeatedly to refuse the request of a

brave Askari that he might come and fight for us. But when, two days

later, Lieutenant Grundmann, though severely wounded and scarcely

able to walk, reported himself, saying that he could not, in spite

of orders, bring himself to surrender, I have seldom been so pleased

as at this breach of discipline. It may be mentioned here that in

general the enemy, as far as I am in a position to judge, treated our

prisoners with humanity, but it seems to me that he was anxious to

convict us of cruelty to English prisoners, perhaps in order to justify

reprisals, perhaps for other reasons. Lieutenant Cutsch had been left

sick in Nandanda, and fell into the enemy’s hands. On the totally

unfounded and unproved evidence of a negro that Lieutenant Cutsch had

on one occasion, when commanding a patrol, burned to death a wounded

Englishman, he was put in irons and sent by sea to Dar-es-Salaam,

being imprisoned during the voyage just outside the ship’s roundhouse.

At Dar-es-Salaam he was locked up for several weeks in the prison

without a trial. When at last he was tried, it came out that the

charge of senseless cruelty rested purely on the lying evidence of

the negro. Again, General Deventer informed me that Captain Naumann,

who had surrendered near Kilima Njaro, had been tried for murder. He,

too, as I heard later, was kept imprisoned for a long time without a

hearing, until his innocence was finally established. I find it all the

more difficult to understand this mockery of justice, as the English

prisoners were always humanely treated by us, and were often better

cared for materially than our own people.[5]

These decisions placed the conduct of the war on an entirely different

basis. Hitherto we had stored the supplies in dumps and for the most

part had been able to satisfy our demands from these; the ammunition

also had been maintained from stores. This system had laid us more

open to attack and offered the enemy points of attack which we could

not protect. But by the methods adopted hitherto it had been possible

to keep the troops in the field at great strength, considering our

position, and to employ a great part of them on a small area for a

considerable period. It had further been possible to give a permanent

character, at any rate to some of our hospitals, where sick and wounded

could recuperate in peace, and in this way we could fill the gaps in

our front with refreshed and experienced men. This system had made

our operations dependent to a great extent on the situation of the

supplies and reinforcements, and had hindered freedom of movement.

The advantage, however, in our position of being able to employ

strong troops and with them successfully to engage, and often defeat

decisively, superior enemy forces was so great that I held to this

system as long as it was at all possible.

It was now no longer possible, and the advantages I have mentioned

had to be sacrificed under the pressure of necessity. It was

certainly questionable whether the reduced force could be maintained

without supply dumps, and without reinforcements the prospect of

remaining, after twelve days in the plains, with five thousand hungry

negroes and without supplies was not attractive. Should we succeed

in satisfying those requirements of the force which could not be

obtained on the spot, especially ammunition and arms, by means of

capture from the enemy—for the only possibility of renewing our

supplies lay in capturing the enemy’s—in sufficient quantities to

make the continuation of the war possible? That was the all-important

question. If we succeeded, however, in maintaining the force on the

new territory the increased independence and mobility, used with

determination against the less mobile enemy, would give us a local

superiority in spite of the great numerical superiority of the enemy.

In the unlimited territory at our disposal it would be possible to

withdraw from unfavourable positions. The enemy would be compelled to

keep an enormous amount of men and material continually on the move,

and to exhaust his strength to a greater extent proportionately than

ourselves. There was also the prospect of tying down strong enemy

forces and protracting the operations indefinitely if—my forecast

proved correct. This was at that time doubtful, but the risk had to be

taken.

We did not stay long at Nambindinga; this place situated on the

plateau had no water and the springs in the valley were within range

of the enemy’s guns and machine guns. Under the protection of patrols,

which held back the enemy at Nambindinga, Headquarters and the main

part of the forces arrived at Kitangari on 18th November. The enemy

did not follow, probably he could not. As had been foreseen, he had

strained every nerve to strike the so long hoped-for knockout blow at

Chiwata and had to re-form before undertaking further operations. At

Kitangari the old experience was repeated of finding that the supplies

stored there had been estimated much too highly. The supplies at all

serviceable would, all told, only feed the force for about ten days; we

could reckon on no appreciable addition to these stores from the region

south of Kitangari. The question in which direction the march should be

continued focussed itself in the main on the prospect of again finding

the means of adequately feeding the force. There was no time to be lost.

I knew that in the area along the Rovuma the English and Portuguese had

systematically destroyed our supplies. Our small dumps, requisitioning

stations and supply columns had been attacked and the supplies

destroyed. The natives had been influenced against us. The north

and south banks of the middle Rovuma were only thinly populated; at

Tunduru, further up the Rovuma, strong forces of both sides had been

engaged and the supplies there were probably exhausted. I could get

no reliable information about the Mafia plateau south of the lower

Rovuma. Even if, as many reported, this had been a richly-cultivated

district before the war it was very doubtful whether now, after strong

Portuguese forces had been billeted there for years, there would be

any food left. The most probable place for finding supplies seemed to

me at that time to be the district where Major Stuemer’s operations

had taken place: the corner between the Rovuma and the Ludjenda rivers

and further south in the region of Nangware and Mwembe. Even this was

doubtful, for here, too, war had interfered with the agriculture of the

natives. Meanwhile, of the various improbabilities this last seemed to

me the least improbable, and I decided to march at once up the Rovuma.

A determining factor in the choice of this direction was my wish to

equip my force for a prolonged period of action by a large capture of

ammunition and other war material. Previous observation and the reports

of the natives led me to believe that somewhere near the Rovuma the

enemy still possessed large stores. On 20th November we reached Nevale,

where we were joined by the patrols which had secured our southern

flank, and the reorganization of the force was finally carried through.

At Nevale the last men unfit for marching were left behind, and on

21st November we marched south to the Rovuma with 300 Europeans, 1,700

Askari, and 3,000 bearers and other natives. Every man was loaded to

his full capacity. In general, as the supplies were consumed, the

bearers no longer required were left behind, so as to keep the number

of consumers as low as possible. In many cases we had to refuse the

urgent requests of our good old bearers to remain with us, a large

number offering to carry on without pay, some even without either pay

or rations; these were ready to provide their own rations from what

we threw away and Pori fruit. The quartermaster at that time, Naval

Lieutenant Besch, reorganized the supplies and transport service very

efficiently. He deserves the chief credit for the force’s ability to

carry on.

As was to be expected, only small detachments of the enemy were

reported in the neighbourhood of the Rovuma. On 21st November we

arrived at Mpili, on the bank of the river, and were about to pitch

our camp when several shots passed close to a hunting party. On

reconnoitring we found in front of us a large pond, on the opposite

side of which horses were being watered. Behind rose a rocky mountain.

Soon afterwards a native, apparently a spy, appeared, bringing a

written message: “We are English cavalry, and we want to get into touch

with Portuguese infantry regiments.” Whether this was a ruse could not

be ascertained. It was clear that for the moment we had only to do

with a small squadron of cavalry. By a sharp attack the enemy was soon

routed and in the pursuit sustained several casualties: five European

prisoners belonging to the 10th South African Mounted Infantry were,

for reasons of supply, sent back to the enemy. The captured horses were

welcome as chargers and as a possible addition to our rations.

[Illustration: Native Types (3).

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)]

[Illustration: Native Types (4).

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)]

The rest of the march up the Rovuma progressed very slowly. A great

part of the force were unaccustomed to long route-marches. The columns

straggled endlessly. The Askari women followed singly, several hundred

yards apart. It was some time before they learned to keep to a regular

marching order. Incidentally it became obvious that in some companies

the Askari who had come with us had not been selected from the most

suitable point of view. In the reorganization of the companies which

had had to be carried out during the fighting, many good and reliable

men had been left behind, and replaced by others, stronger perhaps,

but less reliable. Many went into battle with their children on their

shoulders; it would have been better to choose an equally reliable man

who was not burdened by having to drag about a wife and family.

But it was too late now to alter anything.

Apparently we had quite got outside the enemy’s range of observation.

The aircraft which usually followed our marches were absent and no

bombs fell on our camps. Once an enemy supply column crossed the Rovuma

right into our camp. It was a welcome capture. Of grain we found

practically none in this district, but on the other hand, we shot

plenty of game. Several buffaloes and quite a number of antelopes,

particularly Wasserbok, fell to our guns. But we dared not delay; our

shrinking supplies urged us continually forward. Fortunately I had with

me a few Europeans who knew the country, and who, shortly before, had

been working near the confluence of the Ludjenda and the Rovuma. In

peace time a Portuguese station had been situated there, and even in

war a more or less strong garrison had been reported there. It might

be assumed that even now we should find some traces of the enemy. The

few natives we came across even spoke of a stronger garrison, amounting

to two thousand English or Portuguese. The natives’ figures could not,

of course, be relied on, but they strengthened my belief that in the

neighbourhood of Ngomano something might be done.

PART III

FIGHTING ON FOREIGN SOIL

(From the Crossing into Portuguese East Africa to the Armistice)

CHAPTER I

ACROSS THE ROVUMA

EARLY in the morning of November 25th, 1917, our advance guard waded

across the Rovuma, a little above the Ludjenda confluence; the main

force of nine companies followed in the course of the forenoon, the

rearguard about two days’ march in the rear. Captain Goering with three

companies had crossed much further downstream to surprise a Portuguese

camp reported there. We had no news of Captain Tafel, and I thought it

probable that he would strike the Rovuma much further west.

The feeling that we were cut off from all support, as well as the

absolute uncertainty as to the fate before us, had produced what is

popularly known as “_allgemeine Wurschtigkeit_” (absolute callousness).

Undisturbed by the tactical situation, our hunting parties went on with

their work, and their shots were, as afterwards transpired, distinctly

heard by the enemy.

While crossing the river, many took a careful bath in full view of

the enemy; in many cases it required some effort to make clear the

requirements of the state of war.

On the south bank we soon came under fire. The company acting as

advance guard came upon enemy scouts, several of whom were killed. I

employed the next few hours, while the troops gradually came up and

covered the crossing of the rest, to reconnoitre. Not far from our

front, on the far bank of the Ludjenda river, signals could be heard

and men could be seen. We came close to the enemy camp and saw men

in white suits moving about, a few hundred yards away. Others were

building earthworks and a transport column was also observed. The

troops were certainly in great force.

While I was still considering whether, and in what way, a prospect

of attack offered, a column of Askari in khaki advanced from the

camp towards our troops. About a company of the enemy left the camp.

Guessing that the enemy was wisely about to attack our troops with all

his force while they were still occupied in crossing the river, I ran

back quickly and ordered those of our companies who had crossed first

to put themselves in a defensive position. The favourable opportunity

I had hoped for did not, however, materialize: the enemy did not come.

Thus I was again faced with the question what to do. I was doubtful

whether, in view of our large numbers of bearers, it would not be more

expedient to march past the enemy stationed here at Ngomano and advance

further up the Ludjenda river. Either the enemy would not hinder us,

or, if he did, he would have to emerge from his entrenched positions

and make up his mind for a difficult attack.

On the other hand, it was not unlikely that an attack by us on

the enemy camp would be successful, for its defences were not yet

especially strong. Reconnaissance had established that on the far bank

of the Ludjenda river a belt of thick wood led right up to the camp and

offered the opportunity of surprising the enemy here in strength, and

bringing off a decisive attack. I had not yet fully made up my mind

when Captain Müller decided me to take that one of the two decisions

which, though very risky, offered a prospect of the long awaited

decisive success and the capture of ammunition and war material which

had become an urgent necessity. No time was to be lost.

The attack was, therefore, made while part of the force was still

crossing the river. While our light mountain-gun fired on the enemy’s

entrenchments from the west, and while at the same time several

companies engaged the enemy on this side as also from the north,

Captain Koehl’s detachment crossed the Ludjenda half a mile above

Ngomano, marched through the high wood on that bank and made a

determined attack on the enemy’s camp from the south. I took up my

position on a little hill west of the camp, near our guns. Immediately

behind me the last company of General Wahle’s force to cross the river

was advancing along a valley. In front I had a fairly good view of

the enemy’s entrenched positions. The enemy’s machine guns were not

shooting badly, and their fire was at times directed upon our little

sand hill, from which I had to send into cover a number of Europeans

and Askari, who had collected there immediately and were visible to

the enemy. The clear ring of the enemy rifles, which we had heard

before, and the absence of trench-mortars, made it probable that the

enemy were Portuguese. We had already learned to distinguish clearly

between the dull, full detonation of our ’71, the sharp crack of our

S-rifle, the double report of the English rifle and the clear ring of

the Portuguese rifle of a little over 6 mm. calibre. Even our Askari

had noticed at once that in short skirmishes the speed with which the

enemy trench-mortars always got the range of our positions had been

very harassing.

Our ’71 rifles threw up so much smoke that it was impossible to guard

against this. To-day, however, there were no mine-throwers, and the

treacherous smoke of our good old rifles was not so bad. On the other

hand, when they did hit their target they made a very considerable

hole. Our Askari soon realized that to-day they were able to bring

their soldierly superiority to bear without being handicapped by

inferior weapons. “To-day is the day of the old rifles!” they shouted

to the German leaders, and from my hill I soon saw the firing line of

Koehl’s detachment storm the enemy’s entrenchments at the double and

capture them.

This was the signal for attack on the other fronts also. From all sides

they charged the enemy, who was badly shaken by the concentrated fire.

Scarcely more than 200 of the enemy force, about 1,000 strong, can

have survived. Again and again our Askari troops, in search of booty,

threw themselves ruthlessly upon the enemy, who was still firing; in

addition, a crowd of bearers and boys, grasping the situation, had

quickly run up and were taking their choice of the pots of lard and

other supplies, opening cases of jam and throwing them away again

when they thought they had found something more attractive in other

cases. It was a fearful _mêlée_. Even the Portuguese Askari already

taken prisoner, joined in the plunder of their own stores. There was

no alternative but to intervene vigorously. I became very eloquent,

and, to make an example, dashed at least seven times at one bearer I

knew, but each time he got away and immediately joined in the looting

somewhere else. At last I succeeded in restoring discipline.

