CONTINUOUS FIGHTING NEAR THE RUFIJI
IN order to oppose the troops of General Northey, who were advancing
from the direction of New Langenburg, Captain Braunschweig had
been dispatched from Dodoma at the end of June. He had taken up
reinforcements from Kondoa and Dar-es-Salaam to the two German Askari
companies that had slipped away from the New Langenburg country, and
had concentrated his own troops, totalling five companies and one field
howitzer, at Malangali. At that place his force had fought a brave
action with a superior force of the enemy, but had been obliged to fall
back towards Mahenge.
As the converging hostile columns were now approaching each other in
the direction of Morogoro, it became necessary to consider our future
plan of operations. The enemy expected us to stand and fight a final
decisive engagement near Morogoro, on the northern slopes of the
Uluguru Mountains. To me, this idea was never altogether intelligible.
Being so very much the weaker party, it was surely madness to await
at this place the junction of the hostile columns, of which each one
individually was already superior to us in numbers, and then to fight
with our back to the steep and rocky mountains, of which the passes
were easy to close, and which deprived us of all freedom of movement
in our rear. I thought it sounder so to conduct our operations that we
should only have to deal with a part of the enemy. Knowing that the
enemy, and General Brits in particular, had a liking for wide turning
movements, I felt sure that one column would move off from Dakawa,
where large hostile camps had been identified, or from Kilossa, in
order to reach our rear by working round the west side of the Uluguru
Mountains. This possibility was so obvious that I cycled out every day
to the mountains west of Morogoro, so as to get the reports from the
patrols in good time, and to supplement them by personal observation
of the clouds of smoke and dust. The latter soon put it beyond doubt
that a strong column was moving from near Dakawa towards the railway
between Morogoro and Kilossa. Patrols identified enemy troops that had
crossed the railway and were marching further south. The observers on
the mountains reported the clouds of dust to be moving towards Mlali.
As I meant to let this movement run its full course and then attack
the isolated detachment with the whole of my forces, I waited until I
thought it was near Mlali. On the evening of the 23rd August, Captain
Otto, who was encamped at Morogoro, was ordered to march off for Mlali
during the night with three companies. He arrived there early on the
24th, just as English horsemen had taken possession of the depot. When
I reached Otto’s Detachment the fight was in full swing. The country
was, however, unsuitable for short decisive strokes, owing to the many
steep hills which impeded movement. The other troops at Morogoro,
except Captain Stemmermann’s Detachment, were ordered up by telephone.
I myself went back again to Morogoro to talk things over. Stemmermann’s
Detachment, to which, on account of the roads, the 4-inch _Königsberg_
gun and the howitzer battery were attached, was ordered to fall back
along the eastern slopes of the Uluguru Mountains, and to delay the
enemy there. The passes over the mountains themselves were closed by
weak patrols. When I arrived once more at Mlali in the afternoon, the
fight was still undecided. At several points the enemy had been driven
back, and several people thought they had seen him suffer considerably.
But by nightfall we had got so entangled in the mountains, and every
movement had become so difficult and took so much time, that we
halted. We found the night very cold, lying out on the hills without
the carriers’ loads. Luckily, however, this fertile region had so far
hardly suffered at all from the war, and a fowl roasted on a spit soon
appeased our hunger.
The next morning numerous explosions in the German depots, which had
been surprised by the enemy, indicated that he had moved off and had
destroyed the 4-inch shells stored there. We surmised that he was
moving south-west, which eventually turned out to be the case. The
enemy was probably making a turning movement so as to reach Kissaki
before us. At the wealthy Administration Office at that place, 600 tons
of food supplies and the military stores removed from Morogoro had been
collected. Wild rumours exaggerated the actual facts, and stated that
strong forces had already reached the roads leading to Kissaki before
us. Although the wagon road stopped at Mlali, and the remainder of the
route to Kissaki consisted only of paths broken by many ravines and
obstacles, the possibility that the enemy might make a rapid march on
Kissaki had to be taken very seriously, and we had no time to waste. In
the evening we were most hospitably entertained by the Father at Mgeta
Mission. The buildings are charmingly situated in the deep ravine of
the Mgeta river, which in this part comes down very swiftly. The many
lights on the slope of the hill made one think one was approaching some
small watering-place in Germany. A few European women from Morogoro
were also staying there, and bade farewell to the Force for the last
time. With the exception of a few nurses all women had to stay behind.
