METEREN AND HOEGENACKER RIDGE
MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1918
The moral of our troops was a subject of frequent notice in the Press
during March and April, and it was so persistently stated that it
had not been affected by reverses and disasters that suspicions were
aroused about the value of a moral which required so much loquacity
to convince people of its soundness. As a matter of fact the men in
France were calmer and less nervous than our “Home Front,” as the
Germans would call it. It is true that both in March and April there
had been instances of unseemly panic, but this was inevitable in
an army numbering many thousands. But though here and there a few
weaklings succumbing to exhaustion and despair lost heart, the vast
majority of the men of the Fifth, Third, and Second Armies never
faltered; they fully realised that on their devotion and sacrifice
depended the fate of civilisation. Greater nervousness was in fact
apparent after the crisis had passed, and during the summer of 1918
there was a regular epidemic of self-inflicted wounds, but it was
very noticeable that practically all the culprits were fresh soldiers
who had never been in any fighting, and a few weeks’ careful training
in the trenches led to a rapid diminution of this feeble-hearted
device.
A clear gain early in 1918 was the greater reliability of our
official communiqués. The garbled and misleading accounts of the
battles since the time of Loos were not calculated to elevate the
moral of those fighting in France, and men who had taken part in
such an action as the “3rd May” 1917 were exasperated to find it
reported in the Press as a great British victory. “British official,”
formerly the hall-mark of truth, became a dubious phrase, and the
practice of soothing the timid by toning down reverses was more than
counter-balanced by a loss of faith in the veracity of the British
Government. The method now adopted of publishing full accounts of
events was as wholesome as it was satisfactory, and undoubtedly
helped to improve the moral of the Army.
The Germans in two offensives had seized a vast extent of territory,
and made huge captures in prisoners and material, but they had failed
to overwhelm the British forces and to break our liaison with the
French. During the panic in March and April the British Government
extended the scope of the Military Service Act, and sought, without
adequate consideration, to introduce conscription into Ireland.
From these measures no real gain was to be expected; for the men in
Britain now drawn into the Army were more necessary for the upkeep of
industry at home, and were too old to be of much service as soldiers,
while the attempt to bring Ireland under conscription delivered
the country to the Sinn Feiners, and compelled the Government to
divert to that island large forces which could have found more
useful employment on the Western Front. A more solid compensation
was derived from the energy and celerity with which America came
to the assistance of the Entente, and the rapid and continuous
transportation of its soldiers across the Atlantic to France was
the most signal illustration of the failure of the German submarine
campaign. Unless Germany could intercept American reinforcements her
position was hopeless; and her capacity for interference was at least
curtailed by the dashing naval operations which blocked the harbours
of Ostend and Zeebrugge.
Even success on land added to her embarrassments; for her length
of front had been greatly augmented and portions of her line,
especially in the north, were difficult and costly positions to
defend. Moreover, the attack had taxed her strength to the utmost,
and it was not till the end of May that she was able to strike a
fresh blow. The new offensive directed against the Chemin des Dames
with the object of widening the German front towards Paris, marked
the final abandonment of the strategical conception with which
Ludendorff had commenced the campaign, though our front near Amiens
probably remained for the enemy the most profitable point of attack.
The rush on the 27th May, which chiefly affected the French, at first
swept everything before it, and by the end of the month the enemy
had reached the Marne between Château Thierry and Dormans. Near that
point the line became stabilised, and the resistance of the French
was supported by British and American troops.
During the greater part of May, the Ninth after leaving Poperinghe
was resting and reorganising near St Omer. D.H.Q. were at Blaringhem,
and the brigades were in neighbouring villages except the 27th, which
was in a camp at Lumbres. After three weeks of constant training and
good weather, the Division, now largely composed of youths little
more than eighteen years of age, was ready to return to the line, and
on the night of the 25th May the 26th Brigade with the 9th Scottish
Rifles attached, relieved the Thirty-first Division near Meteren.
On the following day the South African Brigade took over the right
sector from the 26th.
The position held by the Ninth was essential for the safety of
the important railway centres of Hazebrouck and St Omer, and had
therefore to be maintained at all costs. The main feature was the
narrow isolated ridge of the Meteren Hill running north and south
from Fontaine Hoek towards Meteren; on the east it overlooked
the French and German lines towards St Jans Cappel and Bailleul,
and on the west the valley of the Meteren Becque as far as the
Flêtre-Roukloshille Ridge which lay behind the Hill. The enemy was in
possession of the village, which, standing on high ground, afforded
him observation of all approaches to the west of Meteren Hill and
almost all the ground in our area east of the Flêtre-Roukloshille
Ridge, thus preventing any movement on the part of our men in
daylight.
