It soon grew dark; the firing increased and died down again, until

suddenly heavy firing was heard from the direction of Goering’s

detachment. Then there was silence. Goering’s detachment had surprised

the enemy in the rear and stormed some stubbornly defended trenches.

The retreating enemy was, however, not recognized as the enemy by

another German detachment and got away. The night was unpleasantly

cold; it was pouring with rain and our baggage had not yet come up.

On the following day 3 enemy Europeans and 41 Askari were buried by

us; 1 European and 6 Askari wounded, 1 European, 7 Askari and 28 other

blacks unwounded were taken prisoner. Among the prisoners was the enemy

Commander, Major Garrod, who commanded the half of the 2nd battalion

4th King’s African Rifles here. On our side, Sergeant-Major Nordenholz

was shot through the head; 6 Askari and 1 machine-gun bearer were

killed; 3 Europeans, 18 Askari and 4 machine-gun bearers were wounded;

40,000 rounds of ammunition and two light machine guns, in addition to

hand-grenades, medical stores and large quantities of supplies, were

captured. Among our wounded left behind in the clean, massively built

houses was Lieutenant Ott, cheerful as ever. Fortunately, his wound was

not so serious as was feared at first, but it was not possible to take

him with us.

On August 25th I wanted at all costs to reach the camp of Regone.

From captured papers I knew that valuable stores had been taken to

Regone to be safe from us, including trench-mortar ammunition. Regone

was probably, for the moment, still weakly garrisoned. In view of the

proximity of the enemy columns it might, however, be assumed that

August 26th would already be too late for a _coup de main_. The path

led through a pass in the steep rocky hills. During the march our

advance guard soon came upon the enemy and engaged him, while I, with

the main force, passed round this enemy and marched direct on Regone.

During the climb over the hilly country, where it was only possible

to see a short distance ahead, two German detachments, mistaking each

other for the enemy, nearly became engaged. The machine guns were

already in position when the mistake was fortunately discovered.

We then advanced further over the hills, while below us, already

considerably in the rear, could be heard the machine-gun fire of our

advance guard. The march was so difficult, and as we could only cross

the hills in single file, our column was so long that Regone, my

objective for that day, was not nearly reached. As a matter of fact we

had no exact idea where Regone was. Only the fact that we could see in

the distance the converging of several paths led us to conclude that

Regone must lie there. Half way to Regone we saw a large encampment

of tents which I took to be the other half of the battalion which had

marched from Regone to the support of Numarroe.

In pouring rain we had to pitch our camp in the bush. On the next day

the camp we had observed had been struck. The Boma of Regone was held

in considerable strength. An attack on this place over the bare hills

offered no prospect of success, and we confined ourselves to skirmishes

with patrols and single detachments. As I had seen from his papers,

the enemy had given orders that we should be allowed to strike at

Regone unhindered and then attacked in the flank or rear by the strong

reserves which lay outside. It was therefore necessary to exercise

particular caution, and the impetuosity with which Lieutenant Boell’s

company, in spite of all these considerations, advanced on the Boma

might have had serious consequences. Several enemy camps and columns

outside the entrenchments were surprised by our fire and some supplies

captured. The captured papers informed us of the approach of strong

enemy columns from the south and south-east towards Regone. But there

were also troops to the north; whether these were in the neighbourhood

of Lioma-Malacotera or at Malema could not be ascertained. It was,

however, certain that they were at hand and it was probable that they

were approaching Regone, and that from the north.

As a _coup de main_ against Regone offered no prospect of success, and

a prolonged enterprise, in view of the intervention to be expected from

outside, could not be relied on, I determined to resume the march.

On account of the obstacles formed by the rivers and swamps south of

Lake Nyassa, the line of march I had formerly decided on to the west

appeared ill-advised, especially as the enemy could, with the help of

steamers and railways, easily concentrate and maintain a force there.

A further march north seemed to me more practicable, passing the

lake on the east; it seemed probable that our return to German East

Africa would be a complete surprise to the enemy, who would take our

objective to be the natural capital of this district, Tabora. Under

this impression he might be expected, in order to save his main force

the difficult overland march to Tabora, to withdraw to the Portuguese

coast, take ship from there to Dar-es-Salaam, and proceed by rail to

Tabora. These calculations were to a large extent realized. It was

natural that, having reached the north end of Lake Nyassa, I should

continue my march, not to Tabora but in another direction, probably

west. In any case, the first thing was to reach the north end of the

lake. This could not be done in less than a month and meanwhile the

situation might alter considerably.

At Regone we observed the concentration of strong enemy forces, who

examined our camps immediately after our departure but followed us

only slowly. The country, with its numerous ravines and water-courses,

was particularly favourable to us. On the way to Lioma a considerable

enemy supply dump was captured, including a large quantity of

tobacco. Müller’s detachment, which had gone on ahead to Lioma, soon

reported the enemy occupation of this place, but could not obtain

any exact information as to his strength. I reached this advance

detachment on 30th August with the main force. The position of the

enemy entrenchments in the thick bush had not yet been located with

any exactness. Apparently he had only just arrived and had not yet

completed his works. I therefore attacked immediately. The detachments

of Müller and Goering marched round the enemy to take him from the

north. Meanwhile the main force gradually closed in along several

ravines in the forest.

In view of the lack of information I could get no clear picture of the

situation. Suddenly lively firing was heard from the rear, where our

carrier columns were still on the march. A strong enemy patrol had

unexpectedly opened fire on our bearers. A great part of our baggage

was lost. Captain Poppe, who with two companies was standing by in case

I required him, was sent to attack. He could no longer find the patrol,

but followed their line of retreat and came upon an entrenched camp

which he immediately stormed. Sergeant-Major Schaffrath was severely

wounded. These events were personally reported to me by Captain Poppe,

who was brought back severely wounded in the chest. He reported that

the enemy had been completely defeated, and that large captures of arms

and ammunition had been made. The companies of Poppe’s detachment had

pursued the fleeing enemy and come upon a fresh and larger camp. This

same camp was also attacked from the north by Goering’s detachment,

so that the enemy was taken under an effective cross fire. Meanwhile,

a new enemy, advancing from the north-east, was held up by Müller’s

detachment.

I did not get anything like a clear view of these different events

until I personally reconnoitred the position long after dark. On one of

these reconnaissances an enemy rifle-bullet, of which many were being

fired, passed through the trousers of one of my companions (Hauter, of

the Landsturm), struck my other companion, Lieutenant Besch, in the

thigh and severed the artery. Fortunately we were near the dressing

station. I was thus able to take leave of this officer, who had

hitherto acted as Quartermaster and at the same time had undertaken the

duties of orderly officer, with the knowledge that he would recover.

His few possessions he gave to his companions together with his wishes

for good luck for the future. I, too, was honoured with a handful

of cigarettes. It was my habit to smoke continuously during serious

fighting.

In the middle of the bush I met Lieutenant Von Ruckteschell with some

bearers, on his stretcher which he was forced to use temporarily

because of his wounded leg, which had not yet healed; he had kept the

column together as far as possible during the long march and now, rifle

in hand, was beaming with joy at the possibility of taking part in the

engagement with the enemy patrol which appeared on the flank and in our

rear. Part of our columns had lost their way in the thick bush and only

found us some hours later. After nightfall the dressing station in a

ravine had been filled with wounded. It was reported that Lieutenant

Schroetter and Naval Lieutenant Freund had fallen. In a further

patrol-attack, Sergeant-Majors Bolles and Hüttig accidentally came

close to the enemy positions and were fired on suddenly; Bolles fell,

Hüttig was captured, severely wounded. Sergeant-Major Thurmann had come

within five yards of the enemy trenches, and being an excellent shot he

repeatedly picked off from an ant-hill any of the enemy inside the camp

who exposed himself, until he, too, received a mortal wound.

Captain Goering, regarding it as hopeless to storm the camp, did not

attempt this and, after dark, withdrew the force, leaving only patrols

in front of the enemy. The main force was thus collected in several

groups north of the enemy camp, and I decided to evacuate the scene of

action on the following day and march on.

[Illustration: Fig. xx. Through Portuguese East Africa.]

By force of necessity we had to leave behind part of our sick and

wounded, as well as the sick prisoners, in charge of an English medical

officer, and at nine o’clock in the morning we began our march north

in several columns. We had no guides; the country was quite unknown to

us and I could only give the Commander of the advance guard general

instructions that I intended to pass round one of the hills that lay

before us to the north. Soon firing could be heard from the advance

guard. It gradually became clear in the bush that our advance guard had

turned against an enemy who had attacked in the rear from the left.

The shooting was at close range, and from Headquarters, which was with

the main body, seemed to come from a considerable force.

I sent back an Askari to lead the head of the main force to the place

where I was. The position certainly invited us to catch the enemy

between our advance guard and our main force, and overwhelm him. I

waited, but our main force did not arrive. At last I ran back and saw

from the tracks that the main force had been wrongly guided and had

marched past us a long way to the side. On the other hand, I saw the

head of Stemmermann’s detachment, to which the greater part of our

columns and our sick belonged, in the very act of marching unwittingly

straight into the enemy. There was just time to head off this

detachment. I myself now joined the advance detachments of Müller and

Goering, who had meanwhile continued their march further north. They

were following a road which led up the hill and was then completely

lost. I paid no further attention to the firing which I heard from time

to time further to the rear. In the late afternoon I was astonished to

notice that the rest of the troops had not followed the detachments of

Müller and Goering, but were marching along the valley to our right.

I had no idea that our column had meanwhile been fired on again by a

new enemy from the east and that a great part of a field hospital had

fallen into the enemy’s hands.

In order to bring the force together, I tried to descend from my

hill. The descent, however, proved impossible; the rocks were steep,

almost perpendicular. We continued along a native path, and evening

was falling when Captain Müller reported that this path, too, ended

abruptly in a precipice. Fortunately there was another small bypath.

This we followed and succeeded in climbing down. Even here it was very

steep in places, but the bare feet of the carriers gave them a good

foothold and I, too, after taking off my boots, managed the descent.

