THE BATTLES OF ARRAS
THE ACTIONS OF 9TH APRIL, 12TH APRIL, 3RD MAY, 5TH JUNE 1917
The preliminary bombardment of the German entrenched positions opened
on the 5th April. Special attention was devoted to counter-battery
work, and with the assistance of aeroplane observation and
sound-ranging devices, a great many of the hostile guns were knocked
out by direct hits. As a result, the reply was extraordinarily weak,
and though a few shells were thrown into Arras, little damage was
done. Our “Chinese barrages” not only made fine spectacles, but
were most useful as the reply they provoked showed us where the
German retaliation barrage would fall. The assembly of the Division
was completed without difficulty during the night of the 8th/9th.
On the front of the 26th and 27th Brigades the leading troops were
accommodated in the trenches, but the South Africans made use of
small craters, which had been blown by the sappers in front of their
line.
Shortly before zero all hope of a fine day was dashed by a gentle
drizzle of rain. At 5.30 A.M. our guns opened with a deafening
crash. Overhead the rushing steel sounded like a frenzied discord
combining the deep boom of the drum with the shrill shriek of the
whistle, and where the shells landed, the earth leaped up in a mad
barbaric dance. A gigantic wall of smoke and fire lay right along
the enemy’s line, and sprays of coloured lights, shooting up from
his trenches, betokened the anxiety and distress of the garrison.
The hostile barrage was slow, and when it descended on our front
line, eight minutes after zero, it was thin and ragged. During the
first three minutes of our barrage the leading waves took up their
position for the advance, the only trouble being on the extreme
left, where the K.O.S.B., forming up, had some casualties through
our smoke-shells falling short. With the first lift the khaki lines
pushed forward. In spite of their training, the men had the greatest
difficulty in recognising the hostile trenches, which had been so
torn up that they hardly presented a break in the belt of churned-up
soil that marked the devastating path of the artillery. The only
serious resistance was encountered by the Seaforths, who stormed
the Island near Blangy and killed a number of bombers among the
rubble and cellars of Athies. Elsewhere the advance was carried on
without check. A few casualties were inflicted by machine-guns, but
the smoke-screen was most effective, and owing to this the enemy’s
shooting was very erratic. The ardour of our troops could scarcely be
restrained; flushed with success, they kept close up to the barrage
and in many cases passed through it. The Bavarians had built up a
worthy reputation during the war, but before they had time to show
fight our men were upon them. On reaching the Black Line the Black
Watch captured the regimental commander and the adjutant of the 8th
Bavarians, who had not realised that a battle was in progress. On the
left, Lieut.-Colonel Thorne of the 12th Royal Scots was killed when
leading his men, but the battalion under Major Hay was irresistible
and easily secured the Black Line. The K.O.S.B. shot past the first
objective and stopped in a sunken road beyond it, where they found
swarms of the 25th Bavarians crouching in the dug-outs. The whole of
the Black Line was secured in the time allotted. During the advance
a few of the South Africans bore too much to the north, but the
Black Watch extended their left flank and the boundaries between the
brigades were readjusted at the first objective.
Owing to the bad light and the obliteration of the enemy system, the
“moppers” had great difficulty in recognising the various trenches
and in some cases overran their objectives, consequently there were
several instances of Germans emerging from their shelters and firing
at the backs of our men. The most serious mishap took place on the
front of the 27th Brigade, where a machine-gun suddenly came to life
and opened fire on a party of the 9th Seaforths who had come up to
dig a communication trench. The men dropped their shovels, picked up
their rifles, and after killing its crew carried off the machine-gun
as a trophy. The clearing parties found the front system full of
Germans, most of whom had taken shelter either in the dug-outs or
just in the doorway, and they were killed or taken prisoner.
