positions of Yvré, Auvours, and Sargé strongly; whilst Colomb (17th Corps)
was instructed to send General Pâris's division forward to Ardenay, thus
reducing Colomb's actual command to one division, as Jouffroy's column had
previously been detached from it. On both sides every operation was
attended by great difficulties on account of the very severe weather.
A momentary thaw had been followed by another sudden frost, in such wise
that the roads had a coating of ice, which rendered them extremely
slippery. On January 9 violent snowstorms set in, almost blinding one, and
yet the rival hosts did not for an hour desist from their respective
efforts. At times, when I recall those days, I wonder whether many who
have read of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow have fully realized what that
meant. Amidst the snowstorms of the 9th a force of German cavalry attacked
our extreme left and compelled it to retreat towards the Alençon line.
Rousseau's column being in a dangerous position at Connerré, Colin's
division of the 21st Corps was sent forward to support it in the direction
of Montfort, Gougeard with his Bretons also advancing to support Colin.
But the 13th German Corps attacked Rousseau, who after two engagements
was driven from Connerré and forced to retreat on Montfort and
Pont-de-Gennes across the Huisne, after losing in killed, wounded, and
missing, some 800 of his men, whereas the enemy lost barely a hundred.
At the same time Gougeard was attacked, and compelled to fall back on
Saint-Mars-la-Bruyére.
But the principal event of the day was the defeat of General Paris's force
at Ardenay by a part of the 3rd German Corps. The latter had a superiority
in numbers, but the French in their demoralised condition scarcely put up
a fight at all, in such wise that the Germans took about 1000 prisoners.
The worst, however, was that, by seizing Ardenay, the enemy drove as it
were a wedge between the French forces, hampering their concentration.
Meantime, the 9th German Corps marched to Bouloire, which became Prince
Frederick Charles's headquarters. The 10th Corps, however, had not yet
been able to advance to Parigné l'Evêque in accordance with the Prince's
orders, though it had driven Barry back on Jupilles and Grand Lucé. The
sole advantage secured by the French that day was that Curten managed to
retreat from Château-Renault; but it was only on the night of the 10th,
when he could be of little or no use to Chanzy, that he was able to reach
Château-du-Loir, where, in response to Chanzy's urgent appeals,
Jauréguiberry had succeeded in collecting a few thousand men to reinforce
the troops defending Le Mans.
For four days there had been fighting on one and another point, from the
north-east to the south of the town, the result being unfavourable to the
French. Chanzy, it is true, was at this critical moment in bad health.
According to one account which I heard at the time, he had had an attack
of dysentery; according to another, he was suffering from some throat
complaint, combined with violent neuralgic pains in the head. I do not
think, however, that his ill-health particularly affected the issue, which
depended so largely on the manner in which his plans and instructions were
carried out. The strategy adopted by the Germans at Sedan and in the
battles around Metz had greatly impressed the generals who commanded the
French armies during the second period of the war. One might really say
that they lived in perpetual dread of being surrounded by the enemy. If
there was a lack of concentration on Chanzy's part, if he sent out one and
another flying column, and distributed a considerable portion of his army
over a wide area, it was precisely because he feared some turning movement
on the part of the Germans, which might result in bottling him up at
Le Mans.
The earlier instructions which Prince Frederick Charles forwarded to his
subordinates certainly seem to indicate that a turning movement was
projected. But after the fighting on January 9, when, as I have indicated,
the 3rd German Army Corps penetrated wedge-like into the French lines, the
Prince renounced any idea of surrounding Chanzy's forces, and resolved to
make a vigorous frontal attack before they could be reinforced by any of
the still outlying columns. In coming to this decision, the Prince may
well have been influenced by the result of the recent fighting, which had
sufficiently demonstrated the superiority of the German troops to show
that, under the circumstances, a frontal attack would be attended with far
less risk than if he had found himself faced by a really vigorous
antagonist. Captain Hozier, whom I had previously seen at Versailles, was
at this time acting as _Times_ correspondent with the Prince's army, and,
in subsequently reviewing the fighting, he expressed the opinion that the
issue of the Prince's operations was never for a moment doubtful. Still,
on all points but one, the French put up a fairly good defence, as I will
now show.