We buried about 200 enemy dead, and about 150 European prisoners

were released after taking an oath not to fight again during this

war against Germany or her Allies; several hundred Askari were taken

prisoner. Valuable medical stores, so necessary to us, and, as a result

of the Portuguese experience of centuries of colonial campaigning, of

excellent quality, were captured, as well as several thousand kilos of

European supplies, large numbers of rifles, six machine-guns and about

thirty horses. Unfortunately we captured no native supplies. Almost

half of our force was re-armed this time with Portuguese rifles; and a

plentiful supply of ammunition was served out. A quarter of a million

rounds of ammunition were captured, and this number was increased in

the course of December to nearly a million. From captured dispatches we

learned that the Portuguese-European companies had only reached Ngomano

a few days before, in order to carry out the impossible English order

to prevent a German crossing of the Rovuma. It was really a perfect

miracle that these troops should have arrived so opportunely as to make

the capture of the place so profitable to us. With one blow we had

freed ourselves of a great part of our difficulties.

But yet another serious difficulty arose, which drove us remorselessly

on. This was the necessity of procuring food for our large numbers of

natives. Accordingly we advanced up the Ludjenda river. Day after day

our patrols searched for native guides and supplies. During the next

few days, however, they had little success. The natives, never numerous

in this district, had fled before the advance of the Portuguese,

fearing their ruthlessness and cruelty, and had hidden what stores they

possessed. One after another, mules and horses found their way into our

stew-pots. Fortunately this district is very rich in game, and the

hunter can always shoot one of the numerous antelopes or guinea-fowl.

Though at first our marching columns were too long and straggling, here

again practice made perfect. Bearers, boys, women and children, soon

learned to keep pace and distance as exactly as the Askari. Regularly

and in good order, the expedition wound along the narrow native paths,

and even through the thick bush, into the unknown land. Half an hour’s

halt was called after every two hours’ march; the rule was six hours’

march a day, _i.e._, about fifteen to twenty miles, and this was often

exceeded. The force was for the most part divided into detachments of

three companies, each with one supply train and one field hospital.

The advance detachment was a day’s march ahead of the main body, the

last a day’s march behind. At the head of each detachment marched the

fighting companies with their machine guns; they had with them only the

necessary ammunition and medical stores, and each European was allowed

one load of necessities. The Askari marched gaily forward, straight

as lances, and with their guns reversed over their shoulders, as has

always been the custom in the rifle regiments. Lively conversation

was kept up, and after the plundering of an enemy camp, which often

yielded rich booty, cigarette smoke rose on all sides. The little

signal recruits strode bravely forward, half-grown youths in Askari

uniform for the most part, carrying all their worldly goods in a bundle

on their heads. The Askari would call out their friendly, “Jambo Bwana

Obao,” or “Jambo Bwana Generals” (“Good-day, Colonel”), or a little

signalman would express his hope of coming some day to Uleia (Europe)

and Berlin. “Then the Kaiser will say to me, ‘Good-day, my son,’ and I

shall give him an exhibition of signalling. Then he will give me roast

meat and present me to the Empress. The Empress will say, ‘Good-day, my

child,’ and will give me cakes and show me the shop-windows.” During

all their talk the Askari kept a sharp look-out, and no movement in the

thick bush escaped their lynx eyes.

The head of the column investigated every trail, and from it gave the

number and the distance of the enemy. Equally soldierly were the

machine-gun bearers, mostly strapping Waniamwezi and Wazukuma. The

companies and detachments were followed by bearers with the loads of

supplies, baggage, camp-kit and stretcher cases. The loads, about 25

kg., were carried alternately on the head and shoulders. The endurance

of these men is enormous. They became more and more attached to the

troops. If ever the supplies were short and the hunting parties

unsuccessful, they would say, “Haiswu’b (it doesn’t matter), we wait,

get some another time.” Many marched barefoot and often got thorns in

their feet. Often one would promptly take his knife and calmly cut out

a piece of flesh from the wounded foot. Then he would start off again.

The bearers were followed by the women and the Bibi. Many Askari had

their wives and children with them in the field, and many children were

born during the march. Each woman carried her own Mali (property), as

well as that of her lord, on her head. Often they carried on their

backs a small child, his woolly head peeping out of the cloth in which

he was wound. The women were kept in order and protected by a European

or a trustworthy old non-commissioned officer, assisted by a few

Askari. They all liked gay colours, and after an important capture,

the whole convoy stretching several miles would look like a carnival

procession.

Even during the march the obtaining of supplies had to be attended to.

Hunting patrols marched ahead of the column or on the flanks in the

bush. Often they would remain behind near the old camping sites, where

game or traces of game had been observed. Other patrols followed human

tracks leading to settlements to requisition supplies. On arriving at

the camping-ground, four Askari and my boy Serubiti would cut down

branches and erect a frame for the tent sections or for a grass-hut.

Sometimes a raised bivouac of branches was arranged and covered with

grass. Soon afterwards the bearded Baba, my cook, would arrive and give

careful directions for the arrangement of the kitchen. The bearers

would come and fetch water, cut grass and firewood with their bush

knives. The hunting patrols brought in what they had shot, and soon the

smell of cooking rose from the camp-fires on all sides. Meanwhile,

parties of bearers had been threshing in the villages, and brought

back corn. In the Kinos (thick wooden vessels) the corn was crushed by

beating it with thick clubs, the dull thuds sounding far into the bush.

Messages, reconnaissance reports, and captured dispatches were brought

in; a box in a shady spot served as a desk. During the longer halts

a table was built of branches. The evening meal was eaten in company

with friends round the camp fire, the boys bringing cases to sit on.

The more lordly had deck-chairs. Then to bed under the mosquito-nets,

and in the early morning once more into the unknown. Should we find

supplies, and could we make what we had last out until we did? These

uncertainties cropped up every day afresh, and haunted us week after

week and month after month. The eternal marching was, as will be

understood, no mere pleasure. At—— I heard some remarks about myself,

such as: “Still further? The fellow must come from a family of country

postmen!”

When we reached the confluence of the Chiulezi, difficulties of

supplies had become so serious, and the district hitherto regarded as

fertile had so greatly altered, that I dropped my original intention of

keeping the force together. For the moment it seemed impossible, from

the tactical point of view also. From the English, who were probably

following us, we need not expect any strong pressure, owing to the

daily lengthening of their line of communication and the consequent

difficulty of bringing up supplies.

A written message from the British Commander-in-Chief, General van

Deventer, in which he summoned me to surrender, was brought under

protection of the white flag, and strengthened me in my belief that our

escape had taken him by surprise, and that our invasion of Portuguese

territory had put him at a loss. Neither he nor General Smuts had

ever thought of sending a summons to surrender when the situation

was favourable to the English. Why should they do so in a situation

like the present, or that of September, 1916, at Kissaki, which was

undoubtedly favourable to us? Only because they were at their wits’

end. That was indeed not difficult to see through. The time before the

setting in of the rainy season, at the end of December, was too short

to prepare for a fresh operation, and after the rains had begun the

enemy transport of supplies, which depended largely on motors, would be

faced with new difficulties.

We had, therefore, plenty of time, and could divide ourselves into

several columns without hesitation. We had nothing to fear from

temporary loss of touch one with the other. Accordingly General Wahle’s

detachment was separated from the rest, and marched through the Mkula

mountains, while I marched further up the Ludjenda.

The surrender of Captain Tafel, which I learned from General van

Deventer’s message, came as a severe and unexpected blow.

Captain Tafel had taken over the command at Mahenge from General Wahle,

when the latter left to take over the forces on the Lindi front. He

secured the fertile region of Mahenge to the north, with Commander

Schoenfeldt’s detachment of a few companies. The latter succeeded in

holding his ground with his weak force by skilful use of his 10·5 gun

from the _Königsberg_, and put his force in a very favourable position

materially by the cultivation of gardens and fields.

On the middle Ruhudje was a weak detachment under Captain Aumann,

and north-east of Ssongea Captain Lincke’s detachment near Likuju.

The latter engaged the enemy repeatedly, and in the barren district

suffered from lack of supplies. They therefore gradually retired north

to Mponda. There they were reinforced by two companies and one gun

from the main force. Captain Otto took over the command. In August,

1917, strong English and Belgian forces converged on Mahenge; Captain

Tafel had foreseen this, and withdrawn his supplies out of the Mahenge

district to Mgangira. On September 11th, Mahenge was evacuated.

Even though the individual engagements were often successful, the

superiority of the enemy made itself seriously felt, and the shortage

of ammunition handicapped more and more the Askari companies, mostly

armed with the smoky ’71 rifle.

I learned later through Captain Otto, who had fought his way through

to me with one of Captain Tafel’s patrols and joined me at——, that

Captain Tafel, from west of Livale, had marched south in three columns,

and on the upper Mbemkuru had fought several partially successful

actions, capturing large quantities of ammunition. He had then marched

further south to the Bangala river, and turned east when he thought he

was near Massassi. South of this place he heard from the natives that

the Germans had not been fighting north of Rovuma for several days.

Captain Tafel turned towards the Rovuma and crossed near the Nangala

confluence, hoping to find supplies on the south bank. His own were

literally exhausted. He found nothing and had no idea that about a

day’s march from him Goering’s detachment of my force had captured the

Portuguese camp and found enough food on the prosperous farms to enable

them to live well for fourteen days. Captain Tafel therefore returned

to the north bank of the Rovuma and surrendered to the enemy.

The news of Captain Tafel’s surrender strengthened my reluctance to

detach another part of my force, though, in view of my proximity, the

junction at which we were both aiming had as nearly as possible been

effected. I was straightway put upon the rack by the cessation of news

from Goering’s detachment with which, while it was at Ngomano, we had

kept touch by means of patrols. During the march up the Ludjenda, when

we had to keep the different detachments and companies further apart,

in order to facilitate the search for food, it was necessary to impress

upon subordinate leaders the importance of keeping the whole force in

touch. It was, however, not to be expected that these officers, who

later performed such excellent work as leaders of detachments, and

worked so successfully in co-operation with the rest, should possess

the necessary training from the beginning. The Governor had remained

with the force even after leaving the Protectorate, in accordance

with the regulation (certainly not intended to provide for war with

a European power) that he was the military head of the Protectorate.

He had interpreted this authority in such a way as to interfere

most seriously with that of the Commander-in-Chief, and had often

encroached upon my sphere of activity. I had been powerless to prevent

this, and now that we were outside the Protectorate I attached the

greatest importance to the fact that now, at any rate, I had a free

hand. Even if I did not yield to the Governor’s claims, it must be

understood that in the unprecedented military situation there were

enough differences of opinion to overburden the Commander-in-Chief,

who, whatever happens, is held actually, if not morally, responsible.

It was perhaps natural that at this time I was not always very gentle

and considerate to those around me. So it happened that those very

officers of my Staff who were working with the greatest devotion to

the cause and deserved the most recognition, were the objects of

much unjustified reproach. For not taking offence or allowing this

to prejudice the cheerful continuation of their work, they deserve

particular gratitude. It is largely to the work of these officers,

often carried out under adverse circumstances, that are due the

successes which the public is so generously inclined to place wholly to

my credit. For me, who have always delighted in the good comradeship

characteristic of our officer corps, this general atmosphere of

snarling and fault-finding was naturally not ideal. Fortunately,

however, it was only a passing phase.

Our position was now such that in case of an encounter with the

enemy we could not investigate his strength. We had no time for

prolonged reconnaissance. Perhaps this conviction, together with the

determination with which we attacked the Portuguese forces whenever

we met them, accounts for the fact that, during December, three more

Portuguese fortified positions were taken in quick succession. Of

decisive importance in these enterprises was the personality of the

officer in command who first engaged the enemy. He must lose no time,

and so could not wait for orders. On the 2nd November, Lieutenant

Kempner, commanding the 11th Company, which was acting as advance-guard

in the march up the Ludjenda, came upon a fortified Portuguese camp

at Nangwale. Like most Portuguese camps, it lay on a bare hill, with

a wide range of fire. The brave 11th Company at once deployed along

the edge of the bush, and advanced to the attack across three hundred

metres of open ground exposed to the enemy’s fire. The Askari, who

were carrying full marching kit, could not keep up with the company

commander and his Effendi (black officer). Lieutenant Kempner and

the Effendi leapt upon the enemy’s breastwork, and from there into

the enemy’s entrenchments, and so for a time found themselves alone

among the enemy garrison, consisting of a platoon. The latter were

so dumbfounded that, hearing the cheers of the oncoming Askari, they

at once obeyed the order to lay down their arms. In addition, a

considerable ammunition dump fell into our hands, as well as enough

rations to feed our whole force for several days. When the Portuguese

officer invited Lieutenant Kempner to a glass of special brandy and

found the bottle empty, its owner had further reason for being taken

aback, but with the difference this time that his enemy was taken aback

equally. An Ombascha (black lance-corporal) had the best of the joke.

I was filled with grave anxiety about the fate of Captain Goering, of

whom I had received no news. From General Wahle’s force, which had

marched up the Chiulezi river, we heard subsequently that they had

attacked and annihilated a force of several Portuguese companies in

a strongly entrenched position in the Mkula mountains. The repeated

attempts to establish communication with Wahle’s force by means

of the heliograph did not succeed, although the Portuguese in the

Mkula mountains had clearly observed our signals from Nangwale. The

Portuguese Europeans captured by our detachment had refused to give

their word not to fight against us again in this war. They had been

sent north to the Rovuma by General Wahle owing to the difficulty of

feeding them.

Captain Stemmermann succeeded, after several days’ siege, in capturing

another very strongly held and vigorously defended fortified position.