The drizzle had developed into a steady downpour while the
reorganisation and arrangements for the second advance were being
carried out. The dispositions of the South African and 26th Brigades
remained unchanged, but in the 27th Brigade the supporting and
leading battalions changed places. At 7.36 A.M. the attack on the
Blue Line (Arras-Lens Railway) commenced. The defenders had not yet
recovered from their surprise, and their resistance, considering
the strength of their position, was extremely poor, though a few
stout-hearted groups held out to the last and inflicted casualties
before they were killed. The right wing of the 26th Brigade was held
up for a time by enfilade machine-gun fire from a post at the Railway
Triangle on the front of the Fifteenth Division. But the artillery
were prompt to assist, and, covered by an effective smoke-screen put
down by “F” Battery R.H.A. from the Railway embankment north of the
Scarpe, the Highlanders reached the Blue Line practically without a
halt. Equally successful was the attack of the other brigades. The
South Africans lost some men from snipers as they were struggling
through the gaps in the wire in front of the Railway cutting, but
the enemy’s machine-guns were dilatory in coming into action and
the South Africans easily accounted for them when they reached the
cutting. On the left, when the leading battalions of the 27th Brigade
advanced into the valley, they came under hostile machine-gun and
artillery-fire from the Railway and Maison Blanche Wood. Two of the
machine-guns were rushed in the cutting, and two others, which were
holding up the advance of the Thirty-fourth Division, were enfiladed
by Lewis Guns and driven to earth. Of the garrison on the Railway not
one escaped; all were killed or captured.
The four tanks allotted to the Division were very unlucky. Two were
put out of action at the start by artillery-fire; a third broke down
about 200 yards from the Railway on the front of the 27th Brigade;
and the fourth failed to reach the Railway after the officer in
charge of it was killed, but the surprise of the enemy was so
complete that there was little need for them. South of the Scarpe a
tank did good service by helping to clear the Railway Triangle, which
had caused a great deal of trouble to the Fifteenth Division.
During the halt on the Blue Line, the only changes in disposition
occurred in the 26th and South African Brigades, where the Camerons,
Argylls, 1st and 2nd Regiments were placed in the lead. The four
hours of waiting were not without anxiety. An enemy aeroplane came
over our lines and as a result the German artillery opened on the
Railway, 300 yards east of which our protective barrage was falling
at that time. Fortunately this counter-barrage did not last long, and
the majority of the leading men were already formed up some yards
east of the Railway, but for a short spell nearly six battalions lay
precariously between two fires in a space of 300 yards. At length
the final attack began at 12.16 P.M. On the right, tough resistance
by the enemy at the Railway Triangle left us with an exposed flank,
and a quick and critical decision had to be made whether to advance
on this wing or not. Brig.-General Kennedy decided to press on, and
the movement was completely screened by the smoke-curtain put down
by our guns. This prudently bold policy not merely prevented our own
troops from being checked, but materially assisted the Fifteenth
Division to capture the Railway Triangle. Elsewhere the last vestige
of resistance had disappeared with the capture of the Blue Line, and
the assault on the Brown Line took the form of an orderly procession.
This was a happy occurrence, since the wire in front of the Point
du Jour trenches had scarcely been damaged and was penetrated
laboriously even by unmolested men. The spectacle of lines of men
moving steadily forward with their rifles at the slope seemed more
like a Salisbury Plain ceremonial manœuvre than an attack in grim
earnest. As the troops pressed on, their eyes were gratified by the
sight of scores of Germans fleeing in a wild panic. Fanned by the
breath of victory and keen to grasp all its rewards, they broke into
a smart run. The Thirty-fourth Division had been slightly delayed by
Maison Blanche Wood, and there was an awkward space on the flank of
the 11th Royal Scots, the left battalion of the Ninth, but this was
filled by a company of the K.O.S.B. which rushed a machine-gun at the
Point du Jour, destroyed the team, and devoured its lunch. With the
capture of the Brown Line the Division had accomplished all its tasks.
Half an hour before the commencement of the attack on the Brown Line
the leading battalions of the Fourth Division began to arrive. As
they came down the slope of the valley from the first objective they
suffered some casualties from shell-fire. They reached the Point du
Jour-Athies line in good time, and at 3.10 P.M. passing through the
Ninth pressed on to the Green Line, which they secured easily and
swiftly.
Success had been gained without a check and at very small cost, and
the uniform excellence of the work performed by the several arms of
the Division was one of the noticeable features of the battle. The
Sappers, Pioneers, and R.A.M.C. toiled steadily and efficiently. The
infantry, including the wounded, were hyperbolical in their praise of
the smoke and H.E. barrage, to which they attributed their own slight
losses and the complete surprise of the enemy. The only criticism
was that the barrage was too slow for eager men and that there was
scarcely enough of smoke. Never at any previous time were the men so
jubilant and so confident of a speedy victory. On that day the ground
captured and the booty seized far exceeded all that had hitherto
been secured in the same period by the British forces in France. In
all, 51 officers, 2086 other ranks, 17 field-guns and howitzers, 24
machine-guns, and 3 trench mortars were the spoils of the Division.
