FROM LEDEGHEM TO THE SCHELDT
14TH OCTOBER TO 27TH OCTOBER 1918
The barrage opened at 5.32 A.M. on the 14th October and three minutes
later the infantry moved forward. The Black Watch company and the
left of the Royal Scots Fusiliers experienced sharp fighting from
the beginning. Mogg Farm, wire-bound, was obstinately defended, but
regardless of losses the Black Watch pressed on and ejected the enemy
from this stronghold. The wind was light and from the south-east,
and the smoke of the barrage, adding density to the haze of a fine
autumn morning produced an impenetrable fog about 500 yards from our
line. As a result our troops found it difficult to keep direction,
and some confusion arose but was speedily rectified. Though our
troops lost the barrage it had a most salutary effect upon the enemy,
and after the first resistance had been overcome the infantry made
rapid progress. Rolleghem Cappelle, the first belt of wire, Neerhof,
and the Wulfdambeek were carried with much less trouble than had
been expected, and the abject failure of the Germans to offer any
opposition worth the name behind such defences was a convincing proof
of their loss of moral.
At the conclusion of the initial barrage the 28th Brigade A.F.A.
reverted to Corps reserve, while the 50th and 51st Brigades
moved forward to give further support to the infantry. Owing to
difficulties of observation and communication they were not able
at first to take much part, but the mobile trench mortars dealt
effectively with a single field-gun and machine-guns which were
opposing our troops on the east bank of the Wulfdambeek. No sooner
were the infantry checked on the ridge south-west of Steenen Stampkot
than the 50th Brigade came into action and helped them to capture the
ridge by 9.30 A.M., and all the field-guns were moved up behind it.
On our left the 26th Brigade gradually became involved in the battle,
partly by reason of the vigorous resistance offered by the German
garrison of Mogg Farm, and partly owing to a gap developing between
the 28th Brigade and the Belgians. North-east of Rolleghem Cappelle
the Highlanders had a stiff time and during their advance several
field-guns, firing over open sights, were enveloped and taken.
Shortly after the capture of the ridge by the 28th Brigade, which was
in touch with the Twenty-ninth Division, the Highlanders and Belgians
entered Winkel St Eloi. By this time the Camerons as well as the
Black Watch were in the fighting line.
About noon the infantry resumed their advance, supported at close
range by the 50th and 51st Brigades R.F.A., but the enemy had rushed
up a reserve division (6th Cavalry) to hold Laaga Cappelle Wood and
Steenbeek and a desperate combat ensued. Forward patrols of the
Newfoundlanders pressed the enemy so closely that they came under our
own rifle-fire—luckily escaping casualties—and forced the Germans to
continue their retirement. Hostile groups could be seen retreating
through Laaga Cappelle Wood, and towards the north a solitary German,
mounted and towing a machine-gun cart behind him, helped to fill in
the landscape. The Highlanders, passing partially through the left
of the 28th Brigade, which, after its long advance of the morning,
was naturally somewhat exhausted, fought their way forward, with
all three battalions in line, gained a footing in the wood and
established a line on the western slope of a low hill to the north
of it, but beyond this point progress was barred by fire from Hill
40, 500 yards east of the wood. Near the village of Steenbeek, amply
furnished with machine-guns, the enemy managed to stem the advance
of the 28th Brigade, the right flank of which was now ahead of the
Twenty-ninth Division and was exposed.
During the severe fighting experienced by the Newfoundlanders one
of their number won the V.C. Early in the push, when the attack was
temporarily checked by the fire of a German battery at point-blank
range, Private T. Ricketts went forward with his section commander
and a Lewis Gun, with a view to outflanking the battery; but when
they were still 300 yards away from the enemy they ran short of
ammunition, and the Germans, hoping to save their guns, brought up
the teams. Thereupon Private Ricketts darted back under a fierce fire
from machine-guns with the battery, procured more ammunition, and
returned at the double to the Lewis Gun, which he fired with such
accuracy that the Germans with their gun teams were compelled to take
refuge in a farm. The rest of the platoon was now able to press on
without casualties, and 4 field-guns, 4 machine-guns, and 8 prisoners
were taken. Subsequently a fifth field-gun was intercepted by our
fire and captured.