As the storming of this offered no prospects of success, the enemy’s

water supply was cut off, which made his position in the trenches

untenable, and forced him to surrender. Among our casualties,

unfortunately, were a number of very good native non-commissioned

officers. I was not present at the fighting at Nangwale, as I was

occupied in dealing with delays in the rear companies and arranging

that the march should be kept up to the intended standard. By a double

day’s march I easily made up for the delay this had caused me, and

arrived in Nangwale in time to superintend the division of the captured

stores. In the most favourable circumstances we were only living from

hand to mouth. At Nangwale, where six months before our troops had

found such a rich neighbourhood, the position was now quite different.

Apart from the captured stores there was absolutely nothing; even the

game in a considerable area round Nangwale had been shot or frightened

away. This was a disappointment, for I had hoped at this place to be

freed from the more ordinary difficulties of supplies. The force had,

therefore, to be split up. From the information of the prisoners and

captured documents it appeared that the garrison in Nangwale had been

fed by columns of bearers from the distant neighbourhood of Mwalis.

There must, then, be something to be found there.

On 5th December Captain Koehl, with five companies, a gun and an

ammunition column, left Nangwale to march to the Mwalia—Medo district.

I myself continued the march up the Ludjenda. Fortunately the assurance

of Lieutenant von Scherbening and other Europeans, who had already

patrolled this district, that we should soon come into a region rich in

supplies was confirmed. These supplies, however, were not excessive,

and we were very glad that they could be largely supplemented by

hunting. The enormous numbers of hippopotami which lived in the river

above Nangwale, often in large herds of from fifteen to twenty, had

become quite a staple dish. I myself could not resist having a shot at

a huge bull; the animal sank at once, the water above it swirling as

over a sinking ship. After a time it came to the surface again, feet

uppermost, and made little further movement. The animal was then drawn

to the bank with a rope. The numerous crocodiles made us cautious,

and many a good prize had to be left from fear of these. The flesh

of the hippopotamus tastes like coarse beef; the tongue, however,

is particularly delicate. The most valuable product, however, is

the excellent lard which the men had very quickly learnt to prepare.

Its snow-white, appetizing appearance now was quite different from

the dirty yellow of the first attempts on the Rufiji. On my many

reconnoitring and hunting expeditions into the bush the Askari,

who came with me and the bearers to carry the spoils of the chase,

gradually revealed some of the secrets of the bush. We had long ago

learned to make excellent spinach from different foliage plants (called

Mlenda); now they showed me many different kinds of excellent wild

fruit. We also learnt that the kernel of the Mbinji-fruit, the pulp of

which I already knew contains prussic acid, is quite free from acid,

and when roasted makes an exceptionally delicate dish, tasting like our

hazel-nut.

On the 17th December, 1917, Headquarters arrived at Chirumba (Mtarika).

Lieutenant von Ruckteschell, with his company, had gone on ahead and

had soon driven off the weak Portuguese outposts. This was a station of

the Portuguese Nyassa company; this merchant company also administered

the northern part of the colony. Further south, too, the administration

is in the hands of other private companies. The Portuguese official

in Chirumba, called Fernandez, seems to have been very capable. The

massive buildings of his station, situated at the top of a bare

eminence, were spotlessly clean. A trench ensured it against surprise.

Beautiful gardens with fruit and vegetables stretched along the bank

of the adjacent Ludjenda river. Avenues of mulberry and mango trees

fringed the carefully laid-out roads. Many species of this mango fruit,

known to the natives as Emben, were to be found in the station and

the neighbouring native villages. It was already beginning to ripen

and was so plentiful that it was found worth while to have the fruit

systematically gathered. The waste to which the natives are generally

prone was prevented as far as possible. The beautiful, sweet fruit was

enjoyed by all the Europeans and a great part of the natives, and, in

view of the shortage of sugar, for weeks provided a really valuable

addition to the supplies. When, on my arrival at Chirumba, I stepped

on to the veranda of the European house, Lieutenant Ruckteschell set

before me some hog’s lard, which I had not seen for a long time. Here,

as at many other Portuguese stations, there had been European pigs.

We remained here for several weeks. One detachment moved further

upstream and took possession of the small station of Luambala.

At the same time General Wahle marched to the prosperous station

of Mwemba, already known to us. The richly-cultivated triangle

Chirumba-Luambala-Mwemba and beyond the frontier was patrolled by our

requisitioning and reconnaissance patrols. The natives of this district

showed themselves for the most part intelligent and friendly; they

already knew that they had nothing to fear from the German troops. In

spite of that they had hidden their stores of food in the bush and

would let us have little or nothing. Our men had, however, long since

learned to examine closely, for example, a suspicious-looking tree

stump, and often found that it had been put together by hand and was

the hiding place for stocks of food. Others would drive their sticks

into the hollow ground of a freshly laid-out garden and found stores

of grain buried there. In short, many such hiding-places were found,

and when, at Christmas, we sat down to dinner in a large grass-hut,

we were relieved of the most pressing shortage of food. According to

the descriptions of our men the Ludjenda river was, during several

months of the year, so full of fish that they could be pulled out in

basketfuls. Oddly enough, on this occasion only very few were caught.

Most of them were sheat-fish, about eighteen inches long, and smaller

fish which were best fried crisp. These, too, contributed their modest

share towards the improvement of the rations.

Touch was kept with Koehl’s detachment in the neighbourhood of Medo

by means of a system of relays. I thought it probable that the enemy,

following his usual tactics, was preparing a great concentric movement

against us which would not be ready for at least a month. We could

thus rely on there being no considerable enemy activity until after

the rains, which would end at the end of February. About this time I

intended to concentrate my forces in the neighbourhood of Nanungu.

Until then we must husband our supplies in this area and live as

far as possible on what could be obtained in the outer fringe of our

present locality. At first there was not much game shot at Chirumba,

but the bag increased when we found considerable herds of antelopes

on the east bank of the Ludjenda, and particularly further upstream.

During the remainder of the dry season, while the river was low,

caravans of bearers were continually crossing the river by several

fords, carrying their loads to the dumps on the east bank. As well

as the fords, canoes made from hollowed tree-trunks were used for

crossing. Patrols were sent out for weeks at a time to collect supplies

and reconnoitre. Lieutenant von Scherbening, with his patrol, made an

expedition lasting months, marching from Chirumba via Mtenda, Mahua

and finally south, via the Lurio river, then up the Malema, where

they surprised the Portuguese Boma Malema. An Italian, who had been

hunting elephants on the Ludjenda and had joined us in a ragged,

starving condition, accompanied Lieutenant von Scherbening’s patrol.

The man’s health was, however, so undermined by lingering malaria and

his spleen so terribly swollen that he had to be carried from Mahua to

a plantation near Malacotera.

At the beginning of January, 1918, the English began to move. From the

south-east corner of Lake Nyassa two battalions—the 1st and 2nd King’s

African Rifles—began to advance towards Captain Goering’s detachment,

which had joined up with us and occupied the acute angle between the

Luhambala and Ludjenda rivers. He was covering the supply stores

further up the Ludjenda. On 9th January, in the forenoon, a detachment

of the enemy, attacking unsupported, was defeated. When, in the

afternoon, the enemy returned to the attack after the arrival of his

reinforcements, and at the same time an enemy force pressed forward in

a northerly direction toward the supply dumps on the east bank, Captain

Goering crossed to the east bank with the main part of his force. Only

a strong patrol was left in the old camp on the west bank, and they

held the enemy in check. At the same time an enemy force—the 2nd Cape

Corps of South African half-breeds was identified—was advancing on

Mwembe.

Then began innumerable small skirmishes and patrol actions, which

often put us in an awkward position, owing to our inability to protect

the bearers bringing up supplies. The English cleverly took advantage

of these difficulties to try to undermine the loyalty of our Askari.

Many were very war-weary. Added to this, there was in many cases the

feeling of uncertainty as to where the campaign was going to lead

them. The great majority of black men cling to their homes and their

relations. They said to themselves: “If we go further we shall come

into country we don’t know. We can find our way back from where we are

now, but soon we shan’t be able to.” The English propaganda, by word

of mouth and pamphlets, fell in many cases on fruitful ground, and,

as a result, a number of good Askari and even older non-commissioned

officers deserted. Small annoyances, such as are bound to arise—the

persuasion of the women and so on—all contributed to their decision

to desert. One old _sol_ (native sergeant-major) suddenly disappeared,

who had led a brilliant independent patrol and had brought a strong

detachment of bearers with their loads right through the enemy lines,

and for his good service had been promoted to “Effendi.” He, too, had

deserted. The impulsiveness of the black makes him very sensitive

to insinuation. But even if the English Colonel can boast of having

lowered the _moral_ of certain elements, this was only a passing phase.

The old lust of battle and the old loyalty returned, even among those

who had begun to hang their heads. The example of the faithful Askari,

who simply laughed at the mountains of gold the English promised them

if they would desert, won the day. In so long and trying a campaign

the _moral_ was bound to be low from time to time. It was no use to be

astonished and discouraged, the important thing was to fight against it

firmly, and for this the loyal elements, of which there were many, both

among Europeans, Askari and bearers, had firmly made up their minds.

CHAPTER II

EAST OF THE LUDJENDA

THE patrol of Captain Otto, who had been sent from Captain Tafel to

me after the latter’s surrender, and gave me details about the events

leading up to it, had arrived at Chirumba. Captain Otto, with two

additional companies, now marched to Luambala and took over the command

also of Goering’s detachment (three companies). As was expected,

the main pressure of the enemy was felt at Luambala, as also on the

east bank of the Ludjenda. It was clear that if the enemy advanced

downstream my position at Chirumba on the west bank of the river, in a

district where the supplies were being gradually exhausted, and with

the river swollen by the rains in my rear, was extremely unfavourable.

It was necessary to evacuate this position and to move my force,

while there was time, to the east bank of the Ludjenda. Unfortunately

the fords were impassable, owing to the height of the river, so that

the whole crossing had to be effected by means of the three canoes

available.

Gradually, and without interference, the companies were transferred

to the east bank. The supply question was beginning to become very

serious. Fortunately Captain Koehl, who, in the neighbourhood of Medo

and Namunu, had kept the very intelligent natives to the cultivation

of the quickly ripening grain, reported that a good harvest could be

relied on as early as the middle of February. But that was not for

another month, so we should have to try by every possible means to hold

out a bit longer at Chirumba. Welcome as the manna to the children of

Israel, the fungi which shoot up at this season helped to keep us from

starvation. I had already in Germany interested myself in mycology,

and soon found fungi closely related to our German species of mushrooms

and yellow boleta and others, in the African bush. I had often gathered

basketfuls in a very short time, and even though an excessive diet

of mushrooms is indigestible and not very sustaining, they were a

considerable help.

In torrential rain we marched east. The usually dry ravines had become

raging torrents. Trees, felled in such a way as to fall over the

stream, formed bridges, a hand-rail being improvised from poles or

bark lashed together. The mule I was riding on account of fever—I am

apparently very sensitive to malaria, from which I suffered a great

deal—as well as the few other riding animals that had not found their

way into the cooking-pot swam across. When we arrived at the camping

ground my men soon built me, on account of the damp, a raised shelter

of branches over which both my tent-cloths were laid as a roof.

Veterinary Surgeon Huber, who was responsible for the material welfare

of the staff, and under him our capable black cook, old bearded Baba,

at once got to work and, no matter how wet the wood, we were always

able in a short time to sit down to our meal beside the camp-fire.

Dr. Huber often managed even to have a grass roof erected for our

protection.

On sunny days tobacco was eagerly dried and cut. The efficient

Quartermaster-Lieutenant Besch, who was full of resource where the

comfort of the men was concerned, had thought of this and had collected

very good tobacco from the natives. But in spite of everything the

deprivations were very great and the insidious whisperings of the

enemy, that every native who deserted should be free to go home and

there live in comfort on his own land, did not always fall on deaf

ears. Even the faithful boy of one of our officers, whom he had served

for years, had one morning disappeared; probably his Bibi (wife) had

had enough of campaigning.

Captain Otto’s detachment marched from Uambala due east to Mahua, and

there, on the Lurio river, found a district rich in supplies. Goering’s

detachment, marching from Luambala across country to Mtende, found

considerable supplies on the way. In this district the harvest was

very much earlier than in German East Africa; the maize was beginning

to ripen and could to a large extent already be eaten. Headquarters

next moved from Chirumba to Mtende and, some days later, on to Nanungu.

Wahle’s detachment, which had followed us from Chirumba to Mtende, was

here cut off by several enemy companies which appeared unexpectedly

on a height on their rear and interrupted the messenger service and

the transport. General Wahle extricated himself by a détour from this

uncomfortable position and advanced nearer to Headquarters at Nanungu.

At Nanungu we found abundant supplies and we thought it expedient, as

before, to establish requisitioning stations and supply dumps in the

district between Nanungu and Namunu and further south. There was good

shooting, and the natives readily brought garden produce and honey

to exchange for meat or, preferably, clothing. Very welcome was a

delicate sweet, cherry-like Pori fruit, which ripened in millions in

the neighbourhood of Nanungu. I preferred to have it made into jam. We

also occasionally obtained other dainties, particularly pig-nuts, and

the crowing of cocks proclaimed far and wide that there were fowls and

eggs in the camps and among the natives.

The setting in of the rainy season did not quite coincide with the

forecasts of the natives. There were some sharp downpours, but in the

undulating country the water quickly ran off and collected in the main

artery of that region, the Msalu river, which was soon swollen so

as to form a strong obstacle. Over the Msalu river the post-service

official, Hartmann, who had joined the force as a Sergeant-Major, had

built a pontoon bridge which connected us with General Wahle’s force,

which was still on the west bank. The floating supports of the bridge

were boats made from bark. The necessity in this well-watered country

of being able to cross the swollen rivers without difficulty had drawn

my attention to this question. Hitherto our sole provision for such

contingencies consisted of a few hollowed canoes. Their continued

transport, however, was too difficult and their capacity too limited.

A planter named Gerth, who had joined us as a volunteer, interested

himself particularly in this matter and had himself instructed by the

natives of the district in the building of boats from bark. The ensuing

experiments soon produced good results, after which the building of

these boats, which took barely two hours to put together, for crossing

rivers was enthusiastically taken up by every company. Most of these

boats were not used, but they gave us a feeling of security that, if

necessary, even a full stream would not be impassable for our unwieldy

caravans and baggage.

