THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS
APRIL 1918
In spite of their success in forcing the passage of the Somme on the
27th March, the Germans had shot their bolt, and though they had
secured the most extensive acreage ever taken in any one offensive
since trench warfare began, they had failed in their strategical
design—the capture of Amiens and the severance of the French and
British forces. Their front had been worn to a fine point by the
27th, and an attempt to widen it by a stroke against Arras was
shattered by the glorious defence of the northern wing of the Third
Army on the 28th March. No effort on their part could prevent our
thin line in front of Amiens gaining in strength and stability.
Throughout the retreat General Gough had shown sound generalship and
admirable control, but the strain on him and his staff had been so
constant and severe, that Sir Douglas Haig replaced the Fifth Army
Staff by that of the Fourth under General Rawlinson. This arrangement
unfortunately appeared to strengthen the impression created by the
Prime Minister’s unjust remarks in the House of Commons on the 9th
April, implying that General Gough was responsible for our disasters
at the Somme. These were primarily due to the failure of the home
authorities to keep our line in France adequately supplied with men.
About this time, the conference at Doullens arrived at the vastly
important decision which led to the appointment of Marshal Foch on
the 26th March as the Generalissimo of all the forces on the Western
Front.
After the relief of the Ninth, General Blacklock was transferred
to another division, and he was succeeded by Major-General H. H.
Tudor. There could have been no more popular promotion. The new
commander, since he joined the Division in February 1916, had
exercised an important influence in its councils, and his conduct of
the operations from the 21st to the 24th March had marked him as a
leader of outstanding skill. Brig.-General H. R. Wainwright succeeded
General Tudor as C.R.A.
During the retreat from Gouzeaucourt to the Ancre, our losses
exceeded 50 per cent. of the infantry, but the rest were in good
heart. In the fighting of the last few days there had been an element
of sport which appealed to the men, and though they were the hunted
they had killed an enormous number of the pursuers. Consequently
the Division was exhilarated rather than disheartened by its recent
experiences, and its moral was all that could be desired, when, on
the 1st April, it entrained for the north, where it expected to take
over a quiet sector on the front of the IX. Corps in the Second Army.
On the 2nd and 3rd April it detrained at Abeele and Hopoutre, D.H.Q.
being established at Scherpenberg.
On the night of the 3rd/4th April, the Highland and Lowland Brigades
relieved the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Australian Division in the area
extending from Hollebeke (inclusive) across the Ypres-Comines Canal
to the south end of Bulgar Wood, a stretch of some 3000 yards. Here
there were no indications of an impending attack, and General Tudor
was told that his first duty was to prepare his command as speedily
as possible for the “second round of the Third Somme Battle,” which,
it was generally believed, would be continued. This involved a
great deal of preparation. Although individual soldiers recovered
remarkably quickly from exhaustion, units could not recover with
equal rapidity, as there was a lamentable dearth of trained leaders
and instructors. Very large drafts, consisting chiefly of youths of
eighteen and nineteen years of age, were received almost daily by
the 26th and 27th Brigades, but they could not be brought speedily
to the same level of efficiency as that exhibited by the veterans
of the Somme, while the process of absorbing so many new officers
and men, which would have been slow at any time, was rendered even
more difficult by the fact that both brigades were in the line. The
physique of the drafts that joined the Division at this time was
excellent. They were largely composed of lads who had been taken at
the age of seventeen, and were splendid examples of the beneficial
effect of good feeding, regular exercise, and military discipline on
young Scotsmen. The South African Brigade[111] about 1300 strong,
and now under the command of Brig.-General Tanner, appeared to have
no immediate prospects of obtaining reinforcements, and while the
several regiments meanwhile maintained their identity the question of
forming it into one battalion was under consideration. Too weak to
man a brigade front, it was stationed in divisional reserve in the
vicinity of Ridge Wood, 1000 yards north of Vierstraat.
In order to hasten reorganisation as much as possible General Tudor
decided to hold the whole of his line with the 27th Brigade, while
the 26th was withdrawn to absorb its numerous reinforcements. This
arrangement however was upset by Corps orders to take over from the
Nineteenth Division 500 yards of line to the south of Hollebeke on
the night of the 10th/11th. The Highland Brigade was instructed to
do this, but on the morning of the 9th, the enemy made his surprise
attack against the XV. and Portuguese Corps, which for some time
jeopardised our grip on the Channel Ports, and the Division was
required to carry out the relief on the night of the 9th/10th, and
take over the remainder of the Nineteenth Division front on the night
of the 10th/11th. Accordingly, the Lowland Brigade was ordered to
relieve the 26th and garrison also the 500 yards of front in the
Nineteenth Division’s sector on the night of the 9th/10th. The new
area was a featureless and desolate waste of shell-holes, where it
was hard enough to locate one’s position in broad daylight and with
the aid of a map, and was therefore all but impossible in darkness.
