in nature, to which that quality refers, and on which it is formed and
modelled. And, indeed, admitting this to be the case, one should be
apt enough to conclude, that when the Author of nature condescended to
inspire one of these plastic performances of human art, he would make it
by the exactest pattern of the _Archetype_.
‘But the proposition is fanciful and false. Eloquence is not congenial
or essential to human speech, nor is there any Archetype in nature to
which that quality refers. It is accidental and arbitrary, and depends
on custom and fashion: it is a mode of human communication which changes
with the changing climates of the Earth; and is as various and unstable
as the genius, temper, and manners of its diversified inhabitants.
For what is PURITY but the use of such terms, with their multiplied
combinations, as the interest, the complexion, or the caprice of a writer
or speaker of authority hath preferred to its equals? What is ELEGANCE
but such a turn of idiom as a fashionable fancy hath brought into repute?
And what is SUBLIMITY but the application of such images, as arbitrary or
casual connexions, rather than their own native grandeur, have dignified
and ennobled? Now ELOQUENCE is a compound of these three qualities of
speech, and consequently must be as nominal and unsubstantial as its
constituent parts. So that, that mode of composition, which is a model of
_perfect eloquence_ to one nation or people, must appear extravagant or
mean to another. And thus in fact it was. Indian and Asiatic eloquence
were esteemed hyperbolic, unnatural, abrupt and puerile to the more
phlegmatic inhabitants of _Rome_ and _Athens_. And the Western eloquence,
in its turn, appeared nerveless and effeminate, frigid or insipid, to
the hardy and inflamed imaginations of the East. Nay, what is more,
each species, even of the most approved genus, changed its nature with
the change of clime and language; and the same expression, which, in
one place, had the utmost _simplicity_, had, in another, the utmost
_sublime_[143].’
The Bishop then proceeds to illustrate this last observation by a
famous instance, taken from the first chapter of _Genesis_, and then
recapitulates and enforces his general argument in the following manner.
‘Apply all this to the books of the N. T. an authorized collection,
professedly designed for the rule and direction of mankind. Now such a
rule demanded that it should be inspired of God. But inspired writing,
the objectors say, implies the most _perfect eloquence_. What human
model then was the Holy Ghost to follow? And a human model, of arbitrary
construction, it must needs be, because there was no other: Or, if there
were another, it would never suit the purpose, which was to make an
impression on the minds and affections; and this impression, such an
eloquence only as that which had gained the popular ear, could effect.
Should therefore the _Eastern_ eloquence be employed? But this would be
too inflated and gigantic for the _West_. Should it be the _Western_?
But this would be too cold and torpid for the _East_. Or, suppose the
_generic_ eloquence of the more polished nations was to be preferred,
which _species_ of it was to be employed? The rich exuberance of the
Asiatic Greeks, or the dry conciseness of the Spartans? The pure and
poignant ease and flowing sweetness of the Attic modulation, or the
strength and grave severity of the Roman tone? Or should all give way
to that African torrent, which arose from the fermented mixture of the
dregs of _Greece_ and _Italy_, and soon after overflowed the Church
with theological conceits in a sparkling luxuriancy of thought, and a
sombrous rankness of expression? Thus various were the species’s! all
as much decried by a different genus, and each as much disliked by a
different species, as the eloquence of the remotest East and West, by one
another[144].’
Thus far the learned Bishop, _with the spirit and energy_, as you well
observe, _of an ancient orator_[145]; and, let me add, with a justness
and force of reasoning, which would have done honour to the best
ancient Philosopher. But here we separate again. You maintain, with Dr.
MIDDLETON, _that eloquence is something congenial and essential to
human speech_: While _I_, convinced by the Bishop’s reasoning in these
paragraphs, maintain that it assuredly is not.
The subject, indeed, affords great scope to your rhetorical faculties;
and the cause, you maintain, being that, as you conceive, of the antient
orators, and even of eloquence itself, you suffer your enthusiasm to bear
you away, without controul; and, as is the natural effect of enthusiasm,
with so little method and precision of argument, that a cool examiner of
your work hardly knows how to follow you, or where to take aim at you,
in your aery and uncertain flight. However, I shall do my best to reduce
your Rhetoric to Reason; I mean, to represent the substance of what you
seem to intend by way of argument against the Bishop’s principle, leaving
your eloquence to make what impression on the gentle reader it may.