The artillery supported the infantry with magnificent dash, and
Brig.-General Wainwright must have been very proud of the work
accomplished by his gunners. Our batteries going into action
presented the most sensational and picturesque spectacle of the
advance, and introduced into the war a tinge of the glamour and
romance that seemed for ever to have departed from it. Tearing along
at full gallop, C/50 Battery under Major Hoggart plunged almost
into the infantry firing-line, quickly unlimbered and at 800 yards’
range turned its guns against the foe in Steenbeek with a rapidity
and precision that amazed and thrilled the infantry. The disgruntled
Germans bringing up a field-gun had the great fortune to wipe out one
team. A/50 Battery, coming up in gallant style, joined C/50 and their
combined fire forced the enemy out of the village, but owing to the
low trajectory our guns could not touch him in his cleverly chosen
position at the eastern edge of Laaga Cappelle Wood. Two batteries of
the 51st Brigade dashed over the ridge just in rear of our infantry,
but were unable to come into action because of the hostile shelling
of Steenen Stampkot.
By 3 P.M. the 27th Brigade was concentrated behind the ridge west
of Steenen Stampkot, and the 12th Royal Scots were sent forward
to support the 28th; but since it was clear that the Germans were
occupying in force a naturally strong position, and that nothing but
a properly organised assault was likely to succeed, it was decided to
postpone the attack until next day, when the troops would be fresher
and more artillery ammunition available. In the evening, the 28th
Brigade took over a part of the line held by the 26th, thus making
a front of 1200 yards, while the Highlanders continued to hold the
remaining 300 and fully 700 yards of line in Belgian territory. The
Third Belgian Division, under General Joostens, on our left had
fought with admirable courage and _élan_, and at the end of the day
had its right ahead of our left. Ever since the 28th September the
co-operation with King Albert’s army had been excellent, and the
Ninth never desired on its flanks better troops than the Belgians
proved themselves to be.
Every preparation was now made for the renewal of the attack. The
28th Brigade A.F.A., which was again attached to the Division,
joined the 50th and 51st Brigades in the line, and two 60-pounder
batteries and three sections of 6-inch howitzers came into position.
“B” and “C” Companies of the Ninth Machine-Gun Battalion took up
barrage positions on the ridge south-west of Steenen Stampkot. Zero
was arranged for 9 A.M., because it was impossible to bring up an
adequate supply of ammunition before that hour and it was essential
that the men should have a good night’s rest. The objective was the
same as on the previous day, and after its capture the Division was
to exploit towards the Lys. The operation was to be carried out by
the 11th and 12th Royal Scots, who were to pass through the two
brigades in the line.
Punctually at 9 A.M. on the 15th the 11th Royal Scots advanced at
the double under a smoke-screen against Hill 40 to the north, but
owing to the exact position of our forward posts being uncertain the
barrage was placed beyond this hill. The comparatively late hour
of attack and the wonderfully heavy barrage which the artillery
and machine-guns were able to provide, took the enemy unawares.
Nevertheless the 11th Royal Scots suffered an unexpected jar at the
start; raking machine-gun fire was opened on them from the hill
behind Laaga Cappelle Wood. But the assailants, adroitly and boldly
led, after clearing the wood, advanced towards Hill 40. The slight
delay gave two machine-gun groups on the Hill time to prepare, and
their fire drove the Royal Scots to earth. At this juncture Corporal
Elcock, valiantly braving death, rushed forward with a Lewis Gun and
killed the two men manning one of the guns, then diving into their
shelter he turned his gun against the other group and knocked it out.
A V.C. was awarded for this heroic and timely feat, which allowed the
whole line to press on and capture the Hill. On the heels of the 11th
followed Lieut.-Colonel Murray with the 12th Royal Scots who, after
passing the wood, swung south and ejected the enemy from Steenbeek
village and Hill 40 to the south.
The line was then reformed under cover of a protective barrage put
down by our guns on Heule Wood and Gemeenhof. Resuming the pursuit,
the 12th Royal Scots mopped up the enemy posts in Heule Wood and
reached the Snephoek-Heule road, where a slight pause was made until
touch was obtained with the divisions on the wings, both of which
were making good progress. By 11.30 A.M. the Royal Scot battalions
had won the objective on the Heule-Ingelmunster Railway, all
opposition from trench mortars and machine-guns having been overcome
by the infantry with the assistance of our forward guns. For a short
time our men on the Railway were harried by two hostile field-guns,
but Captain Brock of the 12th Royal Scots after a fine piece of
stalking shot the crews and captured the guns.