But the decisive nature of the victory was due not so much to the
surprise of the enemy as to the foresight with which arrangements
were made to overcome all possible obstacles, and the readiness
and resource which the infantry showed in attacking places outside
their own area. Typical examples of the latter were the capture by
the Seaforths of the Island and the storming of the Point du Jour
by the K.O.S.B. It was too often the tendency during the war for a
unit to keep to its own allotted task without making any effort to
help its neighbours, and the facility and speed with which our men
in this battle worked to their flanks were very important factors in
contributing to the rout of the enemy. General Furse had repeatedly
impressed on the officers of the Ninth the necessity and advantage of
assisting their neighbours, and never was this practice exemplified
on a finer scale by the Division than on the 9th of April.
It is impossible to praise too highly the forethought shown with
regard to the Railway Triangle. Brig.-General Tudor learned just
before our advance from the Black Line was resumed, that the
Fifteenth Division was held up by the Triangle and had not won
its first objective. Realising the disastrous result of this for
the Ninth, since the enemy south of the Scarpe would see our
infantry north of the river and would enfilade them with numerous
machine-guns, he turned on a battery, which he had standing by for
such an eventuality, to blind that enemy to our movement. This not
only enabled the Ninth to make its advance undisturbed from the
right, but further enabled its right brigade, after seizing the Blue
Line, to turn its machine-guns and some infantry against the northern
wing of the enemy opposing the Fifteenth south of the river, thus
combining a flank with a frontal attack on that portion of the enemy
and compassing his defeat and the advance of the Fifteenth Division.
Without this prearrangement the whole fight would have been far less
successful and far more costly.
The action of the 9th April was a very great triumph for British
arms. Compared with the gigantic advances made after August 1918,
the ground gained may seem insignificant and the number of prisoners
meagre, but the true comparison is not with 1918 but with 1916. In
1917, as in the Somme fighting, the moral of the Germans was high
and their resistance formidable, and there is substantial reason for
regarding, as Professor Pollard[75] does, the capture of the Vimy
Ridge and the advance to Fampoux as amongst the finest achievements
of the war. But the impetus of our attack came to an end on the same
day. It is possible that the magnitude of the first day’s success was
so much more extensive than had been expected that the preparations
for supporting it lagged in arrear, and that the Germans were able
to concentrate more quickly for the defence than we were for the
renewal of the onset. Wet weather, which figures so constantly in
Sir Douglas Haig’s despatches as the marplot of British projects,
was made chiefly responsible for our failure to follow up our
victory, but though it greatly increased our difficulties, it is
probable that ineffective Staff work rather than weather may have
been the chief cause of our disappointment. The possession of the
Vimy Ridge, the disengagement of Arras, and the obligation of the
enemy to draw on his reserves had largely fulfilled the intentions
of the Higher Command, but it is never satisfactory to lose chances
of exploiting success. For a time the Germans were badly shaken, and
Ludendorff admitted that the opening of the Arras Battle caused him
considerable uneasiness. If cavalry had been available to go through
on the afternoon of the 9th April they could not have failed to bring
in many more prisoners, but they made no advance until the 11th,
and by that time it was too late; the enemy had recovered from his
fright and had brought up reserves. Nor were there large reserves of
our infantry at hand to resume the attack at once. The infantry had
become the handmaid of the artillery, and vexatious delays occurred
until the latter could move up their guns.
Till late in the evening of the 9th the bulk of the Division remained
in the trenches on the Brown Line, but after all danger of a
counter-attack had passed, the battalions were withdrawn to the Blue
and Black Lines. The weather, which had shown signs of improvement
during the afternoon, utterly broke down, and blizzards of snow and
sleet swept the ground. The wearied men spent a wretched night, as
there was not sufficient shelter for all, and many had to lie in the
open, unprotected from the drenching sleet. The next day was spent
in cleaning rifles, replacing kit, and salvaging the battlefield. On
the 11th, the Fourth Division was instructed to secure the slopes of
Greenland Hill, a small ridge lying to the east of the village of
Roeux, and the South African Brigade was sent up to support it. The
attack was repulsed, and the Ninth was ordered to renew the attempt
the following day.