It was pitch dark and we had no water. At last, however, we found

some, and a load fell from my heart when we came upon the rest of the

force which, under General Wahle, had, on their side, been trying to

join us. On the 30th and 31st of August, we had lost 6 Europeans,

23 Askari killed; 11 Europeans, 16 Askari wounded; 5 Europeans, 29

Askari missing; 5 Askari taken prisoner; 48,000 rounds of ammunition,

important medical and surgical stores, a considerable number of rifle

parts and the whole transport of Müller’s detachment had been lost. The

enemy losses were also severe, as appeared from a casualty list of the

1st battalion 1st King’s African Rifles which was captured later. In

addition to this battalion part of the 3rd battalion of this regiment

and the 2nd King’s African Rifles had taken part in the fighting

against us.

Our men fought brilliantly; some of the carriers, it is true, had

been somewhat unnerved by the unexpected fire and more than 200 were

missing. There was no news of Koehl’s detachment, but our leaders had

become so experienced and skilled in bush warfare that there was no

need for me to be anxious. On the next day, on arrival at our camp, we

surprised an English supply column.

We then crossed the Cutea-Malema road on which enemy troops also

appeared, and then crossed the Lurio river at Mtetere. An English

requisitioning force fled and some supplies were captured. Here Koehl’s

detachment rejoined the main force. They had followed the enemy who

was following us and had ascertained that he was several battalions

strong. We then marched down the Lurio to the fertile district of

Mpuera. Here Sol (Sergeant-Major) Salim, who, during an earlier patrol

expedition, had married a wife who had followed him faithfully, left

her behind with her father, the local Jumbo, in view of her approaching

confinement.

As there was plenty of food in this district, I gave our troops,

who had been very exhausted by recent events, a day’s rest. It was

necessary, anyhow, in the interests of our numerous invalids. Captain

Koehl had been left behind with his company without transport so that

he could do the enemy as much damage as possible. He reported that

strong bodies of enemy troops had arrived in the neighbourhood and

east of Mtetere. It was clear that for the time being the enemy was

devoting his whole energies to pursuing us, and for that purpose had

concentrated all his forces. On that account I did not think the

moment favourable for some partial success, because it could not be

exploited, and an action would have cost us wounded whom we could not

take away with us. As my idea was to forage the district north of

Luambala for food, I was unwilling to postpone the march thither any

longer.

The day of rest, September 5th, was employed in completing our food

supplies from the fertile region of Mpuera, and early on the 6th we

continued our march in a northerly direction. It was to be assumed that

the enemy would march downstream, and therefore in a north-easterly

direction, in several columns. Our troops advanced in order of echelon

through the bush, and I expected any moment to come across the most

northerly of the enemy columns, but we crossed its probable course

without discovering its tracks. About midday we were approaching our

objective, a water-hole on Mount Hulua. Here our advance guard was shot

at and before long a lively action was in progress. Captain Müller, in

command of the advance guard, had stumbled on the rear of a hostile

column which was marching north-east on a course making an acute angle

with ours. He had immediately attacked the 2nd battalion 2nd King’s

African Rifles, which was at the end of the column, and put it to

flight, capturing the enemy’s field-hospital and his mule train.

I deployed Goering’s detachment on the right of Müller’s detachment,

and it quickly threw back part of the opposing forces, but did not

press on as the enemy deployed larger bodies—the 1st battalion of the

2nd King’s African Rifles and apparently parts of the 3rd battalion as

well.

Our left wing, which had arrived in rolling, open country in its

advance, and also collided with fresh hostile troops, had retired a

few hundred yards and occupied a slight eminence, giving a field of

fire of several hundred yards. I was not able to get a clear picture

of the situation until I went from the right wing, where I had joined

Goering’s detachment, back to the left.

The action was pretty violent and at length came to a standstill. We

now heard the sound of trench-mortar fire coming from the rearguard,

under Captain Spangenberg, whose arrival I was awaiting. The rearguard

had beaten off the attack of another enemy column at Mpuera and

driven part of it away in disorderly flight. In accordance with its

instructions it had followed the main body at seven o’clock in the

morning. It arrived on the battlefield about five in the afternoon, and

I considered whether I ought not to throw in all my reserves to inflict

a decisive defeat on the 2nd King’s African Rifles there and then on

Mount Hulua. I gave up the idea, however. Time was very short, for

there was only an hour to darkness, and I felt perfectly certain that

very early next morning fresh hostile forces would appear on the scene.

If we were to achieve a decisive victory it would certainly cost us

appreciable losses, and I was anxious to avoid such losses in view of

the small numbers—176 Europeans and 1,487 Askari—which our strength

return of September 1, 1918, revealed. Lieutenant Wenig (Navy), who had

been employed with his gun in Goering’s detachment, told me that he

had taken over the command of that detachment, because all the other

officers were incapacitated. Before long, Captain Goering, with a

severe wound in the breast, and Lieutenant Boell, with one in the head,

were brought to the dressing station.

Accordingly I would not commit our reserves to the confusion and

uncertainty of a night battle in the bush, and determined to slip away

from the battlefield in a north-westerly direction. It was soon quite

dark and our progress was very slow in the thick, high grass. After

going three miles we bivouacked. Our losses in the action of September

6th had been 5 Askari, 4 machine-gunners killed; 13 Europeans, 49

Askari, and 15 other natives wounded; 3 Europeans, 13 Askari, and 12

carriers missing; 3 Askari and 3 bearers captured. The enemy were seen

to have some 10 Europeans and 30 Askari hit, while 8 Europeans and 45

Askari were captured; those of the prisoners who were sick or wounded,

and our own more severely wounded, were left on the battlefield under

the charge of English R.A.M.C. Documents captured later on at Mwembe

showed that “Karturol” (abbreviation for “Column of the 2nd King’s

African Rifles”) had heavy losses on the 6th September and was put out

of action for a time.

The enemy did not molest our further progress. Captain Koehl had

remained behind with his company to the west of Mpuera, in order to

operate from the rear against the enemy and his communications. He

followed our trail, having slight encounters at Milweberg with the

1st battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles, which arrived at that

point from the south on the 8th September. We moved in several columns

right through the bush, a region rich in game. We even killed several

buffaloes on the march. At Kanene we crossed the road that ran from

Lake Amaramba to Mahua. The enemy had burnt down the store at Kanene,

but we found ample supplies in the country itself, and the material

condition of the troops would have been good, if only the influenza

epidemic had not made such strides. About half had bronchial catarrh,

and from three to six men in each company had inflammation of the

lungs; as it was only possible for some eighty sick to be carried in

the whole force, about twenty men suffering with slight inflammation

of the lungs had to march at times. No satisfactory solution of the

problem of transport of sick was to be found, short of abandoning the

campaign; we could not simply leave the sick to die in the bush. This

difficult position inevitably placed the greatest possible strain

on the nerves of Surgeon-Major Taute, our splendid senior medical

officer. It was the greatest good fortune that this officer, singularly

gifted both in medicine and in organization, proved equal to his grave

responsibility. We owe it to the measures adopted by him, as well as

to the change of district and climate forced upon us by circumstances,

that the epidemic soon abated. A number of Askari and other natives not

in a fit state for heavy work followed the force slowly; many of them

lost courage when they continually found our camping-places empty. A

large number, however, caught up with us, especially when the force did

one of its short marches, or was able (a rare occurrence enough) to

take a day’s rest.

CHAPTER VII

ON GERMAN SOIL ONCE MORE

BUT we could not afford many halts. The military position imperatively

demanded that we should pass quickly through the districts to the east

of the centre of Lake Nyassa, which were not fertile and had been

largely stripped in the latest period of the war. Rapidity was all

the more essential as it was possible for the enemy to move troops by

sea to the north end of the lake and thus anticipate us by strongly

occupying the district there. As we approached the river Lujenda, the

ground became more mountainous and was scored with many water-courses

and ravines. We could not simply march by the compass, but had to have

regard to the watershed and keep along the mountain ridge. Fortunately,

the leader of the advance guard, Captain Spangenberg, found some

natives who acted as pathfinders and made it much easier to discover

a good route. But a certain amount of doubling was unavoidable, and

that retarded our progress, while the enemy were in a position to

move troops and supplies swiftly from Malacotera along a good road to

Luambala.

I was somewhat anxious to know whether the water of the river Ludjenda

would have fallen sufficiently to enable us to use the fords. It would

no doubt have been easy to construct bark boats, but the transport

of the whole force could hardly have gone smoothly forward, having

regard to the violence of the current. In any case, I thought it most

important that there should be no enemy opposition, and that again

made haste essential. Fortunately patrols which we sent ahead found

a ford below Luambala, where the wading of the river presented no

difficulty. Several slaughtered hippopotami enabled us to prepare

some fat again, and in the neighbourhood of Mwembe, which we reached

on the 17th September, we were able to replenish our supplies once

more. At this point we took our first day’s rest for a long time. It

was here at Mwembe that the lung epidemic reached its crisis. Since

the middle of August, 7 Europeans and about 200 natives had been

attacked, of whom 2 Europeans and 17 natives had died. The stores at

Mwembe had been destroyed by the weak enemy posts, but there were still

ample supplies to be had in the district. The question of carriers

began to cause anxieties. The men had been severely tested by the

continual marching, by the epidemic, and by the carriage of the sick;

and we were approaching their home districts. It was probable that

the Wangoni carriers would desert the moment they reached their home,

which lay to the north of the Rovuma. In the district of Mwembe and the

well-cultivated valleys of the river Luscheringo, several patrols of

the enemy “Intelligence Department” were encountered; true, they were

easily driven off, but their presence showed that the enemy was in the

main aware of our movements.

We sent long-distance patrols towards Mitomoni and Makalogi. To the

south of the Rovuma, after leaving the Luscheringo valley, the steppe

through which our march led us was amazingly rich in game, as was the

Rovuma itself, which we reached on the 28th September. But the big

game had its drawbacks, for once again a sentry was killed by lions.

We came on to German soil again, and stayed two days at Nagwamira;

we surprised several enemy depots and columns, which had had no news

of our appearance. The country was amazingly fertile, and the troops

were able to get thoroughly fit again. Our patrols sent out towards

Mitomoni reported a camp somewhat strongly held and the arrival of

reinforcements coming from the west. Ssongea, too, was occupied by

the enemy, but in what strength could not be ascertained. Various

reports, as well as the geographical position, made it likely that

reinforcements were also on their way to Ssongea from Lake Nyassa.

