BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL RAILWAYS
I ASK the reader to imagine himself in the position of a Commander,
with insufficient means, exposed to attack by superior numbers, who has
continually to ask himself: What must I do in order to retain freedom
of movement and hope?
At the end of June, 1916, events in the other theatres of war began
to exercise a decisive influence on our operations at Kondoa. The
Belgians pushed in from near Lake Kivu and from Russisi, the English
from the Kagera, west of Lake Victoria, and, since the middle of July,
from Muansa also, and all these forces were converging on Tabora. Our
troops stationed in the north-west were all combined under the command
of General Wahle, who was at Tabora; and he gradually drew in his
detachments from the frontiers towards that place.
Owing to the difficulties of communication Headquarters had but meagre
information of these events. Hostile detachments were also pressing
in from the south-west, from the country between Lakes Tanganyika and
Nyassa. Before them, our company fighting in the neighbourhood of
Bismarckburg fell back slowly in a north-easterly direction towards
Tabora. The two companies left behind to secure the Langenburg district
gradually retreated on Iringa, followed by General Northey, whose
division was equipped with all the appliances of modern warfare.
On the Northern Railway, Major Kraut’s patrols, who started out from
his fortified position at Lembeni, had occasionally scored pleasing
successes. Several aeroplanes were brought down, or came to grief,
the passengers being captured and the machines destroyed. When the
heavy rains had ceased, the enemy commenced his advance from Kahe
along the Northern Railway, as well as east of it through the Pare
Mountains, and west of it along the Pangani. Hundreds of automobiles
and large numbers of mounted troops were observed. In order to avoid
the danger of being cut off by the greatly superior enemy, Major Kraut
withdrew his main body by rail to Buiko, leaving small detachments in
contact with the enemy. In this vicinity, as well as near Mombo, a
few actions took place, in some of which our companies drove through
the enemy, who tried to block the line, and fired on him from the
train. Being in superior force, the enemy was always able, with little
trouble, to execute outflanking movements with fresh troops, but their
effectiveness was greatly reduced by the difficulty of the country. It
seemed, therefore, as though the enemy frequently departed from this
idea and adopted a sort of tactics of attrition instead. To-day he
would attack with one portion of his force, then let that rest, and put
in another the next day, and a different portion again on the third.
In spite of all his obvious urging, and his favourable conditions of
supply, his advance was fairly slow. Major Kraut’s troops never got
into a really difficult situation; on the contrary, they were often
able to catch the enemy under fire unawares, and to gain partial
successes, which occasionally caused him very considerable losses, such
as Captain Freiherr von Bodecker’s rearguard action near Handeni.
In view of this concentric advance from all directions, the question
arose, what should be done with the main body of the Protective Force
now before Kondoa? For an attack the situation was altogether too
unfavourable. The problem, therefore, was, what should be the general
direction of our retreat? I decided on the Mahenge country. By moving
there we should avoid being surrounded, it was fertile, and suitable
for guerilla warfare. From there also it would be possible to withdraw
further to the south and to continue the war for a long time to come.
Another important consideration was the safeguarding of our stores
deposited along the Central Railway, particularly in the vicinity
of Morogoro. These were greatly endangered by the rapid advance of
General Smuts, who was opposing Major Kraut, and had penetrated far to
the south beyond Handeni. Although it was to be assumed that General
Smuts would be delayed by the continually increasing length of his
communications, he seemed to me to be the most dangerous and important
of our opponents. I therefore decided to leave in front of the Kondoa
force only a detachment at Burungi, under Captain Klinghardt, but to
march my main body back to Dodoma, proceed thence by rail to Morogoro,
and move up in support of Major Kraut. It turned out afterwards that
the English were informed of this movement down to the smallest
details, and that, for instance, they knew all about a railway accident
that happened to one company during its progress. When our companies
arrived at Morogoro and the Europeans there saw the splendid bearing
of the Askari they lost the last traces of their depression; every man
and woman had comprehended that our situation was indeed difficult, but
also that there was nothing for it but to go on fighting, and that our
Force was, from its whole quality and nature, capable of carrying on
for a long time to come.
Early in July I reached Major Kraut, who was holding a fortified
position on Kanga Mountain, north-east of Tuliani. I had expected the
Askari to be depressed by their retreat, but found them in excellent
spirits and full of confidence. In front of their position they had
cleared the foreground for 50 to 100 yards and were fully convinced
that they could beat off an attack.
I employed the time that elapsed before the arrival of the other
detachments in reconnaissance, and soon formed a mental picture of the
passes which led across the difficult rock and forest country westward
of our line of communication.
