PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE
OCTOBER 1917 TO 21ST MARCH 1918
The operations of the 12th October concluded the share of the
Division in the fighting of 1917. It had played an important part in
all the big battles except Messines and it had been too recently in
action to be employed in the operations near Cambrai, which began in
November. The Ninth was frequently engaged in the travail of battle;
its rôle during the year had been rather that of storm-troops than
of mere occupants of the line, and though this had entailed great
hardships and a heavy casualty list, some compensation had been
derived from the comparatively long interludes spent in rest and
training. Through gain and loss, hope and fear, officers and men had
shown that splendid and invincible cheerfulness which made the Ninth
so terrible in battle. The general standard of physique was perhaps
not so high as in earlier years, but the spirit of the Division
remained as unconquerable as ever despite the disappointing nature of
the recent operations.
The situation at the close of the year contrasted sadly with the
soaring hopes entertained at the beginning. Russia, whose claim
to be the protector of the Balkan Slavs had been the occasion of
the war, had been ignominiously driven from the field, and her
military collapse involved the sacrifice of Roumania. Near Salonica,
the Entente had been able to do little more than hold its own, and
the greater part of Serbia was in the hands of Bulgarians. The
Italians, unable to wrest the coveted port of Trieste from the
Austrians, were in October dispersed in rout at Caporetto before a
combined army of Austrians and Germans, and the allies in the West
had hurriedly to send reinforcements to stiffen Italy’s resistance.
In Flanders the Passchendaele offensive dragged on beyond the
limits sanctioned by sagacity or prudence until November, and its
only result was to secure us less than five miles of ravaged soil
without effecting any important strategical gain. The Belgian coast
was still firmly controlled by the enemy and our military efforts
had signally failed to contract his submarine campaign. Audacity
and originality, exhibited in the intelligent employment of tanks,
achieved on the 20th November our most remarkable victory and all but
led to the capture of Cambrai, but we were either slow or unprepared
to extend our success, and what had been our greatest triumph was
counter-balanced by our gravest defeat. Ten days later the German
counter-stroke made Cambrai secure and rent a gap in our line near
Gouzeaucourt and Gonnelieu.
Even at sea there was cause for concern. Though the Battle of Jutland
on the 30th June 1916 had rendered the German Navy negligible, the
submarine activities of the enemy wrought serious havoc among our
merchant shipping, and compelled the British Government to adopt a
system of rationing to conserve the food supply. Till the end of the
year it was estimated that we were losing ships faster than we could
build them, and it was not till the beginning of 1918 that we made
any real headway against the submarine menace.
Only in Mesopotamia and Egypt had the tide of fortune turned
definitely in our favour. In the former, General Marshall pushed our
conquests far beyond Bagdad, though it was impossible without Russian
help on his flank to make any ambitious movement against Aleppo.
General Allenby had been transferred to Egypt in June 1917, and in a
vigorous and masterly campaign carried Gaza and gained possession of
Jerusalem before the end of the year.
But if the year ended in humility and disappointment the future was
not without a gleam of hope. The entry of America far outweighed
the defection of Russia, and gave complete assurance of ultimate
victory. Nevertheless the immediate situation was not happy. Though
American troops had taken their place in the line by December, great
numbers of trained men could not be expected to reach the Western
Front from the United States until well on in 1918, and it was
certain that Germany would make a supreme effort to snatch victory
before their arrival. For such an emergency the British forces in
France were perilously short of men, yet on the plea of home defence,
which was absurd while the Navy controlled the seas, the Government
retained in this country large bodies of troops urgently needed by
Sir Douglas Haig as reinforcements. And at this juncture the British
Commander became responsible for an additional stretch of 28 miles
of front, taken over from the French in deference to a decision of
the Versailles Council against the expressed opinion of the British
military representative.
[Illustration: NIEUPORT BAINS, LOOKING TOWARDS THE GERMAN LINES]
On leaving the disagreeable and constantly bombed camps near Ypres,
the Division moved on the 25th October to the Wormhoudt area, and
on the following morning to the coast in the Nieuport sector. Here
two days later the 26th Brigade relieved the Forty-first Division in
the line. After the stress and turmoil of the Salient the Belgian
coast was a veritable haven of rest, the only storm centre being
Dunkirk, which was nightly bombed. Even in the trenches there was
little to disturb the harmony of life, and when our gunners in
accordance with their usual practice began to liven up matters, they
were ordered by the XV. Corps to assume a quieter attitude. Behind
the lines the broad, firm expanse of sand fringing the coast offered
ample scope not merely for the manœuvring of troops but for such
forms of recreation as polo and football.
The sojourn in this sector, where preparations were made for a
long period of useful training, came to an abrupt end. On the
11th November General Lukin was informed that his command was to
be transferred to the X. Corps of the Second Army. Further orders
were received that the 9th Seaforths were to be sent ahead of the
Division, and on the 19th they moved to the area of the VIII. Corps.
