GERMANY’S SUPREME EFFORT
21ST TO 29TH MARCH 1918
The 21st March 1918 was big with destiny; on that day began the
battle on the issue of which depended the fate of Germany and the
world. At first the omens seemed favourable to the enemy, for a thick
mist, hovering over ridges and valleys, allowed his grey-clad men to
leave their trenches without detection. At 4.45 A.M. the masses of
guns concentrated by Ludendorff on the British front spoke with an
ear-splitting noise, and our lines were robed in smoke and flame.
The bombardment of the Forward Zone, particularly on the front of
the 26th Brigade, was not exceptional, but battery areas, Dessart
Wood, and the villages of Heudecourt and Sorel were heavily shelled.
Nurlu, where General Tudor had his H.Q., was the special target for
a high velocity gun, and as such marked attention to a D.H.Q. was a
luxury reserved for great occasions, it served to give early warning
that the supreme crisis had arrived. Large quantities of gas were
sent over, compelling the battalions at Heudecourt and Dessart Wood
to wear respirators for two hours. Shortly after 5 A.M. telephonic
communication between the two front brigades and D.H.Q. was broken,
the line to the 26th being invariably cut immediately after repair.
But General Tudor remained in constant touch with Brig.-General Croft
at Sorel, and when the bombardment terminated, the lines to the South
African and Highland Brigades were quickly mended. At 9.53 A.M. news
was received that German infantry had been seen advancing on Gauche
Wood and Quentin Ridge behind a smoke-barrage, and this information
was reported at once to the VII. Corps and the S.O.S. sent out by
wireless.
In the sector of the Highland Brigade there was no infantry attack;
small parties of Germans were seen to make a show of advancing from
Gonnelieu, but an assault, if it had been intended, was prevented by
our tremendous concentration of artillery-fire on the village. But
a serious thrust was made against the South Africans and between 8
and 9 A.M., under cover of a smoke-screen, strong hostile parties
marched against Gauche Wood, which was garrisoned by a company of the
2nd Regiment holding three strong points with another in the open on
the south-west side of the wood. Captain Green, who was in command,
was assisted by two machine-guns and a section of the brigade T.M.B.
Some Germans attacked the wood fiercely from the east, and others,
screened by the fog while threading their way through our outposts
in the north, entered it from that direction. A desperate resistance
was offered by the posts, and great rents were ruthlessly torn in
the ranks of the invaders, but yard by yard the Germans tightened
their hold. The garrisons of two of the posts were almost completely
blotted out, but Lieut. Beviss and half a platoon hacked their way
out and dug in immediately west of the wood. Captain Green with the
men of the third post fought his way back to join his troops near the
south-west margin. Prodigal of life, the pursuing Germans charged
in mass at 50 yards’ range, and whole sections were shot down by
the vengeful fire of the South Africans. Brought to a sudden halt,
the assailants commenced to dig themselves in on the western edge;
still the unerring bullets of Captain Green’s men took heavy toll of
them, and they retired within the shelter of the wood, but even there
they found no safety, for Brig.-General Dawson, on hearing what had
happened, directed all the artillery at his disposal to bombard it.
Gauche Wood was all that the Ninth yielded on the first day of the
battle.
The first confirmation that General Tudor received of the enemy’s
attack was at 11 A.M., when he learned that German infantry were
advancing between Vaucellette Farm and Gauche Wood. Half an hour
later, he heard from the Twenty-first Division that the farm had been
lost, and from the South Africans that the Germans were occupying the
wood.
Up to noon the situation seemed to be fairly satisfactory. To the
north, the right of the Forty-seventh Division had been unmolested,
while on our right the Twenty-first Division, according to its
reports, still held Cavalry Trench, east and south-east of Chapel
Hill. But at that time sinister tidings arrived, a divisional
observer reporting that the infantry of the Twenty-first had
withdrawn from the Hill on Revelon Farm at 11 A.M. From noon, gnawing
anxiety was the constant companion of the Division. As we have seen,
Chapel Hill formed the southern buttress of our defence scheme, and
accordingly General Tudor ordered Brig.-General Dawson to ascertain
at once if the Hill and Chapel crossing were still in our hands, and,
if not, to concert measures with the brigade on his right for the
reoccupation of these vital positions.
The South Africans’ commander was fully alive to the seriousness of
the situation, for the loss of Chapel Hill might mean the sacrifice
of his two forward battalions. He promptly ordered the troops holding
Lowland Support (the rear trench of the Yellow System) to turn about
and face south, thus forming a defensive flank between Chapel Hill
and Revelon Farm, and this flank he strengthened by sending forward a
company of the 2nd Regiment; it however met the enemy in the trenches
on the north slope of the hill and could make no further progress.
The task of recapturing Chapel Hill was entrusted to a company of
the South African Scottish; at 5.30 P.M., advancing with great dash,
the men chased the Germans from the crest, took the trenches on the
southern and south-eastern slopes and linked up the position with
Genin Well Copse.
But farther south matters were becoming exceedingly grave. The
Germans bored a passage to the vicinity of Genin Well Copse, where
they were rudely checked by the fire of a machine-gun section
at Railton, while the South African Scottish raked them with
flanking-fire, and C/51 Battery under Major Sawder at Revelon Farm
engaged them over open sights with deadly effect. Patrols of the 11th
Royal Scots entering into the fray, dislodged the enemy’s snipers
from the copse and captured an officer and 33 men.
On the afternoon of the 21st March the situation on the front of the
Ninth was satisfactory. No serious assault, except on the right, had
been made against its entrenchments, but the Germans had in store for
it perils more desperate than those that come from a frontal attack.
So far, our main source of anxiety was the south, where the chief
shock of the onset had been felt, but the possession of Chapel Hill,
Lowland Support, Revelon Farm, and Railton, gave reasonable security
to our flank and kept us in touch with the Twenty-first Division,
which, according to our patrol reports, was holding the Brown Line
south of Railton. The ominous news in the Corps Summaries of disaster
farther south, and the fact that our line of retreat to the Green
Line, which ran south-west, was already jeopardised by the enemy’s
penetration to a depth of fully 2000 yards on the Twenty-first
Division’s front necessarily kept the attention of General Tudor
focussed on our right flank.
