IN THE SOUTH-EAST CORNER OF THE COLONY
WHILE at Narunyu there was a lull in the fighting for several weeks,
the enemy had shown considerable activity in the section of Portuguese
territory occupied by Stuemer’s force. Several English columns from the
south-west and south had concentrated on Mwembe, and Major von Stuemer,
not thinking himself strong enough to resist, had evacuated Mwembe.
The different companies had then gradually retired on the Rovuma.
North of this river Lieutenant-Commander Jantzen, who had been sent
from Headquarters to Tunduru, and under whom the various companies of
Stuemer’s force had re-formed, had taken over the command. Enemy forces
were also advancing on Tunduru from Ssongea.
It was difficult to obtain detailed information about the enemy. My
impression was that he wanted to bring our main force to a halt, invade
our supply-area in the Tunduru-Massassi-Ruponda district with strong
forces, and carry off our supplies. I did not then think it out of
the question that we might score a success, and I, therefore, marched
on the 10th September, 1917, with five companies, from our camps at
Narunyu towards Massassi. From there Captain Goering immediately
marched with three companies towards Tunduru; Jantzen’s division
stood north-east of this place. I reconnoitred the road to Tunduru on
a bicycle and feared that the difficulties of supply would be very
serious. These fears were unfortunately realized. Supplies from the
land could not be brought up and there was no time for a prolonged
operation that would allow of additional supplies being obtained from
Massassi.
The small English and Portuguese patrols which attacked our supplies
and transport from across the Rovuma to the south did not cause us to
hurry our movements. But the enemy from Kilwa, whom Captain Koehl’s
heavy attack from Mbeo-Chini and a number of lesser encounters had not
been able to stop, reached the neighbourhood of Nahungu. His flying
columns, for the most part mounted, outflanked Koehl’s force, and
pressed forward up the Mbemkuru river to Nangano. Communication with
Captain Koehl by means of the telephone-line from Nahungu to Nangano
was first interrupted for a few days, and then broken off completely.
The supply dumps fell into the enemy’s hands and were destroyed. To
provide against the interruption of the exposed telephone-line a new
line had been laid from Ruponda, running north-east, but connection by
messenger between this line and Koehl’s division took several days.
In view of the slow means of communication with Koehl’s detachment, it
was not possible to get an accurate view of the situation in time, and
as the intended success at Tunduru could not in any case be attained,
I marched the five companies from Massassi to Ruponda at the beginning
of October, and then further north-east, joining forces with Koehl’s
force at Likangara. On receiving the report that enemy detachments
were approaching Ruponda, I ordered the removal of the sick and the
stores from Ruponda to Lukuledi and Mnacho. On 9th October, 1917,
an enemy patrol was beaten off with some losses at Ruponda. On 10th
October a considerable force of the enemy—the 25th Indian Cavalry
Regiment was identified—assaulted Ruponda from several sides. The
withdrawal of our companies had, therefore, unfortunately been rather
premature; otherwise the enemy might have encountered some of our
passing companies at Ruponda and perhaps suffered a serious defeat. As
it was, there were no troops in Ruponda except a few of our patrols;
most of the sick fell into the enemy’s hands, and also some 90,000 kg.
of supplies. At Likangara there was no fighting worthy of notice. Some
enemy patrols and weak detachments did appear, but our fighting-force,
which was attacking the enemy’s main line of communication along
the Mbemkuru river, firing on and destroying motor-transport, and
capturing mails and supplies, led me to suppose that the strongest part
of the Kilwa force was recuperating further west in the direction of
Ruponda.
The increased enemy activity a few days’ march east of Likangara, where
he established requisitioning stations, as well as the stories of the
natives, made it seem probable that considerable enemy forces were
marching from Nahungu towards the south, and therefore against General
Wahle. Captured mails revealed the fact that in spite of his extensive
intelligence and spy systems the enemy was groping in the dark. He did
not know, for instance, where I was, although he seemed to place the
greatest importance upon knowing. The knowledge of my Headquarters
would tell him the probable position of our main force. While one
letter thought that I was in the neighbourhood of Lukuledi, another
professed to know that I was at Tunduru, and according to a third I was
at Mahenge. The talkativeness of these Europeans, who, in spite of all
warnings, cannot refrain from communicating to one another in their
private letters their knowledge and their conjectures about the war
situation, had in this case done good: there was so much gossip, the
rumours were so contradictory, and even the most improbable things were
so indiscriminately believed, that anything at all could be read into
the German correspondence. In spite of this unintentional misleading
of the enemy, it is difficult to understand how intelligent people can
entrust to the post important matters, the knowledge of which must be
kept from the enemy, knowing how unreliable the post is, and that the
letters often fall into the enemy’s hands.
It was clear to me that the enemy’s obvious uncertainty about the
situation would give me a great opportunity if it could be used quickly
and decisively. I ventured to hope that the intended decisive blow
might now be struck for which I had tried twice near Lindi and once at
Tunduru, and the success of which at Narungombe had hung on a hair. The
development of the situation on Wahle’s front seemed favourable for
this attempt. His forces had gradually withdrawn from the Mtua district
to Mahiwa. The enemy’s whole handling of the campaign suggested that
his various columns would press forward with all their weight and
try to crush us by a concentration from all sides. The enemy’s Lindi
Division was advancing energetically with the rest. General Wahle’s
nine companies, fighting stubbornly, had retired before them to Mahiwa.
