“The bureaus named in the distribution list are held

responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed

pieces of the order and copies made thereof.

“The Chief of the High Command of

the Armed Forces

“By order of

“Jodl”

* * * * * *

“I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the

destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare

noncompliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it

necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and

commanders the reasons for this decree.

“As in no previous war, a method of destruction of

communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace

working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important

industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been

developed in this war.”

* * * * * *

“The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary

weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is

cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single

electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the _Luftwaffe_

of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the

construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the

fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the

Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

“Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the

adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at

the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can,

according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they

themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers

or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of

suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at

the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender

and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the

provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however,

that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva

agreements, especially since part of these elements are even

criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate

themselves through these activities.

“England and America will therefore always be able to find

volunteers for this kind of warfare as long as they can

truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life

for them. At worse, all they have to do is to successfully

commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other

installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to

capitulate.

“If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage

through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary

that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without

exception, to the last man.

“This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is

nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that

a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to

be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the

Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly

exterminated.

“The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces

communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage,

terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and

exterminated to the last man.

“I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies

subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only

to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry

out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned

officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported

without fail, or under circumstances when there is danger in

delay to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as

well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to

expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as

well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition

remains secure.

“These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.

“If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to

initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot

immediately after interrogation.

“(signed) A. Hitler” (_503-PS_).

Ten days later, on 28 October 1942, while Raeder was Commander-in-Chief

of the Germany Navy, the Naval War Staff in Berlin transmitted its copy

of the basic order of 18 October to the lower Naval commands. The copy

distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the Naval War

Staff (_C-179_) shows clearly the secrecy which surrounded the

dissemination of this order:

“Enclosed pleased find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of

terror and sabotage units.

“This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla

leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

“After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above

authorities must hand this order over to the next highest

section which is responsible for its confiscation and

destruction.

“(s) Wagner” (_C-179_).

* * * * *

“_Note for Distribution_:

“These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the

battalions and corresponding staffs of the other services. After

notification, those copies distributed over and above the

Regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must

be withdrawn and destroyed.” (_C-179_)

On 11 February 1943, just twelve days after Doenitz had become

Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, the Naval War Staff promulgated a

further memorandum on this subject in order to clear up certain

misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October 1942

(_C-178_). It was stated in this subsequent memorandum that all

commanders and officers who neglected their duty in failing to instruct

their units concerning the order would run the risk of serious court

martial penalties:

“From the notice given by 3/SKL [Naval War Staff] on February

1st 43, it has been discovered that the competent departments of

the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force

Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment

of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at 3/SKL proved that this

Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of

this situation, reference is made to figure _6_ of the Fuehrer

order of October 18, 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 26

367/42 Top Secret of October 28, 42) according to which all

commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in

instructing their units about the order referring to treatment

of saboteurs, are threatened with punishment by court martial.

“The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18,

42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 2108/42 Top Secret of

October 27, 42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely

because it is stated therein:

“1. That, according to the Fuehrer’s views the spreading of

military sabotage organizations in the East _and_ West may have

portentous consequences for our whole conduct of the war and

“2. That the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military

orders must be carried out even _after_ they have surrendered

voluntarily and asked for pardon.

“On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle

is not at all to be kept secret but on the contrary to be

currently published in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed

Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a

deterrent, will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy

‘Commando Operations’ would not learn that certain death and not

safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be

annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first

needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all

members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these

types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be

annihilated, but also all departments of the home staff, dealing

with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of

action which has been ordered.” (_C-178_)

The Hitler order of October 1942 was actually carried out in a number of

instances. During the night of the 19-20 November 1942, a British

freight glider crashed near Egersund in Norway. The glider carried a

British commando unit of 17 men, of whom 3 were apparently killed in the

crash. All were in English uniform. The 14 survivors were executed in

accordance with the Hitler order in the evening of 20 November 1942. The

proof is contained in the following document (_508-PS_):

“1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a

British freight glider at Hegers and in the night of November

20:

“a. No firing on the part of German defense.

“b. The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed the ground, 7 man

crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the

17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer

order has been carried out.”

* * * * * *

“On November 20, 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 Km NE

of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of

wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are

severely, the others slightly wounded.

“All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia.

Furthermore following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skis

and radio sender, exact number is unknown. The glider carried

rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown.

At present the prisoners are with the Bn. in Egersund.”

* * * * * *

“Beside the 17 member crew extensive sabotage material and work

equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was

absolutely proved. The 280th Inf. Div. (J.D.) ordered the

execution of the action according to the Fuehrer’s order. The

execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of

the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms

which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short

interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their

names, ranks and serial numbers.”

* * * * * *

“In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew,

the Armed Forces Commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order

to the district commanders, according to which the interrogation

by G-2 (Ic) and by BDS are important before the execution of the

Fuehrer order; in case of No. 4 of the Fuehrer order the

prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS.” (_508-PS_)

In three specific instances the Hitler order was carried out in Norway

(_512-PS_). The procedure was to take individual commandos prisoner and

interrogate them to extract military intelligence before executing them.

This procedure was in accordance with the last sentence of Hitler’s

supplementary order (_503-PS_), and is obviously in flat contradiction

of the requirements of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The reason for

this procedure is explained as follows:

“_TOP SECRET_—According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer

order of 18th October (_CHEFS_), individual saboteurs can be

spared for the time being in order to keep them for

interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the

cases of Glomfjord, Twoman torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane

Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge

of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur

was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore,

Armed Forces Commander (WB) referred to above mentioned (OA)

last sentence of the Fuehrer order (Liquidation only after short

interrogation).” (_512-PS_)

Another instance from the Norwegian theater of war (_526-PS_): On 30

March 1943, 10 Norwegian navy personnel were taken prisoner from a

Norwegian cutter at Toftefjord. The 10 prisoners were executed by the SD

in accordance with the Hitler order, but the published report announced

only that the unit was destroyed:

“On the 30.3 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was

sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10

prisoners.

“Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian

Navy.”

* * * * * *

“_Purpose_: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of

strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and

bridges.

“_Assigner of Mission in London_: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.

“Fuehrer order executed by S.D. (security service).

“_Wehrmacht Report_ of 6.4 announces the following about it:

“In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and

destroyed on approaching the coast.” (_526-PS_)

Similar action took place in the Italian theater. A telegram (_509-PS_)

from the Supreme Commander in Italy to OKW, dated 7 November 1943, shows

that on 2 November 1943 three British commandos captured at Pascara,

Italy, were given “special treatment” (_Sonderbehandelt_), which, as

previous evidence has shown, (_3040-PS_) means death. What happened to

the remaining nine prisoners of war who were wounded and in the hospital

is not known. (_509-PS_)

An affidavit (_2610-PS_) dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche, a

Major in the Army of the United States, furnishes other evidence of the

carrying out of the Hitler order. Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of

an American Military Commission which tried General Anton Dostler,

formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful

execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. His affidavit

states:

“FREDERICK W. ROCHE being duly sworn deposes and says:

“I am a Major in the Army of the United States.

“I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried

Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of fifteen

United States Army personnel who comprised the ‘Ginny Mission.’

This Military Commission consisting of five officers was

appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Orders No.

269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean

Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512.

“The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945

and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States v.

Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed four days and the

findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12

October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are as

follows:

“‘Charge: Violation of the law of war.’

“‘Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then General, commanding

military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation,

to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in

the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war,

order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army

personnel, consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted men

who had then recently been captured by forces under General

Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about 26

March 1944, resulting in the death of the said fifteen members

of the Army of the United States identified as follows * * *’.”

* * * * * *

“I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the

testimony, and I am familiar with the record in this case. The

facts developed in this proceeding are as follows: On the night

of 22 March 1944, two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the

2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the

United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and

landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All

fifteen men were members of the Army of the United States and

were in the military service of the United States. When they

landed on the Italian coast they were all properly dressed in

the field uniform of the United States Army and they carried no

civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad

tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail

line was being used by the German Forces to supply their

fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead fronts. The

entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a

patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of

the German Army. All fifteen men were placed under interrogation

in La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning of

26 March 1944 when they were all executed by a firing squad.

These men were never tried nor were they brought before any

court or given any hearing; they were shot by order of Anton

Dostler, then General Commanding the 75th German Army Corps.

“Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified by way

of defense that he ordered the fifteen American soldiers to be

shot pursuant to the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 on commando

operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and

not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been

interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject

to court martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler

order.

“The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in

the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler, as these

findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial

and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy on 12

October 1945:

“‘_FINDINGS_: General Dostler, as president of this commission it is

my duty to inform you that the commission in closed

session and upon secret written ballot, at least

two-thirds of all the members of the commission

concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the

specification and of the charge:

“‘GUILTY’.

“‘SENTENCE: And again in closed session and upon secret written

ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of

the commission concurring, sentences you:

“‘TO BE SHOT TO DEATH BY MUSKETRY’.” (_2610-PS_)

The order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as the evidence

shows, until the end of the war. On 22 June 1944 in a document initialed

by Warlimont (_506-PS_) the OKW made it clear that the Hitler order was

to be applied even in cases where the commando operation was undertaken

by only one person:

“WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group

judge [_Heeresgruppenrichter_] with the Supreme Commander

Southwest of 20 May 44 (Br. B. Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order

is to be applied even if the enemy employs only _one_ person for

a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several

persons or a single person take part in a commando operation.

The reason for the special treatment of participants in a

commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to

the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.”

(_506-PS_)

The allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course of

which large scale air-borne operations took place, raised among the

Germans the question as to how far the Hitler order would be applied to

Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. A memorandum (_531-PS_)

dated 23 June 1944 and signed by Warlimont, starts by quoting a teletype

from the Supreme Command in the West inquiring what should be done about

applying the Hitler order to air-borne troops and commandos:

“Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No. 1750/44

Top Secret of 23 June 44:

“The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried

out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale

landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred

to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken

prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal

combat operations (large-scale landing operations and

undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and

4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the

troops how far the concept ‘within the limits of normal combat

operations, etc.’ is to be extended.

“The application of number 5 for all enemy _soldiers in uniform_

penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is

held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest

solution.” (_531-PS_)

Warlimont’s memorandum (_531-PS_) continues by reciting the position

taken with reference to the request by the OKW Operations Staff, of

which Warlimont was the Deputy Chief:

“_Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff_:

“1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after

the enemy landing in the west.

“2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that

the order is not valid for _those_ enemy soldiers in uniform,

who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of

the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender.

Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the

divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to

and including corps headquarters.

“3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have

fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD,

upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the Commando

order is to be applied or not.

“4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units

committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner

with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando

undertakings of 18 Oct. 42 along with the above explanation.”

(_531-PS_)

On 25 June 1944 the OKW replied to this inquiry in a teletype message

(_551-PS_) signed by Keitel and initialed by Warlimont and Jodl:

“_Subject_: Treatment of Commando Participants.

“1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the

order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage

units of 18 Oct. 1942 remains fully in force.

“Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the

bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in

the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the

Corps Commands, according to No. 5 of the basic order of 18 Oct.

1942, remain exempted.

“2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the

immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all

parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they

are to be turned over to the SD.

“3. All troops, committed outside the combat area of Normandy,

are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and

sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the

directives, issued for it.

“4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily, how

many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies

especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The

number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces Communique

to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done

toward previous commando undertakings in the same manners.”

“[Initial] W [Warlimont]

“[signature] Keitel (_551-PS_).

In July 1944, the question was raised within the German High Command as

to whether the order of October 1942 should be applied to members of

foreign military missions, with special regard to the British, American,

and Soviet military missions which were cooperating with allied forces

in Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by

Warlimont (_1279-PS_) embodies the discussions which were had at that

time at OKW. It discloses that the Armed Forces Operational Staff

recommended that the order should be applied to these military missions

and drew up a draft order to this effect. The order which actually

resulted from these discussions (_537-PS_), dated 30 July 1944 and

signed by Keitel, provides:

“_Re: Treatment of members of foreign ‘Military Missions,’

captured together with partisans._

“In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest

members of foreign so-called ‘Military Missions’ (Anglo-American

as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the

struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as

speculated in the Special Orders regarding the treatment of

captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs

but in conformity with the Fuehrer’s order re the elimination of

terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt.

003830/42 g. Kdos).

“This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the Armed

forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be

destroyed after being made record.

“The Chief of the High Command of the _Wehrmacht_

“Keitel” (_537-PS_)

Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an allied military

mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945. An affidavit (_L-51_)

signed by one Adolf Zutter, who was the adjutant at the camp where the

executions took place, reads in part:

“Concerning the American Military Mission which had landed

behind the German main line of resistance in Slovakian or

Hungarian territory in January 1945, I remember when in January

1945 it was brought to the concentration camp at Mauthausen. I

suppose there were about 12 to 15 newcomers. They wore an

American or Canadian uniform, of brown-green color, blouse, and

cap made of cloth. Eight or ten days after their arrival the

order for execution came in by radiogram or teletype. Colonel

Ziereis came to me in the office and said: now Kaltenbrunner has

authorized the execution. The letter was secret and had the

signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. These people were then shot

according to martial law and T/Sgt [_Oberscharfuehrer_]

Niedermeyer handed their belongings over to me. In spring 1945,

a written order based on an Army manual to destroy all files was

received by the security officer in Mauthausen, 1st Lt.

[_Obersturmfuehrer_] Reimer; this order had been sent by Lt.

[_Untersturmfuehrer_] Meinhardt, security officer of Section D

in Oranienburg. Reimer forwarded this order personally in

written form to the various sections and supervised the

compliance with it. Among the files were also all the execution

orders.” (_L-51_)

The foregoing documents with respect to the order of 18 October 1942,

and its subsequent enforcement and application, clearly demonstrate that

members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the

defendants Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder, ordered and directed the

commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, and that

these orders were carried out in numerous instances.

(_b_) _War Crimes on the Eastern Front._ The order of October 1942 with

respect to the murdering of captured commandos operated chiefly in the

Western theater of war, against British and American commando troops.

This was natural since Germany occupied almost the entire Western coast

of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that

period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando

operations. The Mediterranean Theater likewise lent itself to this type

of warfare.

On the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in

Poland and the Soviet Union from 1941 on, the German forces were

fighting amongst a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan

activities behind their lines. It will be shown that the activities of

the German Armed Forces against partisans and other elements of the

population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial

policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and barbaric massacre of Jews and

of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by the

Nazis as undesirable. It was the policy of the German Armed Forces to

behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the

occupied territories, and to conduct its military operations,

particularly against partisans, so as to further these Nazi policies. It

will be shown that the German Armed Forces supported, assisted, and

acted in cooperation with the SS Groups which were especially charged

with anti-partisan activities. Members of the General Staff and High

Command Group ordered, directed, encouraged, and were fully aware of

these criminal policies and activities.

It is not proposed to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes

committed by the Nazis on the Eastern Front; evidence of those crimes

are to be presented by the Soviet delegation. Evidence concerning the

activities of the SS, SD, and Gestapo will be discussed only to the

extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations

and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration

in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.

These policies of ruthless severity to the civilian population of the

occupied Eastern territories were determined upon and made official for

the German Armed Forces even before the invasion of the Soviet Union

took place. An order by Hitler, dated 13 May 1941, and signed by Keitel

as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (_C-50_) provided:

“_Order_

“_Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and PROCEDURE

IN THE AREA ‘Barbarossa’ and special military measures._

“The application of martial law aims in the first place at

_maintaining discipline_.

“The fact that the operational areas in the East are so

farflung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the

peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial

with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve

while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of

pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless

jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main

task.

“This is possible only if _the troops_ take ruthless action

themselves against any threat from the enemy population.

“For these reasons I herewith issue the following order

effective for the area ‘Barbarossa’ (area of operations, army

rear area, and area of political administration).

“I. _Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians._

“1. Until further notice the military courts and the

courts-martial will not be competent for _crimes committed by

enemy civilians_.

“2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military,

whether they are fighting or in flight.

“3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed

Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once

by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the

assailants are destroyed.

“4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first

possible, _persons suspected of criminal action will be brought

at once before an officer_. _This officer will decide whether

they are to be shot._

“On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a

Battalion Commander, _collective despotic measures_ will be

taken without delay against _localities_ from which cunning or

malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances

do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.

“5. It is _expressly forbidden_ to _keep_ suspects _in custody_

in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement

of civil courts.

“6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the

competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce _military

jurisdiction for civilians_, in areas which are sufficiently

settled.