We continued our march, moving in the direction of Ssongea, and

southwards of this place came into thickly settled country. The

enemy wireless disclosed that enemy troops were present in Ssongea,

and that another column had arrived in the neighbourhood, in all

probability from Mitomoni. On the 4th October I passed Ssongea on the

west and continued to the north. When the advance guard under Captain

Spangenberg reached the high road from Ssongea to Wiedhafen, it was

attacked with trench-mortars by three enemy companies, which had come

from the west. The enemy was forced back a little. On account of the

hilly and ravine-scored nature of the ground and the advanced hour, it

was improbable that we could achieve a really effective success on this

day. By the morrow, however, there would be further enemy troops on the

spot. I accordingly carried the attack no further, and marched by to

the west of the enemy into a camp at the Peramiho mission station.

As we passed through the Wangoni territory, a large number of our

carriers deserted, as we had feared would happen. It would after all

have been asking too much of human nature, to expect that these men,

who had not seen their people for years, should now march straight

through their native district. The nigger’s love of home is too

strong. Even Samarunga, one of my own carriers and a very devoted and

trustworthy fellow, asked for leave to visit his village, which lay

near by. He came back faithfully enough and brought his brother with

him. The two then marched on with us, and Samarunga stayed on even when

his brother left. To revive his depression, I gave him some of my meat

ration, but on the next morning he proved to have disappeared after

all, having first put all my things in order.

To the north of Ssongea a few enemy reconnoitring patrols were again

met with. Day after day we moved through territory formerly fertile

and well settled. Thousands of farmers could settle there in a healthy

and beautiful climate. On the 14th October, we reached Pangire

(Jacobi), a pleasantly situated mission station, in which, before the

war, the missionary Gröschel had entertained me on my last tour. The

missionary’s family had been removed, but the natives, who were of

the Wabena tribe, had remained, and received us as in peace time, in

a most friendly manner. Several old Askari, also, who had left the

force for one reason or another, now reported again. Here, too, some

patrols were met with and driven off. In the Wabena country, which is

well stocked with cattle, our very scanty stocks were replenished, and

a mobile food-reserve thus constituted, which helped greatly to lighten

our transport. After we had quitted Pangire, a patrol that we had left

there was fired on by an enemy detachment. Near Ubena our rearguard,

under Captain Müller, was attacked by several enemy companies arriving

from the south. A fairly strong enemy column was thus following our

track. The free open steppes of Ubena were not favourable ground for us

to fight on, as they were commanded from long range by rifle and gun

fire. Several reports were also received of the advance on Ubena of

strong enemy forces from Mwakete; these reports proved to be in part

incorrect, and led to a short fight between two German patrols.

It was highly probable, and later it proved to be the case, that enemy

troops would be moved by water to the northern end of Lake Nyassa and

march from there on Ubena or further to the north. If I desired to give

up the march towards Tabora, and to move instead between Lakes Nyassa

and Rukwa, and later between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, to Rhodesia,

the time for the change of direction was now approaching and there was

not a day to lose; this was all the more so as our freedom of movement

was severely restricted by the steep slopes of Mount Livingstone

and the hills round Mbeja. In settling our line of march we had to

bear in mind that our stocks of provisions had dwindled considerably

and required replenishing. Native information pointed to this being

possible in the region of Kidugala and Sombowano, while famine was said

to be raging in Ussangu, and especially round New Utengule.

On the 17th October, I quitted Ubena with the main body, leaving behind

there, sick or wounded, General Wahle, two other Europeans, and some

Askari. I reached Kidugala on this day. Koehl’s detachment followed on

the 18th October. On the same day, the Boma Ubena was occupied by some

100 enemy Askari, while 200 to 300 advanced northwards to the Iringa

road. We learnt from captured newspapers that Cambrai had fallen on

the 29th September and that the Belgians had advanced 3 kilometres west

of Roubaix. We read, too, of the cessation of hostilities in Bulgaria,

of the retirement of Count Hertling, and of the capture of St. Quentin

and Armentières. But positions could be given up for so many different

reasons that I did not attribute any decisive importance to this news.

Our further march past Ngombowano and Brandt led us through a district

well stocked with cattle. Missions and schools had been deserted,

but we were very glad to find garden fruits, especially mulberries

and peaches. In the bush we also found great quantities of wild figs

and other sweet and tasty fruits. Small patrol encounters indicated

that enemy troops were moving direct from Lake Nyassa northwards into

the Brandt district. In Ruiwa we found large English depots, and we

had to destroy a whole warehouse full of leather. We went on to the

mission of Old Utengule, also well known to me from peace time, and now

lying deserted. We then reached Mbozi mission, where the English had

assembled the men from the district, examined them, and sent them to

New Langenburg, probably in order to turn them into Askari there. At

Mbozi there was a large English depot, containing, among other things,

75 loads of salt and 47 loads of coffee.

It was difficult to feel our way through the district. In the main it

was but little known to us, and for years the enemy had been altering

it by building storehouses and transport roads. To have reconnoitred in

advance would have made too great a demand on our time and strength,

besides depriving us of the advantage of surprise. The inhabitants

were very hostile to the English and rendered us valuable service,

but their information was too often very vague. While we rested a day

in Mbozi and replenished our stores, our patrols were far afield, one

towards Galula (St. Moritz’ mission), another towards Itaka, one in

the direction of New Langenburg, and one in that of Fife. Some of them

would be away for weeks, and we could not wait for their reports.

This much, however, became clear, that a main communication road of

the enemy ran past Mbozi from Fife via Rwiba to New Langenburg. On

this road we captured a lot of stores and several supply columns on the

march. The existence of this road showed that a large English depot

must lie in the neighbourhood of Fife. It would probably be possible

to capture this by swift action, before stronger enemy forces arrived

there. On the morning of 31st October a fighting patrol was dispatched

against Fife. On the evening of the same day natives and patrols

reported the advance of strong enemy forces on the New Langenburg-Rwiba

road. In the early morning of the 1st November I moved off with the

whole force, advancing in the first instance towards Mount Rwiba. There

the track showed that a strong enemy column had passed the Rwiba hill

shortly before us, in the direction of Fife. This enemy force had not

been observed by a German fighting patrol that had been sent out to

Mount Rwiba.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ADVANCE INTO BRITISH RHODESIA

THE second patrol dispatched by us on the 31st October towards Fife

had halted at Mount Rwiba. I had now to advance with the whole force

towards Fife, in order to reach it before the enemy, or to attack if

our first patrol should prove to be engaged there. The ten-hour march

(actual marching time) from Mbozi to Fife was a tremendous strain on

the force, but the reports of our patrols, the track of the enemy, and

his notes found on the trees, proved beyond a doubt that the enemy

was doing everything possible to reach Fife on the same day, the 1st

November. The great distance which they, too, had to march justified

us in assuming that our patrol, which I expected would reach Fife on

the 31st October, or at the latest on the 1st November, would be equal

to preventing the enemy occupying the depot at Fife on the 1st. In the

course of the afternoon we fired on several patrols, without halting

in our advance. Late in the afternoon weak enemy detachments in the

hills near Fife were quickly thrown back. I myself, with Spangenberg’s

detachment, which had moved off the road to the right, advanced along a

mountain ridge on to a point where we judged that Fife would lie.

The ground was becoming more open, being mainly covered with knee-high

bush and grass, when a few hundred yards before us we observed men

moving about and tents pitched close together. The men were moving

about in such unconcerned fashion that I almost took them for our own

patrol, but at 200 yards we were received with violent and at first

very well directed rifle and machine-gun fire. It was fortunate that

our men did not answer it, for I had happened to get in advance and

was between the two parties. After a time the enemy, who had apparently

become very excited, began to fire high. It started to grow darker, so

that my patrol was able to get back to our line. We had, at any rate,

reached certainty. We knew that the enemy with a strength of several

companies was lying before us in an entrenched position with a good

field of fire. His advanced detachments had been thrown back. His

depots lay in part outside the trenches, and later fell into our hands.

I did not want to undertake the storming of the position, which would

have been costly, but the opportunity seemed favourable to bombard the

enemy, massed as he was in the position, with our trench-mortar, and

also from a height with our gun, as well as with rifle and machine-gun

fire if he should show himself. Our machine guns were accordingly

moved forward in the night close to his position and entrenched.

Reconnaissance for a good gun position was postponed to the next day.

It was probable that the opening of our trench-mortar and gun-fire

would lead the enemy advancing from New Langenburg to attack us. Such

an attack against our heights would have been very difficult. But

in spite of the bombardment on the 2nd November, which was observed

to cause some losses, no new enemy appeared. The definite success

for which we hoped against the camp was not achieved, since our

trench-mortar was destroyed at one of the first shots by a prematurely

bursting shell. Flat trajectory fire alone could do nothing against

the well-protected enemy. In the afternoon, therefore, our main body,

with its herds of cattle more than 400 strong, marched off, between

Fife and the Mwenzo mission towards Rhodesia. When we had reached

camp, we saw heavy columns of smoke rising from the depots at Fife,

to which Müller’s detachment had set fire after our departure. From

the direction of the Mwenzo mission we heard short bursts of fire on

several occasions.

Reports came in gradually from that direction. In addition to our

fighting patrols dispatched from Mbozi, other patrols of ours had

arrived, and had fought with English patrols, and also with each other.

One report stated that one enemy patrol had been observed with quite

dark uniforms, hitherto unknown, and that it must be some recently

arrived body. After many inquiries I finally ascertained that one of

our own patrols, whose equipment was certainly no longer quite in

accord with regulations, had been continually mistaken for the enemy.

In the Mwenzo mission itself there was a stationary enemy hospital,

from which we were able to replenish our medical stores. Our quinine

stocks were brought up to over fourteen kilos, supplies thus being

insured until June, 1919.

[Illustration: Fig. xxi. The March into Rhodesia.]