Yet in spite of the impossibility of reconnaissance through lack of
time, and a heavy bombardment of the trench system and battery area
with H.E. and gas, the relief was duly carried out, though it was
after daybreak on the 10th before our outposts were in position.
The satisfactory accomplishment of this relief was a very fine feat
on the part of the 27th Brigade. To move in the dark over the most
barren country in Europe under a really heavy bombardment, without
losing cohesion, was an achievement that would have done credit to
the finest soldiers of “The Contemptibles.”
Brig.-General Croft’s Brigade had a span of 4000 yards astride
the Ypres-Comines Canal, with its right about 800 yards south-west
of Hollebeke, and its left approximately 1200 yards east of Klein
Zillebeke. As this sector formed the extreme right flank of the
Passchendaele salient, the general direction of the lines of defence
ran from south-west to north-east. The whole front was covered by a
line of posts, some of which were in “Pill-boxes,” and 300 to 800
yards behind this and overlooking it was a continuous trench from
the northern divisional boundary to 500 yards from the Canal, where
the ground was swampy. From 300 yards south of the Canal another
continuous trench ran as far as the Hollebeke road. In the part taken
over from the Nineteenth Division there were no defences immediately
in rear of the posts, except some 100 yards of trench leaning in a
northerly direction.
Our position north of the Canal appeared the part most likely
to be attacked, since it formed the hinge of the Passchendaele
salient, while the Klein Zillebeke Spur and Hill 60 offered tempting
objectives to the enemy, who could make his arrangements and
concentrate his forces under cover of the Zandvoorde Ridge. South of
the Canal the reserve line defences consisted of a strongly-wired
line of posts stretching in a south-westerly direction to the
Stables, and supported by the defences of White Château, a former
residence of Leopold of Belgium, which, as it occupied a commanding
position, was now tunnelled with dug-outs and held a permanent
garrison. From the Stables two massive belts of wire extended
south-south-east and south-west. Behind these were a few posts which
it was impossible to man adequately, owing to the length of the
brigade front and the necessity of holding in strength Hill 60, The
Bluff, and White Château. No switch protected the right flank of the
Division, but a section of machine-guns covered the space between the
right of the support line and the Stables.
The front was covered by the 50th and 51st Brigades R.F.A. In
divisional reserve were the 26th Brigade, south-west and north-west
of Vierstraat, the South African Brigade between La Clytte and
Scherpenberg, and the 9th Machine-gun Battalion (less two companies)
about 1000 yards east of Ridge Wood.
The heavy cannonade, which had commenced at 1 A.M., slackened about
two hours later. On this morning the tide of battle flowed north,
and the right flank of the IX. Corps being hotly engaged, the South
Africans were sent by the Corps to positions of assembly south of
Neuve Eglise, there to be in Corps reserve. Brig.-General Kennedy was
instructed to be ready to move his brigade at thirty minutes’ notice,
and the line along the eastern slopes of the Messines-Wytschaete
Ridge was to be held at all costs. Early in the afternoon the
situation near Wytschaete, which was held by the Nineteenth Division,
was very obscure, and Brig.-General Kennedy sent a patrol of Camerons
to ascertain the relative positions of the enemy and of our troops.
Between 1 and 2 P.M. the Ninth entered the battle. After a
terrific bombardment the Germans rushed our outpost positions
south of the Canal held by the 11th Royal Scots, and attacked the
support position, but the enemy’s ranks were swept away by rifle
and machine-gun fire, and by the accurate fire put down by the
27th L.T.M.B. under the direction of Captain Drummond Shiels.
Unfortunately success farther south enabled the Germans to threaten
our flank, and the next assault, developing from the south and
extending as far west as the Stables, would have broken our defences
but for the timely arrival of two companies of the 12th Royal Scots,
who prolonged the defensive flank formed by the 11th Royal Scots.
Considering the exceptionally fatiguing relief, the fine resistance
of the 27th Brigade was a magnificent effort. Nevertheless the
situation was decidedly alarming. All touch with the troops to the
south had been lost, and as the Highland Brigade had been placed
under the Nineteenth Division, the 9th Seaforths, now the only
infantry General Tudor had in reserve, were despatched to reinforce
the Lowland Brigade and were posted on the Dammstrasse, echeloned in
rear of the right flank of the Lowlanders.