Owing to the remarkably dense bush an attempt to send a strong
detachment round the enemy’s camp to attack it in rear was
unsuccessful. But the enemy did sustain casualties through numerous
minor enterprises by our patrols, who fired at his transport columns
and the automobiles working behind his front. In this way also a Staff
car was once effectively fired on. The enemy’s patrols were also active
and several of his distant patrols had got behind us. One of them,
commanded by Lieutenant Wienholt, betrayed its presence by surprising a
column of our carriers and burning the loads. Among other things these
contained a quantity of trousers which had come out in the store-ship
and were anxiously expected. Wienholt, therefore, aroused painful
interest on the part of everyone. His patrol was discovered in camp in
the dense bush and surprised. He himself got away, and trusting to the
fact that it is not easy to find anyone in the African bush, wanted
to work his way alone through our lines and back to the English. Our
well-tried men, zan Rongew, Nieuwenhudgu and Trappel, who had effected
the clever capture of the horses near Longido Mountain, succeeded
in tracking and capturing him. On my return from a reconnaissance I
met Wienholt in our camp at Tuliani enjoying a cheery meal with his
captors. We could none of us help honestly admiring the excellent work
of his patrol, whose route was accurately marked on the map that was
captured in his possession. Wienholt was then taken to a prisoners’
camp in the interior, from which he escaped some months later while
bathing. In 1917 he did excellent work on patrol round Kilwa and
Livale, and also later on, in 1918, in Portuguese East Africa. I was
greatly interested in his description of an attack by a leopard which,
with great boldness, killed his companion in camp. I presume he has by
now given friends and acquaintances the benefit of his vivid account,
of which he unfortunately lost the original later on in a patrol
encounter.
Weeks now passed, during which the English annoyed us mainly by bombs
from aircraft. They had evidently found out the exact site of our
Headquarter camp at Tuliani. I remember one day when four aeroplanes,
against which we could do nothing, circled over our camp for hours and
dropped bombs. But we had learned to make ourselves invisible, and
only the European employed in the telephone hut was so badly hurt that
he lost his hand. An adjoining hut full of valuable documents was set
alight by an incendiary bomb.
My cars were then still working, and from Tuliani I was often
able quickly to reach Kraut’s Detachment in front by the good
line-of-communication road. Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld had there
made excellent arrangements for directing the fire of the 4-inch and
3·5-inch naval guns. From his observation posts on the heights of
Kanga Mountain one had a good view of the English camps. Some weak
German detachments had not followed Major Kraut from Usambara towards
Tuliani, but had escaped along the Usambara Railway towards Tanga.
There, and also near Korogwe, they had minor encounters with the enemy
and gradually fell back towards the south, on the east side of Kraut’s
Detachment. They were followed by more considerable portions of the
enemy. Gradually the force at Tuliani became liable to be circumvented
on the east, and to lose its communication with the Morogoro country,
which was so important for the supply of stores, ammunition and
food. At the same time General van Deventer, whose force had been
augmented to a division, advanced from Kondoa to the south, and Captain
Klinghardt retired before him, first to the south, and then towards
Mpapua.
The closeness and difficulty of the country caused Captain Klinghardt
to still further subdivide his already small force (five companies)
in order to watch and block important passes. The enemy followed
with a large number of automobiles, and occasionally one of them
was successfully blown up by mines sunk in the roads. Owing to the
unavoidable dissemination of Captain Klinghardt’s troops, and the
difficulty of maintaining touch between them, one part often could
not know what was happening to its neighbours. A large German mounted
patrol was attempting to connect up from the east with a detachment
believed to be at Meiameia, on the road from Dodoma to Kondoa-Irangi.
All unconsciously it rode straight into a hostile camp and was captured
almost without exception. The retirement of our troops from Kondoa,
who had not merely to escape, but also to inflict damage on the enemy,
was a very difficult manœuvre; the right moment to fall back, to halt
again, to advance for a sudden counter-stroke, and then break off
again quickly, and in sufficient time, is difficult to gauge. Reliable
reports were lacking. Owing to the scarcity of means of communication
the difficulties attending the retirement of several columns through
unknown country grew infinitely great. The influence of the commander
was often eliminated, and too much had to be left to chance. On the
31st July, 1916, the enemy reached the Central Railway at Dodoma.
Captain Klinghardt slipped off to the east along the railway. In
the actions which took place west of Mpapua several favourable
opportunities were not recognized, and neighbouring detachments, whose
assistance had been relied on, did not arrive in time. Such things
easily give rise to a feeling of insecurity among the troops and weaken
confidence and enterprise. The difficulties were accentuated in this
case by the fact that Captain Klinghardt was taken ill with typhoid and
became a casualty just at the critical moment. Captain Otto was sent
from Tuliani to replace him, and succeeded in once more collecting the
scattered parties and in establishing united control.
The 2nd Rifle Company also, which had been obliged to retire on Saranda
by the Kondoa-Saranda road, and with which all touch had been lost,
made a great circuit on the south side of the railway and rejoined
Otto’s Detachment. Owing to the numerical superiority of the enemy, in
the actions which now took place, Otto’s Detachment frequently found
itself exposed to an attack on its front while being enveloped on both
flanks. The enemy did not always succeed in timing these movements
correctly. Thus, at Mpapua, the frontal attack got too close to our
line and suffered severely; and the flank attack, even when directed
on the rear of our positions, produced no decisive effect. The short
range of visibility always enabled us either to avoid the danger, or,
if the opportunity was favourable, to attack the troops outflanking us
in detail. In any event, these outflanking tactics of the enemy, when
followed, as in this case, in extraordinarily thick bush, and among
numerous rocks, demanded great exertions and used up his strength.