Various reports and statements of prisoners showed that enemy transport

was moving from the Broken Hill district to Kasama, and from there

onwards to Fife, with motor-cars and ox-wagons. Kasama itself seemed to

be a large place and an important road centre. In any case, we could

expect enemy depots on the way from Fife to Kasama, and Kasama itself

would be a valuable objective. So far as one could tell from the map,

the position also seemed to be such that we should be able there to

decide to go further southwards round Lake Bangweolo and reach the

Zambesi-Congo watershed, or to march further westwards between Lakes

Bangweolo and Moero. The information was certainly very uncertain,

resting almost exclusively on several Askari, who as children had been

employed in trade caravans in the neighbourhood of Lake Moero.

The important question of the nature of the rivers, and in particular

of the Luapala, which flowed from Lake Bangweolo into Lake Moero, was

for the time quite unsolved. We did not clear up these points until

we captured some maps and notes. About this time, according to these,

the Luapala was a mighty barrier; deep and in many places very broad;

it is enclosed by extended marshes. In the rainy season that was just

approaching, any attempt to cross the river in canoes would meet with

difficulties, since on our approach the canoes would certainly be

removed to the opposite bank or concealed. I devoted every minute to

the study of maps and travel-descriptions, burying myself in them at

every halt in the march. There was great danger that in ignorance of

our position we might run into an _impasse_ in this region of great

rivers and lakes.

The first thing was to sweep rapidly along the communication road

Fife-Kajambi mission-Kasama. Mobile detachments were sent on by forced

marches, capturing several small depots, taking their guards prisoner,

and also securing a few ox-wagon teams. Captain Spangenberg followed

immediately with three companies, and then the main body, at a distance

of about one day’s march.

The heavy marches and the deviation to the south-west, into quite new

and unknown territory, was too much for a number of carriers. On one

single day there deserted from the staff 20 Wafiri, who had their homes

in the region of Bismarckburg, and 13 carriers from other districts.

The main body arrived at Kajambi on the 6th November. The Catholic

mission station there consists of wonderful, spacious and massive

buildings. The missionaries had fled, quite unnecessarily. In the nuns’

house there was a letter for me from a Catholic nun. She was a native

of Westphalia, and as a fellow-countrywoman appealed to my humanity.

She would certainly have spared herself many discomforts if both she

herself and the other people attached to the mission had remained

quietly at their posts. We should have done as little to them as we had

done earlier to the old English missionary at Peramiho, near Ssongea.

The soil was extraordinarily fertile; in the mission garden magnificent

strawberries were growing. At midday we heard rifle fire from the

rearguard, which was encamped two hours’ march north-east of Kajambi;

Captain Koehl had remained there to gather supplies, and his Europeans

and Askari had largely been distributed into separate supply patrols.

In this situation he was attacked by an enemy patrol. Captain Koehl

extricated himself from this unpleasant position and on the next day

established his front by Kajambi mission, and we had the opportunity,

which we used with great success, to take the enemy under our fire

by surprise. On the 7th November our main body resumed its march on

Kasama. The enemy were not observed to be following up. If, however,

they were to press on behind us, it was to be assumed that questions of

supply would prevent their doing so in really great strength. We had

the prospect of swiftly seizing Kasama, and then of making this place

our base and giving battle under favourable conditions.

But these were hopes of the future; the first thing was to take Kasama

itself quickly; according to our information it was not strongly held,

but was well fortified. Captain Spangenberg with the advance guard

kept increasing his distance from the main body by longer and longer

marches. I followed with the main body; ample supplies were found, and

we also met with confirmation of the descriptions given in various

books to the effect that the forest is well stocked with tasty bush

fruits.

On the 8th November Spangenberg’s detachment had several patrol fights

to the north of Kasama, and on the 9th it took Kasama, whose garrison,

in the strength of half a company, retired to the southward. Only a

little ammunition was captured and there was little else of value

in the armoury. There was a large repair shop for motor and other

vehicles, and more than a score of Boer wagons were taken. There was

considerable booty in food supplies for Europeans. It was noteworthy

that an English company in Kasama—I think it was the African Lakes

Corporation—had given written instructions for the destruction of

its depots by the natives. These came in large numbers to loot, and

Spangenberg’s detachment found buildings and their contents largely

destroyed by looting natives. It is due to his action that among other

things the house of the British Commissioner, which was built and

furnished with great taste, was preserved.

During our advance from Fife it had appeared that the further we went

the fuller were the enemy depots. We gained the impression that we were

working up a line of communications which started around Broken Hill

or somewhat to the north of it, and was only just being established.

We had grounds for hoping that if we moved rapidly forward, we should

find depots even more plentifully stocked; and the documents taken,

besides information from natives, seemed to confirm this. Three days’

march further along the telephone line, large stores were said to be

lying at the Chambezi ferry, which had in part been brought thither by

boat. I myself on the 11th November cycled to Kasama and met Captain

Spangenberg there, and he immediately resumed his march, with two

companies, southwards, in the direction of the Chambezi ferry.

On the 12th November the main body reached Kasama. Towards evening

rifle and machine-gun fire was heard from the direction of our march.

Our rearguard had been attacked in its camp, two hours to the north

of Kasama. The enemy who had fought at Kajambi had not followed us

directly, but had taken a parallel course. In the evening Koehl’s

detachment arrived in Kasama. I had now formed the opinion that the

attempt on the Chambezi depot was the more promising and important

undertaking, especially as the whole position made it probable that the

pursuing enemy would continue to follow and thus again afford us an

opportunity to give battle.

CHAPTER IX

THE ARMISTICE AND OUR RETURN HOME

ACCORDINGLY only Koehl’s detachment remained at Kasama, with

instructions to follow us a day’s march behind. Early on November 13th

I followed Spangenberg’s detachment with our main body. I had gone on

ahead on a bicycle, selected the site for our camp and was waiting for

the troops to come up when Captain Müller appeared before me, also on

his bicycle, and reported that an armistice had been concluded. An

English motor-cyclist who was to have brought the news to the British

troops had apparently passed through Kasama and been captured there by

Koehl’s detachment. Thanks to the English telephone line, along which

we were marching, we were soon able to understand each other, and thus

did we get the news of the armistice.

The telegram of the motor-cyclist ran as follows:

* * * * *

“12. 11. 18. To be fwded via M.B. cable and despatch rider.

“Send following to Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck under white flag. The

Prime Minister of England has announced that an armistice was signed

at 5 hours on Nov. 11th, and that hostilities on all fronts cease at

11 hours on Nov. 11th. I am ordering my troops to cease hostilities

forthwith unless attacked, and of course I conclude that you will do

the same. Conditions of armistice will be forwarded you immediately

I receive them. Meanwhile I suggest that you should remain in your

present vicinity in order to facilitate communication.—General van

Deventer. As message is also being sent to Livingstone, it is important

Karwunfor receives this same time as enemy; every effort must be made

to get message to him to-day.”

Our feelings were very mixed. Personally, as I had no knowledge of the

real state of affairs in Germany, I felt convinced that the conclusion

of hostilities must have been favourable, or at least not unfavourable

to Germany.

Spangenberg’s detachment, which was on ahead, had to be told as soon as

possible, and I immediately set out on my bicycle after it, taking with

me Haouter, a Landsturm soldier, as my sole companion. About half-way,

Reissmann’s cyclist patrol of Spangenberg’s detachment met me and

reported that Captain Spangenberg had arrived at the Chambezi. Although

I had no doubts about the correctness of the English news, our position

was very uncomfortable. We were in a district where there was little

food, and were therefore compelled to move on from place to place. This

circumstance had already compelled us to reconnoitre and secure for

ourselves the crossings of the Chambezi. If hostilities were resumed we

must be certain of a safe crossing. This was a burning question, as the

rainy season, meaning a great rise of this river, was near at hand. We

had already encountered heavy storms. I had, therefore, much to discuss

with Captain Spangenberg and the English officer who would presumably

be on the far bank of the river. In any case we must continue to

devote our energies to buying or getting food. Full of that idea, I

sent my companion back and cycled myself with Reissmann’s patrol to

Spangenberg’s detachment.

We arrived about eight o’clock, when it was quite dark. Captain

Spangenberg was away on a reconnaissance, but Assistant-Paymaster

Dohmen and other Europeans looked after me well as soon as they learnt

of my arrival. I was able to convince myself that the supply depot of

Kasama really existed. I tasted jam and other good things which had

been unknown to me hitherto.

When Captain Spangenberg came back he told me that he had already heard

of the armistice through the English. After I had gone to bed in his

tent, he brought me about midnight a telegram from General Deventer

which had been brought in by the English. It had come from Salisbury.

It stated that Germany had accepted the unconditional handing-over of

all troops operating in East Africa. Deventer added that he demanded

the immediate surrender of all our English prisoners of war, and that

we should march to Abercorn. All our arms and ammunition were to be

given up at Abercorn, but our Europeans were to be allowed to keep

their weapons.

The full text of the telegram ran as follows:

* * * * *

“13. 11. 18. To Norforce. Karwunfor via Fife.

“Send following to Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck under white flag: War

Office London telegraphs that clause seventeen of the armistice signed

by the German Govt. provides for unconditional surrender of all German

forces operating in East Africa within one month from Nov. 11th.

“My conditions are. First: hand over all allied prisoners in your

hands, Europeans and natives to the nearest body of British troops

forthwith. Second: that you bring your forces to Abercorn without

delay, as Abercorn is the nearest place at which I can supply you

with food. Third: that you hand over all arms and ammunition to my

representative at Abercorn. I will, however, allow you and your

officers and European ranks to retain their personal weapons for the

present in consideration of the gallant fight you have made, provided

that you bring your force to Abercorn without delay. Arrangements will

be made at Abercorn to send all Germans to Morogoro and to repatriate

German Askari. Kindly send an early answer, giving probable date of

arrival at Abercorn and numbers of German officers and men, Askari and

followers.”

* * * * *

This was news enough if it were confirmed, and showed the desperate

situation of the Fatherland. Nothing else could account for the

surrender of a force still maintaining itself proudly and victoriously

in the field.

Without being in a position to examine the ground in detail, I had to

tell myself that the conditions imposed upon us were inevitable, and

must be loyally carried out. I met the British Commissioner, who had

come from Kasama to the Chambezi rubber factory, at the river at eight

o’clock on the morning of the 14th. There I handed to him a telegram

to His Majesty, in which I reported what had happened and added that I

would act accordingly. The Commissioner told me that the German fleet

had revolted, and that a revolution had also broken out in Germany;

further, if he was to accept a report which was official but had not

yet been confirmed, the Kaiser had abdicated on November 10th. All this

news seemed to me very improbable, and I did not believe it until it

was confirmed on my way home months later.