XII
LE MANS AND AFTER
The real Battle of Le Mans begins (January 10)--Jouffroy and Pâris
are driven back--Gougeard's Fight at Champagné--The Breton Mobilisés
from Conlie--Chanzy's Determination--His Orders for January 11--He
inspects the Lines--Pâris driven from the Plateau of Auvours--Gougeard's
gallant re-capture of the Plateau--My Return to Le Mans--The Panic at La
Tuilerie--Retreat inevitable--Withdrawal of the French--Entry of the
Germans--Street Fighting--German Exactions--My Escape from Le Mans--The
French Retreat--Rear-Guard Engagements--Laval--My Arrest as a Spy--A
Dramatic Adventure.
Some more snow fell on the morning of January 10, when the decisive
fighting in front of Le Mans really began. On the evening of the 9th the
French headquarters was still without news of Generals Curten, Barry,
and Jouffroy, and even the communications with Jauréguiberry were of an
intermittent character. Nevertheless, Chanzy had made up his mind to give
battle, and had sent orders to Jauréguiberry to send Jouffroy towards
Parigné-l'Evêque (S.E.) and Barry towards Ecommoy (S. of Le Mans). But
the roads were in so bad a condition, and the French troops had been so
severely tried, and were so ill-provided for, that several of the
commander-in-chief's instructions could not be carried out.
Jouffroy at least did his best, and after a hard and tiring march from
Grand Lucé, a part of his division reached Parigné in time to join in the
action fought there. But it ended disastrously for the French, one of
their brigades losing as many as 1400 men, and the Germans taking
altogether some 2000 prisoners. Jouffroy's troops then fell back to
Pontlieue, the southern suburb of Le Mans, in a lamentable condition, and
took care to place the Huisne between themselves and the Germans. In the
same direction Paris's demoralised, division, already worsted at Ardenay
on the previous day, was driven from Changé by the 3rd German Corps, which
took no fewer than 5000 prisoners. It had now almost cut the French
eastern and southern lines apart, threatening all direct communication
between the 21st and the 16th French Corps. Nevertheless, it was in a
dangerous position, having both of its flanks exposed to attack, one from
Yvré and Auvours, and the other from Pontlieue and the Chemin des Boeufs,
which last line was held by the 16th French Corps.
Meantime, Gougeard's Bretons had been engaged at Champagné, quite a close
encounter taking place in the fields and on the vineyard slopes, followed
by a house-to-house fight in the village streets. The French were at last
driven back; but somewhat later, on the Germans retiring from Champagné,
they reoccupied the place. The result of the day was that, apart from the
somewhat hazardous success achieved by the 3rd German Corps, the enemy had
gained no great advantage. His 13th Corps had made but little progress,
his 9th had not been brought into action, and his 10th was as yet no
nearer than Grand Lucé. On the French side, Barry had at last reached
Mulsanne, thus covering the direct southern road to Le Mans, Jauréguiberry
being lower down at Ecommoy with some 9000 men of various arms and
regiments, whom he had managed to get together. As for Curten's division,
as it could not possibly reach the immediate neighbourhood of Le Mans in
time for the fighting on the 11th, it received orders to march on La Suze,
south-west of the imperilled town. During the 10th, moreover, Chanzy was
strengthened by the welcome arrival of several additional field-pieces and
a large number of horses. He had given orders to raise the Camp of Conlie,
but instead of the forty or fifty thousand men, which at an earlier period
it was thought that camp would be able to provide, he now only derived
from it some 9000 ill-equipped, badly armed, and almost undrilled
Breton Mobilisés. [On the other hand, as I previously related, the camp
had already provided the bulk of the men belonging to Gougeard's
division.] They were divided into six battalions--one of which came
from Saint Malo, the others from Rennes and Redon--and were commanded by
a general named Lalande. They proved to be no accession of strength; they
became, on the contrary, a source of weakness, and disaster, for it was
their behaviour which eventually sealed the fate of the Second Loire Army.
But Chanzy, whatever his ailments might be, was personally full of energy
and determination. He knew, moreover, that two new army corps (the 19th
and the 25th) were being got ready to reinforce him, and he was still
resolved to give battle and hold on for another four or five days, when he
relied on compelling Prince Frederick Charles to retreat. Then, with his
reinforced army, he hoped to march once more in the direction of Paris.