Behind the 27th Brigade came the 1/1st Yorks Cyclists, commanded
by Lieut.-Colonel Thomson, and the 11th Motor Machine-Gun Battery;
under the orders of Brig.-General Croft they now passed through the
infantry. The cyclists displayed extraordinary pluck and daring, and
their close pursuit prevented all chance of German reorganisation.
One company stormed Stokerij and then pushed on to the Chapel north
of Abeelhoek, where it was finally stopped by machine-gun fire from
the ridge between Abeelhoek and the Lys. Other cyclists, after
occupying Le Chat, dashed into Cuerne about 2.45 P.M., just as the
Germans were hurriedly evacuating it. There were several skirmishes,
and amongst the victims were two Uhlan officers. Making for the
river, the cyclists came under heavy machine-gun fire from the east
bank of the Lys, and took up positions covering the southern and
eastern outskirts of Cuerne. A stream of hostile transport was moving
in panic haste along the Courtrai-Harlebeke road, and the cyclists
and the men of the motor machine-gun battery enjoyed effective
shooting at targets it was almost impossible to miss.
The infantry followed the more mobile groups. A short distance from
the Railway the 27th Brigade had some trouble on the left, because
our immediate neighbours, the Third Belgian Division, did not advance
at first beyond the objective, as Ingelmunster farther north had been
retaken by a German counter-attack. Consequently the 11th Royal Scots
were enfiladed from Heetje, and were obliged to attack the village.
It was captured only after a severe fight, and the Royal Scots were
so far delayed that they did not reach the ridge between Abeelhoek
and the Lys till dusk. Their attempt to storm this position was
unsuccessful, but the Germans withdrew in the course of the night.
Eventually Heetje was taken over from the 27th Brigade by the Third
Belgian Division, whose left wing was thrown back to the Railway. The
aggressiveness of the enemy near Ingelmunster seemed to point to a
counter-attack from the north-east, so the 28th Brigade, which had
advanced to Cappelle St Catherine was ordered to be ready to protect
our left wing. The situation on this flank improved greatly during
the night, when the Belgians, pressing on, seized Bavichove and
Hulste.
On our right there was not the same anxiety, and the 12th Royal
Scots and 6th K.O.S.B. moved steadily forward, the leading troops
of the former entering Cuerne between 3 and 4 P.M., and the latter
relieving the cyclists about 6.30 P.M. Cuerne was not in the Ninth
area, but the Twenty-ninth Division had tough work to clear Heule,
and was slightly in rear. It was known to be moving forward, but the
Ninth was prevented from securing the crossings over the river that
day by the fact that until after dark the situation on our left was
unsatisfactory and on our right uncertain. The 6th K.O.S.B. and the
11th Royal Scots held the divisional front during the night.
From the hour in which Ledeghem was captured, every village disgorged
a number of Belgian civilians, and Cuerne was filled with them.
They were warned that it was dangerous to remain, but stating that
the Germans had promised not to shell Cuerne, the great majority of
them refused to leave their abodes. During the night the village was
heavily gas-shelled by the enemy, and the sufferings of many of these
poor people must have been dreadful. Posts were pushed close to the
river after dark, but all the bridges had been destroyed by the enemy.
On the 16th Brig.-General Croft drew up his plans for forcing the
passage of the Lys. Guns, both field and heavy, were moved into
position to cover this operation, and arrangements were made for the
construction of bridges. The 51st Brigade R.F.A. took up positions
on the general line of the Heule-Stokerij road, each brigade sending
forward two guns in close support, while four howitzers of the 50th
Brigade went into action in Cuerne. The 28th Brigade A.F.A. was
active in rear of the 50th and 51st, and twelve 60-pounders and eight
6-inch howitzers of the 59th R.G.A. had opened fire by the evening.
At 2 P.M. and again at 5 P.M. all the Field Artillery Brigades
shelled the Courtrai-Harlebeke road where the K.O.S.B. had observed
numerous parties of Germans, and excellent work was accomplished by
our forward guns in silencing machine-guns firing from houses in
Harlebeke, a large and substantial village.
Brig.-General Croft’s plan arranged that the river, about seventy
feet wide, should be crossed at two places simultaneously; on the
left, the 11th Royal Scots with the aid of the 90th Field Coy. R.E.
were to throw a bridge over the ruins of the Hoogebrug Bridge on
the Harlebeke-Stokerij road and attack the village of Harlebeke; on
the right, the K.O.S.B. were to pass over by boats and improvised
bridges in the loop of the river south-east of Cuerne, secure the
Courtrai-Harlebeke Railway with the high ground east of it, and
effect a junction with the 11th Royal Scots at the level-crossing in
Harlebeke.
