PASSCHENDAELE, 1917
ACTIONS OF THE 20TH SEPTEMBER AND THE 12TH OCTOBER
From the 13th June till the 26th July, the best part of the summer of
1917, the men remained out of the line, and this unusually long and
welcome rest enabled the Division to regain its old efficiency. As
it was necessary to convince the infantry that progress was possible
even when artillery support was unavailable, training was directed
not merely to develop a high standard of efficiency in musketry, but
to foster initiative and resource among the subordinate leaders. The
value of the rifle-grenade had been demonstrated on the 5th June, and
practice in its use was taught by means of shell-hole attacks. An
area of country was cratered by the sappers to present the appearance
of a shell-torn battlefield, and marks to indicate machine-gun posts
having been placed on one side of it, the infantry advanced from the
other. Under cover of rifle-grenades, fired in volleys, riflemen and
Lewis Gun teams moved forward by rushes, till they were able to make
a converging assault from a short distance under a final grenade
barrage. This form of training realised as nearly as possible the
actual conditions of warfare, and new men thus became accustomed
to the distracting noise of battle and gained confidence in their
own powers. A few casualties were caused by “short” bursts, but
no one was seriously wounded, and the trifling cost was more than
counter-balanced by the assurance and keenness inspired in the men.
On the 25th July the Division was transferred to the IV. Corps, whose
area embraced the devastated country lying east of Bapaume. The
completeness and care with which the demolition had been carried out
showed how thoroughly the foe had made his detailed preparations for
retreat. Desolation reigned everywhere, no village possessed a roofed
building, and even the trees had not escaped, their bark being partly
stripped off so that the sap would dry up. From the rubble of ruined
houses, billets and stabling accommodation could be constructed, but
food to supplement rations could be obtained only from canteens and
consisted mainly of tinned products.
[Illustration: HAVRINCOURT]
The front line was taken over from the Fifty-eighth Division on the
night of the 26th by the 26th Brigade, the South African and 27th
Brigades coming in on its left on the 28th and 30th. The sector
held at first lay south of the Canal du Nord at Havrincourt, but on
the 4th August the 27th Brigade was transferred from the south of
the line to the north. The country was undulating, with ridges and
alternate valleys lying north-north-east. The excavated channel of
the Canal du Nord, which after an easterly course turned off in a
northerly direction past Moeuvres, formed the boundary between the
27th and the other two brigades. South of the Canal the line lay on
the slopes of the spurs that ran out from Havrincourt Wood under
observation of the enemy, though the wood itself provided a covered
approach to within 1500 yards of our front line. Some of the spurs
had originally formed part of the forest, but they had been
cleared by the enemy, who used the timber for engineering purposes,
and they were now covered with a low thick scrub, which afforded
concealment for small groups. On the southern bank of the Canal was
a spoil heap which, as the greater part of it was in our possession,
gave us observation along our entire front. The position was well
adapted for defence, since machine-guns, placed on a spur, could
bring flanking and cross-fire to bear on the adjoining spurs. The
trench system consisted of outpost, front, support, and reserve lines.
On the front of the 27th Brigade, the Canal, of which the channel was
more than 50 feet below the surface, separated friend from foe except
at a spoil heap on the west bank, which the enemy held as an outpost
to his main system. Havrincourt village, red-tiled and attractive
in the sun, occupied a commanding position, while to the north-east
behind the German front line could be seen the dark cloud of Bourlon
Wood. The enemy’s defences along the whole front were strongly
entrenched and lavishly wired.
A comparatively uneventful month was passed in this quiet spot, less
discomfort being caused by the enemy than by the unusually heavy
rainfall of August. The most active of the brigades was the 26th, and
it afforded some diversion by carrying out a number of raids. Several
posts, which the enemy held only during the night, were located, and
on the 18th August a patrol of the 7th Seaforths, crossing the wire
guarding one of these by means of a sheet of expanded metal, lay in
wait for the garrison, who, though taken unawares, put up a stiff
fight. Four of the enemy were killed or wounded and one was taken
prisoner, the casualties of the Seaforths being one wounded and two
missing. After dusk on the same evening the Argylls sent out strong
patrols, which met with strenuous resistance; several Germans were
killed and one was captured, while the Argylls had two officers and
eleven men wounded, and one officer and three men missing. The object
of the patrols had been to sweep the enemy from his position on the
spoil heap, and though they failed to accomplish this, the Germans
were so shaken that they evacuated the heap, which was found to be
clear when the Argylls made another raid on the 30th. The scope for
adventure by the 27th Brigade was necessarily limited to the hostile
positions on the west bank of the Canal, and on the 25th, 2nd Lieut.
Mosscrop with three men of the “Rifles” entered a night post shortly
after dusk and captured one of the garrison when it arrived. The
prisoner belonged to the 89th Grenadier Regiment (17th Division), a
_sturm truppen_ lot, and this seemed to indicate that the enemy had
aggressive designs on hand, so the troops were warned not to relax
their vigilance.