And, FIRST, in opposition, as you suppose, to the Bishop’s tenet, “_That
eloquence is_ NOT _something congenial and essential to human speech_,”
you apply yourself to shew, through several chapters, that tropes,
metaphors, allegories, and universally what are called by Rhetoricians
_figures of speech_, are natural and necessary expressions of the
passions, and have their birth in the very reason and constitution of
things. To make out this important point is the sole drift of your I, II,
III, and IVᵗʰ Chapters; in which you seem to me to be contending for that
which nobody denies, and to be disputing without an opponent. At least,
you can hardly believe that the Bishop of _Gloucester_ is to be told,
that metaphors, allegories, and similitudes are the offspring of nature
and necessity, HE, who has, _with the utmost justness and elegance of
reasoning_, as you well observe[146], explained this very point, himself,
in the DIVINE LEGATION.
What then are we to conclude from these elaborate chapters? Why, that by
some unlucky mistake or other, let us call it only by the softer name, of
_inattention_, you have entirely misrepresented the scope and purpose of
all the Bishop has said on the subject of eloquence. And that this is no
hasty or groundless charge, but the very truth of the case, will clearly
be seen from a brief examination of the Bishop’s theory, compared with
your reasonings upon it.
The position, _that eloquence is something congenial and essential to
human speech, supposes_, says the Bishop, _that there is some certain
Archetype in nature, to which that quality refers, and on which it is to
be formed and modelled_.
The Bishop, you see, requires an _Archetype_ to be pointed out to him of
that consummate eloquence, which is said to be _congenial and essential
to human speech_. The demand is surely reasonable; and not difficult
to be complied with, if such an Archetype do, in fact, subsist. But do
you know of any such? Do you refer him to any such? Do you specify that
_composition_? or do you so much as delineate that _sort_ of composition,
which will pass upon all men under the idea of an Archetype? Nothing of
all this. Permit us then to attend to the Bishop’s reasoning, by which he
undertakes to prove that no such Archetype does or can exist.
‘The proposition [that asserts, there is such an Archetype] is fanciful
and false. Eloquence is not congenial or essential to human speech, nor
is there any Archetype in nature to which that quality refers. It is
accidental and arbitrary, and depends on custom and fashion: It is a mode
of human communication which changes with the changing climates of the
earth; and is as various and unstable as the genius, temper, and manners
of its diversified inhabitants[147].’
The Bishop asserts _there is no Archetype_, because eloquence is a
variable thing, depending on custom and fashion; is nothing absolute
in itself; but relative to the fancies and prejudices of men, and
changeable, as the different climes they inhabit. This _general_ reason
seems convincing: it appeals to fact, to experience, to the evidence of
sense. But the learned Prelate goes further. He analyzes the complex
idea of eloquence: he examines the qualities of speech, of which it is
made up; and he shews that they are nominal and unsubstantial. Hence
it follows, again, That there is no Archetype in nature of perfect
eloquence; its very constituent parts, as they are deemed, having no
substance or reality in them.
But why should the Bishop condescend to this analysis, when his _general
argument_ seemed decisive of the question? For a good reason. When the
Bishop asked for an ARCHETYPE, though you are shy of producing any, he
well knew that the masters of Eloquence, those I mean who are accounted
such in these parts of the world, had pretended to give one. He knew
the authority of these masters of human speech with the sort of men, he
had to deal with: he therefore takes the Archetype, they have given, and
shews, upon their own ideas of eloquence, it is a mere phantom.