The attempt was made at 8 P.M. On the left, it was completely
repulsed in spite of the gallant and costly efforts of the Royal
Scots and sappers of the 90th Field Company, who were swept away by
machine-gun fire at close range. On the right, Lieut.-Colonel Ker
sent three companies across a boat bridge erected by the sappers of
the 64th Field Company. Under a powerful barrage of H.E. and smoke,
the K.O.S.B. scrambled up the marshy slope of the east bank, and
reaching the Courtrai-Harlebeke road where several Germans were
captured, pushed out towards the Railway. The left company then moved
north towards Harlebeke but met with obstinate resistance, and the
battalion was ordered to maintain the ground it had won, holding the
loop of the river with an outpost line on the Railway.
A half-hearted counter-stroke during the night against the right
flank garrison of the bridgehead was easily defeated. Before dawn the
Sappers had constructed a relief bridge close to the first, and by
these two bridges, two sections of the 9th Machine-gun Battalion and
two platoons of the 2nd Hampshire Regiment (Twenty-ninth Division)
crossed. The left company of the K.O.S.B., which had suffered
severely in the attempt to force Harlebeke, was relieved by the
reserve company and drawn back to the west of the Lys.
Owing to the failure on the left the operation had fallen short of
complete success. It was suggested that the rest of the brigade
should be taken over the river during the hours of darkness by the
K.O.S.B. bridges, and an assault made on Harlebeke at dawn with a
view to extending the bridgehead, but it was ultimately decided to
consolidate the ground that had been gained. Our position on the east
of the river could hardly be considered satisfactory, and it was
doubtful if under the conditions of modern war it could be regarded
as a bridgehead in the true sense of the term, since the enemy’s guns
in Harlebeke commanded the river and were in a position to demolish
the bridges when daylight came; in fact, if the Germans had possessed
a tithe of the spirit that animated them before April there would
have been good reason to dread the utter destruction of our forces on
the east of the Lys. The attempt was made because it was evident that
the enemy’s moral was on the wane.
The 17th October was a day of acute anxiety. At 5.10 A.M. the Germans
barraged the Courtrai-Harlebeke road and a few minutes later their
infantry advanced to the attack. The centre of the K.O.S.B. was
pierced and four machine-guns were knocked out, but the flanks held
firm and a timely bayonet charge by the reserve of the right company
under Captain White put the enemy to flight. At the same time the
centre company was rallied by Major McDiarmid of the 9th Machine-gun
Battalion, who had swum the river under heavy fire, and it reoccupied
its position. On the first news of the attack two companies of the
12th Royal Scots, who had been warned to be ready to reinforce,
crossed the river with fine steadiness under intense artillery-fire
which speedily sank both bridges. This addition to the garrison now
made our position on the east bank reasonably secure; for the dismal
failure of the enemy’s counter-stroke showed clearly that he was
losing heart. Over thirty dead Germans were counted after the bayonet
charge, and of those who fled many were shot down by our riflemen and
Lewis Gunners.
But though the attack had been brilliantly repulsed and was not
renewed, the position of the K.O.S.B. and the Royal Scots caused
Brig.-General Croft the keenest concern. The slightest movement
provoked machine-gun fire, and as both bridges had been sunk the men
could be neither reinforced nor withdrawn during daylight without
enormous losses and the risk of virtual annihilation. Nevertheless
it was necessary to keep the garrison supplied with ammunition and
rations, and two platoons of the 12th Royal Scots, in single file,
working their way along the wreckage of the bridges and wading over
their waists in water under a constant fusilade of bullets, crossed
the river with supplies of ammunition. In similar fashion, runners
succeeded in maintaining communication between the troops on both
sides of the Lys. Aeroplanes were also employed and carried over
abundant rations and ammunition, which they dropped by means of
parachutes. Thus with ample provisions the men on the east bank were
in good heart, and later when they were withdrawn they declared that
they had never been so well fed in all their previous war experience.