A proposal by the IV. Corps that the Division should undertake a
big raid against the main entrenchments of the enemy was vetoed as
impracticable, since the amount of gun-fire necessary to cut the
wire was bound to advertise our intentions. It led however to an
interesting suggestion by Brig.-General Tudor, which he submitted
to the Corps after satisfying himself, with Brig.-General Kennedy’s
help, of its practicability on this front, and it formed the basis
of the scheme carried through in the same region by Sir Julian
Byng during the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917. Artillery
preparation, he pointed out, could be dispensed with if tanks were
employed, and thus surprise, the value of which had been fully
grasped by the Ninth, might be obtained. The tanks, protected by a
smoke-barrage, would cut the gaps to allow the infantry to enter the
enemy’s positions, and the probability was that the Germans would
be so completely surprised that large captures would be made and
much ground gained at a trifling cost. The infantry were to advance
towards Flesquières Ridge, but half of the tanks were to wheel to
the north and roll up the German front system to the Scarpe, the aim
being not to break through in depth but to destroy the enemy’s forces
on a wide front. This, with some modifications, was the plan carried
out by the Third Army in the following November.
But the Division was not destined to participate in the Cambrai
offensive. By the end of August it was relieved by the Thirty-sixth
(Ulster) Division, recently engaged in the Battle of Passchendaele,
and this spot the Ninth surmised was to be its next destination. The
first sojourn was in the shell-torn region near Achiet le Grand,
where the nature of the training gave the men a fair idea of what
would be expected of them later, and on the 12th September the
Division moved north by rail to camps between Poperinghe and Ypres in
the V. Corps’[85] sector.
As already indicated, the principal campaign planned by Sir Douglas
Haig was in the north. His design was to carry the Passchendaele
Ridge and secure the command of the Belgian coast, as this would
threaten the enemy’s communications, and at the same time restrict
appreciably his submarine warfare. But the British Field-Marshal
was favoured with little luck, and it was not till the beginning of
May, after the failure of General Nivelle’s offensive in the Aisne,
that his plans were approved at a conference held in Paris on the
4th and 5th May. This comparatively late start proved to be a fatal
handicap, and in other theatres the rosy hopes of the beginning
of the year were dispelled by the tragic events in Russia. The
Revolution eliminated Russia as a German enemy, rendered the position
of Roumania practically hopeless (though in the days of its stress it
fought with admirable and heroic resolution), and prevented General
Maude from garnering the full fruits of the fine campaign that had
resulted in the capture of Bagdad on the 11th March. The Egyptian
offensive broke down at Gaza, the Salonica front remained stationary,
and Italy, engrossed in Trieste and Albania, was scarcely pulling her
weight. Moreover, as the Germans were cognisant of our aims, and had
made dispositions to defeat them, it was regrettable that G.H.Q. did
not excogitate a fresh plan, which, carried out in the same manner as
the Cambrai offensive later, would have disconcerted the foe and led
to extensive gains without a heavy sacrifice of life.
The preliminary of the attack on Passchendaele was the capture of
the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, which overlooked our lines and a
large portion of the hinterland. This was brilliantly accomplished
by the Second Army on the 7th June, the enemy’s position being blown
into the air and the ridge passing into our hands with slight loss.
The preparations for the assault on Passchendaele were then taken
in hand, but for some yet unexplained reason the first blow was
not struck till the 31st July. During the interlude the Germans,
delivering on the 10th July an attack against the bridgehead
north-east of the Yser between Nieuport and the coast, were so far
successful that they prevented the projected co-operation between
the Fourth Army and the Navy, which they dreaded above all things.
The first assault launched by the Fifth Army began well, and the
greater part of the ridge overlooking Ypres was stormed, but the
German scheme of defence, based on holding their forward positions
lightly, depended chiefly on counter-attack, and before the end
of the day many of our gains, including St Julien and Westhoek,
were recaptured. Above all, the key of the enemy’s position on the
Menin road remained in his hands. On the same day the fatal rains
made their appearance, and torrential downpours transformed the
battlefield into a quagmire. The continuance of the wet weather,
which made August of 1917 one of the most disastrous months in the
war, was all in favour of the Germans; it delayed our preparations,
and should indeed have led to the abandonment of the campaign; but
with the pertinacity of the true gambler, the British resumed the
attack on the 16th August, but made little progress south of St
Julien, the Germans defying all our efforts in the neighbourhood of
the Menin road.
The defence, which was directed by General Sixt von Armin, who had
achieved great fame as a tactician during the battles of the Somme,
was distributed in depth. Trenches being impossible in a swamp, the
defenders were placed in the ruins of barns and farmhouses; these,
strongly concreted to an average thickness of three feet, offered
a small mark for artillery and were proof against all except the
heaviest of our projectiles. These fortified farms, or “Pill-boxes”
as they were called by the men, were so situated that each could
support its neighbour by cross- and enfilade-fire and was a veritable
fortress in itself. They were of various sizes, according to the
extent of the ruins on which they were erected; some had several
apartments, and were capable of accommodating a whole company of men.
