is small hurt done, provided they turn out, what he seems persuaded they
will, only _truths_. Let us attend his Lordship, then, in the proof of
his FIRST Paradox.
‘I will not pretend, says he, to point out which books of the N. T. were,
or were not, composed by those who had the Greek tongue thus miraculously
infused into them; but this I will venture to say, that the style of a
writer so inspired, who had not (as these writers had not) afterwards
cultivated his knowledge of the language on the principles of Grecian
eloquence, would be precisely such as we find it in the books of the New
Testament.
‘For, if this only be allowed, which no one, I think, will contest with
me, that a strange language acquired by illiterate men, in the ordinary
way, would be full of the idioms of their native tongue, just as the
Scripture-Greek is observed to be full of Syriasms, and Hebraisms;
how can it be pretended, by those who reflect upon the nature of
language, that a strange tongue divinely infused into illiterate men,
like that at the day of Pentecost, could have any other properties and
conditions[134]?’
Here, the features of this bold paradox begin to soften a little. We are
something reconciled to it, 1. by being told, what the _rudeness and
barbarity_ is, which is affirmed to be _one certain mark_ of an inspired
language, namely, _its being full of the idioms of the native tongue_ of
the inspired writer: And 2. by being told, that these idioms are equally
to be expected whether the new language be infused by divine inspiration,
or acquired by illiterate men in the ordinary way. In the _latter_
case, it is presumed, and surely with reason enough (because experience
uniformly attests the fact), that a strange language, so learnt, would
abound in the native idioms of the learner: All that remains is to shew,
that the event would be the same, in the _former_. The Bishop then
applies himself, in order, to this task.
‘Let us weigh these cases impartially. Every language consists of two
distinct parts; the single terms, and the phrases and idioms. The
first, as far as concerns appellatives especially, is of mere arbitrary
imposition, though on artificial principles common to all men: The second
arises insensibly, but constantly, from the manners, customs, and tempers
of those to whom the language is vernacular; and so becomes, though
much less arbitrary (as what the Grammarians call _congruity_ is more
concerned in this part than in the other), yet various and different
as the several tribes and nations of mankind. The first therefore is
unrelated to every thing but to the genius of language in general;
the second hath an intimate connexion with the fashions, notions, and
opinions of that people only, to whom the language is native.
‘Let us consider then the constant way which illiterate men take to
acquire the knowledge of a foreign tongue. Do they not make it their
principal, and, at first, their only study, to treasure up in their
memory the signification of the terms? Hence, when they come to talk or
write in the speech thus acquired, their language is found to be full of
their own native idioms. And thus it will continue, till by long use of
the strange tongue, and especially by long acquaintance with the owners
of it, they have imbibed the particular genius of the language.
‘Suppose then this foreign tongue, instead of being thus gradually
introduced into the minds of these illiterate men, was instantaneously
infused into them; the operation (though not the very mode of operating)
being the same, must not the effect be the same, let the cause be never
so different? Without question. The divine impression must be made
either by fixing the terms or single words only and their signification
in the memory; as for instance, Greek terms corresponding to the Syriac
or Hebrew; or else, together with that simple impression, another must
be made, to inrich the mind with all the ideas which go towards the
composing the phrases and idioms of the language so inspired: But this
latter impression seems to require, or rather indeed implies, a previous
one, of the tempers, fashions, and opinions of the people to whom the
language is native, upon the minds of them to whom the language is thus
imparted; because the phrase and idiom arises from, and is dependent on,
those manners: and therefore the force of expression can be understood
only in proportion to the knowledge of the manners: and understood they
were to be; the Recipients of this spiritual gift being not organical
canals, but rational Dispensers. So that this would be a waste of
miracles without a sufficient cause; the Syriac or Hebrew idiom, to
which the Disciples were enabled of themselves to adapt the words of the
Greek, or any other language, abundantly serving every useful purpose,
all which centered in giving CLEAR INTELLIGENCE. We conclude, therefore,
that what was thus inspired was the TERMS, together with that grammatic
congruity, which is dependant thereon. In a word, to suppose such kind
of inspired knowledge of _strange tongues_ as includes all the native
peculiarities, which, if you will, you may call their _elegancies_; (for
the more a language is coloured by the character and manners of the
native users, the more elegant it is esteemed) to suppose this, is, as I
have said, an ignorant fancy, and repugnant to reason and experience.