After relief by the XXXVI. French Corps, the Ninth concentrated near
Fruges. Then on the last day of the month the Germans delivered their
counter-thrust near Cambrai, and the whole Division was hurried by
rail to Péronne. On the 3rd December it came under the III. Corps,
and two days later relieved the right brigade of the Guards’ Division
and the Second Cavalry Division in the sector extending from Gauche
Wood to Chapel Crossing.
On its flanks were the Twenty-first Division on the right and the
Sixty-first on the left. All three brigades were in the line, the
26th and 27th in the north and south respectively, and the South
African in the centre. With feverish energy the trenches were
strengthened, improved, and protected by wire entanglements. On
the 15th December the Ninth came under the control of the VII.
Corps.[100] Two days later, when the fear of an immediate attack was
dying away, at a conference the brigadiers agreed that it would be
a gain to hold the sector with two brigades, allowing the third to
work and train, and it was also decided to hold our front with an
outpost line with a buffer line running through Gouzeaucourt, while
the main line of resistance was to be the reserve system. From the
17th December there were heavy falls of snow, but in spite of the
inclement weather the enemy launched an attack early on the morning
of the 30th against the Sixty-third Division, which had relieved the
Sixty-first on our left. After a violent barrage he broke into its
trenches, and two parties taking the position of the Highland Brigade
in the flank were repelled by the Argylls only after a desperate
conflict, in which the enemy sustained heavy losses. During the
afternoon a counter-attack of the Sixty-third Division succeeded in
recapturing part of the lost trenches. At dawn next morning the enemy
shelled the 26th Brigade with gas and H.E., but made no infantry
attack on our front, though he delivered a fruitless assault against
the left division. Fine cold weather prevailed during the opening
days of 1918, but in the middle of January a thaw set in and our
parapets melted away in liquid snow and mud. The greatest vigilance
and alertness were maintained by both sides, and patrols found few
opportunities of effecting surprise. Alarms still continued, and a
message picked up from the Germans seemed to indicate that an attack
would be made on the 19th, but nothing out of the usual occurred
until the 23rd, when an enemy patrol was repulsed in an attempt to
rush the trenches held by the 11th Royal Scots. Towards the close of
the month the relief of the Ninth by the Thirty-ninth Division was
begun, and was completed on the first day of February.
For almost six weeks the Division remained out of the line, the
time being spent in training and in work on the railways and rear
defences. During this period our waning strength in man-power was
responsible for infantry brigades being placed on a three- instead
of a four-battalion basis, and in accordance with this rearrangement
the Argylls were sent to the Thirty-second Division and the “Rifles”
to the Fourteenth, while the 3rd South African Regiment was broken up
and its members allocated to the remaining battalions of the brigade.
This alteration not merely affected the strength of the Division,
but to some extent its fighting efficiency, because the new grouping
of units was one with which the British Army was unfamiliar, and new
methods of tactical handling had to be acquired. At this time also
the 9th Seaforths were reorganised as a three-company battalion.
The training was on the old lines of the open warfare system. It was
known that the Germans were receiving special training for a supreme
effort, and the best means of countering it was by securing an equal
efficiency. There was nothing new or original in the methods of
Ludendorff; he wished to recapture the old flexibility in movement
and method that distinguished the Germans in 1914, but had been lost
through the routine of trench warfare. An army of the same experience
as that of “The Contemptibles” would have had no difficulty in coping
with Ludendorff’s _sturm truppen_, but the New Armies of Britain
through sheer lack of opportunity for training were much below that
standard. Using picked troops the Germans intended to press on
without halting to adjust irregularities in their line, pockets of
resistance being compelled to withdraw or surrender by the pressure
on their flanks. This method was well known to the British Army, and
was distinctly emphasised in the manual on Infantry Training, 1914,
in which the men were told that the best way to help a neighbour
forward was to push on themselves. Though the time was short every
moment was fully utilised, and the infantry of the Ninth had reached
a very satisfactory stage of efficiency when they returned to the
line. The artillery, now at Bray under Brig.-General Tudor, underwent
a course of training, the value of which was soon to be shown.
On the 1st March a further reorganisation took place with regard to
machine-guns. Each division was equipped with a machine-gun battalion
of 4 companies with 16 guns each, and the 3 companies attached to the
infantry brigades now formed part of the 9th Machine-gun Battalion
under Lieut.-Colonel Chalmers. This rearrangement strengthened the
discipline of the Machine-gun Corps by the introduction of senior
officers, and a more intense _esprit de corps_ followed. It also
permitted greater co-ordination and co-operation in the use of
machine-guns. There was a great increase in the number of Lewis
Guns; each battalion now possessed 36, with an additional 4 for
anti-aircraft work.