“For the _area of the_ ‘_Political Administration_’ this order

will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed

Forces.

“II. _Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by

members of the Armed Forces and its employees._

“1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by

members of the Wehrmacht and its employees _prosecution is not

obligatory_ even where the deed is at the same time a military

crime or offence.

“2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind,

whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in

1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the

fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of

innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by

Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

“3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases

whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether _legal

measures_ are necessary. In the case of offences against

inhabitants it will order a _court martial_ only if _maintenance

of discipline_ or _security of the Forces_ call for such a

measure. This applies for instance to serious offences

originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a

criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the

troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have

resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other

captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a

rule be judged no less severely.

“_The order to institute proceedings_ requires in every single

case the signature of the Judicial Authority.

“4. _Extreme caution_ is indicated in assessing the credibility

of statements made by enemy civilians.

“III. _Responsibility of the Military Commanders._

“Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are

_personally_ responsible for seeing that:

“1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command

is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on

principles set out under I above.

“2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these

instructions and of _verbal information in which the political

intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs_.

“3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in

accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.

“IV. _Security._

Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as

“Most Secret”:

“By order

“Chief of the Supreme Command

of the Armed Forces

“(signed) Keitel” (_C-50_)

Less than three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, these

instructions were amplified and made even more drastic. An order dated

16 September 1941 and signed by Keitel, was widely distributed

(_C-148_). This order was of general application in all theaters of war,

but was clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front:

“_Subject_: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.

“1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia,

Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in

the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is

growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual

members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread

guerilla warfare.

“It can be seen that this is a _mass movement centrally directed

by Moscow_, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial

isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise

quiet.

“In view of the many political and economic crises in the

occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that

_nationalist and other circles_ will make full use of this

opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying

forces by associating themselves with the Communist

insurrection.

“This creates an increasing _danger to the German war effort_,

which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the

occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of

forces to the main centers of disturbance.

“2. _The measures taken up to now_ to deal with general

insurrection movement _have proved inadequate_. The Fuehrer has

now given orders that we take action _everywhere with the most

drastic means_ in order to crush the movement in the shortest

possible time.

“Only this course, which has always been followed successfully

throughout the history of the extension of influence of great

peoples, can restore order.

“3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the

following _general directions_:

“_a._ It should be inferred, in _every case_ of resistance to

the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual

circumstances, that it is of _Communist origin_.

“_b._ In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most

drastic measures should be taken immediately on _the first

indication_, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may

be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this

connection it should be remembered that a human life in

unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a

deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The

death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded

in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier’s

life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still

further increase the deterrent effect.

“The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively

lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of

deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not

accord with these principles and should therefore not be

followed.”

* * * * * *

“4. _The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories_ are

seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay

to all military establishments concerned in dealing with

Communist measures of insurrection.”

“[Indecipherable initial]

“Keitel” (_C-148_)

The German military leaders took up, sponsored, and instructed their

troops to practice the racial policies of the Nazis. On 10 October 1941

a directive was issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau, the

Commander-in-Chief (_Oberbefehlshaber_) of the German 8th Army, then

operating on the Eastern Front (_UK-81_). Reichenau (who died in 1942)

was therefore a member of the group, and here is what he had to say:

“Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

“Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic

system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most

essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a

complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination

of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this

connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the

one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern

territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of

the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology

and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon

German and racially related nations.

“Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the

necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The

Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilation of

revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always

been caused by Jews.

“The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not

being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and

unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and

guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes

and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and

sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian

officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly

about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens.

Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete

thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to

clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

“The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not

working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally

misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes

and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great

sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to

the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the

enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It

is an important part of our supply.

“When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire.

The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only

as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of

billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former

bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the

struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic

considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories.

The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of

raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The

complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the

fighting troops is imperative considering the long and

vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured

weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this

be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the

weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated

partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army

drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be

extended to that part of the male population who were in a

position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of

numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a

‘wait and see’ attitude, must give way to a clear decision for

active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being

judges and treated a member of the Soviet System.

“The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than

the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far

from all political considerations of the future the soldier has

to fulfill two tasks:

“1. _Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of

the Soviet State and its armed forces._

“2. _The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty

and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in

Russia._

“This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate

the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.

“Commander-in-Chief

“(Signed) von Reichenau

“Field Marshal.” (_UK-81_)

Immediately preceding Reichenau’s order is a memorandum, dated 28

October 1941, which shows that Reichenau’s order met with Hitler’s

approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the

Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. It is also clear that Reichenau’s

order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was

received by the 12th Infantry Division on 27 November 1941. (_UK-81_)

These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German

military leaders, it is no wonder that the _Wehrmacht_ joined in the

monstrous behavior of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front. Units (known

as _Einsatzgruppen_) were formed by the SIPO and SD and sent out to

operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in

order to combat partisans and to “cleanse” and “pacify” the civilian

population.

In a directive dated 19 March 1943, the Commanding Officer of one of

these units praised and justified such activities as the shooting of

Hungarian Jews, the shooting of children, and the total burning down of

villages (_3012-PS_). The officer directed that in order not to obstruct

the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry,

“as a rule no more children will be shot” (_3012-PS_).

A report covering the work of the _Einsatzgruppen_ in the German

occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October

1941 disregards every vestige of decency (_R-102_). It states cynically

that, in the Baltic areas,

“spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on

the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not

been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate

indoctrination” (_R-102_).

This report shows clearly that “pacification” and “anti-partisan

activity” are mere code words for “extermination of Jews and Slavs” just

as much as “_Weserubung_” was a code word for the invasion and

subjugation of Norway and Denmark.

Documents quoted earlier show that the German Army was operating under

similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that, in these

practices, the Army and the SS worked hand in glove. The report

describing the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto (_1061-PS_) stresses the

close cooperation between the SS and the Army:

“The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the

_Waffen SS_, Police and _Wehrmacht_ became; they fulfilled their

duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as

models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted

from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols

with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the

Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and

killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their

stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring

groups or exchanging news with them.” (1061-PS)

To the same general effect is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German

General Commissioner for Minsk (_R-135_). This report describes an

anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 “enemies” were killed, 5,000

suspected partisans were killed, and 59 Germans were killed. The

cooperation in this adventure by the German Army is shown in the

following excerpt:

“The above mentioned figures show, that we have to count with a

strong annihilation of the population. The fact that only 492

rifles were found on the 4,500 enemy dead, demonstrates that the

numerous peasants from the country were also among the enemy

dead. The battalion _Direwanger_ is particularly known to have

destroyed numerous human lives. Among the 5,000 partisan

suspects who were shot, are numerous women and children.

“Units of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_] also took part in the

action, by order of SS Lt. General [_Obergruppenfuehrer_] von

dem Bach. SA Colonel [_Standartenfuehrer_] Kunze led the troops

[Wehrmannschaften], who included also 90 members of my authority

and of the district-commissarate Minsk-Stadt. Our men returned

yesterday from the action without any losses. I refuse the use

of officials and Reich-Employees of the General Commissarate in

the rear areas. The men who work for me have not been classified

as essential, after all in order to fight the partisans actively

in the place of the Armed Forces and the Police.

“Of the troops [_Wehrmannschaften_], one railroad employee had

been wounded (shot through the lung). The political effect of

this large scale action on the peaceful population had been

disastrous, because of the numerous executions of women and

children. The town BEGOMIE was cleared by the Armed Forces and

the Police in December. The population of Begomie was

predominantly favorable to us. Begomie, which has been fortified

as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German

Air Attacks during the fighting.” (_R-135_)

The _SS Obergruppenfuehrer_ von dem Bach referred to in this quotation

is mentioned in Himmler’s speech to a gathering of SS generals at Posen

on 4 October 1943 (_1919-PS_). In this speech Himmler announced the

appointment of von dem Bach to be Chief of all anti-partisan units:

“In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of

the Anti-partisan Units” [_Bandenkampf-Verbunde_]. Our comrade

_SS-Obergruppenfuehrer_ von dem Bach is Chief of the

anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the

Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these

battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to

take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly

political one. Except where the units which had been supplied

and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to

fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.