‘Now, from what has been observed, it follows, that if the style of the
N. T. were indeed derived from a language divinely infused as on the
day of Pentecost, it must be just such, with regard to its style, as,
in fact, we find it to be; that is to say, Greek words very frequently
delivered in Syriac and Hebrew idiom.
‘The conclusion from the whole is this, that _nominal_ or _local_
barbarity of style (for that this attribute, when applied to style, is no
more than nominal or local, will be clearly shewn under our next head) is
so far from being an objection to its miraculous acquisition, that it is
one mark of such extraordinary original[135].’
I have given this long quotation together, that the reader may comprehend
at one view the drift and coherence of the Bishop’s argument: which is so
clearly explained that what force it hath, can receive no addition from
any comment of mine upon it.
It is true, this force appears to you no mighty matter—“We are told, you
say, that, in order to convey clear intelligence to a foreigner, nothing
more is necessary, than to use the _words_ of his language adapted to the
_idiom_ of our own. But shall we always find correspondent words in his
language[136]?”
Shall _we always find correspondent words_?—Not always, _perfectly_
correspondent. Where does the Bishop say, we shall? Or, how was it to
his purpose to say it? He does indeed speak of _such a correspondency of
terms_, and chiefly _of such an adaption of the terms of one language
to the idiom of another_, as shall abundantly serve to give _clear
intelligence_. And this is all he had occasion to say.
Well, but an exact correspondency of terms is material. To what? To give
_clear intelligence_? But if this be true, no clear intelligence can
possibly be given in any translation from one language into another;
for, in all translations whatever, it is necessary to render some words
by others, that are not perfectly correspondent. You will scarcely deny
that our English translation of the Gospels conveys, in general, _clear
intelligence_ to the English reader, though many terms are used in it,
and were of necessity to be used, that do not perfectly and adequately
correspond to the Greek terms, employed by the sacred writers. Without
doubt it was your purpose to convey _clear intelligence_ to your
English reader in the elegant translations, they say, you have made of
DEMOSTHENES: and yet doubtless you will acknowledge that many words of
the Athenian orator are not perfectly correspondent to those employed by
you in your version of them.
What follows from this? Why, either that all translations must be
exploded and set aside as insufficient to give clear intelligence, or
that we must accept them, with all their unavoidable imperfections, as,
in general, sufficiently representative of the sense of their originals,
though in some particulars that sense be inadequately conveyed to us.
But how then, you will say, shall we gain a clear and perfect
intelligence of such particulars? Why in the way, which common sense
suggests; by inquiring, if we are able, what the precise meaning is of
those terms of the original language, to which the translated terms are
thus imperfectly correspondent. And if this be an inconvenience, ’tis an
inconvenience necessarily attending every translation in the world, in
which a writer would express the mixed modes denoted by the words of any
other. For supposing the Greek tongue, infused by divine inspiration into
the sacred writers, to have been that of PLATO or DEMOSTHENES himself,
you will hardly pretend that it could have furnished them with Greek
terms perfectly expressive of such compound ideas as certain Syriac or
Hebrew terms expressed, and of which their subject obliged them to give,
as far as the nature of the case would permit, _clear intelligence_. So
that I cannot for my life comprehend the drift of that short question,
_Shall we always find correspondent terms in a foreign language?_ or,
the pertinence of your learned comment on the text of CICERO’S letter to
SERVIUS.
I am sensible indeed, that, if the _terms_ only of the new language
were divinely infused, _these_, whether perfectly correspondent or not,
would be insufficient of themselves to give clear intelligence. But the
Bishop supposes more than this to be infused; for, _what was inspired,
he tells us, was the terms_, TOGETHER _with that grammatic congruity
which is dependent thereon_. Now this knowledge of the _grammatic
congruity_ of any tongue, superadded to a knowledge of its _terms_, would
methinks enable a writer to express himself in it, for the most part,
_intelligibly_.