Information from the north had been reassuring, the Forty-seventh
Division having reported at 4.40 P.M. that no alarming thrust had
been made on its front. It therefore came as a huge surprise to
General Tudor when he was ordered to withdraw his men during the
night to the Battle Zone, in order to conform with the retreat of
the V. Corps to the Red Line (a continuation of our Yellow System).
This was due to events on the front of the Third Army, where the
Germans had scored a greater measure of success than could have been
anticipated. The loss of Doignies and the penetration of hostile
infantry as far as Beaumetz and Morchies imperilled the Flesquières
salient and compelled General Byng to withdraw his men on the right
to Highland Ridge, and thence westwards along the Hindenburg Line to
Havrincourt and Hermies. But a more extensive withdrawal involving
the abandonment of the whole of the salient would probably have
been our wisest policy, since it would have forestalled the enemy’s
designs.
Warning orders, immediately sent out to brigades, prevented
Brig.-General Dawson from carrying out an attempt, which he had in
mind, to recapture Gauche Wood. Instructions were also received
for the Ninth to take over the defences of Chapel Hill from the
Twenty-first Division; this had actually been done, but parties of
the Twenty-first still on Chapel Hill and between it and Revelon Farm
were relieved by the South Africans during the night. In order that
the extra territory then taken over might be adequately guarded, the
11th Royal Scots were sent up to reinforce the South Africans, who
established a continuous line from Chapel Hill in front of Revelon
Farm to Railton, a trench being dug on it after dark by the Sappers
and 9th Seaforths. With the approach of dusk the withdrawal from
the Forward Zone began and was carried out without molestation, the
night passing quietly except for slight gas-shelling of Dessart
Wood. Cheering news filtered through at midnight; the Twenty-first
Division had retaken the Yellow Line from south of Chapel Hill to the
Railton-Peizière Railway, and the prospect at the close of the first
day’s fighting seemed distinctly good.
With the second day, trials and troubles for the Ninth accumulated
and grew in magnitude as the enemy’s attack was pressed, and during
the following days only consummate leadership and indomitable
gallantry enabled the Division to extricate itself from the dangers
that threatened it on all sides.
When dawn came, gelid shadows of mist drifted over the landscape,
bringing poor comfort to men who, half-numbed with cold, had passed
a long, sleepless night. There was no change in our dispositions,
the Battle Zone being held by the South African Brigade on the right
and the Highland Brigade on the left, each being deployed in depth
between the Yellow and Brown Systems. At 7 A.M. General Tudor was
informed by the Corps Commander that as the weight of the enemy’s
assault was expected to be in the south, he must be prepared to
take over the front of the Twenty-first Division as far as the
Railton-Peizière Railway by 10 A.M., and orders for this relief
were issued at 8.35 A.M. But before they could be carried out heavy
fighting had recommenced.
Enshrouded by fog, the Germans brought up undetected numerous trench
mortars, with the fire of which they hammered our positions from
Chapel Hill to Railton. Brig.-General Dawson, now established at
Sorel, had not the same control of communications as on the previous
day, and was less able to assist his infantry effectively with
artillery-fire. The persevering and tenacious Germans gradually
mastered the Hill, as the garrison became weakened by fatigue and
casualties. General Tudor, having realised that there was little
prospect of the Twenty-first Division establishing any line in front
of the Brown System, which ran south from Railton Station, instructed
Brig.-General Dawson to hold the Reserve Switch, which connected
the front and rear lines of the Yellow System along the line of the
Revelon Farm-Gouzeaucourt road. But our strained right flank was
still locked in conflict, and General Tudor contemplated an attack
by his reserves to relieve the pressure on the South Africans, but
he was instructed by the Corps Commander, in view of the situation
farther south, to form a switch from the Yellow System on the left to
the Brown System on the right.
Scrupulous care and timely anticipation marked the actions of the
G.O.C. In the forenoon he had sent one of his staff officers to
acquaint the Forty-seventh Division with the critical state of
affairs on our front, and at 12.15 P.M. he warned it by telephone
that there was a possibility of our being ordered to retire to
the Brown Line, and that as this withdrawal would necessarily be
in a south-westerly direction, the length of the front of the
Forty-seventh would be greatly extended. The situation on our right
flank was precarious enough in itself, and General Tudor was anxious
to assure his left.
In the afternoon matters developed rapidly. The policy of the Fifth
Army was to fight a rearguard action to delay the enemy, and the
Ninth was instructed to withdraw at once to the Brown Line; but
before this order was issued another message commanded a retirement
to the Green Line. The South African and Highland Brigades were
accordingly told to move back to the Brown Line at 4.30 P.M., and
from it to the Green Line at 7.30 P.M. The 12th Royal Scots already
occupied the Green Line north of Nurlu, and the Black Watch, the
reserve battalion of the 26th Brigade, were withdrawn at once, and
taking up a position on the left of the Royal Scots held the Green
Line as far north as the Fins-Equancourt Railway, with the details
of the 26th Brigade on their left. Brig.-General Croft directed the
K.O.S.B. to hold the high ground between Sorel and Lieramont, and
two companies of the 11th Royal Scots were posted south-west of
Heudecourt. The 150th A.F.A. Brigade was withdrawn and came into
action south of Sorel. It was hoped by these dispositions to secure
the Green Line and cover the southern flank of the South Africans and
Highlanders during their retirement, which in the case of the former
at least was bound to be of exceptional difficulty, since by 4 P.M.
the enemy in the south had entered Guyencourt and threatened to cut
across the Division’s line of retreat.
The first stage of the retirement was accomplished successfully. When
the Germans noticed our movement they advanced in dense formations
past Revelon Farm, until they were broken up in confusion by heavy
fire from the 2nd South African Regiment. The retreat to the Green
Line was one long struggle against frantic odds and deadly perils.