The line, which was held by the Fourth Division, lay some distance
east of the original Green Line[76] and included the village of
Fampoux on the north bank of the Scarpe. From it a number of roads
ran to the north-west and north, while the continuation of the
Main Street joined the Roeux-Gavrelle road near the Station, close
to which lay the Chemical Works of Roeux. The Railway crossed the
Scarpe south-east of Fampoux and ran along a high embankment in a
north-easterly direction to Douai. To the south of it the Scarpe
broadened out into marshes and lagoons, which made approach to Roeux
impracticable except from the north; beyond the Roeux-Gavrelle road
the country ascended in a gradual rise to Greenland Hill. The line
held by the enemy was the Roeux-Gavrelle road, and he had installed
numerous machine-guns in the Chemical Works, the Station, and an Inn
about 1500 yards north of it.
The Division received orders to capture this line from the Inn to the
village of Roeux inclusive. There were two objectives. The first, to
be carried by the South African and 27th Brigades, consisted of the
ground north of the Railway embankment, and comprised the Station
Buildings, the Chemical Works, and the line of the road as far as
the Inn; the second, which fell to the 26th Brigade, entailed the
capture of Mount Pleasant Wood, and the village of Roeux. There was
to be the usual creeping barrage, which, commencing at 5 P.M., was to
move forward at the rate of 100 yards every two minutes. The orders
reached the brigades late during the night of the 11th, so that the
time for preparation was very limited. It was understood that all the
buildings held by the enemy were to be demolished by the fire of the
heavy guns.
The enemy’s position was reconnoitred by brigadiers and battalion
commanders on the morning of the 12th. A reference to the map
suggested that the best place to form up was in the valley at the
east end of Fampoux. But this was found to be out of the question,
for the road lay under direct observation from the Chemical Works and
was thickly sprayed with shells on the appearance of even the small
reconnoitring party. The South Africans, being the right brigade, had
really no choice except the village as an assembly place, but it was
eminently dangerous, since it was a favourite target of the hostile
guns. The 27th Brigade was compelled to choose the German trenches
immediately north of Fampoux, which were sited on the horizon, and
the approach to which from the west had to be carefully reconnoitred
to find lines of advance that would reduce the probability of the
oncoming troops being seen by the enemy. It was an evil position,
for it entailed the advance of the brigade for 1700 yards down the
slope into the valley in full view of the foe on the opposite slope,
but there was no alternative. Brig.-General Maxwell recognised that
to screen the movement, a barrage, with smoke if possible, would be
necessary, but he failed to get into communication with General Lukin
in time. As the barrage was to fall along the enemy’s line at zero,
the 27th Brigade had to commence its advance from its forming-up
position half an hour before zero, so as to reach the front held by
the Fourth Division just before the barrage opened.
The action that followed was calamitous. The firing of the heavy
guns during the day never rose to the intensity of a bombardment,
and the large collection of buildings round the Station remained
quite intact, only one shell being seen to fall near the Chemical
Works. There was absolutely no chance of success from the outset, and
the uncomplaining heroism of the men was on that account the finest
feature of the battle.
Shortly before the attack was delivered, the Division learned from
an air reconnaissance that the enemy had dug in to the west of the
Roeux-Gavrelle road, but this news was received too late for action
to be taken, and our barrage dropped behind the enemy’s front trench.
On the right, the 2nd and 1st South African Regiments were in the
van, with the 4th and 3rd in support and reserve. The assembly of the
brigade in the shell-swept village of Fampoux was a costly business,
but in spite of heavy losses the men were remarkably steady. As soon
as the South Africans emerged from the shelter of the houses their
ranks were scourged by accurate rifle and machine-gun fire, and it
was possible to advance only about 200 yards from the positions held
by the Fourth Division.
[Illustration: EAST OF ARRAS. BATTLE-GROUND OF APRIL 1917]
On the left the attack was carried on by the 11th and 12th Royal
Scots[77] and the “Rifles,” the K.O.S.B. being in reserve. The
advance of the brigade began at 4.25 P.M., and with incredible
coolness the infantry pressed through the enemy’s barrage and reached
the line held by the Fourth Division a few minutes before zero.