Curiously enough, it was precisely on that critical day, January 10, that
Gambetta sent Trochu a despatch by pigeon-post, telling him that on the
20th, at the latest, both Chanzy and Bourbaki would be moving on the
capital, having between them over 400,000 men.
But if Chanzy's spirits did not fail him, those of his men were at a very
low ebb indeed. He was repeatedly told so by subordinate commanders;
nevertheless (there was something Napoleonic in his character), he would
not desist from his design, but issued instructions that there was to be a
resolute defence of the lines on the 11th, together with a determined
effort to regain all lost positions. At the same time, the statements of
the divisional generals respecting the low _morale_ of some of the troops
were not left unheeded, for a very significant order went forth, namely,
that cavalry should be drawn up in the rear of the infantry wherever this
might appear advisable. The inference was obvious.
Three divisions and Lalande's Breton Mobilisés were to hold the
south-eastern lines from Arnage along the track known as the Chemin des
Boeufs, and to link up, as well as possible, with Pâris's and Gougeard's
divisions, to which fell the duty of guarding the plateau of Auvours and
the banks of the Huisne. The rest of the 21st Corps (to which Gougeard's
division belonged) was to defend the space between the Huisne and the
Sarthe. Colomb's fragmentary force, apart from Pâris's division, was still
to cover Le Mans towards the north-east. Barry's men, on their expected
arrival, were to serve as reserves around Pontlieue.
The morning of January 11 was bright. The snow had ceased falling, but lay
some inches thick upon the ground. In order to facilitate the passage of
troops, and particularly of military waggons, through the town, the Mayor
of Le Mans ordered the inhabitants to clear away as much of this snow as
possible; but it naturally remained undisturbed all over the countryside.
Little had been seen of Chanzy on the two previous days, but that morning
he mounted horse and rode along the lines from the elevated position known
as Le Tertre Rouge to the equally elevated position of Yvré. I saw him
there, wrapped in a long loose cloak, the hood of which was drawn over his
képi. Near him was his picturesque escort of Algerian Spahis, and while he
was conversing with some officers I pulled out a little sketch-book which
I carried, and tried to outline the group. An aide-de-camp who noticed me
at once came up to inquire what I was doing, and I therefore had to
produce the permit which, on returning to the front, I had obtained from
the Chief of the Staff. It was found to be quite in order, and I went on
with my work. But a few minutes later the general, having given his
orders, gathered up his reins to ride away. As he slowly passed me, he
gave me just one little sharp glance, and with a faint suspicion of a
smile remarked, "I will look at that another time." The aide-de-camp had
previously told him what my purpose was.
That day the 3rd German Corps again resumed the offensive, and once more
drove Gougeard out of Champagné. Then the enemy's 9th Corps, which on
January 10 had done little or nothing, and was therefore quite fresh, was
brought into action, and made a resolute attack on the plateau of Auvours.
There was a fairly long fight, which could be seen from Yvré. But the
Germans were too strong for Pâris's men, who at last disbanded, and came,
helter-skelter, towards the bridge of Yvré in terrible confusion. Flight
is often contagious, and Gougeard, who had fallen back from Champagné in
fairly good order, feared lest his men should imitate their comrades.
He therefore pointed two field-pieces on the runaways, and by that means
checked their stampede.
Having established themselves at the farther end of the plateau, the
Germans advanced very cautiously, constantly seeking cover behind the
various hedges. General de Colomb, to whose command Pâris's runaway
division belonged, insisted, however, that the position must be retaken.
Gougeard thereupon collected a very miscellaneous force, which included
regular infantry, mobiles, mobilisés, and some of Charette's Volontaires
de l'Ouest--previously known in Borne as the Pontifical Zouaves. Placing
himself at the head of these men, he made a vigorous effort to carry out
Colomb's orders. The French went forward almost at the charge, the Germans
waiting for them from behind the hedges, whence poured a hail of lead.
Gougeard's horse was shot under him, a couple of bullets went through his
coat, and another--or, as some said, a splinter of a shell--knocked off
his képi. Still, he continued leading his men, and in the fast failing
light the Germans, after repeated encounters, were driven back to the
verge of the plateau.
That was told me afterwards, for at the moment I was already on my way
back to Le Mans, which I wished to reach before it was absolutely night.