In the early summer the initiative still remained with the enemy,
and there was anxious speculation as to the place where his next
blow would fall. Prince Rupprecht was known to have large forces in
reserve and the Mont des Cats and Hazebrouck seemed to offer tempting
prizes. Our aeroplane observation showed that extensive preparations
for an attack had already been made, and throughout May and June
our vigilance was never suffered to relax. Rows of trenches were
dug back to St Omer; in the forward area a continuous front trench
was excavated, covered by isolated advance posts, while there was a
strong support line hinging on Phineboom and a reserve position near
Flêtre. On the 27th May the “Rifles” secured a wounded prisoner, who
informed us that the enemy was going to make a big attack on the
29th, but that day passed without any untoward occurrence. The German
operations near the Chemin des Dames were now in full swing, but the
foe on our front continued to form dumps and depots, and not until
the end of June was it clear that his projected offensive on the Mont
des Cats and Hazebrouck had been given up.
On the whole, the Ninth found the sector a very pleasant one to hold
and our casualties from the enemy’s artillery-fire were not very
high. The landscape was typically agricultural and consisted of wide
fields of long waving corn, coloured in patches by the bright red
of the poppy, with a few substantial farmhouses interspersed here
and there. So hurried had been the flight of the civilians from the
district that at many of the farms some live-stock had been left, and
in one portion of the line two cows were regularly handed over on
reliefs as part of the trench stores.
The attitude of the Division was one of active defence. Patrolling
was assiduous; screened by the tall corn, small parties left our
lines every day to examine the enemy’s positions. Raids for the
purpose of securing identifications were constantly carried out, and
as the youngsters of the Division gained experience and learned the
lie of the country they became adepts in the art of surprising posts.
Abortive attempts to take prisoners were made by the K.O.S.B.[118]
on the night of the 2nd/3rd June, the 12th Royal Scots[119] on the
10th, and the Black Watch on the night of the 14th/15th, but during
these forays several Germans were killed and wounded. On the 15th,
however, the “Rifles” captured a prisoner, and on the 20th a party
of the 11th Royal Scots under Lieutenant Keen took three Germans of
the 81st Reserve Division. Two days later, a smart piece of stalking
by Sergeant Smith of the K.O.S.B. realised a bag of three prisoners
belonging to the same division.
In June alarm was caused by a distressing outbreak of trench fever
which affected the whole Division; numerous officers and men were
removed to hospital, but the attack proved to be as short as it
was sharp, and in the majority of cases the patients were able
to rejoin their units after a fortnight’s absence. In the same
month several officers and N.C.Os. from the American forces were
attached to the Ninth for instruction in trench warfare; they were
agreeable companions and enthusiastic workers and willingly joined in
enterprises carried out by the units to which they were attached.
[Illustration: METEREN]
Our neighbours at this time were the French on the left and the
Australians (First Australian Division) on the right. The latter had
won a big reputation by their success in stalking Germans, and there
was scarcely a Corps Intelligence Summary which did not record some
Australian captures. On the night of the 2nd June a minor operation
surprised the enemy in the middle of a relief and the Australian haul
consisted of 5 officers and 250 other ranks. At 12.30 A.M. on the
24th a joint enterprise by two companies of the South Africans and
two companies of the 1st Australian Brigade advanced our line on a
front of 2000 yards to a maximum depth of 500 yards. The attack took
place astride the Meteren Becque under cover of an artillery and
trench-mortar barrage, and the South African share of the spoils
amounted to 29 prisoners and 4 machine-guns.
From the end of June the Germans were daily harassed by Scotsmen,
South Africans, and Australians. The captures on the front of the
Ninth were smaller than on the right, but our difficulties were
greater, the country in our sector being thickly streaked with dense
hedges often profusely wired. On the night of the 11th/12th July
three successful raids bringing in 7 prisoners were made by the 12th
Royal Scots to the north-east of Meteren, and by the Royal Scots
Fusiliers and the South Africans to the south of the village. Two
nights later, a German N.C.O. was surprised and surrendered to the
K.O.S.B.