Farther south the plodding Germans, still making ground, had pierced
before dark the Brown Line south of Railton in the sector of the
Twenty-first Division, and, commencing to roll up our line, burst
into Heudecourt from the south-east at 6.30 P.M. This manœuvre
threatened the right wing of the Ninth with destruction, and all
three battalions of the South African Brigade were in imminent danger
of envelopment. Safety depended on the successful checking of the
enemy until the friendly mantle of night gave the several units an
opportunity to retire. General control was impossible, but section
and subordinate leaders handled their men in a manner that must have
excited the admiration even of their skilful adversaries, and the
bulk of the South African forces succeeded in reaching the Green Line.
While the retirement of the artillery was taking place, throngs of
hostile aeroplanes flitting above them sprayed the teams with bullets
and engaged our infantry. In the dim light, the South Africans
could see in Sorel the sad evidences of an army in retreat; streams
of wounded, guns, and details of departmental units were hurrying
through the streets, while the enemy was pressing on towards the
village in large numbers. It was imperative to stop him until our
retiring troops and guns had reached safety, and Brig.-General Dawson
manned the trenches west of Sorel with the personnel of his staff.
The K.O.S.B., already in position, were engaged with the Germans, and
with the help of Brig.-General Dawson’s staff brought them to a halt.
Before they had time to organise an attack the last guns had left
the village, and Brig.-General Dawson with his H.Q. drew off into
divisional reserve at Moislains. The remnants of his three battalions
withdrew north to Fins, which they left as the advance parties of
the enemy entered it, and thence they retired without interference
behind the Green Line. A few of the South Africans missed their way
in the darkness and did not rejoin the Division until some days later.
The retirement of the Highlanders was attended with many thrills. In
the morning they had been undisturbed and patrols had remained till
noon in Gouzeaucourt, which was spasmodically shelled by the Germans,
who seemed to be unaware that our men had left the Forward Zone.
Fortunately there was no frontal pursuit; for the Germans advancing
from Gonnelieu walked into our anti-tank minefield and exploding
some of the bombs hurriedly retired. The route of the Seaforths and
Camerons ran through Fins to Etricourt, but the enemy had already
taken possession of the former, and the Highlanders had to make a
wide detour to the north in order to reach Etricourt, where they
spent the night, part holding the line with the Black Watch and part
in brigade reserve.
The flames of burning huts fired by the Sappers, with the dark
silhouettes of retiring troops, formed an awesome and romantic
spectacle. From Nurlu ascended clouds of brick-dust, like the genie
from the brass bottle, and shell dumps belched forth volumes of thick
black smoke and glowing flames, while every now and then a heavy
shell exploded with a deafening crash, and green, red, white, and
blue rockets soared through the air like fairy fountains.
“That night, a child might understand,
The Deil had business on his hand.”
Amid such turmoil and desperate haste it was inevitable that several
parties should go astray, and material should be lost. The South
African company of Captain Green near Gauche Wood and a company of
the 11th Royal Scots at Revelon Farm had never a chance of escape and
were overwhelmed. A platoon of the Seaforths under Lieut. Cameron
had been left in the Yellow System by mistake, but at 10 P.M. with
amazing coolness this young officer piloted his men through groups
of the foe and brought back 18 prisoners, including an officer.
The guns, which had covered the withdrawal up to the last moment,
firing over open sights, had caused dreadful havoc among the hostile
infantry, and were all brought out except a forward anti-tank gun,
one which was bogged, and ten field-guns of the two batteries of the
150th A.F.A. Brigade, the teams of which failed to turn up in time.
All the abandoned pieces were rendered useless.
During the night the K.O.S.B., the remaining three companies of the
11th Royal Scots, and the 63rd and 90th Field Companies occupied
Nurlu and the Green Line, as far south as Epinette Wood. The 9th
Seaforths and the 64th Field Company moved into divisional reserve in
Vaux Woods, north of Moislains.
General Tudor, who had transferred his H.Q. to Moislains at 3 P.M.,
had extricated his force from one danger only to be confronted by
another equally critical. He had been most punctilious in his reports
to the Forty-seventh Division in order to avoid any misunderstandings
about his left flank, and to give that division timely warning of
the measures to be adopted to maintain liaison. But in spite of
his precautions complications arose. The staff officer he had sent
to inform it of our withdrawal to the Green Line returned with the
message that the Forty-seventh was going to retire to the Brown Line
only, and was not prepared to accept responsibility for connecting
up its right on the Brown Line with our left on the Green Line.
This was a most awkward _contretemps_, and General Tudor at once
informed the Corps Commander, who promised to arrange matters with
the V. Corps, to which the Forty-seventh belonged. Shortly before 7
P.M. the point was again referred to, when the Ninth was advised that
the Third Army was also to withdraw to the Green Line. Accordingly
at 7.30 P.M. the exact position of our troops was reported to the
Forty-seventh Division, which informed us that the 99th Brigade
was at Manancourt and Equancourt in reserve. This brigade was
placed under the orders of the Ninth at 9.10 P.M., and one of its
battalions was ordered to extend from the left of the 26th Brigade
to a point about 1000 yards north of Fins. The stretch of front
held by the Division, with the 99th Brigade attached, on the night
of the 22nd/23rd amounted to 7500 yards. No touch was established
with the units on either flank, but the V. Corps promised that its
troops would link up with the 99th Brigade at 5 A.M. on the 23rd,
while the Twenty-first Division stated that it was holding up to the
north-eastern end of Epinette Wood.
