HOSTILE ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH-EAST OF THE COLONY
MEANWHILE, the situation at Kilwa began to demand increased attention.
We had there only weak detachments for protecting the coast, which
consisted mainly of young, newly-enlisted Askari, and had been
organized as a company. This company was not sufficient, and there
was a danger that the enemy might march from Kilwa to the Rufiji,
or to Livale, and get in our rear. No doubt the enemy had some such
intention, and something had to be done to prevent it. Major von
Boemken, with three companies, had already marched off from the
battlefield of Dutumi for Kunguliu on the Rufiji, proceeding thence to
Utete by route march and on the stern-wheeler _Tomondo_. The _Tomondo_
was the only shallow-draught steamer on the Rufiji, and carried most
of the supplies, which came from the lower Rufiji to Kunguliu, whence
they were carried to the troops at Kiderengwa by donkeys and carriers.
It now required a certain amount of discussion before the civil
authorities would place the _Tomondo_ at my disposal for carrying the
necessary troops. At Kilwa the situation did not develop altogether
satisfactorily. It is true that a few minor engagements were more or
less in our favour, but, as so often happened during the war, we did
not manage to secure united control of our forces. Among other things,
the enemy succeeded in destroying a supply depot west of Kilwa, which
was too near the coast. The enemy cleverly incited the natives to
rebellion, and they rendered him valuable service as spies. Several
German reconnoitring detachments were ambushed and suffered severely.
The District Commissioner of Kilwa was taken prisoner. The awkwardness
of the already difficult situation at Kilwa was increased by the fact
that the District Commissioner’s Askari were not placed under the
orders of the military commander.
At the same time, the pressure of hostile forces was felt from the
direction of Dar-es-Salaam, in the north, towards the lower Rufiji.
Our weak detachments, which had fallen back from Dar-es-Salaam in a
southerly direction towards the Rufiji, and consisted principally
of a young company of Askari and part of the ship’s company of
the _Königsberg_, were not enough to protect the rich sources of
subsistence in the lower Rufiji country. But at the time this country
was what the Force depended on, for the middle Rufiji country was but
sparsely settled, and could not maintain both troops and carriers for
any length of time. In view of this necessitous situation, we had at
once started to grow maize in the fertile lowlands of Logeloge and
Mpanganya, but the harvest could not be expected before March, 1917. We
were, therefore, threatened by a great danger when several companies of
Indians attacked our advanced officers’ post in the Boma of Kissengire.
The enemy, who assaulted the steep walls without sufficient preparatory
fire, was driven off with considerable loss. Unfortunately, the
German commander, Lieutenant Baldamus, of the Reserve, who exposed
himself too freely to the enemy projectiles, was killed. But his
resolute and gallant defence secured us in the possession of the
seat of administration at Kissengire until the arrival of adequate
reinforcements; it is, therefore, due to this officer that we retained
control of the rich supply area of the lower Rufiji for months to come.
[Illustration: Askari. A halt.
(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)]
[Illustration: The Banyan Tree.
(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)]
[Illustration: Fig. xiii. Battles of Kissaki and Dutumi.]
[Illustration: Fig. xiv. March of German Main Force, September, 1916,
to June, 1917.]
It has already been mentioned that a pause in the operations had
occurred at Kiderengwa; an attack on the enemy, who was entrenched in
a strong position, promised no success. Headquarters accordingly left
only eight companies, under Captain Tafel, in the Kissaki-Kiderengwa
area (and this force was reduced later), moving with the bulk of the
troops to the lower Rufiji. The road to Kunguliu led past large lakes,
which, like the Rufiji, were full of hippopotami. Owing to the general
demand for fat, hippopotamus shooting became a question of existence.
One has to watch until the animal’s head is clearly visible, so as to
hit in a spot that will cause instantaneous death. The animal then
sinks, and comes up again after a little time when it can be drawn to
the bank by means of a rope, quickly made of bark. There it is cut up,
and the expert knows exactly where to find the white, appetizing fat.