It is not to be supposed that the Bishop, in touching incidentally the
question of Eloquence in a theological treatise, should follow the Greek
and Latin rhetors through all the niceties and distinctions of their Art,
or should amuse himself or us with a minute detail of all the particulars
which go to the making up of this mighty compound, their ARCHETYPAL IDEA
of human eloquence. If he had been so pleased, and had had no better
business on his hands, it is likely he could have told us _news_, as you
have done, out of ARISTOTLE, LONGINUS, and CICERO. But his manner is
to say no more on a subject, than the occasion makes necessary; which,
in the present case, was no more than to acquaint his reader, in very
general terms, with the constituent parts of eloquence; which he resolves
into these three, PURITY, ELEGANCE, and SUBLIMITY.
But this you call _a most illogical division of Eloquence; for that the
Bishop hath not only enumerated the constituent parts imperfectly; but,
of the three qualities which he hath exhibited, the first is included in
the second, and the third is not necessarily and universally a part of
eloquence_[148].
The _enumeration_, you say, _is imperfect_. Yet _Purity_, I think,
denotes whatever comes under the idea of PROPRIETY, that is, of approved
custom, as well as grammatical use, in any language: _Elegance_,
expresses all those embellishments of composition, which are the effect
of ART: and I know no fitter term than _Sublimity_, to stand for those
qualities of eloquence, which are derived from the efforts of Genius,
or NATURAL PARTS. Now what else can be required to complete the idea of
Eloquence, and what defect of logic can there be in comprehending the
various properties of human speech under these three generic names? The
division is surely so natural and so intelligible, that few readers, I
believe, will be disposed to object with you, _that the first of the
three qualities is included in the second, and that the third is not
necessarily and universally a part of eloquence_.
But let the Bishop’s enumeration be ever so _logical_, you further
quarrel with his _idea_ of these three constituent parts of eloquence,
and his reasoning upon them.
‘What; says his Lordship, is PURITY but the use of such terms with their
multiplied combinations, as the interest, the complexion, or the caprice
of a writer or speaker of authority hath preferred to its equals?’
This idea of purity in language you think strange; and yet in the very
chapter in which you set yourself to contemplate and to reprobate this
_strange idea_, you cannot help resolving _purity_, into _usage and
custom_, that is, with QUINTILIAN, into _consensum_ (_eruditorum_); which
surely is but saying in other words with the Bishop, that it consists
_in the use of such terms, with their multiplied combinations, as the
interest, the complexion, or the caprice of a writer or speaker of
Authority hath preferred to its equals_—for _equals_ they undoubtedly
were, till that usage or custom took place. When this _consent of the
learned_ is once established, every writer or speaker, who pretends to
_purity_ of expression, must doubtless conform to it: but previously
to such consent, _purity_ is a thing arbitrary enough to justify the
Bishop’s conclusion, that this quality _is not congenial and essential to
human speech_.
Next, the Bishop asks, ‘What is ELEGANCE but such a turn of idiom as a
fashionable fancy hath brought into repute?’
Here, again, you grow very nice in your inquiries into the idea of
_fancy_, the idea of _fashion_, and I know not what of that sort. In
a word, you go on _defining_, and _distinguishing_ to the end of the
chapter, in a way that without doubt would be very edifying to your young
scholars in _Trinity College_, but, as levelled against the Bishop, is
certainly unseasonable and out of place. For define _elegance_ that you
will, it finally resolves into something that _is not of the essence
of human speech_, but factitious and arbitrary; as depending much on
the taste, the fancy, the caprice (call it what you please) of such
writers or speakers, as have obtained the popular vogue for this species
of eloquence, and so had the fortune to bring the turn of idiom and
expression, which they preferred and cultivated, into general repute.
‘Lastly,’ the Bishop asks, ‘What is SUBLIMITY but the application of such
images, as arbitrary or casual connexions, rather than their own native
grandeur, have dignified and ennobled?’