They were admirably adapted to break up and delay the line of an
attack, and even if they were carried and the objective taken, the
worn-out assailants would have to meet a counter-blast from the fresh
German reserves in rear. Up to the 16th August no satisfactory means
had been found of dealing with these fortifications.
Apart from these strongholds the great problem was how to keep rifles
and machine-guns clean; on more than one occasion our men had been
forced to give ground, because their rifle-bolts jammed owing to
mud so that the rifles could not be fired. It was also clear that
“Pill-box” fighting demanded skilful leading and resource on the
part of subordinate commanders. The series of waves, so successful
in the Arras battles, was not suitable to meet the new conditions.
Accordingly it was planned that the attack should be carried out by
lines of sections, each section being in file and separated from
its neighbours by about twenty yards. This gave an opportunity of
overwhelming a “Pill-box” by the co-operation of the nearest sections
while the others made headway, and each part was to be cleared and
garrisoned before the sections involved continued their advance. The
plan ensured the attack being carried on with the greatest expedition
and the least fatigue, and, provided the leadership was good, it held
out reasonable prospects of success. This was the form of training
practised in the devastated area near Achiet le Petit, the ground
being marked out by tapes in facsimile of the actual country where
the assault was to be made.
The next phase of the Passchendaele Battle was arranged for the 20th
September, and the assembly line of the Division lay along the crest
of the Frezenberg Ridge. The span of front allotted to the Ninth,
fully 1500 yards in all, consisted of a number of posts placed at
intervals along a road roughly at right angles to that on which stood
the hamlet of Frezenberg. So battered and ravaged was the country by
continuous shell-fire that no trace of the road could be discerned.
From the ridge the ground sank to the valley of the Hanebeek stream,
which trickled through the gaunt and melancholy remains of Hanebeek
Wood and meandered northwards past the Ypres-Roulers Railway. From
the hollow the ground rose gently to another ridge, higher on the
right where the main point was Anzac Redoubt, and gradually sank on
the left to a flat swamp. Beyond this was another valley, covered
by the spur on which stood the ruins of the Station and the village
of Zonnebeke. The ordinary landmarks indicated by the map did not
exist; the only one remaining that the eye could pick up without much
effort was the Ypres-Roulers Railway. All vestige of roads had been
obliterated, and even the Hanebeek brook had ceased to flow. Its
banks had been blown in by months of relentless gun-fire and a zigzag
trail of shell-holes, rather deeper and more full of water than
the others, alone gave evidence of its former existence. A bleaker
and more repellant battlefield it is impossible to imagine, and
even the sun served only to throw into stronger relief the dreadful
ghoulishness of the landscape. If a personal reconnaissance was
impossible, the one safe way to gain a knowledge of the country was
by a study of the excellent air photographs furnished by the R.F.C.
Apart from the Railway, and to the south of it, the most prominent
guide was Hanebeek Wood, which housed a number of “Pill-boxes.”
Clusters of these forts lay along the Railway and to the north of
it, the most important being Beck House, Borry Farm, and a strong
group called Potsdam.
The attack was allotted to the 27th and South African Brigades.
The former had two objectives; the first (indicated on the map as
the Red Line) ran from the eastern half of Hanebeek Wood up to
Potsdam; the second (Green Line) was Zonnebeke Redoubt on the ridge
running north-west from Anzac Redoubt. The 6th K.O.S.B.,[86] 9th
Scottish Rifles,[87] and 12th Royal Scots were to take the former,
and then the first two battalions were to go on to the latter. The
South Africans had three objectives; the first (Red Line) was in
prolongation of that of the 27th Brigade; the second included Bremen
Redoubt (Yellow Line); and the third carried on the Green Line from
the Frezenberg-Zonnebeke road to the Zonnebeke stream. The leading
battalions were the 3rd and 4th[88] Regiments, and these were
supported by the 1st and 2nd.[89] The assault was to be on the “Leap
Frog” system; when any hostile work was met it had to be occupied and
held while the line immediately behind the attacking one was to pass
through and carry on to the next objective. The Ninth was flanked on
the right by the Second Australian Division and on the left by the
Fifty-fifth.
[Illustration: ZONNEBEKE FROM FREZENBERG]
There were few novices in the Ninth in the art of mounting an attack,
but Passchendaele demanded special and anxious consideration.
