Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ 29, 70,
│ Appendix B. │ I │ 71
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April │ │
│1941, replying to Bormann’s letter of │ │
│19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA │ │
│371) │ III │ 119
│ │ │
*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │
│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │
│501) │ III │ 416
│ │ │
*501-PS │Collection of four documents on │ │
│execution by gas, June 1942, one │ │
│signed by Dr. Becker, SS │ │
│Untersturmfuehrer at Kiev, 16 May │ │
│1942. (USA 288) │ III │ 418
│ │ │
*502-PS │Order, 17 July 1941, entitled │ │
│“Regulations for the Commandos of the │ │
│Chief of the SIPO and SD which are to │ │
│be activated in Stalags”. (USA 486) │ III │ 422
│ │ │
*526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │
│concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │
│in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434
│ │ │
532-PS │Telegram of WFSt, 24 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Commandos. │ III │ 437
│ │ │
*553-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942,│ │
│regulating treatment of paratroops. │ │
│(USA 500) │ III │ 441
│ │ │
654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │
│on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │
│delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │
│extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467
│ │ │
*668-PS │Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD │ │
│and OKW letter, 24 June 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of punishable │ │
│offenses against the Reich or │ │
│occupation forces in occupied │ │
│territories. (USA 504) │ III │ 476
│ │ │
*674-PS │Secret letter from President of High │ │
│District Court of Kattowitz re │ │
│executions being carried out by │ │
│Gestapo without judicial processes, 3 │ │
│December 1941. (USA 505) │ III │ 478
│ │ │
*701-PS │Letter from Minister of Justice to │ │
│Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning │ │
│Poles and Jews who are released from │ │
│Penal institutions of Department of │ │
│Justice. (USA 497) │ III │ 510
│ │ │
*710-PS │Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31 │ │
│July 1941, concerning solution of │ │
│Jewish question. (USA 509) │ III │ 525
│ │ │
745-PS │Letter from Chief of SD, Koblenz, 12 │ │
│June 1944, concerning enemy aviators │ │
│who have been shot down. │ III │ 543
│ │ │
775-PS │Memorandum of Minister of the Interior│ │
│concerning clarification of police │ │
│matters, 1935. │ III │ 547
│ │ │
779-PS │Directive by Frick, regulating │ │
│“protective custody”, 12 April 1934. │ III │ 555
│ │ │
833-PS │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head │ │
│of the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of crimes │ │
│against the Reich or occupying forces │ │
│in the occupied territories. │ III │ 600
│ │ │
1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │
│Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │
│destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │
│(USA 275) │ III │ 718
│ │ │
*1063-A-PS │Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2 │ │
│January 1941, concerning │ │
│classification of concentration camps.│ │
│(USA 492) │ III │ 775
│ │ │
*1063-B-PS │Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26 │ │
│July 1943, concerning establishment of│ │
│Labor Reformatory camps. (USA 492) │ III │ 777
│ │ │
*1063-D-PS │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942, │ │
│concerning prisoners qualified for │ │
│work to be sent to concentration │ │
│camps. (USA 219) │ III │ 778
│ │ │
1063-E-PS │Copy of Mueller’s order, 25 June 1942,│ │
│concerning increased shipments to │ │
│concentration camps. │ III │ 780
│ │ │
*1104-PS │Memorandum, 21 November 1941, │ │
│enclosing copies of report concerning │ │
│anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)│ III │ 783
│ │ │
1113-PS │Report of 6 November 1942 concerning │ │
│action “Marshfever”. │ III │ 792
│ │ │
*1165-PS │Letter from Commandant of │ │
│concentration Camp Gross Rosen, 23 │ │
│October 1941, and letter of Mueller to│ │
│all Gestapo offices, 9 November 1941, │ │
│concerning execution of Russian PW’s. │ │
│(USA 244) │ III │ 821
│ │ │
*1276-PS │Top secret letter from Chief of SIPO │ │
│and SD to OKW/WFSt, 17 June 1944, │ │
│concerning Commando operations. (USA │ │
│525). │ III │ 855
│ │ │
1285-PS │Extract from The German Police, 1943, │ │
│pp. 81-82. │ III │ 863
│ │ │
1437-PS │Law concerning reuniting of Austria │ │
│with German Reich, 18 March 1938. 1938│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 262. │ IV │ 17
│ │ │
1438-PS │Fuehrer concerning administration of │ │
│Sudeten-German territory, 22 October │ │
│1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1453. │ IV │ 17
│ │ │
*1472-PS │Copy of telegram from Mueller to │ │
│Himmler, 16 December 1942, concerning │ │
│recruiting Jewish labor. (USA 279) │ IV │ 49
│ │ │
*1481-PS │Gestapo order, 20 January 1938, │ │
│dissolving and confiscating property │ │
│of Catholic Youth Womens Organization │ │
│in Bavaria. (USA 737). │ IV │ 50
│ │ │
*1514-PS │Order, 27 July 1944, from 6th Corps │ │
│Area Command concerning delivery of │ │
│prisoners of war to secret state │ │
│police. (USA 491) │ IV │ 53
│ │ │
*1521-PS │Report from the Bavarian Political │ │
│Police to the Gestapo, Berlin, 24 │ │
│August 1934, concerning National │ │
│mourning on occasion of death of von │ │
│Hindenburg. (USA 740) │ IV │ 75
│ │ │
*1531-PS │Directive from RSHA, 26 October 1939, │ │
│concerning execution of protective │ │
│custody, and directive, 12 June 1942, │ │
│concerning third degree. (USA 248) │ IV │ 93
│ │ │
1551-PS │Decree assigning functions in Office │ │
│of Chief of German Police, 26 June │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, │ │
│pp. 946-948. │ IV │ 106
│ │ │
*1573-PS │Order signed Mueller, 18 June 1941, │ │
│concerning measures to be taken │ │
│against Emigrants and civilian workers│ │
│from Russian areas and against Foreign│ │
│workers. (USA 498) │ IV │ 112
│ │ │
1638-PS │Circular of Minister of Interior, 11 │ │
│November 1938, on cooperation of SD │ │
│and other authorities. 1938 Reichs │ │
│Ministerialblatt, p. 1906. │ IV │ 142
│ │ │
*1650-PS │Directive to State Police Directorates│ │
│from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, │ │
│4 March 1944, concerning captured │ │
│escaped PWs except British and │ │
│American PWs. (USA 246) │ IV │ 158
│ │ │
*1680-PS │“Ten Years Security Police and SD” │ │
│published in The German Police, 1 │ │
│February 1943. (USA 477) │ IV │ 191
│ │ │
*1723-PS │Order concerning cooperation of Party │ │
│offices with the Secret State Police, │ │
│25 January 1938, published in Decrees,│ │
│Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol.│ │
│II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206) │ IV │ 219
│ │ │
*1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning │ │
│the study and treatment of church │ │
│politics. (USA 510) │ IV │ 415
│ │ │
*1852-PS │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by│ │
│Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449) (See Chart │ │
│No. 16.) │ IV │ 490
│ │ │
1956-PS │Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State │ │
│Police, published in The Archives, │ │
│January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1342. │ IV │ 598
│ │ │
2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a│ │
│Chief of German Police in the Ministry│ │
│of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703
│ │ │
2104-PS │Law on organization of Secret State │ │
│Police office, 26 April 1933. 1933 │ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 122. │ IV │ 730
│ │ │
2105-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 30 │ │
│November 1933. 1933 Preussische │ │
│Gesetzsammlung, p. 413. │ IV │ 731
│ │ │
2107-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 10 │ │
│February 1936. 1936 Preussische │ │
│Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22. │ IV │ 732
│ │ │
2108-PS │Decree for execution of Law on Secret │ │
│State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936│ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.│ IV │ 732
│ │ │
2113-PS │Decree for application of law of 30 │ │
│November 1933, concerning Secret State│ │
│Police of 8 March 1934. 1934 │ │
│Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 143. │ IV │ 743
│ │ │
2232-PS │Tasks and Means of a Political Police,│ │
│from German Administrative Law by Hans│ │
│Frank, pp. 420-430. │ IV │ 881
│ │ │
2243-PS │Law relating to finance measures in │ │
│connection with the police, 19 March │ │
│1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 325. │ IV │ 924
│ │ │
2245-PS │Frick decree of 20 September 1936 │ │
│concerning employment of Security │ │
│Police Inspectors. 1936 Reichs │ │
│Ministerialblatt, pp. 1343-1344. │ IV │ 928
│ │ │
*2273-PS │Extract from a top secret report of │ │
│Einsatz Group A. (USA 487) (See Chart │ │
│No. 4.) │ IV │ 944
│ │ │
*2285-PS │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French │ │
│officers, about shooting of prisoners │ │
│at Mauthausen. (USA 490) │ IV │ 991
│ │ │
2344-PS │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering,│ │
│1934, p. 89. │ IV │ 1065
│ │ │
2347-PS │Court decisions from 1935 │ │
│Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp. │ │
│577-578, 20 July 1935. │ IV │ 1066
│ │ │
2348-PS │Affidavit of Rauff, Head of Amt II D, │ │
│RSHA, 19 October 1945. (USA 485) │ IV │ 1068
│ │ │
2371-PS │Execution of ordinance for Security of│ │
│people and state, 28 February 1933. │ │
│1933 Reichs Ministerialblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 543. │ IV │ 1102
│ │ │
2372-PS │Unified Designation of offices of │ │
│Secret State Police in Reich. 1936 │ │
│Reichs Ministerial Gazette, Part V, │ │
│pp. 1344-5. │ IV │ 1105
│ │ │
2374-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 27 June │ │
│1945, concerning treatment of │ │
│English-American commando groups. │ V │ 1
│ │ │
2375-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │
│November 1945, concerning activities │ │
│of SIPO and SD. │ V │ 2
│ │ │
2376-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 │ │
│November 1945, concerning treatment of│ │
│Jews. │ V │ 3
│ │ │
*2460-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels. (USA 751) │ V │ 205
│ │ │
*2477-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 518) │ V │ 229
│ │ │
2478-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 230
│ │ │
2479-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Mildner, 4 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 230
│ │ │
*2499-PS │Original Protective Custody Order │ │
│served on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March │ │
│1935. (USA 232) │ V │ 236
│ │ │
*2542-PS │Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, 30 September│ │
│1945. (USA 489) │ V │ 286
│ │ │
*2605-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, │ │
│former President of the Hungarian │ │
│Zionist Organization, 13 September │ │
│1945. (USA 242) │ V │ 313
│ │ │
2614-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 918) │ V │ 337
│ │ │
2615-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 338
│ │ │
*2620-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 919) │ V │ 341
│ │ │
2622-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 343
│ │ │
2644-PS │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 357
│ │ │
2645-PS │Affidavit of Gottfried Boley, 14 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 357
│ │ │
*2751-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 482) │ V │ 390
│ │ │
2752-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 8 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 392
│ │ │
2846-PS │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 13 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 507
│ │ │
2884-PS │Affidavit of Walter Warlimont, 14 │ │
│November 1945. │ V │ 550
│ │ │
2890-PS │Extracts from Befehlsblatt of the SIPO│ │
│and SD. │ V │ 557
│ │ │
*2990-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 18 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 526) │ V │ 694
│ │ │
*2992-PS │Affidavits of Hermann Graebe. (USA │ │
│494) │ V │ 696
│ │ │
*3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │
│1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │
│Service, and record of telephone │ │
│conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │
│1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731
│ │ │
*3033-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 21 │ │
│November 1945. (USA 488) │ V │ 741
│ │ │
*3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │
│all stations of State Police, 10 │ │