I confess, the Bishop speaks—_of fixing the terms or single words_ ONLY,
_and their signification, in the memory_—But then he does not mean to
exclude the _grammatic congruity_ in the use of them, which, as we have
seen, he expressly requires in the very same paragraph, but merely to
expose the notion of the _phrases and idioms_ being required, too. His
Lordship speaks of the _terms, or single words_ ONLY, in opposition to
_phrases and idioms_: you seem to speak of _terms, or single words_ ONLY,
in opposition to _systematic congruity_.
I say, you _seem_ so to speak: for, otherwise, I know not what to make
of all you say concerning the insufficiency of the _terms only_ of any
language to give intelligence. And yet, in what follows, you _seem_ to
do justice to the Bishop, and to admit that, besides the _terms_, a
_grammatic congruity in the use of them_ was divinely inspired. For you
go on to observe, “That the real purport of almost every sentence, in
every language, is not to be learned from the signification of detached
words, _and their grammatical congruity_, even where their signification
may be expressed by correspondent words in another language[137].”
And here, Sir, your learning expatiates through several pages: the
purpose of all which is to shew, that, if the _terms_ of one language,
though _congruously used_, be strictly adapted to the _idiom_ of another,
still they would give no intelligence, or at least a very obscure
one; as you endeavour to prove by a _decent_ instance taken from your
countryman, SWIFT, in his dotages; and another, given by yourself in a
literal version of a long passage of a sacred writer. It is true, in this
last instance, you do not confine yourself to the strict observance of
_grammatic congruity_. If you had done this, it would have appeared, from
your own instance, that _intelligence_ might have been given, and with
tolerable _clearness_ too, even in a literal version.
But be it allowed, that, if the terms of one language, even though a
congruous construction be observed, be constantly and strictly adapted
to the _idioms_ of another, the expression will still, many times, be
very dark and obscure: how is this _obscurity_ to be prevented? Take what
language you will for the conveyance instruction, it will be necessary
for the reader or hearer to gain a competent knowledge of its idioms
and phraseology, before he can receive the full benefit of it. So that,
unless there had been a language in the world, native to all nations, and
in the strictest sense of the word _universal_, I see not how inspiration
itself could remedy this inconvenience. Suppose, as I said before, that
the inspired language in which the Apostles wrote had been the purest
Greek, still its _idiomatic phraseology_ had been as strange and obscure
to all such to whom that language was not native, as the Syriac or Hebrew
idioms, by which the Apostolic Greek is now supposed to be so much
darkened.
I conclude upon the whole, that nothing you have said overturns, or so
much as affects, the learned Prelate’s notion of divine inspiration, _as
conveying only the terms and single words of one language, corresponding
to those of another, together with that grammatic congruity in the use
of them which is dependant thereon_. This _first and grand principle_,
as you call it, of the Bishop’s new theory, _is such_, you say, _as no
critic or grammarian can admit_[138]. On the contrary, I must presume
to think, because I have now shewn, that no critic or grammarian, who
deserves the name, can reasonably object to this _principle_, as it
allows all that is necessary to be supposed of an inspired language, its
sufficiency to give clear intelligence: so _clear_, that, had the idioms
of the new language been inspired too, it could not, in the general view
of Providence, who intended this intelligence for the use of all people
and languages, have been clearer.
But your unfavourable sentiment of the Bishop’s principle arises
from your misconception of the _circumstances_, _abilities_, and
_qualifications_ of the Apostles, when they addressed themselves to the
work of their ministry, and especially to the work of composing books
for the instruction of the faithful in this originally inspired language.
When the Greek language was first infused, it would, no doubt, be full of
their native phrases, or rather it would be wholly and entirely adapted
to the Hebrew or Syriac idioms. This would render their expression
somewhat dark and obscure to their Grecian hearers. But then it would be
intelligible enough to those to whom they first and principally addressed
themselves, the _Hellenistic Jews_, who, though they understood Greek
best, were generally no strangers to the Hebrew idiom.