The quantity varies: a well-fed beast provides over two bucketfuls. But
one has to learn, not only how to prepare the fat, but also how to kill
immediately with the first shot. Some foolish people had been reckless,
and in many places the dead bodies of wounded animals were to be seen,
which quickly decompose and become unfit for food. The elephant also
was now regarded in a new light; ordinarily the elephant hunter gauges
the length and weight of the tusk before firing; now the pressing
question was: how much fat will the beast supply? For elephant fat is
very good, and possibly tastes even better than that of the hippo.
At Kunguliu the herds of cattle we had brought along were driven
into the river, and swam across. Up till then the troops had crossed
by ferry, on which Herr Kühlwein, the former traffic manager of our
lost Northern Railway, now contented himself with the more modest
post of “Traffic Manager, Kunguliu Ferry.” When we arrived, a bridge,
three hundred and thirty yards long, had been completed, which was
also capable of taking vehicles. On the south bank we went into camp
near Niakisiku Plantation, belonging to Lieutenant Bleeck, of the
Reserve, who had been called up. The Europeans’ houses had been fitted
up as hospitals, and were fully occupied. At Logeloge we found the
Headquarters of the Line of Communication, where a large number of
roomy grass huts had been put up for the troops. The plantation itself,
belonging to a company, comprised extensive sisal fields. Food also was
cultivated in plenty. The country being free of tse-tse, supported a
large amount of cattle, and the survivors of our pack-donkeys had been
brought there from the tse-tse country north of the Rufiji. Here the
families of the Europeans still lived in their solidly-built houses,
and were thankful that the course of the operations had enabled them
to continue their home and business life undisturbed for more than two
years.
At Logeloge, and at the agricultural experimental establishment
of Mpanganya, which we reached next day, other Europeans of the
neighbourhood had also collected, and, where the existing buildings
failed to accommodate them, had built themselves houses with poles and
cane, or grass. Here an unpleasant symptom also made its appearance.
While the troops at the front were animated by the best spirit and
great enterprise, things behind the front were not always the same.
The people who understood least of the business always knew everything
better, and fostered a certain amount of discontent. That kind of thing
is catching, and in the long run undermines right feeling. Fortunately,
however, many of the troops behind the front had enough soldierly
pride to shut up the grousers pretty bluntly on occasion. In one of
the hospitals there someone was becoming rather too free with his
destructive criticism, and a wounded man answered: “I tell you what,
the Commandant is the brain of the Force, but you’re its backside!”
This unvarnished epithet was so apt, that it at once turned the laugh
on the side of the speaker, and polished away the spot of tarnish that
threatened to spread.
The question now was, whether we should first turn to the north against
the force at Kissengire, or against the one at Kilwa. The latter had
not, as Major von Boemken had feared, moved on towards Livale, but,
possibly influenced by the movements of our troops, had turned towards
the north. It thus worked into the Kibata country, which, though rich,
was very mountainous, and difficult for manœuvre, and as long as it
remained there I did not think it would be very dangerous. I considered
it sufficient merely to prevent it from pushing further towards the
Rufiji, for which a weak force of five companies, under Major Schulz,
was enough. Major von Boemken, who was anxious about Livale, had, with
two companies and a 4-inch gun, made his way into the neighbourhood of
Mpotora, a chance circumstance, from which, as will be seen, we later
reaped great benefit. I had, therefore, a free hand to move on towards
Kissengire. That was important, and enabled us to secure the rich
supply country north of the lower Rufiji, and to get away the valuable
stocks from thence to the middle Rufiji. Whether there would be an
opportunity of obtaining a success in the field it was not possible to
tell; but I thought that the enemy, since he had pushed troops from the
Uluguru Mountains in an easterly direction to the neighbourhood of
Kissengire, would exert some pressure from the north. So it was quite
possible that we might find a favourable opportunity for a fight. We
crossed the Rufiji at Utete in boats, and in a few days reached Makima,
one day’s march south of Kissengire. By that time a sufficient garrison
of two companies had been assembled at Kissengire, where it was
actively employed in strengthening the position. A little to the north,
at Maneromango, was a strong force of the enemy, and a European patrol,
which had started out from Kiderengwa, reported that hostile troops had
been moved from the west towards the Maneromango-Kissengire area.
