Freyeinet. In the first place he desired to recruit and strengthen his
forces, so sorely tried by their difficult retreat; and in order that he
might have time to do so, he wished Bourbaki to execute a powerful
diversion by marching in the direction of Troyes. But Gambetta and
Freyeinet had decided otherwise. Bourbaki's advance was to be towards the
Vosges, after which he was to turn westward and march on Paris with
150,000 men. Chanzy was informed of this decision on and about January 5
(1871), and on the 6th he made a last attempt to modify the Government
plan in order that Bourbaki's march might be directed on a point nearer to
Paris. In reply, he was informed that it was too late to modify the
arrangements.
With regard to his own operations, Chanzy's idea was to march towards the
capital when his forces were reorganized. His bases were to be the river
Sarthe, the town of Le Mans, and the railway-line running northward to
Alençon. Thence he proposed to advance to some point on the river Eure
between Dreux and Chartres, going afterwards towards Paris by such a route
as circumstances might allow. He had 130,000 men near Le Mans, and
proposed to take 120,000 with 350 field-pieces or machine-guns, and
calculated that he might require a week, or to be precise eight days, to
carry this force from Le Mans to Chartres, allowing for fighting on the
way. Further, to assist his movements he wished Faidherbe, as well as
Bourbaki, to assume the offensive vigorously as soon as he was ready. The
carrying out of the scheme was frustrated, however, in part by the
movements which the Government ordered Bourbaki to execute, and in part by
what may be called the sudden awakening of Prince Frederick Charles, who,
feeling more apprehensive respecting Bourbaki's movements, had hitherto,
in a measure, neglected Chanzy's doings.
On December 22 Captain, afterwards General, de Boisdeffre [He was Chief of
the French Staff during the famous Dreyfus Case, in which his name was
frequently mentioned.] reached Le Mans, after quitting Paris in one of the
balloons, and gave Chanzy certain messages with which Trochu had entrusted
him. He brought nothing in writing, as what he had to communicate was
considered too serious to be committed to paper. Yet both my father and
myself could have imparted virtually the same information, which was but a
_secret de Polichinelle_. It concerned the date when the fall of Paris
would become inevitable. We--my father and myself--had said repeatedly at
Versailles and elsewhere that the capital's supply of food would last
until the latter days of January, and that the city (unless in the
meanwhile it were relieved) must then surrender. Authentic information to
that effect was available in Paris before we quitted it in November.
Of course Trochu's message to Chanzy was official, and carried greater
weight than the assertions of journalists. It was to the effect that it
would be necessary to negotiate a capitulation on January 20, in order to
give time for the revictualling of the city's two million inhabitants.
As it happened, the resistance was prolonged for another week or so.
However, Boisdeffre's information was sufficiently explicit to show Chanzy
that no time must be lost if Paris was to be saved.
Some German cavalry--probably the same men who had pursued Gougeard's
column--showed themselves at Saint Calais, which is only some thirty
miles north-east of Le Mans, as early as December 18, but soon retired,
and no further advance of the enemy in that direction took place for
several days. Chanzy formed two flying columns, one a division under
General Jouffroy, and one a body of 4000 men under General Rousseau, for
the purpose of worrying the enemy and keeping him at a distance. These
troops, particularly those of Jouffroy, who moved towards Montoire and
Vendôme, had several small but none the less important engagements with
the Germans. Prince Frederick Charles, indeed, realised that Jouffroy's
operations were designed to ensure the security of Chanzy's main army
whilst it was being recruited and reorganized, and thereupon decided to
march on Le Mans and attack Chanzy before the latter had attained his
object.
On Christmas Day a force of German cavalry, artillery, and infantry
descended upon Saint Calais (then a town of about 3500 inhabitants),
levied a sum of 17,000 francs, pillaged several of the houses, and
ill-treated a number of the townsfolk. When some of the latter ventured to
protest, pointing out, among other things, that after various little
engagements in the vicinity several wounded Germans had been brought into
the town and well cared for there, the enemy's commanding officer called
them a pack of cowards, and flung them 2000 francs of his recent levy, to
pay them, he said, for their so-called services. The affair was reported
to Chanzy, who thereupon wrote an indignant letter to the German general
commanding at Vendôme. It was carried thither by a certain M. de Vézian, a
civil engineer attached to Chanzy's staff, who brought back the following
reply:
"Reçu une lettre du Général Chanzy. Un général prussien ne sachant pas
écrire une lettre de tel genre, ne saurait y faire une réponse par écrit.
