subdivided as follows:
D (_aus. arb._) Foreign Workers.
D 1 Matters of the Protectorate, Czechs in the Reich, Slovakia,
Serbia, Croatia, and the remaining regions of the former
Jugoslavia, Greece.
D 2 Matters of the General Government, Poles in the Reich.
D 3 Confidential office, foreigners hostile to the State, emigrants.
D 4 Occupied territories, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark.
D 5 Occupied Eastern territories.
Section E dealt with security and was subdivided as follows:
E 1 General security matters, supply of legal opinions in matters of
high and State treason, and other security matters.
E 2 General economic matters, defense against economic espionage,
protection of works and those engaged in guarding.
E 3 Security West.
E 4 Security North.
E 5 Security East.
E 6 Security South.
Section F dealt with passport matters and alien police and was
subdivided as follows:
F 1 Frontier police.
F 2 Passport matters.
F 3 Identification and identity cards.
F 4 Alien police and basic questions concerning frontiers.
F 5 Central visa office. (_L-219_)
Subordinate offices of the GESTAPO were established throughout the Reich
and designated as _Staats Polizeileitstellen_ or _Staats
Polizeistellen_, depending upon the size of the office. These offices
reported directly to the RSHA in Berlin but were subject to the
supervision of _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police in the various
provinces. The inspectors were expected to foster cooperation between
the Security Police and the central offices of the general and interior
administration. (_2245-PS_)
In the occupied territories the regional offices of the GESTAPO were
coordinated with the Criminal Police and the SD under _Kommandeurs_ of
the Security Police and SD, who were subject to _Befehlshabers_ of the
Security Police and SD who reported to the Chief of the Security Police
and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (_1285-PS_)
(2) _Organization of the SD (Amt III of the RSHA)._ The headquarters
organization of the SD (including only _Amt_ III of the RSHA and not
_Amt_ VI, the Foreign Intelligence Branch) was set up on a functional
basis. In 1943 it contained four sections.
Section A dealt with questions of legal order and structure of the Reich
and was subdivided as follows:
A 1 General questions of work on spheres of German life.
A 2 Law.
A 3 Constitution and administration.
A 4 National life in general.
A 5 General questions of police law, and technical questions of
legislation.
Section B dealt with nationality, and was subdivided as follows:
B 1 Nationality questions.
B 2 Minorities.
B 3 Race and health of the people.
B 4 Citizenship and naturalization.
B 5 Occupied territories.
Section C dealt with culture, and was subdivided as follows:
C 1 Science.
C 2 Educational religious life.
C 3 Folk culture and art.
C 4 Press, literature, radio, office for evaluation of material.
Section D dealt with economics, and was subdivided as follows:
D a Reading office, economics, press, magazines, literature.
D b Colonial economics.
D S Special questions and review of material.
D West Western occupied regions.
D Ost Eastern occupied regions.
D 1 Food economy.
D 2 Commerce, handcraft, and transport.
D 3 Finance, currency, banks and exchanges, insurance.
D 4 Industry and Power.
D 5 Labor and Social Questions. (_L-219_)
Within Germany the original regional offices of the SD were called
_SD-Oberabschnitte_ and _SD-Unterabschnitte_. In 1939 these designations
were changed to _SD-Abschnitte_ and _SD-Leitabschnitte_. Offices of the
_SD-Abschnitte_ were located in the same place as the
_Staatspolizeistellen_. _SD-Abschnitte_ located where there were _Staats
Polizeileitstellen_ were called “_SD Leitabschnitte_.” Direct orders
came from the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin (RSHA) to
these regional offices, but they were also subject to the supervision of
the _Inspekteurs_ of the SIPO and SD. In the occupied territories the
regional offices of the SD were coordinated with the GESTAPO and
Criminal Police under _Kommandeurs_ of the SIPO and SD who were subject
to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD who reported to the
Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (_1680-PS_,
_L-361_)
(3) _Combined Organization of the GESTAPO and SD._ The central offices
of the GESTAPO and SD were coordinated in 1936 with the appointment of
Heydrich, the head of the SD, as chief of the Security Police. The
office of Heydrich was called “Chief of the Security Police and SD.”
(_1551-PS_)
When the central offices of the GESTAPO and SD, together with the
Criminal Police, were centralized in one main office (RSHA) in 1939, the
functions were somewhat redistributed.
_Amt_ I of the RSHA handled personnel for the three agencies. Subsection
A 2 handled personnel matters of the GESTAPO, A 3 handled personnel
matters of the KRIPO, and A 4 handled personnel matters of the SD.
_Amt_ II handled organization, administration, and law for the three
agencies. Subsection C handled domestic arrangements and pay accounts,
and was divided into two sections, one to take care of pay accounts of
the Security Police and the other to take care of pay accounts of the
SD, since personnel of the former were paid by the State and personnel
of the latter were paid by the Party. Subsection D, under
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff handled technical matters, including the
motor vehicles of the SIPO and SD.
_Amt_ III was the SD and was charged with investigation into spheres of
German life. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.
_Amt_ IV was the GESTAPO and was charged with combatting political
opposition. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.
_Amt_ V was the KRIPO and was charged with combatting criminals.
Subsection V D was the criminalogical institute for the SIPO handling
matters of identification, chemical and biological investigations, and
technical research.
_Amt_ VI was concerned with foreign political intelligence and contained
subsections dealing with western Europe, Russia and Japan,
Anglo-American sphere, and central Europe. It contained a special
section dealing with sabotage.
_Amt_ VII handled ideological research against enemies, such as
Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and liberalism.
(_L-185_; _L-219_)
The centralization of the main offices of the GESTAPO and SD was not
fully carried out in the regional organization. Within Germany the
regional offices of the GESTAPO and SD maintained their separate
identity and reported directly to the section of the RSHA which had the
jurisdiction of the subject matter. They were, however, coordinated by
the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD. The _Inspekteurs_ were
also under the supervision of the Higher SS and Police leaders appointed
for each _Wehrkreis_.
The Higher SS and Police leaders reported to the Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police in each _Wehrkreis_ and supervised not only
the _Inspekteurs_ of the Security Police and SD but also the
_Inspekteurs_ of the Order Police and various subdivisions of the SS.
(_1285-PS_)
In the occupied territories the organization developed as the German
armies advanced. Combined operational units of the Security Police and
SD, known as _Einsatz_ Groups, operated with and in the rear of the
Army. These groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the
KRIPO, and the SD, and the enlisted men were composed of Order Police
and Waffen SS. They functioned with various army groups. The _Einsatz_
Groups were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, _Sonderkommandos_, and
_Teilkommandos_, all of which performed the functions of the Security
Police and SD with or closely behind the army. After the occupied
territories had been consolidated, the _Einsatz_ Groups and their
subordinate parts were formed into permanent combined offices of the
Security Police and SD within prescribed geographical locations. These
combined forces were placed under the _Kommandeurs_ of the Security
Police and SD, and the offices were organized in sections similar to the
RSHA headquarters. The _Kommandeurs_ of the Security Police and SD
reported directly to _Befehlshabers_ of the Security Police and SD, who
in turn reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In
the occupied territories, the Higher SS and Police leaders exercised
more direct control over the _Befehlshabers_ and the _Kommandeurs_ of
the Security Police and SD than within the Reich. They had authority to
issue direct orders so long as they did not conflict with the Chief of
the Security Police and SD who exercised controlling authority.
(_1285-PS, Chart Number 19._)
C. _Place of the GESTAPO and SD in the Conspiracy._
(1) _Tasks and Methods of the GESTAPO._ In the basic law of 10 February
1936, the GESTAPO was declared to have “the duty to investigate and to
combat in the entire territory of the State, all tendencies dangerous to
the State.” The decree issued for the execution of said law gave the
GESTAPO the authority to make police investigations in treason,
espionage, and sabotage cases, “and in other cases of criminal attacks
on Party and State.” (_2107-PS_; _2108-PS_)
In referring to the above law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best,
commented as follows:
“Not the State in its outward organic appearance but the tasks
of the leadership in the sense of the National-Socialist idea is
the object of protection.” (_2232-PS_)
The duties of the GESTAPO were described in 1938 as follows, in an order
published by the Party Chancery:
“To the GESTAPO has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to
watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the
National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of
all kinds directed against both.” (_1723-PS_)
In _Das Archiv_, January 1936, the duties of the GESTAPO were described
in part as follows:
“Since the National Socialist revolution, all open struggle and
all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of the
State is forbidden, and a Secret State Police as a preventive
instrument in the struggle against all dangers threatening the
State is indissolubly bound up with the National Socialist
Fuehrer-State.” (_1956-PS_)
The successful accomplishment of this mission to strike down the
political and ideological opponents of the Nazi conspiracy was stated in
the official magazine of the SIPO and SD on 1 February 1943 in the
following words:
“The Secret State Police by carrying out these tasks,
contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist
constructive work could be executed in the past ten years
without any serious attempts of interference by the political
enemies of the nation.” (_1680-PS_)
The methods used by the GESTAPO were limited only by the results to be
obtained.
“The duties of the political police and the necessary means for
their performance are not chosen freely but are prescribed by
the foe. Just like the operations of an army against the outward
enemy and the means to fight this enemy cannot be prescribed, so
the political police also must have a free hand in the choice of
the means necessary at times to fight the attempts dangerous to
the State.” (_2232-PS_)
The GESTAPO was not restricted to the limitations of written law. The
Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:
“As long as the ‘police’ carries out the will of the leadership,
it is acting legally.” (_1852-PS_)
The GESTAPO was given the express power to take action outside the law
in the occupied territories. The laws pertaining to the administration
of Austria and the Sudetenland provided that the Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police will take measures for the maintenance of
security and order “even beyond the legal limitation otherwise laid down
for this purpose.” (_1437-PS_; _1438-PS_)
The actions and orders of the GESTAPO were not subject to judicial
review. The decision of the Prussian High Court of Administration on 2
May 1935 held that the status of the GESTAPO as a special police
authority removed its orders from the jurisdiction of the Administrative
Tribunals. The court said that under the law of 30 November 1933 the
only redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority within
the GESTAPO itself. (_2347-PS_)
The basic law of 10 February 1936 on the powers of the GESTAPO provided
specifically in Section VII:
“Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to
the review of the administrative courts.” (_2107-PS_)
Concerning the power of the GESTAPO to act outside the law, the Nazi
jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:
“It is no longer a question of law but a question of fate
whether the will of the leadership lays down the ‘right’ rules,
i.e., rules feasible and necessary for police action—the
‘police’ law suitable for and beneficial to the people. Actual
misuse of the legislative power by a people’s leadership—be it
a harmful severity or weakness—will, because of the violations
of the ‘laws of life,’ be punished in history more surely by
fate itself through misfortune, overthrow and ruin, than by a
State Court of Justice.” (_1852-PS_)
The great power of the GESTAPO was “_Schutzhaft_”—the power to imprison
people without judicial proceedings on the theory of “protective
custody.” This power was based upon the law of 28 February 1933 which
suspended the clauses of the Weimar Constitution guaranteeing civil
liberties to the German people, including Article 114 thereof, which
provided that an abridgement of personal liberty was permissible only by
authority of law. (_2499-PS_)
In April 1934 the Reich Minister of the Interior issued a decree (which
was not made public) stating that in view of the stabilizing of the
national situation it had become feasible to place restrictions upon the
exercise of protective custody and providing for limitations upon its
exercise. (_L-301_; _779-PS_)
The GESTAPO did not observe such limitations, and the practice of taking
people into protective custody increased greatly in 1934. The GESTAPO
did not permit lawyers to represent persons taken into protective
custody and, in one instance, counsel were themselves placed in
protective custody for trying to represent clients. Civil employees were
investigated and taken into protective custody by the GESTAPO without
knowledge of their superiors. (_775-PS_)
As of 1 February 1938, the Reich Minister of the Interior rescinded
previous decrees relating to protective custody, including the decree of
12 April 1934, and issued new regulations. These regulations provided
that protective custody could be ordered:
“* * * as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against
persons who endangered the security of the people and the State
through their attitude, in order to counter all aspirations of
enemies of the people and State”;
that the GESTAPO had the exclusive right to order protective custody;
that protective custody was to be executed in the State concentration
camps; and that the GESTAPO, which authorized release from protective
custody, would review individual cases once every three months. The
Chief of the Secret Police was given authority to issue the necessary
regulations. (_1723-PS_)
The importance of this power of protective custody was set forth in _Das
Archiv_, 1936, in the following language:
“The most effective preventive measure is without doubt the
withdrawal of freedom, which is covered in the form of
protective custody, if it is to be feared that the free activity
of the persons in question might endanger the security of the
State in any way. While protective arrest of short duration is
carried out in police and court prisons, the concentration camps
under the Secret State Police admit those taken into protective
custody who have to be withdrawn from public life for a longer
time.” (_1956-PS_)
The authority of the GESTAPO to administer the concentration camps was
set forth in the decree to the basic law of 10 February 1936.