On the 19th July Meteren was attacked. The commanding ground on which
the village stood and its proximity to the line, for the protection
of which the Ninth was responsible, rendered it desirable that our
front should be advanced beyond the village. During May and June
when the enemy was expected to strike, it was inadvisable to attempt
the operation but preparations for it were made. Our experience
of Longueval suggested the necessity of thoroughly demolishing
Meteren; it was therefore systematically bombarded to prevent the
consolidation of the position by the enemy and to level the walls and
so allow a creeping barrage to go through the village without danger
to the assailants. For a fortnight previous to the attack, “heavies,”
field-guns, and trench mortars poured a never-ending stream of
missiles into Meteren and completely flattened it.
As it had been decided that the infantry would attack under a
smoke-barrage, bombardments with H.E. and smoke, accompanied by the
discharge of gas from projectors, took place from time to time with
a view to leading the enemy to associate our use of smoke with gas.
It was originally intended to wait for a wind favourable for smoke,
but later it seemed politic to carry the operation into effect as
soon as possible in order to ascertain the enemy’s designs and to
delay his preparations for an offensive if one was contemplated.
Arrangements had therefore to be made to attack without too much
dependence on a favourable wind, and batteries were moved into
positions more directly in rear of their tasks. In calculating the
amount of smoke and the placing of it on or beyond the barrage line,
the velocity and direction of the wind were to be taken into account.
The artillery barrage was to be reinforced by the action of trench
mortars and machine-guns.
Zero was arranged for 7.55 A.M., as that was an unusually late hour
for an attack and the enemy might therefore be expected to be off
his guard. The assault was entrusted to the South African and 26th
Brigades, the former attacking with the South Africans and the Royal
Scots Fusiliers, and the latter with the Camerons and Black Watch.
The “Rifles” and Seaforths were in support. The infantry were in
their assembly positions before dawn, and in order to avoid detection
before zero, the trenches were covered with cocoanut fibre matting,
along which a black streak eighteen inches wide had been painted so
as to simulate the appearance from the air of an empty trench. As the
enemy’s centre formed a prominent salient, the men in our centre were
to advance at zero, but those in the wings had to remain in their
trenches for a few minutes until the middle portion of the barrage
came on an alignment with the flanks.
The assault began under the most inauspicious circumstances. On the
previous day the battle stores of the South African Brigade were
destroyed when the farm in which they had been dumped was burned to
the ground, and fresh stores were obtained only in time to be issued
to the men when in their assembly positions. Then a Stokes mortar
detachment moving to the left brigade sector strayed into the enemy’s
lines five hours before zero, and one man was captured. The wind
was unsteady and unfavourable for smoke. Finally, some guns on both
flanks opened five minutes too soon, and while this mistake proved to
have no bad consequences on the right flank, it probably served to
put the enemy on the alert on our left.
In spite of these mishaps the operation met with almost complete
success. The South African Brigade easily subdued all opposition
except on its extreme left, where a pocket of Germans in a shallow
trench behind a wired hedge offered a stout resistance, but this was
adroitly overcome by the Royal Scots Fusiliers. The whole objective
on the right was secured to time, numerous losses being inflicted on
the enemy, especially behind the hedges running north and south on
the west side of Meteren. Fortunately the course of the advance took
the hedges in flank and discounted the protection which the Germans
hoped to obtain from these obstacles. When the protective barrage
ceased a company of South Africans advanced and captured an enemy
trench running north-east from the Meteren Becque towards Alwyn Farm.
The Highland Brigade had a more strenuous time. The Camerons clearing
the German front passed on through the ruins of Meteren, where the
enemy was found holding a hedge in considerable force. After a brisk
combat they seized the hedge and reached their objective in time. But
the Black Watch on the left were not so happy. A portion of the right
company won its objective along with the Camerons, but the remainder
of the battalion was at once checked by a thick hedge on the left
flank. Previously a successful raid had been effected at this place,
but the enemy had since then appreciably strengthened the defences,
and now there was a belt of wire behind as well as in front of the
hedge covering the hostile infantry and machine-guns. Lying too near
our lines to be bombarded by the gunners, it had been dealt with by
Stokes mortars, but these had failed to cut the wire. Dogged pluck
and persistent efforts were of no avail against this strong point,
and after serious losses the left half of the Black Watch retired
sullenly to their original trenches. The gap between the two portions
of the Black Watch was filled by two platoons of the Seaforths, who
on the following day turned the enemy’s defences by advancing from
the west and drove him from the hedge.