When we became better acquainted with the neighbourhood, we found

fords over the Msalu which could be used even when the river was in

flood. Our patrols, in charge of Sergeant Valett and others, left our

fortified camp at Nanungu, crossed the river which formed the boundary

of our camp on the west, and went to look for the enemy in his camps at

Mtenda. One of these patrols, which was particularly strong and armed

with two machine guns, succeeded in surprising an enemy column west of

Mtenda. Our men, however, did not get away quickly enough to escape the

enemy’s covering force and, attacked from all sides, found themselves

in a difficult position. Both machine guns were lost and the Europeans

working them fell. Gradually the Askari all returned to Nanungu, but

the patrol leader, Sergeant-Major Musslin, who had got away from the

rest during the march, had fallen into the enemy’s hands. Another

patrol, with which Captain Müller crossed the Msalu to the north,

quickly drove off an English outpost at Lusinje. In the neighbourhood

of Lusinje, also the camp of the English, Lieutenant Wienholt, who, as

has already been mentioned, escaped from arrest and became one of the

best English patrol leaders, was captured. The natives were thoroughly

exploited by the English patrols and acted as spies for the enemy in

return for articles of clothing. The volunteer, Gerth, who has been

mentioned in connection with boat-building, was attacked and killed by

an English patrol while in the house of a native chief.

In the second half of March, 1918, our spirits were greatly raised

by the news, received by our wireless, of the powerful German March

offensive on the Western front. I laid a wager with the Staff Medical

Officer, Staff-Surgeon Taute, that Amiens would soon fall. I used

the period of rest that now set in for several weeks during the lull

in our operations to have my foot attended to. It had been bitten by

a sand-fly, and for the last six months had caused me inconvenience.

These sand-flies, which infested many of the camps, bore their way

into the flesh, round the edge of the toe-nails, causing painful

inflammation. If care is not taken they attack the flesh round them

and, according to medical opinion, the maiming of the feet frequent

among the natives is very often to be traced to the sand-fly. I,

too, was suffering from this inconvenience, and on the march the

inflammation constantly recurred. Fortunately Staff-Surgeon Taute,

using a local anæsthetic, was able to extract the nail.

I was also inconvenienced in another way. On a reconnoitring expedition

a blade of the tall grass, which grows above a man’s height, had

pierced my right eye. During the subsequent treatment it was feared

that the use of the lens might be affected by atropia; the result was

that I could not see properly with my right eye and was unable to

read hand-writing or sketch-maps. This was very awkward, as my left

eye had been so seriously injured by a shot wound received during the

Hottentot rebellion in South-West Africa, that I could only see through

it with the help of spectacles. Suitable spectacles could not, however,

be obtained, and so I was compelled to carry out various enterprises

without being able to see properly.

The patrols of Koehl’s detachment in the Medo-Nanungu district had

meanwhile reached the coast, after taking Portuguese fortresses on, and

far south of, the lower Lurio river, and carrying off a few guns and,

what was more important, rifles, ammunition and considerable supplies.

The natives showed themselves very friendly towards our men, whom they

regarded as their deliverers from Portuguese oppression. Patrols from

Otto’s detachment from Mahua had also reconnoitred as far as the region

south of the Lurio. Lieutenant Methner, so experienced in the ways

of the natives, and first _referant_ of our government, praised the

capacity and cleverness of the Portuguese natives and the intelligence

and far-sightedness of their local chiefs.

Lieutenant von Scherbening, who with his patrol had taken the Boma

Malema, reported that this neighbourhood was very productive. As a

specimen he sent us a captured pig to Nanungu. As it refused to walk it

was carried the 500 km. Unfortunately it turned out eventually not to

be a European pig at all, but a Pori pig, like those we frequently shot

in the bush.

Once more a time had come when it was difficult to obtain news of the

enemy, but a good deal could be conjectured from the incomplete maps at

our disposal. I could have no doubt that the imminent enemy operations

would be launched from the neighbourhood of Port Amelia with their main

force from the coast. The appearance of strong enemy forces at Mtende,

as well as the report, unconfirmed it is true, that troops were on the

march from the south-west towards Mahua, showed me that other troops

from the west were going to co-operate with the approaching attack of

the enemy main force. A situation seemed to be developing in which

I could make use of my inner line to attack one part of the enemy

singly. The enemy’s position with regard to reserves and supplies made

it obvious that the columns marching from the west could not be over

strong. This seemed to be the chance I had so long been awaiting. I,

therefore, remained with my main force at Nanungu and also recalled

Captain Otto’s detachment from Lurio. With these forces I intended to

assume the offensive in a westerly direction. Captain Koehl, whose

detachment was assembled at Medo, was charged with the duty of holding

up the enemy’s main force advancing from Port Amelia and retiring

gradually on my force.

Captain Müller, who, after years of work at Headquarters, had taken

over an independent detachment of two companies, was sent on from

the neighbourhood of Nanungu to Mahua to harass the enemy as far as

possible. He passed round Mahua and surprised, south-west of this

place, the fortified supply depot of Kanene. The defending English

European troops saw that all the stores were lost. To prevent this, at

least to some extent, they fell upon the stores of liquor in the camp

and were captured in a thoroughly intoxicated condition.

For myself, I, likewise, advanced in the middle of April in the

direction of Mahua, and during the march could hear from afar heavy

sounds of firing. At Koriwa, north-east of Mahua, Captain Müller had

attacked an enemy battalion under Colonel Barton, which had been making

a reconnoitring expedition and was at once attacked by our troops on

the march. In spite of the fact that on our side scarcely 70 rifles

took part in the action, our troops succeeded in enveloping the enemy’s

right wing, and from a large ant-hill poured upon him such a vigorous

and effective machine-gun fire that he fled wildly. He lost over 40

men in this action. Lieutenant-Commander Wunderlich, who had received

a severe wound through the abdomen, had to be taken to the hospital at

Nanungu, two days’ march distant, and died shortly afterwards.

The blow which I had intended to strike with the main force had already

been successfully carried through by Müller’s weak detachment. I,

therefore, turned with my main force to the district west of Nanungu. A

large force of the enemy had arrived meanwhile on the Msalu river and

had crossed it with several patrols. My calculation that I should be

able to surprise a strong body of the enemy immediately after crossing

the river was not fulfilled: the reports received had been incorrect.

However, in a whole series of minor engagements on the Msalu river and

further west our fighting patrols inflicted, gradually, severe losses

on the enemy and his patrols soon evacuated the east bank of the Msalu.

On 3rd May our supply patrols, whose duty it was to obtain further

supplies from the direction of Mahua, surprised, in the neighbourhood

of Saidi, strong enemy detachments which were seriously threatening our

field hospital and supply depots at Makoti.

Part of our stores had been brought to Makoti in readiness for the

operations planned to be carried out further west. Our fighting

patrols, which were sent out immediately, had several encounters with

the enemy near the Kireka mountain at Makoti. I thought at first that

these were only enemy patrols, so sent Captain Schulz there with a

strong patrol as a reinforcement, and myself marched on the 4th of May,

with the main body, to the Nanungu-Mahua road. From here I expected to

be able to carry out a swift attack on the enemy forces, which were

trying to surprise us somewhere in this neighbourhood. The general

situation was made clear when it was known that patrols had, in the

course of the day, encountered a new enemy near the Kireka mountain. An

enemy detachment had been thrown back and it was probable that strong

forces were in entrenched positions in the rear. In the morning of the

5th May I marched from my camp to Makoti. During the march I hoped

sincerely that the enemy would spare us the necessity of making the

attack on his fortified positions and that, as in view of the general

situation was not improbable, he would emerge from his entrenchments

and offer battle in the open. If this happened, and we succeeded

in attacking with our main force before the enemy was aware of our

arrival, a considerable success was probable.

At eleven o’clock in the forenoon I arrived at the Kireka mountain

and went on ahead to see Captain Schulz who, with his patrol, had

occupied some rocky grottos in the copse. As soon as I had arrived a

_sol_ (native Sergeant-Major), who had just returned from a patrol

expedition, reported that the enemy was advancing in great force

and must soon appear at close quarters. I passed on this report to

Lieutenant Boell, who had just brought up his company in the rear

of Schulz’s detachment, and instructed him to go up at once in case

of an enemy attack. I then went back and ordered the advance of our

companies which were gradually arriving. Meanwhile the fighting in

front began. The enemy, advancing in close order, had quickly thrown

back our patrols out of the grottos, but had then been completely taken

by surprise by the effective machine-gun fire of Boell’s company and

partially driven back. Goering’s detachment, coming up at that moment,

began an enveloping movement on the right, completely surprising the

enemy, who was rapidly driven back with very heavy losses.

After several miles of hot pursuit we reached the enemy’s

entrenchments. On our left wing, where two more companies had been sent

into action, the fight wavered, and it was difficult for me in the

thick bush to distinguish friend and foe. It was, therefore, some time

before I could get a clear idea of the situation on the left wing, and

it was not until I received a report from Major Kraut, whom I had sent

to investigate, that I realized that, in advancing, our left wing had

come under a withering enemy fire in a clearing which had brought it

to a standstill. A counter-attack by the enemy, which had brought him

very near to the position of our Headquarters, looked very dangerous.

Fortunately for us, however, just at this moment Lieutenant Buechsel,

whose company had been detached from the main force and so arrived

late, came upon the scene of action and was able to avert the danger.

Meanwhile, on the right wing, Captain Goering had realized that a

frontal attack on the enemy entrenchment offered no prospect of

success. He had, therefore, sent Lieutenant Meier with a strong patrol

round the enemy’s position to fire on the enemy mine-thrower from the

rear and if possible to capture it. This capture was not brought off,

for the enemy had at his disposal unexpected reserves which were able

to keep Meier’s patrol at a distance.

The action thus came to a standstill. When it had grown quite dark we

were close in front of the enemy. Shots were still being exchanged from

both sides, but only occasionally. The clerical work—even in Africa

there was writing to be done, though not as much as is usually the

case—was postponed during the fighting. A number of charges and other

tiresome details had to be written up. I was able from time to time

to talk personally with the company leaders, and called them together

for this purpose. I changed my own position as little as possible to

avoid difficulties and annoying delays in the dispatch and receipt of

messages. A meal was cooked further in the rear, where the dressing

station had also been established. We at Headquarters had our meal

prepared as usual by our black servants, who brought it up to the

firing-line.

In order to get the force in hand ready for further action, some parts

of it were withdrawn from the front line and mustered. I came to the

conclusion that it would be expedient to remain where we were for the

night, to be in readiness to renew the action on the following day, and

especially to cut the enemy off from his water-supply, which must be

somewhere outside the camp.

About midnight it was reported that one of our patrols had encountered

a strong enemy force on the Nanungu-Mahua road. I was afraid that this

force, which I took to be strong in view of its independent movement,

would advance further on Nanungu and capture our company’s stores

(ammunition, medical stores, supplies, etc.), which were on this road

as well as the depot at Nanungu. I therefore withdrew during the night

with the greater part of my force, via Makoti, to the Nanungu-Mahua

road. Only strong patrols remained in front of the enemy, but these

did not notice that the enemy, too, evacuated his position during the

night and withdrew towards Mahua. On 6th May it became apparent that

the report of strong enemy forces on the Nanungu-Mahua road, which had

caused my retirement, was incorrect. There was no enemy there. Captain

Müller, hearing the firing of the English trench-mortars, had, with

admirable initiative, immediately begun a forced march from his camp

north-east of Mahua, towards the sound and had apparently been taken

for the enemy.

When he arrived on the battlefield he found that the enemy had retired.

The enemy, consisting of four companies and a machine-gun company,

and to judge from his fortifications a thousand strong, had been

completely defeated by our force of little more than 200 rifles—we

were 62 Europeans and 342 Askari. He had lost 14 Europeans and 91

Askari killed, 3 Europeans and 3 Askari taken prisoner. In addition,

his hospital with about 100 wounded had fallen into our hands, and

according to the natives he had taken other wounded with him. Our

casualties were: 6 Europeans, 24 Askari, 5 other natives killed; 10

Europeans, 67 Askari and 28 other natives wounded.

While this gratifying success against the enemy’s western columns was

being attained, Koehl’s detachment had been engaged in continuous

fighting, often on a considerable scale, against the enemy divisions

which were advancing on Nanungu from Port Amelia. At Medo the enemy,

according to his own statement, suffered heavy losses in one

engagement west of Medo. Captain Spangenberg, with his two companies,

had succeeded in getting round the enemy, falling on and capturing

from the rear his light field howitzer battery. Nearly all the men and

horses of this battery were killed. Unfortunately it was not possible

to remove the guns and ammunition. They were rendered useless. But in

spite of this individual success, Koehl’s detachment had to retire.

The moment was approaching when the timely intervention of my main

force with Koehl’s detachment might bring about a decisive success

against General Edwards. Once more, however, the question of supplies

dragged our movements. The crops of the district had all been consumed,

except the Mtama, which ripens much earlier in this country than

in German East Africa. But it was not yet ripe. In order to avoid

having to withdraw simply for reasons of supply, we ripened the Mtama

artificially by drying it. This made the grain quite edible, and as

there was plenty of it in the district everyone got as much as he

wanted, and there was no want.

The condition of the crops prompted me to march with the main body of

the force further south-west, in the direction of Mahua, and pitch my

camp beside the Koroma mountain, not far from the Timbani mountain.

I intended, if necessary, to march further south, to avail myself of

the abundant crops in the fertile districts near the confluence of

the Malma and Lurio rivers. West of the Timbani mountain the country

was favourable for a decisive action against General Edwards, who was

following Captain Koehl’s detachment south-west from Nanungu. The

extraordinarily rocky and broken country near the mountain, and four

miles north-east of it, as far as the place to which Koehl’s detachment

had retired, was not favourable for the decisive attack I had in view.