(_2108-PS_)
Other methods used by the GESTAPO consisted of the dissolution of
associations, prohibition and dissolution of assemblies and
congregations, prohibition of publications of various kinds and so
forth. (_1956-PS_)
(2) _Tasks and Methods of the SD._ The task of the SD, after it became
the intelligence service for State and Party, was to obtain secret
information concerning the actual and potential enemies of the Nazi
leadership so that appropriate action could be taken to destroy or
neutralize opposition. (_1956-PS_)
The duties of the SD were stated by the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, as
follows:
“As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist
Labor Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of
investigating and keeping a watch over all forces, events and
facts which are of importance for the domination of the National
Socialist idea and movement in German territory. With this task
follows that duty laid down by the Reich Minister of the
Interior—the duty of supporting the Security Police—which is
fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State orders. In support of
the tasks of the Security Police in securing the ranks of the
German people against interference and destruction of any kind,
the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of
the German people with regard to the activities of inimical
forces and the result of state and political measures, and to
inform continually the competent State authorities and offices
about the facts which have come to light. Finally, it has to
investigate politically and explore fundamentally the activities
and connections of the great, ideological, arch-enemy of
National Socialism and the German people, in order thereby to
render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it.”
(_1852-PS_)
To accomplish this task, the SD created an organization of agents and
informants operating out of various SD regional offices established
throughout the Reich, and later in conjunction with the GESTAPO and
Criminal Police throughout the occupied territories. The organization
consisted of several hundred full-time agents whose work was
supplemented by several thousand part-time informants. Informants were
located in schools, shops, churches, and all other spheres of German
life, operating under cover, and reporting any utterances or actions
against the Nazi Party, State or leadership. (_2614-PS_)
The SD had direct and powerful influence in the selection of Nazi
leaders. It investigated the loyalty and reliability of State officials,
evaluating them by their complete devotion to Nazi ideology and the
Hitler leadership. It secretly marked ballots and thereby discovered the
identity of persons who cast “No” votes and “invalid” votes in the
referenda. (_2614-PS_; _R-142_)
The SD worked closely with the GESTAPO. An article in the “_Voelkischer
Beobachter_” published in _Das Archiv_, January 1936, stated:
“As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in addition to
its primary executive tasks, this observation of the enemies of
the state, to the extent necessary, there steps alongside to
supplement it the Security Service of the Reichsleader of the
SS, set up by the Deputy Fuehrer as the political intelligence
service of the movement, which puts a large part of the forces
of the movement mobilized by it into the service of the security
of the state.” (_1956-PS_)
(3) _The Place of the GESTAPO and the SD in the Conspiracy._ The GESTAPO
was founded in April 1933 by Goering to serve as a political police
force in Prussia. Goering instructed Diels, the first Deputy Chief of
the GESTAPO, that his main task would be the elimination of political
opponents of National Socialism and the fight against Communism.
(_2460-PS_)
In “_Aufbau Einer Nation_,” published in 1934, Goering said:
“For weeks I had been working personally on the reorganization
and at last I alone and upon my own decision and my own
reflection created the office of the Secret State Police. This
instrument which is so feared by the enemies of the State, has
contributed most to the fact that today there can no longer be
talk of a Communist and Marxist danger in Germany and Prussia.”
(_2344-PS_)
So effective had the GESTAPO proven itself in combatting the political
opposition to National Socialism by the fall of 1933 that Goering took
over direct control of the GESTAPO (_2105-PS_). Goering’s position as
Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia was recognized by Himmler even after he
became Chief of the German Police in 1936 (_2372-PS_). Even as late as
December 1938 Goering continued to exercise his direct control over the
Prussian GESTAPO. (_D-183_)
Himmler was named Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia in 1934. He
used the GESTAPO, infused with new personnel recruited in large part
from the SS, to carry out the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934. (_2460-PS_)
The GESTAPO, through its great power of arrest and confinement to
concentration camps without recourse to law, was the principal means for
eliminating enemies of the Nazi regime. Diels, the former Deputy Chief
of the GESTAPO under Goering, declared:
“* * * From (1934) on the GESTAPO is responsible for all
deprivations of freedom and breaches of law and killings in the
political field which took place without court verdict. Of
primary importance among these was the shooting of numerous
persons who had been committed to jails by the courts and then
shot supposedly because of resistance. Many such cases were at
that time published in the papers. For people guilty of
immorality such illegal shootings became the rule. As for
deprivation of freedom, there was no legal reason any more for
protective custody orders after 1934, which had still been the
case before that date, since from 1934 on the power of the
totalitarian state was so stabilized that the arrest of a person
for his own protection was only an excuse for arbitrary
arrest—without court verdict and without legal measures for
him. The terroristic measures, which led to the development of
the pure force system and punished to an increasing degree each
critical remark and each impulse of freedom with the
concentration camp, took on more and more arbitrary and cruel
forms. The GESTAPO became the symbol of the regime of force.”
(_2460-PS_)
D. _Criminal Responsibility of the Gestapo and SD._
In the remainder of this section the criminal responsibility of the
GESTAPO and the SD will be considered with respect to certain crimes
against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity which were in
principal part committed by the centralized political police system the
development and organization of which has previously been considered. In
some instances the crimes were committed in cooperation or conjunction
with other groups and organizations.
Frequent reference will be made to the phrase, “SIPO and SD.” The SIPO
and SD was composed of the following organizations,—the GESTAPO, the
KRIPO and the SD.
The GESTAPO was the largest of these, having a membership of about
40,000 or 50,000 in 1943-45. It was the political police force of the
Reich. Much of its personnel consisted of transferees from former
political police forces of the States. Membership in the GESTAPO was
voluntary.
The KRIPO was second largest, having a membership of about 15,000 in
1943-45. It was the criminal police force of the Reich.
The SD was the smallest, having a membership of about 3,000 in 1943-45.
It was the intelligence service of the SS. Membership in the SD was
voluntary. (_3033-PS_)
In common usage, and even in orders and decrees, the term “SD” was used
as an abbreviation in the term “SIPO and SD.” Since the GESTAPO was the
primary executive agency of the SIPO and SD, and by far the largest, in
most such cases the actual executive action was carried out by personnel
of the GESTAPO rather than of the SD or of the KRIPO. In occupied
territories members of the GESTAPO frequently wore SS uniforms.
(_3033-PS_)
The term “Chief of the Security Police and SD” describes the person who
is the head of the GESTAPO, KRIPO and the SD, and of their headquarters
office called the RSHA. The “Chief of the Security Police and SD” and
the “head of the RSHA” are always one and the same person. The RSHA was
a department in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and in the SS.
Sometimes organizational responsibility can be established by the fact
that the orders in question were issued by or submitted to _Amt_ III of
the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the SD), to _Amt_ IV of the
RSHA (in which case the action concerned the GESTAPO), or to _Amt_ V of
the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the KRIPO).
Although the GESTAPO was the chief executive agency in the political
police system, all three organizations contributed to the accomplishment
of most of the criminal activities discussed hereinafter.
E. _Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD against the Peace._
Prior to the invasion of Poland by Germany, “border incidents” were
fabricated by the GESTAPO and SD for the purpose of furnishing Hitler
with an excuse to wage war. (_2751-PS_)
Early in August, 1939, the plan was conceived by the Chief of the
Security Police and SD, Heydrich, to stage simulated border raids by
personnel of the GESTAPO and SD dressed as Poles. To add authenticity,
it was planned to take certain prisoners from concentration camps, kill
them by use of hypodermic injections, and leave their bodies, clad in
Polish uniforms, at the various places where the incidents were planned
to occur. The Chief of the GESTAPO, Mueller, took a directing hand in
these actions, which were staged on 31 August 1939 in Beuthen,
Hindenburg, Gleiwitz, and elsewhere.
The leader of the SD agents who made the pretended attack on the
Gleiwitz radio station on 31 August, said:
“* * * In my presence, Mueller discussed with a man named
Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should
be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German
troops. Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to
be used. Mueller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals
who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the
ground of the scene of the incident, to show that they had been
killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given
fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they
were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the incident members
of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of
the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.
“4. Mueller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make
one of those criminals available to me for the action at
Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals
was ‘Canned Goods.’
“5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried
out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I
recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon of
the 31st August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code
word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock that
evening. Heydrich said, ‘In order to carry out this attack
report to Mueller for Canned Goods.’ I did this and gave Mueller
instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I
received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the
station. He was alive but he was completely unconscious. I tried
to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was
alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds but
a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian
clothes.
“6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech
of three to four minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired
some pistol shots and left.” (_2751-PS_; _2479-PS_)
These were the “frontier incidents” to which Hitler referred in his
speech to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939. (Adolf Hitler, “My New
Order,” Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 687.)