All our troops, native as well as Europeans, had always held the

conviction that Germany could not be beaten in this war, and were

resolved to fight on to the last. Of course it was doubtful whether

our resources would last out if the war lasted several years more, but

we faced all possibilities tranquilly for at least another year. The

men were well armed, equipped and fed, and the strategic situation at

the moment was more favourable than it had been for a long time. The

Askari, it is true, saw that our numbers were dwindling—we were still

155 Europeans, comprising 30 officers, medical officers and higher

officials, 1,168 Askari, and about 3,000 other natives—but whenever I

discussed this topic with one of my orderlies he always assured me: “I

will always stick by you and fight on till I fall.” Many others spoke

to the same effect, and I am convinced that it was not merely a case of

empty words.

In the afternoon of the 14th November, I cycled back to our main body

and told the Europeans what I had learned at the Chambezi, and that it

was my intention to carry out the conditions which had been officially

communicated to me, conditions the accuracy of which I did not doubt.

Before the prisoners were released Colonel Dickinson, the most senior

of them, came to look for me to say good-bye. He said that his period

of captivity (it had been more than three months) had given him an

interesting insight into our camp life, our marching methods, and

the way in which we conducted our actions. He was full of praise for

the simplicity of our arrangements and the absence of friction which

distinguished our operations. There is no doubt he had been using his

eyes.

Our Askari were now informed of the turn of affairs. It was to be

anticipated that there would be difficulties when it came to settling

up with them for their pay, which was years overdue, and the same

applied to the carriers. Yet it was a matter of honour for us to see

that these people, who had fought and worked for us with such devotion,

should receive their rights. The sum involved—about one and a half

million rupees—was relatively small, and so Lieutenant Kempner was

sent out on a bicycle to get this sum from the English, or induce them

to procure it as quickly as possible. Our repeated efforts were without

result. We were told at different times and places that the matter

was “under consideration” by the War Office, and there it remained. I

never even received a reply to my telegram to the German Government

in Berlin. There was nothing for it but to draw up lists of all the

back pay that was due, and give the individual carriers and Askari

certificates against it.

We then marched by short stages through Kasama to Abercorn. The British

gave us further details about the armistice conditions. It appeared

that not “unconditional surrender” (as General van Deventer had said

originally) but “unconditional evacuation” was what was required.

I made several protests against the interpretation of the British

War Office, which made the word “evacuation” include surrender and

disarming, but I received no answer either from the Governments of the

allied countries and the United States, or from the German Government.

In view of the doubtful interpretation of the word “evacuation,” I

considered whether I should not cut short negotiations and march to

join the Belgians or somewhere else. But in comparison to the whole

series of peace conditions which affected the Protective Force, this

seemed a small point, and in the end I decided to go to Dar-es-Salaam,

as General van Deventer required, though certainly in the expectation

that in accordance with the terms the English would immediately send us

back from there to Germany. As will appear later that expectation was

not fulfilled.

Not far north of Kasama we came up with the enemy with whom we had

fought our last engagement. They were the 1st battalion of the 4th

King’s African Rifles. I had to refuse the invitation of Colonel

Hawkins (their estimable commander, who was barely thirty years old),

communicated to me on the march by Colonel Dickinson, to bring all the

German officers to lunch, much though I appreciated such an expression

of chivalry. Yet Colonel Dickinson did not neglect to pay me his

promised visit on one of the following days, and we had a very pleasant

hour over a cup of coffee. I must record that the officers of this

battalion, even in the somewhat difficult circumstances in which they

were placed, behaved with great tact and with that regard which is due

to an honourable foe. Hawkins told me that for reasons of supply he

would not have been able to follow us any further, and in fact we had

to help him out with cattle, of which we had an ample stock.

Lieutenant Kempner had gone on to Abercorn on his bicycle. When he came

back I went there myself in a car which General Edwards had sent for

me. My reception by General Edwards, as well as his Staff, was very

kind. I put forward my point of view to General Edwards that I did not

recognize any duty to surrender of our arms, but was ready to do so if

I was thereby conferring some advantage, not on ourselves individually,

but on the German Government. I was then informed that the arms we

surrendered would form part of the quantity which Germany had to hand

over to the Allied Governments in accordance with the terms of the

armistice. Further, the surrender of our arms should not have the

character of a laying-down of arms.

As regards the Askari and carriers, I was informed that the English

would take them to an internment camp at Tabora, until the question

of their pay had been settled and their repatriation arranged. The

Europeans were to be interned at Dar-es-Salaam until their ship left,

presumably, therefore, for a few days. Not only the Askari but the

Europeans at Dar-es-Salaam were kept behind barbed wire for a month and

a half and more.

The troops arrived at Abercorn on the 25th November. The English flag

was waving on the parade-ground where the handing-over of arms took

place, and this shows that the character of a surrender of our arms was

not altogether avoided. What we handed over was as follows:

1 Portuguese gun, 37 machine guns (7 German, 16 heavy and 14 light

English), 1,071 English and Portuguese rifles, 208,000 rounds,

40 rounds of artillery ammunition. The English were mighty quick

at getting away the surrendered material. There was not a single

modern German rifle among it! The strength of our troops was: the

Governor, 20 officers, 5 medical officers, a doctor of the Voluntary

Medical Detachment, a senior veterinary officer, a senior chemist, a

field-telegraph officer, 125 European other ranks, 1,156 Askari and

1,598 carriers. The arrival of individual detachments was delayed for

hours by heavy rain.

The camp for the Askari was surrounded by a thick thorn hedge, and

was much too small. This led to a good deal of bad feeling among our

Askari, which vented itself in frequent demonstrations against the

English Askari. But at length our people resigned themselves to the

uncomfortable conditions, and even General Edwards realized that the

treatment provided an opportunity for unnecessary friction. We were

not ordinary prisoners of war, whose escape he had to fear, but had

given ourselves into his hands voluntarily in the performance of an

unpleasant duty. He took precautions against similar occurrences during

our march to Bismarckburg, and we went there with Hawkins’ battalion

and without the slightest friction. On November 28th we bivouacked by

the mighty waterfall of the river Kalambo, three hours’ march from

Bismarckburg. Here we remained several days, as the departure of the

steamer from that place was being continually delayed. Many of my

officers continually badgered me to know whether we could not fight

on. These suggestions were far from comfortable, as I had already

quite enough to do to consider how we should get out of so unpleasant

a situation. But putting aside the difficulties involved, I could only

feel glad and proud of such a revelation of true soldierly spirit, a

spirit which did not shrink, even after we had handed over all our

arms, from storming an enemy camp and once more procuring for ourselves

the means to continue the war.

On December 3rd I received a telegram, dated the 2nd December, from

General van Deventer. It ran as follows:

* * * * *

“I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram setting forth your

formal protest against your troops being treated as prisoners of war.

This will duly be forwarded to the War Office. Meanwhile I am sure you

will recognise that pending the receipt through the War Office of a

communication on the subject of the German Govt. I have had no choice

but to act in accordance with the orders of the War Office, and treat

your force as prisoners of war.”

* * * * *

The same day the first lot of troops for transport went on board four

ships. One of them, the _St. George_, had, in addition to its crew of

English bluejackets and an escort officer, only the Governor and the

officers of our force with their black servants. For food the English

gave us corned beef, dates and biscuits, and Dr. Huber, the veterinary

officer, looked after our bodily welfare here on board as carefully as

he had done for so many years in the bush. The British commander, the

escort officer and the whole crew were extraordinarily kind. After a

short stop on the evening of the 3rd, at the Belgian station of Vua, a

violent storm arose in the night. It tore away the awning and, among

other things, carried off Dr. Huber’s coat. The English sailors did all

they possibly could for the Germans, who were quite wet through.

On December 5th we arrived at Kigoma. The place was under Belgian

control, and the Belgians received us with a hospitality which could

not have been anticipated. They displayed a tactful reserve to us which

had never been shown before. Tables covered with cloths had been set

out for all the Europeans, a sight we had not seen for years. Some red

wine was produced. The Belgian Governor had sent his orderly officer,

who spoke German fluently, to receive us officially, and I was glad

to take the opportunity, before we started on our railway journey,

to thank the Belgian commandant for the _camaraderie_ shown us,

_camaraderie_ which always exists among soldiers, even between enemies,

when they have a mutual regard for each other.

Among the English, too, examples of discourtesy on the part of

individual officers, who apparently had not been brought up in the

South, were absolutely exceptional. The senior men immediately adopted

a tactful attitude, whereas one or two juniors did otherwise—for

example, they were inconsiderate enough to want to keep a German

invalid out of the compartment. We Europeans were very well looked

after on the train, and it was like peace time to get a good night’s

rest by letting down the bunks and using a leather pillow.

There was quite a crowd of Germans on the station at Tabora. They

complained of many cases of theft on the part of the Belgians and

English. It is undoubtedly true that such outrages had taken place. We

stopped for the night at Dodoma and next morning had an opportunity of

fetching water and having a bath.

The news of the approach of our train had reached Morogoro, and when

we arrived there in the afternoon we once more found the German women

whom we had left behind us in and about Morogoro two years before. They

had tea and coffee waiting for us. They had arranged tables and baked

plenty of rolls and cakes. In addition they had got the finest fruit

for us. The English were almost as much interested as the Germans.

Besides a very amiable elderly medical officer I have a particularly

lively recollection of a tall, lanky corporal who had apparently drunk

a whole series of glasses to our health before our train arrived. I

managed to slip away from him at last.

We reached Dar-es-Salaam at seven o’clock on the morning of December

8th. The Europeans were well housed in tents in a camp within a

barbed-wire fence. Food was good and plentiful, and we were able

to buy necessaries of all kinds cheaply from the English canteen.