“It is notable that, by setting up this department we have

gained (p. 58) for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army,

and the next step, which is the High Command of an army or even

of a group—if you wish to call it that.” _(1919-PS_)

The report of _Einsatzgruppe A_, (_L-180_) covering the period up to 15

October 1941, makes clear beyond doubt the participation of the German

military leaders and Armed Forces in these extermination policies:

“Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action

proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June

1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group

North consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4

had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish

personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the

commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from

the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was

generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4

under Col. Gen. Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial.

Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the

first days, were cleared up mainly through personal

discussions.”

* * * * * *

“Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start

pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture,

though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following

out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the

Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But

it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an

immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the

extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German

circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native

population itself took the first action by way of natural

reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades

and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the

preceding period.”

* * * * * *

“After the failure of purely military activities such as the

placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied

territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to

look out for new methods. The Action-Group undertook to search

for new methods. Soon therefore the Armed Forces adopted the

experiences of the Security Police and their methods of

combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous

reports concerning the struggle against the partisans.”

* * * * * *

“1. _Instigation of self-cleansing actions._

“Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had

suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and

Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be

expected that after the liberation from that foreign government,

they (i.e., the population themselves) would render harmless

most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red

Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion

these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the

correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the

cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less

important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and

provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the

most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy

quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities

could not be found out.

“In Lithouania this was achieved for the first time by partisan

activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to

set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the

leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for

this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the

basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment

acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or

German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the

first pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithouanian

partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to

several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned

down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses.

During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless

in a similar way. In other parts of Lithouania similar actions

followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to

the Communists who had been left behind.

“These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army

authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this

procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first

days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for

carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the

self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.

“It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar

cleansing actions in _Latvia_. Essentially the reason was that

the whole of the national stratum of leaders had been

assassinated or destroyed by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It

was possible though through similar influences on the Latvian

auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga.

During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400

Jews were killed. As the population of Riga quieted down

quickly, further pogroms were not convenient.”

* * * * * *

“5. _Other jobs of the Security Police._

“1. Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic

asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many

institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their

whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had

fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a

danger to the general security; therefore

in Aglona (Lithouania) 544 lunatics

in Mariampol (Lithouania) 109 lunatics and

in Magutowo (near Luga)  95 lunatics

were liquidated.”

* * * * * *

“When it was decided to extend the German operations to

Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to

this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action

Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to

Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able

to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad

and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action

Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was

effected in agreement with and on the express wish of

Panzer-Group 4.”

* * * * * *

“Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police

participated from the beginning in the fight against the

nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the

Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were

collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a

thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength,

equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on.”

(_L-180_).

Certain affidavits, furnished by responsible officials in both the

_Wehrmacht_ and the SS, fill in much of the background for the documents

quoted above. An affidavit (_3710-PS_) by Walter Schellenberg who, at

the time under discussion, was an important official in the RSHA,

states:

“In the middle of May 1941, as far as I remember, the Chief of

Amt 4 of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of

the Chief of the RSHA (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held

discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General

Wagner) about questions connected with the operations of the

SIPO and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the

imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no

agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send

another representative. I was at that time Chief of Section E in

Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt Mueller and was sent by

Heydrich to Wagner because of my experience in matters of

protocol for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement.

According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to

make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible

headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give

complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and

Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD. I discussed the problem of

this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In

accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the

completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full

approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final

discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May

1941.

“The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were

substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer’s command,

mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO

and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field

Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in

conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply

zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various

areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be

active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then

assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the

campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective

armies which were to take part in the campaign.

“The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in

detail:

“1. In front-line areas: in complete subordination to the Field

Army, tactically, functionally and administratively;

“2. In rear operational areas: in merely administrative

subordination to the Field Army, but under command and

functional control of the RSHA;

“3. In rear Army areas: arrangement as in 2;

“4. In areas of the civil administration in the East: same as in

the Reich.

“The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of

front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat

Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore

needed no further clarification.

“The agreement made it clear that the administrative

subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but

also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to

support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of

supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the

communications network.

“This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my

presence. Wagner signed it either ‘acting for’ or ‘by order of’

the OKH.

“After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both of

them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while

leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete

privacy the Fuehrer’s command, which was apparently known in

advance by each of them personally, and its far-reaching

implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once

more just to say goodbye.

“Today I read the ‘Operational and Situational Report No. 6 of

the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the

period from 1 to 31 October 1941),’ as well as the

‘Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941.’

The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime

mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO

and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews,

Communists and other elements of resistance. It is also clear

from the above-cited ‘Comprehensive Report,’ which embraces no

more than the first four months of these operations, that the

cooperation of the respective _Oberbefehlshabers_ with Combat

Group A was ‘in general good and in individual instances, for

instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner,

very close, in fact almost cordial’ (page 1). From an inclosure

to this same report, bearing the title ‘Summary of the Number of

Executed Persons,’ particularly from the figures arranged

according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident

that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as fully to

carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of

all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the

advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and

authenticity of both of the above cited reports. Therefore I

must today express my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers

of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the

Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH

channels of communication about the extensive future mission of

the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as

including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists and all

other elements of resistance.

“In the beginning of June 1941 all of the Ic

counter-intelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of

the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps and some

of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian

campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and

the Chief of the Amt for Counter-Intelligence Abroad in the OKW

(Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building

at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the Combat Groups and

Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part

likewise present. I was also there. The essential substance and

purpose of this meeting was to outline the military strategy

against Russia and to announce the above-mentioned details of

the written agreement reached by Wagner and Heydrich.

“This group of Ic counter-intelligence officers and Ic officers

remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully

instructed in several additional conferences, at which I was not

present, about further details of the coming Russian campaign. I

assume that these discussions were concerned with the exact

delineation of the Fuehrer’s command ‘to smash utterly all

resistance in occupied areas by every means and as quickly as

possible,’ including even planned mass executions of all

elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation between the

Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the above-cited

documents is clearly revealed as existing but a few weeks

thereafter, could not in my opinion have been forthcoming. In

any event there is hardly any reason to doubt that these Ic

counter-intelligence officers, immediately upon their return

from Berlin, accurately informed their own superiors, including

all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were

to march against Russia, about the full extent of the

agreement.”

“(signed) Walter Schellenberg

“26. XI. 45” (_3710-PS_)

Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between the

_Wehrmacht_ and the SS at the top level with respect to anti-partisan

warfare (_3711-PS_) is sworn to by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of

the German Army who worked in the War History Section of OKW from 1941

to 1945:

“I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the

OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.

“Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I

remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the

Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in

the Fuehrer’s headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the

Fuehrer’s appointee for the compilation of the history of the

war.

“Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of

Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to

handle this matter.

“In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan warfare

developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW

had to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations

Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific officer

was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his

special job. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations

against the partisans with _Wehrmacht_ troops in Russian as well

as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while

threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport

routes that were necessary to support the German _Wehrmacht_.

For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the

railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian

area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during

that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to

300 locomotives.

“It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted

with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known that

reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose

inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting

them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been

known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW

and in the Army’s General Staff. It was further well-known that

Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting

counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as

deterrents.

“I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw,

SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian

and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade

Kaminski, which fought on the German side.”

“(Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt

“Retired Captain of the Reserve” (_3711-PS_)

The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were made between

the OKW, OKH and Himmler’s headquarters with respect to anti-partisan

warfare. They show conclusively that the plans and arrangements were

made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only

fully aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same is

true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who attained the rank

of General of Panzer Troops (the equivalent of a Lt. General in the

American Army), has made three statements (_3713-PS_; _3714-PS_).

Roettiger was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army

Group Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:

“As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943,

to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had

occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan

warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from

the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the

harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of

the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security

battalions.

“At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued

through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In

accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents

were delivered up to the SD.

“The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very

high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which

have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order

from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the

anti-partisan war can have been intended to make possible a

ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by

using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against

the partisans.” (_3713-PS_)

Roettiger’s second statement reads:

“Supplementary to my above declaration I declare:

“As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-in-Chief

of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage

war against the partisans more severely than was required at the

time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the

annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a

surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily

had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them

could very well be used as members of native volunteer units

against the partisans.

“Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there

was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the

population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them

to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the

women too were continually urged to get their men back from the

forests or to keep them by other means from joining the

partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring

of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of

partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time

were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the

area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was

obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give

up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.