At the beginning of March, General Lukin[101] was appointed to a
command in England. During his period of command the Ninth had
gained numerous outstanding successes, particularly those of the
9th April and 20th September 1917, and had developed steadily the
reputation so firmly established at Loos. He had served with the
Division for nearly two years and had won the esteem and confidence
of all ranks. His successor was Major-General C. A. Blacklock, who
arrived on the 13th March. The Division had also a new G.S.O.I.;
Lieut.-Colonel P. A. V. Stewart, who had served with the Ninth
since March 1916, left it in December 1917, and was succeeded by
Lieut.-Colonel T. C. Mudie.
On the nights of the 11th/12th and 12th/13th March, the Ninth
returned to the line in relief of the Thirty-ninth Division. The
sector extended from about a thousand yards west of Villers-Guislain
to about the same distance north-west of Gonnelieu, and, except
that Chapel Hill was now included in the sector of the Twenty-first
Division, was the position held before February. The hill should have
been left in the area of the Ninth because it formed the key to the
greater part of its defences.
The Ninth was on the left flank of the VII. Corps of the Fifth
Army, and on its left flank was the Forty-seventh Division of the
V. Corps of the Third Army. Since the junction of different armies
is always a tempting mark for a hostile attack, the position of
these divisions was one of particular importance; on the liaison
between them depended the liaison of the Fifth and Third Armies. Of
these two armies the former was by far the weaker; General Gough was
responsible for a front more than forty-five miles in extent, and
the forces at his disposal numbered only 14 infantry and 3 cavalry
divisions, while opposing him were 46 strong German divisions.
General Byng with slightly over twenty-six miles of front had 19
divisions (11 in line and 8 in reserve). Sir Douglas Haig probably
anticipated that the heaviest blow would fall on the Third Army, and
he furnished it with a comparatively large body of reserves. The
Fifth Army holding less vital ground had ample scope for manœuvre and
was therefore provided with fewer troops. But the position of General
Gough was not a comfortable one, as the first shock of attack would
absorb his few reserves, and after that he would have to rely on his
neighbours for help.
The country comprised in the Ninth’s area was undulating, with
rolling downs dotted here and there, with a few scattered woods and
ruined villages. The main tactical features were the low ridges on
the east and west of Gouzeaucourt, which joined about Chapel Hill,
one and a half miles south of the village. We held Quentin Ridge,
east of Gouzeaucourt, as far north as Quentin Redoubt, from which
point our front line ran along the western slopes of the ridge
to Fifteen Ravine, which was the boundary between the Ninth and
Forty-seventh Divisions and the Fifth and Third Armies.
The area was organised into three zones for defence. The defences
of the first or Forward Zone consisted of a continuous front line
supported on the right and centre by Gauche Wood and Quentin Redoubt,
a well-wired, anti-tank field, an intermediate line running due north
from Chapel Hill, and including the village of Gouzeaucourt, and the
Red Line stretching from Chapel Hill west of Gouzeaucourt to Beaucamp
Ridge, where it joined the second zone defences at the Divisional
boundary.
[Illustration: GONNELIEU FROM GOUZEAUCOURT]
The second or Battle Zone consisted of two continuous trenches—called
the Yellow System—two or three hundred yards apart, starting on
Chapel Hill and lying roughly north and south along the ridge west
of Gouzeaucourt, and a continuous trench (the Brown Line) leading
north-west from Railton about one mile south-west of Chapel Hill. The
Brown Line was the only one which would not be seriously compromised
by the loss of Chapel Hill. Numerous strong points had been made
between the Brown and the Yellow Systems, and the support line of the
former was in course of construction. A switch line from the Yellow
System along Revelon Ridge to the Brown Line was begun when the blow
fell, but Revelon Farm, which was to have been in this switch, was
strongly defended and permanently garrisoned.
Behind this lay the Rear Zone. The villages of Heudecourt, Sorel
and Fins were intended to form centres of resistance, but their
fortifications had scarcely been commenced at the time of the attack.
Beyond these was a continuous trench, the Green Line, running north
and south through the village of Nurlu, which formed a centre of
resistance. The sector for the defence of which the Ninth was
responsible lay between the north end of Epinette Wood and the south
end of Equancourt; it was thus echeloned in rear of the right flank
of the Battle Zone. This point requires notice; for the enemy’s
penetration of the Division on our right on the first day of the
battle, and later the failure of the troops on our left to extend
to their southern boundary, were causes of great trouble during the
retreat.
The general scheme of defence may be summarised thus: The men in the
Forward Zone were to maintain their ground, but no counter-attack on
a large scale was to be made to recover any part of it that might
be lost. But all the resources at the command of the Division
were to be engaged, if necessary, to retake any part of the Battle
Zone invaded by the enemy, and the artillery positions were chosen
primarily with a view to the defence of the Battle Zone.