A few days after leaving Kiderengwa this patrol had got into a
waterless country in terrible heat, and the various members had lost
each other in the dense bush. They made their presence known by firing,
and had no choice but to surrender to the English. Only the determined
patrol-leader had managed to escape to a native village, where the
inhabitants greeted him with apparent friendliness and brought him
eggs. As he bent down to take them, they fell upon him, and handed him
over to a patrol of English Askari concealed close by. An Askari with a
mule, who behaved rather arrogantly, was to escort the German back. On
the way the German, during conversation, drew his attention to faults
in his bridle, and succeeded in seizing the mule and riding off on it
with all speed. In the struggle which took place, he had seized the
Askari’s rifle and shot him with it.
To the east of Kissengire our patrols also pushed on to the north, and
quite a number of minor engagements took place in the bush, in which
the enemy at times suffered very severely. Further to the east, on
the coast near Kissiju, other hostile detachments were also roaming
about, and a small English man-of-war was there too. One morning
Captain von Lieberman, with the 11th Company, surprised this opponent,
and our Askari went for him with a will, cheering. The man-of-war was
also fired upon with the field gun, and apparently several hits were
obtained. After driving the enemy out of Kissiju, Captain von Lieberman
returned. We also operated against the enemy’s communications, and
small fights occurred almost daily.
The closely-settled country is of simply fabulous fertility. Besides
abundant flour, both Europeans and Askari had mangos, paw paws,
mustapheles, cocoanuts, and other tropical fruits. We were surprised
to see the large rice-fields, which were here close to the south side
of Dar-es-Salaam, seeing that in peace-time most of the rice had come
from India. Of cattle there was but little, but the companies began to
send out shooting parties into the prairie, which was full of game, and
extended especially on the western side of our positions. That there
must be game in the vicinity was proved by the presence of numerous
lions. Frequently a family of five lions wandered through our camp at
night, and occasionally killed animals in it.
While Headquarters was at Makima in October, a report came in which
caused me to suppose that the landing of strong enemy forces at Kilwa,
and the appearance of hostile detachments which, coming from the west
towards Livale, had arrived on the Mbaranganda river, formed part of a
big converging movement by the enemy against Livale. Strong forces of
Portuguese had crossed the Rovuma, invaded the highlands of Makonde,
and established themselves in the district of Nevala. The captain
of the _Königsberg_, Captain Looff, had, after the evacuation of
Dar-es-Salaam, proceeded by land, first to the _Königsberg’s_ old area
on the Rufiji, and then to Lindi. He had now taken over command in the
south. With the three newly-raised companies of Askari, the only troops
available there at the moment, he had entrenched himself in front of
the strong positions of the enemy who had landed at Lindi, covered the
removal of the cargo of the store-ship from Ssudi to the north, and
inflicted damage on the Portuguese, who had shown themselves on the
lower Rovuma, by means of minor expeditions. His force was, however,
rather too weak to enable him to turn against the Portuguese, who were
advancing in his rear about Nevala, with any prospect of a rapid and
decisive success.
It was, therefore, very convenient that, as already mentioned, two
companies and the 4-inch _Königsberg_ gun of von Boemken’s Detachment
happened to be at Mpotora. To command this detachment, Captain
Rothe, of the Reserve, was sent from the Rufiji, as he could in
the circumstances be spared from his duties as Principal Postmaster
(_Oberpostdirektor_), and had, at his urgent request, been placed at
the unrestricted disposal of the Protective Force. In a few days he
arrived from Niakisiku by cycle, took over his detachment, and led it
towards Nevala. Captain Looff took command of the whole force, the
Portuguese were thoroughly well hammered by the _Königsberg_ gun,
and their positions were captured by assault. We took a really very
considerable amount of booty, including four mountain guns, a number
of machine guns, several hundred rifles, much ammunition, several
automobiles, supplies, and all kinds of equipment. During the following
weeks we continually found quantities of buried stores and ammunition.