“(signed) Roettiger” (_3713-PS_)

Roettiger’s third statement reads:

“During my period of service in 1942/3 as chief of staff of the

4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in

the beginning, apparently for the purpose of

counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear

that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the

local civilian population with the result that my commanding

officer therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army

group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear

out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The

reason for this first and foremost was that the excesses of the

SD units by way of execution of Jews and other persons assumed

such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its

combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace. Although

in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and

appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest

military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as

possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops.

“(Signed) Roettiger” (_3714-PS_)

An extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces

Operational Staff (Warlimont), dated 14 March 1943, deals with the

problem of shipping off suspected partisans to concentration camps in

Germany (_1786-PS_). It appears clearly from this extract that the Army

was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment

for suspected partisans, without at the same time obstructing the

procurement of labor from the occupied territories:

“The General Quartermaster [_General Quartiermeister_] together

with the Economic Staff (East) [_Wirtschaftsstab Ost_] has

proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison

camps or to ‘training centres in their own area,’ and that

deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees

are on probation and in less serious cases.

“In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff

[_Wehrmachtfuehrungstab_] this proposal does not take sufficient

account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with

the treatment meted out to the ‘peaceful population’ which has

been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation

to concentration camps in Germany which have already been

introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he

is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [_Wehrmacht_] in

the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High

Command of the Armed Forces [_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_]

therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not

to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS

and Police Leader [_Hoehrer SS und Polizeifuehrer_] and orders

that the difference between ‘punitive work’ and ‘work in

Germany’ is to be made clear to the population.” (_1786-PS_)

A final group of four affidavits show that the SD _Einsatzgruppen_ on

the Eastern Front operated under the command and with the necessary

support of the _Wehrmacht_, and that the nature of their activities were

fully known to the _Wehrmacht_. The first of these is a statement

(_3715-PS_) by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor

of the Police, and was head of Himmler’s personal command staff from

1943 to 1945:

STATEMENT

“I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Command Staff of the

Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring

of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt

Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the

Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish forces necessary for

anti-partisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to

guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through

personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations

Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General

von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler,

General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg

and Colonel v. Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under

the sole command of the respective Army commander-in-chief in

operational areas (for instance in the Central Army Group under

Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch) and since police troops for

the most part could not be spared from the Reichscommissariates,

the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in

the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by

Himmler but by the OKH. SS and police troops transferred to

operational areas from the Reichscommissariates to support the

army groups were likewise under the latter’s command. Such

transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the

Reichscommissariates. According to a specific agreement between

Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay

in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop

contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could

have SS and police under him, and on the other hand that army

troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police.

Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be

ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it,

until 1944 mostly through the intervention of

Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary

Ganzenmueller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the

army groups concerned, for compliance.

“The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically

diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had

already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for

its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops

through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops

as well as to those of the SS and police. There was absolutely

no difference in the manner in which these two components

carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as

embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police. As a

result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out

by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with

Himmler’s desires or intentions. As proof of this the order of

the OKW and OKH can be adduced, which directed that all captured

partisans, for instance such as Jews, agents and political

commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to

the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the

provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the

above named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on

by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the

result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with

General Herzog, Commander of the XXXVIII Army Corps and with his

chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg in the General Staff, both of

whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that

anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the

systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.

“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (_3715-PS_)

Another and shorter statement by Rode reads:

“As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army

groups were _completely subordinate_ to them, that is to say

tactically as well as in every other way. The

commanders-in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the

missions and operational methods of these units. They approved

of these missions and operational methods because apparently

they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews,

agents and commissars, who were handed over to the SD underwent

the same cruel death, as victims of so-called ‘purifications,’

is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also

corresponded with what the highest political and military

authorities wanted. Frequent mention of these methods were

naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were

condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were

condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always

pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of

the authority of the commanders-in-chief of army groups to

oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an

energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have

resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they

should ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by

even more ruthless commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion,

would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.

“(Signed) Ernst Rode” (_3716-PS_)

In an affidavit by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who at the beginning of

the Russian campaign was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division,

the following statement is made:

“At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the first

General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the

mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk.

Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received

through channels from the OKW a written order of the Fuehrer.

This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon

capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly.

This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although

the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the

Commanding General of the XXXVII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer

Troops Lemelsen) forbade its being passed on to the troops

because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral

points of view.

“(Signed) Bogislav v. Bonin

“Colonel” (_3718-PS_)

Finally an affidavit (_3717-PS_) by Heusinger, who was a Generalleutnant

in the German Army, and who from 1940 to 1944 was Chief of the

Operations Section at OKH, states as follows:

“1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I

was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn

1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.

“When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to

the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of

advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.

“This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army

responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the

east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the

operational areas, for instance, all troops (security units, SS

units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariates.

“All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also

subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to

transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done

by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand,

corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered

by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General

Staff of the Army.

“The high SS and police leaders normally had command of

operations against partisans. If stronger army units were

committed together with the SS and police units within

operational areas, a high commander of the army could be

designated commander of the operation.

“During anti-partisan operations _within_ operational areas all

forces committed for these operations were under the command of

the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.

“2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on

counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW (Keitel) to

the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with

Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of

these orders to army groups, for instance such orders as those

concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and

communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts

martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the

population, as well as those establishing the basic principles

governing reprisals against the inhabitants.

“3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the

treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare

in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was

the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.

“4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of

the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare

in operational areas presented the highest political and

military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out

their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and

Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these

cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to

make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.

“(Signed) Heusinger

“Generalleutnant.” (_3717-PS_)

(At this point, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was called upon for oral

testimony. His testimony on direct examination was substantially to the

same effect as his affidavit _3712-PS_.)

(_c_) _Responsibility of the Group for War Crimes and Crimes Against

Humanity: Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment._ The foregoing evidence

against the General Staff and High Command Group is such that no German

soldier can view it with anything but shame. The German High Command

developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and

paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the

Western Front. On the Eastern Front it descended to savagery. In advance

of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command ordered the

troops to take “ruthless action”, left it to the discretion of any

officer to decide whether suspected civilians should be immediately

shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a Battalion Commander

to take “collective despotic measures” against localities. Offenses

committed against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not

required to be prosecuted, and prosecution was suggested only where

desirable in order to maintain discipline and security from a military

standpoint.

Soon after the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were told by

the OKW that “a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for

nothing” and were encouraged to observe a punitive ratio of 50 to 100

Communists for one German soldier. German troops were told that they

were to take “revenge on sub-human Jewry” and that they were not merely

soldiers but “bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of

bestialities”. The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler

jointly planned the establishment of the _Einsatzgruppen_, the behavior

of which has been shown in detail. These groups when in operational

areas were under the command of the German Army, and German soldiers

joined in their savagery. The _Einsatzgruppen_ were completely dependent

upon the Armed Forces for supplies with which to carry out their

atrocities. The practices employed against the civilian population and

against partisans were well known to all high ranking German officers on

the Eastern Front. No doubt some of them disapproved of what was going

on. Nonetheless, the full support of the military leaders continued to

be given to these activities.

The record is clear that the General Staff and High Command Group,

including the defendants, who were members of the Group and numerous

other members ordered, directed, and participated in war crimes and

crimes against humanity as specified in counts 3 and 4 of the

Indictment.

C. _Conclusion._

The world must bear in mind that the German High Command is not an

evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of

thought or tradition which is shattered or utterly discredited. The

German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved

victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster,

and have survived through a singular durability not unmixed with

stupidity. An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner

Welles, has written (“The Time for Decision”, 1944, pp. 261-262) that:

“* * * the authority to which the German people have so often

and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German

Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German

General Staff.

“It will be said that this insistence that the German General

Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous

oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance

of other factors in German history. They all have their place.

But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in

so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the

German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and

channelled through, the German General Staff.”

* * * * * *

“Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or

Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the

population is given to that military force controlled and guided

by the German General Staff. To the German people, the army

to-day, as in the past, is the instrument by which German

domination will be brought about. Generations of Germans may

pass. The nation may undergo defeat after defeat. But if the

rest of the world permits it, the German General Staff will

continue making its plans for the future.”

The German General Staff and High Command is indicted not now at the bar

of history, but on specific charges of crimes against International Law

and the dictates of the conscience of mankind as embodied in the

Charter. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that of a group

of men with great powers for good or ill who chose the latter; who

deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will

could be imposed on the rest of the world; and who gladly joined with

the most evil forces at work in Germany. “Hitler produced the results

which all of us warmly desired”, Blomberg and Blaskowitz say, and that

is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military

leaders furnished Hitler with the means and might which were necessary

to his mere survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those

purposes which seem to the world so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and

so fearfully imminent in 1942.