I had a fair personal knowledge of the country at Mahiwa. It was very
probable that my march in that direction would not be observed by the
enemy in time.
On the 10th October, 1917, trusting in the fortune of war, I crossed
the Linkangara mountains to Mnacho with five companies and two mountain
guns. I arrived there at dark and left again at daybreak on the 15th.
On the narrow mountain paths the force got very scattered. The guns
were left far behind, and the pack-animals gave trouble. Askari and
bearers came to the rescue, and again and again Sergeant-Major Sabath
rose superior to the difficulties and brought his guns forward. It
surprised me that we were unable to get any information from Mahiwa,
but the rifle and machine-gun fire indicated that fighting was in
progress. Before dark I reached Lieutenant Methner’s company, which was
in reserve behind Wahle’s left wing. The enemy seemed to be attacking
this company with a view to enveloping it. His fire had the unfortunate
effect of causing the disappearance of my bearer, with my dispatch-box,
containing most important dispatches and maps: he did not return for
two days. The first two companies to come up were immediately thrown
against the enemy’s enveloping movement, and the enemy was thrown back.
The companies then dug themselves in. On the morning of the 16th I went
to reconnoitre, and found that the enemy had also entrenched himself
immediately in front, at a distance of sixty to a hundred metres. When
Lieutenant von Ruckteschell offered me a cup of coffee, care had to
be taken, as the enemy was keeping a fairly sharp look-out, and shot
with tolerable accuracy. I thought the opportunity favourable for a
determined surprise attack. It was decided to launch the attack at
noon, on the left (north) wing, and try to turn the enemy’s flank.
Goering’s detachment was to lead the attack.
After we had eaten our midday meal undisturbed, I went at once to
the left wing, where Captain Goering had just begun his advance with
his two companies. When he had crossed a wide depression in the
ground, to my surprise he changed direction still further to the
left. The companies were soon in action. Only gradually I realized
the significance of this surprising move. Captain Goering had come
unexpectedly upon a new enemy who had come from Nahungu and was now
attacking from the north. The force consisted of several battalions
and two guns of the Nigerian Brigade who knew nothing of our arrival
at Mahiwa and were expecting to smash General Wahle’s force by an
attack on his left flank and rear, while his front, facing east, was
vigorously attacked by a division. The Nigerian Brigade was as much
taken by surprise as Captain Goering and was not so quick to adapt
itself to the new situation. Captain Goering, closely supported by
the reserves, threw himself so vigorously against the enemy in the
bush that he ran through some of his detachments, threw them into
confusion, and finally put them to flight. An enemy officer in command
of an ammunition column took our men for his own, with the result that
we captured about 150,000 rounds of ammunition. A gun with ammunition
was taken by assault, and the killed did not consist wholly of
Nigerian Askari. On Captain Goering’s right, where two companies under
Lieutenant von Ruckteschell and Lieutenant Brucker, wounded in this
action, were fighting, the enemy was also thrown back some way into the
bush.
While this fighting was going on on the flank, and on the following
day also, the enemy attacked Wahle’s force with all his strength.
Here the enemy was in great superiority; wave after wave of fresh
troops were thrown against our front. There was a danger that General
Wahle’s front would give way, and the fighting was very severe. There
was also serious danger that our enveloping movement, in the very
difficult swampy ground of the bush, would be held up so long by weak
enemy forces that a defeat would be inflicted upon our front before it
could make itself felt. In that case the battle was lost. I thought it
expedient to increase the disadvantages that the enemy was bringing
upon himself by his costly frontal attack and used all my available
strength in such a way that the enemy by the increasing fierceness of
his frontal attack was bleeding himself to death.
The original intention of enveloping the enemy’s left wing was not
developed further on the following days, but, on the contrary, every
available company was withdrawn from the left wing to stiffen General
Wahle’s front. In this way we not only succeeded in holding our
ground, but, by immediately taking advantage of the enemy’s moments
of weakness to make heavy counter-attacks with our reserves, we were
able to inflict a real defeat. My, perhaps surprising, tactics were
prompted by the personality of the enemy commander. I had learned in
the engagement at Reata (11th March, 1916) that General Beves threw his
men into action regardless of loss of life and did not hesitate to try
for a success, not by skilful handling and small losses, but rather by
repeated frontal attacks which, if the defence held its ground and had
anything like adequate forces, led to severe losses for the attack. I
guessed that here at Mahiwa he was carrying out the same tactics. I
think it was by taking advantage of the enemy leader’s mistaken tactics
in this way that we were able to win this splendid victory. Until the
18th October, for four days therefore, wave after wave of the attack
broke on our front, but my own observation told me that the weight of
the attack here on the right wing was diminishing and that the enemy’s
defeat was absolute.