The very secret places were particularly well stocked. The Portuguese
were driven completely out of German territory, and pursued for some
distance into their own country. But consideration of the general
situation prevented me from carrying on the pursuit to the uttermost.
Rothe’s Detachment was brought back to Mpotora, in order to keep an
eye on the enemy at Kilwa, who grew continually stronger. Even before
this movement was executed, I considered it necessary to transfer
strong forces from the neighbourhood of Kissengire towards Kibata. No
opportunity had presented itself of fighting a decisive successful
battle north of the lower Rufiji; as I had expected, I was obliged to
proceed to a prolonged operation in the mountains of Kibata, which
offered but little prospect of leading to a decision.
The transfer of the troops towards Kibata took place at the end of
November, 1916. On the way we encamped at Utete, where roomy hospitals
had been established in the building of the Civil Government, and where
an officers’ mess had been established on a _baraza_ (an airy veranda).
The place was situated on dominating heights, and had been strongly
fortified with trenches and abatis, and commanded the lower-lying
and very extensive native town. Almost all night one heard the deep
grunting of the hippo, and one impudent lion, having failed in his
attack on a native, tried to kill another man in our camp. Fortunately
his quarry was taken from him at the last moment by a European, who
hurried to the spot, and several natives. Continuing, we reached
the Moboro-Kibata road. Captain Schulz, who had with his detachment
occupied a strong position two hours north of Kibata, was drawing his
supplies from the country round Moboro. Several depots on this road
were filled from the fertile country immediately surrounding them.
In addition, Captain Schulz sent out parties to buy supplies in the
districts near his camp, in which the whole wealth of the country is
revealed.
From a mountain near Mbindia, the camp of Schulz’s Detachment, one
could see a broad forest track passing over the heights. This was the
road for a 4-inch _Königsberg_ gun, which was being brought up to its
position before Kibata by Lieut.-Commander Apel. Chanting in rhythm,
hundreds of natives dragged the heavy load up and down the steep
slopes, over which a suitable track had been surveyed and cut through
the thick bush. Shortly after its arrival at Mbindia, the gun had been
placed in position on a mountain saddle from which, later on, the
bombardment was successfully carried out. One of the 4-inch howitzers
was also got into position further forward in a valley, so as to fire
over the high ground in front and reach the enemy’s camps. Detailed
reconnaissances had disclosed the possibility of moving our infantry,
concealed by the dense bush, into some high ground which commanded
the country north of Kibata. The weak hostile force holding this high
ground was surprised by an attack from the rear and quickly driven off.
Then another height was attacked, situated at a water-hole immediately
to the north of the solid European buildings. We could soon see our
Askari climbing up it, and establishing themselves on it about eighty
yards in front of a hostile position.
By this time the deployment of our artillery was completed; besides the
4-inch _Königsberg_ gun and the field-howitzer the two mountain guns
had been brought into action, in line with our infantry. We had delayed
opening fire on the buildings, where we saw numbers of men and animals
walking about on the bare hill-top, until everything was ready. One
company which had got round the enemy’s rear, and established itself
on his main line of communication, running from Kibata to Kilwa,
observed that the heavy shells falling near the Boma (Fort) caused a
frightful panic. Heaps of the enemy’s Askari ran away as fast as they
could, across the front of the company which was lying in concealment.
But unfortunately the company allowed itself to be deterred from taking
advantage of this favourable opportunity. It hoped that the scattered
parties of Askari would soon be followed by larger bodies, and did
not want to give away the chance of a surprise prematurely. But the
expected large bodies did not come, and thus, as unfortunately happened
often, a good opportunity was lost through waiting for a better. The
infantry attack on the above-mentioned heights immediately north of
Kibata had involved the loss of several very efficient Europeans.
Sergeant-Major Mirow was killed, Vice-Sergeant-Major Jitzmann was
shot in the leg and sustained a severe and very painful injury to the
nerve of his leg. He had previously often distinguished himself by his
untiring and successful raids on the Uganda Railway. Through prolonged
detention in hospital he was now lost to the Service, and fell into the
enemy’s hands before he was recovered.