Further still, though this Hebrew-Greek language was all that was
originally infused into the Apostles, nothing hinders but that they
might, in the ordinary way, improve themselves in the Greek tongue,
and superadd to their inspired knowledge whatever they could acquire,
besides, by their conversation with the native Greeks, and the study of
their language. For, though it can hardly be imagined, as the Bishop
says, _that the inspired writers had cultivated their knowledge of the
language on the principles of the Grecian eloquence_[139], that is, had
formed and perfected their style by an anxious and critical attention to
the rules and practice of the Greek rhetors, yet we need not conclude
that they wholly neglected to improve themselves in the knowledge and use
of this new language. So that, by the time they turned themselves to the
Gentiles, and still more by the time they applied themselves to pen the
books of the N. T. they might be tolerable masters even of the peculiar
phraseology of the Greek tongue, and might be able to adapt it, in good
measure, to the Greek idioms.
All this, I say, is very _supposeable_; because their turning to the
Gentiles was not till near TEN years after the descent of the Holy Ghost
upon the Apostles and the date of their earliest writings, penned for
the edification of the Church, was not till near TWENTY years after that
period: In all which time, they had full leisure and opportunity to
acquire a competent knowledge of the native idiomatic Greek, abundantly
sufficient to answer all ends of clearness and instruction.
But I go further, and say, It is not only very _supposeable_, and
perfectly consistent with all the Bishop has advanced on the subject of
inspiration, that the sacred writers _might_ thus improve themselves,
but it is, likewise, very _clear_ and _certain_ that they DID. How else
are we to account for that difference of style observable in the sacred
writers, whose expression is more or less coloured by their native Hebrew
idioms, according as their acquaintance with the Greek tongue was more or
less perfect? There were still, no doubt, very many of their own native
idioms interspersed in their most improved Greek: As must ever be the
case of writers who compose in a foreign tongue, whether acquired in the
ordinary way, or supernaturally infused into them: But these barbarisms,
as they are called, I mean these Syriasms or Hebraisms, are not so
constant and perpetual as to prevent their writings from giving _clear
intelligence_. In short, the style of the inspired writers is JUST that
which we should naturally expect it to be, on this supposition of its
being somewhat improved by use and exercise, and which the learned Bishop
_accurately_ (and in perfect _consistency_ with his main principle, _of
the terms only being inspired, with the congruous use of them_) defines
it to be, “_Greek words_ VERY FREQUENTLY _delivered in Syriac and Hebrew
idiom_[140].”
Thus, in every view, the Bishop’s _grand_ principle may be safely
admitted. All that we _need_ suppose, and therefore all that is
_reasonable_ to be supposed, is, _That the terms of the Greek language,
and a grammatical congruity in the use of them_, was miraculously
infused: The rest would be competently and sufficiently obtained by the
application of ordinary means, without a miracle.
After saying so little, or rather after saying indeed _nothing_,
that affects the Bishop’s principle, I cannot but think it is with
an ill grace you turn yourself to cavil at the _following incidental
observation_ of his Lordship, which yet will be found as true and as just
as any other he has made on this subject.
To those who might expect _that, besides the simple impression of the
Greek terms only, and their signification_ on the minds of the inspired
linguists, _another should have been made to inrich the mind with all
the ideas which go towards the composing the phrases and idioms of the
language so inspired_ (all which had been necessary, if the inspired
language had been intended for a perfect model of Grecian eloquence),
the Bishop replies—‘This latter impression seems to require, or rather
indeed implies, a previous one of the tempers, fashions, and opinions, of
the people to whom the language is native, upon the minds of them to whom
the language is thus imparted; because the phrase and idiom arises from,
and is dependent on those manners[141].’ But such an impression as this,
he goes on to shew, was not to be expected.
It is clear from this passage, that the Bishop is speaking of _an
impression_ necessary to be made on the minds of the Apostles, if the
inspired language had been so complete as to extend to all its native
phrases and idioms. If the Apostles were instantly to possess the
inspired Greek in this perfection, it is necessary to suppose that this
_last_ impression must, as well as that of the terms, be made upon them.
Can any thing, be more certain and undeniable than this _affirmation?_
Yet, in p. 86. of your book, you have this strange passage.
After having shewn, as you suppose, that the Bishop’s grand principle, of
the inspiration of the TERMS only, stands on a very insecure foundation,
“Perhaps,” you say, “it is no less HAZARDOUS to affirm, that a knowledge
of the idiom or phraseology of any language, _always_ implies a previous
knowledge of the customs and manners of those to whom it is vernacular.”
You intended, no doubt, in your censure of this hazardous position, to
oppose something which the Bishop had affirmed. Be pleased now to cast
your eye on the passage you criticize, and tell me where the Bishop
asserts, _that a_ KNOWLEDGE _of the idiom or phraseology of any language_
ALWAYS _implies a previous knowledge of the customs and manners of
those to whom it is vernacular_. What the Bishop asserts is, _That an_
IMPRESSION _of the phrases and idioms of an inspired language implies
a previous_ IMPRESSION _of the tempers, fashions, and opinions of the
people to whom the language is native, upon the minds of them to who
the language is_ THUS _imparted_: that is, if a knowledge of the idioms
had been _impressed_, a knowledge of the customs and manners from which
those idioms arise, and without a knowledge of which they could not be
understood (as they were to be, by the recipients of this spiritual
gift), must have been _impressed_ likewise. No, you say: a _knowledge_ of
the idiom of a language does not _always_ imply a previous _knowledge_
of the manners. Who says, it does? We may come to _know_ the idioms of
languages, without a _divine impression_: and without such impression,
for any thing appears to the contrary, the Bishop might suppose the
sacred writers came by their knowledge, so far as they possessed it,
of the Greek idioms. But the _impression_ of such idioms could only
come from another and _previous impression_ of the customs and manners:
because in this case, without a previous impression of the _customs and
manners_, the _idioms_ themselves, when impressed, could not have been
understood, nor consequently put to use, by the persons on whom this
impression was made. They had no time to recur to Lexicons, Grammars, and
Commentaries to know the meaning of the impressed idioms. How then were
they, on the instant, to know their meaning at all, but by a _previous
impression_ of the manners, from which they arose, and which would put
them into a capacity of understanding these impressed idioms?
In a word, the Bishop is speaking of SUPERNATURAL IMPRESSION: you, of
NATURAL KNOWLEDGE. No wonder, then, your reasoning and your learning,
in the concluding pages of this chapter, should look entirely _beside_
the matter in hand, or, at best, should look so _askew_ on the Bishop’s
_hazardous_ position. It is certain, you are far enough out of all danger
of encountering it, when you entrench yourself, at length, behind this
distant and secure conclusion—“that the knowledge of idiom is so far from
requiring, or implying a previous one of tempers, manners, _&c._ that the
very CONVERSE of this seems to be the safer principle; and that tempers
and manners are not to be learned, without some degree of previous
acquaintance with the peculiarities of a language[142]:” a proposition,
which though exceptionable enough, as you put it, and even suggesting
some pleasant ideas, I am in no humour, at present, to contest with you.
This, SIR, IS THE WHOLE of what I find advanced by you, that hath any
shew or appearance of being intended as a Confutation of the argument
by which the Bishop supports his FIRST PARADOX; in opposition to Dr.
MIDDLETON’S opinion, _That an inspired language must needs be a language
of perfect eloquence_. The Bishop has told us in very accurate terms what
he conceives the character of an inspired language must needs be: and I
have at least shewn, that the character he gives of it may be a just
one, notwithstanding any thing you have objected to it in your learned
Dissertation.
I now proceed to the Bishop’s SECOND PARADOX; which opposes Dr.
MIDDLETON’S _second Proposition, That eloquence is something congenial
and essential to human speech, and inherent in the constitution of
things_.