"Au quartier-général à Vendôme, 28 Décembre 1870."
Signature (_illegible_).
It was, perhaps, a pity that Chanzy ever wrote his letter of protest.
French generals were too much given to expressing their feelings in
writing daring that war. Deeds and not words were wanted.
Meantime, the army was being slowly recruited. On December 13, Gambetta
had issued--none too soon--a decree authorising the billeting of the men
"during the winter campaign." Nevertheless, when Gougeard's troops
returned to Yvreé l'Evêque, they were ordered to sleep under canvas, like
many other divisions of the army. It was a great mistake. In that severe
weather--the winter was one of the coldest of the nineteenth century--the
men's sufferings were very great. They were in need, too, of many things,
new shoes, linen, great-coats, and other garments, and there was much
delay in providing for their more urgent requirements. Thus the number of
desertions was not to be wondered at. The commander-in-chief did his best
to ensure discipline among his dispirited troops. Several men were shot by
way of example. When, shortly before the battle of Le Mans, the 21st Army
Corps crossed the Huisne to take up positions near Montfort, several
officers were severely punished for riding in ambulance and baggage
waggons instead of marching with their men.
Le Mans is not easily defended from an enemy advancing upon it from
eastern, north-eastern, and south-eastern directions. A close defence is
impossible by reason of the character of the country. At the time of which
I write, the town was one of about 37,000 inhabitants. Very ancient,
already in existence at the time of the Romans, it became the capital of
Maine. William the Conqueror seized it, but it was snatched from his son,
Robert, by Hélie de La Flêche. Later, Geoffrey, the First of the
Plantagenets, was buried there, it being, moreover, the birthplace of his
son, our Henry II. In after years it was taken from Richard Coeur-de-Lion
by Philip-Augustus, who assigned it, however, to Richard's widow, Queen
Berengaria. A house in the town is wrongly said to have been her
residence, but she undoubtedly founded the Abbaye de l'Epau, near Yvré
l'Evêque, and was buried there. It was at Le Mans that King John of
France, who surrendered to the Black Prince at Poitiers, was born; and in
the neighbouring forest, John's grandson, Charles VI, first gave signs of
insanity. Five times during the Anglo-French wars of the days of Henry V
and Henry VI, Le Mans was besieged by one or another of the contending
parties. The town again suffered during the Huguenot wars, and yet again
during the Revolution, when the Vendéens seized it, but were expelled by
Marceau, some 5000 of them being bayoneted on the Place de l'Epéron.
Rich in associations with the history of England as well as that of
France, Le Mans, in spite of its accessibility--for railway lines coming
from five different directions meet there--is seldom visited by our
tourists. Its glory is its cathedral, strangely neglected by the numerous
English writers on the cathedrals of France. Here are exemplified the
architectural styles of five successive centuries, and, as Mérimée once
wrote, in passing from one part of the edifice to another, it is as if you
passed from one to another religion. But the supreme features of the
cathedral are its stained-glass windows, which include some of the very
oldest in the world. Many years ago, when they were in a more perfect
condition than they are now, Hucher gave reproductions of them in a rare
folio volume. Here, too, is the tomb of Queen Berengaria of England,
removed from the Abbaye de l'Epau; here, also, was formerly that of her
husband's grandfather, Geoffrey Plantagenet. But this was destroyed by
the Huguenots, and you must go to the museum to see all that remains of
it--that is, the priceless enamel _plaque_ by which it was formerly
surmounted, and which represents Geoffrey grasping his sword and his azure
shield, the latter bearing a cross and lions rampant--not the leoparded
lions passant of his English descendants. Much ink has flowed respecting
that shield during squabbles among heraldists.