It was said above that the German militarists were inept as well as

persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he

succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in

1933. But it was not enough for the Nazis that the generals should be

voluntary allies; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under

his control. Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked

the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death of

President Hindenburg in August 1934, the German officers swore a new

oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now it was to a

man, Adolf Hitler. It was not until 18 days later that the law requiring

this change was passed. A year later the Nazi emblem became part of

their uniform and the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process of

infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire

military machine.

No doubt these generals will ask what they could have done about it. It

will be said that they were helpless, and that to protect their jobs and

families and their own lives they had to follow Hitler’s decisions. No

doubt this became true. But the generals were a key factor in Hitler’s

rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal aggressive designs.

It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw from a criminal

conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a conspirator may claim

mercy on the ground that his fellow-conspirators threatened him with

harm should he withdraw from the plot.

In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff and High

Command group presents today is the most degrading of all the groups and

organizations charged in the Indictment. The bearers of a tradition not

devoid of valour and honour, they emerge from this war stained both by

criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive

Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn into

adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. From crimes in which almost

all of them participated willingly and approvingly were born others in

which they participated because they were too ineffective to alter the

governing Nazi policies, and because they had to continue collaboration

to save their own skins.

Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group

planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned

Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the Armed Forces to be used for

foul practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale

slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be

their cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in

the profession to which they are an eternal disgrace.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GENERAL STAFF AND

HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

│ │ │

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page

│ │ │

│Charter of the International Military │ │

│ Tribunal, Article 9. │ I │ 6

│International Military Tribunal, │ │

│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │

│ Appendix B. │ I │ 29, 72

3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting │ │

│ the Laws and Customs of War on Land,│ │

│ Annex, Articles 4, 23. │ VI │590, 594

3738-PS │Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to │ │

│ treatment of Prisoners of War, │ │

│ Articles 2,3. │ VI │ 600

│ ———— │ │

│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │

│document indicates that the document │ │

│was received in evidence at the │ │

│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │

│before a document number indicates │ │

│that the document was referred to │ │

│during the trial but was not formally │ │

│received in evidence, for the reason │ │

│given in parentheses following the │ │

│description of the document. The USA │ │

│series number, given in parentheses │ │

│following the description of the │ │

│document, is the official exhibit │ │

│number assigned by the court. │ │

│ ———— │ │

375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │

│report of Intelligence Division, │ │

│Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August │ │

│1938. (USA 84) │ III │ 280

│ │ │

*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │

│the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │

│November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │

│adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │

│November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295

│ │ │

*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │

│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │

│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │

│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305

│ │ │

*444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from │ │

│Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by │ │

│Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 │ │

│November 1940, concerning plans for │ │

│prosecution of war in Mediterranean │ │

│Area and occupation of Greece. (GB │ │

│116) │ III │ 403

│ │ │

*446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed│ │

│by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │

│Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December │ │

│1940, concerning the Invasion of │ │

│Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407

│ │ │

447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │

│No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │

│1941, concerning Directives for │ │

│special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409

│ │ │

*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │

│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │

│501) │ III │ 416

│ │ │

*503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │

│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │

│of his commando order of the day │ │

│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426

│ │ │

*506-PS │Draft of top secret letter, 22 June │ │

│1944, initialled by Warlimont, │ │

│concerning enemy agents. (USA 549) │ III │ 430

│ │ │

*508-PS │OKW correspondence, November 1942, │ │

│about shooting of British glider │ │

│troops in Norway. (USA 545) │ III │ 430

│ │ │

*509-PS │Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, │ │

│reporting “special treatment” for │ │

│three British commandos. (USA 547) │ III │ 433

│ │ │

*512-PS │Teletype from Army Commander in │ │

│Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning │ │

│interrogation of saboteurs before │ │

│shooting; and memorandum in reply from│ │

│OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) │ III │ 433

│ │ │

*526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │

│concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │

│in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434

│ │ │

*531-PS │OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing │ │

│inquiry from Supreme Command West │ │

│about treatment of paratroopers. (USA │ │

│550) │ III │ 435

│ │ │

*537-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of members of │ │

│foreign “Military Missions”, captured │ │

│together with partisans. (USA 553) │ III │ 439

│ │ │

551-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of Commando │ │

│participants. (USA 551) │ III │ 440

│ │ │

*728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │

│Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │

│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │

│enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526

│ │ │

729-PS │Handwritten note initialled Keitel, 14│ │

│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │

│enemy terror aviators. │ III │ 529

│ │ │

730-PS │Draft of letter to Foreign Office, │ │

│attention Ambassador Ritter, 15 June │ │

│1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │

│aviators. │ III │ 530

│ │ │

731-PS │Memorandum initialled by Jodl, 22 May,│ │

│concerning measures to be taken │ │

│against Anglo-American air crews in │ │

│special instances. │ III │ 531

│ │ │

732-PS │Letter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June │ │

│1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │

│terror aviators. │ III │ 532

│ │ │

733-PS │Telephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of terror │ │

│aviators. │ III │ 533

│ │ │

*735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │

│fix the cases in which the application│ │

│of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │

│would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533

│ │ │

737-PS │Conference Notes, 4 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │

│aviators. │ III │ 536

│ │ │

*740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │

│aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537

│ │ │

741-PS │Secret memorandum, 5 July 1944, │ │

│concerning terror aviators. │ III │ 538

│ │ │

*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │

│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │

│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572

│ │ │

*798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │

│Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │

│22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581

│ │ │

*872-PS │Memorandum of Discussion between the │ │

│Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case │ │

│“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” │ │

│(African operation). (USA 134) │ III │ 626

│ │ │

*1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and │ │

│Police Leader of Warsaw, on │ │

│destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. │ │

│(USA 275) │ III │ 718

│ │ │

*1279-PS │Minutes of meeting concerning │ │

│treatment of members of foreign │ │

│“Military Missions” captured with │ │

│partisan groups and draft of order, 7 │ │

│July 1944 pertaining thereto. (USA │ │

│552) │ III │ 857

│ │ │

*1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13│ │

│December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101

│ │ │

*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │

│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │

│speech by Hitler to German High │ │

│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │

│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │

│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272

│ │ │

*1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │

│February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357

│ │ │

*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │

│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │

│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360

│ │ │

1786-PS │Excerpt of 14 March 1943 of War Diary │ │

│of the Deputy Chief of the Armed │ │

│Forces Operations Staff. (USA 561) │ IV │ 369

│ │ │

*1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │

│1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377

│ │ │

*1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │

│The Jewish Question, under the │ │

│Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │

│12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425

│ │ │

*1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS │ │

│Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │ │

│170) │ IV │ 558

│ │ │

*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │

│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │

│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │

│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │

│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │

│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │

│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934

│ │ │

*2327-PS │Two top secret memoranda, 14 June │ │

│1939, concerning operation “Fall │ │

│Weiss”. (USA 539) │ IV │ 1035

│ │ │

*2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │

│August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23

│ │ │

*2610-PS │Affidavit of Frederick W. Roche, │ │

│Major, U. S. Army, 7 November 1945. │ │

│(USA 548) │ V │ 330

│ │ │

*2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │

│conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │

│Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │

│Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443

│ │ │

*3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │

│1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │

│Service, and record of telephone │ │

│conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │

│1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731

│ │ │

3040-PS │Secret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20 │ │

│February 1942, concerning commitment │ │

│of manpower from the East. (USA 207) │ V │ 744

│ │ │

*3702-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │

│Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) │ VI │ 411

│ │ │

*3703-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │

│Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │

│532) │ VI │ 413

│ │ │

*3704-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Werner von │ │

│Blomberg, 7 November 1945. (USA 536) │ VI │ 414

│ │ │

*3705-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │

│Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │

│535) │ VI │ 415

│ │ │

*3706-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Johannes │ │

│Blaskowitz, 10 November 1945. (USA │ │

│537) │ VI │ 417

│ │ │

*3707-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │

│Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) │ VI │ 419

│ │ │

*3708-PS │Affidavit of Colonel Bernd von │ │

│Brauchitsch, 20 November 1945. (USA │ │

│534) │ VI │ 419

│ │ │

*3710-PS │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26 │ │

│November 1945. (USA 557) │ VI │ 420

│ │ │

*3711-PS │Affidavit of Captain Wilhelm Scheidt, │ │

│26 November 1945. (USA 558) │ VI │ 424

│ │ │

3712-PS │Affidavit of General von dem Bach, 27 │ │

│November 1945. │ VI │ 425

│ │ │

*3713-PS │Affidavit of General Roettiger, 8 │ │

│December 1945. (USA 559) │ VI │ 429

│ │ │

3714-PS │Affidavit of General Roettiger, 28 │ │

│November 1945. (USA 560) │ VI │ 430

│ │ │

*3715-PS │Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 │ │

│November 1945. (USA 562) │ VI │ 431

│ │ │

*3716-PS │Affidavit of Major General Rode, 30 │ │

│November 1945. (USA 563) │ VI │ 433

│ │ │

*3717-PS │Affidavit of General Heusinger, 1 │ │

│December 1945. (USA 564) │ VI │ 434

│ │ │

*3718-PS │Affidavit of Colonel v. Bonin, 1 │ │

│December 1945. (USA 565) │ VI │ 435

│ │ │

*3739-PS │Memo on General Staff and High Command│ │

│and affidavit thereto. (USA 778) │ VI │ 624

│ │ │

*3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │

│Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │

│execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │

│Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │

│819) │ VI │ 787

│ │ │

*C-5 │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the │ │

│Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, │ │

│concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) │ VI │ 815

│ │ │

*C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │

│Navy files containing notes year by │ │

│year from 1927 to 1940 on │ │

│reconstruction of the German Navy, and│ │

│dated 18 February 1938, 8 March 1938, │ │

│September 1938. (USA 49) │ VI │ 827

│ │ │

*C-35 │Entry in Naval War Diary, January │ │

│1941, p. 401. (USA 132) │ VI │ 852

│ │ │

*C-50 │Covering letters and Order of 13 May │ │

│1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless │ │

│treatment of civilians in the USSR for│ │

│offenses committed by them. (USA 554; │ │

│GB 162) │ VI │ 871

│ │ │

*C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │

│“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB │ │

│87) │ VI │ 883

│ │ │

C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │

│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │

│(GB 86) │ VI │ 884

│ │ │

*C-65 │Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder │ │

│concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85) │ VI │ 885

│ │ │

*C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 │ │

│January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │

│and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887

│ │ │

*C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │

│convening conference on Barbarossa on │ │

│14 June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909

│ │ │

*C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │

│operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │

│74) │ VI │ 911

│ │ │

*C-102 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │

│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │

│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916

│ │ │

*C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │

│Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 │ │

│October 1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928

│ │ │

*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │

│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │

│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932

│ │ │

*C-136 │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 │ │

│October 1938, signed by Hitler and │ │

│initialled by Keitel. (USA 104) │ VI │ 947

│ │ │

*C-138 │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed│ │

│by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the │ │

│OKW. (USA 105) │ VI │ 950

│ │ │

*C-139 │Directive for operation “Schulung” │ │

│signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA │ │

│53) │ VI │ 951

│ │ │

*C-142 │Intention of the Army High Command and│ │

│Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA │ │

│538) │ VI │ 956

│ │ │

*C-148 │Keitel Order, 16 September 1941, │ │

│subject: Communist Insurrection in │ │

│Occupied Territories. (USA 555) │ VI │ 961

│ │ │

C-156 │Concealed Rearmament under Leadership │ │

│of Government of Reich, from “Fight of│ │

│the Navy against Versailles │ │

│1919-1935”. (USA 41) │ VI │ 970

│ │ │

*C-159 │Order for Rhineland occupation signed │ │

│by Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54) │ VI │ 974

│ │ │

*C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │

│Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977

│ │ │

*C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │

│“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003

│ │ │

*C-178 │Order of Navy concerning treatment of │ │

│saboteurs, 11 February 1943. (USA 544)│ VI │ 1012

│ │ │

*C-179 │Hitler’s second decree, 18 October │ │

│1942, regarding annihilation of terror│ │

│and sabotage units. (USA 543) │ VI │ 1014

│ │ │

*C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │

│Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │

│March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017

│ │ │

*D-39 │Telegrams relating to activities │ │

│against partisans in Italy. (GB 275) │ VI │ 1023

│ │ │

*D-411 │Letters of 26 and 28 November 1941, │ │

│enclosing orders concerning protection│ │

│of troops against Partisans and │ │

│sabotage. (USA 556) │ VII │ 49

│ │ │

*D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │

│SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │

│Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │

│Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │

│1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │

│relative to procedure in cases of │ │

│unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │

│execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74

│ │ │

D-730 │Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 │ │

│December 1945. (GB 279) │ VII │ 177

│ │ │

*D-731 │Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 │ │

│December 1945. (GB 278) │ VII │ 183

│ │ │

*D-762 │Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, │ │

│concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │

│and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │

│Territories. (GB 298) │ VII │ 221

│ │ │

*D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │

│regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │

│non-German civilians in Occupied │ │

│Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222

│ │ │

*D-764 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │

│concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │

│and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │

│Territories and jurisdiction relative │ │

│thereto. (GB 299) │ VII │ 223

│ │ │

*D-765 │Directives of OKW, 2 September 1944, │ │

│regarding offenses by non-German │ │

│civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │

│302) │ VII │ 225

│ │ │

*D-766 │Circular of OKW, 4 September 1944, │ │

│regarding offenses by non-German │ │

│civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │

│301) │ VII │ 226

│ │ │

*D-767 │Memorandum, 13 September 1944, on │ │

│offenses by non-German civilians in │ │

│Occupied Territories. (GB 303) │ VII │ 228

│ │ │

*D-769 │Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, │ │

│21 September 1940, relative to │ │

│application of capital punishment in │ │

│connection with Railway strike in │ │

│Holland. (GB 304) │ VII │ 229

│ │ │

D-770 │Circular, 24 September 1944, on │ │

│offenses of non-German civilians in │ │

│Occupied Territories. (GB 305) │ VII │ 229

│ │ │

*D-774 │Directive of Chief of OKW to German │ │

│Foreign Office at Salzburg, on │ │

│treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers, 14 June 1944. (GB │ │

│307) │ VII │ 231

│ │ │

*D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │

│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │

│“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │

│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232

│ │ │

*D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │

│June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │

│Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │

│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233

│ │ │

*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │

│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │

│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │

│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234

│ │ │

*D-778 │Notes, 18 June 1944, concerning │ │

│treatment of Anglo-American │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 311) │ VII │ 235