F. _War Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD._
(1) _The GESTAPO and SD carried out mass murders of hundreds of
thousands of civilians of occupied countries as a part of the Nazi
program to exterminate political and racial undesirables (“Einsatz
Groups”)._ About four weeks before the attack on Russia, special task
forces of the SIPO and SD, called _Einsatzgruppen_ or Special Task
Groups, were formed on order of Himmler for the purpose of following the
German armies into Russia, combatting partisans and members of
resistance groups and exterminating the Jews and Communist leaders. In
the beginning four _Einsatz_ Groups were formed. _Einsatz_ Group A,
operating in the Baltic States, was placed under the command of
Stahlecker, former Inspector of the SIPO and SD. _Einsatz_ Group B,
operating toward Moscow, was placed under the command of Nebe, the Chief
of _Amt_ V (KRIPO) of the RSHA. _Einsatz_ Group C, operating toward
Kiev, was placed under the command of Rasch and later of Thomas, former
Chief of the SIPO and SD in Paris. _Einsatz_ Group D, operating in the
south of Russia, was placed under the command of Ohlendorf, the Chief of
_Amt_ III (SD) of the RSHA.
The _Einsatz_ Groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the SD
and the KRIPO. The men were drawn from the Order Police and the Waffen
SS. The groups had complements of 400 to 500 men, and had their own
vehicles and equipment. By agreement with the OKW and OKH, the
_Einsatzkommandos_ were attached to certain Army corps or divisions. The
Army assigned the area in which the _Einsatzkommandos_ were to operate,
but all operational directives and orders for the carrying out of
executions were given through the RSHA in Berlin. Regular courier
service and radio communications existed between the _Einsatz_ Groups
and the RSHA.
The affidavit of Ohlendorf, Chief of the SD, who led _Einsatz_ Group D,
reads in part as follows:
“When the German Army invaded Russia, I was leader of
_Einsatzgruppe_ D in the southern sector, and in the course of
the year during which I was leader of the _Einsatzgruppe_ D, it
liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women and children. The
majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were also
among them some Communist functionaries.
“In the execution of this extermination program the
_Einsatzgruppen_ were subdivided into _Einsatzkommandos_, and
the _Einsatzkommandos_ into still smaller units, the so-called
_Sonderkommando_ and _Teilkommandos_. Usually the smaller units
were led by a member of the SD, the GESTAPO or the KRIPO. The
unit selected for this task would enter a village or city and
order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews
for the purpose of resettlement. They were asked to hand over
their personal belongings to the leaders of the unit, and
shortly before the execution, to surrender their outer clothing.
The men, women and children were led to a place of execution
which usually was located beside a deepened antitank ditch. Then
they were shot, kneeling or standing, and the corpses were
thrown into the ditch. I never permitted the shooting by
individuals in Group D, but ordered that several of the men
should shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct personal
responsibility. The leaders of the unit, or especially
designated persons, however, had to fire the last shot against
those victims who were not dead immediately. I learned from
conversations with other group leaders that some of them asked
the victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through
the neck. I did not approve of these methods.” (_2620-PS_)
The contention that these murders were carried out by subterfuge and
without force and terror is belied by the eyewitness account of two such
mass murders witnessed by Hermann Graebe, who was manager and engineer
in charge of the branch office of the Solingen firm of Josef Jung in
Sdolbunow, Ukraine, from September 1941 until January 1944. Graebe’s
interest in the mass executions derived from the fact that in addition
to Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians, he employed Jews on the various
construction projects under his supervision. He was personally
acquainted with the leader of the SIPO and SD who carried out the
actions hereinafter described with the aid of SS-men (most of whom wore
the SD arm-band) and Ukrainian militia. Graebe negotiated with SS-major
Putz, the leader of the SIPO and SD, for the release of about 100 Jewish
workers from the action which took place in Rowno on 13 July 1942. The
original letter which exempted these Jewish workers from the action is
attached to Graebe’s affidavit, which states in part as follows:
“In the evening of this day I drove to Rowno and posted myself
with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the Bahnhofstrasse
in which the Jewish workers of my firm slept. Shortly after
22.00 the ghetto was encircled by a large SS detachment and
again about three times as many members of the Ukrainian
militia. Then the electric floodlights which had been erected
all around the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details
of 4 to 6 members entered or at least tried to enter the houses.
Where the doors and windows were closed and the inhabitants did
not open upon the knocking, the SS men and militia broke the
windows, forced the doors and beams with crowbars and entered
the dwellings. The owners were driven onto the street just as
they were, regardless of whether they were dressed or whether
they had been in bed. Since the Jews in most cases refused to
leave their dwellings and resisted, the SS and militia both
applied force. With the help of whippings, kicks and hits with
the rifle butts they finally succeeded in having the dwellings
evacuated. The people were chased out of their houses in such
haste that the small children who had been in bed had been left
behind in several instances. In the street women cried out for
their children and children for their parents. That did not
prevent the SS from chasing the people along the road, at double
time, and hitting them until they reached a waiting freight
train. Car after car was filled, over it hung the screaming of
women and children, the cracking of whips and rifle shots. Since
several families and groups had barricaded themselves in
especially strong buildings, and the doors could not be forced
with crowbars or beams, these houses were now blown open with
hand grenades. Since the ghetto was near the railroad tracks in
Rowno, the younger people tried to get across the tracks and to
a small river to be outside of the ghetto. This sector being
outside of the floodlights was lighted by signal ammunition. All
through the night these beaten, chased and wounded people
dragged themselves across the lighted streets. Women carried
their dead children in their arms, children hugged and dragged
by their arms and feet their dead parents down the road toward
the train. Again and again the calls ‘Open the door,’ ‘Open the
door’ echoed through the ghetto.” (_2992-PS_)
The leader of _Einsatz_ Group D, Ohlendorf, stated in his affidavit that
other _Einsatz_ Group leaders required the victims to lie down flat on
the ground to be shot through the neck. Graebe describes a mass
execution of this kind which he observed carried out under the direction
of a man in SD uniform on 5 October 1943 at Dubno, Ukraine, as follows:
“Thereupon in the company of Moennikes I drove to the
construction area and saw in its vicinity a heap of earth, about
30 meters long and 2 meters high. Several trucks stood in front
of the heap. Armed Ukrainian militia chased the people off the
trucks under the supervision of an SS man. The militia men were
guards on the trucks and drove them to and from the excavation.
All these people had the prescribed yellow badges on the front
and back of their clothes, and thus were recognized as Jews.
“Moennikes and I went directly to the excavation. Nobody
bothered us. Now we heard shots in quick succession from behind
one of the earth mounds. The people who had gotten off the
trucks—men, women, and children of all ages—had to undress
upon the orders of an SS man who carried a riding or dog whip.
They had to put down their clothes in fixed places, sorted
according to shoes, over and underclothing, I saw a pile of
shoes of about 800 to 1,000 pairs, great piles of laundry and
clothing. Without screaming or crying these people undressed,
stood around by families, kissed each other, said farewells and
waited for the nod of another SS man, who stood near the
excavation, also with a whip in his hand. During the 15 minutes
that I stood near the excavation I have heard no complaint and
no request for mercy. I watched a family of about 8 persons, a
man and a woman, both about 50 with their children of about 1, 8
and 10, and two grown-up daughters of about 20 to 24. An old
woman with snow-white hair held the one-year-old child in her
arms and sang for it, and tickled it. The child was squeaking
from joy. The couple looked on with tears in their eyes. The
father held the hand of a boy about 10 years old and spoke to
him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed
toward the sky, fondled his hand, and seemed to explain
something to him. At that moment the SS-man at the excavation
called something to his comrades. The latter counted off about
20 persons and instructed them to walk behind the earth mound.
Among them was the family which I had mentioned. I remember very
well a girl, blackhaired and slender, passing near me; she
pointed at herself and said, ‘23 years.’ I walked around the
mound, and stood in front of a tremendous grave. Closely pressed
together the people were lying on top of each other so that only
their heads were visible. Several of the people shot still
moved. Some lifted their arms and turned their heads to show
that they were still alive. The excavation was already
two-thirds full. I estimated that it contained about 1,000
people. I looked for the man who did the shooting. I saw an
SS-man who sat at the rim of the narrow end of the excavation,
his feet dangling into the excavation. On his knees he had a
machine pistol and he was smoking a cigarette. The completely
naked people descended a stairway which was dug into the clay of
the excavation and slipped over the heads of the people lying
there already to the place to which the SS-man directed them.
They laid themselves in front of the dead or injured people,
some touched tenderly those who were still alive and spoke to
them in a low voice. Then I heard a number of shots. I looked
into the excavation and saw how the bodies jerked or the heads
rested already motionless on top of the bodies that lay before
them. Blood was running from their necks. I was surprised that I
was not chased away, but I saw there were two or three postal
officers in uniform nearby. Now already the next group
approached, descended into the excavation, lined themselves up
against the previous victims and was shot. When I walked back,
around the mound, I noticed again a transport which had just
arrived. This time it included sick and frail persons. An old,
very thin woman with terribly thin legs was undressed by others
who were already naked, while two persons held her up.
Apparently the woman was paralyzed. The naked people carried the
woman around the mound. I left with Moennikes and drove with my
car back to Dubno.” (_2992-PS_)
There are two reports by Stahlecker, the Chief of _Einsatz_ Group B,
available. The first report, found in Himmler’s personal files, states
that during the first four months of the Russian campaign _Einsatz_
Group A murdered 135,000 Communists and Jews, and carried out widespread
destruction of homes and villages and other vast crimes. Enclosure 8 to
this Stahlecker report is a careful survey of the number of persons
murdered, classified as to country, and whether Jew or Communist, with
totals given in each instance. This report discloses that the _Einsatz_
Groups frequently enlisted the aid of the local populations in the
extermination program. It states:
“In view of the extension of the area of operations and the
great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security
Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the
cooperation of the reliable population for the fight against
vermin—that is, mainly the Jews and Communists.” (_L-180_)
With respect to extermination of Jews the report stated:
“From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish
problem could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with
the basic orders received, however, the cleansing activities of
the Security Police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the
Jews. Special detachments reinforced by selected units—in
Lithuania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian
auxiliary police—therefore performed extensive executions both
in towns and in rural areas. The actions of the execution
detachments were performed smoothly. * * *”
Enclosure 8, “Survey of the number of executed persons” is quoted
directly from the report:
“_Enclosure 8—Survey of the number of executed persons_
Area │ Jews │Communists│ Total
“Lithuania: │ │ │
Kowono town and surroundings │ │ │
(land) │ 31,914│ 80│ 31,994
Schaulen │ 41,382│ 763│ 42,145
Wilna │ 7,015│ 17│ 7,032
│ —————│ —————│ —————
│ 80,311│ 860│ 81,171
│==========│==========│==========
“Latvia: │ │ │
Riga town and surroundings │ │ │
(land) │ │ │ 6,378
Mitau │ │ │ 3,576
Libau │ │ │ 11,860
Wolmar │ │ │ 209
Dueanaburg │ 9,256│ 589│ 9,845
│ —————│ —————│ —————
│ 30,025│ 1,843│ 31,868
│==========│==========│==========
“Esthonia │ 474│ 684│ 1,158
│==========│==========│==========
“White Ruthenia │ 7,620│ │ 7,620
│==========│==========│==========
“Total: │ │ │
Lithuania │ 80,311│ 860│ 81,171
Latvia │ 30,025│ 1,843│ 31,868
Esthonia │ 474│ 684│ 1,158
White Ruthenia │ 7,620│ │ 7,620
│ —————│ —————│ —————
│ 118,430│ 3,387│ 121,817
“to be added to these figures:
In Lithuania and Latvia Jews annihilated by pogroms 5,500
Jews, Communists and partisans executed in old-Russian area 2,000
Lunatics executed 748
————
122,455
Communists and Jews liquidated by State Police and Security
Service Tilsit during search actions 5,502
————
135,567”
(_L-180_)
The second report from _Einsatz_ Group A (_L-180_) reports the
extermination of nearly 230,000 persons. With respect to Esthonia, it
states in part:
“Only by the SIPO and SD were the Jews gradually executed as
they became no longer required for work. Today there are no
longer any Jews in Esthonia.”