Judging by recent plans of Le Mans, a good many changes have taken place
there since the time of the Franco-German War. Various new, broad,
straight streets have been substituted for some of the quaint old winding
ones. The Pont Napoléon now appears to have become the Pont Gambetta, and
the Place, des Minimes is called the Place de la République. I notice also
a Rue Thiers which did not exist in the days when Le Mans was familiar to
me as an old-world town. In this narrative I must, of course, take it as
it was then, not as it is now.
The Sarthe, flowing from north to south, where it is joined by its
tributary the Huisne, coming from the north-east, still divides the town
into two unequal sections; the larger one, on the most elevated part of
which stands the cathedral, being that on the river's left bank. At the
time I write of, the Sarthe was spanned by three stone bridges, a
suspension bridge, and a granite and marble railway viaduct, some 560 feet
in length. The German advance was bound to come from the east and the
south. On the east is a series of heights, below which flow the waters of
the Huisne. The views range over an expanse of varying elevation, steep
hills and deep valleys being frequent. There are numerous watercourses.
The Huisne, which helps to feed the Sarthe, is itself fed by a number of
little tributaries. The lowest ground, at the time I have in mind, was
generally meadow-land, intersected here and there with rows of poplars,
whilst the higher ground was employed for the cultivation of crops. Every
little field was circumscribed by ditches, banks, and thick hedges.
The loftiest point of the eastern heights is at Yvré l'Evêque, which was
once crowned by a renaissance chateau, where Henry of Navarre resided when
he reduced Le Mans to submission. Northward from Yvré, in the direction of
Savigné, stretches the high plateau of Sargé, which on the west slopes
down towards the river Sarthe, and forms one of the most important of the
natural defences of Le Mans. Eastward, from Yvré, you overlook first the
Huisne, spanned at various neighbouring points by four bridges, but having
much of the meadow-land in its valley cut up by little water-channels for
purposes of irrigation--these making the ground additionally difficult for
an attacking force to traverse. Secondly, you see a long plateau called
Auvours, the possession of which must necessarily facilitate an enemy's
operations. Following the course of the railway-line coming from the
direction of Paris, you notice several pine woods, planted on former
heaths. Still looking eastward, is the village of Champagné, where the
slopes are studded with vines, whilst the plain is arable land, dotted
over with clumps of chestnut trees. North-east of Champagné is Montfort,
where Chanzy at first stationed the bulk of the 21st Army Corps under
Jaurès, this (leaving his flying columns on one side) being the most
eastern position of his forces at the time when the German advance began.
The right of the 21st Corps here rested on the Huisne. Its extreme left
extended northward towards the Sarthe, but a division of the 17th Corps
under General de Colomb guarded the Alençon (N.) and Conlie (N.W.) railway
lines.
Confronted by the Huisne, the heights of Yvré and the plateaux of Sargé
and Auvours, having, for the most part, to keep to the high-roads--for,
bad as their state might be at that season, it was nothing compared with
the condition of the many narrow and often deep lanes, whose high banks
and hedges, moreover, offered opportunities for ambush--the Germans, it
was obvious, would have a difficult task before them on the eastern side
of Le Mans, even should they drive the 21st Corps from Montfort. The
approach to the town is easier, however, on the south-east and the south,
Here are numerous pine woods, but on going towards Le Mans, after passing
Parigné-l'Evêque (S.E.) and Mulsanne (S.), the ground is generally much
less hilly than on the east. There are, however, certain positions
favourable for defence. There is high ground at Changé, midway between the
road from Saint Calais to Le Mans, _viâ_ Yvré, and the road from Grand
Lucé to Le Mans _viâ_ Parigné. Over a distance of eight miles, moreover,
there extends--or extended at the time I refer to--a track called the
Chemin des Boeufs, suitable for defensive purposes, with high ground at at
least two points--Le Tertre Rouge, south-east of Le Mans, and La Tuilerie,
south of the town. The line of the Chemin des Boeufs and the position of
Changé was at first entrusted by Chanzy to the 16th Corps, whose
commander, Jauréguiberry, had his headquarters at the southern suburb of
Pontlieue, an important point affording direct access to Le Mans by a
stone bridge over the Huisne.