At 5 P.M. our barrage opened and was excellent, but our men were
checked almost at the start by very heavy machine-gun fire. In these
circumstances nothing could be gained by throwing the 26th Brigade
into the battle and the forward troops were accordingly withdrawn.
The collection and evacuation of the wounded proved a difficult
and harassing job, but this was accomplished before dawn through the
untiring and unselfish efforts of the infantry and R.A.M.C.
Little can be said in defence of this battle, which the Division
fought with great reluctance. The preparations and arrangements were
hurried to a culpable degree, and though the basis of the action was
understood to be the bombardment of hostile machine-gun emplacements
by the Corps’ heavy artillery, the heavies might as well have
remained silent for all the assistance they gave. Apart from the fact
that the time for reconnoitring the enemy’s position, particularly by
the artillery,[78] was miserably inadequate, defeat was practically
inevitable when the 27th Brigade had to be formed up in full view of
the enemy and at a distance of more than 1000 yards from the barrage
line. Much of the haste was undoubtedly caused by D.H.Q.[79] being
too far back, the time necessary for the issue of orders and the
arrangement of preparations being thus unduly extended. The only
possibility of success lay in the Ninth taking over the front line
from the Fourth Division on the night of the 11th, but this was not
done, because it was considered expedient to let the worn-out men
have a good night’s rest.
After the battle the Ninth was withdrawn from the line and was
concentrated in billets near Hermaville. The high spirits of the men,
which had been at fever-pitch on the 9th, had been somewhat damped by
the events of the 12th, but a short rest served to illustrate once
more the amazing recuperative capacity of the British soldier. The
South African and 27th Brigades had been hardest hit. The weakness
of the former occasioned grave concern as its losses exceeded its
drafts, and it was clear that, if its identity was to be preserved,
it could not be available for immediate action.[80] More drafts were
forthcoming for the 27th Brigade, which by the end of the month was
ready for the field.
In the latter part of April strenuous fighting took place near
Roeux and the Chemical Works, both of which, though we gained a
good deal of ground, remained in the hands of the enemy. While the
South Africans were employed on work at Arras, the other brigades
relieved the Thirty-seventh Division on the nights of the 28th/29th
and 29th/30th April. On the last day of April the Division lost
Colonel F. A. Symons, the popular and efficient A.D.M.S., who was
killed by a shell near Athies; Colonel Elsner of the 27th Field
Ambulance was appointed his successor. There was now a welcome change
in the weather, brilliant sunshine and warm breezes giving promise
of a glorious summer. On the 2nd May instructions were issued for
an operation on the 3rd. This was to be undertaken with the Fourth
Division on the right, the Ninth in the centre, and the Thirty-first
on the left, and the First and Fifth Armies were also to attack. It
was believed to be of unusual importance, for on the evening of the
2nd the Division received a message that the battle was to be the
biggest in which the British armies had yet taken part.
The 26th Brigade, with the Camerons and Black Watch in front, the
Argylls in support, and the Seaforths in reserve, was on the right;
and on the left was the 27th, with the “Rifles” and K.O.S.B. in
front, and the 11th and 12th Royal Scots in support and reserve. In
place of the South Africans the Division was supported by the 52nd
Brigade, which was located at the Blue Line. The objectives were the
line of trenches Weed-Weak and the Biache-Gavrelle road. The attack
was to be under the customary creeping barrage, which was to open 200
yards east of our front line and, after a pause of four minutes, was
to move forward at the rate of 100 yards every two minutes, while a
machine-gun barrage was to keep 400 yards in advance of it. The time
of zero, 3.45 A.M., was made known to the Division only a few hours
before the battle.
The position held by the enemy lay on the western slopes of Greenland
Hill and consisted of shell-holes and stretches of trenches hastily
excavated after his defeat on the 9th April. His trenches therefore
were not of the same elaborate and formidable nature as those he
occupied on that date, but owing to their comparative indefiniteness
they offered neither a clear target for the artillery nor an easily
recognisable landmark for the infantry.
The night of the 2nd May was clear, with no hint of dawn when the
hour of zero approached, though by the mellow sheen of the stars and
the setting moon one could see about 50 yards along a path. At 3.45
A.M. the air reverberated with the crash of thousands of guns, their
flashes forming an almost solid glow. On striking the dry earth the
shells threw up a thick curtain of smoke and dust, which, owing to a
north-east wind, drifted back towards our lines. At the same time,
the Germans sent up showers of coloured lights and rockets in a wild
appeal to their artillery for assistance.