│November 1938, on measures against │ │
│Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │
│termination of protest actions. (USA │ │
│240) │ V │ 797
│ │ │
3058-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11 │ │
│November 1938, reporting action │ │
│against the Jews. (USA 508) │ V │ 854
│ │ │
3343-PS │Speech delivered at labor-meeting of │ │
│Prussian State Council on 18 June │ │
│1934, from Speeches and Essays of │ │
│Hermann Goering. │ VI │ 78
│ │ │
3344-PS │Extract from Befehlsblatt of the Chief│ │
│of Security Police and SD, Berlin, 7 │ │
│September 1942, No. 39, p. 249. │ VI │ 78
│ │ │
*3360-PS │Teletype, 12 February 1944, relating │ │
│to recaptured escaped Eastern │ │
│laborers. (USA 499) │ VI │ 95
│ │ │
3363-PS │Special delivery letter, 21 September │ │
│1939, from Chief of Security Police to│ │
│Chiefs of all detail groups concerning│ │
│Jewish problem in Occupied zone. │ VI │ 97
│ │ │
*3840-PS │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February│ │
│1946, concerning the elimination of │ │
│the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803) │ VI │ 775
│ │ │
*3841-PS │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer │ │
│Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, │ │
│concerning elimination of the Warsaw │ │
│Ghetto. (USA 804) │ VI │ 776
│ │ │
*3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │
│Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │
│execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │
│Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │
│819) │ VI │ 787
│ │ │
D-46 │Order designating Herzogenbosch as │ │
│concentration camp, 18 January 1943. │ VI │ 1025
│ │ │
D-50 │Order establishing concentration camps│ │
│at Lublin, 9 April 1943. │ VI │ 1027
│ │ │
D-183 │Order of Gestapo Office, Darmstadt, 7 │ │
│December 1938, concerning treatment of│ │
│articles secured during protest action│ │
│against Jews. │ VI │ 1075
│ │ │
*D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │
│SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │
│Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │
│Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │
│1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │
│relative to procedure in cases of │ │
│unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │
│execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74
│ │ │
*D-762 │Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, │ │
│concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │
│and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │
│Territories. (GB 298) │ VII │ 221
│ │ │
*D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │
│regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │
│non-German civilians in Occupied │ │
│Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222
│ │ │
*L-18 │Official report, Katzmann to General │ │
│of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, │ │
│concerning “Solution of Jewish │ │
│Question in Galicia”. (USA 277) │ VII │ 755
│ │ │
*L-37 │Letter from Illmer, Chief of the SIPO │ │
│and SD of Radom, to subordinates, 19 │ │
│July 1944, concerning collective │ │
│responsibility of members of families │ │
│of assassins and saboteurs. (USA 506) │ VII │ 782
│ │ │
*L-41 │Orders of Mueller, Chief of the │ │
│Gestapo, 17 December 1942 and 23 March│ │
│1943, concerning transfer of workers │ │
│to concentration camps. (USA 496) │ VII │ 784
│ │ │
*L-51 │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August │ │
│1945. (USA 521) │ VII │ 798
│ │ │
L-53 │Order from Commandant of the SIPO and │ │
│SD for the Radom District to Branch │ │
│Office in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on │ │
│clearance of prisons. (USA 291) │ VII │ 814
│ │ │
*L-61 │Express letter from Sauckel to │ │
│Presidents of Landes Employment │ │
│Office, 26 November 1942, concerning │ │
│employment of Jews and exchange of │ │
│Jews in essential employment against │ │
│Polish labor. (USA 177) │ VII │ 816
│ │ │
*L-89 │Top secret letter issued by the │ │
│Commandant of the SIPO and SD, │ │
│District Radom, 24 February 1944, │ │
│concerning intensified interrogations.│ │
│(USA 507) │ VII │ 868
│ │ │
*L-90 │Fuehrer decree, February 1942, │ │
│concerning prosecution of offenses in │ │
│Occupied Territory; “First Ordinance” │ │
│signed by Keitel for execution of the │ │
│directive; memorandum of 12 December │ │
│1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503) │ VII │ 871
│ │ │
L-152 │RSHA Order concerning fraternization │ │
│of Jews and Aryans, 3 November 1941. │ VII │ 903
│ │ │
L-167 │Orders of the Reichsminister of the │ │
│Interior, 24 March 1942, concerning │ │
│use of public transportation by Jews, │ │
│and covering letters. │ VII │ 917
│ │ │
*L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │
│Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group │ │
│A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978
│ │ │
*L-185 │Organization plan of the RSHA, 1 │ │
│January 1941. (USA 484) │ VII │ 996
│ │ │
*L-215 │File of orders and dossiers of 25 │ │
│Luxembourgers committed to │ │
│concentration camps at various times │ │
│in 1944. (USA 243) │ VII │ 1045
│ │ │
L-217 │Order of Secret State Police │ │
│concerning camouflage of Jewish │ │
│businesses, 20 November 1936. │ VII │ 1052
│ │ │
*L-219 │Organization plan of the RSHA as of 1 │ │
│October 1943. (USA 479) │ VII │ 1053
│ │ │
L-297 │Law commissioning Secret State Police │ │
│Bureau with supervision of duties of │ │
│Political Police commanders in │ │
│provinces, 20 September 1936. 1936 │ │
│Reichs Ministerialblatt, p. 1343. │ VII │ 1099
│ │ │
L-301 │New ruling on protective custody, from│ │
│The Archive, April 1934, p. 31. │ VII │ 1099
│ │ │
*L-316 │RSHA Order of 5 November 1942, signed │ │
│by Streckenbach, concerning │ │
│jurisdiction over Poles and Eastern │ │
│Nationals. (USA 346) │ VII │ 1104
│ │ │
*L-358 │Extract from register of arrests by │ │
│Gestapo in Poland, 1943. (USA 495) │ VII │ 1107
│ │ │
*L-361 │Three documents concerning the │ │
│formation of the RSHA, Himmler, 27 │ │
│September 1939; Heydrich, 23 and 27 │ │
│September 1939. (USA 478) │ VII │ 1109
│ │ │
*R-102 │Report on activities of The Task │ │
│Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 │ │
│October 1941. (USA 470) │ VIII │ 96
│ │ │
*R-110 │Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all│ │
│Senior Executive SS and Police │ │
│officers. (USA 333) │ VIII │ 107
│ │ │
*R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │
│reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │
│in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │
│Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205
│ │ │
*R-142 │Memoranda to Koblenz District │ │
│Headquarters, 22 April 1938 and 7 May │ │
│1938, relating to the plebiscite of 10│ │
│April 1938. (USA 481) │ VIII │ 243
│ │ │
R-145 │State Police Order, 28 May 1934, at │ │
│Duesseldorf, signed Schmid, concerning│ │
│sanction of denominational youth and │ │
│professional associations and │ │
│distribution of publications in │ │
│churches. (USA 745) │ VIII │ 248
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │
│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596
│ │ │
Affidavit C │Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny, 29 │ │
│November 1945, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg, 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 606
│ │ │
Affidavit D │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg, 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 622
│ │ │
Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │
│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │
│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
Chart No. 3 │Organization of the SS. (USA 445) │ VIII │ 772
│ │ │
*Chart No. 4 │Report of Special Purpose Group “A” │ │
│regarding Jews killed in the Baltic │ │
│Countries, White Russia and Lithuania.│ │
│(2273-PS; USA 487) │ VIII │ 773
│ │ │
*Chart No. 5 │Position of Kaltenbrunner and the │ │
│Gestapo and SD in the German Police │ │
│System. (USA 493) │ VIII │ 774
│ │ │
*Chart No. 16 │The Structure of the German Police. │
│(1852-PS; USA 449) │ End of VIII
│ │ │
*Chart No. 19 │Organization of the Security Police │
│(Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD │
│1943-1945. (USA 480) │ End of VIII
7. THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
In one respect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces is to be distinguished from the other groups and organizations
against which the prosecution seeks declaration of criminality. The
Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, for example, was the instrument by which
Hitlerism rose to full power in Germany. The SA and the SS were
branches—large branches to be sure—of the Nazi Party. The German
police had certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism, but
was almost entirely a creature of the party and the SS. The Reichs
Cabinet was, in essence, merely a committee or set of committees of
Reichs Ministers, and when the Nazis came to power these ministerial
positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All those groups and
organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to
Naziism, or automatically became nazified when Hitler came to full
power.
That is not true of this group, the General Staff and High Command of
the German Armed Forces. It is common knowledge that German armed might
and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades.
The war of 1914-18, the Kaiser, and the “scrap of paper” are modern
witnesses to this fact.
As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles,
the size and activities of the German armed forces were severely
restricted. The last few years have made it abundantly apparent that
these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German
militarism. The full flowering of German military strength came about
through collaboration between the Nazis and the career leaders of the
German Armed Forces—the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen.
When Hitler came to power in 1933, he did not find a vacuum in the field
of military affairs; he found a small _Reichswehr_ and a body of
professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German
military history.
The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in
the Indictment—the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men. Needless to
say, it is not the prosecution’s position that it is a crime to be a
soldier or sailor, or to serve one’s country as a soldier or sailor in
time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one, and can be
honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who
commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in
uniform.
It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the prosecution’s
position, that all members of this group were wicked men, or that they
were all equally culpable. But this group not only collaborated with
Hitler and supported many Nazi objectives. They furnished one thing
which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for
Germany—skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.
Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? The answer is simple.
The answer is that they agreed with the basic objectives of Naziism, and
that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in
achieving those objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted Germany to
aggrandize at the expense of neighboring countries, and to do so if
necessary by force or threat of force. Force—armed might—was the
keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have
been possible.
As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had
two alternatives: to collaborate with and expand the _Reichswehr_, or to
ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The
generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter. So they were the
more ready to play along with the Nazis. Moreover, the Nazis offered the
generals the chance of achieving much that the generals wished to
achieve in the expansion of German armies and frontiers. And so the
generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their
direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the
direction themselves. In fact, it was ultimately they who were taken
over by the Nazis. Hitler attracted the generals to him with the glitter
of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically. As the
war proceeded they became his tools.
But if the leaders of the Armed Forces became the tools of Naziism, it
is not to be supposed that they were unwitting, or that they did not
participate fully in many of the actions which are charged as criminal.