It was very difficult to find one’s way in the extraordinarily rugged
mountains of Kibata. A number of reconnoitring expeditions were sent
out and after a few days we felt more or less at home. It was possible
to obtain a good view of Kibata and of the enemy’s communications, and
we ascertained that he was reinforcing his troops more and more. As
a matter of fact he employed at Kibata the main body of the division
landed at Kilwa. Our observations and the peculiarities of the ground
led us to expect that the enemy intended to work from Kibeta round our
right, or western, flank, and thus force us to evacuate the heights
commanding Kibata and its water-supply from the north. A direct attack
by the 120th Baluchis had been defeated with great loss to the enemy.
During the opening days of December we observed at first weak, and then
stronger detachments, which pushed forward from hill to hill towards
our right flank, and whose advanced parties soon reached a commanding
mountain, known to the English as Gold Coast Hill. Our counter-stroke
against this force was at first favoured by ravines and forests, and
our Askari surprised even us when they became visible close in front of
the enemy’s positions. Our guns were ready to fire, but unluckily the
first shell pitched among our own men, and the infantry attack, which
could only succeed by rapidity and surprise, failed. However, the fire
of our two mountain guns at under 1,800 yards, and of our howitzers,
which were further back, caused quite considerable casualties among
the Gold Coast Regiment. The enemy was on a narrow hog’s-back, the
steep slopes of which were for the most part bare. He could, therefore,
hardly withdraw, and in the hard ground entrenching took a long time.
We then surrounded the hill with infantry, and poured a converging
fire on the good targets presented to us. It became impossible for the
enemy to hold this highly important position any longer. After it was
evacuated we found a large number of graves, each for many bodies, and
at this point the enemy must have lost not less than 150 killed.
The advance of the Gold Coast Regiment had nevertheless been of
advantage to the enemy. My force being so weak—we had, all told, about
nine companies—I had withdrawn one of the two companies stationed in
the immediate vicinity of Kibata in order to employ it against Gold
Coast Hill. After I had returned to camp that night I heard the sound
of a number of small detonations emanating from the one company left
alone to face the enemy. It was only after some time that we recognized
this as a grenade attack, a manœuvre then unknown to us. Several
companies of the enemy attacked with such rapidity and skill, that they
penetrated the trenches of our weak company by surprise and drove it
out. The loss of this position deprived us of the possibility of firing
at close range from that very suitable height at hostile troops moving
about, or proceeding to their water-supply. Until then I had done so
with success, and had even occasionally sent up a light gun to the
place, withdrawing it again after it had ceased fire.
But the loss of this high ground and the casualties sustained in it
faded into insignificance beside the success achieved on Gold Coast
Hill. In spite of our inferiority in numbers, we completely dominated
the situation. Our patrols and stronger raiding parties worked right
round the enemy’s rear and pushed on to his communications. Minor
enterprises on his part produced no results. On the whole, the enemy
suffered very considerable casualties at Kibata, and I think they
should be estimated at not less than four hundred men. The operations
intended by him were also completely wrecked. There can be no doubt
that he waited to advance from Kilwa on Livale. Our vigorous action at
Kibata forced him to move from Kilwa against us, and to leave the rest
of the country and the whole of our supply and transport apparatus in
peace. Towards the end of December hostile planes appeared, cruising
about over our positions and dropping bombs. Although they now used
far more powerful bombs than formerly, they hardly inflicted any
casualties. On Christmas Day we saw a larger mass than usual falling on
the Boma of Kibata. We were disappointed in our hope that the enemy was
bombing his own camp; it was only a large quantity of cigarettes as a
Christmas present for the troops.
One day, during that period, I received a personal letter from the
British Commander-in-Chief, General Smuts, in which he informed me
that I had been awarded the Order Pour le Mérite, and expressed the
hope that his cordial congratulations would not be unacceptable to
me. I thanked him equally politely, although I at first believed that
he was confusing it with the Second Class of the Order of the Crown
with Swords, which I had received a short time before. I mention this
letter from General Smuts as a proof of the mutual personal esteem and
chivalry which existed throughout in spite of the exhausting warfare
carried on by both sides. On many other occasions also the enemy
intimated his great appreciation of the achievements of the German
forces.