The removal of our loads was carried out fairly satisfactorily.
The Force profited by the fact that owing to the insistence of the
energetic Captain Feilke, about a thousand native labourers, who had
until a few days previously been working in the forestry department at
Morogoro, were placed at its disposal. But the carrier question was
beginning to be difficult. The natives saw that we were evacuating
the country; a number of them, who had promised to come, stayed away,
to the despair of the sensible Chiefs, who would gladly have helped
us. As only small parties of the enemy appeared in the country round
Mgeta, it began to seem probable that his principal forces were making
a turning movement. Leaving a rearguard behind, which only followed us
slowly, our main body was, during the ensuing days, moved nearer to
Kissaki. One night an Askari appeared at my bedside, bearing himself
in a smart military manner: it was the Effendi Yuma Mursal, of the 4th
Field Company, who had been left behind sick at Morogoro. He reported
that a force of the enemy, as strong as that at Kahe had been, had
marched round the west side of the Uluguru Mountains from Morogoro, and
that a number of German Askari had found the recent fighting too much
for them. They had deserted, and were now plundering the plantations
south-west of Morogoro.
A telephone line was laid from Kissaki to us, by means of which Captain
Tafel kept us continually informed; up to date no enemy had been seen
at Kissaki. But to the west of us, patrols reported the enemy to be
marching to the south. I therefore moved to Kissaki, and had to destroy
some of our stores, which were collected in small depots along our
route. Unfortunately, in carrying this out, an efficient Ordnance
N.C.O. was accidentally killed, as had happened before on a similar
occasion at Morogoro. At Kissaki, several days passed before we came
seriously into collision with the enemy. It was not advisable to occupy
the Boma Fort itself; it consisted of a group of buildings surrounded
by a massive high wall, and was situated in the middle of a completely
cleared bit of country. The enemy could, therefore, only capture it by
a costly attack; but he had no need to assault it at all; by means of
artillery and bombs from aircraft, he could have made it intolerable
for us to remain in the cramped Boma, and we ourselves should then have
been forced to make a sortie over the open and to endure the fire which
the enemy would have been able to pour into us in perfect security. Our
defences were, therefore, placed a long way outside the Boma, covered
from the view of aircraft, and so arranged that they could be occupied
and evacuated unobserved.
It was not until I arrived at Kissaki myself that I obtained a proper
idea of the abundance of stores and supplies available there. I learned
that, contrary to my belief, practically nothing was stored further
south at Behobeho or at Kungulio, on the Rufiji. At Kissaki there
were large stocks, but notwithstanding the dense native population,
it was impossible to get them away. The numerous inhabitants, to whom
the war and the many Askari were something quite new, lost their heads
and ran away into the bush. The Civil Administration, which enjoyed
the complete confidence of the people, proved powerless against the
overwhelming influences now bursting in upon them. Even presents of
clothing, which were ordinarily so highly valued, failed to hold them.
It seemed as if all the evil spirits had conspired together to deprive
us of transport. Our column of several hundred pack-donkeys had been
driven over the mountains from Morogoro. It arrived at Kissaki late and
completely exhausted. Our ox-wagons, which had to go round the east
side of the Uluguru Mountains on account of the state of the roads,
seemed to be never going to arrive. The head of the Communications
Service could not find any other means of carrying away the stocks
which were essential to us for continuing the war. And yet it was
obvious that we must continue to fall back further south, towards the
Rufiji, before the superior numbers of the enemy.