The enemy’s powerful artillery swept all the back areas and the
approaches to our line unceasingly, and roads and camps beyond
the effective scope of shells were persistently bombed by fleets of
Gothas. There were no roads or communication trenches to guide troops
on their way to the front line, and along the ridges of craters
zigzag routes constructed with duckboards became a mark for hostile
gun-fire, but they could not be deserted except at the risk of death
by drowning or suffocation, which was the melancholy fate of more
than one poor man and animal. These routes required the most careful
preliminary reconnoitring, as the chances of taking a wrong turn were
too numerous to be neglected. Casualties on the march to the assembly
area were regarded as inevitable, and there was nothing for it but to
trust to luck. Everything was done to ensure that the wounded would
be properly attended; numerous aid posts were established and the
staff of stretcher-bearers was greatly increased by large parties
from the infantry. The problem of conveying stores and ammunition was
colossal, and so, in order to be independent of carrying parties as
far as possible, the men were to take rations for forty-eight hours
and extra water-bottles. Rifles were covered with sand-bags, so that
they would be in good working order when the operation commenced, and
each man carried a spade. For dealing with the “Pill-boxes” a liberal
quantity of phosphorous bombs was issued.
The attack was to be carried out after a preliminary bombardment of
twenty-four hours and under cover of a creeping barrage. The shell
commonly used in the Second and Fifth Armies was shrapnel, and it
was due solely to the insistence of General Lukin that the Division
was given reluctant permission to use that combination of smoke and
H.E., which had given so much satisfaction at Arras. During these
weeks the gunners had a dreadful time, for our artillery supremacy
had been boldly challenged by the foe, and day and night our battery
positions were fiercely bombarded. Hostile bombing machines played
their part by night and frequently interrupted the laborious toil
of bringing up the ammunition for the guns; hence the work of our
gunners was carried out under much greater difficulties than usually
fell to their lot. The creeping barrage of smoke and H.E. was to open
150 yards in front of the leading line and move at the rate of 100
yards every four minutes for the first 200 yards; then it was to pass
on to the first objective at the rate of 100 yards every six minutes.
The infantry, who were expected to arrive at the Red Line in twenty
minutes, were to wait there for an hour, protected by barrier-fire.
On the resumption of the advance the rate of the barrage was to be
100 yards every eight minutes, till the final objective was reached.
A searching barrage of shrapnel was to precede the creeping one and
sweep the open country 500 yards in advance of it. The combination
of H.E. and smoke allowed certain refinements to be introduced which
would have been impracticable with shrapnel. The most prominent
obstacles were kept under fire while the barrage moved on, so that
the infantry could surround them on all sides when the fire lifted.
This was most conspicuously illustrated in the case of Hanebeek Wood,
bristling with “Pill-boxes” and machine-guns. To allow the K.O.S.B.
to come to grips with the defenders before they could open effective
fire, Brig.-General Tudor arranged for the barrage to be maintained
on the wood, while a lane was to be left clear for men to move up and
get to its rear; thus when the fire lifted the infantry would be able
to attack the wood simultaneously from all sides.
Machine-guns also had an important rôle to play. They were to
barrage the final objective until the infantry began their advance
from the first, and then they were to lift on to an S.O.S. line
in front of the Green Line. The machine-gun was expected to be
of great assistance in defence, and several were to be taken up
with the assaulting brigades to support them against the expected
counter-stroke.
Until the 12th September the Ninth was in camp near Ypres, and on the
16th and 17th it relieved the Forty-second Division on the Frezenberg
Ridge, the 27th Brigade taking over the right sector and the South
African the left. Unhappily, a deplorable incident occurred. When
the 11th Royal Scots,[90] who were conveyed to Ypres by rail, were
detraining near the Asylum, a shell landed among the men, causing 51
casualties in killed and wounded.
The responsible task of taping out the assembly areas was
satisfactorily accomplished by both brigades. On the night of the
19th the assaulting battalions made the purgatorial march along
the slippery trench-board tracks to the forming-up points. Heavy
rain descended for nearly three hours, but by rare good fortune the
enemy’s guns were unusually quiet and comparatively few casualties
were suffered; this was taken as a good omen. By 5 A.M. on the 20th
the assembly of the Division was completed.
At zero the light was perfect, being sufficient for the assailants
to distinguish their objectives, but rendering them only dimly
visible to the enemy. Under a first-rate barrage the leading lines
advanced, one company of the K.O.S.B. halting near the west margin
of Hanebeek Wood, which appeared like a gigantic furnace shooting
up blazing roots and trunks to an enormous height. To the left of
it another company, advancing along a lane flanked by two walls of
smoke and fire, took up a position on the rear, having intercepted
and killed on the way a party of Germans who were moving up to
reinforce their comrades in the wood. When the barrage lifted the
wood was rushed from front and rear, and the terrifying combination
of lusty Australians and dour Scotsmen was invincible. The Germans
were allowed no time to bring their machine-guns into action, and
the wood yielded up four machine-guns and about 50 prisoners. Our
casualties were few and were caused chiefly by rifle-fire and by our
own shrapnel which was used on the right flank of the wood.