Every day Captain Otto fell back only a couple of miles further to the
east, and in these operations the railway enabled him to change the
position of his big gun at will. When Otto’s Detachment approached
Kilossa it became necessary to move the main body at Tuliani also.
Headquarters and a part of the force moved to Morogoro, Major Kraut,
with several companies and a 4-inch gun, to Kilossa. At Tuliani Captain
Schulz took command.
I now considered that columns pressing on from the north would soon
reach the country west of Bagamoyo, and that at this place also troops
would be landed. In order to reconnoitre personally, I travelled to
Ruwa Station and thence by bicycle over the sandy, undulating road
to Bagamoyo. One day’s march south of Bagamoyo I came on the camp of
two Europeans: it was District Commissioner Michels, who wanted to
remove his threatened District Headquarters from Bagamoyo towards the
interior. The inhabitants were confiding and were living as in peace.
So far the universal war had passed them by without a trace. As time
pressed I had to turn back and Herr Michels’ fast Muscat donkey carried
me back to Ruwa in a few hours. On the next day, from Kidugallo, I
reconnoitred the supply depots established there and further to the
north by cycle and then returned to Morogoro. Other reconnaissances,
mostly also by cycle, took me to the mountains lying to westward in the
direction of Kilossa, and along the roads leading round the Uluguru
Mountains on the west and east. The passes leading from Morogoro up
the northern slopes of the gigantic Uluguru group, and down again on
the south side towards Kissaki, had to be examined on foot. Owing
to the pressure exerted by General van Deventer on Kilossa, and the
danger that Captain Schulz might also be circumvented at Tuliani, it
was imperative not to miss the right moment for withdrawing Captain
Schulz to Morogoro. But in order to retain the power of delivering
counter-strokes we had to hold on to the Tuliani area as long as
possible.
Captain Stemmermann’s Detachment, which had been pushed out a short
day’s march due north of Tuliani, was attacked at Maomondo by a strong
force of Europeans and Indians. The enemy was very skilful. A machine
gun of the 6th Company, placed on a rocky slope, was seized by a few
Indians, who had crept up to it from the front unobserved, and thrown
down the steep slope, so that it could not be found again. The enemy,
who had penetrated our lines, was thrown out again with heavy loss by
a counter-attack by the 21st Company. At close quarters the English
Major Buller, a son of the well-known General of the South African War
days, put a bullet through the hat of the Company Commander, Lieutenant
von Ruckteschell, but was then severely wounded by the latter. Major
Buller was got away to the German hospital at Dar-es-Salaam and nursed
back to health by the wife of his opponent, who was working there as
a nurse. During the actions at Maternondo English horsemen had worked
round farther to the west, and suddenly appeared in one of the mountain
passes leading from the west to Tuliani. In the dense bush the 2nd
Mounted Brigade, which had come from South Africa under General Brits,
apparently sustained heavy casualties.
With the consent of Headquarters, Captain Schulz now withdrew to
Derkawa, which is situated in dense bush on the Wami river, on the
road from Tuliani to Morogoro. Here he occupied a fortified position
on the south bank, where he was attacked on the 13th August by the
enemy pursuing from Tuliani, with a force of at least one brigade of
infantry, and General Brits’ Mounted Brigade, while simultaneously
another brigade, which had marched up the right bank of the Wami,
attacked him from the east. During the action continuous telephonic
communication was maintained with Captain Schulz from Morogoro. The
enemy’s losses were estimated at several hundred, and were afterwards
confirmed by the English. The attacks were beaten off, but in the dense
bush it was so difficult to obtain a clear idea of the situation that
it did not seem possible to achieve a decisive success. Captain Schulz
was chary of putting in the one formed company he had left. I approved
his intention of falling back to Morogoro at the end of the action,
as the general situation made it desirable for me to concentrate my
forces. After Major Kraut’s arrival at Kilossa I also brought Captain
Otto in to Morogoro, with part of his companies. Major Kraut had passed
behind Otto’s Detachment through Kilossa and after some engagements
at that place, he took up a position immediately to the south of it,
on the road to Mahenge. Even after the enemy had moved into Kilossa
telephonic communication with Kraut’s Detachment had continued to work
for a few hours through the enemy.
From that time on direct communication with Major Kraut was
interrupted. Signalling by helio did not work, and the wires which
led from Kissaki, and later from the Rufiji, to Mahenge, and thence
to Major Kraut, were not yet completed—in some cases not even begun.
With General Wahle at Tabora we had also had no communication since the
second half of July, that is, for over a month. Bagamoyo had fallen
into the enemy’s hands; and every day we expected to hear of the fall
of Dar-es-Salaam and to lose touch with that place.