To this question you reply by asking another, _Whether sublimity doth
necessarily consist in the application of images?_ But, _first_, if
what is _called_ Sublimity, _generally_ consists in the application of
images, it is abundantly sufficient to the Bishop’s purpose: _Next_,
I presume to say, that the sublime of eloquence, or the impression
which a genius makes upon us by his expression, consists necessarily
and universally in the application of _images_, that is, of bright and
vivid ideas, which is the true, that is, the received sense of the word,
_images_, (however rhetoricians may have distinguished different kinds
of them, and expressed them by different names) in all rhetorical and
critical works. _Lastly_, I maintain that these bright and vivid ideas
are rendered _interesting_ to the reader or hearer from the influence of
ASSOCIATION, rather than _of their own native dignity and grandeur_: of
which I could give so many instances, that, for this reason, I will only
give your _own_, which you lay so much stress upon, of _the famous oath,
by the souls of those who fought at_ Marathon _and_ Platæa[149]: where
the peculiar ideas of _interest_, _glory_, and _veneration_, associated
to the _image_ or idea of the battle of _Marathon_ and _Platæa_, gave a
sublime and energy to this oath of DEMOSTHENES, _by the souls of those
that fought there_, in the conceptions of his countrymen, which no other
people could have felt from it, and of which you, Sir, with all your
admiration of it, have certainly a very faint conception at this time.
I should here have dispatched this article of _Sublimity_, but that you
will expect me to take some notice of your objection to what the Bishop
observes, ‘That this species of eloquence changed its nature, with
the change of clime and language; and that the same expression, which
in one place had the utmost _simplicity_, had, in another, the utmost
_sublime_[150]:’ An observation, which he illustrates and confirms by the
various fortune of the famous passage in _Genesis, God said, Let there be
light, and there was light; so sublime_, in the apprehension of LONGINUS
and BOILEAU, and so _simple_, in that of HUETIUS and LE CLERC.
To this pertinent illustration, most ingeniously explained and enforced
by the learned Prelate, you reply with much ease, “That this might well
be, and even in the same place,” and then proceed to _inform_ him of I
know not what union between _simplicity_ and _sublimity_; though you
_civilly_ add, “That it is a point known to every SMATTERER in criticism,
that these two qualities are so far from being inconsistent with each
other, that they are frequently united by a natural and inseparable
union[151].”
“Simplicity and _sublimity_ may be found together.” I think the
proposition false, in your sense of it, at least. But be it true, that
these qualities in expression may be found together. What then? The
question is of a passage, where these qualities, in the apprehension of
great critics, are found separately; the one side maintaining that it is
merely _simple_, the other, that it is merely _sublime_. _Simplicity_
is, here, plainly opposed to _sublimity_, and implies the absence of
it: BOILEAU, after LONGINUS, affirming that the expression _is_, and
his adversaries affirming that it is _not_, _sublime_. Can any thing
shew more clearly, that the _sublime_ of eloquent expression depends on
_casual associations_, and not on the nature of things?
But the Bishop goes further and tells us, what the _associations_ were
that occasioned these different judgments of the passage in question.
The ideas suggested in it were _familiar_, to the sacred writer: they
were _new_ and admirable, to the Pagan Critic. Hence the expression would
be of the greatest _simplicity_ in MOSES, though it would be naturally
esteemed by LONGINUS, infinitely _sublime_.
Here you cavil a little about the Effect of _familiarity_: but, as
conscious of the weakness of this part of your answer, _Not to insist_,
you say, _upon this, How comes it then that_ BOILEAU _and many other
Christian readers, to whom the ideas of creation were as familiar as to_
MOSES _himself, were yet affected by the sublime of this passage_? You
ask, How this comes to pass? How? Why in the way, in which so many other
strange things come to pass, by _the influence of authority_. LONGINUS
had said, the expression of this passage was _sublime_. And when he had
said this, the wonder is to find two men, such as HUETIUS and LE CLERC,
who durst, after that, honestly declare their own feelings, and profess
that, to them, the expression was _not_ sublime.
But more on this head of _Authority_ presently.