About 3 P.M. the order placing the 26th Brigade under the Nineteenth
Division was cancelled, and the 58th Brigade (the left of the
Nineteenth Division) together with its front was transferred to the
Ninth. It was uncertain what ground was held by that brigade, but
some of its troops were believed to be in Wytschaete, which was also
occupied by the Cameron patrol, and so the Highland Brigade was sent
up to establish a line between the left of the 58th and the right
of the 27th Brigade. At 5.30 P.M. the situation was believed to
be as follows: The 58th Brigade was holding the line L’Enfer-Pick
House-Torreken Corner; the Black Watch were in Grand Bois, the
Seaforths moving on Dammstrasse, and the Camerons in reserve
south-west of Vierstraat, while the 9th Seaforths and a detachment
of Sappers were in the Dammstrasse; the 27th Brigade was holding the
line from the Stables to Hollebeke, thence along the support position
to the Canal and its original line north of the Canal.
[Illustration: WYTSCHAETE FROM VIERSTRAAT]
At 8 P.M. the 26th Brigade, which had established itself on the
line Stables-Delbske Farm-Ravine Wood-southern edge of Denys
Wood-Guedezeune Farm, reported that Wytschaete had been evacuated
by our troops. Having received as reinforcements the 62nd Brigade
(less one battalion but with one battalion of the 146th Brigade
attached), General Tudor sent two battalions to strengthen his line,
and these passing through the Cameron detachment, which had already
reoccupied the village, established a line east and south-east of
Wytschaete. The Black Watch also advanced and held a line along the
eastern edge of Onraet and the western margin of Oosttaverne Wood,
connecting the left of the 62nd Brigade with the right of the 7th
Seaforths[112] and the 9th Seaforths in the Dammstrasse. The 4th and
11th M.M.G. Batteries, being sent to the Ninth, were retained in
reserve near Scherpenberg.
South of our positions the Germans made disquieting progress during
the day; they compelled our troops to evacuate Armentières, and
crossing the Lys in strength occupied Estaires, Steenwerck, and
Ploegsteert, and threatened the Messines Ridge. So very grave was
the crisis that the weak South African Brigade was thrown hurriedly
into the battle. On the front of the Nineteenth Division the Germans
had penetrated our defences between Messines and Pick House on the
Wytschaete road, and the South Africans along with the 57th and 58th
Brigades of the Nineteenth Division were ordered to retake this
portion of the ridge. With the 1st and 2nd Regiments leading and the
4th in support, the South Africans moved forward to the attack at
5.45 P.M. On their right was the 57th Brigade. Only two F.A. Brigades
were available for artillery support, and the enemy’s riflemen and
machine-gunners in shell-holes and “Pill-boxes” were able to inflict
numerous casualties on the assailing troops, but in spite of the
difficulty of keeping touch in the mist, the South Africans pressed
on, expelled the enemy from his shell-holes and “Pill-boxes,” and
established a line along the western outskirts of Messines-Middle
Farm-Four Huns Farm-Lumm Farm, with a defensive flank thrown back
to L’Enfer. The 1st Regiment, dashing through Messines, by a fine
bayonet charge drove the enemy down the eastern slopes of the ridge,
but the village was an awkward place to hold, and though in a series
of stubborn hand-to-hand combats the 1st Regiment kept its ground,
the village was eventually abandoned and a line was established just
west of it.
In the small hours of the 11th the Germans resumed their efforts,
and strong forces attempted to break through our defences on the
Dammstrasse and the right flank of the Lowland Brigade from the
Stables to the southern end of the support position, but the hostile
concentration had been observed and our rifle, machine-gun, and
artillery-fire, cutting deep lanes in the dense field-grey hordes,
beat back the foe in tumultuous and terror-stricken disorder. The
Seaforths, taking full advantage of the panic, counter-attacked with
a small party under Sergeants Tait and Jeffries, and rounded up 17
Germans and 3 machine-guns. The young soldiers who had joined the
Division behaved with admirable courage and coolness, and our gunners
earned the gratitude of the infantry by the rapidity and precision
with which they engaged every favourable target.
On the front of the Ninth the enemy had been too severely punished to
risk another enterprise, and no incident interrupted the rest of the
day. A counter-attack was even contemplated with a view to clearing
the high ground west and north of Oosttaverne, but the project was
given up on account of German inroads farther south. Advantage of
the lull was taken to reorganise the line, the 62nd Brigade now
holding from Pick House to Somer Farm, the 26th to the Hollebeke-St
Eloi road, and the 27th in its original sector, the total frontage
amounting to nearly 9000 yards. During the evening the Division and
its sector were transferred from the IX. to the XXII. Corps.