On 21st May smoke indicated fresh enemy camps west of the positions of

Koehl’s detachment. I guessed that this new enemy would march on 22nd

May to take Koehl’s detachment in the rear from the west. Unfortunately

I omitted to give Koehl’s detachment definite orders to withdraw their

main force immediately from the unfavourable country to the south-west

of the Timbani mountain. Instead of a positive order I gave him

instructions which left him too much freedom of action.

Thus it came about that Koehl’s detachment did not get their bearers

with the ammunition and baggage on the march until the forenoon of the

22nd of May. Even then all would have been well if the Governor, who

had attached himself to Koehl’s division, had not marched at their

head. Not understanding the seriousness of the situation, he made a

considerable halt in the middle of this unfavourable country, where he

was exposed to a surprise attack from the enemy at any moment, without

being able to put up an effective defence. The bearers of Koehl’s

detachment, in spite of Captain Koehl’s orders, allowed themselves to

halt likewise. During the morning of this day, I once more personally

reconnoitred the very favourable country south-west of the Timbani

mountain, and met, among others, Lieutenant Kempner, who had been

wounded the day before with Koehl’s detachment and carried to the rear.

From Koehl’s detachment itself, where, since the morning, several

enemy attacks had been beaten off, sounds of distant fighting were

to be heard. There was telephonic communication with Captain Koehl,

and I returned about 11 a.m. to the Koroma camp without having any

idea of the situation of his transport. At noon I had just entered

the camp when suddenly there was a loud sound of firing, from a very

short distance, of trench-mortars, beyond doubt between us and Koehl’s

detachment. Immediately afterwards telephonic communication in that

direction was broken off. There was no alternative but to march my

whole force immediately from the Koroma camp against this new enemy.

I secretly hoped that, in spite of the unfavourable country, we

might perhaps succeed in taking him by surprise, and in inflicting a

decisive defeat. Barely an hour later we reached the Timbani mountain

and quickly threw back the advanced detachment of the enemy. A few

scattered men reported that the Governor and Captain Koehl’s transport

had been surprised by the enemy and all the baggage lost. The Governor

himself had only just managed to get away; others said he had been

taken prisoner. The enemy had opened a fairly lively fire with several

mine-throwers, and was attacked by our companies from several sides. He

had, however, taken up a good position, in which he entrenched himself

and had hidden part of the captured baggage. Unfortunately we only

recaptured a small quantity. But the enemy position was surrounded and

subjected to a concentrated and gruelling fire. According to a dispatch

captured later, the 1st King’s African Rifles alone lost about two

hundred men.

[Illustration: Native Types (5).

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)]

[Illustration: Native Types (6).

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)]

[Illustration: Fig. xviii. The Action at the Kireka Mts.]

Several companies and patrols of Captain Koehl’s detachment took part

in this envelopment of the enemy. Captain Koehl himself had turned his

main force against the new enemy, attacking his rear, and hoped to be

able to defeat him while a strong patrol facing north-east held his

former enemy in check. This patrol, however, was much too weak. It was

pressed back, and had again to be reinforced with troops from Captain

Koehl’s detachment. Even though the enemy had without doubt suffered

on the whole considerable losses, a decisive success was unattainable.

The fighting was broken off at dark, and we withdrew to the favourable

country I had reconnoitred between the Timbani and Koroma mountains.

Meanwhile the Governor had found his way to the camp by the Koroma

mountain. He had lost all his belongings in the adventure, and was

looked after by Heder, a non-commissioned officer, and the trustworthy

and cautious leader of the supply column. I, too, came up to help the

Governor in his adversity, and honoured him with a pair of blue socks,

which his wife had made me at the beginning of the war, but which

unfortunately had faded.

Apart from the serious loss of about 70,000 rounds of ammunition,

we had also lost a considerable amount of notes—I believe it was

30,000 rupees. My desire to give requisition notes in preference to

bank notes, and so save a lot of transport of securities and avoid

unnecessary losses, had not been acceded. Millions of rupee notes

had been printed, the dragging about of which, in the present war

situation, was particularly burdensome. In order, at least, to avoid

similar losses in the future, the Quartermaster, on my instructions,

destroyed a great part of the notes which had been obtained with so

much trouble.

CHAPTER III

IN THE REGION OF THE LURIO AND LIKUNGO RIVERS

ON May 23rd the rest of our transport and the main body of the troops

were started off from Coroma camp on a track right through the bush

to Koriwa. The bulk of our carrier columns and the sick had gone on

ahead. The rearguard under Captain Otto remained a few days longer on

the Koroma Mountain and there successfully repulsed several hostile

attacks. It looked as if our enemy had once again collected the bulk of

his troops at Timbani, after the conclusion of a concentric operation,

and needed some time to reorganize his supply before resuming

his march. Returning patrols reported heavy motor traffic on the

Nanungu-Timbani Mountain road. Other patrols informed us that hostile

forces from the east were approaching the northern bank of the Lurio

river.

Unmolested by the enemy, I now made for the fertile district of

Kwiri, south of Mahua, and from thence on to the Lurio. It turned

out, however, that some of our seriously wounded and sick would not

be able to endure several days of such marches in their “Maschille”

(litters). Nor was it easy to ensure medical attention. We had too few

attendants to be able to leave the sick behind individually. So there

was nothing for it but to collect our invalids from time to time, turn

them into a complete Field Hospital, under a single medical officer,

and take our leave of them finally. Even the senior medical officer of

the Protective Force, Dr. Meixner, was left behind at Kwiri with one

such hospital. On that occasion I said farewell to Lieutenant Schaefer

who had rendered us such exemplary service in the preparations for the

action at Jassini, and was now stricken with black-water fever. This

experienced “African” was fully aware of his situation, but was as

cheerful as ever and faced his inevitable end, which was approaching

fast, with composure.

I did not wish to linger long north of the Lurio, for I thought that

this river, which had been very high only a short time before, would

be a serious obstacle. For that reason I proposed to cross it with our

large quantity of transport quickly and without let or hindrance. When

we actually reached the Lurio it appeared that at this time of the year

there were plenty of fords which offered a comfortable crossing. We

left some of our troops on the northern bank without anxiety as to the

drawbacks involved, and established a camp for the main body on the

southern bank. The country was very fertile and the inhabitants trusted

in us; good relations had been established by the earlier visits of the

patrols and raiding parties. One of my orderlies had a hearty reception

from some old acquaintances.

I was pretty sure that the English would attack us here and be

compelled to bring up ever more troops. If I only withdrew slowly

enough, the strong enemy forces would, I believed, probably follow,

but in view of their immense supply difficulties, it would be in vain.

In this way I might achieve my main purpose of gaining enough time to

raid the weaker hostile camps and posts further south. Captain Müller’s

detachment, which had been sent south, discovered one such camp at

Malema, the same place where our troops had won heartening successes

before.

After fighting for several days Captain Müller captured the Boma

Malema. It had been occupied by an English half-battalion which retired

south at night. Simultaneously a Portuguese patrol had gone north from

the Boma Malema and returned. Captain Müller took the latter for the

retreating English, attacked them on the march and was very astonished

to find that the killed were Portuguese.

After the action Captain Müller shifted his camp. In the move,

Lieutenant von Schroetter, who was ill with malaria, was left behind

for a short time and taken prisoner by an English patrol which suddenly

appeared upon the scene. When this patrol marched off to the Boma

Inagu he managed to escape, and rejoined us at length, quite exhausted.

But he lost all his belongings, and had nothing on his head—a very

serious matter under a tropical sun.

From the reports of the natives and our own patrols there was no longer

room for doubt that strong enemy forces, which had disembarked at

Mozambique, were marching west on the Boma Malema, and were already

only a few days’ march from that place. Simultaneous reports were

received that troops were also marching towards the Boma Malema from

the west, the direction of Malacotera. A few days later the enemy

following us from the north reached the Lurio, so we evacuated its

northern bank. From captured documents and the fighting that took place

on the northern bank, we judged that this hostile force was stronger

than I had suspected. Thanks to its light motor transport columns it

had been able to follow us up quickly with all its supply as well as a

body which I estimated at about three or four battalions with auxiliary

arms.

The country along the river Malema in which we had our camp was quite

extraordinarily fertile. The _mtama_ was perfectly ripe, and there was

an abundance of tomatoes, bananas, sweet potatoes (_batatas_) and other

fruits. The food was also very varied. Game and fish were plentiful.

The natives knew the German troops from previous acquaintance, and

were very friendly. When I rode from one detachment to another the

women came running out of their houses to see the “Njama” (animal,

game, flesh), a creature quite unknown to them. I was riding a horse,

of course! The fertile country was so extensive that we could not

even approximately exploit or protect it. We could not prevent it

supplying the necessities of life to the large number of Askari and

non-combatants with our enemies, as well as ourselves. We could not

deprive the enemy of the possibility of also making this prolific

region in a large measure into a new base and shortening his line

of supply. From our point of view the country was, if anything, too

fertile and we were not in a position, as on earlier occasions, to

exploit it to such an extent before we left that it was insufficient

to support the enemy masses. But at any rate it had the result that

for the moment we were very mobile as, thanks to our sojourn of several

weeks, our wounded and sick were so far recovered that all, even the

inmates of the field hospitals, were quite fit for marching.

This advantage would have been lost once more by any considerable

actions. I decided gradually to evacuate the region, in spite of its

extraordinary fertility, and slip through the ring in which the enemy

columns were enclosing me in the fertile district of the Malema river.

My idea was that a small part of my troops should hold off these enemy

columns and keep them so busy that they would think they were involved

in a serious affair, and attack my rearguard properly. In coming to

this decision, good service was done me by the orders of the English

commander which had fallen into our hands. He had no intention of

being “foxed” by us a second time, as he had been at Koriwa, and had

therefore arranged that whenever contact was established with us at any

point, several detachments should immediately execute a flank march

round us at a distance of five or six English miles. I told General

Edwards about this later on, and he was extraordinarily amused that

this had given me an intimation of his intentions, and enabled me to

take my counter-measures against them. It was obvious that if I only

echeloned my troops deeply enough the enemy’s enveloping detachments

would be placed in the greatest peril. They would find themselves

sandwiched between my detachments and in this way could be taken by

surprise in the flank or rear by my troops echeloned further back.

Unfortunately the execution of this plan was only imperfect. In the

very thick bush, however carefully one watched camp fires and the

dust, there were too few indications to follow a column properly and

it was very difficult for a column to keep its direction. In addition

there were a number of factors that threw out one’s calculations,

factors such as dense bush, marshes and water-courses. In spite of all

these obstacles, we succeeded every now and then in taking one of the

hostile enveloping columns by surprise and bringing it under fire.

The inevitable difficulties of moving separate columns in the thick

bush were even greater on the English side than on the German. When a

collision occurred there was often a complete mix-up in which neither

friend nor foe knew whom he had before him. On one occasion Lieutenant

von Ruckteschell’s detachment, which had been nearest to the enemy,

fell back on some of our troops which had been echeloned further back.

In so doing it came across a reconnoitring party in the bush, at a

distance of about thirty paces. This patrol was recognized as an enemy.

The machine guns were brought into position under the nose of the enemy

and without any interference on his part, and the patrol, which had

taken our men for English, was fired on lustily at point-blank range

and put to flight in a second.

In the same way our own patrols continually found themselves in the

middle of enemy troops. On one such occasion _Vizefeldwebel_ Schaffrath

made his patrol lie down in the high grass and then opened an effective

fire on the head of approaching enemy columns. Then he took cover

again. In this way he succeeded in the course of a few hours in

inflicting sensible losses on the enemy several times and capturing

some material.

I wanted to gain time by these holding actions, so that I could get

my main body into the country further south, which was supposed to be

fertile, according to report, and fall upon and drive away the smallish

hostile garrisons we expected to find there. The first objective

of this nature was the Portuguese _Boma_ Alto-Moloque. A captured

map showed that this had been the seat of a higher administrative

authority in peace time and the military station of a force exceeding

a company. Both natives and food must certainly be there. Between us

and Alto-Moloque lay the high range of Inagu. An English battalion in

its entrenched camp at Inagu barred the road which led from the Boma

Malema round the west side of the Inagu Mountains to Alto-Moloque.

It was therefore probable that our advance by that road would be

contested, and that would have been unpleasant in view of the length

of our carrier columns. In any case we should have been delayed and

our intended surprise attack on Alto-Moloque would have been spoilt.

But surprise I regarded as absolutely essential, as we suspected the

presence of ammunition and arms at Alto-Moloque.

Accordingly we left the enemy in peace in his entrenchments at Inagu

and marched round the east side of the Inagu Mountains on Alto-Moloque.

The strategic situation was somewhat remarkable, and well described in

the words of an old Boer, words that were not quite pure High German:

“Is das eine Komische Orlog; ons lopt achter de Portugies an, und de

Englanders lopt achter ons an” (_This is a funny war. We chase the

Portuguese, and the English chase us_).

We marched by native tracks or straight through the bush. Several

considerable streams had to be negotiated on the way. This district,

too, was fertile, and we soon came across unmistakable human tracks

leading towards Alto-Moloque, not to mention kraals, the first I had

ever seen. They were grass huts, very thick and carefully built. Ashes

were smouldering in places and the heads of hens which were lying about

were still fresh. We exchanged shots with some Portuguese patrols and a

few rifles with ammunition were captured.

No time must be lost, so Müller’s detachment, made specially mobile

by being relieved of all its transport, went on ahead and found in

Alto-Moloque only a few Portuguese officers and non-commissioned

officers who were just drinking coffee on the verandah of the very fine

European house. These were taken prisoner.