You see, Sir, I pass over these chapters _on the qualities of Eloquence_,
though they make so large a part of your _Dissertation_, very rapidly:
and I do it, not to escape from any force I apprehend there to be in your
argument or observations, but because I am persuaded that every man,
who knows what language is, and how it is formed, is so convinced that
those qualities of it by which it comes to be denominated _pure_, and
_elegant_, and _interesting_, are the effects of _custom_, _fashion_,
and _association_, that he would not thank me for employing many words
on so plain a point. Only, as you conclude this part of your work with
_an appeal_, which you think sufficiently _warranted, against the most
positive decisions of fashion, custom, or prejudice, to certain general
and established principles of rational criticism_, subversive, as you
think, of the Bishop’s whole theory, I shall be bold to tell you, as I
just now promised, what my opinion is, _of these established rules of_
RATIONAL CRITICISM: by which you will understand how little I conceive
the Bishop’s system to be affected by this confident appeal to _such
principles_.
I hold then, that what you solemnly call _the established principles
of rational criticism_ are only such principles as criticism hath seen
good to establish _on the practice of the Greek and Roman speakers
and writers_; the European eloquence being ultimately the mere product
and result of such practice; and European criticism being no further
_rational_ than as it accords to it. This is the way, in which ancient
and modern critics have gone to work in forming their systems: and their
systems deserve to be called _rational_, because they deliver such rules
as experience has found most conducive to attain the ends of eloquence in
these parts of the world. Had you attended to this obvious consideration,
it is impossible you should have alarmed yourself so much, as you seem to
have done, at the Bishop’s bold Paradox, as if it threatened the downfall
of Eloquence itself: which, you now see, stands exactly as it did, and
is just as secure in all its established rights and privileges on the
Bishop’s system of _there being no Archetype of Eloquence in nature_, as
upon your’s, _that there is one_. The rules of criticism are just the
same on either supposition, and will continue the same so long as we take
the Greek and Roman writers for our masters and models; nay, so long as
the influence of their authority, now confirmed and strengthened by the
practice of ages, and struck deep into the European notions and manners,
shall subsist.
You need, therefore, be in no pain for the interests of Eloquence, which
are so dear to you; nor for the dignity of your _Rhetorical office_ in
the University of _Dublin_; which is surely of importance enough, if you
teach your _young hearers_ how to become eloquent in that scene where
their employment of it is likely to fall; without pretending to engage
them in certain chimerical projects how they may attain an essential
universal eloquence, or such as will pass for eloquence in all ages and
countries of the world.
You see, Sir, if this opinion of mine be a truth, that it overturns
at once the whole structure of your book. We, no doubt, who have been
lectured in Greek and Roman eloquence, think it preferable to any
other; and we think so, because it conforms to certain rules which our
criticism has established, without considering that those rules are
only established on the successful practice of European writers and
speakers, and are therefore no rules at all in such times and places
where a different, perhaps a contrary, practice is followed with the
same success. Let a Spartan, an Asiatic, an African, a Chinese system
of rhetoric be given: Each of these shall differ from other, yet each
shall be best and most _rational_, as relative to the people for
whom it is formed. Nay, to see how groundless all your fancies of
a _rational essential eloquence are_, do but reflect that even the
European eloquence, though founded on the same general principles, is
yet different in different places in many respects. I could tell you of
a country, and that at no great distance, where that which is thought
supremely _elegant_ passes in another country, not less conversant in the
_established principles of rational criticism_, for FINICAL; while what,
in this country, is accepted under the idea of _sublimity_, is derided,
in that other, as no better than BOMBAST.
What follows, now, from this appeal to _experience_, against your
appeal to the _established rules of criticism_? Plainly this: That all
the rhetors of antiquity put together are no authority against what
the Bishop of _Gloucester_ asserts concerning the nature of eloquence;
since THEY only tell us (and we will take their word for it) what will
_please or affect_ under _certain_ circumstances, while the BISHOP only
questions whether the same rules, under ALL circumstances, will enable a
writer or speaker to _please and affect_. Strange! that you should not
see the inconsequence of your own reasoning. The Bishop says, The rules
of eloquence are for the most part, local and arbitrary: No, you say,
The rules are not local and arbitrary, FOR they were held reasonable
ones at _Athens_ and _Rome_. Your very answer shews that they were local
and arbitrary. You see, then, why I make so slight on this occasion
of all your multiplied citations from the ancient writers, which, how
respectable soever, are no decisive authority, indeed no authority at
all, in the present case.