With respect to Latvia, the report states in part:
“Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed
by these _Sonderkommandos_. The remaining Jews who were still
indispensable from the economic point of view were collected in
Ghettos, which were established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau.”
With respect to Lithuania, the report states in part:
“Therefore by means of selected units—mostly in the proportion
of 1:8—first of all the prisons, and then systematically,
district by district, the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of Jews
of both sexes. Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a
great number of single actions. As the complete liquidation of
the Jews was not feasible, as they were needed for labor,
Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied as follows:
Kauen approximately 15,000 Jews; Wilna approximately 15,000
Jews; Schaulen approximately 4,500 Jews. These Jews are used
primarily for work of military importance. For example, up to
5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near Kauen
on earthworks and work of that sort.”
With respect to White Russia, the report states in part:
“In view of the enormous distances, the bad condition of the
roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol, and the small forces
of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort to be able
to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews
have been shot up to now.”
With respect to Jews from the Reich, the report states in part
“Since December 1940 transports containing Jews have arrived at
short intervals from the Reich. Of these, 20,000 Jews were
directed to Riga and 7,000 Jews to Minsk. Only a small section
of the Jews from the Reich is capable of working. About 70-80
percent are women and children or old people unfit for work. The
death rate is rising continually also as a result of the
extraordinarily bad winter. In isolated instances sick Jews with
contagious disease were selected under the pretext of putting
them into a home for the aged or a hospital, and executed.”
Attached as an enclosure to this report is a map entitled “Jewish
Executions Carried out by _Einsatzgruppe_ A,” on which, by the use of
coffins as symbols, the number of Jews murdered in each area covered by
_Einsatz_ Group A is shown (_Chart Number 4_). The map shows thousands
of Jews in ghettos, and an estimated 128,000 Jews “still on hand” in the
Minsk area. Number of murdered, according to figures beside the coffins,
during the period covered by this report, was 228,050.
On 30 October 1941 the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a
report to the Commissioner General, Minsk, in which he severely
criticized the actions of the _Einsatzkommandos_ operating in his area
for the murder of all the Jews of Sluzk:
“On 27 October in the morning at about 8 o’clock a first
lieutenant of the police battalion No. 11 from Kauen (Lithuania)
appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion
commander of the security police. The first lieutenant explained
that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect
the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within
two days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength
of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian
partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to
begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to
discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About
half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk.
Immediately after the arrival the conference with the battalion
commander took place according to my request. I first explained
to the commander that it would not very well be possible to
effect the action without previous preparation, because
everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to
terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to
inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone
the action one day. However, he rejected this with the remark
that he had to carry out this action everywhere and in all towns
and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these two
days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means.
For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must
point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already
on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of horror during
the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the
German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian
partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White
Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded
together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in
different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The
White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves
from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish
people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a
terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian
people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over
with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an
action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a
revolution. In conclusion I find myself obliged to point out
that the police battalion has looted in an unheard of manner
during the action, and that not only in Jewish houses but just
the same in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use such
as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, has been
taken away. On the basis of statements of members of the armed
forces, watches were torn off the arms of Jews in public, on the
streets, and rings were pulled off the fingers in the most
brutal manner. A major of the finance department reported that a
Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000
rubles to have her father released. This girl is said to have
actually gone everywhere in order to obtain the money.”
(_1104-PS_)
This report was submitted by the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia
to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories on 1 November 1941
with the following comment:
“I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may
be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be
maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To bury
seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their
graves again is such a base and filthy act that the incidents as
such should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reichs Marshal.”
(_1104-PS_)
On the same date by separate letter the Commissioner General of White
Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories
that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the
police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been
deposited with the Reich Credit institute for the disposal of the Reich
Commissioner. (_1104-PS_)
On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the
personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich
with a copy to Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and SD.
(_1104-PS_)
On 6 November 1942 a secret report submitted to the Reich Commissar for
the East concerning the struggle against partisans in the East discloses
that destruction of villages continued, and reports the execution of
1,274 partisan suspects and 8,350 Jews, and the deportation of 1,217
people. This report was forwarded on 10 December 1942 to the Reich
Minister for the occupied Eastern territories. (_1113-PS_)
The report from the prison administrator at Minsk as of 31 May 1943 to
the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia states:
“The German, former dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and his wife
Elisa Sara Tichauer, born Rosenthal, were delivered to the
Court-Prison by the SD (_Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube) on 13 April
1943. Since that date, the golden bridgework, crowns and
fillings of the received German and Russian Jews were pulled
out, respectively broken out by force. This always happened 1-2
hours before the actions in question.
“Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews were
liquidated. After careful investigation it was ascertained that
gold objects were only taken away during 2 actions, namely on 14
April 43 from 172 and on 27 April 43 from 164 Jews. About 50
percent of the Jews had gold teeth, bridges or fillings.
_Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube of the SD was always present in person,
and also took the gold objects with him.
“This has not been done before 13 April 1943.”
This report was forwarded to the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern
territories on 1 June 1943. (_R-135_)
Death vans were used by the _Einsatz_ Groups to murder victims by gas.
These vans were built by the Saurer Works in Berlin and other firms. The
vans were built for the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, which
sent them to the _Einsatz_ Groups in the field. They were first used in
the spring of 1942 and continued to be used throughout the war
(_2348-PS_). The method of using the vans is described by Ohlendorf in
the following words:
“We received orders to use the car for the killing of women and
children. Whenever a unit had collected a sufficient number of
victims, a car was sent for their liquidation. We also stationed
these cars in the neighborhood of the transit camps to which the
victims had been brought. They were told that they would be
resettled and had to climb into the cars for that purpose. Then
the doors were closed and as soon as the cars started moving the
gas would enter. The victims died within ten to fifteen minutes.
The cars were driven to the burial place where the corpses were
taken out and buried.” (_2620-PS_)
A letter from Becker, the operator of several death vans, written to
Rauff, the head of the technical section of _Amt_ II of the RSHA, on 16
May 1942, states:
“The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While
the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the
weather is not too bad the vans of the second series (Saurer)
stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance
for only one-half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply
skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is
only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at
the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that
place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of
execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is
difficult of access because of its location; in damp or wet
weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be
executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize
immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be
avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load
them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.
“I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as
house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each
side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans,
such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans
became so well-known, that not only the authorities but also the
civilian population called the van “death van”, as soon as one
of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion that the van cannot
be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.
“* * * I should like to take this opportunity to bring the
following to your attention: several commands have had the
unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I
brought to the attention of the commanders of those SK concerned
the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health
which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately,
at least later on. The men complained to me about headaches
which appeared after each unloading.
“* * * The application of gas usually is not undertaken
correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the
driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing
that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation
and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now
have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes
faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces
and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer
noticed.” (_501-PS_)
The death vans were not always satisfactory. A telegram from the
commandant of the SIPO and SD “Ostland” to the RSHA, _Amt_ II D, on 15
June 1942, states:
“A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way,
arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security
Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.
“The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that
purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the
same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three
S-vans on hand (2 Diamond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are
leaky already.” (_501-PS_)
The reports of the various _Einsatz_ Groups were summarized at RSHA, and
the summaries were then distributed to the various sections interested,
particularly _Amt_ III (the SD), _Amt_ IV (the GESTAPO), and _Amt_ V
(the KRIPO) (_2752-PS_). One such report covering the period 1-31
October 1941 is entitled “Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the
_Einsatz_ Groups of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR”
(_R-102_). This report describes in summary form the activities of the
various _Einsatz_ Groups during the month of October 1941. The report
first discusses the stations and in that regard states:
“During the period covered by this report the stations of the
Task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have changed only
in the Northern Sector.
“The present stations are:
“Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.
“Task Force B: continues in Smolensk.
“Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.
“Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.
“The Action and Special Commandos (_Einsatz und Sonder_
Commandos) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the
march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been
assigned to them.” (_R-102_)
The report next discusses the activities of each _Einsatz_ Group. There
is included first a discussion of the Baltic area, next of White
Ruthenia, and last of the Ukraine. Under each section the work of the
_Einsatz_ Groups in connection with the action taken against partisans,
Jews, and communist officials is considered. With respect to the
treatment of Jews in the Baltic area the report states in part:
“* * * However, the Estonian Protective Corps (_Selbstschutz_),
formed at the time of the entry of the _Wehrmacht_, immediately
started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action
was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police
and the SD.
“The measures taken were:
1. Arrest of all male Jews over 16.
2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who lived in
Reval and environs and were fit for work; these were
employed in peat cutting.
3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all
Jewesses living in Dorport and its environs.
4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in
Pernau and environs.
5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and
capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in
a camp that is being prepared.
“The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of
doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still
in progress. After completion of this action there will remain
only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern territory. * * *”
(_R-102_)
With respect to partisan activity in White Ruthenia, the report states
in part:
“* * * In the village Michalowo, after careful reconnaissance
through civilian agents, 8 partisans were surprised in a house
by the same Commando of the Security Police and the SD, they
were arrested and hanged the next day in this particularly
partisan infested village.
“The president of the District Region Soviets in Tarenitsch and
his secretary were shot because of their connections with
partisans.
“During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of Mogilow,
25 Armenians, Kirghize and Mongols were apprehended with false
identification papers with which they tried to conceal the fact
that they belong to a partisan group. They were liquidated. * *
*” (_R-102_)
With respect to arrests and executions of communists in White Ruthenia,
the report states in part:
“A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was
devoted to the combating of Communists and criminals. A special
Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63
officials, NKVD agents and agitators. * * *” (_R-102_)
With respect to the action taken against the Jews in White Ruthenia the
report states in part:
“* * * All the more vigorous are the actions of the task forces
of the Security Police and the SD against the Jews who make it
necessary that steps be taken against them in different spheres.
“In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschernigow 19 Jewish
Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish communists were shot
at Beresna.
“It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women showed an
especially obstinate behaviour. For this reason 28 Jewesses had
to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at Mogilev.
“In Borissov 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were
executed.
“In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the last in
incitement and horror propaganda [_Hetz-und Greuelpropaganda_]
against the German army of occupation.
“In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own accord and
returned to their old home quarters, attempting to expel the
Russians who had been quartered there in the meantime. All male
Jews as well as 3 Jewesses were shot.