When I returned to Le Mans from Saint Servan in the very first days of
January, Chanzy's forces numbered altogether about 130,000 men, but a very
large proportion of them were dispersed in different directions, forming
detached columns under Generals Barry, Curten, Rousseau, and Jouffroy. The
troops of the two first-named officers had been taken from the 16th Corps
(Jauréguiberry), those of Rousseau were really the first division of the
21st Corps (Jaurès), and those of Jouffroy belonged to the 17th, commanded
by General de Colomb. [The 16th and 17th comprised three divisions each,
the 21st including four. The German Corps were generally of only two
divisions, with, however, far stronger forces of cavalry than Chanzy
disposed of.] It is a curious circumstance that, among the German
troops which opposed the latter's forces at this stage of the war, there
was a division commanded by a General von Colomb. Both these officers had
sprung from the same ancient French family, but Von Colomb came from a
Huguenot branch which had quitted France when the Edict of Nantes was
revoked.
Chanzy's other chief coadjutors at Le Mans were Jaurès, of whom I have
already spoken, and Rear-Admiral Jauréguiberry, who, after the general-in-
chief, was perhaps the most able of all the commanders. Of Basque origin
and born in 1815, he had distinguished himself as a naval officer in the
Crimean, Chinese, and Cochin China expeditions; and on taking service in
the army under the National Defence, he had contributed powerfully to
D'Aurelle's victory at Coulmiers. He became known among the Loire forces
as the man who was always the first to attack and the last to retreat.
[He looked somewhat older than his years warranted, being very bald, with
just a fringe of white hair round the cranium. His upper lip and chin were
shaven, but he wore white whiskers of the "mutton-chop" variety. Slim and
fairly tall, he was possessed of no little nervous strength and energy. In
later years he became Minister of Marine in the Waddington, the second
Freycinet, and the Duclerc cabinets.]
Having referred to Chanzy's principal subordinates, it is fitting that I
should give a brief account of Chanzy himself. The son of an officer of
the First Empire, he was born at Nouart in the Argonne, and from his
personal knowledge of that region it is certain that his services would
have proved valuable during the disastrous march on Sedan, when, as Zola
has rightly pointed out in "La Débâcle," so many French commanding
officers were altogether ignorant of the nature and possibilities of the
country through which they advanced. Chanzy, however, like many others who
figured among the Loire forces, had begun life in the navy, enlisting in
that service when sixteen years of age. But, after very brief experience
afloat, he went to the military school of St. Cyr, passed out of it as a
sub-lieutenant in 1843, when he was in his twenty-first year, was
appointed to a regiment of Zouaves, and sent to Algeria. He served,
however, in the Italian campaign of 1859, became lieutenant-colonel of a
line regiment, and as such took part in the Syrian expedition of 1860-61.
Later, he was with the French forces garrisoning Rome, acquired a
colonelcy in 1864, returned to Algeria, and in 1868 was promoted to the
rank of general of brigade.
At the outset of the Franco-German War, he applied for active service, but
the imperial authorities would not employ him in France. In spite of the
associations of his family with the first Empire, he was, like Trochu,
accounted an Orleanist, and it was not desired that any Orleanist general
should have an opportunity to distinguish himself in the contemplated
"march on Berlin." Marshal MacMahon, however, as Governor of Algeria, had
formed a high opinion of Chanzy's merits, and after Sedan, anxious as he
was for his country in her predicament, the Marshal, then a prisoner of
war, found a means of advising the National Defence to make use of
Chanzy's services. That patriotic intervention, which did infinite credit
to MacMahon, procured for Chanzy an appointment at the head of the 16th
Army Corps, and later the chief command of the Second Loire Army.
When I first saw him in the latter days of 1870, he was in his
fifty-eighth year, well built, and taller than the majority of French
officers. His fair hair and fair moustache had become grey; but his blue
eyes had remained bright, and there was an expression of quiet resolution
on his handsome, well-cut face, with its aquiline nose and energetic jaw.
Such, physically, was the general whom Moltke subsequently declared to
have been the best that France opposed to the Germans throughout the war.