As a result of the darkness, intensified by dust clouds, the
attacking troops lost direction almost at the beginning. The Germans
replied immediately with heavy machine-gun fire from trenches and
organised shell-holes, which were closer to our front line than
we expected and had escaped our barrage. The Camerons, misled by
hostile lights sent up from short entrenched lines echeloned in
depth, swung so much to the right that they crossed the front of
the 2nd Essex Regiment (Fourth Division), who fired on them. The
Black Watch also lost cohesion and only a few groups managed to
reach the enemy’s front trench. The Argylls in support, who became
heavily involved in the fighting, suffered serious casualties when
they moved forward, and were subjected to persistent bombing attacks
from the vicinity of the Gavrelle-Plouvain road. Most of them were
compelled to take cover in shell-holes, from which they gradually
worked their way back to our line. One company of this battalion,
maintaining direction throughout, went straight to the first
objective, but being unsupported and cut off only a few survivors
managed to return. This effort was really a brilliant performance.
In a second attempt the Black Watch succeeded in expelling the enemy
from Charlie and Cuthbert Trenches, but they were unable to remain
there owing to accurate machine-gun fire from the Railway embankment
and the Chemical Works. When the 26th Brigade was reorganising in its
original line, German aeroplanes displayed great audacity; three of
them hovered persistently over our front until one was brought down
by machine-gun fire.
The task of the 27th Brigade was complicated by the fact that
the left battalion, the K.O.S.B., occupied a position beyond the
“Rifles.” Before advancing, the former had therefore to wait for
five minutes until the latter came into line, and as a guide to the
“Rifles” a lamp was shown on the right flank of the K.O.S.B. When
at zero the “Rifles” left their trenches they failed to pick up the
lamp, which was to guide their left, and in spite of compass-bearings
the two assaulting companies swerved to the right, with the result
that the right flank reached Cuthbert Trench earlier than was
intended. This trench, which had been scarcely damaged, was strongly
manned, and here a stern hand-to-hand contest was waged. Some of the
“Rifles” succeeded in pressing forward, but practically none of the
two leading companies returned, the great majority being killed,
wounded, or taken prisoner. When the supporting companies attempted
to advance they came under heavy machine-gun fire and dug themselves
in 200 yards beyond the front trench. The 11th Royal Scots, unable to
see what was happening, pushed up two companies, which joined with
the supporting companies of the “Rifles,” and dug in along with them.
The K.O.S.B. after waiting five minutes for the arrival of the
“Rifles,” went on without them, according to orders. Three companies
crossed the enemy’s front trench and passed on towards the objective.
Lieut.-Colonel Smyth,[81] with a view to protecting his exposed
right flank, sent out a platoon from the remaining company to block
the south end of Wit Trench, but it was practically annihilated on
leaving the parapet, though the Lewis Gun was brought back owing to
the splendid coolness of Sergeant C. Hawthorn. A serious disaster
had occurred, and Lieut.-Colonel Smyth, who was badly wounded in
the shoulder, was unable to do anything to help the three forward
companies; for the front of the 27th Brigade was swept from both
flanks, and the position here was almost hopeless unless the 26th
Brigade and the Thirty-first Division could clear the enemy in front
of them. Later Lieut.-Colonel Fulton, commanding the “Rifles,” and
Major Hamilton of the 90th R.E., ignorant of the check experienced
by the rear companies of the “Rifles,” went up to the right of the
K.O.S.B. in Wish Trench, and observing a party of 50 Germans, whom
they took to be prisoners entering Wit Trench, sent an officer and
two men to bring them in. These were fired at and hit. It was thus
manifest that the enemy had reoccupied Wit Trench and that he now
interposed between us and the three companies of the K.O.S.B. Some of
these penetrated as far as Square Wood, but their plight was beyond
hope and most of them were killed though a few were taken prisoner.
The only tidings to reach D.H.Q. were those of failure. Oppy on the
north defied all assault, and the Thirty-first Division was driven
back and counter-attacked by the Germans, who gained a footing in the
outskirts of Gavrelle. Accordingly at 8.39 A.M. instructions were
issued that the general onset was not to be pressed. Brig.-General
Maxwell asked for artillery-fire to be directed on the portion of Wit
Trench opposite his front, in the hope of clearing out the Germans,
and so opening a way of retreat for the men who had been cut off.