On the flank of the K.O.S.B. the right company of the “Rifles”
encountered very feeble opposition and reached the first objective
in good time, but the left company, being seriously delayed by
machine-gun fire from a “Pill-box” on the Railway, gained the
objective only in time to go forward with the advance to the Green
Line.
The Railway line was a formidable fortress, as it was defended by
several strong “Pill-boxes,” R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5, and was flanked
by the fire of the Potsdam group on the left. A company of the 12th
Royal Scots was detailed to seize the “R” “Pill-boxes” up to the
first objective, but its onrush was checked at the outset by bombs
and machine-gun fire from R1, so Lieut.-Colonel Ritson sent up two
platoons from his reserve company to attack it from the south. This
manœuvre, attracting the attention of the enemy, gave the platoons on
the Railway the opportunity of rushing the “Pill-box” and overcoming
the garrison, of whom 40 were taken and three machine-guns. This
practically ended the resistance on the Railway, and the right
company of the Royal Scots soon arrived at the Red Line. The task
of the left company was to capture “A” and Potsdam. The defenders
of the former were wide-awake, and their raking machine-gun fire
made the assailants very uncomfortable, but Captain Reynolds and
six men managed to move close up to the “Pill-box,” where they were
safe from the hostile fire. They tried to put a Mills bomb through
the loophole, but this the garrison blocked with a pack while still
keeping the machine-gun firing. There was a real danger of the attack
in this sector being held up by the obstinate “Pill-box”; but Captain
Reynolds, showing extraordinary bravery and resource, under a storm
of lead contrived to squeeze a phosphorous bomb past the obstruction
through the loophole; the explosion set the place on fire and smoked
out the garrison, who immediately surrendered, 7 prisoners and two
machine-guns being the result of this lively episode.
At Potsdam two machine-guns were in action in the open. While two
platoons of the Royal Scots made a frontal assault, a third, assisted
by some South Africans, attacked from the north, and another platoon
from the south. Before this converging onslaught the defenders were
overpowered, and 70 prisoners and two machine-guns were captured.
During the pause on the first objective the K.O.S.B. and the right
companies of the “Rifles” reorganised their forces. In each case the
supporting companies had now to lead the attack, but as the right
supporting company of the K.O.S.B. had already suffered severely from
the enemy’s barrage, Lieut.-Colonel Maclean was obliged to put his
whole battalion in the front line, and he asked Lieut.-Colonel Sir
John Campbell to support him with two companies of the 11th Royal
Scots. On the left, Lieut.-Colonel Lumsden, owing to the late arrival
of his left companies, resolved to swing his right companies towards
the Railway, and to keep in touch with the K.O.S.B. by means of one
platoon.
The operations against the Green Line caused very little trouble. The
K.O.S.B. encountered one machine-gun in a shell-hole right out in
the open, but the men worked round it and bayoneted the team. At the
Zonnebeke Redoubt the enemy made no show of a fight, and 40 prisoners
were taken. Equally swift progress was made by the “Rifles.” The two
left companies, moving up rapidly, caught up the barrage and joined
in the action; except for slight opposition from two “Pill-boxes” all
was plain sailing.
Brig.-General Maxwell, who reached the Green Line just after its
capture, selected the line to be consolidated, and this was done by
improving shell-holes and then forming short lengths of trench by
connecting them up. The workers were covered by a number of advanced
posts, each with a Lewis Gun, but the enemy made no attempt at a
counter-stroke. At the same time half of the men cleaned their rifles
while the others kept guard, and machine-gun sections arrived and
took up positions. While the consolidation was in progress a hostile
aeroplane, flying low up and down our line, roughly indicated the
position to the German gunners who sent over a few shells.
On the South African front the Red Line was carried almost without a
check, and the 4th Regiment on the left entered Borry Farm, isolated
in the same manner as Hanebeek Wood, and Beck House, before the
Germans had time to resist. The only trouble was on the right, where
the 3rd Regiment sustained several casualties from Potsdam, but an
assault by Captain Sprenger with a few men materially assisted the
12th Royal Scots to overcome this stronghold. At the first objective
the supporting battalions took the lead, and at 7 A.M. the 1st and
2nd Regiments moved against the Yellow and Green Lines. The former
reached its objective without opposition, but the latter had to fight
nearly every yard of the way. From Waterend House, Tulip Cottages,
and Hill 37, all in the area of the Fifty-fifth Division, machine-gun
fire scourged the flank of the South Africans, and created a gap
between them and the troops on the left. When the 2nd Regiment
eventually carried Zevencote and Bremen Redoubt, a defensive flank
was thrown out on the south bank of the Zonnebeke stream, and the
garrison of Mitchell’s Farm was augmented. So heavy had been the
losses of the South Africans that they had to be reinforced by the
Camerons. Late in the evening the Fifty-fifth Division succeeded in
clearing Hill 37, and thus closed the gap between it and the South
Africans.