At the end of 1916 I regarded the military situation in the Colony as
remarkably favourable, for I knew that the South African troops were
for the most part worn out with battle-casualties and sickness, while
a large proportion of the remainder were returning to South Africa at
the end of their engagements. Prisoners had repeatedly assured us that
they had had enough of the “picnic” in East Africa. The Indian troops
also, who had been in the field in East Africa for some length of time,
were reduced in numbers, while the late arrivals—we identified Indian
Pathan Regiments at Kibata—consisted largely of young soldiers. Other
regiments, like the 129th Baluchis, who had fought in Flanders, were no
doubt very good, but they might not be expected to stand the fatigues
of African warfare for a very prolonged period. The enemy’s Askari
were, generally speaking, new troops, and only a small proportion of
them had at that time been in the field. So we could continue calmly
to contemplate the continuation of the war for a considerable time.
I still believe that we would have succeeded not only in holding our
own, but even in beating the enemy, if he had not enjoyed the power of
continually filling up his reduced units and of bringing up fresh ones.
At the end of 1916 I did not know that this had already been effected
on an extensive scale. Among other reinforcements a strong brigade of
black troops had been brought from Nigeria to Dar-es-Salaam, whence it
had been moved on without delay to Dutumi and Kissaki.
In the early days of January, 1917, the five companies encamped
there under Captain Otto were attacked by General Smuts with at
least two brigades. In planning his attack the enemy had provided
for simultaneous wide turning movements, which, with his greatly
superior numbers, enabled him to bar the retreat of our troops towards
Kungulio. More than once our Askari had to clear their way with the
bayonet, and in the close country some of our companies got into very
awkward situations. In withdrawing to Behobeho our field howitzer,
having only a weak escort, was ambushed by a hostile force of several
companies, and was lost, after the whole detachment had been killed.
But in the end all portions of the detachment successfully avoided
being surrounded, and in assembling at Behobeho. At this place very
heavy fighting immediately took place, in which the enemy also fought
with great bravery. It was in this action that the old hunter Selous
was killed, who was well known even among Germans, on account of his
charming manner and his exciting stories. He had joined as a subaltern.
With a superior enemy before him and on both flanks, and behind him the
mighty Rufiji, crossed only by the one frail bridge, Captain Otto yet
succeeded in reaching the south bank of the river, with all his troops,
and in destroying the bridge, in accordance with his instructions.
We had also observed a wide turning movement which the enemy was making
from Kissaki further west towards Mkalinzo on the Rufiji, which now
became ineffective. The hostile brigade undertaking it did not reach
the south bank of the Rufiji in time to oppose Captain Otto’s passage,
and thus render his situation desperate; on the contrary, we gained
partial successes which were quite considerable. The enemy following
us from Behobeho came on very vigorously and passed a large part of
his force over the Rufiji at Kungulio in boats. Captain Otto held his
detachment in readiness a little to the south of the river, and now
attacked the enemy, of whom part only had crossed over, and completely
defeated him with heavy loss. This partial success was favoured by
the inaction of the hostile column, which, as already mentioned, was
making the turning movement by Mkalinzo. It consisted principally of
whites, and a part of the black Nigerian troops. Neither of them were
equal to the long march involved, and had therefore reached the Rufiji
exhausted and unfit for further operations. They remained out of action
for quite a long time, and the unity of General Smuts’ otherwise quite
well-planned operation was wrecked.
In consequence of the enemy’s advance in force at Kungulio, the danger
arose that he might gain possession of the middle Rufiji, and of the
country to the south of it. He might then easily seize the bulk of
our stores, and our whole system of communications, which for the
most part ran from the middle Rufiji towards Livale. It was therefore
necessary for me to meet his movements with our main body, which was
before Kibeta, and so I marched off with the greater part of it to Lake
Utungi, where I would be in a position to help Captain Otto, or to
seize any favourable opportunity that might offer.