Thus the prospects on the night of the 22nd were uncertain and
disquieting. The onus of anxiety had hitherto come from the south,
but from now onwards the gate[107] between the Fifth and Third Armies
began to be pressed open, and offered a glorious chance of sweeping
victory to the enemy. And the course of events forced the Ninth to
become the guardians of the door, which it held by the gallantry
of its men and the skill of its leaders, until reinforcements
were available. On the evening of the 22nd the divisions in the
Flesquières salient had been violently attacked at Villers-Plouich
and Havrincourt, and though the assaults had been beaten off with
great slaughter they hindered the retreat of the Third Army in
a south-westerly direction. The V. Corps, pushed away from its
boundary, failed to link up with the Ninth at 5 A.M. on the 23rd as
arranged, so that a co-ordinated retirement by the two armies was
impossible.
It must be borne in mind that throughout the retreat the men suffered
constantly from want of sleep, and supplies being inevitably
irregular, they had to endure frequently the pangs of hunger and
thirst.
Unfriendly mist again bathed the battlefield at dawn on the 23rd.
Orders were received at 5.26 A.M. to hold the Green Line with
rearguards only, and to withdraw the remainder to a line east of
Moislains and along the eastern edge of Vaux Woods, the retirement of
the rearguards to conform with that of the troops on our right. The
movement was necessary owing to a breach in the Green Line farther
south, but it added enormously to the territory of the Ninth, which,
being obliged to keep in touch with the Forty-seventh Division west
of Fins, now had the vast frontage of 11,000 yards.
Before the orders for retreat reached the front line troops, the
enemy launched a resolute assault against the Green Line under an
artillery and trench-mortar barrage. On the left it was repulsed, but
the right of the Division was turned by Germans who swarmed through
Epinette Wood, and only a brilliant rearguard action by Captain
Cockburn enabled the K.O.S.B. to extricate themselves from a critical
position. The South Africans retired undisturbed to divisional
reserve on a ridge east of Bouchavesnes, but the Highlanders and
Lowlanders passed through a fiery ordeal.
The retreat had to take place in broad daylight under strong pressure
and without the support of the guns, which had to be conveyed across
the Canal du Nord, but it was slowly and skilfully carried out, and
appalling losses were inflicted on the pursuers. The men behaved
like veterans, and the Sappers took their place with the infantry.
Brig.-General Kennedy never received the orders to retire, and his
Highlanders commenced to retreat only when the enemy was in Nurlu
and shared the same trenches. Admirably covered by two companies of
the Seaforths and two companies of the Camerons, the brigade shook
itself free. The covering force counter-attacked the Germans, and
the Seaforths meeting them with the bayonet hurled them back into
Nurlu. As a result of this fine effort, the Highlanders successfully
effected their retirement to the ridge behind Equancourt and
Manancourt which extended from the Beet Factory to Hennois Wood. For
the 26th Brigade there was only one bridge at Manancourt across the
Canal, which here was full of water, and some of the Black Watch had
to swim, but by 2 P.M. the whole Division was safely behind the Canal
du Nord from Moislains to the Beet Factory north of Etricourt, with
the 99th Brigade, about 750 strong, continuing the line to the north
of Fins, where it was in touch with the Forty-seventh Division. The
position was a strong one and had been reconnoitred the previous
evening by General Tudor, but the vast extent of front could not be
held as a continuous line, and touch between the various units was at
all times precarious.
The whole of the 99th Brigade and most of the 26th, the right of
which was just east of Hennois Wood, were in Third Army territory,
and this was pointed out to the VII. Corps. An attack on this weak
and far-stretched flank was to be dreaded, since it might drive these
brigades north and north-west and break the front of the Division.
Accordingly, General Tudor, having obtained permission from the V.
Corps to order the right brigade of the Forty-seventh Division to
take over our front north of Fins to north of Equancourt, delivered
these instructions to it at 11.15 A.M. In the afternoon the 99th
Brigade was transferred to the V. Corps, which was to extend its
right flank down to the boundary between the Third and Fifth Armies,
west of Manancourt.
In the afternoon the Germans launched a furious attack against the
26th and 99th Brigades, and succeeded in penetrating some distance
between Brig.-General Kennedy’s Highlanders and Brig.-General Croft’s
Lowlanders. The Twenty-first Division fell back to the south of
Bouchavesnes, and the South Africans took up a position on the ridge
east of that village to cover the right rear of the Ninth. Orders
were then received from the Corps to take up a line from Bouchavesnes
along the eastern edge of St Pierre Vaast Wood to a point south-east
of Saillisel on the Third and Fifth Army boundary. This gave the
Ninth a span of 6000 yards, and all three brigades were required to
hold it because casualties had been numerous and the men were tired
out by continual marching and fighting. General Tudor thereupon
visited the South Africans, and gave orders to Brig.-General Dawson
to retire after dusk from the Epine de Malassise to the ridge just
west of Bouchavesnes, requesting him to tell Brig.-General Croft
to withdraw his men to the east of St Pierre Vaast Wood. The new
line was to be held at all costs. This message was never received
by Brig.-General Croft, and when the South Africans commenced their
retirement between 7 and 8 P.M. the right of the Lowland Brigade,
thus left unprotected, was heavily attacked. At the same time the
left wing of the Lowlanders was threatened by the enemy’s advance
from Manancourt, and was out of touch with the Highlanders, whose
right in the course of fierce fighting had been compelled to give
way, and who, with their ammunition practically exhausted, were now
occupying a line extending from a mile south of Mesnil-en-Arrouaise
to a point 1000 yards west of the Beet Factory.
On leaving the South Africans, General Tudor hastened to see
Brig.-General Kennedy, whose brigade he found in a critical position.
Envelopment of both flanks appeared imminent, but as a withdrawal
by daylight meant destruction, he instructed Brig.-General Kennedy
to retire by 4 A.M. to a line in front of Saillisel. Returning to
H.Q., he reported his action to Fifth Army H.Q., the VII. Corps then
being on the move, and pointed out that, unless the Third Army could
take over the front as far as its southern boundary according to
arrangement, a gap would exist between the two armies after 4 A.M.