At the fall of night all the objectives of the Division had been
secured and consolidated. A counter-thrust was expected and even
hoped for, but it did not come. A terrific barrage along our line
about 5 P.M. seemed to be the prelude to an onslaught, and our men,
surging forward out of the shelled zone, peered eagerly into the
mist for a sight of the field-grey foemen, but all attempts of the
enemy to mass were broken up by our artillery-fire. So accurate and
stupendous was our barrage that it seemed like a solid, impenetrable
barrier.
The nature of the fighting lent itself to individual exploits, and
two V.Cs. were given to the Division, one being awarded to Captain
Reynolds and the other to Lance-Corporal W. H. Hewitt of the 2nd
South African Regiment. He tackled a “Pill-box” single-handed,
and on attempting to enter the doorway was severely wounded by
the defenders; undaunted, he crawled to a loophole, and though
wounded again pushed a bomb through the embrasure, the explosion
of which dislodged the Germans. Numerous feats of a similar nature
were performed by the men of all battalions, and the excellent
understanding between the members of sections was a source of
legitimate gratification to all responsible for the training of the
men.
The line captured was held by the Division until the 24th September.
The “Pill-boxes” provided a welcome shelter during the fierce gusts
of artillery-fire; but their interiors were disgustingly squalid, and
the floors were a foot or more under water. The Argylls and Camerons
relieved the 2nd and 1st South African Regiments on the left, while
the “Rifles” and K.O.S.B. held the right front. During this period
there were violent storms of artillery-fire but there was no infantry
action.
A deep gloom was cast over the whole Division by the news of the
death of Brig.-General Maxwell on the 21st. Since taking over the
command of the 27th Brigade in October 1916 he had been one of the
outstanding personalities in the Ninth. Daring to a fault, he was a
soldier with real gifts of generalship, and it was a sad calamity
that death prevented his brilliant talents receiving fuller scope
in a higher command. He was one from whose manner and bearing all
plucked courage and confidence; in the glamour of his presence, his
unfailing courtesy, and the opulence of his ideas lay the secret
of the love and respect with which he was regarded by all his
subordinates. Too great a disregard of personal danger led to his
death; in his anxiety to ascertain that all was right on his front
he exposed himself freely, and was shot by a sniper at 40 yards’
range. His habitual hardihood had been a constant source of anxiety
to his staff, but it was one of the qualities that raised him above
criticism in the eyes of the men. Courage begets courage, and within
a few weeks of his coming Brig.-General Maxwell had made the 27th one
of the finest fighting brigades in France. His spirit lived among the
men after his death, and his teaching and training remained a fount
of inspiration to all ranks of the 27th Brigade.
The action of the 20th September was one of the most satisfactory
in which the Ninth took part. Though the number[91] of prisoners
taken was not large and the space of ground gained inconsiderable,
the operation was the first to reap satisfactory results against
Von Armin’s system of defence, and it encouraged the Higher Command
to continue the campaign in spite of the lateness of the season.
Communications throughout the battle had been wonderfully good, and
though telephone wires could be maintained only with difficulty on
account of shell-fire, messages were received by means of pigeons,
lamps, and runners. The arrangements of the R.A.M.C. were effective
and adequate, and the extra stretcher-bearers furnished by the
infantry enabled the wounded to be rapidly evacuated from the forward
areas. The H.E. and smoke-barrage required no justification in
the eyes of the Ninth, but its success attracted the attention of
higher authorities and led to its being employed by the Third and
Fifty-ninth Divisions in the engagement of the 26th September.
On the 24th September after being relieved by the Third Division, the
Ninth moved to Arneke and neighbouring villages, where the men were
practised for their next engagement, which, if all went well, was
expected to bring us near Westroosebeke. The new leader of the 27th
Brigade was Brig.-General Croft, who was recalled from the brigade to
which he had been appointed just before the September battle. As C.O.
of the 11th Royal Scots he had been with the Division since December
1915, and no man was more likely to keep the high standard which his
predecessor had set. Realising the value of a distinctive name, he
caused his brigade to be known by the term “Lowland” as well as by
its number. The spell of good weather that set in during the latter
part of September did not last, and rain fell almost continuously
from the 6th October onwards. On the 5th the Division was ordered to
concentrate in the area of the XVIII. Corps,[92] and under the most
depressing conditions it was transferred to the vicinity of Brake
Camp, the infantry arriving late on the night of the 9th. For many of
the men there was no shelter from the rain, and bivouacs and tents
had to be hastily erected on the sodden ground. No camps in the whole
British line were more dismal than those round Ypres, sloppy with mud
and persistently bombed by the enemy’s aeroplanes. So serious were
the effects of bombing that all tents and horse lines were encircled
by ramparts of earth to localise the explosions. On the night of
the 10th/11th the Highland Brigade relieved the 144th (Forty-eighth
Division) in the line near Poelcapelle, and the Ninth received orders
for an attack on the 12th October.