The willingness, indeed eagerness, of German officers to become partners
of the Nazis will be fully developed.
A. _Composition and Functions of The General Staff and High Command
Group._
During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed
Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name persists in the
public mind, but the _Grosse Generalstab_ no longer exists in fact.
There has been no such single organization, no single German General
Staff, since 1918. But there has of course been a group of men
responsible for the policy and acts of the Armed Forces. The fact that
these men have no collective name does not prevent us from collecting
them together. Men cannot escape the consequences of their collective
acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a
general staff or a high command lies not in name but in function. And
the men comprised within this group do constitute a functional group,
welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the
principal authority and responsibility under Hitler, for the plans and
operations of the German armed forces.
(1) _Structure and Organization of the German Armed Forces._ When the
Nazis came to power in 1933 the German Armed Forces were controlled by a
Reich Defense Minister, at that time Field Marshall von Blomberg.
Subordinate to von Blomberg were the chiefs of the army staff (at that
time von Fritsch), and of the naval staff, the defendant Raeder. Owing
to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the
German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatsoever.
In May 1935, at the time that military conscription was introduced in
Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices but the
structure remained basically the same. Field Marshall von Blomberg
remained in supreme command of the armed forces, with the title of Reich
Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch
became Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy. The army and naval staffs were renamed “High
Commands”—_Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine_,
from which are derived the initials by which they are usually known (OKH
and OKM).
The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this
same time, but it was not put under von Blomberg. It was an independent
institution under the personal command of Goering, who had the double
title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
In February 1938 a rather fundamental reorganization took place, both in
terms of personnel and organizational structure. Although Raeder
survived the reshuffle, von Blomberg and von Fritsch were both retired
from their positions, and Blomberg’s ministry, the War Ministry, was
wound up. This ministry had contained a division or department called
the _Wehrmachtamt_ or “Armed Forces Department,” the function of which
was to coordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From
this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed Forces
authority, known as the High Command of the Armed Forces—_Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht_—usually known by the initials OKW. As the Air Force as
well as the Army and the Navy was subordinated to OKW, coordination of
all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was in effect
Hitler’s personal staff for these matters. It combined staff and
ministerial functions. Keitel was appointed chief of the OKW. The most
important department of OKW was the operations staff, of which Jodl
became the chief. Jodl’s immediate subordinate was Warlimont, with the
title of Deputy Chief of The Armed Forces Operations Staff from 1941.
(The genesis of this department is explained in _L-79_.)
This reorganization and establishment of OKW were embodied in a decree
issued by Hitler on 4 February 1938 (1938 RGBl., Part I, page 111):
“DECREE ON THE COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
“Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on
exercised directly by me personally.
“The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its
functions becomes ‘The High Command of the Armed Forces’ and
comes directly under my command as my military staff.
“The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces
is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the
title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His
status is equal to that of Reich Minister.
“The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the
affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces as my representative exercises the functions
hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister.
“The High Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peace
time for the unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in
all areas according to my directives.
“Berlin, 4 February 1938.
“The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
“(S) Adolf Hitler
“The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
“(S) Dr. Lammers
“Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
“(S) Keitel”
Under OKW were the supreme commands of the three branches of the Armed
Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force, which did not receive the official
designation of _Oberkommando der Luftwaffe_ (OKL) until 1944. Raeder
remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and von Fritsch
was replaced by von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 von
Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army by Hitler
himself, and Raeder was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy by
Doenitz early in 1943. Goering continued as Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force until the last month of the war, when he was replaced by von
Greim.
OKW, OKH, OKM and the Air Force each had its own staff. These four
staffs did not have uniform designations; in the case of OKH, the staff
was known as the _Generalstab_ (General Staff); in the case of OKW, it
was known as the _Fuehrungstab_ (Operations Staff); but in all cases the
functions were those of a General Staff in military parlance. It will be
seen, therefore, that there was in this war no single German General
Staff, but rather four, one for each branch of the service plus one for
the OKW as the over-all interservice supreme command.
Under OKH, OKL, and OKM were the various fighting formations of the
Army, Air Force and Navy respectively. The largest army field formation
was known to the Germans, as it is among the nations generally, as an
“army group”. An Army group was a headquarters controlling two or more
“armies.” In some cases, e.g. in the campaigns in Norway and Greece
where only one army was used, “armies” were directly subordinated to
OKH, rather than to an “army group.” Under the armies come the lower
field formations such as corps, divisions, regiments, etc.
In the case of the German Air Force (OKL), the largest formation was
known as an “air fleet” (_Luftflotte_) and the lower units under the air
fleet were called “corps” (_Fliegerkorps_ or _Jagdkorps_) or “divisions”
(_Fliegerdivisionen_ or _Jagddivisionen_).
Under OKM were the various “naval group commands,” which controlled all
naval operations in a given area, with the exception of the operation of
the high seas fleet and the submarines, which by their nature, were too
mobile to be restricted to an area command. The Commanders of the fleet
and submarines, and certain other specialized units, were directly
subordinate to the German Admiralty.
(2) _Composition of the Group Charged as Criminal._ The group charged in
the Indictment (Appendix B) as criminal comprises, first, German
officers who held the top positions in the four supreme commands
described above; and second, the officers who held the top field
commands.
The holders of nine of the principal positions in the supreme commands
are included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme
authority: the chief of the OKW, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force. Four other positions are those of the Chiefs of Staff to the four
Commanders-in-Chief: the Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW, the Chief
of the General Staff of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff of the
Air Force, and the Chief of the Naval War Staff. The ninth position is
that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW. The particular
responsibility of the holder of this office was planning, and for this
reason his office has been included in the group.
The group named in the Indictment comprises all individuals who held any
of these nine staff positions between February 1938 and the end of the
war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the opening date because
it was in that month that the top organization of the German Armed
Forces was reorganized and assumed substantially the form in which it
persisted up to the end of the war. Twenty-two different individuals
occupied these nine positions during that period, of whom eighteen are
still living.
With regard to the officers who held the principal field commands, the
Indictment includes as members of the group all Commanders-in-Chief in
the field who had the status of _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or
Air Force. The term _Oberbefehlshaber_ defies literal translation into
English: literally the components of the word mean
“over-command-holder,” and it is perhaps best translated as
Commander-in-Chief. In the case of the Army, commanders of army groups
and armies always had the status and title of _Oberbefehlshaber_. In the
Air Force, the Commander-in-Chief of air fleets always had the status of
_Oberbefehlshaber_, although they were not formally so designated until
1944. In the Navy, officers holding the senior regional commands, and
therefore in control of all naval operations (other than of the high
seas fleet itself) in a given sector, had the status of
_Oberbefehlshaber_. Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of
_Oberbefehlshaber_ in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in
question, and all but approximately a dozen of them are still alive.
The entire General Staff and High Command group as defined in the
Indictment comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed still
to be living. These figures are the cumulative total of all officers who
at any time belonged to the group during the seven years and three
months from February 1938 to May 1945. The number of active members of
the group at any one time is, of course, much smaller; it rose from
about 20 at the outbreak of the war to 50 in 1944 and 1945.
The structure and functioning of the German General Staff and High
Command group have been described in a series of affidavits by some of
the principal German field marshalls and generals. A brief description
of how these statements were obtained may be helpful. In the first place
two American officers, selected for ability and experience in
interrogating high-ranking German prisoners of war, were briefed by an
Intelligence officer and a trial counsel on the particular problems
presented by this part of the case. These interrogators were already
well versed in military intelligence and were able to converse fluently
in German. The officer who briefed these interrogators emphasized that
their function was objectively to inquire into and to establish facts on
which the prosecution wishes to be accurately and surely informed; the
interrogators were not to regard themselves as cross-examiners. The
German officers to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the
special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of
positions held by them during the past generation. After each interview
the interrogator prepared a report. From this report such facts as
appeared relevant to the issues now before the Tribunal were extracted
and a statement embodying these facts was prepared. This statement was
then presented to the officer at a later interview. It was presented in
the form of a draft and the officer was asked whether it truly
reproduced what he said at the previous interview. He was also invited
to alter it in any way he thought fit. This careful and laborious, but
necessary, process had as its object the procuring of the best possible
testimony in the form of carefully considered statements.
These affidavits fully support the prosecution’s description of the
group, and conclusively establish that this group of officers was in
fact the group which had the major responsibility for planning and
directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.
The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder (_3702-PS_), who
held the rank of _Generaloberst_ (Colonel General), the equivalent of a
four-star general in the American Army. Halder was chief of the General
Staff of OKH from September 1938 to September 1942 and is, accordingly,
a member of the group. His statement reads:
“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in
Germany was vested in the Head of State who prior to 2 August
1934 was Field Marshall von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945
was Adolf Hitler.
“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of
State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In
practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a
relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers
exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by
virtue of their training, their positions and their mutual
contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed
Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the
instructions of the OKW in the name of their respective
Commanding Officers and were presented by them to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of
State).
“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility
of preparing for military operations within their competent
fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as
were to be undertaken by troops in the field.
“Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled
and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples
of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the
Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish
campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14
June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition
of this group and the relationship of its members to each other
were as shown in the attached chart. This was in effect the
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.”
“(S) Halder” (_3702-PS_)
A substantially identical statement (_3703-PS_) was made by von
Brauchitsch, who held the rank of Field Marshall, and who was
Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941. Von Brauchitsch was
also, therefore, a member of the group. The only difference between the
two statements is worth noting occurs in the last sentence of each.
Halder states that the group described in the Indictment “was in effect
the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces,”
(_3702-PS_), whereas von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently,
saying “in the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the
chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.” (_3703-PS_)
Both von Brauchitsch and Halder have stated under oath that the General
Staff chart (_Chart Number 7_) accurately portrays the top organization
of the German Armed Forces. The statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder
also fully support the prosecution’s statement that the holders of the
positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major
responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces
matters.
Another affidavit by Halder (_3707-PS_) sets forth certain less
important matters of detail:
“The most important department in the OKW was the Operations
Staff—in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army
and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel
there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in
status with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military
affairs they and their departments were less important and less
influential than Jodl and Jodl’s staff.
“The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of
these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was
chief. It was called the ‘National Defense’ Section and was
primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions.
From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same
duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.
“There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as
the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.
“Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out
by the group of high-ranking officers described in my Statement
of 7 November (in the Army: ‘General Staff of the Army’; in the
Air Force ‘General Staff of the Air Force’).
“Operational matters in the Navy were even in World War I not
worked out by the ‘Great General Staff’ but by the Naval Staff.”
“(Signed) Franz Halder” (_3707-PS_)
This affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General
Staffs of the four Commanders of OKW, OKL, OKM, and OKH and fully
supports the inclusion of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services in
the indicted group, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy
Chief of the OKW Operations Staff, with his strategic planning
responsibilities.