The crisis of the battle was swiftly approaching. The whole line of
the Fifth Army was in flux, for General Gough, with weak and battered
forces and no prospect of reserves, dared not risk an engagement, and
the Germans seemed confident of victory, their infantry onslaughts
being heralded by many “Hochs!” and bugle blasts. But our men showed
marvellous control; time after time the enemy was allowed within
50 yards of our line, and then on the word of command a shower
of well-aimed bullets abruptly halted him. During the night, in
compliance with orders, the Lowland Brigade, with the 9th Seaforths
attached since the 23rd, moved back to St Pierre Vaast Wood, where
it repulsed with many losses several attacks before midnight. During
this conflict the K.O.S.B. lost their commander, Lieut.-Colonel
Smyth being wounded for the fifth time in the war. The hazardous
and complicated move of the Highlanders was attended with wonderful
fortune, and they came into line on a position extending from the
northern corner of the wood across the ridge, on which stood the
village of Saillisel. The Third and Fifth Armies were now separated,
there being a space of fully 3000 yards between them. Nothing had
been heard of the 99th Brigade since it had been attacked in the
afternoon, but after midnight it was learned that it had been
withdrawn to Rocquigny and Le Transloy. No troops arrived to hold
the ground between Mesnil and the left of the Ninth, and fruitless
efforts were made to establish connection with a brigade of the
Seventeenth Division, which had been ordered by the V. Corps to take
up a position west of Saillisel.
The great activity of the enemy on the night of the 23rd utterly
precluded sleep. About 2 A.M. the troops of the Twenty-first Division
on the right of the South Africans reported to Brig.-General Dawson
that Cléry was in the hands of the enemy and that they were about
to make a further retirement. The South Africans were on the right
of the Ninth on the ridge west of Marrières Wood, the Lowlanders at
St Pierre Vaast Wood and the Highlanders on the left. There was no
reserve except the details of the Divisional R.E., and our front
measured 9500 yards.
Before dawn the Highlanders, acting on a false report that the
Lowland Brigade had been withdrawn, retired to the line of the
Bapaume-Péronne road in order to secure touch with it. The message
with this news took five hours to reach D.H.Q., now at Maurepas.
Three tanks, which were at Combles, were ordered to proceed to a
point between Marrières Wood and Rancourt to prevent the enemy
penetrating between the South African and 27th Brigades. But it was
too late.
At 8 A.M. vast hordes of Germans assailed the Lowland Brigade in
front and on both flanks. The weight of attack was on the right
wing, but the K.O.S.B., in brigade reserve south of Rancourt, were
able to delay the enemy’s turning movement long enough to allow
the other battalions of the brigade to be withdrawn from St Pierre
Vaast Wood to a position covering Combles. This position had been
rapidly taken up by details of the Divisional R.E. under the orders
of Brig.-General Croft, and these troops aided by the three tanks
helped to cover the retirement of the Lowlanders, and held their
ground for over an hour. From there, greatly harassed by bombs and
machine-gun fire from aeroplanes flying low and bearing British
colours, the brigade withdrew first to Guillemont Ridge, and then to
a position between Maricourt and the Somme, already occupied by the
9th Provisional Battalion.
Meanwhile the enemy delivered a series of blows, growing in fury,
upon the South Africans from 9 A.M., and Brig.-General Dawson
reported at 11.10 A.M. that he was being heavily attacked from south
and west, but that his line was still intact. This was the last
message received from the brigade.
When the South Africans were posted near Marrières Wood, they
succeeded in gaining touch with the left of the Twenty-first
Division, but, except for a company of the K.O.S.B., they failed
to find the 27th Brigade. Brig.-General Dawson’s last instructions
were to hold the position “at all costs,” and he explained to his
battalion commanders the full significance of these words. The
position contained one good trench and one or two poor ones, and
there was a large number of shell-holes. The ground sloped downwards
towards the east, and then rose to another ridge about 1000 yards
from the front line. The men had each 200 rounds of ammunition and
there was a fair supply of Lewis Gun drums, but the four Vickers
Guns had only four belts, and three of these with their teams
were accordingly sent back to the Transport. The strength of the
brigade was only 500 all told, including the personnel of H.Q. and
a detachment of the Machine-gun Battalion, while all ranks had been
three nights without sleep, and were in a state of extreme fatigue
from their physical exertions and the strain of the previous days.
At 9 A.M., heralded by machine-gun and artillery-fire, the enemy
onsets began. At the first essay the hostile infantry kept a
respectful distance, and did not venture to assault. But an hour
later a dangerous attack developed on the left front and flank from
the north-east. Under a smoke-screen, formed by setting fire to the
dry grass, the Germans skilfully picked their way up to a point
between 200 and 100 yards from our front line, but further advance
was baulked by unerring marksmanship, the South Africans husbanding
their ammunition and firing carefully. Foiled but persistent, the
assailants wheeling a field-gun forward by hand tried to bring it
into action, but a Lewis Gunner of the 1st Regiment shot down the
team before it could be fired. Some hours later another gun was
brought up at the gallop, but, under the accurate fire of the same
Lewis Gunner, men and horses went down in a straggling mass, an
inspiring sight greeted by the South Africans with jubilant cheers.
About noon the troops on the right and left of the brigade retired,
and the movement misled an officer and about 30 men of the South
Africans who, thinking a withdrawal had been ordered, began to fall
back, but no difficulty was experienced in bringing them in. The
exposed left flank was protected by Major Ormiston with 25 men. No
wounded, except those who could not handle a rifle, were allowed to
quit the brigade area, but none complained or gave the slightest
evidence of any desire to leave their comrades; the corporate
heroism of the South Africans was beyond all praise. Every round
was collected from casualties, and men not in the front line or
not having occasion to use their rifles passed their ammunition to
those who required it. By 2 P.M. the South Africans were completely
surrounded, and were being fired at from the west as well as from the
south and east.