About noon instructions were received from the II. Corps to make no
further attempt to establish bridgeheads across the Lys. Our efforts
were to be devoted to the reconnaissance of suitable crossing places
and to the collection of bridging material. If it were practicable
the K.O.S.B. bridgehead was to be maintained, and this matter was
left to the discretion of the G.O.C. But since the Ninth was now to
take over the front north of Hoogebrug as far as the junction of the
Vaarneuykbeek with the Lys north-east of Bavichove, the decision
as to the bridgehead was left to the Twenty-ninth Division, which
relieved our troops on the east bank after dusk by means of boats
and bridges constructed by the Sappers of the 63rd Field Company.
Brig.-General Freyburg, who went over in person, decided to abandon
the bridgehead, and the 27th Brigade on being drawn back was
concentrated in the vicinity of Laaga Cappelle Wood.
The operations[131] in Flanders had fully realised the expectations
of Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas Haig. The enemy was obliged to
relinquish his grip on the Flanders coast and to withdraw his forces
to the neighbourhood of Ghent, and farther south he was compelled
to abandon Lille on the 17th October and soon after the industrial
centres of Tourcoing and Roubaix. It was necessary to follow up our
successes and to press our advantage. Accordingly preparations were
made on the 18th and 19th for crossing the Lys on a large scale,
and the night of the 19th/20th was fixed for the attempt. New gun
positions were selected and ammunition brought up, and the 26th and
28th Brigades with the Sappers reconnoitred all possible crossings.
The boundary between the Ninth and the Twenty-ninth Division
stretched from Hoogebrug—south of Ingoyghem—to the Scheldt south of
Trappelstraat. On our left was the Thirty-sixth, which had relieved
the Third Belgian Division, and the boundary on this flank ran from
the junction of the Plaatsbeek and the Lys—south of Beveren—north of
Vichte and Ingoyghem—to the Scheldt north-west of Berchem. Our first
objective was the line running north-east and south-west about 500
yards east of the Lys, and the attack was to be carried out by the
26th and 28th Brigades. Divisions were allowed to choose their own
time for crossing the river and securing this objective, but all had
to be ready to take part in a general advance from it at 6 A.M. on
the 20th. The objective for the next advance was the St Louis-Vichte
road, but, if the army on our left did not move forward, then the
line St Louis-Belgiek about four miles from the Lys.
The Sappers of the 63rd and 64th Field Companies, assisted by two
companies of the Pioneers, were responsible for the bridging and
ferrying arrangements on the front of the Ninth. Each field company
was to throw two single duckboard barrel bridges sufficiently
strong to take infantry in file, and to launch and navigate two
half pontoons and three rafts, each capable of taking eight men.
Lieut.-Colonel Hickling’s task was far from enviable; all the
pontoons of the Division were at the bottom of the Lys and all the
material to make bridges had to be collected without delay. Since on
our front the left bank of the river was exposed for a distance of
several hundreds of yards, it was impossible to place the bridging
material in position before dark. As it was calculated that our
preparations would not be completed till 11 P.M., this was the hour
arranged for the launching of the pontoons and rafts. The Ninth and
Twenty-ninth Divisions agreed to go over simultaneously, but the
Thirty-sixth decided to cross earlier. The first troops were to be
ferried over, and it was hoped that the light bridges would be ready
by 11.15 P.M.
In effecting the passage of the leading troops, surprise[132] was of
course aimed at, and for that reason no artillery-fire was to open
until 11.15 P.M., though forward guns were to be prepared to fire
at point-blank range at two farms, which being near the crossings
might be troublesome. From 11.15 P.M. to 11.45 P.M. an artillery
barrage, thickened by machine-guns, was to be put down to cover the
forming-up of the infantry on the line of the Harlebeke-Beveren
road, after which it was to move forward to a line in front of the
first objective. In order to avoid close range machine-gun fire
from the houses in Harlebeke, no passage was to be attempted south
of the junction of the Vaarneuykbeek and the Lys, and an enfilade
smoke-barrage was to blind the northern end of the village while the
crossing was being effected. In the afternoon the various divisions
were ordered by the Corps to accelerate the passage of the river; in
the case of the Ninth this was impossible, but the Twenty-ninth and
Thirty-sixth both went over before the hour originally fixed.
The enemy’s bombing planes and artillery were uncommonly active
during the evening and Stokerij and Heetje, important centres of
communication, were subjected to concentrations of gas-shell at
intervals and to steady harassing fire from 9 to 11.30 P.M. There
was also considerable shelling of our forward areas, due probably to
the alarm caused by the crossing of the divisions on our flanks. The
enemy was thoroughly roused, and with his guns and trench mortars
fired vigorously but somewhat aimlessly on our bank of the river.