An affidavit (_3708-PS_) by the son of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch,
who had the rank of _Oberst_ (Colonel) in the German Air Force, and who
was personal aide to Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the German Air
Force, furnishes a few details on the _Luftwaffe_:
“_Luftflottenchefs_ have the same status as the
_Oberbefehlshaber_ of an army. During the war they had no
territorial authority and accordingly exercised no territorial
jurisdiction.
“They were the highest troop commanders of the air force units
subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
“Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation
‘_Befehlshaber_’ and from then on that of ‘_Oberbefehlshaber_.’
This change of designation carried with it no change in the
functions and responsibilities which they previously had.”
“(Signed) Brauchitsch” (_3708-PS_)
(3) _Functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group._ In many
respects, the German military leaders functioned in the same general
manner as obtains in the military establishments of other large nations.
General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants
at OKW, OKH, OKL, and OKM, in collaboration with the field generals or
admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision
to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the
highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political
and diplomatic questions as well as purely military considerations. When
the decision was made, to attack Poland, for example, the top staff
officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military
plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the
Commanders of the Army groups and Armies who were to be in charge of the
campaign. Consultation would follow between the top field commanders and
the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, and the plans would be revised,
perfected, and refined in detail.
The manner in which the group worked, involving as it did the
interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers
at OKW and OKH and the principal field commanders, is graphically
described in two affidavits by Field Marshall von Brauchitsch
(_3705-PS_):
“STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945
“In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military
preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was
immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan.
This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him as amended
by a change which he desired.
“After the operational and deployment orders had been given to
the two Commanders of the army groups and the five Commanders of
the armies, conferences took place with them about details in
order to hear their desires and recommendations.
“After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of
keeping in close and constant touch with the Commanders-in-Chief
of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their
headquarters as well as by telephone, teletype or wireless. In
this way I was able to obtain their advice and their
recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In
fact it was the accepted policy and common practice for the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate
Commanders-in-Chief and to maintain a constant exchange of ideas
with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of
Staff communicated with army groups and, thru them as well as
directly, with armies; thru army groups on strategical and
tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and the
administration of conquered territory occupied by these armies.
An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a
relatively small staff which was concerned only with military
operations. In all territorial matters it was the
Commander-in-Chief of the army and not of the army group who
exercised jurisdiction.
“(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (_3705-PS_)
* * * * *
“SUPPLEMENT TO MY STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945
“When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of
his political objectives through military pressure or through
the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an
appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.
“Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the
OKM. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally
by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a
written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed
Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the
operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies
involved. Details of the operational and deployment plans were
discussed by the OKH with the Commanders of the army groups and
armies and with the Chiefs of Staff of these Commanders.
“During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of
ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio and
courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every
opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the
Commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of
personal visits to them. In the war against Russia the
Commanders of army groups and of armies were individually and
repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation.
“Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army
groups and for all matters concerning supply and territorial
jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.”
“(Signed) von Brauchitsch” (_3705-PS_)
The _Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field, therefore—and in the case of the
army that means the Commander-in-Chief of army groups and
armies—participated in planning, and directed the execution of the
plans. The _Oberbefehlshaber_ were also the repositories of general
executive power in the areas in which their army groups and armies were
operating. This fact appears from a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by
Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_447-PS_).
This directive sets out various regulations for the impending operations
against the Soviet Union (which were actually begun on 22 June 1941).
Under paragraph I, is entitled “Area of operations and executive power
(_Vollziehende Gewalt_)”, subparagraph 1 and 2(a) provide:
“It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the
General-Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in
accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21
October 1939, the Commander in Chief of the Army shall be
authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of
his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may
transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief
[_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of
that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian
agencies.”
* * * * * *
“The area of operations created through the advance of the Army
beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries
is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to exercise the
executive power [_Vollziehende Gewalt_] in this area, and may
transfer his authority onto the Commanders in Chief
[_Oberbefehlshaber_] of the Army Groups and Armies.” (_447-PS_)
The official command invitation to participate in consultations at the
Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, eight days prior to the German attack
on the Soviet Union, also shows the group at work (_C-78_). This meeting
is referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder
(_3702-PS_) and von Brauchitsch (_3703-PS_) mentioned above. This
document, signed by Colonel Schmundt, Chief _Wehrmacht_ Adjutant to
Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941, begins:
“_Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’_
“The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
ordered reports on Barbarossa [the code name for the invasion of
the U.S.S.R.] by the Commanders of Army Groups and Armies and
Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.”
This document likewise includes a list of the participants in this
conference which closely parallels the structure of the group as set
forth in the Indictment. The list includes General Field Marshal von
Brauchitsch, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and a member
of the group; and General Halder, who was chief of the Army Staff, and a
member of the group. Then there are three subordinates who were not
members of the group: Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt. Next is navy
Captain Wagner, who was chief of the Operations Staff, Operations
Division of the Naval War Staff, not a member of the group. On the air
side there were General Milch, State Secretary and Inspector of the Air
Force, again not a member of the group; General Joschonnek, chief of the
General Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his
assistants. Passing to the OKW, High Command of the Armed Forces, we
find that Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were
present, with an assistant from the General Staff. Then there were four
officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not members of the
group. Present from the Field Commanders were General von Falkenhorst,
Army High Command, Norway, member of the group; General Stumpff, Air
Fleet 5, member of the group; Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stuelpnagel,
Schobert, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group. Of the
Air Force officers present, General Loehr, Air Fleet 4, was a member of
the group; General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was
director of the Home Forces, commander of the Home Forces, and the other
the Director General of Equipment and Supply. Turning to the Navy, those
present were Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the Naval
War Staff, and a member of the group; and an assistant who was not a
member, Carls, Navy Group North, member of the group, and likewise
Schmundt were present. Then from the Army, Leeb, Busch, Kuechler, all
members of the group as _Oberbefehlshaber_, and Keller, a member of the
group, were present. Also Bock, Kluge, Strauss, Guderian, Hoth,
Kesselring, all members of the group, were present. It will be seen
that, except for a few assisting officers of relatively junior rank, all
the participants in these consultations were members of the group, and
that in fact the participants in these consultations included the
members of the group who were concerned in the impending operations
against the Soviet Union.
B. _Criminal Activities of the General Staff and High Command Group._
The General Staff and High Command group is well represented among the
individual defendants in this case. It must be kept in mind that this
group may be declared criminal in connection with any act of which an
individual defendant who is a member of the group may be convicted
(Charter, Article 9). Five of the individual defendants, or one-quarter
of the total number accused, are members of this group.
In the order of listing in the indictments, the first is Goering.
Goering is a defendant in this case in numerous capacities. He is a
member of the General Staff and High Command group by reason of having
been the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force from the time when the Air
Force first came into the open, and was officially established, until
about a month prior to the end of the war. During the last month of the
war he was replaced in this capacity by von Greim, who committed suicide
shortly after his capture at the end of the war. Goering is charged with
crimes under all counts of the Indictment.
The next listed defendant who is a member of the group is Keitel. He and
the remaining three defendants who are members of the group are all four
in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all
four of them were professional soldiers or sailors. Keitel was made the
chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) when the OKW
was first set up in 1938, and remained in that capacity throughout the
period in question. He held the rank of Field Marshall throughout most
of this period, and in addition to being the Chief of OKW, he was a
member of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for
the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all four
counts of the Indictment.
The defendant Jodl was a career soldier; he was an _Oberstleutnant_
(Lieutenant Colonel) when the Nazis came to power, and ultimately
attained the rank of _Generaloberst_ (Colonel General). He became the
Chief of the Operations Staff of the _Wehrmacht_, and continued in that
capacity throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all
four counts of the Indictment.
The defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of the entire
group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as early as
1928. He attained the highest rank in the German Navy, _Grossadmiral_,
and in addition to being Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he was a member
of the Secret Cabinet Council. He retired from Supreme Command of the
Navy in January 1943, and was replaced by Doenitz. Raeder is charged
with crimes under counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment.
The last of these five defendants, Doenitz, was a relatively junior
officer when the Nazis came to power. During the early years of the Nazi
regime he specialized in submarine activities and was in command of the
U-boat arm when the war broke out. He rose steadily in the Navy and was
chosen to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943. Doenitz then
became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and attained the rank of
_Grossadmiral_. When the German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of
the war, Doenitz succeeded Hitler as head of the German government. He
is charged with crimes under counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment.
Four of these five defendants are reasonably typical of the group as a
whole. Goering is an exception: he is primarily a Nazi party politician
nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result of his career in 1914-18.
But the others made soldiering or sailoring their life work. They
collaborated with and joined in the most important adventures of the
Nazis, but they were not among the early party members. They differ in
no essential respect from the other 125 odd members of the group. They
are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects than some of the other
members, as they rose to the highest positions in the German Armed
Forces, and all but Jodl attained the highest rank. But they are
generally representative of the group, and their expressed ideas and
actions are fairly characteristic of those of the other group members.
It is not, of course, the prosecution’s position, and it is not
essential to its case, that all 130 members of this group, (or all the
members of any other organization or group named in the Indictment),
actually committed crimes, under Article 6 of the Charter. It is the
prosecution’s position that the leadership of the group and the purposes
to which the group was committed by the leaders were criminal under
Article 6. The individual defendants were among the leaders of the
General Staff and High Command group, and, acting in the official
capacities which made them members of the group, they performed and
participated in acts which are criminal under Article 6 of the Charter.
Other members of the group performed such acts. The German Armed Forces
were so completely under the group’s control as to make the group
responsible for their activities under the last sentence of Article 6 of
the Charter.
(1) _The Planning and Launching of Wars of Aggression._ It is, of
course, the normal function of a military staff to prepare military
plans. In peacetime, military staffs customarily concern themselves with
the preparation of plans of attack or defense based on hypothetical
contingencies. There is nothing criminal about carrying on such
exercises or preparing such plans. That is not what these defendants and
this group are charged with.
This group agreed with the Nazi objective of aggrandizing Germany by
force or threat of force. They joined knowingly and enthusiastically in
developing German armed might for this criminal purpose. They joined
knowingly and willfully in initiating and waging aggressive wars. They
were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to launch aggressive wars.
They laid the military plans and directed the initiation and carrying on
of the wars. These things are criminal under article 6 of the Charter.
Aggressive war cannot be prepared and waged without intense activity on
the part of all branches of the Armed Forces and particularly by the
high-ranking officers who control such forces. To the extent, therefore,
that German preparations for and waging of aggressive war are historical
facts of common knowledge, or are proved, it necessarily follows that
the General Staff and High Command group, and the German Armed Forces,
participated therein.
This is so notwithstanding the effort on the part of certain military
leaders of Germany, after defeat, to insist that until the troops
marched they lived in an ivory tower of military technicalities, unable
or unwilling to observe the end to which their work led. The documentary
evidence which follows fully refutes any such contentions.