On the same day Messines Ridge was wrested from our grasp. During
the night of the 10th/11th the South Africans tried to gain touch
with the Ninth near Pick House, but this place consisting of three
“Pill-boxes” was found to be strongly manned by the enemy and defied
every attempt to overpower it. At daybreak the 108th Brigade moved
up in support of the South Africans, and the forenoon passed without
event. Early in the afternoon, however, the Germans, attacking the
left wing of the South Africans in great strength, expelled the 2nd
Regiment from the crest, and though a resolute counter-stroke, led
by Captain L. Greene, regained the lost ground, the enemy’s turning
movement on our left flank forced the South Africans to retire to a
line some 200 yards east of Hell Farm. This position was maintained
in face of heavy losses and incessant attacks throughout the
remaining hours of daylight.
Owing to German penetration in the south the right flank of the
Second Army, pivoting on Wytschaete, was obliged to withdraw in the
night to a line passing through Kruisstraat Cabaret and a point east
of Wulverghem. When this movement was completed the right wing of
the 62nd Brigade rested on the Bogaert Farm-Pick Wood Spur, and a
defensive flank was formed along the Wytschaete-Peckham road.
The retirement was naturally more pronounced in the case of the
Nineteenth Division, and in conformity with the rest of that
formation the South Africans were drawn back to a line N. Midland
Farm-Kruisstraat Cabaret-Spanbroekmolen-Maedelstede Farm.
From the 12th to the 15th there was a lull in the fighting on
the front of the Ninth, but merciless artillery-fire caused many
casualties. During this period of comparative peacefulness General
Tudor made several rearrangements. The 64th Brigade (less one
battalion) took over the front from Somer Farm to Dome House in
relief of the 26th, which continued to hold the Dammstrasse, and
the 9th Seaforths and the 58th Brigade were withdrawn from the
front trenches, the latter rejoining its own Division on the 13th.
Meantime reinforcements were gathering in the rear; the South
Africans returned to the Ninth on the night of the 13th/14th and two
battalions of the 39th Composite Brigade (late Thirty-ninth Division)
were moved by the Twenty-first Division to Ridge Wood to be available
if required. All our defences were strengthened and the Sappers
and 9th Seaforths laboured steadily on the Vierstraat line, which
the 62nd and 26th Brigades were ordered to garrison, each with a
battalion. A prolongation of front on the evening of the 15th obliged
the 62nd Brigade to take over the front of the Nineteenth Division
as far as Spanbroekmolen. The success of the enemy also forced us
to surrender our dearly-bought gains of the Passchendaele campaign,
and in conformity with the withdrawal round Ypres, the left flank of
the Ninth from the north-east end of the Dammstrasse to the northern
divisional boundary was brought back to the Corps line.
This line, leaving the Dammstrasse, east of Eikhof Farm, crossed
the Canal just east of The Bluff, where, turning east-north-east,
it passed over the Klein Zillebeke Spur, 500 yards north-west of
the hamlet of the same name. The White Château and Klein Zillebeke
were thus given up, but The Bluff and Hill 60 were retained. With
a view to shortening our front, and so economising troops, a more
extensive retirement—to the Vierstraat line—was contemplated; but on
General Tudor urging that this position, besides offering inadequate
protection against artillery-fire, was completely overlooked from the
Spanbroekmolen-Wytschaete Ridge, and was a poor substitute for the
valuable observation afforded by our present position, the idea was
abandoned.
The stretch, for which the Ninth with its attached troops was
responsible, amounted to 9000 yards. The portion of the Corps line,
occupied by the Lowland Brigade, consisted of a string of cleverly
camouflaged posts protected by heavy and continuous belts of wire,
and had previously been reconnoitred by Brig.-General Croft and
Captain Duke, his brigade major. The retreat was skilfully carried
out on the night of the 15th/16th under cover of patrols, which,
going out as usual after dusk, were so enterprising that the enemy
failed to realise that a withdrawal was in progress. All next day the
Germans violently shelled the vicinity of the Corps line, but the
posts were so well concealed that little damage was done, and even
low flying aeroplanes were unable to detect our new positions. Our
far-reaching observation served us handsomely; the enemy frequently
presented excellent targets as he advanced, and the accurate and
galling fire of our Stokes mortars and machine-guns stationed on The
Bluff shattered a hostile concentration near the Canal.
On the 16th a huge enemy effort was directed against Wytschaete.