On the evening of the 18th October we had, with some 1,500 men,
completely defeated a whole enemy detachment at least 4,000, and
probably not less than 6,000, strong. With the exception of Tanga, it
was the most serious defeat he had suffered.
According to a high English officer the enemy lost 1,500 men; but
I have reason to believe that this estimate is much too low. Our
casualties were: 14 Europeans and 81 Askari killed, 55 Europeans and
367 Askari wounded, 1 European and 1 Askari missing. Considering the
smallness of our forces these losses were for us very considerable, and
were felt all the more seriously because they could not be replaced.
We captured a gun, six heavy and three light machine guns, and 200,000
rounds of ammunition.
The situation, unfortunately, did not allow us to take full advantage
of our victory; in our rear was the enemy who had occupied Ruponda
on the 10th October, advanced in strong force further south and on
18th October attacked Major Kraut at Lukuledi. It must be remarked in
passing that our troops which had fought under Lieutenant-Commander
Jantzen near Tunduru had gradually retired north-east to the upper
Mbenkuru and had reached Headquarters above Ruponda before the
occupation of that place by the enemy on the 10th October. Two of these
companies had reinforced the company which was guarding our supplies
near Lukuledi, and it was these three companies, under the command of
Major Kraut, which were attacked by a superior enemy from the north on
the 18th October.
The enemy, believed to be six companies of the Gold Coast Regiment, was
driven off, but in order to protect our supplies and material lying at
Chigugu and Chiwata, Major Kraut retired to the first of these places.
As well as Chigugu and Chiwata, Ndanda, where we had large stores of
war material, was also threatened by the enemy, who had doubtless, in
my opinion, been reinforced at Lukuledi. The enemy from Lukuledi might
at any moment attack our lines of communication, capture our stores and
supplies, and so put us out of action. We had no means of protecting
our lines of communication locally, for the few thousand men we had
were required for fighting. As, however, the force had to be kept
alive, the danger had to be overcome in some other way.
There was only one way: to beat the enemy decisively at Lukuledi. It
was necessary therefore to lose no time at Mahiwa, and, hard though
it was, I had to abandon the idea of an annihilating pursuit. When,
early on the 19th October, a few scattered detachments of the enemy
were seen and fired on, I had already begun my march with six companies
and two guns. On the next day at two o’clock we entered Lukuledi from
the east, and on 21st of October at dawn we attacked the enemy, who
was apparently taken completely by surprise. North of Lukuledi, on
the Ruponda road, Major Kraut’s column surprised the camp of the 25th
Indian Cavalry Regiment, which, with transport harnessed, stood ready
for the march on Massassi; the camp was taken by storm and the regiment
lost almost the whole of its transport horses, altogether 350. Whilst I
was engaged with the detachments of Koehl and Ruckteschell in a fairly
serious action against the enemy entrenched at Lukuledi, I waited in
vain for the intervention of Kraut’s force. An attack on the camp
without the advantage of surprise had little hope of success. When the
force began to come under the fire of the enemy’s mine-throwers on
the flank, I withdrew the greater part from the zone of the effective
cross-fire, after beating off a strong enemy attack, in order to avoid
unnecessary losses. A fresh enemy, in the shape of a company of King’s
African Rifles (English East African Askari), who appeared unexpectedly
from the bush, was quickly driven off. In this engagement Lieutenant
Kroeger fell at the head of his company. The action was then broken
off. No news came of Major Kraut until night; thinking he could no
longer attack successfully at Lukuledi, and hearing no sounds of
fighting, he had made a détour and then approached Lukuledi from the
south.
Owing to unfavourable circumstances we had not succeeded in inflicting
a decisive defeat on the enemy at Lukuledi, and the operation had
only in part gained its objective, but the enemy’s losses must be
regarded as serious. The impression made on him was even greater than
I had supposed. At any rate, it was reported that he had evacuated
Lukuledi and withdrawn to the north. Among our casualties were three
company-commanders killed. I can still see Lieutenant Volkwein,
severely wounded in the leg, limping through the bush at the head of
his company. I had also spoken with Lieutenant Batzner and Lieutenant
Kroeger shortly before they fell. Sergeant-Major Klein also fell, who
had so often led his patrol on the Uganda railway. He was a capable
machine gun leader. But our losses were not in vain. Our patrols
pursued the enemy and fired on his camp near Ruponda and also his lines
of communication. The impossibility of maintaining large bodies of
troops in the neighbourhood of Ruponda—our supplies collected there
had fallen into the enemy’s hands—forced me to give up all idea of
pursuing the enemy.
At that time I thought it possible that the enemy’s withdrawal from
Lukuledi might have been due to the movements of Captain Tafel’s force,
which was marching from Mahenge to join us. We had lost touch with
him since the beginning of October. He had received orders to retire
gradually before the strong enemy columns which were advancing on
Mahenge from the north (Ifakara), west and south-west (Likuju, Mponda),
and to try to get into touch with the main force under my command. I
thought it quite possible that he had already arrived in the district
of Nangano, or west of that place, and that the enemy had turned about
again out of anxiety for his lines of communication.