The South African Brigade[102] on the right and the 26th[103] on the
left held our front. In each of these one and a half battalions were
detailed for defence and local counter-attack within the Forward
Zone, and the remainder was entrusted with the defence of the front
of the Battle Zone. The 27th Brigade,[104] the 9th Seaforths, and
the Divisional Engineers were in reserve. The 11th Royal Scots were
quartered in Heudecourt, the 12th Royal Scots in Dessart Wood, and
the K.O.S.B. and the 9th Seaforths in Sorel. The Divisional Reserve
was to be ready to counter-attack within the Battle Zone or to man
the Brown System. Of the Machine-gun Battalion, three companies were
deployed in depth in the Forward Zone and in the Yellow System, and
all guns were sited for direct fire, but where possible they had also
been given an indirect S.O.S. line. The remaining company was in
reserve at Heudecourt. The machine-gun barrage was designed to cover
the valley between Gonnelieu and Villers-Guislain and the ground in
front of Fifteen Ravine on the extreme left. Gun positions in the
Battle Zone behind the Yellow System had been reconnoitred, and this
proved of great value later, for guns hastily taken up to the south
of Revelon Farm on the first day of the battle did great execution.
The Divisional Artillery, reinforced by the 65th and 130th A.F.A.
Brigades, covered our sector, and the barrage-fire of the field-guns
was concentrated in front of Gonnelieu and Villers-Guislain.
Alternative and rear positions had been prepared, and it was noted
that four batteries, which had moved into their alternative positions
during the week before the attack, were not shelled during the German
bombardment.
Concerning the intentions of the enemy there could be no doubt.
From the beginning of March fresh indications of an impending blow
were reported daily in the Intelligence Summaries of the VII.
Corps and Fifth Army, though long before this the construction of
railways, roads, and bridges over the Canal de St Quentin had aroused
speculation. The fact that several German divisions[105] had been
put in the line about the middle of February, and taken out again at
the end of the month, presumably for a final rehearsal, seemed to
point to the middle of March as the probable time for the beginning
of the offensive. On the 12th March the Corps Intelligence Summary
stated that during the last four days the enemy’s preparations had
been extended to the forward area and were being carried on rapidly,
noticeably north of Gonnelieu, while from the statements of prisoners
it appeared probable that the attack would commence between the 14th
and the 16th.
Up to this date all the information on which an estimate of the
enemy’s purpose could be based came from higher authority. Not a
sign of the coming thrust could be discerned by the men holding the
line. The only suspicious circumstance lay in the failure of the
hostile artillery to retaliate after the heavy bombardment carried
out by our gunners at dawn every morning. On the 13th, 14th, and
15th, our left and the right of the Division on our left were
subjected to severe gas bombardments; but apart from this the silence
of the enemy’s artillery was significant. Nothing unusual occurred
till the 16th, when an extraordinary amount of movement was reported
by our observers, and it was noticed that our heavy artillery
“shoots” caused a surprising number of explosions.
During these days of suspense Brig.-General Tudor was in command of
the Ninth, General Blacklock having gone on leave on the 16th. The
Corps Summary for the 19th stated that the attack was to be expected
on the 20th or 21st. It would have been impossible for anyone to
detect any trace of nervousness among our troops, and a remark in
the diary of the Highland Brigade on the 6th March that “the enemy
is supposed to be going to attack here” reflected in its cheerful
unconcern the attitude of the men. But the strain of waiting was
beginning to tell on them physically, since the need for unremitting
vigilance and frequent “stand-to’s” materially curtailed the time for
sleep. Hence the stroke of the enemy was longed for more than feared.
The German plan of attack is described in _Meine Kriegserinnerungen_
by Ludendorff. The enemy had two fronts[106] of attack; the
northern extending from Croisilles to Moeuvres; the southern
from Villers-Guislain to a point on the Oise near the junction
of the French and British fronts. The position of the Ninth was
exceptionally complicated; the southern half of its area was included
in the German southern front of attack, but the northern half lay in
an area comprising the Flesquières salient, which projected between
the two zones of the hostile operations, and against which it was no
part of Ludendorff’s plan to push home an attack. In addition to the
northern wing of the Ninth, the salient was held by three divisions
of the V. Corps, and provided that the pressure north and south of
it met with success, Ludendorff had good reason to expect that the
whole of the garrison would be cut off and forced to surrender. It is
important to note that the Ninth’s line of retreat, plainly indicated
on the map, lay south-west, while the direction of the enemy’s
southern advance ran due west. Thus it was clear that, should the
German attack compel a retirement, the Division would be in danger of
being cut off, since its line of retreat took it across the enemy’s
front.