The scene of battle was the low, flat country near the northern end
of the Passchendaele Ridge. Along the left boundary of the Division
ran the Lekkerboterbeek stream, and though the whole area was studded
with fortified farms and houses, there were no clear landmarks. Since
the 20th September performance had lagged far behind programme,
and Westroosebeke lay beyond our immediate grasp. There were three
objectives[93]; the first two (the Yellow Dotted and the Blue Dotted
Lines) were to be taken by the Highland Brigade, and the final one
(the Dotted Purple Line) by the Lowland. The leading battalions of
the 26th, the Black Watch[94] and Argylls, each on a two-company
front, were to capture a subsidiary objective (Green Line) and the
Yellow Dotted Line, after which the Seaforths and Camerons[95] were
to pass through and go on to the Blue Dotted Line, while the final
attack was allotted by Brig.-General Croft to the 12th[96] and 11th
Royal Scots. The assault was on a very wide frontage for a brigade,
and necessitated considerable gaps between sections. The barrage
was to move at the rate of 100 yards every eight minutes, with a
pause on the first and second objectives, and 16 Vickers Guns were
to form a machine-gun barrage and were also to support the infantry
with covering-fire. On the flanks of the Ninth the attack was to
be carried on by the New Zealand Division on the right and the
Eighteenth Division on the left. Zero was 5.35 A.M.
About midnight on the 11th, the weather broke down completely, and
the march of the battalions of the 27th Brigade under torrents of
rain along the slippery duckboards to their assembly positions was
one prolonged ordeal. The forming-up positions were heavily barraged
with gas and H.E. by the enemy’s guns; many of the taping parties
were killed or wounded, and all had to wear their respirators for
several hours. The assembly was in consequence a difficult matter,
and slight confusion arose before the men were placed in their
correct positions.
At 5.35 A.M. our barrage opened, but was thin and ragged. The leading
men lost direction almost at once, owing to the wide frontage and
the execrable condition of the ground. The right company of the
Black Watch, by the aid of skilful Lewis Gun and rifle-fire, rushed
Adler Farm, captured several prisoners, and though some casualties
were sustained reached its objective on the Green Line. But the
left company ran into our own barrage, and inclining to the left,
made a gap between it and the right company; it was under fire the
whole way and was compelled to dig-in a few hundred yards in front
of our original line. The company, which was to pass this one on the
Green Line, also swung to the left to such an extent that it came up
on the left of the leading company; from the very commencement it
was in trouble, and its commander and H.Q. were all knocked out in
an attempt to rush a “Pill-box.” Meantime the right rear company,
passing through its front one, reached Source Trench near the Yellow
Dotted Line.
[Illustration: ARTILLERY HEAD-QUARTERS NEAR ST. JULIEN]
The first company of the Seaforths, sadly depleted by fire from
parties of Germans[97] in organised shell-holes, advanced and filled
the space between the two leading ones of the Black Watch. The
12th Royal Scots, following close behind, became mingled with
the Seaforths. There was some opposition from Inch Houses, and in
numerous cases clusters of Germans offered resistance until they were
taken in flank; in one case two of our sergeants, both of whom had
been wounded, charged a group of nine and killed every one. Small
parties of our men were seen in the dim light to pass Banff Houses
and Source Trench, and some may even have reached Source Farm and Vat
Cottages. A mixed body of Black Watch, Seaforths, and Royal Scots
entered the eastern end of Wallemolen, but being heavily enfiladed
from both flanks had to fall back on the Cemetery-Inch Houses line.
On the left, matters were even worse; for the ground in some places
was impassable, and as a consequence the Argylls were unable to keep
pace with the barrage. The right company and its supporting company
maintained direction, but the others swung to the left and some of
the men, crossing the Lekkerboterbeek, so churned up by shell-fire
that it was unrecognisable, entered the sector of the Eighteenth
Division. On the right a “Pill-box” near the front line stopped the
leading company and held up the whole advance, with the result that
parties from the rear battalions, the Camerons, 11th Royal Scots,
and 6th K.O.S.B.[98] became involved in the firing-line. A combined
assault by men of all units on the “Pill-box,” the occupants of
which had shown the white flag but continued firing, eventually
mastered the defence, the garrison being killed and four machine-guns
captured. But by this time the barrage was far ahead, the troops
were exhausted and disorganised, and the leading ranks were able
to proceed only 150 yards or so from the “Pill-box,” where they
consolidated a line of shell-holes. The men of the left company who
crossed the Lekkerboterbeek advanced for some 80 yards, but were
stopped by machine-gun fire from Beek and Meunier Houses. The left
rear company, which could make no headway, formed a defensive flank
and gained touch with the Eighteenth Division on its old front line.