Rescue was now impossible, and the South Africans grimly set
themselves to sell their lives at the highest price. Between 2 and
3 P.M. German troops in the north were seen to retire, and wild
hope surged through the men that the Thirty-fifth Division, which
was known to be coming up, was now within reach; but the enemy had
come under his own machine-gun fire from the west and was merely
withdrawing from the danger zone. About 4 P.M. only 100 worn-out,
dust-covered men remained and the ammunition was all but finished,
while batteries of field-guns and several trench mortars were now
in action against them. The faint chance of effecting an escape
under cover of night was extinguished when, half an hour later, the
enemy in great strength and dense formation surged down on the
survivors. Only a few scattered shots greeted this, the final charge,
and then the tiny groups were swallowed up in a sea of Germans and
Brig.-General Dawson and his small band of heroes were prisoners.
The glorious stand of the South Africans was the most dramatic
and arresting episode of the retreat, and has already achieved a
prominent place in the annals of the British Empire. Throughout all
lands of the British race it silenced craven panic and roused that
strong pride of race which is ever the parent of valorous deeds. The
story[108] reported by Captain Peirson, the B.M. of the 48th Brigade
of the Sixteenth Division, reveals the effect on the enemy, which
was not confined to moral results. As Brig.-General Dawson was taken
behind the German lines he saw the roads blocked with a continuous
double line of transport and guns from west of Bouchavesnes to
Aizecourt le Haut; for over seven hours the South Africans had kept
back, in addition to the infantry, all the artillery and transport
which were to advance by the Bouchavesnes-Combles road, and the delay
was of inestimable value to our troops in rear.
Meantime the 26th Brigade, which remained on Sailly Saillisel Ridge,
north-west of St Pierre Vaast Wood until 11.30 A.M., retired through
Guillemont and Maricourt. A stand was made on the Morval-Combles
Ridge, where the enemy experienced a rough handling, and later
the brigade held the ridge behind Leuze Wood to Combles for a
considerable period until the Lowlanders had established their
position. During the murderous combat that ensued here Brig.-General
Kennedy had his horse shot under him, and the stubborn Highlanders
were hard pressed to stem the savage onrushes of the Germans. The
most heroic assistance was rendered by the Divisional Artillery,
whose alternate battery retirement was magnificent, and they killed
vast numbers of the enemy at point-blank range; in numerous cases
they remained in action until the enemy’s infantry were swarming
on them. C/51 and D/51 Batteries catching the Germans coming down
the slopes towards Combles, inflicted enormous casualties and kept
on firing till the last possible moment. All the guns were safely
withdrawn, though the last gun-team of D/51 was slightly delayed by a
direct hit from a “dud” 4·2 shell, which went right through the wheel
horse. Skilfully, Brig.-General Kennedy withdrew his men, but in the
keen and close encounters the brigade became split up into three
parties. The bulk of the Highlanders after a brief halt at Maricourt
proceeded to Montauban, where a position was taken up in support of
the First Cavalry Division, which was then maintaining a line in
front of Bernafay Wood.
The second group, consisting of about 150 Camerons on the left
flank of their battalion, had been the last to retire. These men
drew off in the direction of Les Bœufs and finding it occupied by
Germans marched to Flers, where they joined the 52nd Brigade of
the Seventeenth Division. They went with the 52nd Brigade as far
as Martinpuich, where they attached themselves to the Sixty-third
Division on the 26th, but having received permission to go back to
the Ninth, succeeded in rejoining it later in the evening. Another
party of Camerons, about 100 in all, in attempting to keep touch with
the troops on its left became separated from the rest of the brigade
and attached itself to the 142nd Brigade, Forty-seventh Division, and
on the 25th, after reaching Albert, formed a part of Lieut.-Colonel
Hadow’s force.
The third group, consisting of 300 Black Watch under Lieut.-Colonel
Hadow, remained on Morval Ridge until its flank was turned, and it
was compelled to retreat northwards. This force, growing in numbers
as it collected stragglers from all units, was 2000 strong on the
26th; as “Hadow’s Force” it was organised into two battalions and
under the orders of the VII. Corps, took up a position from Mericourt
L’Abbé to Sailly le Sec. There it remained until relieved by the 43rd
and 38th Australian Brigades on the 28th, after which the men of the
26th Brigade rejoined their battalions.
Sunday, the 24th March, was one of the most dismal days of the
retreat. In the south General Gough’s men did not fare so badly;
for though the Péronne bridgehead had been lost on the 23rd the
enemy did not make much progress between the Somme and the Oise.
But the terrific fighting along the entire front all but shattered
our defences. On the Third Army front the enemy attacking on the
right flank of the V. Corps won Combles, Morval, and Les Bœufs,
compelled the Third Army to surrender the whole of the old Somme
battlefield, and threatened the liaison between the Third and Fifth
Armies. Fissures appeared between the units of the V. Corps, which
was forced away from its boundary, and when darkness fell, its
right flank, which should have been south of Montauban, rested near
Bazentin.
The Ninth now under General Blacklock, who had returned from leave in
the afternoon, and reinforced by the 12th H.L.I. of the Thirty-fifth
Division, remained in ignorance of the misfortunes of the V. Corps
until after midnight. In accordance with instructions from the VII.
Corps it took up at 8.30 P.M. a position extending from an east
and west line through Hardecourt to the Guillemont-Montauban road.
The 12th H.L.I. formed the outpost; the main position was held by
the 27th Brigade and two composite battalions of the VII. Corps
Reinforcement Training Camp under Lieut.-Colonel Hunt, the 18th
H.L.I. being in reserve. The 26th Brigade was at Montauban and D.H.Q.
were at Billon Wood. The fragments of the South African Brigade,
consisting of the men who had been separated from their brigade on
the 22nd, were collected during the night near Maricourt and formed
into a battalion under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Young, who had
been in charge of the South African details. A dismounted cavalry
brigade under General Legard, composed of remnants of the First
Cavalry Division, occupied a position between Montauban and Bernafay
Wood. Persistent efforts were made to establish touch with the left,
and at 1.20 A.M. General Blacklock learned that the right of the
Forty-seventh Division was at Bazentin. The Forty-seventh was now as
far behind as it had been in front of us in the morning, and there
was a gap of two and a half miles between the two armies.