On our right the Camerons were the first to go over, two companies
passing on to the first objective while the remainder mopped up
Harlebeke. The Seaforths followed, coming up on the left of the
Camerons. On the sector of the 28th Brigade the enemy’s fire was
heavy and accurate; one bridge was broken and the other badly
damaged, while both pontoons were holed and the launching of the
rafts was delayed. The casualties sustained and the confusion caused
were undoubtedly due to the fact that a simultaneous crossing by
all the attacking divisions had not been arranged. Nevertheless the
“Rifles” and Royal Scots Fusiliers were concentrated on the right
bank of the river half an hour after midnight. This very creditable
achievement under continuous fire was a convincing demonstration
of the fine discipline and resource of the infantry and sappers
concerned. By 1 A.M. the Thirty-sixth Division had two battalions
over the Lys and the Twenty-ninth one, a second having been stayed
by machine-gun fire. Though the two attacking battalions of the 28th
Brigade had crossed, they experienced so much difficulty in securing
connection with each other and with the Thirty-sixth Division that
for several hours it was uncertain if it would be possible to
continue the advance at 6 A.M.; but by 5.15 A.M. all four of our
front line battalions were in touch with one another on the first
objective except on the left, where our line was about 300 yards
behind, owing to the resistance of Beveren.
Both brigades moved forward at 6 A.M. on the 20th under cover of a
barrage of H.E. and smoke. The Royal Scots Fusiliers had a brisk
engagement at Beveren, which they helped the men of the Thirty-sixth
Division to master, but apart from this there was little opposition
at the start. By 8 A.M. Deerlyck fell into our hands, and as soon
as the barrage ceased, the 7th Motor Machine-gun Brigade and the
1/1st Yorks Cyclists, who had been ferried across on rafts, passed
through the infantry. The machine-gun brigade and two companies of
the cyclists moving straight down the Deerlyck-Vichte road entered
Belgiek, but were brought to a standstill a short distance beyond
it by machine-gun fire. Another cyclist company, taking the road
running south-east from Vichte, captured 4 field-guns, 40 prisoners
and much material, knocked out the team of another field-gun who
were attempting to escape, and finally took up a position on the St
Louis-Vichte road. Other cyclists on our left wing compelled the
enemy to abandon a heavy howitzer near Knock and drove him into the
village; four more heavy howitzers were afterwards found abandoned
just south of Belgiek cross roads.
It was on the wings that the infantry had most trouble. The country
over which the Highlanders had to progress was marshy and in parts
flooded, but by 9.30 A.M. they had reached the Railway where a German
field-gun engaged them at close range. Two guns however of the
machine-gun battery went to their assistance, and a steady advance
was maintained despite ever-increasing opposition. Meantime the
Sappers had completed a pontoon bridge south-east of Bavichove, and
by 9.50 A.M. one battery of the 50th Brigade R.F.A., followed by the
mobile medium trench mortars and later by the rest of the divisional
artillery, had crossed the Lys. At 10.30 A.M. both the 26th and 28th
Brigades were believed to be on their objective and a further advance
was ordered to be made at 12.30 P.M.
By that time German resistance had stiffened. St Louis was in our
hands, but the 26th Brigade was being subjected to flanking-fire from
the Wolfsberg, which our gunners dared not shell as they did not know
the exact position of the troops of the Twenty-ninth Division, in
whose area it was. In the centre, Vichte Station was captured after
stubborn fighting by the Newfoundlanders, and this gave rise to an
erroneous report that the village, which lay 1000 yards to the east
of it, was also in our possession. As a matter of fact a company and
a half of the Royal Scots Fusiliers[133] did force their way into
that village but were surrounded, and it is significant of the moral
of the enemy that he did not venture to press his advantage. Some of
our men broke through the German cordon after dark; others sheltered
in cellars with the Belgian civilians until the village was taken two
days later, when they rejoined their battalion. A French force was
now on the left of the Second Army, but on this day it made such slow
progress that the Thirty-sixth Division was compelled to hold a very
extended line, stretching from Straate to the Gaverbeek north-west
of Belgiek, and this strain on the Thirty-sixth inevitably
reacted on our left wing, which was much exposed. On our right the
Twenty-ninth Division, being held up, was consolidating on the line
St Louis-Krote-Pont Levis No. 2, while the division on its right was
some distance behind it.