The purposes and objectives of the German General Staff and High Command
group during the period prior to the absorption of Austria may be
summarized as follows:
(i) Secret rearmament, including the training of military
personnel, the production of war munitions, and the building of
an air force;
(ii) The creation of a military air force, announced by Goering
on 10 March 1935;
(iii) The law for compulsory military service, of 16 March 1935,
fixing the peace-time strength of the German Army at 500,000;
and
(iv) The reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the
refortification of that area.
These events are historical facts not requiring proof. Likewise, the
impossibility of the Nazis’ achieving these ends without cooperation by
the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.
Events and circumstances during the period 1933-36 are discussed in
Section 2 of Chapter IX. Chief among these were the secret expansion of
the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance
of Raeder; the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, adopted the same
day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provision of the
Versailles Treaty (_2261-PS_); von Blomberg’s plan, 2 May 1935, for the
reoccupation of the Rhineland (_C-139_); and von Blomberg’s orders of 2
March 1936 under which the reoccupation was actually carried out
(_C-159_). All these events clearly required the closest collaboration
between the military leaders and the Nazis.
The state of mind and objectives of the German military leaders during
this early period are significant. The viewpoint of the German Navy on
the opportunities which Naziism offered for rearmament so that Germany
could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force, is reflected
in a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937
entitled “The Fight of the Navy against Versailles, 1919-35” (_C-156_).
This memorandum was compiled by a naval captain named Schuessler in the
German Admiralty. The preface contains the following statements:
“The object and aim of this memorandum is to draw a technically
reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence
of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the
unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.”
* * * * * *
“This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal
and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if
the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not
behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the
Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition
for an effective rearmament, in the coordination of the whole
nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and
spiritual powers, could the work of the soldier find its
fulfilment.
“The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in
world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united
will.” (_C-156_)
Thus, the German Navy and the Nazis were in comradely agreement and full
collaboration. Hitler was giving the military leaders the chance they
wanted. Jodl stated the situation clearly in his speech to the
Gauleiters on 7 November 1943 (_L-172_):
“1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its
struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the
outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is
not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like
however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful
regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played
by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to
fight [_Wehrwillen_] in nurturing fighting strength
[_Wehrkraft_] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all
the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small _Reichswehr_
would never have been able to cope with this task, if only
because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the
Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing
about—was the fusion of these two forces.
“2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first
place restoration of fighting sovereignty [_Wehrhoheit_]
(conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with
special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured
and air arm.” (_L-172_)
Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and
objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war.
Notes made by Admiral Carls of the German Navy in September 1938 by way
of comment on a “Draft study of Naval Warfare against England,” read as
follows:
“A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.
“1. If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire
a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient
colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and
secure access to the ocean.
“2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to
Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world
powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful
means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore
forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding
preparations for war.
“3. War against England means at the same time war against the
Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a
large number of countries overseas, in fact against one-half to
one-third of the whole world.
“It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is
prepared _economically_ as well as _politically_ and
_militarily_ and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an
outlet to the ocean.” (_C-23_)
The German Air Force, during this prewar period, was developing even
more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. A
study prepared by the chief, Kammhuber, of a branch of the General Staff
of the Air Force called the “Organization Staff”, contained
recommendations for the organization of the German Air Force in future
years up to 1950 (_L-43_). The recommendations are based on certain
assumptions, one of which was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany
would be as shown on the map which is attached as an inclosure to this
study (_Chart Number 10_). On this map Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included
within the borders of the Reich. Kammhuber also envisaged the future
peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven
“Group Commands.” Four of these were to lie within the borders of
Germany proper, at Berlin, Brunswick, Munich, and Koenigsberg, but the
three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw.
(_L-43_)
The basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German
military leaders cannot be overemphasized. Without this agreement on
objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection, an
affidavit (_3704-PS_) by von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshall, Reich
War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces until
February 1938, is significant:
“From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical
territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were
the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr and Memel.
“I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers,
believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was
the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled
some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of
the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the
Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in
the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to
separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was
regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. This was one
of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament
which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was
accentuated under Nazi rule.
“Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to
Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler since he produced
the results which they desired. After this time some generals
began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of
his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any
definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do
so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their
positions.
“Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to
recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking
officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and
diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my
function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de
bureau. As far as I know he was never named Commander of the
Armed Forces but was always merely a ‘Chief of Staff’ under
Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of
the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler
and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding
between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself
desired and had furthered as _Reichswehrminister_ and
_Reichskriegsminister_. To do the opposite would have led to a
civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people
supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But
it is the truth.
“As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler’s measures. He
became a willing tool in Hitler’s hands for every one of his
decisions.
“He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.”
(_3704-PS_)
This statement by von Blomberg is paralleled closely in some respects by
an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_). Blaskowitz
commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign
against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern
France, and held command of Army Group H, which retreated beyond the
Rhine at the end of the war. His statement is as follows:
“* * * After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the
Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through
diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and
England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter
of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came to naught,
the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not
only with Poland herself, but also with the Western Powers.
“When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to
prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war
came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion
was only strengthened by the Fuehrer’s speech on 22 August 1939
on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality.
Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members
of my staff who were engaged in preparations, participated in
various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army
group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical,
strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my
future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during
the planned Polish campaign.
“During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno
operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the Fuehrer,
visited my headquarters. In fact it was common practice for
commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked
from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their
recommendations by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as
by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually
became advisers to the OKH in their own field so that the
positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which
was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the
German Armed Forces.” (_3706-PS_)
It should be noted that General Blaskowitz, like Colonel General Halder
and Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the
structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group
as described by the prosecution.
It is, accordingly, clear beyond dispute that the military leaders of
Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the
expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties. The
objectives they had in mind are obvious from the affidavits and
documents to which reference has been made. In these documents and
affidavits we see the Nazis and the Generals in agreement upon the basic
objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force, and
collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany in order to make
possible the subsequent acts of aggression.
(_a_) _Austria._ Notes taken by Colonel Hossbach of a conference held in
the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937 show that this
conference, at which Hitler presided, was small and highly secret
(_386-PS_). The only other participants were the four principal military
leaders, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (von Neurath), and Hossbach
acting as Secretary. The four chief leaders of the Armed
Forces—Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister for War, and the
Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces, von
Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goering for the Air
Force—were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of
Germany’s diplomatic and military policy, and stated that the conquest
of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary “for the
improvement of our military position” and “in order to remove any threat
from the flanks”. (_386-PS_)
The military and political advantages envisaged included the acquisition
of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of
troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions
from the population of the conquered territories. Von Blomberg and von
Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated:
“That it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for
this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out
operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of
the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications”
(_386-PS_).
In the following Spring, March 1938, the German plans with respect to
Austria came to fruition. Entries in the diary kept by Jodl show the
participation of the German military leaders in the absorption of
Austria (_1780-PS_). As is shown by Jodl’s diary entry for 11 February
1938, Keitel and other generals were present at the Obersalzberg meeting
between Schuschnigg and Hitler:
“_11 February_
“In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V.
Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together
with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and
military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol”.
(_1780-PS_)
Two days later Keitel and others were preparing proposals to be
submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian government the
impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg
agreement was ratified in Vienna:
“_13 February_
“In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come
to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer order is to the
effect that military pressure by shamming military action should
be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive
maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone
for approval”. (_1780-PS_)
These proposals are embodied in a document 14 February 1938 and signed
by Keitel (_1775-PS_). Portions of Keitel’s proposals to the Fuehrer are
as follows:
“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or
Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.
“2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the
conclusion of military preparations against Austria,
“_a._ through V-men (_V-Maenner_) in Austria,
“_b._ through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier,
“_c._ through travelling agents.”
* * * * * *
“4. Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in
_Wehrkreis VII_ and between Berlin and Munich.
“5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of
the Mountain Troops near the frontier.
“6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th
in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out
measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.” (_1775-PS_)
As Jodl’s diary entry for 14 February shows, these deceptive maneuvers
and threats of force were very effective in Austria:
“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military
preparations.” (_1780-PS_)
About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg’s
decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in
accordance with the preexisting plans for the invasion of Austria (these
plans were known as “Case Otto”) in order to absorb Austria and stop the
plebiscite. Jodl’s diary entry for 10 March 1938 states:
“By surprise and without consulting the ministers, Schuschnigg
ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring
strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or
preparation.
“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March
9 to 10, he calls for Goering, General V. Reichenau is called
back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General V. Schobert is
ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is
with the District Leader [_Gauleiter_] Burckel in the
Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He
drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15,
according to the wish of General V. Viebahn, to give him the old
draft.
‘Prepare case Otto’.” (_1780-PS_)
In an order 11 March, initialed by Keitel and Jodl, Hitler laid down the
general instructions for the invasion, and directed that the Army and
Air Force be ready for action by 12 March (_C-102_). On the same evening
Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria to commence at daybreak on 12
March. The order was initialed by Jodl. (_C-182_)
The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression
in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance.
This was so simple because the invasion was precipitated by an outside
event, Schuschnigg’s order for the plebiscite. But although for this
reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the
foregoing documents make abundantly clear the participation of the
military leaders at all stages. At the small policy meeting in November
1937, when Hitler’s general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was
outlined, the only others present were the four principal military
leaders and the Foreign Secretary (_386-PS_). In February, Keitel,
Reichenau, and Sperrle were present at Obersalzberg to help subject
Schuschnigg to “the heaviest military pressure” (_1780-PS_). Keitel and
others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of
military threat and deception for frightening the Austrian Government
into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol (_1775-PS_). When the actual
invasion took place it was, of course, directed by the military leaders
and executed by the German Armed Forces. Jodl has given a clear
statement of why the German military leaders were delighted to join with
the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. In his
lecture to the Gauleiters in November 1943 (_L-172_) Jodl explained:
“The Austrian ‘Anschluss’, in its turn, brought with it not only
fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both
of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving
our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of
Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into
Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base
for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself
was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now
become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any
attack pressed home with vigour before effective aid from the
West could be expected to arrive”. (_L-172_)
(_b_) _Czechoslovakia._
The steps in the planning for the invasion of Czechoslovakia (“Case
Green” or Fall Gruen) bear the evidence of knowing and wilful
participation by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the General Staff
and High Command Group.
The Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the four
principal German military leaders on 5 November 1937 show, that Austria
and Czechoslovakia were then listed as the first intended victims of
German aggression (_386-PS_). After the absorption of Austria in March
1938, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the armed
forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. In the
Hitler-Keitel discussions on 21 April 1938 a nice balance of political
and military factors was worked out (_388-PS_):
“A. _Political Aspect_
1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or
possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be:
hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a
measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on
the mainland.
2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a
crisis and lead to war.
3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g.
assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German
demonstration).
B. _Military Conclusions_
1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2 and
3. Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have taken security
measures.
* * * * * *
4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive
ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis
will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of
foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of
spoils!) and demoralize “Gruen”.
Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and
employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless
thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague].
(_388-PS_)
From this point on, nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt
file (_388-PS_) and in Jodl’s diary (_1780-PS_). These two sources of
information demolish in advance what will, no doubt, be urged in defense
of the military defendants and the General Staff and High Command Group.
They will seek to create the impression that the German generals were
pure military technicians; that they were uninterested and uninformed
about political and diplomatic considerations and events; that they
passed their days mounting mock battles at the _Kriegsakadamie_; that
they prepared plans for military attack or defense, on a purely
hypothetical basis. They will say all this in order to suggest that they
did not share and could not estimate Hitler’s aggressive intentions, and
that they carried out politically conceived orders like military
automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched and waged were
aggressive or not.
If these arguments are made, the Schmundt file (_388-PS_) and Jodl’s
diary (_1780-PS_) make it abundantly apparent that aggressive designs
were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals; that the
military leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions of the
Nazis; that they were fully informed of political and diplomatic
developments; that indeed German generals had a habit of turning up at
diplomatic gatherings.
If the documents did not show these things so clearly, a moment’s
thought must show them to be true. A highly successful program of
conquest depends on armed might, and cannot be executed with an
unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of
course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to
soldiers alone. It is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far too
dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and
military support.
No doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler’s timing
and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather
amusingly reflected in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 10 August 1938:
“The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt.
Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After
dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three
hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The
subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer’s attention to the
defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few
generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies
especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top
it off he claims to quote from General Adams [_die er noch dazu
dem General Adams in den Mund legt_] that the western
fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer
becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark
that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for
anything. ‘I assure you, General, the position will not only be
held for three weeks, but for three years.’ The cause of this
despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very
widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various
reasons. First of all, it [the General Staff] is restrained by
old memories; political considerations play a part as well,
instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is
certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the
soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the
genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with
Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may
not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the
opposition between the General’s opinion and that of the Fuehrer
is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale
of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be
able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when
the right moment comes.” (_1780-PS_)
But if this entry shows that some of the German generals at that time
were cautious with respect to Germany’s ability to take on Poland and
the Western Powers simultaneously, nonetheless the entry shows no lack
of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in
Jodl’s diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals
lacked sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Furthermore, the top military
leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable
success in the years from 1938 to 1942.
If it is said that German military leaders did not know that German
general policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive, or based on force
and threat of force, it may be noted that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a
Most Secret directive to Keitel (_388-PS Item 11_) in which he said:
“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
military action in the near future. It is the job of the
political leaders to await or bring about the politically and
militarily suitable moment.
“An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia
or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly
favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may
cause me to take early action.
“The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a
favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly
the preparations are to be made at once.” (_388-PS Item 11_)
Jodl was in no doubt what this meant. He noted in his diary that same
day:
“The Fuehrer signs directive ‘Green’, where he states his final
decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
military preparation all along the line”. (_1780-PS_)
The succeeding evidence in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 14, 16, 17_)
and in the Jodl diary (_1780-PS_) shows how those military preparations
went forward “all along the line.” Numerous examples of discussions,
planning, and preparation during the last few weeks before the Munich
Pact, including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff
in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary
(_1780-PS_) and the later items in the Schmundt file (_388-PS Items 18
to 22, 24, 26 to 28, 31 to 34, 36 to 54_). The day the Munich Pact was
signed, Jodl noted in his diary:
“The Munich Pact is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out.
Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th
of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will
be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer
and his determination not to shun even a World War have again
won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that
the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been
converted and will remain that way.” (_1780-PS_)
Plans for the “liquidation” of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made
soon after Munich (_388-PS Item 40_; _C-136_; _C-138_). Ultimately the
absorption was accomplished by diplomatic bullying in which Keitel
participated for the usual purposes of demonstrating that German armed
might was ready to enforce the threats (_2802-PS_). Once again, Jodl in
his 1943 lecture (_L-172_) explained clearly why the objective of
eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German
military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazis:
“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of
1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded
off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then
became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of
more or less favorable strategic premises.” (_L-172_)
This serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg (_3704-PS_) and
Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) already quoted:
“The whole group of German staff and front officers believed
that the question of the Polish Corridor would have to be
settled some day, if necessary by force of arms.”
“A war to wipe out the political and economic losses resulting
from the creation of the Polish Corridor was regarded as a
sacred duty though a sad necessity.”
“Before 1938-39, the German generals were not opposed to
Hitler.”
“Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.”
(_c_) _Poland._ The story of the German attack on Poland furnishes an
excellent case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High
Command Group.
Reference is made to the series of directives from Hitler and Keitel
involving “Fall Weiss” (_C-120_). The series starts with a re-issuance
of the “Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed
Forces”. This periodically re-issued directive was encountered
previously in the case of Czechoslovakia.
In essence these directives are (_a_) statements of what the Armed
Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and
diplomatic policies and developments, and (_b_) indications of what
should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military
tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in
fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and strongly
demonstrate the mutual inter-dependence of aggressive diplomacy and
military planning. The distribution of these documents early in April
1939, in which the preparations of plans for the Polish war is ordered,
was limited. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: one to
Brauchitsch (OKH), one to Raeder (OKM), one to Goering (OKL), and two to
Warlimont in the Planning Branch of OKW. Hitler lays down that the plan
must be susceptible of execution by 1 September 1939, and that target
date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is
clearly brought out by the following part of one of those documents:
“1. _Political Requirements and Aims._ German relations with
Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any
quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards
Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and
adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement
might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with
Poland.
“The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and
create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements
of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed
a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict,
at the latest.
“The political leadership considers it its task in this case to
isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to
Poland only.
“The development of increasing internal crises in France and the
resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in
the not too distant future.
“Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this
cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this
would imply Poland’s destruction by Bolshevism.
“The attitudes of the _Baltic States_ will be determined wholly
by German military exigencies.
“On the German side, Hungary cannot be considered a certain
German ally. Italy’s attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome
Axis.
“2. _Military Conclusions._ The great objectives in the building
up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by
the antagonism of the ‘Western Democracies’. ‘Fall Weiss’
constitutes only a precautionary complement to these
preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however,
as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the
Western opponents.
“The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even
after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the
war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.
“The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be
taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea
coast, as well as the air over them.” (_C-120_)
It cannot be suggested that these are hypothetical plans, or that the
General Staff and High Command Group did not know what was in prospect.
The plans show on their face that they are in earnest and no war game.
The point is reinforced by Schmundt’s notes on the conference in
Hitler’s study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939
(_L-79_). At this conference Hitler announced:
“There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are
left with the decision: _to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity_”. (_L-79_)
Besides Hitler and a few military aides and adjutants, the following
were present: Goering (C-in-C _Luftwaffe_); Raeder (C-in-C Navy); Keitel
(Chief, OKW); von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Army); Col. General Milch
(Inspector General of the _Luftwaffe_); Gen. Bodenschatz (Goering’s
personal assistant); Rear Admiral Schnievindt (Chief of the Naval War
Staff); Col. Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff); Col. Warlimont
(Planning Staff of OKW). All except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the
adjutants are members of the Group as defined in the Indictment.
The initial and general planning of the attack on Poland, however, had
to be examined, checked, corrected, and perfected by the field
commanders who were to carry out the attack. In a document issued in the
middle of June 1939 (_C-142_), von Brauchitsch as C-in-C of the Army
passed on the general outlines of the plan to the field
commanders-in-chief (the _Oberbefehlshaber_ of Army Groups and Armies)
so that they could work out the actual preparation and deployments in
accordance with the general plan:
“The object of the operation is to _destroy the Polish Armed
Forces_. High policy demands that the war should be begun by
heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. _The
intention of the Army High Command_ is to prevent a regular
mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise
invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the
Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the
Vistula-Narve line. This is to be achieved by a concentric
attack from Silesia on one side and Pomerania-East Prussia on
the other side. The possible influence from Galicia against this
operation must be eliminated. The main idea of the destruction
of the Polish Army west of the Vistula-Narve Line with the
elimination of the possible influence from Galicia remains
unchanged even if advanced preparedness for defense on the part
of the Polish Army, caused by previous political tension, should
have to be taken into consideration. In such a case it may be a
question of not making the first attack mainly with mechanized
and motorized forces but of waiting for the arrival of stronger,
non-motorized units. The Army High Command will then give the
correspondingly later time for the crossing of the frontier. The
endeavour to obtain a quick success will be maintained.
“The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands (A.O.K.) will
make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy.
There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to
be abandoned: these will have to be developed simply and quickly
on the same basis: they are to be prepared mentally to such an
extent, that in case of an order from the Army High Command they
can be carried out quickly.” (_C-142_)
A document of approximately the same date reveals an _Oberbefehlshaber_
at work in the field planning the attack (_2327-PS_). This document,
signed by Blaskowitz, at the time the commander-in-chief of the Third
Army Area Command and commander-in-chief of the 8th Army during the
Polish campaign, states in part:
“The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out
of a _plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account
the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war
by surprise and for quick success.
“The order of deployment by the High Command, ‘_Fall Weiss_’
authorizes the Third Army Group [in _Fall Weiss_, 8th Army
Headquarters] to give necessary directions and orders to all
commands subordinated to it for ‘_Fall Weiss_’.”
* * * * * *
“The whole correspondence on ‘_Fall Weiss_’ has to be conducted
under the classification Top Secret [_Chefsache_]. This is to be
disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment
of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every
way—even in connection with other documents.
“For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on
the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered
later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army
Group before 10 July.
“I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the
divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as
possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to
limit the extent of the information and ask that all suitable
measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting
information.
“The Commander-in-Chief of Army Area Command
“(signed) F. Blaskowitz.”
“_Aims of Operation ‘Fall Weiss’_
“1. a. The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish
mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with
forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed
on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial
superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that
can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly
bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the
marching up of the Polish Army.
“Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the
foe by quick action and ruthless attacks.” (_2327-PS_)
Finally, a week before the actual onslaught, when all the military plans
have been laid, The General Staff and High Command Group all gathered in
one place, in fact all in one room. On 23 August 1939 the
_Oberbefehlshaber_ assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler’s
explanation of the timing of the attack, and to receive political and
diplomatic orientation from the head of the State (_798-PS_). This
speech, the second of the two examples referred to in the initial
affidavits by Halder (_3702-PS_) and Brauchitsch (_3703-PS_), was
addressed to the very group defined in the indictment as the General
Staff and High Command Group.
(_d_) _The War Period, September 1939-June 1941: Norway, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece._ On 1 September 1939
Germany launched the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important
action on the western front, Poland was overrun and conquered. German
losses were insignificant.
The “three principal territorial questions” mentioned in the Blomberg
(_3704-PS_) and Blaskowitz (_3706-PS_) affidavits had all been solved.