“In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against the
establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to
be shot. Among them was a political Commissar.
“_MOGILEV_
“In Mogilev too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their removal to
the Ghetto; 113 Jews were liquidated.
“_Wit_
“Moreover four Jews were shot on account of refusal to work and
2 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the
German occupation authorities.
“In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda and in
Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged
orders issued by the German occupation authorities.
“At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot because they had
participated in acts of sabotage.
“_Witebsk_
“On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a beginning
was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto at Witebsk. This
involved approximately 3000 Jews. * * *” (_R-102_)
With respect to partisan activity in the Ukraine the report states in
part:
“Although partisan activity in the south sector is very strong
too, there is nevertheless the impression that spreading and
effective partisan activity are strongly affected by the flight
of higher partisan leaders and by the lack of initiative of the
subordinate leaders who have remained behind. Only in one case a
commando of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight
with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the Communist Party
for the administration district of Nikolajew-Cherson, who was at
the time Commissar of a partisan group for the district
Nikolajew-Cherson-Krim. * * *” (_R-102_)
With respect to treatment of Jews in the Ukraine the report states in
part:
“The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against the Jews
is extremely great because they are thought responsible for the
explosions in Kiew. They are also regarded as informers and
agents of the NKVD who started the terror against the Ukrainian
people. As a measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all
Jews were arrested and altogether 33,771 Jews were executed on
the 29th and 30th September. Money, valuables and clothing were
secured and put at the disposal of the National-Socialist League
for Public Welfare (NSV) for the equipment of the National
Germans [_Volksdeutschen_] and partly put at the disposal of the
provisional city administration for distribution to the needy
population.
“_Shitomir_
“In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience
they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and
saboteurs.
“_Cherson_
“In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation
for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnjepr
the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up
energetically by the task forces of the Security Police and the
SD. The areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of
Jews. In the course of this action 4,891 Jews were liquidated.
At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This
rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the _Wehrmacht_
for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1,000 persons.”
(_R-102_)
These reports, circulated among the various offices of the RSHA, brought
general knowledge to the entire organization of the program of mass
murder conducted by these special task forces of the SIPO and SD.
(_R-102_)
The activities of the _Einsatz_ Groups continued throughout 1943 and
1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the SIPO and SD. New groups were
formed and sent into action in the West (_2890-PS_). Under adverse war
conditions, however, the program of extermination was to a large extent
changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany. A letter written
on 19 March 1943 from the headquarters of a _Sonderkommando_ (section of
_Einsatz_ Group C) states as follows:
“It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security
Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the Reich and fight
against them in the interest of security, and in the zone of
operations especially to guarantee the security of the army.
Besides the annihilation of active opponents all other elements
who, by virtue of their opinions or their past, may appear
active as enemies under favorable conditions, are to be
eliminated [_sind * * * auszumerzen_] through preventive
measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to
the general directives of the Fuehrer with all the required
toughness. Energetic measures are especially necessary in
territories endangered by the activity of hostile gangs. The
competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations
is based on the Barbarossa decrees. I deem the measures of the
Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during
recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:
“1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so
serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and
Italians, who streamed back in chaotic condition, took openly
position against us.
“2. The strong expeditions of hostile gangs, who came especially
from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that,
other revolutionary groups, formed by the population, appeared
suddenly in all districts. The providing of arms evidently
provided no difficulties at all. It would have been
irresponsible, if we had observed this whole activity without
acting against it. It is obvious that all such measures bring
about some harshness. I want to take up the significant points
of harsh measures:
“1. The shooting of Hungarian Jews.
“2. The shooting of directors of collective farms.
“3. The shooting of children.
“4. The total burning down of villages.
“5. The “shooting, while trying to escape” of Security
Service (SD) prisoners.
“Chief of _Einsatz_ Group C confirmed once more the correctness
of the measures taken, and expressed his recognition for the
energetic actions.
“With regard to the current political situation, especially in
the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the
Security Police have to be subordinated to the greatest extent
to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible
time, the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament
industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our
territory daily.
“The work of the field groups has therefore to be changed as of
now. The following orders are given:
“1. Special treatment is to be limited to a minimum.
“2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists and so on,
is to take place by roster only for the time being, without
arresting anybody. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to
arrest all the close relatives of a member of the communist
party. Although, members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested
only if they were active in a leading position.
“3. The activity of the labor offices, respective of recruiting
commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible.
It will not be possible always to refrain from using force.
During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment
Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that wherever prisoners
can be released, they should be put at the disposal of the
Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching [_Uberholung_]
villages, resp., when it has become necessary to burn down a
village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the
Commissioner by force.
“4. As a rule, no more children will be shot.
“5. The reporting of hostile gangs as well as drives against
them is not affected hereby. All drives against these hostile
gangs can only take place after my approval has been obtained.
“6. The prisons have to be kept empty, as a rule. We have to be
aware of the fact that the Slavs will interpret all soft
treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act
accordingly right away. If we limit our harsh measures of
security police through above orders for the time being, that is
only done for the following reason. The most important thing is
the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into
the Reich will be made. No written certificates of political
reliability check or similar things will be issued.
“(signed) Christiansen.”
(_3012-PS_)
The head of the Jewish section in the GESTAPO, and the man directly
responsible for carrying out the mass extermination program against the
Jews by the GESTAPO, _Obersturmbannfuehrer_ Eichmann, estimated in his
report to Himmler on the matter, that 2,000,000 Jews had been killed by
shootings, mainly by the _Einsatz_ Groups of the SIPO and SD during the
campaign in the East. This did not include the estimated 4,000,000 sent
by the GESTAPO for extermination in annihilation camps. (_2615-PS_)
(2) _The GESTAPO and SD stationed special units in prisoner of war camps
for the purpose of screening out racial and political undesirables and
executing them._ The program of mass murder of political and racial
undesirables carried on against civilians was also applied to prisoners
of war captured on the Eastern front. Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff
of the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab_, states:
“* * * Shortly before the beginning of this campaign [with
U.S.S.R.] I was present in a group composed of the Commanders in
Chief (with their Chiefs of Staff) of the three Armed Forces, of
the Army groups, of Armies, and of the corresponding groups in
the Air Forces and Navy. Hitler made an announcement to this
group that special measures would have to be taken against
political functionaries and commissars of the Soviet army. He
said that this would not be an ordinary campaign but would be
the clash of conflicting ideologies. He further said that the
political functionaries and commissars were not to be considered
as prisoners of war but were to be segregated from other
prisoners immediately after their capture and were to be turned
over to special detachments of the SD which were to accompany
the German troops to Russia. He further said that when it was
not possible to turn over the political functionaries and
commissars to the SD, they were to be eliminated by the German
troops.” (_2884-PS_)
The Chief of the SD, Otto Ohlendorf, describes this action in the
following words:
“In 1941, shortly after the start of the campaign against
Russia, an agreement was entered into between the Chief of the
Security Police and SD and the OKW and OKH to the effect that
the prisoner of war camps on the Eastern front should be opened
to _Einsatzkommandos_ of the SIPO and SD so that the prisoners
could be screened. All Jews and Communist functionaries were to
be taken from the prisoner of war camps by the
_Einsatzkommandos_ and executed outside the camps. To my
knowledge, this action was carried on throughout the entire
Russian campaign. In the other occupied territories and within
the Reich—to my knowledge—the GESTAPO had been made
responsible for this program in the Russian prisoner of war
camps. It was, to my knowledge, carried on throughout the
greater part of the war.” (_2622-PS_)
Lahousen, chief of a division in the office of foreign intelligence in
the _Wehrmacht_, states:
“* * * From the start of the campaign against the U.S.S.R. the
higher German political and military leadership followed the
policy of eliminating Russian commissars and various other types
of Russian prisoners of war captured by the _Wehrmacht_. In June
and July 1941 I participated in a conference which concerned
itself with the treatment of Russian commissars. * * *
Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller was present as representative of the
RSHA, and he participated in this matter because, as Chief of
Section IV, he was responsible for the carrying out of these
measures. Jointly with the SD and the GESTAPO he had the task of
instituting the necessary measures for the execution of
commissars. * * * In the discussion that followed, Mueller
promised in a peculiarly cynical manner that these executions
would take place in the future outside the camp, so that the
troops would not be obliged to watch them. He promised further a
certain limitation in the concept of ‘Bolshevistically
infected.’ This concept and its interpretation had been hitherto
left to the discretion of the SD _Sonderkommandos_. * * * An
agreement was concluded between the OKW, the GESTAPO and the SD.
Pursuant to this agreement Russian prisoners of war under the
control of the OKW were delivered to the GESTAPO and SD for
execution. The term ‘_Sonderbehandlung_’ in the official
documents and way of speaking of the SD was equivalent to
‘condemned to death’.” (_2846-PS_)
On 17 July 1941 instructions were issued by the GESTAPO to Commandos of
the SIPO and SD stationed in Stalags, providing in part as follows:
“The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with
the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security
Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16
July 1941 (see enclosure 1). The commandos will work
independently according to special authorization and in
consequence of the general regulations given to them, in the
limit of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will
keep close contact with the camp-commander and the
defense-officers assigned to him.
“The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of
all camp-inmates, the elimination and further ‘treatment’
“_a._ of all political, criminal or in some other way unbearable
elements among them.
“_b._ of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction
of the occupied territories.
“The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at
present and even later, the experiences of the camp-commanders
which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of
the prisoners and examinations of camp inmates.
“Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to
seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable,
regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to
use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if
advisable, later in the occupied territories also.
“By use of such informers and by use of all other existing
possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated
among the prisoners, must proceed step by step at once. * * *
“Above all, the following must be discovered: All important
functionaries of state and party, especially
Professional revolutionaries
Functionaries of the Komintern
All policy forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and
its fellow organizations in the central committees, in
the regional and district committees.
All peoples-commissars and their deputies
All former political commissars in the Red-Army
Leading personalities of the state-authorities of
central and middle regions.
The leading personalities of the business world.
Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence
All Jews
All persons who are found to be agitators or fanatical
communists. * * *
“Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate
vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the general-government are
in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are
to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former
Soviet-Russian territory. * * *
“In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible
removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for
the _Einsatz_-group in the occupied territories, the leader of
the _Einsatz-Kommando_ [?] must make an agreement with the
nearest State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of
the Security Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these
with the Chief of the _Einsatz_-group concerned in the occupied
territories. * * *” (_502-PS_)
On 23 October 1941 the Camp Commander of the concentration camp Gross
Rosen reported to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, a list of Russian PWs
who had been executed the preceding day. (_1165-PS_)
On 9 November 1941 Mueller issued a directive to all GESTAPO offices in
which he ordered that diseased PWs should be excluded from the transport
into the concentration camps for execution. The letter began:
“The commandant of the concentration camps are complaining that
5 to 10 percent of the Soviet Russians destined for execution
are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the
impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such
prisoners in this way. * * *” (_1165-PS_)
The affidavit of Kurt Lindow, former GESTAPO official, states:
“* * * 2. From 1941 until the middle of 1943 there was attached
to subsection IVA1 a special department that was headed by the
_Regierungsoberinspektor_, later _Regierungsamtmann_, and
_SS-Hauptsturmbannfuehrer_ Franz Koenigshaus. In this department
were handled matters concerning prisoners of war. I learned from
this department that instructions and orders by Reichsfuehrer
Himmler, dating from 1941 and 1942, existed according to which
captured Soviet Russian political Commissars and Jewish soldiers
were to be executed. As far as I know proposals for execution of
such PWs were received from the various PW camps. Koenigshaus
had to prepare the orders for execution and submitted them to
the chief of section IV, Mueller, for signature. These orders
were made out so that one order was to be sent to the agency
making the request and a second one to the concentration camp
designated to carry out the execution. The PWs in question were
at first formally released from PW status, then transferred to a
concentration camp for execution. * * *
“* * * 4. There existed in the PW camps on the Eastern front
small screening teams (_Einsatzkommandos_) headed by lower
ranking members of the Secret Police (GESTAPO). These teams were
assigned to the camp commanders and had the job to segregate the
PWs who were candidates for execution, according to the orders
that had been given, and to report them to the Office of the
Secret Police (_Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt_). * * *” (_2542-PS_)
(3) _The GESTAPO and SD sent recaptured prisoners of war to
concentration camps where they were executed (“Bullet Decree”)._ In
March 1944 the Chief of the Security Police and SD forwarded an OKW
order to regional SIPO and SD offices in which the OKW ordered that, on
recapture, every escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoner of war,
with the exception of British and American prisoners of war, were to be
handed over to the SIPO and SD, with the words “_Stufe III_”. Whether
escaped British and American officers and nonworking NCOs, upon
recapture, should be handed over to the SIPO and SD was to be decided by
the High Command of the Army. In connection with this order, the Chief
of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) issued instructions that the
GESTAPO _Leitstellen_ should take over the escaped officers from the
camp commandants and transport them in accordance with a procedure
theretofore in force to the Mauthausen concentration camp. The camp
commandant was to be informed that the prisoners were being handed over
under the operation “_Kugel_”. On the journey the prisoners of war were
to be placed in irons. The GESTAPO _Leitstellen_ were to make
half-yearly reports, giving numbers only, of the handing over of
prisoners of war. Escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoners of war,
with the exception of British and Americans, recaptured by police
stations were not to be handed back to the Stalag command. The Stalag
was to be informed of the recapture and asked to surrender them with the
words “_Stufe III_”. (_1650-PS_)
On 27 July 1944 an order from the 6th Corps Area Command was issued on
the treatment of prisoners of war, which provided that prisoners of war
were to be discharged from prisoner-of-war status and transferred to the
GESTAPO if they were guilty of crimes, had escaped and been recaptured,
or refused to work or encouraged other prisoners not to work, or were
screened out by _Einsatzkommandos_ of the SIPO and SD, or were guilty of
sabotage. No reports on transfers were required (_1514-PS_). This decree
was known as the “_Kugel Erlass_” (“Bullet Decree”). Prisoners of war
sent to Mauthausen concentration camp under it were regarded as dead to
the outside world and were executed. (_2478-PS_; _2285-PS_.)
(4) _The GESTAPO and SD were responsible for establishing and
classifying concentration camps, and for committing racial and political
undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave labor and
mass murder._ The first concentration camps were established in 1933 at
Dachau in Bavaria and at Oranienburg in Prussia. The GESTAPO was given
by law the responsibility of administering the concentration camps.
(_2108-PS_)
The GESTAPO had the sole authority to take persons into protective
custody, and orders for protective custody were carried out in the State
concentration camps. (_1723-PS_)
The GESTAPO issued the orders establishing concentration camps,
transforming prisoner of war camps into concentration camps, designating
concentration camps as internment camps, changing labor camps into
concentration camps, setting up special sections for female prisoners,
and so forth. (_D-50_; _D-46_.)
The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the classification of
concentration camps according to the seriousness of the accusation and
the chances for reforming the prisoners from the Nazi viewpoint. The
concentration camps were classified as Classes I, II, or III. Class I
was for the least serious prisoners, and Class III for the most serious
prisoners. (_1063-A-PS_)
Regional offices of the GESTAPO had the authority to commit persons to
concentration camps for short periods, at first 21 days and later 56
days, but all other orders for protective custody had to be approved by
the GESTAPO headquarters in Berlin. Orders for protective custody issued
by GESTAPO headquarters had to be signed by or on behalf of the Chief of
the Security Police and SD, at first Heydrich, later Kaltenbrunner.
(_2477-PS_)
The Chief of the Security Police and SD had authority to fix the length
of the period of custody. During the war it was the policy not to permit
the prisoners to know the period of custody and merely to announce the
term as “until further notice”. (_1531-PS_)
The local GESTAPO offices which made the arrests maintained a register
called the “_Haftbuch_.” In this register the names of all persons
arrested were listed, together with personal data, grounds for the
arrest, and disposition. When orders were received from the GESTAPO
headquarters in Berlin to commit persons who had been arrested to
concentration camps, an entry was made in the _Haftbuch_ to that effect.
The reason assigned for the arrest and commitment of persons to
concentration camps usually was that, according to the GESTAPO, the
person endangered by his attitude the existence and security of the
people and the State. Further specifications of grounds included such
offenses as that of “working against the Greater German Reich with an
illegal resistance organization,” “being a Jew,” “suspected of working
for the detriment of the Reich,” “being strongly suspected of aiding
desertion,” “because as a relative of a deserter he is expected to take
advantage of every occasion to harm the German Reich,” “refusal to
work,” “sexual intercourse with a Pole,” “religious propaganda,”
“working against the Reich,” “loafing on the job,” or “defeatist
statements.” Sometimes specification of the grounds simply referred to
an “action,” under which a large number of persons would be arrested and
sent to concentration camps. (_L-358_; _L-215_.)
On 16 December 1942, Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, reported that, in
connection with an increase in slave labor required by concentration
camps by 30 January 1943 the GESTAPO could round up 45,000 Jews,
including invalids, aged, and children. The telegram stated:
“In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into
the concentration camps, which was ordered by 30 January 1943,
the following may be applied in the Jewish sector:
“1. Total amount: 45,000 Jews.
“2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943.
“3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943.” (_1472-PS_)
On 17 December 1942, Mueller issued an order to the _Kommandeurs_ and
_Inspekteurs_ of the SIPO and SD and to the directors of the GESTAPO
regional offices, in which he stated that Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police, had given orders on 14 December 1942 that at
least 35,000 persons who were fit for work had to be put into
concentration camps not later than at the end of January. The order
further provided that Eastern or foreign workers who had escaped or
broken the labor contracts were to be sent to the nearest concentration
camps as quickly as possible, and that inmates of detention rooms and
educational work camps who were fit for work should be delivered to the
nearest concentration camps. (_1063-D-PS_)
On 23 March 1943, Mueller issued another directive referring to said
directive of 17 December 1942, in which he stated that measures are to
be carried out until 30 April ‘43. More explicit instructions were given
as to which concentration camps the slave laborers were to be sent. He
said:
“Care has to be taken that only prisoners who are fit for work
are sent to concentration camps, and adolescents only in
accordance with the provisions issued; otherwise, contrary to
the purpose, the concentration camps become overburdened.”
(_L-41_)
On 25 June 1943, Mueller issued an order stating that the decrees of 17
December 1942 and of 23 March 1943 had achieved the intended goal.
(_1063-E-PS_)
On 21 April 1943, the Minister of Justice declared in a letter that the
RSHA had ordered on 11 March 1943 that all Jews who were released from
prison were to be handed over to the GESTAPO for lifelong detainment in
the concentration camps at Auschwitz and Lublin. Poles released after an
imprisonment of over six months were to be transferred to the GESTAPO
for internment in a concentration camp for the duration of the war.
(_701-PS_)
The arrest of Jews and their shipment to annihilation camps was carried
out under the direction of Eichmann, head of the section handling Jews
in the Gestapo. Eichmann’s staff was composed of members of the SIPO,
especially the GESTAPO. The Jews were shipped on order of the SIPO and
SD to annihilation camps in the East. Eichmann estimated, and so
reported to Himmler, that 4,000,000 Jews were killed in the annihilation
camps in the East, in addition to the 2,000,000 Jews shot by the
_Einsatz_ Groups. The extermination of Jews in the annihilation camps
was accomplished mainly after the beginning of 1943, during the time
Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD. (_2615-PS_)
(5) _The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the deportation of citizens
of occupied countries for forced labor and handled the disciplining of
forced labor._ On 26 November 1942, Fritz Sauckel transmitted a letter
to the president of provincial employment offices in which he stated
that he had been advised by the Chief of the Security Police and SD
(RSHA) under date of 26 October 1942 that during the month of November
the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district would begin in order to
make room for the settlement of persons of the German race. The Poles
who were evacuated as a result of this measure were to be put into
concentration camps for labor so far as they were criminal or asocial.
The remaining Poles who were suitable for labor were to be transported
without their families into the Reich, there to be put at the disposal
of the Labor Allocation Offices to serve as replacements for Jews
eliminated from the armament factories. (_L-61_)
During 1943 the program of mass murder carried out by the _Einsatz_
Groups in the East was modified, and orders were issued to round up
hundreds of thousands of persons for the armament industry.
“In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to put at the
disposal of the armament industry one million workers, 500 of
whom have to be sent from our territory daily. * * * The
activity of the labor offices * * * is to be supported to the
greatest extent possible. * * * When searching villages, esp.
when it has become necessary to burn down a village, the whole
population will be put at the disposal of the Commissions by
force. * * * The most important thing is the recruiting of
workers.” (_3012-PS_)
On 18 June 1941 secret orders were issued from the Chief of the Security
Police and SD, signed by Mueller, to prevent the return of Eastern
emigrants and civilian workers from the Reich to the East, and to keep
them in German war production. Any attempts at refusal to work were to
be countered by the GESTAPO with the severest measures, arrest and
confinement in concentration camps (_1573-PS_). The Chief of the
Security Police and SD had exclusive jurisdiction over labor reformatory
camps established under control of the GESTAPO for disciplining foreign
workers. (_1063-B-PS_)
(6) _The GESTAPO and SD executed captured commandos and paratroopers,
and protected civilians who lynched Allied flyers._ On 4 August 1942
Keitel issued an order which provided that the GESTAPO and SD were
responsible for taking counter-measures against single parachutists or
small groups of them with special missions. Even if such paratroopers
were captured by the _Wehrmacht_, they were to be handed over to the
GESTAPO and the SD. (_553-PS_)
On 18 October 1942, Hitler ordered that all members of Commando units,
even when in uniform, or members of sabotage groups, armed or not, were
to be exterminated to the last man by fighting or by pursuing them. Even
if they wished to surrender, they were not to be spared. Members of such
Commandos, acting as agents, saboteurs, etc., handed over to the
_Wehrmacht_ through other channels, were to be turned over immediately
to the SD. (_498-PS_)
On 17 June 1944, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, in a Top
Secret letter to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, stated that he
had instructed the Commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris to treat
parachutists in English uniform as members of Commando operations in
accordance with Hitler’s order of 18 October 1942. (_1276-PS_)
On 26 June 1944, WFSt issued an order in which it was stated that enemy
paratroopers landing in Brittany were to be treated as commandos, and
that it was immaterial whether the paratroopers were in uniform or
civilian clothes. The order provided that in cases of doubt enemy
soldiers who were captured alive were to be handed over to the SD for
examination as to whether the Fuehrer Order of 18 October 1942 was to be
applied or not. (_532-PS_)
Commandos turned over to the SIPO and SD under these orders were
executed. (_526-PS_; _2374-PS_.)