To allow the units on the flanks to come up in line with them, the
Ninth and Twenty-ninth Divisions undertook no operations on the
21st. The sector occupied by the Ninth was a very unpleasant one as
it was overlooked by the enemy, who shelled one farm after another,
devoting, it seemed, particular attention to those occupied by
Brigade and Battalion H.Q. The 12th Royal Scots were unlucky enough
to lose their popular and gallant adjutant, Captain McKinley, who was
hit by three successive shells. On the night of the 21st/22nd the
Twenty-ninth Division took over St Louis from the 26th Brigade, which
was now able to hold its reduced front with the Black Watch alone. On
the same night the 27th relieved the 28th Brigade with the 12th Royal
Scots.
The objectives of the Ninth for the 22nd were Vichte, Hill 50, and
Ingoyghem, and the assault was to be delivered by the 11th Royal
Scots and 6th K.O.S.B. at 9 A.M. The former were to clear Vichte and
Hill 50, at which point the latter were to pass through and exploit
in the direction of Ingoyghem. The Highland Brigade was ordered to be
ready to support the attack and was concentrated north-east of the St
Louis-Vichte road.
[Illustration: INGOYGHEM AND OOTEGHEM. ‘THE LAST RIDGE’]
There was delay at the start, and some confusion was caused by a
dense fog produced by hostile gas-shelling and by the smoke of our
barrage drifting back on the infantry. The fog however blinded the
Germans in Vichte, and the 11th Royal Scots entering the village
surprised the garrison and then moved on towards Hill 50; a few
posts were missed but these were accounted for by the K.O.S.B. On
leaving the village the Royal Scots came under heavy fire from
Klijtberg and Hill 50 and were checked. For a time the situation
was very obscure, and Lieut.-Colonel Ker, who had led his battalion
along the railway to the bridge south-east of Vichte, had the
greatest difficulty in ascertaining the whereabouts of the leading
Royal Scots. Our gunners exhibited once more the daring that had
characterised their efforts throughout the advance, and the guns
of B/50 Battery were already in action east of the village. Boldly
reconnoitring on horseback Captain Andrews located a farm near Hill
50 from which the enemy was firing, and suggested to Lieut.-Colonel
Ker, who had already ascertained that Hill 50 was firmly held by the
Germans, that covered by the fire of the gunners his battalion should
assault the Hill. This was done, and shortly after noon the K.O.S.B.
stormed Hill 50. But any movement towards Ingoyghem was out of the
question; losses had been heavy and the hostile machine-gun fire from
the village and buildings near it was accurate and severe.
The Black Watch, who were now temporarily attached to the 27th
Brigade, filled a gap of 1000 yards between its right and the left
of the Twenty-ninth Division at the end of the day’s fighting. By
nightfall our line ran from the road junction a mile east of St Louis
to Hill 50, and thence to the south-east of the Klijtberg, and the
troops were in touch with the divisions on both flanks. There were
rumours of a German retirement in the north, but on our front the
enemy showed great activity and bombarded our area savagely from time
to time with gas. The Twenty-ninth Division was now relieved by the
Forty-first, and the 27th Brigade by the 26th and 28th Brigades on
the night of the 24th/25th.
At 9 A.M. on the 25th the 26th and 28th Brigades with the Camerons,
Seaforths, Royal Scots Fusiliers,[134] and the “Rifles” in line,
resumed the operations against the Ooteghem-Ingoyghem Ridge in
conjunction with the Forty-first and Thirty-sixth Divisions. The
attack was made under cover of a creeping barrage of smoke and H.E.,
which was more intense than usual because our artillery had been
augmented by the 17th Brigade R.F.A. (Twenty-ninth Division); two
companies of the 9th Machine-gun Battalion and one company of the
104th Machine-gun Battalion also supported the infantry by firing
concentrations on certain points and by barraging roads in rear of
the enemy’s position. The German artillery-fire had been so violent
during the evening that four gun teams of a company of the 9th
Battalion were completely wiped out before the attack commenced.
On the fall of the barrage our infantry immediately dashed forward
but met with most stubborn opposition. The enemy seemed resolved to
dispute every inch of ground, and shortly after zero he put down a
fierce counter-barrage on our leading troops and swept the ranks of
the 28th Brigade with gusts of machine-gun fire; but in spite of
grave losses the infantry made headway and by 10.30 A.M. some of
them were on the objective from Klein Ronsse Hill to the Chapel near
Ingoyghem. But all the ground had not been cleared; every farm with
its steading was a centre of resistance and furious conflicts were
being waged in rear of the objective. The leadership was excellent.