The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified, Memel annexed, and the
Polish Corridor annexed. And much more too. Austria had become a part of
the Reich, and Czechoslovakia was occupied and a Protectorate of
Germany. All of western Poland was in German hands. Germany was superior
in arms, and in experience in their use, to her western enemies, France
and England.
Then came the three years of the war—1939, 1940, 1941—when German
armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to east.
Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria had become German allies. Norway
and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia
and Greece; the western part of the Soviet Union—all this territory was
invaded and overrun.
In the period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack
against the Soviet Union in June 1941, occurred the aggressive wars, in
violation of treaties, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece. But one thing is certain: neither
the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a
series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms
of a war, a war for the conquest of Europe.
Six weeks after the outbreak of war, and upon the successful termination
of the Polish campaign, on 9 October 1939, there was issued a
“Memorandum and Directive for the Conduct of the War in the West.”
(_L-52_). It is unsigned, was distributed only to the four service
chiefs (Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goering, and Raeder) and gives every
indication of having been issued by Hitler. The following are pertinent
extracts:
“The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or
disintegrate the 80 million state again so that in this manner
the European equilibrium, in other words the balance of power,
which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle therefore
will have to be fought out by the German people one way or
another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first
month of war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing
of peace to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially
to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be
no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the
present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the
peace-treaty.
“It is not the object of this memorandum to study the
possibilities in this direction or even to take them into
consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively
to the other case; the necessity to continue the fight, the
object of which, as already stressed, consists so far as the
enemy is concerned in the dissolution or destruction of the
German Reich. In opposition to this, the German war aim is the
final military dispatch of the West, i.e. destruction of the
power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to
oppose the state consolidation and further development of the
German people in Europe.
“As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this
internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda
adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This
does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of
our Western enemies.”
* * * * * *
“The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first
of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without
any hope of realization, that is to say, Germany is able to
enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a
few covering troops.
“The remaining European states are neutral either because they
fear for their own fates, or lack interest in the conflict as
such, or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which
prevents them from taking part at all or at any rate too soon.
“The following is to be firmly borne in mind * * *”
* * * * * *
“_Belgium and Holland_—Both countries are interested in
preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding
prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of
their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the
securing of their interior economy, even of their very life,
depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore, in
their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions, both
countries are dependent upon the West, in the highest degree. If
England and France promise themselves a successful result at the
price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position
to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without
covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality,
they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality.
Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch
neutrality time is not a factor which might promise a favorable
development for Germany.
“_The Nordic States_—Provided no completely unforeseen factors
appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed.
The continuation of German trade with these countries appears
possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)
Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, the group of _Oberbefehlshaber_
again assembled and heard from Hitler much of what he had said
previously to the four service chiefs (_789-PS_):
“For the first time in history we have to fight on only one
front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know
how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time
whether I should strike in the east and then in the west.
Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to
strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or
later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was
decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish
war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our
armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history.
Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the
eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation
which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is
as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his
fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with
him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this
situation.”
* * * * * *
“Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is
favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so anymore.”
* * * * * *
“England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves.
The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring
England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have
occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me.
None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no
importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great
height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this
work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or
destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be
compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the
first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one
man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to
capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even
the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great.
My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the
neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will
question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the
breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do
not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without
attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as
possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question
as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer.
Everything depends upon the favorable instant”. (_789-PS_)
Thereafter the winter of 1939-40 passed quietly—the winter of “phony
war”. The General Staff and High Command Group all knew what the plan
was; they had all been told. It was to attack ruthlessly at the first
opportunity, to smash the French and English forces, to pay no heed to
treaties with, or the neutrality of, the Low Countries.
“Breaking of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is
meaningless. No one will question that when we have won.”
(_789-PS_)
That is what Hitler told the _Oberbefehlshaber_. The generals and
admirals agreed and went forward with their plans.
The military leaders may contend that all the steps in this march of
conquest were conceived by Hitler, and that the military leaders
embarked on them with reluctance and misgivings. Or they may be
restrained by pride from taking so undignified and degrading a position
as to suggest that German military leadership, the bearers of the
tradition of Schlieffen, Moltke, Spee and Hindenburg, was cowed and
coerced into war and plans of which they did not approve by a gang of
political adventurers. But whether they make the argument or not, it is
utterly without foundation.
Hitler’s utterances in October (_L-79_) and November (_789-PS_) 1939 are
full of plans against France, England, and the Low Countries but contain
no suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler’s memorandum
of 9 October 1939 (_L-52_) to the four service chiefs affirmatively
indicates that he saw no reason to disturb the situation to the North:
“_The Northern States_—Providing no completely unforeseen
factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be
assumed. The continuance of trade with these countries appears
possible even in a war of long duration.” (_L-52_)
But a week previous, on 3 October 1939, Raeder had caused a
questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval War Staff, seeking
comments on the advantages which might be gained from a naval standpoint
by securing bases in Norway and Denmark (_C-122_). Raeder was stimulated
to circulate this questionnaire by a letter from another Admiral named
Carls, who pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian
coast by Germany (_C-66_). (Rolf Carls later attained the rank of
Admiral of the Fleet, and commanded Naval Group North from January 1940
to February 1943. In that capacity he is a member of the General Staff
and High Command Group as defined in the Indictment.)
Doenitz, at that time Flag Officer Submarines, on 9 October 1939,
replied to the questionnaire that from his standpoint Trondheim and
Narvik met his requirements, that Trondheim was preferable, and proposed
the establishment of a U-boat base there (_C-5_). Raeder’s visit to
Hitler the next day and certain subsequent events are described as
follows (_L-323_):
“_Entry in the War Diary of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War
Staff) on ‘Weseruebung’._ 1. 10 October 1939. First reference of
the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff), when visiting the
Fuehrer, to the significance of Norway for sea and air warfare.
The Fuehrer intends to give the matter consideration.
“12 December 1939. Fuehrer received Q & H.
“Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces to make mental preparations. The C-in-C of the Navy is
having an essay prepared, which will be ready in January. With
reference to this essay, _Kapitan zur see_ Krancke is working on
‘_Weseruebung_’, and OKW.
“During the time which followed, H maintained contact with the
Chief of Staff of the C-in-C of the Navy. His aim was to develop
the Party Q with a view to making it capable of making a coup,
and to give the Supreme Command of the Navy information on
political developments in Norway and military questions. In
general he pressed for a speeding-up of preparations, but
considered that it was first necessary to expand the
organization. The support which had been promised him in the
form of money and coal was set in motion only very slowly and
came in small quantities, and he repeatedly complained about
this. It was not until the end of March that Q considered the
coup [_Aktion_] so urgent that the expansion of his organization
could not wait. The military advice of H was passed on to the
OKW.” (_L-323_)
On 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with
Hitler at a meeting which Keitel and Jodl also attended (_C-64_). In the
meantime, illustrating the close link between the service chiefs and the
Nazi politicians, Raeder was in touch with Rosenberg on the
possibilities of using Quisling (_C-65_). As result of all this, on
Hitler’s instructions Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940.
The directive related that Hitler had commissioned Keitel to take charge
of preparation for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code
name “_Weseruebung_.” On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive
setting forth the general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark
(_C-174_). The invasion itself took place on 9 April 1940. The directive
was initialled by Admiral Kurt Fricke who at that time was head of the
Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, and who at the end of 1941
became Chief of the Naval War Staff. In that capacity he too is a member
of the Group as defined in the Indictment.
So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark
was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military
leaders. On the contrary it was conceived in the naval part of the
General Staff and High Command Group, and Hitler was persuaded to take
up the idea. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General
Staff and High Command Group as to the Nazis. Launching aggressive war
against inoffensive neighboring states gave the generals and admirals no
qualms.
As for the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were
disturbed about Treaty considerations. At the conferences between Hitler
and the principal military leaders in May 1939 (_L-79_), when the
intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler in discussing the
possibility of war with England said:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
force. Declarations of neutrality will be ignored”. (_L-79_)
And in the speech to the _Oberbefehlshaber_ in November 1939 (_789-PS_),
after the Polish victory, Hitler made clear his intention to attack
France and England by first invading the Low Countries. “No one will
question that when we have won,” he said.
Accordingly, the winter of 1939-40 and the early spring of 1940 was a
period of intensive planning in German military circles. The major
attack in the West through the Low Countries, and the attack on Norway
and Denmark had to be planned. Jodl’s diary for the period 1 February to
26 May 1940 (_1809-PS_) contains many entries reflecting the course of
this planning. These entries show that during February and early March
there was considerable doubt in German military circles as to whether
the attack on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on
the Low Countries; and that at some points there even was doubt as to
whether all these attacks were necessary from a military standpoint. But
there is not a single entry which reflects any hesitancy, from a moral
angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions to overrun
these neutral countries.
On 1 February 1940, General Jeschonnek (Chief of the Air Staff and a
member of the Group as defined in the Indictment) visited Jodl and
suggested that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground
that Holland alone would “be a tremendous improvement in conducting
aerial warfare”. On 6 February, Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek,
Warlimont, and Col. von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a “new idea” was
proposed at this meeting: that the Germans should “carry out actions H
(Holland) and Weser exercise (Norway and Denmark) only and guarantee
Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war” (_1809-PS_). The
German Air Force may have felt that occupation of Holland alone would
give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England, and
that if Belgium’s neutrality were preserved the bases in Holland would
be immune from attack by the French and the British armies in France.
If, to meet this situation, the French and British attacked through
Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But
whether or not the “new idea” made sense from a military angle, it
appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It
was a proposal to violate, without any substantial excuse, the
neutrality of three neighboring small countries, and simultaneously to
guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have
attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circumstances
it is difficult to imagine and in fact the “new idea” projected at this
meeting of military leaders is an extraordinary combination of cynicism
and naivete.
In the meantime, as Jodl’s diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the “special
staff” for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its
instructions from Keitel (_1809-PS_). On 21 February Hitler put General
von Falkenhorst (who subsequently became an _Oberbefehlshaber_ and a
member of the Group) in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl’s
diary records that “Falkenhorst accepts gladly” (_1809-PS_). On 26
February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first into Norway or
the Low Countries, but on 3 March, he decided to do Norway first and the
Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final.
Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the
venture was certain by the first of May; the invasion of the Low
Countries took place 10 days thereafter.
France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side of
Germany, and the African campaign began. In the meantime, Goering’s Air
Force hammered at England unsuccessfully, and the planned invasion of
Britain (“Operation _Seeloewe_”) never came to pass. In October 1940
Italy attacked Greece and was fought to better than a standstill. The
Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia were
embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack on the Soviet
Union was being planned in the winter of 1940-41, and Germany felt she
could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.
Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to
Italy’s aid, and the Yugoslavian coup d’etat of 26 March 1940 brought
about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The aggressive
nature of the German attacks on Greece and Yugoslavia are demonstrated
in _444-PS_; _1541-PS_; _C-167_; _1746-PS_. The decisions were made, and
the Armed Forces drew up the plans and executed the attacks. The
onslaught was particularly ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special
purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment
instructions were issued by Brauchitsch (_R-95_):
“1. The political situation in the Balkans having changed by
reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be
considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of
loyalty at first.