About 5 A.M., after a hurricane bombardment which broke down all
communications in the sector, the Germans, screened by a mist,
carried the battered site on which had stood Spanbroekmolen Mill,
the 64th Brigade being forced to throw out a defensive flank 500
yards north of the former on the line Somer Farm-North House-Black
Cot, whence it was continued to the Vierstraat line by two companies
of the Black Watch. The South Africans were hastily brought up, and
manned the southern sector of the Vierstraat from La Polka to Desinet
Farm, while the Lowland Brigade occupied the northern sector from the
Vierstraat-Wytschaete road to Snipers’ Barn.
About noon a furious attack developed against the Camerons in the
Dammstrasse, but was repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire, and the
Germans withdrew to Pheasant Wood, leaving their wounded where they
fell. An hour later an attempt of the enemy to debouch from the wood
was easily frustrated.
The loss of Wytschaete was no light matter, and an operation for
its recapture was quickly planned. French reserves having been sent
up, one division was to attack with its left flank parallel to and
500 yards north of the Kemmel-Spanbroekmolen road, and the Ninth
was to co-operate by retaking Wytschaete. Our available forces
consisted of two battalions of the 62nd Brigade, the 7th Seaforths,
and two companies of the 39th Composite Brigade, and the objective
was the line Pick Wood-Bogaert Farm, the cutting 300 yards south of
Wytschaete-Staenyzer Cabaret-Somer Farm. The French however were
unable to complete their preparations, and at 7.30 P.M. the Ninth
attacked alone under cover of a creeping barrage. Just as the German
barrage began our troops moved forward. The dash of the Seaforths
was superb. An irresistible charge carried them right through
Wytschaete village, and during a combat where many feats of valour
were performed, Captain Reid and C.S.M. Jeffries singled themselves
out by the daring with which they rushed a “Pill-box” on the ridge
and captured 14 prisoners and 5 machine-guns. But the extreme left
of the attack was checked by machine-gun fire from North House, and
though on the right the men of the 62nd Brigade reached the line
Petit Bois-Maedelstede, they failed to capture the craters at the
two latter places owing to machine-gun fire from Spanbroekmolen and
Peckham, which the French were to have attacked. The result of the
operation was that success on the left had been gained on a narrow
front, while on the right a line had been established which could not
be held by daylight unless Spanbroekmolen were taken.
The French therefore agreed to assault the village at 5 A.M. on the
17th, when the 62nd Brigade was to co-operate by attacking Wytschaete
Wood. To support the Seaforths in Wytschaete village the South
Africans were placed under the orders of Brig.-General Kennedy, and
the 4th Regiment, followed by the 1st, moved up to the village. By
dawn the line occupied ran from Somer Farm through North House and
the Hospice to Black Cot. The French effort against Spanbroekmolen
was unexpectedly feeble, only one company being used, and nothing was
achieved, with the result that the 62nd Brigade had to withdraw to
the line La Gache Farm-eastern edge of Petit Bois.
From the 17th to the 24th no infantry attacks took place, but
relentless artillery-fire persistently swept our trench system and
back areas. On the 18th an unlucky shell struck the 26th Brigade
H.Q., causing the deaths of Lieut.-Colonel Horn, on his way to rejoin
the Seaforths, Major Rose, the B.M. of the artillery, Captain
Somers Cocks, the Staff Captain, and the Rev. C. G. Meister. The
German advance, which had given the enemy possession of Wytschaete,
Wulverghem, Neuve Eglise, Bailleul, and Meteren, had now brought him
close to the Kemmel-Mont des Cats Ridge, the retention of which was
vital to the security of our grip on Ypres and Poperinghe. A weighty
blow had been dealt against the British forces, whose organisation
had been gravely affected by the necessity of throwing piecemeal
all available reserves into the battle line, and Ludendorff might
have realised his dreams if he had returned to the main strategical
design with which he began the year. But his gains at the Lys had
so far exceeded his expectations that he was tempted to carry on in
the north in the hope of securing the Channel Ports, and the two
schemes, by offering conflicting prizes, began to lose all measure of
co-ordination in the German plans.
During this period the French, relieving the Nineteenth Division,
joined up with the Ninth on the right, and on the night of the
19th/20th our front north of Eikhof Farm was handed over to the
Twenty-first Division. This included the whole of the front
originally held by the Ninth Division, and, although the portion
south of the Canal had been heavily attacked time after time, no part
of the ground had been lost, except that portion in front of the
Corps line which was evacuated in conformity with the army plan. On
the 19th the 62nd Brigade was relieved and joined its own division,
while the H.Q. and two half battalions of the 146th Brigade came
under the orders of General Tudor. The remaining two halves arrived
on the 21st and 22nd, and two battalions of the 39th Composite
Brigade were transferred to the Twenty-first Division. Other
reinforcements arrived; the 4th Tank Brigade (less one battalion and
without tanks), consisting of the 5th Battalion, with 30 Lewis Gun
detachments, and the 13th Battalion with 47. On the 22nd the South
African Brigade, for lack of drafts, became a battalion styled the
South African Composite Battalion,[113] and the remaining units of
the brigade, which retained its distinctive name under Brig.-General
Tanner, were made up of the 9th Scottish Rifles and the 2nd Royal
Scots Fusiliers. The former battalion was thus retransferred to
its old division from the Fourteenth, while the latter, a Regular
battalion originally in the famous Seventh Division, came from the
Thirtieth Division, in which it had served since December 1915.