I now followed slowly with the main body. Our rearguard, under

Captain Koehl, had quite a series of little collisions, which in

bulk caused the enemy not inconsiderable losses. One of our Askari

patrols had been surprised and captured by a stronger enemy patrol

when engaged in foraging for food. These Askari subsequently looked on

while this English patrol fought quite a bloody action with another

English detachment in the thick bush and the occurrence gave them

their opportunity of escaping. The lack of caution which many of our

Europeans continually showed, in spite of all warnings, caused us many

unnecessary losses. There was one Askari, a particularly reliable and

intelligent man, whose father, the old Effendi Plantan, had already

been with Von Wissmann’s Zulu Askari, whom I had been only too glad to

take with me on patrol. He never came back from some quite unnecessary

mission on which he was sent, and was probably taken prisoner. It was a

phenomenon common to both sides that a large part of the losses in the

war in East Africa were unnecessary and due solely to thoughtlessness.

Koehl’s detachment gradually came up with the main body, which had

reached the Alto-Moloque-Inagu road at a European plantation which

was well stocked with provisions. From this place it had rung up

Alto-Moloque on the enemy’s telephone and received a reply, first from

a Portuguese, then from Captain Müller. Müller reported that only a

small amount of ammunition had been captured, and that the bulk must

have been got away to the south-east just in time by several carrier

parties. Strong patrols were immediately sent out after them.

When the main body entered Alto-Moloque on June 16th we found some very

fine and massive European houses. They were charmingly situated on a

little hill, and had a view for miles over the neighbouring forests to

the mighty rugged mountains in the distance. There were thousands of

orange trees in full bloom and our coloured men immediately christened

it the “Boma ja machungwa” (Orange _boma_).

The numerous maps and documents of all kinds which were found at

the station gave us a tolerably clear idea of the country towards

Quelimane. We could see that there was a telegraph wire from

Alto-Moloque to Quelimane via Ili. A large company, the Lugella

Company, had its headquarters at the confluence of the Lugella with the

Likungo. There were great plantations and factories and large supplies

of food. Above all, it looked as if preparations were in progress to

make this station a main supply depot for food and ammunition for

considerable bodies of troops.

If we wished to exploit the opportunity that this situation presented,

our subordinate commanders would have to act very promptly and must not

be hampered by too rigid instructions. The impression that I formed in

my mind rested in many respects on unproved assumptions. Our pursuing

patrols must be able to act according to circumstances independently

and rapidly if that original impression was not confirmed subsequently.

Time must not be lost, or the enemy would be able to get his supplies

away in time. He would have the advantage of a railway which began not

far south of the Lugella Company’s station and led south to the river

Namacurra, as well as the steamer which plied on that stream.

As so often happens, our pursuing patrols and companies were

occasionally found wanting in some respects. Yet it must not be

forgotten that besides many other qualities a very mature tactical

judgment is required to give an independent decision on the question

when the very exhausting pursuit of a fleeing foe is to be continued

at top pressure or should be broken off. To exploit the promising

situation to the greatest possible extent, on the very day of my

arrival at Alto-Moloque I had sent in pursuit the whole of Müller’s

detachment, which I had hitherto kept by me. In the course of various

patrols and raids in the neighbourhood we caught individual Portuguese

Askari who in many cases had set up off their own bats as little

tyrants in the villages of the district. The natives reported their

presence to us.

The region of Alto-Moloque turned out to be very fertile, as we

anticipated. We were therefore in a position to give Müller’s

detachment a greater start in following up the enemy. One of the

patrols of this detachment had captured a hostile supply depot near

Ili. An enemy carrier column, turned off by an Anglo-Portuguese

detachment which was now several days’ march east of Alto-Moloque, and

trying to pass through Alto-Moloque in ignorance of our presence, was

a welcome acquisition to our Intendant, who needed it to carry the

supplies captured at Ili. Unfortunately this intended removal succeeded

only partially, for a fresh English detachment appeared at Ili,

apparently from the direction of Inagu, and drove off our patrols.

The advance of our main body on Ili was contested by considerable

hostile patrols which were approaching the Alto-Moloque-Ili road from

the north. One of these patrols was immediately pursued energetically

and attacked in its camp, but I gained the impression that larger enemy

forces were advancing on us from the north of Ili and Alto-Moloque.

I had no intention of delaying, but wished rather to join up as

soon as possible with Müller’s detachment, which was on its way to

Lugella. Accordingly I marched south, skirting Ili and occupied the

Portuguese post of Nampepo. In this district, at about a day’s march

from each other, the Portuguese companies had established a number of

clean, well-arranged stations around which lay the fields, which they

cultivated. A whole series of these posts and their field-depots fell

into our hands during the march. Nampepo was one of them, only larger

than usual, and the centre of an extraordinarily fertile district. A

special feature of the Nampepo camp was our chase after domestic pigs.

Large numbers of these were running loose in the bush, so that we had

excellent sausages to eat, as well as roast pork and brawn. A German

planter named Hauter, from the district of Morogoro, who had delivered

large supplies of sausages to Morogoro during the war, had acquired

expert skill in preparing them, and this now came in very useful. He

now had the insides of pigs to practise on instead of the insides of

cows, and our enjoyment of this unwonted luxury was so great that we

did not allow ourselves to be disturbed even by the shots that fell

into our camp.

For as a matter of fact a considerable enemy column from the north

was approaching the station of Nampepo, which was held by Captain

Spangenberg with our outposts. From the commanding ground the approach

of a large enemy column could be noted quite easily. As a particularly

favourable opportunity for attacking it presented itself we did not

disturb the enemy in his approach. However, contrary to expectation, he

did not attack us. Pillars of smoke arising from the bush about 1,500

yards away showed us that he had encamped there. Our patrols which went

round the enemy crawled up to his camp at night and fired into it.

Koehl’s detachment had come up meanwhile and I marched off with the

main body to follow Müller’s detachment in the direction of Lugella.

Captain Spangenberg remained with our rearguard in touch with the

enemy, and then followed us at a distance of a day’s march.

Meanwhile Captain Müller’s detachment had succeeded in crossing the

Likungo river, near the confluence of the Lugella, at a ford. It

had been able to give an apparently severe drubbing to a Portuguese

battalion which had rushed up from the south to protect it. Several

machine guns were captured. The great depot of the Lugella Company fell

into our hands. It was possible to distribute a large amount of food

and clothing. The buildings themselves, which had been adapted for

defence, and about 300,000 kilograms of food were burnt.

As no other remunerative objective presented itself Captain Müller

considered he had fulfilled his mission for the time being, retired to

the southern bank of the Likungo and there awaited my arrival.

I was afraid that our wonderful captures of the last few weeks would

tempt some of our Europeans to help themselves to things improperly,

and I took advantage of the occasion to point out the evils of such

behaviour. It must not be forgotten that war booty belongs to the

State, and that the individual soldier has to notify to his superiors

if he happens to want any particular object he has captured. An

estimate is then made of the value of the object and he has to pay the

amount. It was important for me to maintain the _moral_ of our troops

unconditionally if I was to be able to appeal to their sense of honour

and make calls on their endurance.

A certain amount of ammunition was captured here and there, and,

further, a small Portuguese gun had fallen into our hands, but the

great haul of cartridges for which we had hoped and striven had not

materialized. I thought it extremely doubtful whether there ever had

been such large stocks at Alto-Moloque and Ili, and suspected that the

whole thing was a case of exaggeration of the approved native type.

That did not imply evil intentions on the part of those concerned. On

the contrary, the natives were well-disposed towards us. For example,

they brought back of their own accord one of our captured Portuguese

officers who had escaped. They also brought us some German black boys

who had been enjoying themselves looting, and had been caught and well

beaten by the natives, excusing themselves on the ground that they had

taken them for Portuguese!

It is an extremely difficult matter even for a European to estimate,

for example, the numerical strength of a detachment on the march. The

native finds it much more difficult, especially when it comes to larger

numbers. The words he so frequently uses, _mingi_ (much) or _kama

majani_ (as thick as grass) can mean 50 just as well as 5,000.

CHAPTER IV

ON TO THE SOUTH

HOWEVER, wherever these large ammunition depots might be, they had

certainly not fallen into our hands. We had to start out on the search

again. The whole strategic situation, as well as the documents we

captured, showed that they _must_ be somewhere in this region. There

was a high degree of probability that the more considerable stocks,

whose existence we suspected, were further south, either because they

had been there from the start or because they had been moved there as a

result of our approach. It seemed likely that before long they would be

transported to the coast and transferred to ships, in case of emergency.

During our march considerable patrols had reconnoitred the region

within a radius of a day’s march, and captured a few small enemy food

depots, but no arms or ammunition. Müller’s detachment, with which

we had joined up at Mujeba on June 27th, marched further south again

the same day. The natives told us of a large _boma_ at Origa, which

was said to be somewhere further south, near the coast, and to have

large ammunition supplies. Müller’s party was to find this _boma_. Our

directions were thoroughly inaccurate, as usual. I was quite certain

that on the march other and conflicting reports would infallibly

arrive. Unfortunately we had not a long time in which to test the

intelligence that came in. All we could do was to trust that it

contained at least an element of truth.

As the situation demanded, Captain Müller was given the greatest

freedom of action. If any promising objective presented itself during

his march, he was to decide without hesitation what his best course

was. I would bring up our main body and intervene unconditionally

in his support, and, in any case, I would accept the situation he

had created. The main thing was that he should not wait for special

orders and instructions. I realized that in acting thus I was in a

large measure placing the conduct of our operations in the hands of a

subordinate commander. It was only possible because that subordinate

commander possessed a very sound, tactical judgment and great

initiative.

Our leading troops, with their three weak companies, had to perform the

double function of cavalry sent out far and wide to reconnoitre, and

that of an advance guard led with the greatest energy. In any other

circumstances I should have been with the advance guard myself, in

view of its important task, so that I could have a surer hold on the

course of operations. Experience had taught me, however, that in view

of the distance between our columns, my presence with the main body was

indispensable, both to overcome obstacles quickly and to be able to

act in face of some unforeseen change in the situation. It must not be

forgotten that our whole advance was based on combination, and that, as

actually happened often enough, the unsuspected appearance of hostile

detachments from some other direction transformed the situation at a

blow and made fresh dispositions necessary.

Accordingly we marched by small native tracks or right through the

bush in single file. Owing to the great length of our columns, on a

day’s march of nineteen miles or so the head had to start off in the

dark—about 5 a.m.—if the tail was to reach the camp appointed the

same day, that is, late in the evening and just before darkness fell.

It was inevitable, because camping material had to be procured, wood

to be chopped, grass to be cut and shelters to be built, in case of

need, for the sick. For that reason our whole force could not march

concentrated. It was much too extended. Müller’s detachment, forming

the advance guard, marched one or two days’ march ahead. The rearguard,

Spangenberg’s detachment, followed the main body at a distance of about

a day’s march. Communication was maintained by means of runners.

In the reports which reached us by the runners of Müller’s detachment,

the name “Kokosani” was now perpetually recurring. Considerable enemy

depots, strongly protected by hostile troops, were to be found there,

so it was said. But where was this Kokosani? The word could not be

found on our maps. It gradually came to light that Kokosani was the

same place that figured on Portuguese maps as Namacurra. In any case,

all our previous intelligence, as well as a glance at the situation on

the map, showed that Kokosani must be our most promising objective. We

had no means of knowing whether it would be possible to capture this

place, probably very strongly fortified, with our relatively limited

resources. Only the attempt itself could enlighten us on that point.

Captain Müller had turned west towards the place independently. On the

way it became clear that, as the natives had told us, there actually

was a ford over the river Likungo.

I now marched on quickly with our main body, in order to join up,

and gave orders to the same effect to our rearguard under Captain

Spangenberg. In the afternoon of July 1st, the main force reached the

Likungo and immediately crossed it. The water of this great river, more

than four hundred yards wide, came up to our necks at the deepest parts

of the ford. It took each man about an hour to cross. When the troops

had successfully reached the western bank, we bivouacked, and next

morning continued our march in the tracks of Müller’s detachment ahead.

On the way some thirty natives met us. They had worked in Kokosani,

and told us that a large number of Portuguese and Askari were

encamped there, and that a number of chests had arrived. We had to

employ interpreters in our talk with these men, as they did not know

Kisuaheli. Several of our Askari were masters of the local tongue or

related dialects.

Before long we received an important report from the advance guard. On

the previous day Captain Müller had completely surprised the enemy at

Kokosani by an encircling move. Marching on the factory buildings from

the north in broad daylight, through a field of knee-high agaves and

without any cover, he had succeeded in getting into the Portuguese

entrenchments and, in several hours of very severe hand-to-hand

fighting, defeating the three Portuguese companies holding them, with

very heavy losses to the enemy. In the course of the action a number of

rifles, as well as two field guns with their ammunition, were captured.

I myself went on a little ahead of our main body, and in the morning

came across several extensive and well-arranged plantations. Next

I followed the track of a field railway, which ran along the main

road right through the fields, and after a short time joined up with

a standard-gauge line. As was to appear later, the latter led from

the river Namacurra northwards to the neighbourhood of Lugella. When

Captain Müller struck this standard-gauge line the day before, he held

up a train which had just come from Lugella. It is easy to realize the

mutual amazement when there descended from the train several Portuguese

non-commissioned officers whom Müller had captured at Lugella and

released again.

When I reached the factory buildings, Captain Müller came limping up to

me, pretty lame. He expressed his astonishment that I had brought my

detachment direct to Kokosani by the main road and without opposition,

for he thought that there must be quite two English companies somewhere

in the neighbourhood. He had not yet been able to ascertain their

whereabouts, but documents which Captain Müller had captured pointed

conclusively to their presence in the district. Müller also told

me that he had not yet found the considerable quantity of infantry

cartridges. All his people were still busy trying to find them and

anything similar.

When I considered the matter more closely, it seemed to me more

probable that the ammunition stores we were hunting for would not

be near the factory, but must be somewhere directly on the railway,

and, indeed, at its southern terminus. That was the place for a large

ammunition depot, for it must be the unloading point where the stuff

was transferred to rail from ships on the Namacurra. We had to find out

whether these deductions were sound. I went back immediately and met

the leading files of our main body among the plantations. The leading

companies were anything but pleased to have to retrace their steps in

order to follow the standard-gauge railway southwards. After the long,

tiring march a few complimentary remarks about my arrangements were

comprehensible enough. Fortunately for me, I did not hear them.