“_The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to
destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible_ * * *”
* * * * * *
“5. _Timetable for the operations._ a. On 5th April as soon as
sufficient forces of the Air Forces are available and weather
permitting, the Air Forces shall attack continuously by day and
night the Yugoslav ground organization and Belgrade.” (_R-95_)
(_e_) _The Soviet Union._ It is quite possible that some members of the
General Staff and High Command Group opposed “Barbarossa,” the German
attack on the Soviet Union, as unnecessary and unwise from a military
standpoint. Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January
1944 (_C-66_):
“1. At this time the Fuehrer had made known his ‘unalterable
decision’ to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all
remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situation
had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of
Naval War Staff, I was never convinced of the ‘compelling
necessity’ for Barbarossa.”
* * * * * *
“The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling
accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude
played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that
he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they
would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian
Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic
States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this
idea.
“The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn
of 1940 could no longer be attained—a realization which the
Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who
were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on
England (our own losses)—surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back
as August and September, to consider whether—even prior to
victory in the West—an Eastern campaign would be feasible with
the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the
Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear,
however, until well into September.”
* * * * * *
“7. As no other course is possible, I have submitted to
compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises
between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments
the Fuehrer used on such occasion (dinner speech in the middle
of July to the Officers in Command) to justify a step he had
planned, usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to
the ‘inner circle,’ than on those who often heard this type of
reasoning.
“Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on
the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941,
whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very
skeptical.” (_C-66_)
But the passage last quoted indicates that the other members of the
General Staff favored “Barbarossa”. Raeder’s memorandum actually says
substantially what Blomberg’s affidavit (_3704-PS_) says; that some of
the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment, but that
the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him
although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command
Group took no stand against Hitler on “Barbarossa” and the events of
1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the
Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless
determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have
already been cited. (_446-PS_; _C-35_; _872-PS_; _C-78_; _447-PS_)
(_f_) _Nature of the General Staff and High Command Group Responsibility
for Aggression._ The nature of the accusation against this Group for
plotting and launching wars of aggression must be clearly understood.
They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not
accused because they did the usual things a soldier is expected to do,
such as make military plans and command troops.
It is among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations
and conferences; to write notes and side memoires to the government to
which he is accredited; and to cultivate good will toward the country he
represents. Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the
usual function of a politician to weigh and determine matters of
national policy and to draft regulations and decrees and make speeches.
Hess, Frick, and the other politician-defendants are not indicted for
doing these things. It is an innocent and respectable business to be a
locksmith but it is none the less a crime if the locksmith turns his
talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And
that is the nature of the charge against all the defendants, and against
the General Staff and High Command Group as well. The charge is that in
performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors,
or whatever they happened to be, they conspired to and did plan,
prepare, initiate, and wage wars of aggression and in violation of
Treaties.
The Charter (Article 6(a)) declares that wars of aggression and wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances are
crimes against peace. It is no defense for those who commit such crimes
to plead that they practice a particular profession, whether it is arms
or the law. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military
plans to meet national contingencies, to carry out such plans and engage
in war if in so doing they do not knowingly plan and wage illegal wars.
There might well be individual cases where drawing the line between
legal and illegal conduct would involve some difficulties. That is not
an uncommon situation in the legal field. But there can be no doubt as
to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command Group, nor as
to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the Group. The
evidence is clear that these defendants, and the leaders of the Group,
and most of the members of the Group, were fully advised in advance of
the aggressive and illegal war plans, and carried them out with full
knowledge that the wars were aggressive and in violation of treaties.
In the case of defendants Goering, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is
voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is
constant. The same is true of the defendant Raeder, and his individual
responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and
Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Doenitz
is less voluminous, for the reason that he was younger and not one of
the top group until later in the war, but his knowing participation in
and advocacy of the Norwegian venture is clear.
Numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command Group,
including its other leaders, participated knowingly and willfully in
these illegal plans and wars. Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont the deputy to Jodl and
chief repository of plans—in the nature of things these men knew all
that was going on, and participated fully, as the evidence has shown.
Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau and von
Schobert, together with Goering, were immediately sent for by Hitler
when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At later date, Blaskowitz as an
_Oberbefehlshaber_ in the field knowingly prepared for the attack on
Poland; Field Marshal List educated the Bulgarians for their role during
the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; von Falkenhorst “gladly” accepted
the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air
side, Jeschonnek had proposed that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and
Holland, and simultaneously assured Belgium that there was nothing to
fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls foresaw at an early date that
German policy was leading to a general European war, and at a later date
the attack on Norway and Denmark was his brainchild; Krancke was one of
the chief planners of this attack; Schniewindt was in the inner circle
for the attack on Poland; Fricke certified the final orders for
“_Weseruebung_” and a few months later proposed that Germany annex
Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia
to vassalage. Most of these 19 officers were at the time members of the
Group, and the few who were not subsequently became members. At the
final planning and reporting conference for “_Barbarossa_,” 17
additional members were present. At the two meetings with Hitler, at
which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully
disclosed, the entire group was present.
The military defendants may perhaps argue that military men are pure
technicians, bound to do whatever the political leaders order them to
do. Such a suggestion must fail, on any test of reason or logic. It
amounts to saying that military men are a race apart from and different
from the ordinary run of human beings—men above and beyond the moral
and legal requirements that apply to others; men incapable of exercising
moral judgment on their own behalf.
It stands to reason that the crime of planning and waging aggressive
warfare is committed most consciously, deliberately, and culpably by a
nation’s leaders—the leaders in all the major fields of activity
necessary to and closely involved in the waging of war. It is committed
by the principal propagandists and publicists who whip up the necessary
beliefs and enthusiasms among the people as a whole, so that the people
will acquiesce and join in attacking and slaughtering the peoples of
other nations. It is committed by the political leaders who purport to
represent and execute the national will. It is committed by the
diplomats who handle the nation’s foreign policy and endeavor to create
a favorable diplomatic setting for successful warfare, and by the chief
ministers who adapt the machinery of government to the needs of a nation
at war. It is committed by the principal industrial and financial
leaders who shape the national economy and marshall the productive
resources for the needs of an aggressive war program. It is no less
committed by the military leaders who knowingly plan aggressive war,
mobilize the men and equipment of the attacking forces, and execute the
actual onslaught.
In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is
accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of
leaders. If the leaders in any notably important field of activity stand
aside, resist, or fail to cooperate in launching and executing an
aggressive war program, the program will at the very least be seriously
obstructed, and probably its successful accomplishment will be
impossible. That is why the principal leaders in all these fields of
activity share responsibility for the crime, and the military leaders no
less than the others. Leadership in the military field, as in any other
field, calls for moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness.
The responsible military leaders of any nation can hardly be heard to
say that their role is that of a mere janitor, custodian, or pilot of
the war machine which is under their command, and that they bear no
responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is put. Such
a view would degrade and render ignoble the profession of arms. The
prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today, when
the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and
destructive than ever before. Should the military leaders be declared
exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging
aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling if not fatal blow to
the efficacy of that declaration.
The American prosecution here representing the United Nations believes
that the profession of arms is a distinguished and noble profession. It
believes that the practice of that profession by its leaders calls for
the highest degree of integrity and moral wisdom no less than for
technical skill. It believes that in consulting and planning with
leaders in other national fields of activity, the military leaders will
act and counsel in accordance with International Law and the dictates of
the public conscience. Otherwise, the military resources of the nation
will be used, not in accordance with the laws of modern civilization,
but with the law of the jungle. The military leaders share
responsibility with other leaders of a nation.
Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive arbiters,
and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive responsibility for
the aggressive wars which were waged. If the leading German diplomats
and industrialists and other leaders had not been infected with similar
criminal purposes, the German military leaders might not have had their
way. But the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine
and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military
leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and if necessary to resort to war
for that purpose. As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in
his opening statement, “the German military leaders are here before you
because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.”
(2) _War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity._ It is proposed to show
that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the
five defendants who are members of the Group, ordered and directed the
commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the
Indictment. It is also proposed to show, in certain instances, the
actual commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces,
as a result of these orders, or as a result of other orders or
arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command
Group, which controlled the German Armed Forces and bears responsibility
for war crimes committed by them.
It is not proposed, however, to make a full showing of war crimes
committed by the German Armed Forces. The full presentation of this
evidence is to be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief
Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet delegations.
It will be shown that the General Staff and High Command became wedded
to a policy of terror. In some cases, where the evidence of this policy
is in documentary form, the activating papers which were signed by,
initialed by, and circulated among the members of the Group will be
presented. In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by
others than members of the German Armed Forces (where, for example
prisoners of war or civilians were handed over to and mistreated or
murdered by the SS or SD), it will be shown that members of the Group
were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of war
crimes. It will be shown that many crimes committed by the SS or SD were
committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff
and High Command, and that frequently members of the German Armed Forces
acted in conjunction with the SS and SD in carrying out tasks then known
by such respectable-sounding terms as “pacification,” “cleansing,” and
“elimination of insecure elements.”
(_a_) _Murder of Commandos, Paratroopers, and Members of Military
Missions._ This story starts with an order issued by Hitler on 18
October 1942 (_498-PS_). The order began with a recital that allied
commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope
of the Geneva Conventions, and thereafter proceeded to specify the
methods of warfare which German troops should use against allied
commandos, and the disposition which should be made of captured
commandos. This order reads as follows:
“1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare
methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions.
Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the
so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially
recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From
captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only
to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on
the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as
prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their
purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have
been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded
in principle.
“2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to
the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future,
Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and
their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that
they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in
combat, wherever they may appear.
“3. I therefore order:
From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe
or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all
appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether
armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered
to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they
are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or
whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these
individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give
themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In
each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW
for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.
“4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents,
saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by
some other means, through the police in occupied territories for
instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any
imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance,
etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for
a short time.
“5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy
soldiers who in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale
offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations),
are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this
order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after
battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by
parachute after battles.
“6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to
carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either
have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this
order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.
“(S) Adolf Hitler” (_498-PS_).
This order was issued by the OKW in twelve copies, and the distribution
included the three supreme commands and the principal field commands.
(_498-PS_)
On the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order (_503-PS_) for the
purpose of explaining the reasons for the issuance of the basic order.
In this explanation, Hitler pointed out that allied commando operations
had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear
communications, intimidation of laborers, and destruction of important
war plants in occupied areas. Among other things Hitler stated in this
explanation:
“Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and
sabotage troops (_OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18
October 1942_) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.
“_This order is intended for commanders only and must not under
any circumstances fall into enemy hands._
“_The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the
receiving bureaus._