One circumstance that brightened the gloom was that our great herds of
cattle, which had been grazing east of Mpapua, had been brought away
in good time. Several thousand head, mostly beautiful cattle, arrived
at Kissaki, and would have formed a most welcome mobile reserve of
supplies. But, unfortunately, our pleasure at this was diminished by
the frequent occurrence of the tse-tse fly at some places; if the
animals got stung by them they lost condition badly, and mostly died
after a few weeks. The bulk of the cattle was, therefore, driven on
into the healthy districts on the Rufiji. As for the rest, we simply
worked with energy at getting away the stores to Behobeho and on to
Kungulio, using the carriers belonging to the troops, all the people
we could raise in the district, and our few wagons. In order to effect
this, we had to gain time, and Captain Stemmermann, who was marching
round the Uluguru Mountains by the eastern road, could only be allowed
to fall back quite slowly before the hostile division which was pushing
after him with all its might.
I waited at Kissaki with the main body, in order to be able quickly
to recognize and make use of any favourable opportunity. As was to be
expected, the enemy had, owing to our withdrawal to Kissaki, abandoned
his concentration on Morogoro; he had sent a few detachments direct
over the Uluguru Mountains, but his other columns had separated and
followed us, extending far to the east and west. The hope of being able
to defeat one or more of these columns separately was fulfilled beyond
expectation. West of the Uluguru Mountains General Brits had divided
his division into brigade columns (two mounted and one infantry),
which had difficulty in keeping touch. Soon large hostile camps were
discovered a day’s march west of Kissaki, and on the 7th September,
1916, Captain Otto’s Detachment, which was encamped at a plantation
near Kissaki, was attacked by a large force of European horse, and
by native and white infantry. It turned out later that this force
consisted of General Enslin’s Mounted Brigade, and of portions of the
infantry brigade of General Brits’s Division. The turning movement
which the enemy was making round the left wing of Otto’s Detachment
was allowed to continue until the outflanking detachment had got right
round in rear of Captain Otto, near the Boma of Kissaki. Evidently the
enemy did not expect German reserves to be posted under cover still
further back. These reserves were now loosed upon him. The gallant 11th
Field Company, under Lieutenant Volkwein of the Reserve, worked through
the dense bush close up to the outflanking enemy, and immediately
attacked with the bayonet, cheering. With that the enemy’s beautiful
plans completely collapsed; our further advance simply rolled him up,
and he was completely defeated. The almost impenetrable bush made it
impossible vigorously to push the enemy, or to undertake a pursuit
on a large scale; but the bulk of his troops was broken up, and the
small fragments were scattered in the bush in hopeless confusion. The
led-horses and horse-holders were captured, and about fifteen Europeans
taken prisoner. Even the next day an English soldier arrived from quite
another direction; he had lost himself with his led-horses in the dense
bush and had no idea where to go. The man had plenty of humour; he
threw his rifle and ammunition across a small stream and said: “It’s
just luck; I might have taken the right road or the wrong one. I had
the bad luck to take the wrong one. That’s my fault.”
Tafel’s Detachment, which was encamped north of Kissaki, on the road
we had come by, had only partially joined in the fight on the evening
of the 7th. I had kept it back, as I thought that, simultaneously with
the attack on the 7th from the west, another one would be made from
the north along the road. And General Brits undoubtedly did hold this
perfectly sound intention; but the execution failed. General Nussy’s
Mounted Brigade, without having any idea of the action of the 7th,
marched along towards Tafel’s Detachment from the north on the 8th. It
was just as thoroughly beaten as its friends had been the day before.
In the dense bush it was, on the 8th, even more difficult to survey
the fighting, and a considerable number of prisoners taken by the 1st
Company managed to escape.
In the two days we took some thirty European prisoners, and some of
them were sent back to the enemy, on taking an oath not to fight again
in this war against the Germans or their allies. The humanity of this
step, which was, under tropical conditions, in the best interest of the
prisoners themselves, was not recognized by the English. They suspected
spying, seized the German envoy who brought back the prisoners, sent
him far into the bush with his eyes bound, and then let him go where
good luck might take him. It was a wonder that the man, who was
exhausted by prolonged wandering about, found his way back. This shows
how difficult the English made it for us to avoid unnecessary severity
towards the enemy. At the same time, the English private soldiers
had faith in the treatment we meted out to our prisoners. While the
battlefield was being cleared, in which both English and German medical
officers took part, wounded Englishmen begged to be treated by the
German doctor. And later on, also, wounded men remarked that they would
hardly have been cured if they had been treated by English medical
personnel.