The affidavit of Adolf Zutter, former adjutant of Mauthausen
concentration camp, states in part:
“* * * Concerning the American Military Mission which landed
behind the German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in
January, 1945, I remember, when these officers were brought to
Camp Mauthausen; I suppose the number of the arrivals were about
12 to 15 men. They wore a uniform which was American or
Canadian; brown-green color, shirt, and cloth cap. Eight or ten
days after their arrival the execution order came in by
telegraph or teletype. _Standartenfuehrer_ Ziereis came to me
into my office and told me now Kaltenbrunner has given the
permission for the execution. This letter was secret and had the
signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. Then, these people were shot
according to martial law and their belongings were given to me
by 1st Sgt. [_Oberscharfuehrer_] Niedermeyer. * * *” (_L-51_)
On 10 August 1943, Himmler issued an order to the Security Police
stating that it was not the task of the Police to interfere in clashes
between Germans and English and American terror flyers who had bailed
out. (_R-110_)
In 1944 at a conference of _Amt_ Chiefs Kaltenbrunner said:
“All offices of the SD and the security police are to be
informed that pogroms of the populace against English and
American terror-flyers are not to be interfered with; on the
contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered.” (_2990-PS_)
On 12 June 1944 the Chief of the SD-_Abschnitte_ Koblenz stated that the
Army had issued a similar order, namely, that German soldiers were not
to protect enemy flyers from the populace and that the Army no longer
attached value to enemy flyers taken prisoner. (_745-PS_)
(7) _The GESTAPO and SD took civilians of occupied countries to Germany
for secret trial and punishment (“Nacht und Nebel Erlass”)._ On 7
December 1941 Hitler issued the directive, since called the “_Nacht und
Nebel Erlass_” (Night and Fog Decree), under which persons who committed
offenses against the Reich or occupation forces in occupied territories,
except where death sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to
Germany and surrendered to the Security Police and SD for trial or
punishment in Germany. An executive ordinance was issued by Keitel the
same date, and on 4 February 1942 the directive and ordinance were
published to the police and the SS. (_L-90_)
In compliance with the above directive, the military intelligence turned
over cases, other than those in which the death sentence was probable,
to the GESTAPO and the Secret Field Police for secret deporting to
Germany. (_833-PS_)
After the civilians arrived in Germany, no word of the disposition of
their cases was permitted to reach the country from which they came, or
their relatives. Even when they died awaiting trial, the SIPO and SD
refused to notify the families, so that anxiety would be created in the
minds of the family of the arrested person. (_668-PS_)
(8) _The GESTAPO and SD arrested, tried, and punished citizens of
occupied territories under special criminal procedure and by summary
methods._ The GESTAPO arrested, placed in protective custody, and
executed civilians of occupied territories under certain circumstances.
Even where there were courts capable of handling emergency cases, the
GESTAPO conducted its own executions without regard to normal judicial
processes. (_674-PS_)
On 18 September 1942, Thierack, the Reich Minister of Justice, and
Himmler came to an understanding by which antisocial elements were to be
turned over to Himmler to be worked to death, and a special criminal
procedure was to be applied by the police to the Jews, Poles, gypsies,
Russians, and Ukrainians who were not to be tried in ordinary criminal
courts. (_654-PS_)
On 5 September 1942 an order was issued by the RSHA to the offices of
the GESTAPO and SD covering this understanding. This order provided that
ordinary criminal procedure would not be applied against Poles, Jews,
gypsies, and other Eastern people, but that instead they would be turned
over to the police. Such persons of foreign extraction were to be
treated on a basis entirely different from that applied to Germans.
“* * * Such considerations which may be right for adjudicating a
punishable offense committed by a German are, however, wrong for
adjudicating a punishable offense committed by a person of alien
race. In the case of punishable offenses committed by a person
of alien race the personal motives actuating the offender must
be completely eliminated. The only standard may be that German
civil order is endangered by his action, and that consequently
preventive measures must be taken to prevent the recurrence of
such risks. In other words, the action of a person of alien race
is not to be viewed from the angle of judicial expiation, but
from the angle of the police guard against danger.
“As a result of this, the administration of penal law for
persons of alien race must be transferred from the hands of the
administrators of justice into the hands of the police. * * *”
(_L-316_)
(9) _The GESTAPO and SD executed or confined persons in concentration
camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives._ On 19 July
1944, the Commander of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom published
an order transmitted through the Higher SS and Police Leaders to the
effect that in all cases of assassination or attempted assassination of
Germans, or where saboteurs had destroyed vital installations, not only
the guilty person but also all his (or her) male relatives should be
shot and the female relatives over 16 years of age put into a
concentration camp. (_L-37_)
In the summer of 1944, the _Einsatzkommando_ of the SIPO and SD at
Luxembourg caused persons to be confined at Sachsenhausen concentration
camp because they were relatives of deserters and were, therefore,
“expected to endanger the interest of the German Reich if allowed to go
free.” (_L-215_)
(10) _The GESTAPO and SD were instructed to murder prisoners in the SIPO
and SD prisons to prevent their release by the Allied armies._ On 21
July 1944, the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom
forwarded an order of the _Befehlshaber_ of the SIPO and SD to the
effect that it was essential that the number of inmates of the SIPO and
SD prisons be kept as low as possible. Inmates were to be subjected only
to short formal interrogations and then to be sent by the quickest route
to concentration camps. Preparations were to be made for total clearance
of the prisons should the situation at the front necessitate such
action. In the case of sudden emergency precluding the evacuation of the
prisoners, they were to be shot and their bodies buried or otherwise
disposed of, the buildings to be dynamited, and so forth. In similar
circumstances, the Jews who were still employed in the armament
industries or in other work were to be dealt with in the same way. The
liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy was to be avoided at all
costs. (_L-53_)
(11) _The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the seizure and spoliation
of public and private property._ In connection with the program for the
mass extermination of Jews and Communist functionaries, the GESTAPO and
the SD seized all personal effects of the persons executed or murdered.
On the eastern front the victims were required not only to give up all
their personal possessions, but even to remove their outer garments
prior to being murdered. (_2620-PS_)
In connection with the program of confiscation of scientific, religious,
and art archives and objects, an agreement was entered into between
Rosenberg and Heydrich, under which the SD and Rosenberg were to
cooperate closely in the confiscation of public and private collections.
(_071-PS_)
(12) _The GESTAPO and SD conducted third degree interrogations._ On 26
October 1939 an order to all GESTAPO offices from the RSHA signed
Mueller, “by order,” in referring to execution of protective custody
during the war, stated in part:
“In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a
concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in the future,
also be transmitted to the State Police District Office
concerned. In this case, too, there is no objection to spreading
the rumour of this increased punishment. * * *” (_1531-PS_)
On 12 June 1942 the Chief of the Security Police and SD, through
Mueller, published an order authorizing the use of third degree methods
in interrogating where preliminary investigation indicates that the
prisoner could give information on important facts such as subversive
activities, but not to extort confessions of the prisoner’s own crimes.
The order stated in part:
“* * * 2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be
employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses,
saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements,
parachute agents, antisocial elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian
loafers or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first
be obtained.
“* * * 4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances,
consist amongst other methods, of:
very simple diet (bread and water)
hard bunk
dark cell
deprivation of sleep
exhaustive drilling
also in flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must
be consulted).” (_1531-PS_)
On 24 February 1944 the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD for the district
Radom, “in view of the variety of methods used to date in third-degree
interrogations and in order to avoid excesses,” published an order
issued by the BdS Cracow based on regulations in force for the Reich
which followed closely the limitations laid down in the above decree of
12 June 1942. (_L-89_)
G. _Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD Against Humanity._
(1) _The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of
the Jews._ The persecution of the Jews under the Nazi regime is a story
of increasingly severe treatment, beginning with restrictions, then
seizure and spoliation of property, commitment to concentration camps,
deportation, slave labor, and finally mass murder. The responsibility of
the GESTAPO and the SD for the mass extermination program carried out by
the Einsatz Groups of the SIPO and SD and in the annihilation camps to
which Jews were sent by the SIPO and SD has already been considered. In
this subdivision, the place of the GESTAPO and SD in the development of
this persecution will be treated.
Section B of the SD dealt with problems of nationality, including
minorities, race and national health, immigration, and resettlement.
Section B4 of the GESTAPO, headed by Eichmann, dealt with Jewish
affairs, including matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies
of the people and State, and dispossession of rights of German
citizenship. One of the functions of the SD was to furnish information
concerning the Jews to the GESTAPO. One of the functions of the GESTAPO
was to carry out the Nazi program of persecution of the Jews. (_L-185_;
_L-219_.)
The GESTAPO was charged with the enforcement of discriminatory laws,
such as those preventing Jews from engaging in business, restricting
their right to travel, and prohibiting them from associating with
gentiles. Violations of such restrictions resulted in protective custody
and confinement in concentration camps by the GESTAPO. (_L-217_;
_L-152_; _L-167_.)
The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the GESTAPO and the SD
to supervise the anti-Jewish pogrom staged in November 1938 following
the von Rath incident in Paris. As many Jews were to be arrested in all
districts as the available jail space would hold. Well-to-do Jews were
to be singled out for arrest, and primarily only healthy male adults of
not too advanced age. Immediately after completion of the arrests, the
competent concentration camp was to be notified in order to provide for
speediest transfer of Jews to the camps. (_3051-PS_)
On 11 November 1938 Heydrich reported to Goering by secret express
letter on the results of the action as reported by the GESTAPO. The
report stated in part:
“* * * The extent of the destruction of Jewish shops and houses
cannot yet be verified by figures. The figures given in the
reports: 815 shops destroyed, 171 dwelling houses set on fire or
destroyed, only indicate a fraction of the actual damage caused,
as far as arson is concerned. Due to the urgency of the
reporting, the reports received to date are entirely limited to
general statements such as ‘numerous’ or ‘most shops destroyed.’
Therefore the figures given must have been exceeded
considerably.
“191 synagogues were set on fire, and another 76 completely
destroyed. In addition 11 parish halls, [_Gemeindehauser_]
cemetery chapels and similar buildings were set on fire and 3
more completely destroyed.
“20,000 Jews were arrested, also 7 Aryans and 3 foreigners. The
latter were arrested for their own safety.