After the capture of the objective, patrols moved forward as soon as
the protective barrage ceased. Near Alwyn Farm and the hedges north
and east of it there was some spasmodic resistance, but our patrols
during the 19th and 20th succeeded in establishing a line on a slight
ridge south of the Brahmin Bridge-Gaza Cross Roads. The battlefield
was rapidly cleared, but the stretcher-bearers had great difficulty
in finding the wounded, who were hidden by the corn. In the days
following the attack, the 26th Brigade gained all its objectives, and
came into line with the advanced troops of the South African Brigade.
The operation of the 19th July was a brilliant triumph, and increased
immensely the enthusiasm and confidence of the young soldiers, to
whose dashing fearlessness the victory was mainly due. Our losses,
with the exception of the Black Watch, were small compared with
our gains; many of the enemy had been killed, while 6 officers and
348 men, with a considerable amount of material,[120] fell into our
hands. The Germans had been taken entirely by surprise. They had
become so accustomed to bombardments of H.E. and smoke accompanied
by gas that they regarded our barrage of the 19th July as another
of the same, and a great many of the prisoners were wearing their
gas-masks when captured. The unusual hour of zero was another factor
in the surprise, and prisoners stated that all expectation of an
attack that day had been abandoned after “stand-to.” Our enterprise
apparently anticipated a hostile offensive on our front; the enormous
quantity of trench-mortar ammunition which was found close in rear of
the enemy’s front positions clearly indicated that the Germans were
preparing to deliver an attack in this sector.
The capture of Meteren was the last operation of the Highland Brigade
conducted by Brig.-General Kennedy. He had led the brigade through
some of the stormiest and most critical fighting of the war, and
of his many fine achievements perhaps the most outstanding was his
daring and skilful handling of his men during the very trying days of
the Somme retreat. After three years of continuous strife he had well
earned the rest which an appointment in England now secured for him.
His successor was Brig.-General the Hon. A. G. A. Hore Ruthven, V.C.,
who came from the Staff of the VII. Corps with a reputation already
established, and assumed command on the 27th July.
The right sector was now taken over by the Lowland Brigade. Before
daybreak on the 25th the enemy sought to gain some compensation for
his recent reverse by raiding our lines. At 2 A.M., under cover of
a trench-mortar and artillery bombardment, hostile parties attacked
trenches held by the K.O.S.B. and 11th Royal Scots. The raid was
utterly repulsed, and the enemy left behind two corpses and two
unwounded prisoners. From the identifications we learned that the
Germans had relieved the battered and demoralised 81st Reserve by
the 12th Division, which had a good fighting record. An even more
formidable raid was made in the early hours of the 26th. But the
Germans were driven off by the K.O.S.B., and though on the right they
succeeded in entering a trench held by the 11th Royal Scots, they
were expelled by an immediate counter-attack, nine prisoners being
taken.
The period from the 26th July till the 18th August was marked by raid
and counter-raid. On the 30th July the Australians took Merris. On
the 31st a raid by the K.O.S.B. just failed to secure prisoners, but
Lieut. C. Campbell and Sergeant Smith killed nearly a dozen of the
enemy in a fierce hand-to-hand encounter. Next day the Germans made
a strong effort to seize a post held by the 12th Royal Scots, but
were easily repulsed. On the 3rd August Captain Grant and a party of
Camerons rushed a hostile post, and after killing six and wounding
one other, returned without loss to our lines. On the 5th and 14th
other raids made by the Germans were driven off.
Since the fear of a hostile offensive was fading away battalions out
of the line enjoyed quite a comfortable time. Training, especially
of officers, carried on diligently and uninterruptedly, produced
a marked improvement in efficiency and discipline. Occasionally,
however, the ordinary routine was broken. On Sunday the 4th August,
the fifth anniversary of the entry of Britain into the war, a Parade
Service, attended by detachments of all divisions in the Second Army,
was held at Terdeghem, the detachments of the XV. Corps being under
the command of Lieut.-Colonel Smyth of the 6th K.O.S.B. At this time
the Ninth adopted the practice, generally followed by most divisions
in France, of distinguishing its personnel by a special mark. This
consisted of a white metal thistle on a small circular disc of royal
blue cloth worn on the upper part of both arms, and the first unit to
be completed with the sign was the 6th K.O.S.B., who had the honour
of marching past His Majesty the King near La Brearde on the 6th
August. Most fortunately this ceremony saved the Lowland Brigade some
casualties; for while a company of the 12th Royal Scots lined the
road a shell passed through its vacant billets.