It was my opinion that these satisfactory successes at Kissaki had
not brought us a final decision against the troops of General Brits,
and I still believe that in the dense bush and the rugged country an
energetic pursuit, which alone would have secured the desired result,
was impossible of execution. My attention was all the more drawn
towards the force pursuing Stemmermann’s Detachment, as it had already
come within two days’ march north-east of Kissaki. During the last few
days the situation there had not been favourable; the broken ground had
in several instances caused our already weak forces to be disseminated.
Some portions had been ambushed, the troops were very fatigued, and
several people were suffering badly from nerves. On the 9th September
Stemmermann’s Detachment approached the village of Dutumi, which
was known to me from previous reconnaissance. I thought the enemy
would press on on the following day, and considered the opportunity
favourable for achieving a success at Dutumi by rapidly moving my main
body there from Kissaki. In the evening we marched away from Kissaki
by the fine broad road, and reached Dutumi that night. Captain Otto
remained at Kissaki with five companies. On arrival I decided to make
use of the factor of surprise, and to make an enveloping attack in the
early morning on the enemy’s left wing, which was identified close
in front of Stemmermann’s Detachment. I knew that this wing was in
the plain, while, looking from our side, the enemy’s centre and right
stretched away to the left up the foot-hills of the Uluguru Mountains.
It was because of these foot-hills that the chances of attack were less
favourable on our left.
Early on the 9th September, Schulz’s Detachment attacked from our
right. Rifle and machine-gun fire soon started, and the enemy’s light
artillery also opened fire; but the thick high elephant grass, with
which the plain was covered, made it impossible to form a clear idea of
things. I thought the attack was going well, and proceeded to the left
in order to get a view of the situation. The heights there were also
densely overgrown. It was very fatiguing to get along and difficult to
find anybody. I was clambering about, fairly exhausted in the heat of a
tropical noon, when I luckily heard the sound of tin pots, and found
I was right in concluding that some European was just having lunch. It
was Captain Goering, who had taken up his post in the bush on a height
which afforded a good view. Here, towards three p.m., I received the
unwelcome news that the attack by Schulz’s Detachment on our right had
not attained its object. It had been simply impossible to get at the
enemy through the dense elephant grass. If, therefore, any decisive
action was to be taken on that day at all, it could only be done on our
left. Even here, owing to the difficult country, success was not very
probable. The advancing companies got into a very intersected mountain
tract, in which they shot at the enemy, and were shot at by him without
any result, and at dusk returned to their original positions.
During the following days the enemy directed his attacks mainly against
our left, and was frequently driven back by counter-strokes. But, on
the whole, it was evident that success was only possible if the enemy
proved very unskilful. On the other hand, our communications, which
from now on no longer ran to Kissaki, but towards Behobeho in the
south-east, were in a great degree threatened by the enemy. I therefore
abandoned Dutumi, and withdrew the main body an hour’s march to the
south, across the Mgeta river, where the Force occupied an extensive
fortified camp, which it continued to hold for months. By this move the
rich fields of Dutumi were unfortunately given up. In the poor country
of Kiderengwa we had to depend mainly on supplies from the rear, which
were sent up from the Rufiji. Unfortunately the fatigues of this
transport work, combined with sickness caused by tse-tse, very soon led
to the almost complete loss of our pack-donkeys. From Kiderengwa our
fighting patrols attacked the enemy’s communications, which ran to the
north-east from Dutumi, as well as the Dutumi-Kissaki road, which soon
became alive with enemy detachments and transport.
Various observations now concurred in disclosing remarkable movements
on the part of the enemy. Both east and west of the Uluguru Mountains
movements of troops in such strength were seen to be taking place
towards Morogoro, that the natives said: “_Wana hama_” (“They are
moving elsewhere”). A large number of the South African Europeans, of
whom, by the way, many had come to the end of their strength, were
sent home. Other observations disclosed a movement of troops towards
the east. Generally speaking, a period of rest ensued, which was only
interrupted by minor expeditions of patrols and occasional artillery
bombardments.
General Smuts realized that his blow had failed. He sent me a letter
calling upon me to surrender, by which he showed that, as far as force
was concerned, he had reached the end of his resources.