It was in a rather bad humour that the men at the head of the column

arrived in the neighbourhood of the railway-station. They did not

seriously believe in the possibility of a fight. It was upon them

suddenly, however, and several Askari were struck by hostile bullets

at quite short range and fell. The rest of our main force, which was

near at hand and ready for action, was brought up. When I arrived, the

situation was not at all clear; the enemy was obviously entrenched and

closer reconnaissance was in progress. An indecisive exchange of shots

now developed. It began to rain and was unpleasantly cold, so that

everyone felt thoroughly uncomfortable. I myself went to Lieutenant von

Ruckteschell’s company, which was lying opposite to and about ninety

yards from the corrugated-iron buildings of the station and directing

a well-aimed rifle and machine-gun fire from some high ant-hills every

time anything showed.

I considered that the situation at the moment was unfavourable to

storming the station. We would have been compelled to rush at the

enemy’s position through the thick bush, which was commanded by a most

effective hostile fire. That offered but little prospect of success. A

number of our men would probably not have joined in the rush at all,

and those who did and got close to the enemy’s fortress would probably

have been held up and found themselves unable to get on. We should,

therefore, achieve nothing.

On the other hand, my reconnaissance had brought the idea to my mind

that on targets, some of which were very visible, artillery fire would

be effective, especially from two sides. It would frighten the enemy’s

Askari and make them run away. That would be a favourable moment for

good machine-gun fire. But the day was already too far advanced, and

our gun was smashed, so that nothing definite could be ventured on for

that day. The larger portion of the troops retired to our camp, and

only three companies of Captain Poppe’s detachment remained in close

contact with the enemy.

The next day, July 3rd, we got our gun into working order again, after

strenuous efforts. As luck would have it, it was of the same model

as the guns Captain Müller had captured, and so, by interchanging

the individual serviceable parts of these three guns, we produced a

field-piece fit for use. There was thus a prospect of putting to good

use the two hundred rounds we had captured two days before. In the

afternoon the gun was to be brought up to within a few hundred yards

of the station, and open fire upon it. Another smaller, 4-cm., gun was

ready in the foremost infantry line—and therefore about a hundred and

twenty-five yards off—to start a cross fire. All our machine guns were

held ready. In the morning I had been to the factory buildings again

for a conference, and had told the civilian personnel there they need

not get frightened if they heard the sound of firing in the afternoon.

The white women and children had been very frightened by the fighting,

and some of them had fled into the bush.

I had gone back to our camp, extremely tired, when the sound of

fighting at the station suddenly made itself heard. We received a

telephone report that loud yells and cries of “hurrah” could be

heard coming from the station. By degrees the following facts were

established: the enemy was apparently tired of the well-aimed,

concentric fire which had been directed at them since the afternoon.

They were now being subjected to artillery fire from two sides at once,

and the moment there was the slightest movement machine guns opened on

them. Their young troops could not stand it, and were very restless.

Our companies recognized that this was their weak moment and used it

immediately, showing splendid initiative. They leaped up with loud

hurrahs, and the next minute were in the enemy’s position. The enemy

began to run away. The English maintained that they had been infected

by the example of the Portuguese. However that may be, they ran away

and our companies immediately went after them as hard as they could.

Our flying foes reached the river Namacurra, which ran immediately

behind their position, quickly pulled off their boots and dashed into

the water. Here most of the hostile troops were drowned, including

their commander, Major Gore-Brown.

Between July 1st and 3rd the enemy had 5 Europeans and 100 Askari

killed, 4 Europeans and about 100 Askari drowned, while 421 Askari

were taken prisoner. Of the Europeans (5 English and 117 Portuguese)

who also fell into our hands, 55 Portuguese escaped and 46 sick and

wounded Portuguese were left behind in the hospital at Kokosani. We had

8 Askari and 1 machine-gun carrier killed, 3 Europeans, 11 Askari and

2 machine-gun carriers wounded. At first it was quite impossible to

estimate, even approximately, what amount of ammunition and food we had

captured at the station. Seven heavy, 3 light machine guns and 2 guns

had fallen into our hands, but these 2 guns had been rendered useless.

More and more cases of captured ammunition were brought into our camp.

The Intendant, Lieutenant Besch (retired naval officer), was in despair

because he did not know where he was going to get enough carriers to

remove such vast stores. They included more than 300,000 kilograms of

food and the stocks from the Kokosani sugar factory. The amount of

booty enabled all our coloured men to receive as much clothing material

as they wanted, and my boy, Serubili, said to me: “This is a very

different matter to Tanga; we’re all getting as much sugar as we want

now.”

It is a fact that the whole camp was littered with sugar. Each of the

blacks was so well-off for food and clothing of all kinds that they

stopped stealing, as if by word of command. Everyone knows what that

means where blacks are concerned.

The booty included large quantities of European food and preserves.

Every European found himself well provided for for months ahead.

Unfortunately it was not possible for us to get away the whole stock

of excellent wine we had captured. After a sufficient quantity had

been set aside as a restorative for the sick, the rest had mainly to

be drunk on the spot. The risk of a wholesale “jollification” _that_

involved was gladly taken, and everyone was allowed to let himself go

for once, after his long abstinence.

In addition there was some fine schnapps in a large number of casks in

the Kokosani factory. These were being stored ready for the English

troops. With the best will in the world it was impossible to drink it

all, so we had to empty a large number of the casks into the Namacurra.

Column after column of carriers arrived in the camp with booty, and

the Intendant became more and more desperate. Affairs reached a climax

when a telephone message came from the station that a river-steamer

had arrived. An English medical officer, all unsuspecting of what had

happened at Namacurra, disembarked from it and closer examination

of the boat revealed the presence of a considerable consignment of

cartridges, exceeding three hundred cases.

In all we had captured about three hundred and fifty modern English and

Portuguese rifles, a welcome addition to our resources, which brought

our armament once more up to requirements. We were able to discard our

’71 pattern rifle almost entirely.

CHAPTER V

BACK NORTH TO THE NAMACURRA RIVER

IN face of the enemy’s orders we had captured I had to anticipate

that within a short time comparatively strong hostile forces would be

coming from Quelimane to attack us. The country between the Namacurra

and the Zambesi, however, offered a large number of river barriers,

so that a march to the Zambesi would be full of difficulties for us

and hinder our freedom of movement to an extraordinary degree. Equally

unfavourable for campaigning, from our point of view, was the country

south and south-west of our present halting-place. In the last resort

we should find ourselves cooped up on the Zambesi without being in a

position to effect a crossing of that mighty river which was commanded

by the enemy’s gun-boats.

I thought it better to abandon our previous march direction. Yet in

view of the total absence of news it was very difficult to say where

I ought to make for. Only one thing appeared to be clear—that the

enemy was not directly on our heels. At any rate our rearguard and the

patrols they had sent out behind them were not being pressed at all by

the enemy. It seemed probable that if hostile bodies were following

us at all they were engaged in trying to overhaul us on some route

parallel to that we had taken. If I were right in that view—and it

seemed to be confirmed by such reports as the natives brought in—we

could assume that the enemy was insufficiently informed of our presence

at Namacurra and further that the Portuguese soldiers among our

prisoners whom we had turned off could give him no clear or trustworthy

information.

We had, therefore, to devote all our efforts to making those fellows

believe we intended to fortify and put up a stiff defence of Namacurra

and, further, that we had our eye on Quelimane.

The unexpected disaster at Namacurra was bound to speed the steps of

the pursuing enemy. It was probable that his columns, advancing on a

parallel line to us, would overshoot the mark, especially as they must

be anxious about the important port of Quelimane. I therefore decided

to wait at Namacurra until the pursuing enemy columns had actually

shot ahead of me and then turn about to the north-east. What chiefly

influenced me in this decision was that a march in this direction,

leading towards Mozambique, on the main line of communication, would

cause the enemy anxiety, and as soon as he became aware of it he would

at once turn about to protect the neighbourhood of Mozambique with

its wealth of stores. If he did not do so we should have a free hand

at Mozambique. As the position would then develop the enemy would be

forced to undertake marches that would exhaust his troops, while we

gained time to recuperate our strength and allow our sick and wounded

to recover.

It was difficult to decide on the most favourable moment for our change

of direction north-east; we should have to rely to some extent on the

fortune of war. Even if I made the movement too soon and encountered

one of the enemy columns there was always a chance of defeating it when

cut off from the rest. The first thing, however, was to get safely

across the Likungo river again. The available information as to the

fords was very unreliable. In order not to use the same fords as before

I marched with my main body on the evening of 4th July to a crossing

further to the south. Lieutenant Ott, however, ascertained by personal

reconnaissance that no ford existed at the place of which we had been

informed. On the other hand, it was apparent from native information as

well as from tracks discovered that on the same day an English patrol

had halted in this neighbourhood. The position might become awkward. In

order to lose no time in investigation I marched along the west bank

of the Likungo to our previous ford. Unfortunately I had withdrawn the

covering force that had hitherto been left there and I did not know

whether it was free. I was therefore very relieved when on 5th July the

crossing was effected without further interference. Koehl’s detachment

was still at Namacurra and followed as rearguard.

When we were again marching as a single column through the bush,

the great length of the column was unwieldy and, in the event of an

encounter with the enemy, would be a source of danger. We therefore

tried to shorten the column and to march in two, and later in several

parallel columns through the bush. The disadvantage of this arrangement

was that instead of one head of a column having to cut a way through

the bush this had now to be done by several. But the advantages of the

shorter length outweighed this disadvantage.

Information from our patrols and from the natives indicated that the

march of the enemy columns to the south-west had not been pressed so

far as I had anticipated. Enemy troops were reported both between

the Moniga and the lower Likungo and also at Mujebain; in some cases

they were ascertained to be marching south-west. This brought about

the extraordinary situation that the enemy troops were marching in

several columns south-west while we were passing between these columns

in the contrary direction, north-east. This fact could not long

remain hidden from the enemy, especially as the patrols soon began

to come in contact, and the enemy troops, marching along the line

of telephone communication from Mulevalla to Murubella, crossed our

track. We continued our march to Oriva, threw back a weak Portuguese

detachment west of this place, and occupied Oriva itself on 14th

July. Unfortunately the abundant stores of supplies and ammunition

that we had expected to find at this station were not forthcoming;

apparently either the numerous enemy troops had drawn heavily on the

resources of the neighbourhood or the stores that had been originally

left here had already been removed. A small patrol, sent out to

Muatama under Sergeant-Major Hüttich, succeeded in surprising a small

mixed detachment of English and Portuguese; as it was unfortunately

impossible to get away the supplies found in this station the stores

had to be burned.

Meanwhile our attempts to get information from the natives as to the

whereabouts of supplies met with no success; it was impossible to wait

for the reports of other patrols dispatched to Murua in search of

supplies. Various patrol actions showed us that the enemy had meanwhile

become aware of the change in the situation and had accordingly turned

his columns about. Want of supplies forced us to continue our march,

and the attack of a mixed Portuguese-English column on our rearguard

under Captain Koehl could not be developed into a complete success

as our main force was already on the march. We halted for a few days

in the tolerably fertile territory between Oriva and Murua. Captured

papers showed us that an English patrol had closely observed our

movements.

It was interesting to notice that the English prisoners whom we

took with us, for the most part, accepted as a matter of course the

hardships of the long marches, the constant crossing of rivers and the

countless difficulties connected with supplies and transport; they

realized that we Germans had exactly the same hardships to endure as

themselves and were in addition burdened with a number of further

duties such as patrol expeditions, fighting, carrying of supplies

and watch-keeping. They bore everything with a certain humour and

it was obviously interesting to them to see the war from the German

point of view. It was quite otherwise with the Portuguese officers.

It is true they were in an unenviable position: for the most part

they were infected with syphilis and were carefully avoided by the

English prisoners. In addition they were not real campaigners. They

had received a generous share of the booty captured at Namacurra, but

had not learned how to make the best of it. They had at once consumed

the precious oil with rice and it was too much to expect that the

Germans should now share with them their own meagre ration. Marching

was a burden to them, their boots were torn to pieces—in short,

their spokesman, the general staff officer captured at Namacurra, was

continually complaining to me of the inconveniences which with the best

will in the world I could not help. He was continually asking to be

released. I should have been only too glad to consent if he would have

given his parole not to fight against us, but this he would not do. I

could not be expected to release people without any obligation and so

put them in a position to attack us again immediately.

Considerations of supply drove us on. After the failure of the Oriva

neighbourhood to come up to our expectations in this respect, I planned

to reach the territory east of the Ligonja, which was marked on the

map as thickly populated and well cultivated. On the way the advance

guard, under Captain Müller, quickly took Boma Tipa, where several

days’ supplies, particularly pig-nuts, fell into our hands. The weak

Portuguese garrison offered only slight resistance and then fled at

once; the leader, a Portuguese sergeant, was the only prisoner captured.

We had reached a high degree of efficiency in the rapid and systematic

distribution of booty; the main force hardly lost a day’s march and I

can still see the approving smile of one of the English prisoners who

seemed to have entirely forgotten that the Portuguese were his allies.

Apparently it amused them to see with what little ceremony we took from

them their depots one after the other, together with their supplies.

The captured enemy papers repeatedly gave us valuable information.

Two days’ march from Tipa lay another _boma_ called Namirrue, where

the Portuguese garrison had been strengthened by an English company.

Apparently considerable stores lay here. At any rate, according to

information, supply columns had been sent to replenish at Namirrue.