Hoegenacker Ridge, lying beyond Meteren, was clearly the next task
of the Division, and instructions for its seizure were received from
the XV. Corps on the 10th August. A general plan of attack had been
drawn up previously, and was in fact being practised by the Lowland
Brigade then in reserve. Since the Meteren Becque was an awkward
obstacle to an advance from the west it was decided, while simulating
preparations for an attack from this direction, to make the assault
from the north. The Ninth was to take the ridge and all the ground
east of the Becque as far south as Terrapin House; but as this would
give it a frontage of 3000 yards on the objective, while the space
for forming-up amounted to only 1500 yards, two companies of the
Twenty-ninth Division were to follow in rear of the right flank of
the Ninth and take over the front from the Becque to Terrapin House
as soon as it had been captured. The Twenty-ninth Division by means
of patrols was to follow up any success gained, and if possible
secure the village of Outtersteene.
The attack was to be supported by machine-guns and trench mortars and
was to be covered by the favourite Ninth barrage. A German document
had been captured in which the enemy, attributing our success at
Meteren to the use of smoke, instructed his machine-gunners to open
fire at once on our parapets when a smoke-barrage came down. It
was therefore necessary to give the foe as little time as possible
to bring his machine-guns into action, and our barrage was to be
put down at one minute after instead of one minute before zero, as
originally intended, while the infantry were to count ten after the
barrage came down before leaving their trenches.
The assault was to be carried out by the Lowland Brigade with
the K.O.S.B., 11th Royal Scots, and “Rifles,” each attacking on
a two-company front, the first wave in skirmishing order and all
succeeding waves in file. In the hope of effecting a tactical
surprise, 11 A.M. on the 18th was fixed as zero, and the camouflage
device so successfully employed at Meteren was adopted to screen
the assembled troops. To ensure that none of the enemy were lurking
within our barrage line the 12th Royal Scots established four new
posts in six days, and held them against all efforts of the Germans
to eject them. These posts were withdrawn before dawn on the morning
of the attack.
The operation met with gratifying success. On the right the K.O.S.B.
suffered losses from a heavy counter-barrage put down by the enemy
between his outposts and his line on the ridge; near the Becque, too,
there were some obstinate encounters in which a German machine-gun
was knocked out by a Lewis Gun fired from the hip. On the left
little opposition was experienced, the enemy being utterly surprised.
In their impetuous eagerness our men more than once overran the
barrage, some casualties being incurred in consequence. The whole
objective of the Division was gained in fine style, and one company
of the K.O.S.B. pressing on as far as Outtersteene returned with two
heavy machine-guns.
So demoralised was the enemy that a great deal more ground could have
been won, but though the men were impatiently anxious to go on, it
was not considered advisable to leave the ridge for the low swampy
ground beyond. The enterprise had been exceedingly satisfactory, no
hitch having occurred at all. Ten officers and 287 other ranks had
been captured along with a quantity of material.[121] The ground
secured was of real importance as it dominated the whole sector,
and unless the enemy had abandoned all hope of an offensive in this
district he was bound to counter-attack. But nothing happened; the
Germans had their hands too full with our counter-offensive in front
of Amiens to contemplate ambitious projects in other parts of the war
zone. Four days after the capture of Hoegenacker Ridge the Germans
commenced a retreat on this front which did not close until they
had abandoned the whole of the Lys salient. This step was probably
chiefly due to events farther south, but the loss of the ridge,
which afforded wonderful facilities for observation, undoubtedly
precipitated the enemy’s retirement.
The Ninth remained in the line until the 24th. Terrapin Farm was
not taken over by the troops of the Twenty-ninth Division until the
19th, probably because the amount of ground gained by exploitation
was greater than had been expected. On the 22nd the Black Watch, in
conjunction with a brigade of the Thirty-sixth Division which was now
on our left, advanced their line about 150 yards without opposition.
On the same date a patrol of the Camerons encountered a hostile post,
which it summarily wiped out; it was then attacked from different
directions and retired after shooting two officers who were leading
enemy parties. On the 24th and 25th Hoegenacker Ridge was taken over
by the Thirty-first Division and the Ninth was withdrawn to rest near
Wardrecques.