Governor Schnee and I were received by the Chief of Staff of the

British commander, General Sheppard, and conducted to our very pretty

house outside the camp. General van Deventer had very kindly sent a

luncheon there as a welcome to us. Major Kraut, Captain Spangenberg,

and Dr. Huber were all quartered here. We found General Wahle, who had

been left behind sick at Ubene and fallen into the enemy’s hands a

few months back. He had quite recovered. We had a common mess and our

freedom of movement out of the house was only limited to the extent

that we had always to be accompanied by a British officer as escort.

At the start these gentlemen were very unpunctual, but gradually

quite tolerable relations were established between us, and I had an

opportunity of visiting acquaintances in Dar-es-Salaam and arranging my

personal affairs. A car was also usually placed at my disposal. Major

Hosken, the Commandant of the prison camp, who had previously shown

himself extremely considerate to the captured German women and children

in Tanga, now again devoted himself to preserve us from unnecessary

annoyance.

On our railway journey we had already been surprised to find almost

more English Europeans at every station than we had in the whole of the

Protective Force. Dar-es-Salaam itself literally swarmed with white

troops. I estimated their number at not less than five thousand, and

hundreds and hundreds of motor lorries and cars were awaiting repairs

in the motor transport park.

This close concentration of human beings revealed its dangers when

Spanish influenza made its appearance. Escort officers told me that

frequently five or seven English officers had died of this disease

at Dar-es-Salaam. We soon came across its traces among ourselves.

Infection had probably taken place while we were on the ship on Lake

Tanganyika, and subsequently on the train. It spread from man to man in

the concentration camps in Dar-es-Salaam. Captain Spangenberg was going

about with me in the town shortly after his arrival at Dar-es-Salaam.

Then he felt ill, and though his iron constitution had successfully

overcome all the hardships of the campaign, he died in hospital on

December 18th of influenza and inflammation of the lungs.

Almost all the Europeans in our camp were attacked by it, and it was

very sad that in addition to Captain Spangenberg, nine other Europeans,

in all, therefore, ten per cent. of our strength, succumbed. Numbers of

our Askari interned at Tabora also died.

My comings and goings often took me to the Administration Staff

(corresponding more or less to our Commandant on the Lines of

Communication). After much questioning I had found it in my old house

which I had occupied before the war. Among intelligent Englishmen I

found the view prevailing that Germany must have colonies on economic

grounds, as well as on account of her over-populousness. England was

considered to have too many colonies. For the time being, at any rate,

she had not sufficient suitable personnel to manage them.

If the English, when telling us of the armistice, insisted on our

coming to Dar-es-Salaam at once, in order that we should be transported

punctually—that is, by the 12th December—they showed no haste

on their own part to carry out the terms of that armistice. Our

embarkation was continually postponed, and, finally, it did not take

place until the 17th January, 1919, five years to the day after I had

landed at Dar-es-Salaam.

* * * * *

To describe my return home in detail would furnish material for a whole

book and could hardly be excelled for tragi-comic events. In addition

to 114 German soldiers, we had 107 women and 87 children on board, and

an escort of 200 British soldiers.

Voyaging by Cape Town, we reached Rotterdam at the end of February. The

large crowd of Germans who turned up to meet us at the quay showed me,

to my surprise, that our East African war had been watched very closely

in the homeland. Many Dutch also gave us proofs of goodwill.

In cold truth our small band, which at the most comprised some 300

Europeans and about 11,000 Askari, had occupied a very superior enemy

force for the whole war. According to what English officers told me,

137 Generals had been in the field, and in all about 300,000 men had

been employed against us. The enemy’s losses in dead would not be put

too high at 60,000, for an English Press notice stated that about

20,000 Europeans and Indians alone had died or been killed, and to that

must be added the large number of black soldiers who fell. The enemy

had left 140,000 horses and mules behind in the battle area. Yet in

spite of the enormously superior numbers at the disposal of the enemy,

our small force, the rifle strength of which was only about 1,400 at

the time of the armistice, had remained in the field always ready for

action and possessed of the highest determination.

I believe it was the transparency of our aims, the love of our

Fatherland, the strong sense of duty and the spirit of self-sacrifice

which animated each of our few Europeans and communicated themselves,

consciously or unconsciously, to our brave black soldiers that gave our

operations that impetus which they possessed to the end. In addition

there was a soldierly pride, a feeling of firm mutual co-operation and

a spirit of enterprise without which military success is impossible in

the long run. We East Africans know only too well that our achievements

cannot be compared with the military deeds and devotion of those in the

homeland. No people in history has ever done more.

If we East Africans received so kindly a reception in the homeland it

was because everyone seemed to think that we had preserved some part of

Germany’s soldierly traditions, had come back home unsullied, and that

the Teutonic sense of loyalty peculiar to us Germans had kept its head

high even under the conditions of war in the tropics.

It is true that that feeling has suffered eclipse in many of our people

under the impression of the present tribulations of our Fatherland.

But it is part of the flesh and blood of us all, and it is just that

enthusiastic welcome which hundreds of thousands of our countrymen gave

us that strengthens our conviction that, in spite of the momentary

distractions and perplexities, the healthy spirit of our German people

will prevail again and once more tread the upward path.

INDEX

A

_Adjutant_ (steamer), 85.

Adler, Captain, 35, 56.

Aeroplanes:

first appearance, 80;

brought down, 86.

Alto Moloque:

surprise, 263;

Portuguese officers taken prisoner, 263;

large supplies of food, 265.

Amaramba, Lake, 302.

Amboni plantation, 62.

Armistice, first news of, 13 Nov., 315.

Arrival of first store-ship, 67;

second ditto, 117.

Artillery, 38, 46.

Arusha:

cattle extensive, 11;

potentiality of the district, 11, 29.

Askari:

native soldiers, 27;

training, 8;

old, well-to-do, 10;

back pay, 319;

women follow our force, 177.

_Astræa_, English cruiser, 27.

Attendants reduced, 176.

Augar, Captain, 35.

Aumann, Captain, 84, 96, 100.

Auracher, District Commissioner, 35, 38.

B

Bagamoyo:

bombarded, 31;

reconnoitre, 146;

falls into enemy hands, 148.

Bangweolo, Lake, 311.

_Baron Dhanis_, steamer (Belgian), 95.

Barrett, Lieutenant (English), 107.

Barton, Colonel (English), 251.

Bast, Sergt.-Major, killed, 87.

Batzner, Lieutenant, 214.

Baudouinville (Congo):

White Fathers, 14;

French missionaries, 14;

native industry, 14.

Baumstark, Captain, 33, 36, 38.

Baziots, The, Administrator, 96.

Becker’s post, 90.

Before the war, re-arming companies, 13.

Behobeho:

field howitzer lost, 171;

heavy fighting and Selous killed, 171.

Belgian steamer _Delcommune_ shot to pieces, 29.

Belgian Commander-in-Chief at Lake Kivu, 92.

Bergmann, Lieutenant, 39.

Besch, Lieutenant, 224, 246.

Beves, General (English), 212.

Bismarckburg-Langenburg operations, 96.

Bleeck, Lieutenant, 56, 162, 200.

Bock, Lieut.-Colonel von, 8.

Bock, Captain von, 89, 136.

Boell, Lieutenant, 138;

wounded, 301.

Boemken, Major von, 159.

Bolles, Sergt.-Major, killed, 296.

Boot-making experiments, 194.

Botha, General, reported coming, 72.

Braunschweig, Captain, 82, 149, 182.

Bread without wheat flour, 193.

Bridge building, 71.

British North Lancashire Regiment, 42.

British Regular officers chivalrous, 107.

British treatment of German prisoners, 221.

Brits, General, 147, 149.

Brucher, Lieutenant, 192.

Bueschel, Lieutenant, 87.

Buffaloes, best in East Africa, 12.

Buiko, 141.

Bukoba, 88, 91.

Buller, Major (English), wounded, 147.

Burungi Mountains, 134;

supplies plentiful, 134.

C

_Camaraderie_ of escort, 322.

Carriers, numbers of, 22, 24.

_Cecil Rhodes_, steamer, sunk, 97.

Chalau taken, 287.

Chambesi depot, 314.

Chappuis, Lieutenant von, 31, 185.

Chirumba station, 241.

Chiulezi, 235.

Chiwata, position, 217;

ammunition shortage, 218.

Christiansen, Lieutenant, 68.

Cloth-making at Kilima Njaro, 70.

Coast towns defence, 63.

Command of Lake Tanganyika, 29.

Communications cut off, 34.

Concentration at Pugu, 21.

Congo Act, against England, 19.

Containing the enemy on Uganda, 77.

Cook, Lieutenant, 101st Grenadier Guards, 45.

Cotton spinning, 69.

Cutsch, Lieutenant, 221.

Cutting down rations, 176.

D

Dar-es-Salaam:

first action, artillery fire, 27;

negotiations for surrender, 28;

English ships appear, 52;

English Consul King, 20;

internment at, 323;

embarkation, 325.

_Delcommune_, Belgian steamer, destroyed, 29.

Delschitz, Lieutenant von, 97.

Dessel, Dr., 38.

Destructiveness of termites, 30.

Deventer, General van:

arrives, 138;

at Kondoa, 144;

at Kilossa, 146;

at Kilwa, 200;

calls for surrender, 235;

telegram of Armistice, 315;

conditions of Armistice, 317.

Dickinson, Colonel (English), 284, 318.

Discontent at Logeloge, 163.

District Commissioner, 6.

Dodoma, enemy reach, 145.

Dsalla, Lake, 110.

Dürr, Father, 10.

Dutumi action, 156;

abandoned, 157.

E

Edwards, General (English), 255, 262, 320.

Embarkation, January 17th, 1919, 325.

Enemy, The:

vital point, 4;

Enemy, The:

propaganda captured, 86;

scouts use poisoned arrows, 90;

advances north-west and south-west, 140;

take a rest, 158.

Engare Len, 78.

England among our enemies, 18.

English Consul King, 20;

naval expedition, 97;

plans discovered, 290;

recruits make good, 104;

spies active, 99.

Enslin, General, 154.

Erdmann, Second Lieutenant, killed, 63.

Erok Mountain ambush, 64.

Europeans and natives interned, 320.

F

Falkenstein, Captain, 84.

Fate of German possessions, 3.

Feilke, Captain, 31, 51, 134, 174.

Field companies increased, 71.

Fife, enemy depots captured, 310.