The boundary question had obtruded itself in a fashion that could
not be neglected. At all costs the breach between the armies had to
be filled if Ludendorff’s plans were to be thwarted. The first step
of G.H.Q. was to transfer all the troops north of the Somme from the
Fifth to the Third Army; in other words, the smaller army holding
the longer stretch of front had to provide reinforcements for the
stronger force with the shorter front. Nothing can illustrate more
clearly than this the absurdity of the story, once widely circulated
and even yet largely credited, that the Third Army would have had no
need to retire at all had it not been for the retreat of the Fifth.
The territory of the latter army was not curtailed in compensation
for the loss of these troops. If the Third Army had been able to
keep to its southern boundary, General Gough could have assisted the
hard-pressed XIX. Corps in the south with units of the VII. Corps.
In accordance with this arrangement the Ninth along with the rest of
the VII. Corps now came under the Third Army. The boundary between
the V. and VII. Corps was fixed as follows: the Railway south of
Montauban, thence along the road Montauban-Mametz-Le Carcaillot, all
inclusive to the former.
These measures did not and could not fill the gap, but it was
expected that if the V. and VII. Corps were put under the same Army
Commander, he would succeed in securing better co-operation.
Early on the 25th the Lowland Brigade was relieved by the 106th
Brigade, 35th Division, and assembled at Talus Boise, whence it
marched to Etinehem to rest and reorganise. After daybreak the 26th
Brigade occupied a position on the south-west of Montauban to protect
the left flank of the cavalry. On the withdrawal of the Lowlanders
the line was held by the 18th H.L.I. and the 9th Provisional
Battalion, along the western edge of Favière Wood to the southern
margin of Bernafay Wood, where the 106th Brigade was connected with
the cavalry near Montauban. The 12th H.L.I. were on outpost from the
north of Hardecourt to the south of Trones Wood. On the right the
Thirty-fifth Division, to which the Ninth was now attached, held from
Hardecourt to Curlu, its H.Q. being at Bray.
The transference of the VII. Corps to the Third Army maintained
liaison between General Gough and General Byng, but there was
still an awkward opening between the VII. and V. Corps. In the
morning of the 25th the enemy launched repeated attacks against
the Ninth’s front, and a resolute effort was made to turn its left
flank, Bernafay Wood being lost and recaptured in the course of the
fighting. By 10 A.M. the reserve consisted of only two companies,
and still no connection had been established on the left with the
Seventeenth Division, which was said to be moving in on the right
of the V. Corps. A welcome reinforcement, a battalion of the 104th
Brigade, arrived and was sent to strengthen the 106th Brigade.
At 1 P.M. the VII. Corps reported that the Seventeenth Division was
holding a line from north of Bernafay Wood to a point 700 yards
south-east of Bazentin-le-Grand, and that two of its brigades were
reorganising east of Fricourt, but attempts to establish touch
were still fruitless. Shortly afterwards, however, information was
received that the Twelfth Division had been commanded by the VII.
Corps to move as rapidly as possible to the line Montauban-Bazentin,
and to link up with the Seventeenth Division.
About 2 P.M. the Germans in great strength debouched from Ginchy
and moved against Trones Wood, and though our gunners swept their
ranks with accurate and withering fire, they drove the 12th and 18th
H.L.I. back to the line of the road running from west of Maricourt
Wood to the Briqueterie south-west of Bernafay Wood. By a fine
counter-attack men of the D.L.I., 106th Brigade, regained Favière
Wood. More reinforcements came up, consisting of tired fragments of
the Twenty-first Division, and at 4 P.M. one battalion was ordered
to join the 104th Brigade at Maricourt and the other two the 106th.
Still the enemy continued his onslaughts, but though he gained
a footing in the Briqueterie south-west of Bernafay Wood he was
summarily ejected.
Until about 6 P.M. there was comparative quietness, but after that
hour frequent reports were received that hostile infantry had been
seen north of Montauban, and even as far west as Mametz Wood. In the
evening a withdrawal to the line of the Bray-Albert road was ordered
by the VII. Corps, the retirement to be covered by rearguards, which
were to maintain their position until 2 A.M., while the retirement
of the artillery was to be accomplished gradually, harassing fire
being kept up all night to conceal the retreat, and to prevent as
long as possible any noticeable diminution in the volume of fire.
The new front of the Ninth extended from east of Meaulte to Albert,
and the 27th Brigade was instructed to occupy it at once. This was a
most fatiguing day for the 26th Brigade. After fighting continuously
all day the men trekked to Etinehem, just in time to receive orders
to march by night on a compass-bearing to Dernancourt. The South
Africans, now formed into one battalion, moved to Ribemont sur
L’Ancre. The last battery did not retire until 3.30 A.M. on the 26th.
After a night march the Lowland Brigade garrisoned the Ninth’s sector
with the 11th and 12th Royal Scots in line, the 9th Seaforths in
support, and the K.O.S.B. in reserve. The dispositions had scarcely
been completed when the vanguards of the Germans approached from
Fricourt, but were checked by our outposts. At 1 P.M. an attack in
force was delivered against the right of the line, a hostile battery
coming into action on a ridge in front of it. The assault withered
away before the careful, well-controlled fire of the 12th Royal
Scots, and the enemy’s battery was quickly compelled to withdraw. The
co-operation between our artillery and infantry was wonderfully good,
and the Germans in Becourt Valley, where an attempt to concentrate
was crushed by our fire, suffered innumerable losses. This repulse
quietened the enemy on our front, but farther south where troops had
retired he gained the high ground between our right flank and Bray,
and brought up machine-guns, with which he enfiladed our line. To
meet this danger Brig.-General Croft formed a defensive flank with
the 9th Seaforths, but no sooner was this wing guarded than the
left was jeopardised by the retreat of the Twelfth Division across
the Ancre during the afternoon. This made it necessary for the 27th
Brigade to conform, and the retirement over the river was carried
out in perfect manner, although the 12th Royal Scots lost heavily in
passing through Meaulte.