Another stroke against Wytschaete in co-operation with the French was
planned for the 26th, but was anticipated by a great German thrust
on the 25th. As was not unusual with the Ninth, its line formed a
pronounced salient, and on the evening of the 24th was held from
right to left by the 27th Brigade from La Gache Farm to Black Cot,
by the 146th Brigade to North House, and the 64th to Dome House,
and thence by the 26th (with the “Rifles” attached) to the northern
divisional boundary at Eikhof Farm. The 27th Brigade was practically
facing south. The Vierstraat line and another from 800 to 1000 yards
in rear of it, known as “The Cheapside line,” had been assiduously
strengthened, and they were divided into three sectors, of which the
right was allotted to the 27th, the centre to the 146th, and the
left to the 26th Brigade. Each sector was held by one battalion,
deployed in depth in and between the two lines, two companies of
each battalion being earmarked as garrison, and the remaining two
being at the disposal of brigade commanders for counter-attack. On
the right the 12th Royal Scots held the line with the K.O.S.B.[114]
in close support and the 11th Royal Scots in reserve. Thirteen Lewis
Gun detachments of the 5th Battalion (Tank Brigade) were stationed
by Brig.-General Croft on supporting positions on Vandamme Hill. The
South African Brigade, now in process of reorganisation, and the
remainder of the 4th Tank Brigade were in divisional reserve, the
former about Hopoutre and the latter half-way between Reninghelst and
Poperinghe. The XXII. Corps H.Q. company, also under General Tudor,
was composed mostly of men unfit for active operations, and was in
reserve.
Our boundary on the south gave to the French the low ridge running
east from Mount Kemmel to Spanbroekmolen, without leaving to them
sufficient space in which to deploy troops for its defence. It was
unfortunate that this ridge was not in the area of the Ninth; for
while it was of little account as regards the defence of Kemmel, it
was essential for the protection of our right flank. During the week
18th to 26th, although no serious attack developed, the troops were
subjected to great strain owing to incessant and severe shell-fire,
and the casualties amongst those in and behind the Vierstraat line
were numerous.
[Illustration: KEMMEL AND YPRES FROM THE FREZENBERG RIDGE]
Between midnight and 1 A.M. on the 25th a prisoner captured by the
French stated that a big onslaught was imminent and would probably
take place on the 25th. Before daybreak a thick mist straddled the
ground, and at 2.30 A.M. a violent hostile bombardment of gas and
H.E. opened along the whole front. Telephonic communication between
General Tudor and Brig.-General Croft was sundered at the outset, and
the S.O.S. was seen to go up on the French front. At 3.20 A.M. the
4th Tank Brigade was ordered to send up immediately two companies
to the Cheapside line, and the South Africans were instructed to be
ready to move at fifteen minutes’ notice.
At 4.50 A.M. news came from the French that the enemy’s infantry were
attacking, and half an hour later the S.O.S. signal was reported
from the front of Wytschaete. Kemmel was wreathed in smoke and large
numbers of enemy aircraft circled over both it and Wytschaete, but no
definite information reached D.H.Q. until 6.40 A.M., when a belated
message arrived from the 64th Brigade to the effect that up to 5.15
A.M. no infantry attack had developed on its front. A few minutes
later the C.R.A. reported that the enemy’s barrage had moved forward
considerably, and that one of our aeroplanes had dropped word that
it extended along the whole front from Ludenhoek to the south-west
end of the Dammstrasse. At 7.15 A.M. another message from the C.R.A.
stated that the Germans were within 300 yards of Siege Farm, about
2000 yards north-west of our right flank troops at La Gache Farm.
This information came as a complete surprise, since no news of an
infantry attack on our front had yet reached D.H.Q.
The enemy’s onset in the first instance was directed about 3 A.M.
against the Twenty-eighth French Division, and the right of the
Ninth held by the 12th Royal Scots. At 5 A.M. there was a determined
frontal assault on the 12th Royal Scots, and at one time a lodgment
was effected between the centre and right companies, but after bitter
fighting the Royal Scots drove off the assailants. About 7 A.M. the
K.O.S.B. in the Vierstraat line received word from the Royal Scots
that their front was intact, and this information was the more
amazing in as much as the K.O.S.B. were themselves hotly engaged with
the enemy, while French prisoners under escort were observed in their
rear. The Germans had been foiled in their frontal attack, but their
onrush had pierced the French on our right and enabled them to turn
our flank from the south.
The 12th Royal Scots were entirely cut off, and about 8.30 A.M. the
battalion fighting desperately to the end was engulfed by a flood
of Germans, here and there a whirling eddy testifying to the fury
of a last stand. Only a few isolated groups escaped the clutch of
the foe and fought their way through many perils to the Cheapside
line. On the left of the Royal Scots, the 1st East Yorks Regiment
(64th Brigade) was forced back to Grand Bois, where, encircled by
hordes of Germans, it put up a gallant fight. The K.O.S.B. also
suffered seriously from the enemy’s turning movement; the two forward
companies were virtually annihilated after a fierce resistance, and
the battalion H.Q. were surrounded and captured. The remainder of
the battalion took up a position on the Cheapside line, which was
also held by the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. (64th Brigade), and by Lewis Gun
detachments of the 4th Tank Brigade. Two companies of the 11th Royal
Scots, the Black Watch, and the 9th D.L.I. were sent up in succession
to support and continue this line back towards La Clytte.
In this manner the dangerous thrust was parried. The Black Watch,
moving up from Ouderdom, crossed the Cheapside line, and engaging the
enemy captured 67 prisoners at small cost to themselves. The K.O.S.B.
in a brilliant counter-attack directed by Captain Cundle, now in
command of the battalion, inflicted severe losses and secured 58
prisoners.
Throughout the action our machine-gunners earned noteworthy
distinction by the doggedness with which they kept their guns in
action till the last possible moment. Most of the company with the
27th Brigade shared the fate of the 12th Royal Scots, but made the
enemy pay a heavy price for his victory. One gun directed on the
Steenbeek valley, fired 1500 rounds before it was put out of action;
other two were silent until the Germans reached the wire in front of
them, when the crews suddenly opened fire and mowed them down. Only
after one gun was knocked out, and the other withdrawn through lack
of ammunition, did the enemy succeed in penetrating the wire. Of the
teams at Vandamme no man returned; at Vandenberghe the guns were kept
in action until the last belt was fired and were then destroyed,
since it was impossible to withdraw them. In the Vierstraat line, a
whole section became casualties. Two sections of another machine-gun
company supporting the 1st East Yorks opened fire on the valley
of the Wytschaete Beck with three guns between 5 and 6 A.M., and
continued firing at intervals, until 9 A.M., when two of the guns
were withdrawn to cover the right flank of the infantry, and remained
in action for two hours without tripods. Of these sections there were
only six unwounded men at the end of the day.
On the left of our line the storm beat violently against the
Dammstrasse, but failed to break the defence of the Highlanders,
who held the position with the Camerons and the Seaforths. Up to
half an hour before noon all hostile attacks were repulsed, our
infantry, machine-gunners and the personnel of the 26th L.T.M.B.
co-operating most effectively. When ammunition began to run short,
several of the men dashed forward to deserted dumps in full view of
the enemy, and brought back bandoliers of cartridges. Between 11.30
and 1.30 P.M. shells fell without ceasing, and the Camerons in the
forward posts were practically wiped out, but our position through
Piccadilly Farm-The Mound proved invulnerable to every attack for the
remaining part of the day. Under Captain H. E. Bennet the men of the
26th L.T.M.B. fired off all their Stokes ammunition into the dense
masses of the Germans, and after destroying the mortars used their
rifles with deadly effect against the hostile infantry and transport.
The machine-gunners with the Highlanders handled their weapons with
such skill and enterprise that the infantry voluntarily collected
ammunition and kept up the supply, while parties of the “Rifles” in
the Vierstraat-Snipers’ Barn line were organised for belt filling.
After darkness fell, a line in rear of the Highlanders having been
established and manned by fresh troops of the Twenty-first Division,
the Camerons and Seaforths with the other detachments extricated
themselves and were drawn back to a camp 700 yards north-east of
Ouderdom. The stone-wall defence of the Highlanders had put a final
stop to the enemy’s northern onrush, which had rolled up the front
and immediate supports of three brigades, and threatened our hold on
Ypres.
The shattered fragments of the Ninth, with the exception of the South
African Brigade and the artillery, were relieved by the Forty-ninth
Division at 11 A.M. on the 26th. The brigade remained in the sector
until the night of the 5th/6th May, and all three battalions, though
constantly harassed by artillery-fire, inflicted enormous casualties
on the enemy when on the 29th he strove to take advantage of his
possession of Mount Kemmel. Rarely has heavier artillery-fire
heralded an attack. On that day, the Royal Scots Fusiliers signally
distinguished themselves. They were deployed in, in front of,
and behind the Cheapside line, and suffered horribly from the
bombardment; but of their eight Lewis Guns, which were out in front
of their position, only one was knocked out, so that when the enemy’s
infantry advanced they were immediately checked, and then our barrage
came down on the top of them. First a few rose up and bolted, and
then the remainder fled in panic, whereupon the Royal Scots Fusiliers
fairly took toll of them with their rifles and Lewis Guns. The
enemy’s attack was utterly defeated.
That date marks the failure of the German designs in Flanders. The
value of Kemmel proved to be less vital than had been anticipated;
the enemy failed to carry the valleys that separated it from
Scherpenberg, and here, as in front of Amiens, the battle line
became stabilised. The diversion had caused anxious tremors at
G.H.Q., and for some time our organisation showed signs of giving
way. The situation was too critical to be glossed over by misleading
communiqués, and Sir Douglas Haig’s famous “Backs to the Wall”
Order,[115] issued to all ranks on the 12th April, was a bracing
and salutary warning to the British Army of what had to be done
to deprive the Germans of victory. But Ludendorff, by using too
much strength to exploit his initial success, had converted the
diversion into a major operation, and had been unable to turn it
into account in front of Amiens. The Flanders offensive instead of
supplementing had supplanted the enemy’s main scheme of the year, and
from this moment the projects of the German Higher Command show both
uncertainty and nervousness.
Considering how sadly the Ninth had been depleted as a result of
the Somme retreat, the unwavering resistance it offered in April
is little short of marvellous. Since the 21st March it had enjoyed
virtually no rest, and yet it had retained all its high fighting
qualities unimpaired; this was largely due to the excellent spirit
shown by the young boys who formed a large proportion of each unit.
The Ninth’s protracted defence of Wytschaete had not merely added
another glorious record to its lengthy list, but had helped almost
as much as the retention of Givenchy by the Fifty-fifth Division
to set a limit to the German gains in Flanders, and earned for it
another “mention”[116] from G.H.Q. It is worth noting that here, as
during the Somme retreat, the enemy never succeeded in wresting any
ground from the Ninth by a frontal attack, and it was only when its
flanks were turned that any territory was surrendered. The infantry
had shown throughout incomparable tenacity and endurance, and the
work of the trench-mortar batteries and the machine-gun battalion
was invaluable. It is doubtful if the 26th L.T.M.B. ever did finer
work than on the 25th April, while no reputation was more thoroughly
established than that of the 9th Machine-gun Battalion, and the
prestige won in these turbulent April days gave a tremendous stimulus
to the _esprit_ of this recently formed unit.
The successful resistance of the Ninth was due to sound generalship
as well as the valour of its troops. On the critical 25th April
the Highland Brigade being on the inner flank had time to send two
companies up from the reserve to form a defensive flank facing south,
and it was this measure that stopped the spread northward of the
German turning movement until the troops along the Dammstrasse could
be withdrawn to the Piccadilly Farm-Mound position, and then at night
behind the Vierstraat-Snipers’ Barn line. In holding up the onslaught
on the Cheapside line and eventually in consolidating themselves in
it, when Mount Kemmel, which looked right along it, was in the hands
of the enemy, the men of the Ninth accomplished an almost incredible
performance. The action is a conspicuous example of the value of
defence deployed in depth; for the fact that the Germans never
broke through the Division, although their first attack completely
outflanked the front and support lines and even the front reserve
line (Vierstraat line), was due, apart from the courage of the
troops, to the great depth of the original deployment of the Division.
By its prowess in March and April the Ninth thoroughly earned the
flattering message[117] received later from Sir Douglas Haig. It
was now widely known even beyond Scotland, and shared with the
Fifty-first Highland Territorial Division, the rare distinction of
appearing in a leading article of _The Times_. This publicity was the
theme of an amusing conversation between the popular Padre Brown and
a Padre of another division.
“Oh, you belong to the Ninth Division, do you?”
“I do.”
“You seem to have a very good Press.” (This, of course, nettled Padre
Brown.)
“Yes, we have.”
“How do you manage it; have you got a special correspondent?”
“Oh yes.”
“Really; and he seems to accompany you wherever you go.”
“Yes, he does.”
“I say, do tell me who he is.”
“Oh, his name is Haig!”