“36 deaths were reported and those seriously injured were also
numbered at 36. Those killed and injured are Jews. One Jew is
still missing. The Jews killed include one Polish national, and
those injured include 2 Poles.” (_3058-PS_)
On 31 July 1941 Goering sent the following order to the Chief of the
Security Police and SD, Heydrich:
“Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January
1939, which dealt with arriving at a solution of the Jewish
problem through furtherance of emigration and evacuation as
advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all
necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial
matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish
question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.”
(_710-PS_)
In February or March 1943, according to Gottfried Boley,
_Ministerialrat_ in the Reich Chancery, a conference on the solution of
the Jewish problem, attended by representatives of the ministries, was
called by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Boley
states:
“The meeting was presided over by Eichmann who had charge of
Jewish problems in the GESTAPO. In his opening remarks Eichmann
referred to former conferences that had taken place in the
office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, and that on
this occasion he wished to discuss the matter in a more basic
manner. He stated that the Jewish question had to be solved in a
quick and proper way. Representatives of the Chief of the
Security Police and SD who attended the conference made it clear
to those present that the remaining Jews had to be sent forcibly
to concentration camps or be sterilized. Those present at the
conference must have carried away the impression that the
objectives were the extermination of the Jewish people.”
(_2645-PS_)
The deportation of Jews into concentration camps was part of the program
for slave labor. Jews not fit for work were screened out at
extermination centers, such as Auschwitz, and the remainder were taken
into concentration and work camps. The orders were issued by Himmler and
passed through the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner
(formerly Heydrich) to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, and then to
Eichmann for execution. (_2376-PS_; _1472-PS_.)
In Galicia, the deportation of Jews was carried out during the period
from April 1942 to June 1943. At the end of that time Galicia had been
entirely cleared of Jews. In all, 434,392 Jews were deported from
Galicia alone. In connection with the deportations, Jewish property was
confiscated, including furniture, clothing, money, dental fillings, gold
teeth, wedding rings, and other personal property of all kinds. The
Security Police participated in this action along with other police and
SS detachments. (_L-18_)
In Warsaw the Security Police played a responsible role in the
segregation of the Jews and placing them in the Ghetto, in the
subsequent removal of the Jews to concentration camps, and in the final
clearance of the Ghetto. The Ghetto was established in November of 1940.
Over 300,000 Jews were deported from it between July and October 1942,
and 6,500 more were deported in January 1943. In April and May 1943 the
final clearance of the Ghetto was accomplished under the direction of
the SS and Police Leader of the Warsaw area, and with units of the SIPO,
Waffen SS, Order Police, and some military and Polish police units.
Thousands of Jews were killed in the action. About 7,000 were
transported to “T. II” where they were exterminated. The remaining
40,000 to 45,000 were placed in concentration camps. (_1061-PS_)
In Denmark the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO and SD was ordered in September
of 1943 to arrest all Danish citizens of Jewish belief and send them to
Stettin by ship and from there to the concentration camp at
Theresienstadt. In spite of the protests of the _Kommandeur_ of the SIPO
and SD, Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD gave direct
orders to carry out the anti-Jewish action. Eichmann, head of the Jewish
section in the GESTAPO, had direct charge of the clearance program.
(_2375-PS_)
In Hungary the deportation of Jews was again carried out by Eichmann.
This action took place under direction of the GESTAPO after the German
occupation of Hungary in March 1944. About 450,000 Jews were deported
from Hungary due to the pressure and direction of the GESTAPO.
(_2605-PS_)
(2) _The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of
the churches._ The fight against the churches was never brought out into
the open by the GESTAPO and the SD as in the case of the persecution of
the Jews. The struggle was designed to weaken the churches and to lay a
foundation for the ultimate destruction of the confessional churches
after the end of the war. (_1815-PS_)
Section C2 of the SD dealt with education and religious life. Section B1
of the GESTAPO dealt with political Catholicism. Section B2 with
political Protestantism sects, and Section B3 with other churches and
Freemasonry. (_L-185_)
As early as 1934 the GESTAPO enforced restrictions against the churches.
An order by the State Police of Dusseldorf prohibited the churches from
engaging in public activities, especially public appearances in groups,
sports, hikes, and the establishment of holiday or outdoor camps.
(_R-145_)
In 1934 the Bavarian Political Police placed three ministers in
protective custody for refusing to carry out the order of the Government
to ring church bells on the occasion of the death of Hindenburg.
(_1521-PS_)
The GESTAPO dissolved those church organizations which it considered to
have political objectives. In 1938 the GESTAPO at Munich dissolved by
order the Guild of the Virgin Mary of the Bavarian dioceses. (_1481-PS_)
An insight into the hidden objectives and secret methods of the GESTAPO
and the SD in the fight against the churches is disclosed in the file of
the GESTAPO regional office at Aachen (_1815-PS_). On 12 May 1941 the
Chief of the GESTAPO issued a directive in which he reported that the
Chief of the Security Police and SD had issued an order under which the
treatment of church politics which had theretofore been divided between
the SD and the GESTAPO was to be taken over entirely by the GESTAPO. The
SD “church specialists” were to be temporarily transferred to the same
posts in the GESTAPO and operate an intelligence service in the church
political sphere there. SD files concerning church political opposition
were to be handed over to the GESTAPO, but the SD was to retain material
concerning the confessional influence on the lives of the people.
On 22 and 23 September 1941 a conference of church specialists attached
to GESTAPO regional offices was held in the lecture hall of the RSHA in
Berlin. The notes on the speeches delivered at this conference indicate
that the GESTAPO considered the church as an enemy to be attacked with
determination and “true fanaticism.” The immediate objective of the
GESTAPO was stated to be to insure that the Church did not win back any
lost ground. The ultimate objective was stated to be the destruction of
the confessional churches. This was to be brought about by the
collection of material through the GESTAPO church intelligence system to
be produced at a proper time as evidence for the charge of treasonable
activities during the German fight for existence.
The executive measures to be applied by the GESTAPO were discussed. It
was stated to be impractical to deal with political offenses under
normal legal procedure owing to lack of political perception which
prevailed among the legal authorities. The so-called “agitator-Priests,”
therefore, had to be handled by GESTAPO measures, and when necessary
removed to a concentration camp. The following punishments were to be
applied to priests according to individual circumstances: warning, fine,
forbidden to preach, forbidden to remain in parish, forbidden all
activity as a priest, short-term arrest, protective custody. Retreats,
youth and recreational camps, evening services, processions and
pilgrimages were all to be forbidden on grounds of interfering with the
war effort, blackouts, overburdened transportation, etc.
In executing this program close cooperation was required between the
GESTAPO and the SD. The study and treatment of the Church in its
opposition to the Nazi state was the responsibility of the GESTAPO. The
result of this treatment of the Church in the sphere of “religious life”
remained the province of the SD. By these means the GESTAPO and the SD
carried on the struggle of the Nazi conspirators against the Church.
H. _Conclusion._
The evidence shows that the GESTAPO was created by Goering in Prussia in
April 1933 for the specific purpose of serving as a police agency to
strike down the actual and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime, and
that henceforward the GESTAPO in Prussia and in the other States of the
Reich carried out a program of terror against all who were thought to be
dangerous to the domination of the conspirators over the people of
Germany. Its methods were utterly ruthless. It operated outside the law
and sent its victims to the concentration camps. The term “GESTAPO”
became the symbol of the Nazi regime of force and terror.
Behind the scenes, operating secretly, the SD, through its vast network
of informants, spied upon the German people in their daily lives, on the
streets, in the shops, and even within the sanctity of the churches.
The most casual remark of a German citizen might bring him before the
GESTAPO, where his fate and freedom were decided without recourse to
law. In this government, in which the rule of law was replaced by a
tyrannical rule of men, the GESTAPO was the primary instrumentality of
oppression.
The GESTAPO and the SD played an important part in almost every criminal
act of the conspiracy. The categories of these crimes, apart from the
thousands of specific instances of torture and cruelty in policing
Germany for the benefit of the conspirators, indicate the extent of
GESTAPO and SD complicity.
The GESTAPO and SD fabricated the border incidents which Hitler used as
an excuse for attacking Poland.
Through the _Einsatz_ Groups they murdered approximately 2,000,000
defenseless men, women, and children.
They removed Jews, political leaders, and scientists from prisoner of
war camps and murdered them.
They took recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps and
murdered some of them.
The GESTAPO established and classified concentration camps and sent
millions of people into them for extermination and slave labor.
The GESTAPO cleared Europe of the Jews and was responsible for sending
4,000,000 Jews to their deaths in annihilation camps.
The GESTAPO and SD rounded up hundreds of thousands of citizens of
occupied countries and shipped them to Germany for forced labor, and
sent slave laborers to labor reformatory camps and concentration camps
for disciplining.
They executed captured commandos and paratroopers and protected
civilians who lynched Allied flyers.
They took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial
and punishment.
They arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied territories
under special criminal procedures which did not accord them fair trials,
and by summary methods.
They murdered or sent to concentration camps the relatives of persons
who had allegedly committed crimes.
They ordered the murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons to prevent
their release by the Allied armies.
They participated in the seizure and spoliation of public and private
property.
They were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews and of the
churches.
In carrying out these crimes the GESTAPO operated as an organization,
closely centralized and controlled from Berlin headquarters. Reports
were submitted to Berlin, and all important decisions emanated from
Berlin. The regional offices had only limited power to commit persons to
concentration camps. All cases, other than those of short duration, had
to be submitted to Berlin for approval. From 1943 to the end of the war
the defendant Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD
in Berlin. The GESTAPO was organized on a functional basis. Its
principal divisions dealt with the groups and institutions against which
it committed the worst crimes—Jews, churches, communists, and political
liberals. Thus, in perpetrating these crimes, the GESTAPO acted as an
entity, each section performing its part in the general criminal
enterprises ordered by Berlin. It must be held responsible as an entity.
The SD was at all times a department of the SS. Its criminality directly
concerns and contributes to the criminality of the SS.
As to the GESTAPO, it is submitted that:
1. The GESTAPO is an organization, in the sense in which
that term is used in Article 9 of the Charter.
2. The defendants Goering and Kaltenbrunner committed
the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter in their
capacity as members and leaders of the GESTAPO.
3. The GESTAPO, as an organization, participated in and
aided the conspiracy which contemplated and involved the
commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the
Charter.
In 1941, on German Police Day, Heydrich, the former Chief of the
Security Police and the SD, said:
“Secret State Police, Criminal Police, and SD are still adorned
with the furtive and whispered secrecy of a political detective
story. In a mixture of fear and shuddering—and yet at home with
a certain feeling of security because of their
presence,—brutality, inhumanity bordering on the sadistic, and
ruthlessness are attributed abroad to the men of this
profession.” (Extract from a brochure on Reinhard Heydrich,
published in December 1943.)
The evidence as it is submitted, shows that brutality, inhumanity,
sadism, and ruthlessness were characteristic of the GESTAPO and that it
was and should be declared, a criminal organization, in accordance with
article 9 of the Charter.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GEHEIME
STAATSPOLIZEI (GESTAPO) AND SICHERHEITSDIENST (SD)