│ │ │

*D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarschall to Chief │ │

│of OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │

│treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235

│ │ │

*D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │

│Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │

│June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236

│ │ │

*D-781 │Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │

│“Luftwaffe”, 23 June 1944, regarding │ │

│treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 314) │ VII │ 239

│ │ │

D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │

│Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │

│315) │ VII │ 239

│ │ │

*D-783 │Note of a telephone communication, 26 │ │

│June 1944, with regard to treatment of│ │

│“Terrorist”-aviators. (GB 316) │ VII │ 240

│ │ │

*D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │

│signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240

│ │ │

*D-785 │Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │

│“Luftwaffe”, 4 July 1944, concerning │ │

│“Terror”-flyers. (GB 318) │ VII │ 241

│ │ │

*D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │

│(GB 319) │ VII │ 242

│ │ │

*L-43 │Air Force “Organizational Study 1950”,│ │

│2 May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. │ │

│10.) │ VII │ 788

│ │ │

*L-51 │Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August │ │

│1945. (USA 521) │ VII │ 798

│ │ │

*L-52 │Memorandum and Directives for conduct │ │

│of war in the West, 9 October 1939. │ │

│(USA 540) │ VII │ 800

│ │ │

*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │

│“Indoctrination on the political │ │

│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847

│ │ │

L-166 │Minutes of conference on Fighter │ │

│Aircraft with Reichsmarshal on 15 and │ │

│16 May 1944. │ VII │ 911

│ │ │

*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │

│Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │

│lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │

│November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │

│Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920

│ │ │

L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │

│Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group │ │

│A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978

│ │ │

*L-323 │Entry in Naval War Diary concerning │ │

│operation “Weseruebung”. (USA 541) │ VII │ 1106

│ │ │

*R-95 │Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, │ │

│30 March 1941, concerning deployment │ │

│instructions for “Action 25” and │ │

│supplementary instruction for action │ │

│“Marita”. (GB 127) │ VIII │ 70

│ │ │

*R-102 │Report on activities of The Task │ │

│Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 │ │

│October 1941, (USA 470) │ VIII │ 96

│ │ │

R-118 │Drafts of letters and memoranda of │ │

│General Staff of Armed Forces │ │

│concerning treatment of enemy fliers. │ VIII │ 127

│ │ │

*R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │

│reports from Kube on German atrocities│ │

│in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │

│Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205

│ │ │

*TC-54-B │Von Brauchitsch appeal to the people │ │

│of Danzig, from Documents of German │ │

│Politics, Part VII, p. 596. (GB 73) │ VIII │ 410

│ │ │

*UK-66 │Report of British War Crimes Section │ │

│of Allied Force Headquarters on German│ │

│reprisals for partisan activity in │ │

│Italy. (GB 274) │ VIII │ 572

│ │ │

UK-81 │Letters of 26 November and 28 October │ │

│1941, with enclosed orders on │ │

│protection of troops against Partisans│ │

│and Sabotage and conduct of troops in │ │

│Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 582

│ │ │

Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │

│January 1946, substantially the same │ │

│as his testimony on direct examination│ │

│before the International Military │ │

│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │

│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587

│ │ │

Affidavit B │Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 │ │

│November 1945, substantially the same │ │

│as his testimony on direct examination│ │

│before the International Military │ │

│Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946. │ VIII │ 596

│ │ │

Affidavit D │Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 │ │

│January 1946, substantially the same │ │

│as his testimony on direct examination│ │

│before the International Military │ │

│Tribunal at Nurnberg 4 January 1946. │ VIII │ 622

│ │ │

Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November│ │

│1945. │ VIII │ 643

│ │ │

Affidavit I │Affidavit of Leopold Buerkner, 22 │ │

│January 1946. │ VIII │ 647

│ │ │

Affidavit J │Affidavit of Erhard Milch, 23 January │ │

│1946. │ VIII │ 653

│ │ │

Statement III │The Origin of the Directives of the │ │

│Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,│ │

│by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 15 │ │

│September 1945. │ VIII │ 669

│ │ │

Statement IV │The Position and Powers of the Chief │ │

│of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, │ │

│Nurnberg, 9 October 1945. │ VIII │ 672

│ │ │

Statement V │Notes Concerning Actions of German │ │

│Armed Forces During the War and in │ │

│Occupied Territory, by Wilhelm Keitel,│ │

│Nurnberg, 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 678

│ │ │

Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │

│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │

│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707

│ │ │

Chart No. 7 │Organization of the Wehrmacht │ │

│1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to │ │

│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 776

│ │ │

*Chart No. 10 │1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion│ │

│1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) │ VIII │ 779

Chapter XVI

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS

The crime of conspiracy is recognized, in various forms, in nearly every

legal system. The Anglo-American doctrine of conspiracy, despite

technical differences, is analogous in purpose to the Soviet notion of a

“criminal gang” and the French _association de malfaiteurs_. German law,

both before and after the Nazi seizure of power, also contained a

similar concept. The fundamentals of the doctrine, common to most

systems of law, are reflected in Article 6 of the Charter, which

declares it a crime to participate in “the formulation or execution of a

common plan or conspiracy” to plan or wage aggressive war, to commit War

Crimes, or to commit Crimes against Humanity. Count I of the Indictment

charges the existence of such a conspiracy on the part of the

defendants, acting together with divers other persons.

The essence of conspiracy is the joining together of persons to pursue

unlawful ends, by legal or illegal means, or to pursue lawful ends by

illegal means. A conspiracy may exist even though the ends or means

employed by the conspirators might have been perfectly legal if carried

out by one person acting alone. The gravamen of the crime is association

and acting in concert for the purpose of formulating and executing a

common plan involving criminal ends or means.

Participation in a common plan or conspiracy results in vicarious

liability, in the sense that each member of the conspiracy is liable for

the acts of every other conspirator, even though he may have actually

committed no criminal acts himself. He still may be adjudged criminal

for mere participation in a common plan to pursue a common criminal

purpose, regardless of disparities in the functions performed by

individual conspirators.

Nevertheless, in order to prove the participation of a certain person in

a conspiracy, his own acts must be considered. The roles played by the

various members of the Nazi conspiracy are necessarily different. The

following sections sketch in rough outline the parts played by each of

the 22 defendants (excepting Sauckel and Speer who are discussed in

Chapter X) and the former defendant and co-conspirator, Krupp von Bohlen

und Halbach, in the conspiracy to commit Crimes against Peace, War

Crimes against Humanity, as alleged in Count I of the Indictment. These

sections are by no means exhaustive but merely indicate the general

lines of a particular defendant’s participation. Further and more

detailed discussion of the parts played by the conspirators in

particular phases of the conspiracy will be found under the pertinent

subject matter in the preceding chapters.

1. HERMANN WILHELM GOERING

For more than two decades Hermann Goering played one of the foremost

roles amongst the Nazi conspirators. He, who called himself the most

faithful paladin of the Fuehrer, was a key figure within the conspiracy,

participating in nearly all phases of the conspiratorial activities. He

took part in the Munich Beer Hall putsch of 1923; he promoted Hitler’s

rise to power in 1933; he founded the Gestapo in 1933 and the

concentration camps in 1934; and he created the German Luftwaffe, making

it an instrument for aggressive war and using it to destroy other

countries. As Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan and chairman of the

Ministerial Council for Defense, Goering became the Czar of German

economy and administration and eventually the executive manager of the

entire conspiracy.

The following list, the correctness of which has been certified by

Goering and his attorney (_2836-PS_) is a partial statement of positions

and offices held by him from 1922 to 1945:

1. Party member (1922-1945).

2. Supreme Leader of the SA (1923—November 1923).

3. Member of the Reichstag (1928).

4. President of the Reichstag (1932).

5. Prussian Minister of the Interior (1933-34).

6. Prussian Prime Minister (1933-45).

7. Prussian Chief of Secret State Police (1933-36).

8. Prussian Chief of State Council (1933-36).

9. Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan (1936-45).

10. Reichsminister for Air (1933-45).

11. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (1935-45).

12. President of the Cabinet Council for the Defense of the

Reich (1939-45).

13. Member of the Secret Cabinet Council (1938-45).

14. Reichsmarschall (1939-45).

15. Successor Designate to Hitler (1939-45).

16. Head of Reichswerke Hermann Goering (1938-45).

17. Head of Gestapo in Prussia (1933-34).

Goering was a member of and assisted in the Nazi conspiracy to commit

crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, in the

following ways:

A. _CRIMES AGAINST PEACE._

(1) _Acquisition and Consolidation of Power in Germany._

(_a_) _Before 1933._ Soon after joining the Party, Goering in 1923 was

placed in command of the entire SA (_2168-PS_). In November 1923, he

took part in the ill-fated attempt at Munich to gain control of the

German State by force. In the encounter with the police, Goering was

wounded and fled from Germany. (_2532-PS_)

After his return, Goering became more than a commander of street

fighters. He was designated Hitler’s first political assistant.

“The movement was conducted by the Fuehrer from Munich. But one

man has to act for him in Berlin, while Gauleiter Goebbels stirs

up the masses and makes them ripe for National Socialism, a man

on whom he could rely unconditionally to the same extent as if

he acted himself. And thus, Hermann Goering became the political

deputy of Adolf Hitler.” (_3252-PS_)

Goering’s official biographer, the Ministerial Dirgent Gritzbach, tells

of his dealings with the Bruening government, his attempts to “break

down the barrier” around the Reich President, von Hindenburg, and of his

“coup” as Reichstag President in September 1932 in procuring a vote of

nonconfidence against the Papen government just before the Reichstag

could be dissolved (_3252-PS_). Goering says in his own book, _Aufbau

einer Nation_:

“The moment was unforgettable for me who have gone back and

forth as representative so often between the Kaiserhof and the

Wilhelmstrasse during the past year, when I hurried out to my

car and could report to the questioning masses as the first one:

‘Hitler has become Reich Chancellor.’” (_3251-PS_)

Goebbels also gave him full measure of credit:

“‘This is surely Goering’s happiest hour’ wrote Dr. Goebbels in

his book Von Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, and, quoting from it,

said: that ‘Goering prepared diplomatically and politically in a

long lasting all hard struggle the basis for Hitler’s rise.”

(_3252-PS_)

In a letter written in 1935, Hitler summarized Goering’s contributions

as follows: