FROM YPRES TO LEDEGHEM
28TH SEPTEMBER TO 14TH OCTOBER 1918
Three hours before zero on the 28th September the Belgians commenced
their preliminary bombardment, which on our front provoked little
retaliation. Heavy rain was falling and it was the dark hour before
dawn, when at 5.25 A.M. our leading infantry advanced to the attack
over the slippery and shell-pitted ground. The 28th Brigade was on a
front of 700[124] yards and the 26th on one of 1200.
The whole operation went like clockwork, although at the start
progress was somewhat impeded by the darkness and the churned-up
soil, now rendered more unstable by the continuous rain. A
smoke-barrage[125] was at first unnecessary owing to the very early
zero[126] hour, but as dawn broke and a south-west breeze sprang
up, its great value became apparent and the tunnelled dug-outs and
“Pill-boxes,” which strewed the Bellewarde and Frezenberg Ridges,
were isolated and captured with greater ease than might have been
expected. By 6.45 A.M. the northern end of the Frezenberg Ridge
was taken; by 8 A.M. the whole of it was in our hands, and patrols
from the Highland Brigade had pushed on towards the Hanebeek, in
conjunction with the Eighth Belgian Division.
The Sappers and Pioneers, who had bridged the stream at Potijze
during the night of the 27th/28th, followed immediately behind the
infantry, and set to work without delay on the Ypres-Zonnebeke and
Hell-fire Corner-Zonnebeke roads. Their rapid improvements rewarded
all the forethought and labour which had been expended in the
accumulation of suitable material, and enabled the forward movement
of the divisional artillery to begin at 8 A.M. By 8.30 A.M. our
first howitzer battery came into action in its new position, but the
Ypres-Zonnebeke road soon became congested with Belgian artillery and
the progress of our remaining batteries was slow.
Advance from the Frezenberg Ridge was resumed at 8.35 A.M. The
dispositions of the 28th Brigade remained unaltered, but in the
26th the Camerons passed through the Seaforths and Black Watch. The
plan now entailed a partial wheel to the left, in order that the
high ground might be secured before the low ground farther north
was crossed. This manœuvre was accomplished with the aid of a H.E.
barrage, into which the Field Artillery joined, battery by battery,
as they reached their new position west of Frezenberg Ridge. The
first real opposition encountered by the infantry was near Anzac
Ridge, where dense strands of wire and groups of “Pill-boxes”
enhanced the natural strength of the position, but nothing could
arrest the momentum of our men, and half an hour before noon all the
main ridge from the Polygone de Zonnebeke to Broodseinde was in our
possession.
Thus our final objective was won with surprising ease and at trifling
cost; the only matter now to be settled was the part to be played by
the 27th Brigade.
This brigade had moved up from camps west of Ypres early on the 28th,
and proceeded steadily over the heavy ground to the Polygone Butt.
Brig.-General Croft had been ordered to be prepared for any one of
three courses; to assist either of our assaulting brigades during the
advance to Broodseinde Ridge, or to advance north from Broodseinde
in the event of the Belgians finding the low and boggy ground on
their front impassable, or to exploit success by an advance towards
Becelaere.
Accordingly General Tudor and Brig.-General Croft went forward to
the Broodseinde Ridge, and by 12.30 P.M. had ascertained beyond
doubt that it was firmly held by the Belgians as well as by our own
men. The resistance of the German infantry was feeble, and their
artillery-fire practically negligible. Gheluvelt had already fallen
to the Twenty-ninth Division, and the Highland Brigade and the Eighth
Belgian Division were in close touch several hundred yards east of
Broodseinde Cross Roads.
The Lowland Brigade was therefore instructed to advance against
Becelaere. Owing to a breakdown of the visual signalling arrangements
there was a delay in the transmission of the orders, and the two
assaulting battalions, the 12th and 11th Royal Scots, did not leave
their position of deployment near Polygone Butt until 2.30 P.M.
Stern opposition was encountered at once, chiefly on the left of the
11th Royal Scots, and increased perceptibly as our men approached
Becelaere. Just north of the village three hostile batteries came
into action in the open, and it was only after a strenuous combat
that the 11th Royal Scots, assisted by a section of “B” Company of
the Machine-gun Battalion, took possession of one of these batteries
and silenced the others. The enemy’s machine-gunners were still full
of fight, but all virtue had gone out of the infantry, who, though
present in large numbers, took no part in the operation. The 11th
Royal Scots mastered the Molenhoek Ridge, and the high ground north
of the village of Becelaere was taken by the 12th Royal Scots about 4
P.M.
The seizure of the village set a limit to our advance that day. At
nightfall the situation was as follows: the Twenty-ninth Division
was believed to be holding the line Nieuwe Kruiseecke Cross
Roads-Poezelhoek, but no connection had yet been secured with it;
the 27th Brigade, holding Becelaere, was in touch at Judge Cross
Roads with the 26th, which was linked up with the Belgians east
of Broodseinde Cross Roads, each brigade having two battalions in
line and one in brigade reserve; the 28th Brigade lay in divisional
reserve near Polygone Butt with one battalion pushed forward to
protect the right rear of the 27th. Our casualties had been slight,
and in that one day considerably more ground had been won than during
months of furious fighting in 1917. Nothing could have revealed in
a stronger light the unmistakable change that had come over the
character of the war.
Our greatest trouble was the opening up of decent roads from Ypres
to the ridge. The one route of any consequence—the Ypres-Zonnebeke
road—was ready for wheeled traffic as far as Zonnebeke by 1 P.M.,
and by dusk all three[127] artillery brigades were in action behind
the Broodseinde Ridge. But it was the one highway fit for use, and
during the hours of darkness it was thronged with Belgian and British
limbers, some of which remained out on the road all night. These
difficulties had been foreseen by Lieut.-Colonel Jeffcoat, who had
organised a small column of pack animals for each brigade, and under
the personal supervision of the brigade staff captains the rations
for the men were brought up on the night of the 28th.
Early in the afternoon of that day General Tudor was informed that
the Thirty-sixth Division, in Corps reserve, was to come into line
between the Ninth and Twenty-ninth Divisions, and the 153rd A.F.A.
Brigade was to be under its command. About midnight orders were
received to continue the push next day by daylight. The Thirty-sixth
Division, which was to take over Becelaere from the 27th Brigade,
was to advance on Terhand while the Twenty-ninth Division was to
carry Gheluwe. The Ninth, covering the left flank of the Thirty-sixth
Division, was to conform on its left to the Belgian Army, by moving
in close touch with it to the vicinity of Keiberg Spur.
The brigadiers received their orders in person from General Tudor.
The 28th Brigade was to lead the attack; the 27th and 26th, following
in rear of the right and left of the 28th respectively, were to
reinforce and carry on the assault without waiting for orders in the
event of progress being checked. To give the men as much rest as
possible and to allow the Thirty-sixth Division to come up into line,
9 A.M. was the hour fixed for the resumption of the forward movement.
The steady downpour under which the attack had begun was still
falling at 9 A.M. on the 29th. The autumn night had been not only
wet but very cold, and as practically no shelter was available great
discomfort was endured by the men. Fortunately the sky showed
signs of clearing when the 28th Brigade, with the “Rifles” and
Newfoundlanders in line, and the Royal Scots Fusiliers in reserve,
passed through the outposts of the 26th Brigade and began its advance
on the Keiberg Spur. There was no creeping barrage, but our guns
fired smoke to cover the movement of the troops across the shallow
valley separating Keiberg from Broodseinde Ridge. Amid desultory
shell and considerable machine-gun fire Brig.-General Jack’s men
pressed on, and by 10 A.M. the Newfoundlanders with the Belgians
on their left had captured the Keiberg and had broken through the
Passchendaele-Terhand line; by 11.25 A.M. they were reported to be
entering Waterdamhoek. One section of the 50th Brigade R.F.A. reached
the Spur and was soon followed by the remainder of the battery.
From the outset the “Rifles” met firm opposition and were
constantly enfiladed by machine-gun fire from the south, though the
Thirty-sixth Division had gone through the outposts of the 27th
Brigade about 9.30 A.M. For a brief space our men were checked by
the Passchendaele-Terhand line, but this was quickly carried, and
about 1 P.M. both the “Rifles” and Newfoundlanders were facing a
strongly-wired line running east of Moorslede and Waterdamhoek,
and west of Strooiboomhoek and Dadizeele, called the Flanders I.
Stellung. Here they suffered grievously through machine-gun fire
from the front and from the right wing, where Terhand had not yet
been captured. There was now a gap between the 28th Brigade and the
Belgians, and the Highland Brigade was ordered to send a battalion to
fill it.
The Camerons accordingly moved forward, but after they had passed
well over the Keiberg Spur, the Belgians, who were experiencing
obstinate resistance near Moorslede asked for assistance, and General
Tudor commanded Brig.-General Hore Ruthven to use his whole brigade
if necessary, and press on south of Moorslede with the utmost speed.
Meanwhile Brig.-General Croft had instructed his battalion commanders
to follow close behind the “Rifles” and to join in the attack if the
advance showed any sign of being checked. Finding that the leading
troops had been brought to a standstill, Lieut.-Colonel Smyth, who
had been reconnoitring well ahead of the brigade, consulted with
Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Campbell, and they sent forward two companies
each of the K.O.S.B. and the 11th Royal Scots. The additional
momentum thus thrown into the onset carried the whole line forward
about 2.30 P.M. On a front of nearly 4000 yards men of the 27th and
28th Brigades broke through the Flanders I. Stellung position and
entered Dadizeele about 4 P.M., just as the enemy was hurriedly
evacuating it. Pushing forward, they established themselves on
the Menin-Roulers road as dusk was falling. North of them the
Highlanders, whose dash had materially assisted the Belgians to
carry Moorslede, took up a position about 300 yards west of the
Menin-Roulers road, extending north almost to St Pieter, which the
Belgians wrongly reported as being in their hands. The latter did not
forget the assistance given them by the Highlanders on this day, and
it was referred to in terms of great appreciation by the King of the
Belgians when he reviewed the Division on the 5th November.
This concluded the operations for the day. On our right the
Thirty-sixth Division, encountering stiff opposition, did not secure
Terhand until 3.45 P.M., and at night the enemy was still holding
Wijfwegen and Hill 41, a very important tactical feature, which
dominated our right flank. On our left the Belgian line ran back for
fully 1000 yards parallel to and south of the St Pieter-Moorslede
road, north of which they had failed to penetrate a thick belt of
wire.
The line of the Ninth was thus well ahead of that held by the
divisions on both wings, our frontage being about 3500 yards, 1500
of which were south of the divisional boundary. Owing largely to the
skilful leading of regimental officers casualties had on the whole
been few, the “Rifles” being hardest hit. Lieut.-Colonel Kelso of the
Royal Scots Fusiliers was blown up by a shell, but though severely
shaken refused to leave his battalion. In the evening the 28th
Brigade was withdrawn into divisional reserve about Potterijebrug,
with the exception of three and a half companies which were left in
the line until the following night to reinforce the 27th Brigade.
After a dry spell, rain commenced again at 6 P.M. and continuing to
fall throughout the night added enormously to the difficulties of
keeping open the Ypres-Zonnebeke road, where traffic was constantly
blocked by huge Belgian drays, slowly hauled along by one or two
miserable horses.
Orders were received from Corps to resume the advance on the 30th,
but in view of the fact that the Ninth was already holding a
difficult salient, General Tudor decided to await news of the attack
by the divisions on our wings before giving any orders. Brigades,
however, were instructed to be ready to move at 9 A.M.
At 8 A.M. General Tudor presided over a conference of brigadiers at
Waterdamhoek. Our patrols had reported strong opposition east of the
Menin-Roulers road, and he therefore ordered his brigade commanders,
pending news from the divisions on our flanks, to look for weak
parts in the hostile line and to push on if opportunity offered.
Neither the Thirty-sixth nor the Eighth Belgian Division attacked in
force on the 30th. The former, under a smoke-screen put down by the
50th Brigade R.F.A., captured Hill 41 about 4.30 P.M., but was almost
immediately expelled by a counter-attack. During the day it took over
the line up to Klephoek Cross Roads from the 27th Brigade, which
even after this adjustment was still holding 1000 yards south of the
divisional boundary. The Belgians failed to secure St Pieter, and the
Black Watch who co-operated were also stopped by severe machine-gun
fire; thus by night the situation was unaltered, the Ninth continuing
to occupy a sharp salient.
During the morning the artillery brigades sent forward one or two
guns to give close support to the infantry, and one gun of B/51
Battery near Slypshoek was almost up to the front line. Between noon
and 2 P.M. the 50th and 51st Brigades R.F.A. were in action in the
area Strooiboomhoek-Slypskappelle-Spriethoek. The route taken by the
50th Brigade to reach its position was in full view of the enemy’s
lines, but the movement was carried out without much interference.
Constant and heavy rain fell throughout the day, and consequently
there was complete dislocation of traffic on the Ypres-Zonnebeke
road, with the result that no artillery ammunition could be brought
up, and the ration wagons of some units remained on the road all
night.
The troubles that beset us were now becoming formidable, and it was
also clear that the enemy was rushing up fresh troops to dispute our
further progress. General Tudor, convinced that isolated attacks
were a mistake, as the experience of the Thirty-sixth Division
and the Belgians on the 30th showed, rode over to see General
Detail, G.O.C. of the Eighth Belgian Division, who agreed that if
an attack was to be made it should be along the whole line. At the
same time, General Detail declared that his division would not be
able to make an assault for some days. Shortly afterwards orders
arrived for a general onset at 6.15 A.M., the Ninth Division having
as objective Ledeghem, thence due east to Cuerne and Harlebeke. The
first objective of the Corps consisted of the villages of Ledeghem
and Menin, and the line of the Railway between them. The frontage
allotted to the Division was from Klephoek, east of Dadizeele, to
St Pieter. The Ninth was ready, but, as shown above, the Belgians
were unable to attack so soon. This was represented to the Corps,
but communications were defective and very slow, speaking on the
telephone was impossible, and time did not permit of a complete
report of the situation reaching Corps H.Q. in time to postpone
the operation. Knowing that the Belgians could not attack, though,
as always, they were eager to help us in any way in their power,
General Tudor acquainted them with the situation, and they agreed
to safeguard our flank by conforming later if our efforts were
successful. He also instructed Brig.-General Hore Ruthven, who was
very anxious about his northern wing, to seize and consolidate the
line of the Railway, but to go no farther unless the Belgians joined
in the battle.
The position on our right also caused great uneasiness; so long
as Hill 41 remained in German hands our advance on this flank was
bound to be a precarious business, but it was understood that the
Thirty-sixth Division would storm the Hill at 5.45 A.M.
The weather was still very disagreeable when at 6.15 A.M. on the 1st
October, the assault was launched under cover of a smoke-barrage. It
was delivered by the 27th Brigade, with the K.O.S.B., the 12th Royal
Scots and a company of the 11th Royal Scots, and by the 26th Brigade
with the Seaforths and Black Watch. On our right the enemy put down
a heavy bombardment, but fortunately it fell principally behind the
27th Brigade. A few field-guns had been brought up to within 400 or
500 yards of the front line to engage Ledeghem and some scattered
farms close to our front. The fire of these guns at short range,
combined with the smoke-barrage, proved of immense value in helping
the infantry to overpower the stout resistance which was at first
encountered in and around the farm buildings. When that had been
quelled, progress was continued with great rapidity, and for a time
all opposition collapsed. The Lowland Brigade carried the whole of
Ledeghem and speedily arrived at the line of the light railway 500
yards east of the village. On the left the Highland Brigade captured
what turned out to be one of the last groups of German “Pill-boxes,”
and also reached the light railway, while the Black Watch advancing
as far as Rolleghem Cappelle penetrated the village and engaged
hostile guns caught in the act of limbering up.
The opposition in front was insignificant, but the enemy, who had
brought up fresh troops,[128] was quick to detect and take advantage
of the weakness on our wings. On the right the K.O.S.B. had been
harassed continuously from the start of the battle by machine-gun
fire from Hill 41, which increased in volume as the Menin-Roulers
Railway was approached. The Thirty-sixth Division had postponed its
attack on the Hill, with fatal consequences to our right wing, and
Dadizeelehoek, less than 1000 yards south of Ledeghem, appeared to
be bristling with machine-guns. Lieut.-Colonel Smyth with admirable
promptitude swung two of his companies to the right, with the
intention of clearing Hill 41 from the north. But the manœuvre was
foiled by an almost solid flow of lead from hostile machine-guns,
and Lieut.-Colonel Smyth was obliged to use the greater part of his
battalion in forming a defensive flank, while a field-gun, with
bullets pattering against its shield, was brought up ready to fire at
point-blank range as soon as the enemy counter-attacked.
On the left, as the Belgian forces had not yet advanced,
Brig.-General Hore Ruthven had to employ his reserve battalion, the
Camerons, in forming a defensive flank under scourging machine-gun
fire.
[Illustration: “PILL-BOX” NEAR LEDEGHEM]
At the outset of the battle the situation appeared to offer a
distinct opportunity for cavalry[129] exploitation to widen the
breach that had been made in the enemy’s line, but no force was
available to move up immediately and the chance was lost. Very
anxious about his left, General Tudor sent messages to the French
Cavalry leader and the commander of the Eighth Belgian Division,
requesting the former to send up without delay a regiment to
Brig.-General Hore Ruthven’s H.Q. at Slypskappelle, and the latter
to fill the gap that now existed between our left and its right.
Word was also despatched to the Corps suggesting that any available
troops should be sent up behind the Ninth to follow up success, and
protect its flanks. At the same time General Tudor commanded the
28th Brigade, which since the 28th September had been out of the
fighting line for little more than twenty-four hours, to be ready to
guard the right flank.
The hostile pressure on our exposed flanks was steadily augmented. By
11 A.M. the Highlanders after suffering severe losses were obliged
to withdraw to the main Menin-Roulers Railway, which they held for
a distance of 1000 yards north of Ledeghem, whence their line ran
back to a point about 500 yards south of St Pieter. This difficult
retirement was carried out with the utmost coolness. Lieut.-Colonel
French of the Black Watch, with great personal courage formed a
defensive flank with his men and prevented the Germans from breaking
our line. The French Cavalry Regiment arrived later; but the
opportunity for its profitable employment had passed. The Belgians
attacking at 11 A.M. took St Pieter, but failed to advance more than
100 yards east of it. Farther north their assault did not succeed,
and their line ran in a north-west or west-north-west direction from
the village. The machine-gun company in divisional reserve was moved
up to reinforce the 26th Brigade, which had gained about 1000 yards
on its right, while its left sloped back to the southern end of St
Pieter.
On our right at 10.30 A.M. a hostile counter-attack from the
south-east, gallantly led by mounted officers, withered away before
the fire of four Lewis Guns in Ledeghem Cemetery, but two hours
later a second attempt from the north-east as well as from the
south-east expelled our troops from most of Ledeghem. An immediate
counter-thrust by the 11th and 12th Royal Scots retook the northern
end of the village, west of which the K.O.S.B. established a line
along the Railway with their right flank thrown back to Manhattan
Farm. From an observation post about 100 yards behind his front
line, Lieut.-Colonel Smyth saw the Germans collecting troops for a
great counter-stroke, and the K.O.S.B. were bracing themselves for a
desperate resistance at Manhattan Farm, when the timely arrival of
the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, who made a most heroic attack on Hill
41 from the north, scared the enemy and turned his efforts solely to
defence. Though the Inniskillings failed to capture the Hill, their
plucky effort probably saved the K.O.S.B., and so great was the
admiration of the latter and the troops of the Ninth Division who
witnessed the attack, that the G.O.C. at their request wrote at once
to the Thirty-sixth Division expressing the admiration and thanks of
the officers and men of the Ninth.
Throughout the whole of that trying time when the Division was
fighting single-handed, the close and fearless support of the
infantry by our gunners proved of inestimable value in breaking up
counter-attacks. In spite of the continuous rattle of bullets on the
shields, Lieut. Gorle of the 50th Brigade R.F.A. led two guns up to
Ledeghem, and on four separate occasions under a veritable hail of
lead brought single guns into action within a few hundred yards of
the enemy. Providentially, though his tunic was combed with bullets,
he escaped the death that seemed inevitable, and for his most
opportune heroism he was worthily awarded the V.C.
Our gains on the 1st October were insignificant compared with those
on the 28th and the 29th September, but in the old days of trench
warfare they would have represented a very creditable achievement.
And there is little doubt that they would have been much more
remarkable but for the lack of co-operation which prevented a
simultaneous attack along the whole front, for the Ninth had been
stopped only by the want of support on its wings. Nevertheless,
since the 28th September the Division[130] had crossed the tragic
Passchendaele Ridge, left behind it the blighted wilderness created
by more than four years of grisly strife, and established itself on
the fringe of a landscape yet unscarred by war. In all, ten miles had
been traversed since the beginning of the battle, and many prisoners
and countless trophies had fallen into our hands.
The operations of the 1st October mark the end of the first phase of
the Flanders offensive. It was clear that the enemy had strengthened
his front, and that time would be saved and success more assured
if the advance was resumed under cover of a thoroughly organised
artillery barrage. This involved a certain amount of delay, as our
advance had outstripped our facilities for sending forward stores
and supplies, and roads and routes had to be constructed through
the trackless jungle of the desolated region before heavy guns and
ammunition could be brought up. Fortunately the line held by us was
so well furnished with “Pill-boxes,” that during the lull our troops
were more comfortably housed and protected than could have been
anticipated.
Reverses in Flanders formed only a portion of the humiliations that
were crowding on Germany. Before September had closed the Hindenburg
Line, and with it all the hopes of the Fatherland, was broken by
British forces, and the German armies were drawn back to the Selle.
This success, together with the advance in Flanders, compelled the
enemy to evacuate the Lys salient and draw back his front towards
Lille and Douai. In the Woeuvre and Argonne, American and French
forces were waging a grim struggle; for here the foe’s resistance was
necessarily desperate, since the collapse of this flank was bound
to involve the utter destruction of the German forces in France.
But steady progress was made, though the Americans were hampered by
commissariat difficulties, and it became exceedingly doubtful if
the enemy could maintain the line of the Meuse, upon which his last
chance of safety rested.
The result of the fighting till the 14th October was that deep dents
had been made in the opposing line, which was left with inconvenient
salients in the north round Lille and Douai, and farther south
between the Oise and the Aisne. With a view to saving Lille and its
industrial environs from the ravages of war, the policy of the Allies
was to encircle the city and so cause its abandonment. To this end a
further attack by the Belgian and British forces was planned for the
14th October.
In this operation the task assigned by the II. Corps to the Ninth
was the Courtrai-Lendelede Railway, after reaching which, the
Division was to make good the crossings over the Lys between Courtrai
and Harlebeke. The railway was 9000 and the river 14,000 yards from
our line. Since the 1st October the Division had experienced a fairly
quiet time, but the Royal Scots Fusiliers had the bad luck to lose
their C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Kelso being badly wounded by a shell; the
command of the battalion was taken over by Major A. King.
On the 3rd the Germans counter-attacked under cover of a heavy
bombardment, but were repulsed mainly through the agency of the
Newfoundlanders, who, in their anxiety not to miss a fight, left
their positions in the support line and hurrying forward to the front
used their rifles and Lewis Guns with such effect that the attack
lost all its sting. The Newfoundlanders had already proved their
mettle on the first two days of the battle, and their prowess on the
3rd won them the sincere homage which good soldiers always pay to a
brave feat of arms. The clannish Scots were proud to have them as
brothers-in-arms.
While preparations for attack were steadily pushed on, each brigade
was drawn back in succession for a short rest in the camps west of
Ypres. The 104th Battalion of the Machine-Gun Corps, which had been
attached to the Ninth since the 28th September, was reorganised into
three companies, two of which were attached to the Twenty-ninth and
Thirty-sixth Divisions respectively. Various minor changes were made
on our front, which on the night of the 13th/14th extended from the
north end of Ledeghem to a hundred yards south of the cross roads in
St Pieter, the Twenty-ninth Division having again come into line on
our right and taken over the position facing the village. Our chief
annoyances during the period were caused by hostile area “shoots”
and aerial bombing which did much damage in the transport lines,
seventy-six artillery horses being killed in a single night. There
were suspicions that the Germans were withdrawing, but constant and
daring patrol work proved our fears to be groundless.
The boundaries within which the Ninth was to advance consisted of
two parallel lines running slightly south-east from the flanks of
our sector, and giving us a frontage of 1500 yards; but as our
left wing was bent back and faced north-east, the jumping-off line
measured nearly 2000 yards. It was therefore advisable to straighten
the line and this could best be done by bringing our left up to the
Menin-Roulers Railway, along which our right already ran. But to
eliminate the risk of the right being barraged by the enemy while
waiting for the left to come up, it was arranged that the whole
line should advance simultaneously, and that the right would pause
for thirty minutes on the light railway, 1000 yards east of the
main railway, to enable the left to come into line and to give the
Twenty-ninth Division time to clear the village of Ledeghem.
Apart from the enemy, the greatest obstacles seemed likely to be
the Wulfdambeek stream, the village of Rolleghem Cappelle and dense
masses of wire. Information about the width and depth of the stream
was conflicting and scanty, but in order to run no risks eight light
foot-bridges were prepared and carried by infantry parties, but, as
it happened, they were not required, all the bridges having been
left intact. The German wire was intensely strong; close in front of
the left flank a belt over 100 yards in depth protected Mogg Farm
and one or two “Pill-boxes” near it, and behind Rolleghem Cappelle
four continuous bands stretched across our front from south-west
to north-east. A similar barrier of equal depth extended along the
reverse slope of a low but prominent ridge 4000 yards from our right
flank. This ridge could be clearly seen from our line, and was at
the extreme range at which the infantry could be covered by the
gunners from their original positions; for this reason it was given
as the first objective of the Ninth. Whether further progress could
be made without artillery support would depend upon the tactical
situation after the ridge was won. The advance to the objective was
to be covered by the Ninth’s usual barrage. A forward section of
18-pounders was detailed to work with each of the two assaulting
battalions, and two 6-inch trench mortars, mounted for the first time
on wheels, were to operate in conjunction with the infantry.
The attack was entrusted to the 28th Brigade, with the
Newfoundlanders and Royal Scots Fusiliers in line, and for the
purpose of maintaining liaison with the Belgians, a company of the
Black Watch was to operate on the left of the 28th Brigade. The 27th
Brigade was in reserve. One company of the 9th Machine-Gun Battalion
was attached to each infantry brigade, the remaining one and a
company of the 104th Battalion being detailed to barrage certain
points to cover the infantry advance, and then to form part of the
divisional reserve. The assault was to be delivered at 5.35 A.M.
On the night of the 12th/13th the 28th Brigade A.F.A. and four guns
of each battery of the 50th and 51st Brigades moved up to forward
positions, the rest of the sections following on the night of the
13th/14th. All the battery positions were within about 1500 yards of
the front line, and forward guns of the 51st Brigade were to deal
with “Pill-boxes” and farms at a range of 700 yards. Supplementary
to the two mobile 6-inch trench mortars, five others were placed in
position. The 27th Brigade moved up by battalions from the rest area
near Ypres to Keiberg Spur on the 13th, and that night the 28th took
over the line except the portion held by the liaison company of the
Black Watch. There was great artillery activity during the relief,
the enemy sending over a good deal of gas, and the Newfoundlanders
and the Royal Scots Fusiliers had over fifty casualties on the way up
to their assembly positions.