On coming from the town early in the morning, I had brought a few eatables
in my pockets, but they had soon been consumed, and I had found it
impossible to obtain any food whatever at Yvré, though some of the very
indifferent local wine was procurable. Thus I was feeling very hungry as I
retraced my steps through the snow towards the little hostelry in the Rue
du Gué de Maulny, where I had secured accommodation. It was a walk of some
four or five miles, but the cold urged me on, and, in spite of the snow,
I made the journey fairly rapidly, in such wise that little more than an
hour later I was seated in a warm room in front of some steaming soup,
answering all sorts of questions as to what I had seen during the day,
and particularly whether _les nôtres_ had gained a victory. I could only
answer that the "Prussians" had taken Auvours, but that fighting was still
going on, as Gougeard had gone to recapture the position. At the moment,
indeed, that was the extent of my information. The landlord looked rather
glum and his daughter somewhat anxious, and the former, shaking his head,
exclaimed: "Voyez-vous, Monsieur l'Anglais, nous n'avons pas de chance--
pas de chance du tout! Je ne sais pas à quoi ca tient, mais c'est comme
ca. Et, tenez, cela ne me surprendrait pas de voir ces sales Prussiens
dans la ville d'ici à demain!" ["We have no luck, no luck at all.
I don't know why, but there it is. And, do you know, it would not surprise
me to see those dirty Prussians in the town between now and to-morrow."]
Unfortunately for Le Mans and for France also, his forebodings were
accurate. At that very moment, indeed, a great disaster was occurring.
Jauréguiberry had reached the southern suburb of Pontlieue at about nine
o'clock that morning after a night march from Ecommoy. He had divided his
miscellaneous force of 9000 men into three brigades. As they did not seem
fit for immediate action, they were drafted into the reserves, so that
their arrival was of no particular help that day. About eleven o'clock the
3rd German Corps, coming from the direction of Changé, attacked Jouffroy's
lines along the more northern part of the so-called Chemin des Boeufs,
and, though Jouffroy's men fought fairly well, they could not prevent
their foes from capturing the position of the Tertre Rouge. Still, the
enemy gained no decisive success in this direction; nor was any marked
result attained by the 13th German Corps which formed the extreme right of
the attacking forces. But Prince Frederick Charles had sent orders to
Voigts Rhetz, who was at Grand Lucé, [A brigade of cavalry kept up
communications between him and the 3rd Army Corps.] advance with the
10th Corps on Mulsanne, which the French had evacuated; and on reaching
Mulsanne, the same general received instructions to come to the support of
the 3rd Corps, which was engaged with Jouffroy's force. Voigts Rhetz's men
were extremely fatigued; nevertheless, the 20th Division of Infantry,
commanded by General Kraatz-Koschlau, went on towards the Chemin des
Boeufs, following the direct road from Tours to Le Mans.
Here there was an elevated position known as La Tuilerie--otherwise the
tile-works--which had been fortified expressly to prevent the Germans from
bursting upon Le Mans from the direct south. Earth-works for guns had been
thrown up, trenches had been dug, the pine trees, so abundant on the
southern side of Le Mans, had been utilised for other shielding works, as
well as for shelter-places for the defending force. Unfortunately, at the
moment of the German advance, that defending force consisted of the
ill-equipped, badly armed, and almost untrained Breton Mobilisés,
[There were just a few old soldiers among them.] who, as I have already
related, had arrived the previous day from the camp of Conlie under the
command of General Lalande. It is true that near these men was stationed
an infantry brigade of the 6th Corps d'Armée, whose duty it was to support
and steady them. They undoubtedly needed to be helped, for the great
majority had never been in action before. Moreover, in addition to the
infantry brigade, there were two batteries of artillery; but I fear that
for the most part the gunners were little better than recruits.
Exaggerated statements have been made respecting the quality of the
firearms with which the Mobilisés were provided. Many of the weapons were
afterwards found to be very dirty, even rusty, but that was the result of
neglect, which their officers should have remedied. It is true, however,
that these weapons were for the most part merely percussion guns. Again,
it has been said that the men had no ammunition, but that statement was
certainly inaccurate. On the other hand, these Mobilisés were undoubtedly
very cold and very hungry--even as I myself was that day--no rations
having been served to them until late in the afternoon, that is, shortly
before they were attacked, at which moment, indeed, they were actually
preparing the meal for which they had so long been waiting.