Except on the extreme right the advance had come to a halt about 100
yards from the starting-point. The New Zealanders on our right flank
had made some progress, but the Eighteenth Division, as was the case
with our left battalion, had been handicapped by the spongy nature of
the ground and was back in its original position. Several unfortunate
men had been drowned in the deep, water-filled shell-holes, and
rifles and machine-guns were clogged with slime. The barrage having
gone far ahead, nothing was to be gained by persisting in the attack,
and the line taken up by the Ninth at the close of the battle ran
from the Cemetery near Wallemolen in front of Inch Houses, thence
to Oxford Houses and back to our original front system. Though the
26th and 27th Machine-gun Companies had been roughly handled during
the action, they were able to provide efficient protection for the
position now held.
During the night the front was reorganised in three sectors; the
right, garrisoned by the 12th Royal Scots, the Seaforths and Black
Watch, the centre held by the Camerons and Argylls with the “Rifles”
in support, and the left occupied by the 11th Royal Scots and
K.O.S.B. Patrols were sent out during the dark hours with orders to
join up with the leading men of the Black Watch, who had been seen
near Source Farm, but not until next day was touch established with
a few of them in Source Trench, and these were relieved during the
night of the 13th/14th. On the same night the South Africans took
over the whole of the front, and the 26th and 27th Brigades were
withdrawn from the line.
Rain and mud constitute the chief explanation for the failure of the
Division in this battle, which should not have been fought; no man
could progress at more than a snail’s pace, and sheer exhaustion was
a factor more potent than the enemy in bringing the advance to a
standstill. The breakdown in communications was understandable and
largely unavoidable, since the pigeons were unable to fly against
the strong wind that prevailed, and the men who had charge of the
messenger dogs all became casualties. The barrage was not up to the
usual standard of the Divisional Artillery, but its lack of density
and its raggedness were due to the short period that had elapsed
since the last action and to the weather. Many of the guns stuck in
the mud, all the men were dead-beat, and Brig.-General Tudor could
not get the quantity of the smoke-shells he wanted. Since the horses
could not leave the roads, it was only by means of light railways
that field-guns could be brought into action off the roads and
supplied with ammunition. The Sappers, under Lieut.-Colonel Hearn,
always a strong advocate of the light railway, gave the greatest
possible assistance to the gunners by constructing a very useful
railway system east of Springfield.
Serious errors were undoubtedly committed by the infantry, but
when officers and men were engaged in a long and cruel struggle
against ineluctable conditions, cool leadership could scarcely be
expected. As on the 3rd May, there was a deplorable loss of direction
at the very start leading to confusion of units, but at the same
time the vast length of the attacking frontage—1500 yards for two
battalions—with wide gaps between each section, and the absence of
conspicuous landmarks made the maintenance of direction a difficult
matter. Leadership, marked more by valour than by discretion, caused
an unnecessary number of battalions to be involved in wasteful and
confused fighting. If the mixing up of the supporting and leading
units of the 26th Brigade can be understood and condoned, it was
none the less regrettable, but there was less reason for throwing
the battalions of the 27th into the fight. Of battalion commanders
Lieut.-Colonel Lumsden alone, seeing that the attack of the 26th
Brigade had been checked, kept his men back, and the net result of
over-zealous leading was that General Lukin, instead of a brigade,
had only one battalion intact. But even in this respect there was
some excuse. It was at least a venial fault that officers and men
refused to accept a check without making a desperate effort, and
Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Campbell and Major Innes Browne regarded our
line as unsatisfactory, if not untenable, while the “Pill-box” that
caused the left of the attack so much trouble remained in the hands
of the Germans. Possibly heroism on a grander scale has never been
shown than in the brutal fighting on the foul quagmires of Flanders.
Often neck-deep in mud, the men floundered forward until their
overtaxed limbs could no longer support them, and to wrest victory
under such appalling conditions was a task beyond the power of man.
Few people at Passchendaele had a more thankless and trying time
than the Sappers and personnel of the R.A.M.C. The former were
constantly engaged in maintaining the shelled duckboard tracks,
making plank roads, repairing paths and constructing shelters and
tramways. Three hundred infantry had been attached to the latter
for stretcher-bearing; they were all needed, and it was only by
sheer hard work and much nervous strain that the wounded were
satisfactorily evacuated from the dreary swamps of Passchendaele.
The line was held by the Division until the 24th October and during
this time the hostile artillery periodically barraged the back areas
and approaches, causing serious losses to reliefs and working-parties
between St Julien and the front trenches. A great deal of material
was carried up to the front for the Sixty-third (Naval) Division
and many yards of cable were buried to ensure a rapid and reliable
signal service. Advance posts were thrown out by the 27th Brigade,
and the assembly areas for the Sixty-third Division were marked
by tape. On the 22nd a feint attack in our sector, carried out by
men of the XVIII. Corps Cyclist Battalion who manipulated dummy
figures, assisted the Eighteenth Division in bringing its position
into line with that of the Ninth. On the 24th the 27th was relieved
by the 188th Brigade (Sixty-third Division) and the Ninth[99] was
concentrated in the various camps near Ypres.