I never once saw Chanzy excited, in which respect he greatly contrasted
with many of the subordinate commanders. Jauréguiberry was sometimes
carried away by his Basque, and Gougeard by his Celtic, blood. So it was
with Jaurès, who, though born in Paris, had, like his nephew the Socialist
leader, the blood of the Midi in his veins. Chanzy, however, belonged to a
calmer, a more quietly resolute northern race.
He was inclined to religion, and I remember that, in addition to the
chaplains accompanying the Breton battalions, there was a chief chaplain
attached to the general staff. This was Abbé de Beuvron, a member of
an old noble family of central France. The Chief of the Staff was
Major-General Vuillemot; the Provost-General was Colonel Mora, and the
principal aides-de-camp were Captains Marois and de Boisdeffre. Specially
attached to the headquarters service there was a rather numerous picked
force under General Bourdillon. It comprised a regiment of horse gendarmes
and one of foot gendarmes, four squadrons of Chasseurs d'Afrique, some
artillery provided chiefly with mountain-guns, an aeronautical company
under the brothers Tissandier, and three squadrons of Algerian light
cavalry, of the Spahi type, who, with their flowing burnouses and their
swift little Arab horses, often figured conspicuously in Chanzy's escort.
A year or two after the war, I engaged one of these very men--he was
called Saad--as a servant, and he proved most devoted and attentive;
but he had contracted the germs of pulmonary disease during that cruel
winter of 1870-71, and at the end of a few months I had to take him to the
Val-de-Grâce military hospital in Paris, where he died of galloping
consumption.
The German forces opposed to Chanzy consisted of a part of the so-called
"Armée-Abtheilung" under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and the "Second
Army" under Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, the latter including the
3rd, 9th, 10th, and 13th Army Corps, and disposing of numerous cavalry
and nearly four hundred guns. The Prince ascertained that the French
forces were, in part, extremely dispersed, and therefore resolved to act
before they could be concentrated. At the outset the Germans came down on
Nogent-le-Rotrou, where Rousseau's column was stationed, inflicted a
reverse on him, and compelled him (January 7) to fall back on Connerré--a
distance of thirty miles from Nogent, and of less than sixteen from Le
Mans. On the same day, sections of Jouffroy's forces were defeated at
Epuisay and Poirier (mid-way between Le Mans and Vendôme), and also
forced to retreat. The French detachments (under Jouffroy, Curten, and
Barry) which were stationed along the line from Saint Calais to Montoire,
and thence to Saint Amand and Château-Renault--a stretch of some
five-and-twenty miles--were not strong enough to oppose the German
advance, and some of them ran the risk of having their retreat cut off.
Chanzy realized the danger, and on the morning of January 8 he despatched
Jauréguiberry to take command of all the troops distributed from the south
to the south-east, between Château-du-Loir and Château-Renault, and bring
them to Le Mans.
But the 10th German Corps was advancing in these directions, and, after
an engagement with Barry's troops at Ruillé, secured positions round La
Chartre. This seriously threatened the retreat of the column under General
Curten, which was still at Saint Amand, and, moreover, it was a further
menace to Barry himself, as his division was distributed over a front of
fourteen miles near Château-du-Loir. Jauréguiberry, however, entreated
Barry to continue guarding the river Loir, in the hope of Curten being
able to retreat to that point.
Whilst, however, these defensive attempts were being made to the south of
Le Mans, the Germans were pressing forward on the north-east and the
east, Prince Frederick Charles being eager to come in touch with Chanzy's
main forces, regardless of what might happen on the Loir and at Saint
Amand. On the north-east the enemy advanced to La Ferté Bernard; on the
east, at Vancé, a brigade of German cavalry drove back the French
cuirassiers and Algerians, and Prince Frederick Charles then proceeded as
far as Saint Calais, where he prepared for decisive action. One army corps
was sent down the line of the Huisne, another had orders to advance on
Ardenay, a third on Bouloire, whilst the fourth, leaving Barry on its left
flank, was to march on Parigné-l'Evêque. Thus, excepting a brigade of
infantry and one of cavalry, detached to observe the isolated Curten, and
hold him in check, virtually the whole of the German Second Army marched
against Chanzy's main forces.