The English troops there probably belonged to an enemy force newly

appeared from the direction of Mozambique. It was impossible for the

enemy force to which we had hitherto been opposed, and which had taken

part in the general march south-west north-east, to have established

such a lead on us. Accordingly the advance guard with our gun at once

marched on Namirrue (the smaller gun had been put out of action at

Namacurra and left behind after firing its few cartridges). Captain

Müller was instructed to reconnoitre the position at Namirrue and act

independently as might be required. For the time being the main force

remained at Tipa, on the east bank of the Moloque. It was to obtain

supplies and hold up the enemy advancing from the south-west long

enough to allow Captain Müller the necessary time at Namirrue. It was

not long before small enemy reconnoitring forces appeared at Tipa, or

the west bank of the Ligonja, which at this point offers no obstacle

worth mentioning. There was a series of unimportant patrol engagements

on the east bank also. The rearguard, under Captain Koehl, carried out

a number of delaying actions at places along the Tipa-Namirrue road

which for the most part have already been mentioned. As I was not clear

whether the main force would find the best opportunity to attack in

Koehl’s position or at Namirrue I began by following cautiously with

him Müller’s detachment. The report then came in from Captain Müller

that an enemy force of some two companies was entrenched on the heights

at Namirrue and that he could not get at them even with his gun. On

the other hand, he reported that in all probability English troops

would come to the support of the enemy from the north or north-west.

There was a favourable opportunity for us to defeat these troops in

the open. I therefore marched the main force to Namirrue and on the

22nd July crossed the Namirrue river, about three miles above the rocky

hill occupied by the enemy. Camp was pitched on the east bank and

immediately there were patrol engagements. I myself, with Lieutenant

Besch, made a detour of the hill to join Captain Müller, who was

encamped immediately south-east of it. The enemy position had been

encircled with patrols and machine guns. On the heights above several

horses could be seen and, here and there, men too. Wherever a target

offered the enemy was fired on to prevent him from sending down men to

fetch water. It appeared, however, that the enemy must have been able

to keep himself supplied with water from a source unknown to us.

After drinking a cup of coffee with Captain Müller we went further

round the hill and came upon Lieutenant Kempner and other patrols,

keenly engaged on reconnoitring work. In order to keep under cover we

had to work our way partly through the thick bush and came on large

quantities of cow-itch: contact with this plant produces an intolerable

irritation of the skin. We were just in the middle of a thicket of

this plant when we heard lively firing from the camp of our main

force. At the same time the enemy in the hill fired several salvoes,

apparently as a signal to their friends. I was immediately convinced

that a not very strong enemy detachment was approaching which was

unaware of the arrival of our main force. I was seized with the desire

to use this rare opportunity at once with my full strength. I tried

with all haste to get to the main force, but the cow-itch hampered my

progress and the irritation was maddening. Eventually we reached the

camp before dark. My second in command, Major Kraut, had begun the

attack with small forces. In the bright moonlight I could still hope

to use the approaching night for a successful battle. All available

forces, with the exception of a company left to protect the camp, were

at once prepared for action. On the left wing, Captain Goering, who

was to undertake an enveloping movement, took his force round to a

position in the rear of the enemy. There he heard the barking of a dog,

ran forward at once and found the English commanding officer, Colonel

Dickinson, with his adjutant and a medical officer, telephoning in a

ravine and took them prisoner. Captain Goering at once attacked and the

detachments of Captains Spangenberg and Poppe, in front and on the left

wing, did the same. In a very short time the enemy, consisting of one

battalion, was completely overwhelmed and routed. All the detachments

engaged in a hot pursuit, but in the darkness and the thick bush touch

was lost with the enemy.

It turned out later that the enemy’s troops marching parallel with us

had crossed the Namirrue at the same time a little further upstream.

In view of the constantly changing situation, due to the continuous

movement of the forces and the impenetrable screen of the bush which

made it impossible to see far in any direction, and also owing to the

large number of his marching columns, it was quite impossible for the

enemy, in spite of the unremitting labours of his wireless service,

to obtain a clear picture of the situation as a whole and to keep

his subordinate leaders informed in time of all the changes of the

situation. In this case a column had become detached and had run upon

us with only a part of its strength: only one battalion had crossed the

river. In an exposed and very dangerous position this battalion had

been badly handled by our main force.

A company detailed for the further pursuit of the retreating enemy

returned the following day without having achieved anything more; here,

again, after such a favourable action the subordinate leaders and the

troops themselves could only with difficulty be persuaded to throw

themselves in to the last ounce to wring every possible advantage from

their success. Lieutenant Schroetter, who then for several days carried

on the pursuit in a manner in keeping with the situation, was unable

to effect more than a few patrol skirmishes. The enemy had, in the

meantime, gained too great a start. No information was obtained except

as to the very hurried flight of the enemy.

[Illustration: Fig. xix. The Action at Namirruë, July 23, 1918.]

I, with the main part of my forces, stood my ground. The full

exploitation of the success lay less in the pursuit of the beaten enemy

than in the chances offered by the situation of the enemy we were

surrounding on the hill, now that the help intended was for the moment

unavailable.

For the first time in this campaign we had captured a trench-mortar

with ammunition. The various parts were collected on the field of

action and the seventeen rounds of ammunition made ready for firing.

Experiments made with practice ammunition gave satisfactory results,

and we were able to arrange for the bombardment of the enemy among the

rocks at four o’clock in the afternoon. The command of this attack

was entrusted to Captain Müller, whose detachment had not taken part

in the fighting on the previous day and had known nothing about it.

To this detachment was added Lieutenant von Ruckteschell’s, which had

remained in the camp. The trench-mortar was placed in position on one

side of the hill, the gun on the other; our machine-guns were disposed

round the hill in readiness for the attack. At 3.45 Lieutenant von

Ruckteschell took leave of the English Colonel Dickinson, who had been

placed in his charge, saying that he expected to be back in an hour. At

4 o’clock the first round from our trench-mortar burst in the centre of

the enemy’s position. The enemy commander was just considering whether

he should make a sortie during the night. In a moment the hill burst

into life: everywhere men could be seen running up and down the rocks.

They were brought under the fire of our gun and machine guns. Very soon

the enemy showed the white flag, but continued to fire.

Lieutenant von Ruckteschell returned to his guest as he had promised,

an hour later, but unfortunately with a shattered leg. His orderly who,

when he was wounded, had tried to carry him out of the fight, was shot

down under him. Meanwhile Captain Müller had climbed the hill from

the other side and stormed the camp. It was occupied by a squadron of

mounted infantry of the Gold Coast Regiment of whom hardly one came

out alive. Even the horses were killed almost without exception. On

our side brave Lieutenant Selke was killed by an enemy bullet shortly

before the storming of the camp. He was buried on the battlefield. The

_matériel_ captured was small, but the two days of fighting had cost

the enemy heavy losses in men. His detachments, which were numerically

hardly less strong than our own, were literally annihilated. Here, as

at Namacurra, it turned out that the English had conscripted black

troops from German East Africa into their fighting force, including a

considerable number of old German Askari.

Our thorough work at Namirrue had been made possible by Koehl’s

detachment, consisting only of three companies, which had kept us free

from interference. This detachment had fallen back gradually from

Tipa on Namirrue, daily fighting rearguard actions with the enemy who

was pressing on with all his strength. They were now within half a

day’s march of Namirrue and I ordered them across to the east bank

of the Namirrue river. Patrols sent out to reconnoitre had meanwhile

learned from the natives that there was an enemy depot with a garrison

at Pekera. This seemed to me very probable, as Pekera lies in the

thickly populated area east of the Ligonja river, said to be a fertile

district. Our expectations were realized when after two days’ march

we arrived at Pekera. The mounted squadron of the Gold Coast Regiment

stationed there was at once destroyed and several motors were captured.

In the same way we quickly took possession of the Boma of Chalau and

a number of other stations where the Portuguese had stored large

quantities of supplies, particularly pig-nuts. Our patrols advanced as

far as Angoche and in a very short time we were masters of the wide

and exceptionally fertile district. One night some of the Portuguese

officer prisoners escaped and succeeded in joining the enemy troops at

Angoche. Apparently there were among these gentlemen some who knew the

country well by reason of their occupations in peace.

The period of rest during our stay in the Chalau district made it

possible for our sick and wounded, who had been brought with us on the

long marches, to recover; the fit, too, benefited by the respite. All

had suffered more or less from the uninterrupted marching and exertions

they had just gone through. It was noteworthy how the recent successes

brought out the warlike spirit of the bearers, who were for the most

part a very sound and reliable lot of men. A large number offered their

services as Askari. Even my old cook was not disinclined to take up

arms.

On 5th of August supplies began to run short and there remained as

our chief article of diet only the still bitter _muhogo_. Several

enemy patrols approaching us from the north-east showed me that the

enemy columns following us from the south-west had actually overtaken

us during our halt and were concentrating for an attack at Wamaka,

north-east of our camp.

CHAPTER VI

BACK TO THE LURIO RIVER

IN order to confirm the enemy in his mistake as to our objective I

marched on 7th August along the road to Wamaka and pitched my camp

three hours’ march north-east of Chalau, in a good supply area. Several

enemy patrols were driven off. From Wamaka an enemy officer appeared

with a flag of truce to announce that the English Commander-in-Chief

would like to arrange for an exchange of medical prisoners. He was also

instructed to inform me as to when and where equipment for the English

prisoners could be handed over to us. These very transparent proposals

showed me that the enemy had something serious in hand from the north

and was trying to make his task easier by enticing me into a trap.

Various enemy spies were captured and confirmed my belief. Their report

that the enemy intended to attack in three columns was in accordance

with the usual plan of such undertakings.

When several patrol and outpost actions on 10th and 11th August

indicated that a strong enemy column was advancing along the

Wamaka-Chalau road, I assumed that at least one other column would

be marching parallel with this further south; their objective was

obviously Chalau. I decided to engage this southern enemy column by

itself. The prospect of the success of my plan was certainly not great,

as the enemy was marching for the most part through the bush, avoiding

the paths. To meet such a development of the situation I had had a

path reconnoitred and marked. In spite of this our march, begun in

the evening of 11th August, lasted through the whole night. Not until

daybreak did we arrive east of Chalau at the place I had selected.

Strong patrols, among them a whole company under Captain Koehl, were

still on the march.

My general idea was a march west to enable me to turn either to the

Blantyre district or east of Lake Nyassa. Without any hindrance from

the enemy we crossed the Ligonja at Metil and the Tipa-Namirrue road.

There the grave of an officer of the 1st battalion 2nd King’s African

Rifles proved that the enemy column, which had first followed us

from Tipa to Namirrue, had gone round us to the north to Wamaka: for

this 1st battalion 2nd King’s African Rifles belonged to the force

which was now approaching from Wamaka. On the further march to Ili

we passed through the camps of the enemy forces which had come from

the south-west and had continued their march in the direction of

Alto-Moloque. They too had made a wide détour and had accomplished

correspondingly long marches. It was strange that all these enemy

columns should suddenly display such a high degree of mobility; they

had changed their supply system and, partially at any rate, left

their lines of communication. According to the reports of prisoners

they sent requisitioning parties on ahead to commandeer supplies

from the natives, which were then distributed among the troops. This

requisitioning of supplies seems to have been carried out with great

ruthlessness. The confidence which the natives had shown during our

recent stay in the Ili district had vanished. They now saw an enemy in

every Askari and individual men who were left behind were on several

occasions attacked by the natives.

When we came to Ili, the English telegraphic station situated there

was quickly captured. The papers found there gave useful information

as to the movements of the enemy troops. According to this there were

considerable stores at Numarroe and Regone; strong forces were to try

to overtake us from Alto-Moloque and Mukubi, while one column followed

immediately on our track. The enemy, who up to a short time back had

been groping in the dark, had apparently received, a few days before,

reliable information as to our movements. It was very difficult to find

the road to Regone, as no guides could be raised. From Ili, however,

a newly erected telephone line of copper wire led to Numarroe. If we

followed this line we were sure to come upon something useful. As a

matter of fact parts of the enemy columns were near us when we left

Ili. The patrols we had left behind even met some Askari whom they took

to be friends: they exchanged cigarettes and lights with these and did

not realize until afterwards that they were enemies.

During these days I was much occupied with a domestic question. The

supply of bread for the European prisoners became difficult in view of

the prolonged marches. The men were unskilled and not in a position to

help themselves. At last I succeeded in getting over the difficulty,

and had considerable quantities of flour prepared by other methods.

Captain Krüger, who had charge of the prisoners of war and died soon

afterwards, was already very ill and exhausted by hardships; with the

best intentions he had not always managed to find the ways and means of

meeting the wishes of the prisoners, which were often very exacting.

In the morning of 24th August we crossed the Likungo river, and

continued our march towards Numarroe. We could already see, several

miles in breadth, the hill and the buildings of Boma Numarroe.

During a halt we lunched in the congenial company of Lieutenant Ott,

Sergeant-Major Nordenholz and the other officers of the advance guard.

We had long grown accustomed during the halts to bring out, without

ceremony, a piece of bread and a box of lard or hippopotamus fat. Naval

Lieutenant Freund even still possessed some butter from Namacurra.

Even the Askari and bearers, who formerly used to wait for their meal

until camp was pitched, adopted more and more the “desturi” (manners,

customs) of the Europeans. As soon as a halt was called every black

would bring out his lunch. It was very jolly when the whole force

bivouacked in this way in the forest, in the best of spirits, and

refreshed themselves for fresh exertions, fresh marches and fresh

fighting.

We were still two hours east of Numarroe when the advance guard was

fired on. An enemy company had camped on our line of march and was

slowly and cleverly retreating before us from kopje to kopje in the

direction of Numarroe. Lieutenant Ott, who was shot through the chest,

was in a very serious condition. With the main body led by Goering’s

detachment, I made a detour, and, passing the enemy to the south, made

straight for the Boma of Numarroe. Before dark our gun was brought into

position and fire opened on the Boma and its entrenchments. Goering’s

detachment, without loss of time, made a still wider detour to the

south in order, by using a ravine, to come close up to the Boma in the

rear. The advance guard (Müller’s detachment), which was out of sound

of the fighting, was also quickly brought up. The enemy shooting was

not bad, and in spite of the distance the rifle bullets of the infantry

came very close whenever one of us exposed himself.