First action, Dar-es-Salaam, 27.

First journey of inspection, 4.

First Masai:

pure Hamites, 10;

original Jews, 10;

characteristics, 10.

Fischer, Major, 119.

Franken, Lieutenant, 97, 186.

French missionary propaganda, 14.

Freund, Lieutenant, 291, 296.

G

Galula, 307.

Gararagua encounters, 110.

Garrod, Major (English), captured, 292.

Gerlich, Lieutenant, killed, 63.

German Fleet revolt, 318;

patrol rides into enemy camp, 144;

possessions, fate of, 3.

German prisoners, British treatment of, 221;

Reservists mobilized, 22;

Revolution, 318;

settlers source of military power, 7.

Goering, Captain, 210;

wounded, 301.

_Goetzen_, steamer:

building, 84;

completed, 96;

sunk, 186.

Gold Coast Hill, enemy grenade attack, 169.

Gore-Brown, Major (English), drowned, 276.

Gothein, Lieutenant Dr., 99.

Grabow, Master Butcher, 40.

Grawert, Major von, surrenders, 188.

Grote, Lieutenant, 75;

died, 121.

Gudovius, wounded and prisoner, 185.

Guerilla warfare imperative, 63;

commenced, 64.

_Gwendoline_, steamer, 99.

H

Hammerstein, Captain von, 18 31, 38, 42, 44, 56, 58;

died of wounds, 63.

Handeni, collecting station, 130.

Hasslacher, Lieutenant, killed, 186.

Haun, Lieutenant, 96.

Haxthausen, Lieutenant von, 89.

_Hedwig von Wissmann_, steamer, 14;

captured, 28, 100.

Henneberger, Lieutenant, 86.

Hering’s battery, 43.

Hiffmeister, Veterinary Officer, 12.

Himo, 32.

Hindenburg’s name not heard of, 48.

Horn, Lieutenant, 28, 94;

builds cottages, 130.

Hoskins, Major (English), 200.

Huber, Dr., 323.

Huebner, Lieutenant, surrenders, 186.

Hulua Mountain, 300.

Hüttich, Sergt.-Major, 280.

_Hyacinth_, The, off Tanga, 86.

I

Ili, 266;

return to, 290;

English plans discovered, 290.

Imminence of universal war, 3.

Inagu, von Schroetter’s escape, 261.

Indian Brigade, 42;

Expeditionary Force, 25, 44.

Influenza epidemic, 302, 324.

Insufficient interest of authorities, 10.

Internment of Europeans and natives, 320.

Iringa, 15.

Irangi:

enemy shell headquarters, 138;

food in abundance, 139;

series of actions, 139;

enemy casualties heavy, 139;

general view of position, 140.

J

Jantzen, Lieutenant, 207.

Jassini. _See_ YASIN.

Jericho, 97.

Jews, first Masai the original, 10.

Jipe, Lake, 108, 125.

Johannes, Lieut.-Colonel, 10.

K

Kaempfe, Lieutenant, 87.

Kahe, 121;

our retreat, 123.

Kaiser’s, The, abdication, 318.

Kajambi Catholic Mission, 312.

Kaltenborn, Captain von, 130.

Kanene, 250, 302.

Kanga Mountain encounters, 142.

Karongo, 98.

Kasama captured, 313.

Kasigao Mountain action, 75.

Kauffman, Second Lieutenant, killed, 63.

Kayense, 47.

Kempner, Lieutenant, 319.

Kepler, Major, 57;

killed, 63.

Kibata:

occupied, 167;

guns brought up, 167;

congratulations of General Smuts, 170.

Kidodi heliograph station, 18.

Kifumbiro, 89.

Kigoma (Tanganyika), 13;

as naval base, 95.

Kilima Njaro:

supply depot, 32;

activities at, 68;

cotton shortage, 69;

making cloth, tyres, motor fuel and boots, 70;

bridge building, 70.

Kilimatinde, best buffaloes in East Africa, 12.

Kilossa, 145.

Kilwa:

demands attention, 159;

Commissioner taken prisoner, 159;

enemy dumps surprised, 192;

bombarding enemy transports, 193;

enemy’s strong forces, 200.

Kimamba depot, 133.

King, English Consul, 7, 20.

_Kingani_, steamer, 95;

lost, 98.

Kirnamba, 31.

Kissaki:

stores destroyed, 152;

enemy defeated, 153, 155;

prisoners taken, 155.

Kissangire Station, 123;

minor engagements, 164.

Kissenyi fighting, 92.

Kissi Mountains, 173.

Kissija:

capture of enemy propaganda, 86;

enemy driven out, 164.

Kitangari, 223.

Kitendu, enemy division surrounded, 188.

Kituta, 96.

Kivu, Lake, 91, 98, 126, 140, 185.

Klein, Sergt.-Major, killed, 214.

Klinghardt, Captain, 93, 126, 134, 142, 144, 145.

Koehl, Captain, 68, 112, 179, 204;

transport surprised, 256.

Kokosani (Namacurra), 272;

Portuguese heavy losses, 273;

search for ammunition, 273;

large supplies captured, 276.

Kondoa:

occupied, 135;

fight in the dark, 137;

English civil administration, 137.

Kondoa-Irangi:

enemy shell Headquarters, 138;

food in abundance, 139;

series of actions, 139;

enemy heavy losses, 139;

general view of position, 140.

Konduchi, 27.

_Königsberg_, The, 19;

puts to sea, 28;

destroys English cruiser _Pegasus_, 84;

concealed in Rufiji delta, 84;

blown up, 85;

ten guns salved, 85;

Adjutant recaptured, 85.

Koriwa, Wunderlich wounded, 251.

Kornatzki, Captain von, 33, 52.

Korogwe, 31, 33, 36.

Kraut, Major, 29, 182, 184, 323.

Kraut, Captain, 32, 47.

Kröber, Railway Commissary, 36, 57, 79.

Kroeger, Lieutenant, killed, 214.

Krüger, Secretary, 30.

Kühlwein, Herr, 162.

Kungulio:

Enemy defeat, 172;

hippo shooting, 160.

Kurungu, our envelopment fails, 205.

Kwiri, field hospital left behind, 259.

L

Lake Amaramba, 302.

” Bangweolo, 311.

” Dsalla, 110.

” Jipe, 108, 125.

” Kivu, 91, 98, 126, 140, 185.

” Moero, 322.

” Nyassa, 98, 306.

” Rukwa, 189, 306.

” Tanganyika, 29, 52.

” Tshahafi, 92.

” Utungi, 174, 177, 179, 188.

” Victoria, 47, 88.

Lang, Lieutenant, 92.

Langenburg:

fertility and native industries, 15;

ours for eighteen months, 99.

Langenn, Major von, 96, 98, 185, 186;

division loses heavily, 187.

Ledebur, Freiherr von, 8.

Lembeni country, 124;

aeroplanes brought down, 140.

“Lettow Schnapps,” 195.

Liebermann, Captain von, 164, 200, 202.

Ligonja, 282.

Lincke, Captain, 136.

Lindi, 196.

Lioma:

retirement after heavy fighting, 296;

transport detachment lost, 299;

severe enemy losses, 299.

Logeloge discontent, 163.

Lolkisale Mountain:

28th Company surrender, 126;

Captain Rothert wounded, 126.

Longido Mountain:

English attack, 67;

enemy reinforced, 106.

Low level of musketry training, 9.

Luambala, 242, 303.

Lugella:

depot captured, 268;

no ammunition found, 270.

Lukuledi, 213;

conference on aspects, 216.

Lupembe, enemy retire, 187.

Luscheringe River, 304.

Lusinje, Captain Wienholt captured, 248.

Lutende:

enemy surprised and routed, 199;

English commanding officer wounded, 199.

Luwungi, 92, 98.

Lyncker, Lieutenant von, 106.

M

Mafia Island, English take, 86.

Magad Railway, 65.

Mahenge country, 141.

Mahiwa:

flank surprise, 211;

severe fighting, 211;

enemy defeat absolute, 211;

guns and ammunition captured, 213.

Mahua, 246, 250.

Makatan, English defeat, 74.

Makima headquarters, 165.

Makoti, enemy retire with heavy losses, 254.

Malangali action, 149, 182;

Wahehe chief rebels, 182.

Malaria, native immunity against, 24.

Malema:

fertility of, 261;

enemy advance, 262;

difficulties of bush tactics, 262;

Boma captured, 260.

Malleson, General (English), 74, 106.

Mara Bay, 90.

Marangu, 105.

Masai, first, 10.

Massako, 98.

Matendu floods, 197.

Matuschka, Lieutenant, 80.

Mawa action, 179.

Maximum strength, 72.

Mayita, 90.

Mbinji fruit, 241.

Mbizi depot, 307.

Mbosi Mission, 15;

reports of English intentions, June, 1914, 15;

country, 96.

Mbuyuni, 73, 79.

Mechanical transport, 50.

Meda, 245.

Medical supplies, 195.

Meinhertshagen, Captain (English), 44.

Meixner, Dr., 259.

Merensky, Lieutenant, 36, 38.

Merker, M., and the Masai, 10.

Michels, District Commissioner, 146.

Mihambia, bombs dropped, 203.

Mirow, Sergt.-Major, killed, 168.

Mkulu Mountain, 239.

Mlali, enemy advance, 150.

Mletere, 299.

Mobilization, August, 1914-18, not extended to overseas, 18;

Reservists, 22.

Moero, Lake, 312.

_Moewe_, steamer, 19, 28, 91, 94.

Mori Bay, 89.

Morogoro as base, 142;

headquarters, 146;

enemy converge on, 149.

Moshi, 52.

Mosquito, The, 25.

Moving forces to Northern Railway, 29.

Mpapua action, 145.

Mpili, 224.

Mpoororo, 91.

Mpotora base, 181.

Msalu river, 247.

Mtende, 246, 248.

_Muanza_, steamer, 47, 87, 88, 89.

Mujeba, 270.

Mujebain, 280.

Müller, Staff Surgeon, 46, 196.

Musketry training low level, 9.

Musslin, Major-General, 248.

Musoma, 89.

Mwasge Mission, 96.

Mwembe, 191, 242, 304.

Mwenzo Mission, 311.