At the end of August the South African Composite Battalion moved to
the Lumbres area preparatory to leaving the Division, its connection
with which officially ceased on the 13th September. Heavily engaged
throughout 1918 it had once been practically demolished, and it was
clear that there was no chance of bringing it up to the strength of
a brigade until it was withdrawn from the line. It was only fitting
that the Union of South Africa should be represented in France by a
force stronger than a battalion; but the severance of the connection
thus rendered necessary was a great blow to everyone in the Ninth.
The trials and hardships borne by Scots and South Africans at the
Somme, Arras, Passchendaele, and the fierce ordeal of the German
offensives in March and April had forged a bond, consecrated by
common sufferings and triumphs, that will ever link in sympathy such
distant parts of the Empire as the misty land of Scotland and the
Dominion that extends from the Cape of Good Hope to the Zambesi. The
departure took place without fuss or ceremony in the same fashion
as tried friends say farewell when duty bids them part. The final
greeting[122] of General Tudor to the men who had played such an
eminent and distinguished rôle in the Division reflected the sincere
feelings of the Scots.
There was some consolation in the report that the place of the
South Africans was to be filled by Ian Hay’s battalion, the 10th
Argylls; but it was not immediately available, and another battalion
of Colonial troops, the Newfoundlanders, tough fighters and good
comrades, joined the Ninth under the command of Lieut.-Colonel T. G.
Matthias. The 28th Brigade thus reconstituted was placed under the
command of Brig.-General J. L. Jack.
Before the end of August the war had taken a turn that was as
unexpected as it was gratifying. The German offensive in May and June
towards Paris had been foiled by the doughty resistance of French and
American troops, and Ludendorff, seeking an easier quest, dealt on
the 15th July his final and hazardous blow against Rheims. Marshal
Foch’s skilfully excogitated tactics were more than a match for the
storm-troops who, lying in a sharp salient near Soissons, Château
Thierry, Epernay, and Rheims, experienced a jarring shock when
attacked on the 18th July by a French force under General Mangin
who had collected it under cover of the forests of Compiègne and
Villers-Cotterêts. The Germans were driven from the salient, Soissons
was recaptured by the French, and on the 3rd August the enemy was
pushed back across the River Vesle.
General Mangin’s stroke on the 18th July was the turning-point in the
campaign. Ludendorff’s hope of victory was broken, and the ultimate
triumph of the Entente was definitely assured. But few people were
prepared for the sequence of brilliant victories that attended the
Allies’ arms, and the autumn of glorious hope that succeeded the
gloomiest spring of the war. On the 8th August the British Fourth
Army struck so shrewd a blow that it disengaged the city of Amiens,
and reduced Ludendorff to despair. The resistance of Germany began
to crumble, and her forces were driven back in a retreat, which
was rapidly developing into a rout, when the Armistice put an end
to hostilities. The line of battle extended to the north when, on
the 21st August, the British Third Army attacked between Albert
and Arras. On the 29th Bapaume fell to the Third, and on the 31st
Péronne to the Fourth Army. The First Army, joining in, stormed the
formidable Drocourt-Queant line. These events emasculated opposition
farther north, and Bailleul, Mount Kemmel, Ploegsteert Wood, and Lens
were evacuated. Before the end of September the Germans had lost all
their conquests of the spring, and were endeavouring to gain time
behind the entrenchments of the Hindenburg Line.
With Germany in the toils all pith and sting dropped from her allies.
In the Balkans, General Franchet d’Espercy, now in command of the
Entente forces in that area, commenced on the 15th September an
attack which in ten days forced the Bulgarians to sue for peace.
With the collapse of Bulgaria the Central Powers lost their grasp on
the Balkans, and there was no force of any consequence to make even
a fight for Serbia. Turkey was now isolated, and suffered a series
of catastrophic reverses from the armies of General Allenby, whose
cavalry campaign mopped up the greater part of the Turkish soldiery,
and eventually with the co-operation of General Marshall from
Mesopotamia compelled the Sultan to accept our Armistice terms on the
30th October.
In France the admirable discipline of the enemy’s troops had so
far prevented anything like a rout, but every day increased the
embarrassments of the German General Staff. Reserves had to be thrown
in hastily to stem our advance with no time to consider how they
might be employed most usefully. Within Germany itself the rigours of
our naval blockade caused acute discomfort, and the failure of the
military effort raised murmurs ominous of the Revolution that was to
sweep the Hohenzollerns from the Imperial Throne.
Thus the general situation towards the end of September was full
of promise for the Allies, and Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas Haig,
realising that a continuation of our pressure was bound to overwhelm
the armies of the adversary, arranged for four simultaneous and
convergent attacks against his sagging line.