The wintry night was gathering round when Kraatz-Kosohlau found himself
with his division before the position of La Tuilerie. He could see that it
was fortified, and before attempting any further advance he fired a few
shells. The Mobilisés were immediately panic-stricken. They made no
attempt at defence; hungry though they were, they abandoned even their
pots and pans, and fled in the direction of Pontlieue, which formed, as it
were, a long avenue, fringed with factories, textile mills, bleaching
works, and so forth. In vain did their officers try to stop the fugitives,
even striking them with the flats of their swords, in vain did Lalande and
his staff seek to intercept them at the Rond Point de Pontlieue. Nothing
could induce them to stop. They threw away their weapons in order to run
the faster. At La Tuilerie not a gun was fired at the Germans. Even the
infantry brigade fell back, without attempting to fight.
All this occurred at a moment when everybody thought that the day's
fighting was over. But Jauréguiberry appeared upon the scene, and ordered
one of his subordinates, General Lebouëdeo, to retake the lost position.
Lebouëdeo tried to do so with 1000 tired men, who had been in action
during the day, and failed. A second attempt proved equally futile. No
effort apparently was made to secure help from Barry, who was at Arnage
with 5000 infantry and two brigades of cavalry, and who might have fallen
on the left flank of the German Corps. La Tuilerie was lost, and with it
Le Mans was lost also.
I was quietly sipping some coffee and reading the local newspapers--three
or four were published at Le Mans in those days--when I heard of that
disastrous stampede. Some of the men had reached the town, spreading the
contagion of fear as they came. Tired though I was, I at once went towards
the Avenue de Fontlieue, where the excitement was general. Gendarmes were
hurrying hither and thither, often arresting the runaways, and at other
times picking up weapons and cartridge-cases which had been flung away. So
numerous were the abandoned weapons and equipments that cartloads of them
were collected. Every now and then an estafette galloped to or from the
town. The civilians whom one met wore looks of consternation. It was
evident, indeed, to everybody who knew how important was the position of
La Tuilerie, that its capture by the Germans placed Le Mans in jeopardy.
When the two attempts to retake it had failed, Jauréguiberry urged
immediate retreat. This was rendered the more imperative by other events
of the night and the early morning, for, inspirited by their capture of La
Tuilerie, the Germans made fresh efforts in other directions, so that
Barry had to quit Arnage, whilst Jouffroy lost most of his positions near
the Chemin des Boeufs, and the plateau d'Auvours had again to be
evacuated.
At 8 a.m. on January 12, Chanzy, after suggesting a fresh attempt to
recover La Tuilerie, which was prevented by the demoralisation of the
troops, was compelled to give a reluctant assent to Jauréguiberry's
proposals of retreat. At the same time, he wished the retreat to be
carried out slowly and methodically, and informed Gambetta that he
intended to withdraw in the direction of Aleneon (Orne) and Pré-en-Pail
(Mayenne). This meant moving into Normandy, and Gambetta pointed out that
such a course would leave all Brittany open to the enemy, and enable him
to descend without opposition even to the mouth of the Loire. Chanzy was
therefore instructed to retreat on Laval, and did so; but as he had
already issued orders for the other route, great confusion ensued, the new
orders only reaching the subordinate commanders on the evening of the
12th.
From January 6 to 12 the French had lost 6000 men in killed and wounded.
The Germans had taken 20,000 prisoners, and captured seventeen guns and a
large quantity of army materiel. Further, there was an incalculable number
of disbanded Mobiles and Mobilisés. If Prince Frederick Charles had known
at the time to what a deplorable condition Chanzy's army had been reduced,
he would probably have acted more vigorously than he did. It is true that
his own men (as Von Hoenig has admitted) were, generally speaking, in a
state of great fatigue after the six days' fighting, and also often badly
circumstanced in regard to clothing, boots, and equipments. [Even when the
armistice arrived I saw many German soldiers wearing French sabots.] Such
things cannot last for ever, and there had been little or no opportunity
to renew anything since the second battle of Orleans early in December.
In the fighting before Le Mans, however, the German loss in killed and
wounded was only 3400--200 of the number being officers, whom the French
picked off as often as possible.