Mwurnoni, 56.

My early experiences, 16.

Mzima Camp, 69.

N

Nagawamira, 304.

Namacurra. _See_ KOKOSANI.

Nambindinga, 220;

reducing the strength, 220.

Namirrue:

enemy routed, 283;

Colonel Dickinson captured, 284;

Lieut. Ruckteschell wounded, 286;

Lieutenant Silke killed, 286;

enemy annihilated, 286.

Nampepo, roast pork and brawn, 267.

Namunu, 245.

Nangwale, 238.

Nanungu concentration, 242.

Narungombe:

enemy flee in disorder, 202;

Liebermann’s great success, 202.

Narunyu, enemy attack, 205.

Native carrier difficulty, 24;

interchange of communications, 13;

method of warfare, 9;

immunity against malaria, 24;

industries, 15.

Naumann, Captain, 189, 221.

Naval guns salved from the Königsberg, 85.

Ndanda Catholic Mission, 206.

Nevale, 224.

New Moshi, 32, 33, 36;

headquarters, 49;

pleasant times at, 59;

aeroplane drops bombs, 113;

abandoned, 119.

New Steglitz headquarters, 116.

New supply detachment raised, 179.

News:

from home, 67;

of German Fleet revolt, 318;

German Revolution, Kaiser’s abdication, 318.

Ngaula, enemy routed, 193.

Ngomano action, 230.

Niemeyer, Commander, 7.

Njango Camp, 204;

telegram from His Majesty, 204.

Nordenholz, Sergt.-Major, 291.

Northey, General, 140, 149.

North Pare Mountains, 125.

Numarroe, 291.

Nyanza hostile enterprises, 47.

Nyassa, Lake, 98.

O

Old Askari, 10.

Old 1871 rifle, 8.

Oldorobo Mountain, 80;

enemy retreat in disorder, 104;

English recruiting bait, 104;

English orders, “Take no prisoners,” 104.

Old Utengule Mission, 307.

Oriva occupied, 280.

Ott, Lieutenant, wounded, 292.

Otto, Captain, 58, 145, 172, 179.

Our movements from North-West to Central, 127.

Our departure from North final, 129.

P

Pangire Mission, 305.

Pare Mountains, 125.

_Pegasus_, English cruiser, 27, 84.

Pekera captured, 287.

Peramiho Mission, 305.

Poisoned arrows used by enemy, 90.

Police Askari, 6.

Poppe, Captain, wounded, 295.

Pori (bush) difficulties, 12;

not easy to disappear in, 13.

Portuguese:

invade Makonde, 165;

driven into their territory, 166;

territory entered, 190.

_President_, steamer, 84, 198.

Prince, Captain von, 4, 32, 41, 45.

Protective Force, 6;

strength of, 19.

Pugu, concentration of troops, 21.

Q

Quelimane, 265.

Quinine production, 71.

R

Ras-Kasone, 36, 39.

Rations cut down, 176.

Reata-Kahe:

our withdrawal by night, 114;

evacuated, 116;

enemy occupy, 116.

Reata-Latima Mountain repulse, 114.

Reata-North defences, 111.

Recke, Lieutenant, killed, 89.

Regone, 293.

Rentell, Engineer, 71.

Reservists mobilized, 22.

Revolt of German Fleet, 318.

Revolution in Germany, 318.

Rifle, old 1871, 8.

Rothe, Director of Postal Service, 30.

Rothert, Captain, 119, 125.

Rotterdam welcome, 325.

Ruckteschell, Lieutenant von, 75, 147, 286.

Rufiji, Delta, 84;

loss of the Königsberg, 85;

enemy advance on, 160;

evacuated at rainy season, 180.

Rugesi Passage, 89.

Ruhudje, fighting on the, 184.

Rukwa, Lake, 306.

Ruponda, we lose supplies, 208.

Russissi minor actions, 93.

Rwiba Mount, 308.

S

Saidi, 251.

Salt supplies, 194.

Schaefer, Lieutenant, 57.

Schaefner, Lieutenant, 259.

Schimmer, Captain, 93.

Schleuntz, Colonel von, 8.

Schnee, Dr., 27.

Schmid, Captain, 31.

Schoenfeld, Lieut.-Commander, 7, 85, 144.

Schottstaedt, Lieutenant, 45.

Schroetter, Lieutenant von, 51, 260, 296.

Schulz, Captain, 33, 94, 98, 130, 146, 163, 167.

Second store-ship arrives, 117.

Selke, Lieutenant, killed, 286.

Selous killed, 171.

“Shensi” spies, 108.

Shirarti, 89.

Singida stud farms, 11.

Sisal plant, 56.

Smith-Dorrien, General, 104.

Smuts, General:

takes over command from Smith-Dorrien, 104;

at Kitovo, 110;

at Handeni, 142;

calls for surrender at Uluguru Mountains, 158;

congratulates Von Lettow on decoration, 170;

operations wrecked on Rufiji, 172;

relieved by General Hoskins, 200.

South Pare Mountains, 76.

Spalding, Lieutenant, killed, 63.

Spangenberg, Captain, 323;

died, 324.

Sphinx Harbour, 100.

Ssongea, enemy at, 304.

Ssonyo treachery, 87.

Stemmermann, Captain, 113, 146, 153.

Sternheim, Lieutenant, 114.

Stewart, General (English), 110.

Stolowsky, Staff Surgeon, 195.

Store-ships arrive, 67, 117.

Strength of Protective Force, 19.

Struwe, Sergt.-Major, 192.

Stud farms at Singida, 11.

Stuemer, Major von, 87, 130, 134, 190, 207.

Supplies devoured at depots, 174.

Supply system, 23.

Supreme military power, 21.

Surgery under difficulties, 196.

Surrender:

Smuts calls for, 158;

Deventer calls for, 235.

Swahili, 15.

_Sybil_, steamer (English), 88, 90.

T

_Tabora_, hospital ship, 51.

Tabora retirement, 186.

Tafel, Captain, 22, 28, 33, 132, 178.

Tafeli surrender, 236.

“Take no prisoners,” English order, 104.

Tanga:

hostile cruisers off, 35.

plans for defence, 36;

enemy attack, 41;

British North Lancashire Regiment defeat, 42;

enemy mowed down, 42;

transfer of wounded, 44.

Tanganyika, Lake, command of, 29.

” Railway, 52.

Taveta, 29, 33.

Termites, 30.

Thierfelder, Dr., 195.

Thurmann, Sergt.-Major, killed, 296.

Timbani Mountain, 256;

Koehl’s transport surprised, 256.

Tipa, Boma, 282.

Tombeur, Belgian commander at Kivu, 92.

Tombwe post captured, 95.

_Tomondo_, steamer, 159.

Treachery of Ssonyo, 87.

Trench mortar captured, 286.

Tse-tse fly, 11;

plague, 26.

Tshahafi, Lake, 92.

Tuliani headquarters bombed, 143.

Tunduru district, 192.

Tunga:

enormous booty, 45;

our losses insignificant, 45.

U

Ubena, 306.

Uganda Railway, containing the enemy on, 4, 77.

Ukerewe, 89.

Unconditional “surrender” or “evacuation,” 319.

Unindi, enemy repulsed, 200.

Universal war imminent, 3.

Unprepared for war, 10.

Unterrichter, Lieutenant von, 68.

Usambara country, 4;

volunteer rifle corps, 4.

Utengule (Old) Mission, 307.

Utungi, Lake, 172, 174, 177, 179, 188.

V

Victoria, Lake, 47, 88;

in English hands, 87.

Volunteer Rifle Corps at Usambara, 4.

Vorbeck, General von Lettow-:

landing at Dar-es-Salaam, 3;

tour of inspection, 4;

buffalo hunting, 13;

water on the knee, 13;

a raw hand, 16;

early experiences, 16;

had malaria ten times, 25;

slightly wounded, 138;

congratulated by Smuts, 170;

experiments in bread-making, 193;

wireless from Kaiser, 204;

Deventer calls for surrender, 235;

hippo shooting, 240;

receives news of German offensive, Western Front, 248;

operation on toe, 249;

injury to eye, 249;

Deventer’s telegram of Armistice, 315;

and conditions of surrender, 317;

sends telegram to Kaiser, 317;

no reply from German Government, 319;

declines Colonel Hawkins’ invitation, 319;

Deventer’s reply to protest, 321;

at Kigoma, 322;

at Tabora and at Morogoro, 323;

at Dar-es-Salaam, December 8th, 1918. Embarked January 17th, 1919,

325;

reached Rotterdam, 325.

W

Waganda Warriors, 47.

Wahehe tribe, 32.

Wahle, Major-General, 23, 31, 51, 97, 140, 184 _et seq._, 323.

_Waimi_, steamer, 86;

blown up, 186.

Wajagga tribe, 24, 32.

Wamaka, 288.

Wangoni desertions, 305.

Wassukuma people, 91.

Water-finding, 80.

Welcome at Rotterdam, 325.

White Fathers, 14.

Wienholt, Lieutenant, capture and escape, 143.

Wienholt, Captain, captured, 248.

Wilhelmstal native police, 6.

Wintgens, Captain, 91, 185, 186;

division captures gun, 187;

taken prisoner, 189.

Winzer, Sergt.-Major, gets through, 188.

Wülfingen, Captain Bock von, 87.

Wunderlich, Lieut.-Commander, wounded, 251.

Y

Yasin. _See_ JASSINI:

enemy advance, 30;

country, 34;

English concentration, 56;

our attack, 58;

enemy surrender, 61.

Z

Zambesi Ferry, 314.

Zelewski’s expedition, 15.

_Ziethen_, steamer, 86.

Zimmer, Captain, 28, 82, 93, 94.

_Printed at The Chapel River Press, Kingston, Surrey._

FOOTNOTES:

[1] M. Merker, “Die Masai,” Berlin, 1904 (2nd Edition, 1910).

[2] Askari are “soldiers,” not a distinct tribe.

[3] Seitenschlag.

[4] We have no corresponding rank. He is a reservist who has served as

a “One-year Volunteer,” but has not yet done enough reserve training to

qualify as an Officer in the Reserve.

[5] The English Government issued to us articles of food for the

English prisoners which we could not get for ourselves.