Brig.-General Hore Ruthven and Brig.-General Jack were constantly
in the stormiest parts of their sectors. Lieut.-Colonel Campbell of
the Royal Scots Fusiliers was ubiquitous; clad in his jerkin, since
the day was warm though the night had been cold, he was perspiring
profusely from the kit he carried, his rapid pace, the distance he
had covered, and the discomfort of one or two nasty crawls, but
he seemed to be absolutely tireless. On our left the Thirty-sixth
Division had failed to carry the slopes of Kleineberg, and word
was received that the right division had also been checked. It was
therefore inadvisable to press on from the ridge and the infantry
were commanded to consolidate the ground which they had won at no
slight cost.
Our gains had been substantial; they comprised the entire
Ooteghem-Ingoyghem Ridge, the last commanding position in the Ninth’s
area of operations. During the afternoon and evening our position was
subjected to galling artillery and machine-gun fire from the east and
north-east. The enemy clung tenaciously to the Kleineberg, from which
an attack by the Thirty-sixth Division at 5 P.M. failed to dislodge
him. During the night of the 25th/26th the Germans surrendered their
last hold on Ooteghem and a patrol of the Camerons pushing past
Klooster Hoek and Langestraat gained the banks of the Scheldt at
Waermaerde; on its return it met and attacked a party of the enemy,
driving it out of Okkerwijk. On the left patrols of the 28th Brigade
went out but could not make much progress since the enemy still
occupied Meulewijk and Bergwijk, which dominated all the country east
of Ingoyghem.
The men were keen to follow up their victory, but they had now
reached the limit of physical endurance. Our losses, though
insignificant compared with the results achieved, had been serious,
for practically no reinforcements had arrived to fill up gaps. There
had been no contraction of front to balance our diminishing numbers
and consequently each successive advance entailed increasing effort.
On the 25th October battalions could muster scarcely 200 bayonets,
and daily it was becoming more doubtful if the Division would have
sufficient weight to carry it forward against anything like a
resolute defence. Hence the weakness of the units and the exhaustion
of the men rendered it desirable, if not necessary, to withdraw
the whole Division for a rest; and its relief by the Thirty-first
Division took place on the nights of the 26th/27th and 27th/28th,
when it went back to the area near Harlebeke and Cuerne.
This was the last operation of the Division in the war. Since the
28th September it had covered over twenty-six miles of ground and
advanced from Ypres to the banks of the Scheldt. It had captured
over 2600 prisoners and many guns,[135] but the trophies gained
were more numerous than were recorded; the advance was so rapid
that there was no opportunity of making a proper search of the
battlefield. And our losses suffered during this amazing march,
involving constant fighting, amounted to only 188 officers and 3604
other ranks, just 1000 more than the number of prisoners captured.
It was certainly the most spectacular of the Ninth’s many successes.
Throughout the advance the admirable co-operation of all branches
of the Division had been the principal factor in contributing to
this glorious result. The spirit of the Division was nowhere more
typified than in the personal example of General Tudor and his staff,
Lieut.-Colonel Mudie, the G.S.O.I., with his thoughtful, cool head,
and Lieut.-Colonel Jeffcoat, the A.A. & Q.M.G., with his typically
exact “Q” arrangements. The G.O.C. during the battles was invariably
in or very near the front line, at the top of insecure church spires
surveying the landscape, or on horseback in shelled areas, and could
always decide with personal knowledge. Incorrigibly dapper, he was
invariably calm, quiet, human, and entirely regardless of his own
safety; it was no wonder that the Division trusted him implicitly.
In similar fashion Brig.-Generals Hore Ruthven, Croft, and Jack
were never far from the hottest encounters and the ready judgment
of these experienced officers was of the utmost value to the G.O.C.
The leading of the infantry had been daring and skilful, while the
men responded to every demand of their officers with unfailing
cheerfulness and determination. As had always been the case in the
Ninth, infantry and gunners worked splendidly together, and the
former will never forget the intrepid dash of the latter who assisted
them with such admirable and dexterous promptitude. Nor must the
assiduous though less showy efforts of the Sappers, the Pioneers, the
R.A.M.C., and A.S.C. go unmentioned; its very best work was freely
given by each branch and was necessary for the common success.