The first was to be delivered by the Americans, who had already
flattened out the St Mihiel salient, and was to be in the Woeuvre in
the general direction of Mezières; the second by the French west of
the Argonne with the same general goal as the Americans; the third on
the Cambrai-St Quentin front by the Fourth, Third, and First British
Armies in the direction of Maubeuge; and the fourth on the 28th
September by the Belgian and Second British Armies in the direction
of Ghent.
The Ninth, being in the Second Army, was thus to take part in the
Flanders campaign. In billets, first near Wardrecques and later in
the neighbourhood of Esquelbec, the men for over three weeks were
resting and training, but the elation caused by their triumphs near
Meteren and the daily reports of fresh victories made them burn to
join in the final onset. On the 11th September the Division was
transferred from the XV. to the II. Corps, and the 26th Brigade took
over the front between the Ypres-Menin and Ypres-Zonnebeke roads from
the Fourteenth Division on the 20th September.
Our front line ran approximately from Hell-fire Corner on the right
to Mill Cot, rather more than a mile east of Ypres. East of this line
the ground was low-lying and marshy, but rose gradually on the right
to Bellewarde Ridge, and thence to the Westhoek-Frezenberg Ridge,
which extended across the divisional front from south to north. From
Stirling Castle, a mile south of Westhoek, the main Passchendaele
Ridge ran north of Broodseinde to the village of Passchendaele.
Between the Frezenberg Ridge and the Noordemdhoek-Broodseinde
sector of the main ridge, two small but important underfeatures ran
north-west; these were known as Anzac Ridge and Glasgow Spur, the
former being separated from the Frezenberg Ridge by the tiny stream
of the Hanebeek in a very boggy valley, which had been heavily wired.
Since the desperate battles of 1917, the sector had experienced
unusual repose, and the wilderness of shell-holes was now covered by
long rank grass.
The Ninth being on the left flank of the Second Army was in
close liaison with the Belgians. The co-ordination of artillery
arrangements naturally presented complications, but ultimately
it was decided that while the Belgians should open with a three
hours’ preliminary bombardment before zero, the Ninth would attack
under cover of its customary creeping barrage, commencing at zero.
There was less difficulty as regards the Twenty-ninth Division on
our right, though a pause of fifteen minutes after the capture of
Bellewarde Ridge was necessary to allow that division after passing
through Sanctuary Wood to reorganise, preparatory to storming
Stirling Castle.
The final objective of the Ninth for the first day extended from the
southern end of Polygone de Zonnebeke to a point about 500 yards
south of Broodseinde. Before this line was reached a series of ridges
had to be secured, Frezenberg, Anzac, and Glasgow Spur. Batteries of
artillery were to move forward as each height was taken, so that an
effective barrage might be maintained throughout the advance. The
assailing troops were the 28th Brigade on the right and the 26th on
the left, the former with the “Rifles” and the Royal Scots Fusiliers
in line, and the latter with the Seaforths and Black Watch[123]; the
Newfoundlanders and Camerons were in reserve. Lieut.-Colonel Lumsden
of the “Rifles” was ill and had a very high temperature on the eve of
the battle, but this officer, who had never missed an action since he
crossed to France with the Division in 1915, refused to go sick. The
27th Brigade was to follow in support, and its rôle was to depend on
the situation at the close of the day. Each brigade had a company of
the Ninth Machine-Gun Battalion attached to it, the remaining company
being in divisional reserve. Zero was at 5.25 A.M.
A big victory was expected and with good reason. Defeats in the south
had caused the enemy to thin the garrison in front of Ypres, but the
nature of the ground with frequent “Pill-boxes” and scattered belts
of wire was likely to retard our advance. The Germans who opposed us
were the 11th and 12th Bavarian and the 10th Saxon Divisions; they
were alert but nervous, and numerous low flying aircraft carried
out reconnaissances over our front system. There was a regrettable
mishap on the 26th. A stray shell hit the H.Q. of the Camerons;
Lieut.-Colonel Inglis was wounded, and Major Cameron, Captain
Fraser, the adjutant, and six others of Battalion H.Q. were killed.
Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Angus then joined the Division, and was sent
up to command the Camerons. Since the 9th April 1917 our men had
never been in better spirit, and when the troops assembled for the
attack on the night of the 27th/28th September, they were full of
confidence.