Meanwhile the 26th Brigade, with the South African composite
battalion attached, after a few hours’ rest occupied about 1 P.M. a
position behind the Ancre between Dernancourt and Moulin du Vivier,
the South Africans holding the former, still apparently a thriving
village. The 9th Machine-gun Battalion, which had been withdrawn
during the night of the 25th/26th to Mericourt L’Abbé, where it was
reorganised into two groups with 10 guns each, covered our line
west of the Ancre. After crossing the river, the Lowland Brigade
was posted along the line of the Railway between the left of the
26th Brigade and the Albert-Amiens road, where it was in close touch
with the Twelfth Division. The enemy on noticing our retirement
advanced towards the river in considerable force, but was caught by
our barrage when moving down the slopes, and the few who succeeded in
crossing were easily dealt with.
At the commencement of the 26th, the fighting strength of the
Division was approximately as follows: Highland Brigade 300,
Lowland Brigade 800, South African Battalion 320, Sappers 120, two
Machine-gun groups with 10 guns each, a total of 1340 rifles and 20
machine-guns. Brig.-General Croft’s men had lost cruelly during the
day, and it was doubtful if the line now occupied, over 3000 yards in
length, could be defended next day against a strong attack.
During the night of the 26th/27th alarming reports of a break-through
on the Albert-Amiens road came in, but nothing serious had actually
happened, and the few troops who had given way were quickly rallied.
A machine-gun on the left of the Lowland Brigade was a source of
much annoyance to the 11th Royal Scots until a smart counter-attack
organised by Major A. C. Campbell put it out of action. Unfortunately
Major Campbell, who had led the 11th Royal Scots with great skill and
sterling courage during the retreat, received wounds which proved
fatal.
The 27th was a critical day for General Gough’s army; for the
Germans forced the line of the Somme from Chipilly to Cérisy, and
took Lamotte on the great Amiens road, about 9000 yards behind
the fighting line of the Fifth Army. There was more stability on
our front, though some of our troops were reported to be retiring
near Albert. This was due to furious shelling, and to bombing by
aeroplanes with British colours, but the retrograde movement was
stopped and an outpost line established along the Railway with Lewis
Gun posts in front. During the day there was a violent artillery and
trench-mortar bombardment of our positions, and at 10.30 A.M. German
infantry were seen entering the valley north-west of Meaulte. Later,
great clusters of the enemy coming down the slopes of the Ancre were
hotly engaged by our artillery and machine-guns, and did not venture
to assault. Here and there clefts appeared in our thin line, but
were promptly closed by swift and skilful local counter-attacks.
Undoubtedly the most disturbing factor was the persistent bombing
of our positions by large numbers of aeroplanes, British by their
marking.
With the close of the day the long travail of the Ninth terminated.
The infantry were relieved by the 4th Australian Division, and after
moving to the neighbourhood of Baizieux, ultimately concentrated in
the Bertangles area on the 29th. For two days more the artillery
remained in action with the Australians and were then withdrawn.
The retreat imposed a heavy burden on the R.A.M.C., but Colonel
Elsner’s staff met their difficulties with untiring devotion and
conspicuous success. Many wounded among the forward troops inevitably
fell into the hands of the enemy, but stretcher-bearers and motor
parties often ventured up to the fighting line in their search for
casualties. The selection of routes for the evacuation of the wounded
called for careful consideration, in order to avoid congestion
on roads blocked with transport and guns, but Colonel Elsner was
eminently successful in making the best working arrangements
possible. Gallantry and resource among the R.A.M.C. were too common
to be remarked on, and motor-drivers as usual braved all the
difficulties of the roads with the air of phlegmatic boredom that
seemed to be their natural expression. Every means of conveyance
was requisitioned, and the whole of the work during the retreat
strikingly revealed the efficiency of the R.A.M.C.
Equally difficult and important was the task of keeping the men
supplied with rations and ammunition. The regular transmission of
stores was naturally affected by the constant movement, but our
organisation withstood the strain, and the A.S.C. performed its
duties in a manner worthy of its high traditions.
Never perhaps did the Ninth render such vital services to the
Empire as during the Somme retreat. It had covered not merely its
own territory, but had extended its line far beyond its northern
boundary, and in the arduous and critical fighting till the 24th
March, its success in blunting the deadly German thrust between the
Third and Fifth Armies did much to save the British forces from what
might have been an irretrievable disaster. Adroit leadership and
dogged pluck were the qualities that steered it through the labyrinth
of dangers that beset it at every turn. Officers of all ranks had
shown throughout the conflict surprising resource and initiative; the
coolness and foresight of General Tudor during the most critical days
led one writer[109] to declare that his name “should be as well known
as are Wellington’s best generals, Crauford, Colborne, and Picton.”
Ably led, the men had brilliantly performed the most difficult
operation in war—a withdrawal in face of the enemy. Men who after
rough buffetings can at the end of a retreat turn round and confront
the foe with unshaken nerve and steadfast courage have proved their
manhood indeed, and this, the acid test of the true soldier, had been
accomplished by the men of the Ninth. In a general sense, it is true
that the gain or loss of ground is insignificant in comparison with
the destruction of an army, but for the individual the surrender of
many miles of territory, painfully won after more than three years of
costly strife, cannot fail to rouse the most sombre reflections, and
only the best of troops can overcome the leaden despondency caused by
a continuous backward movement. Valour alone would not have availed
to stem the enemy’s advance; discipline was required to direct and
control it, and disciplined valour was, in fact, the characteristic
of the Division during the retreat. The six weeks of training in
February had helped to make the Division more than a match for the
pick of Ludendorff’s storm-troops.
Since the time of the Cambrai operations in 1917, G.H.Q. had renewed
the custom, abandoned after Loos, of mentioning by name the divisions
that had particularly distinguished themselves. The retreat was the
first operation in which the Division had participated since the
resumption of this practice, and it earned the proud honour of a
special mention[110] by Sir Douglas Haig.