Unwilling to leave troops who had managed to advance, unsupported and
cut off, he decided to attack Wit Trench with the object of holding
it during the night to allow the K.O.S.B. to return under cover of
darkness. Accordingly one and a half companies of the 12th Royal
Scots were ordered to undertake this operation at 8 P.M., while the
light was still good; they were to be covered on each flank by a
barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire. These men, 150 in all,
made a most determined charge, but though a few reached Wit the
attack was broken by machine-gun fire. Only 30 of them returned, but
their noble sacrifice enabled a considerable number of K.O.S.B.,
mostly from the right company, to come in.
The battle of the 3rd May showed up the training, especially of
officers, in a bad light. The customary gallantry and keenness
were exhibited in full measure, but the high degree of training
essential for efficient leadership was absent. The difficulties
of keeping direction were undoubtedly enormous, and had they been
foreseen, would have given well-trained officers the opportunity of
overcoming them by the application of knowledge and intelligence.
But these difficulties had to be faced by officers and N.C.Os.
without adequate warning. Word of the sudden decision of G.H.Q. on
the 2nd May to launch the attack before instead of during daylight,
as originally planned, was received by the Division only a few hours
before the time of assault, when it was impossible to make the
necessary arrangements for maintaining direction in the dark, and
this ill-advised eleventh hour change was largely responsible for
the failure of the attack. The battle also revealed a lamentable
decline in initiative, largely due to the excessive dependence of
the infantry on the artillery, fostered by the method of the limited
objective and months of trench warfare. After the initial check the
barrage was lost, and the men in general remained where they lay
without making any serious effort to push on. This was strongly
commented on by Brig.-General Kennedy in his notes on the battle. In
the old Regular Army the men had been accustomed to help themselves
and others to make headway by the skilful use of their rifles and by
taking full advantage of folds in the ground, and it was now clear
that subsequent training should be directed towards the recapture of
this lost standard.
These remarks about the Division have a similar application as
regards the attack generally. At a prodigious sacrifice the only
places of importance carried were Fresnoy, Chérisy, and Roeux, and of
these the two latter were regained by the enemy during the day. There
was no doubt that the action cost the assailants many times more
lives than it did the defenders. The short summary in Sir Douglas
Haig’s despatches somewhat disguises the seriousness of the defeat,
for the 3rd May was assuredly a black day for the British Army.
The action however was fought under constraint. The far-reaching
designs of General Nivelle had fallen short of accomplishment, and
the primary function of the British forces was to ease the pressure
on the front of their allies. The surest method of effecting this was
by means of an operation, and similar subsidiary enterprises had been
undertaken in connection with the Battles of Loos and the Somme. But
this method, while gaining its end, has the drawback of involving
a sacrifice of men, and it is possible that the British Army, now
that it was adequately equipped with guns and munitions, could have
secured its object by the employment of artillery battle preparations
without an infantry assault. In face of a vast concentration of guns
and men, an enemy, who had the hardihood to hold his defences thinly,
would expose himself to a deadly stab, but so profound was the
dejection caused in France by the disappointment of her hopes that it
would have been folly to take risks. The restoration of the nerve of
France was worth a big sacrifice.
The Ninth remained in the line until it was relieved by the
Seventeenth Division on the nights of the 9th/10th and 10th/11th
May, and was employed during this period in improving trenches
and communications. The 27th Brigade was assisted by a composite
battalion of South Africans under Major Webber. On relief, the
Division proceeded to billets near Ruellecourt, where it rested,
drilled, and was reorganised. The training area at Monchy Breton was
visited on the 26th May by General Allenby, who presented ribbons and
decorations to officers and men.
At the end of May and beginning of June the Ninth once more returned
to the line in relief of the Fifty-first Division. Those scenes
of fierce encounters, Roeux and the Chemical Works, were now in
our hands, and Arras was rapidly assuming a more settled and less
minatory aspect, for many of the bigger emplacements were now
empty and others showed preparations for removal. At this time the
activity and boldness of the German aeroplanes were very marked. The
bombing of Arras and its environs, which had been occasional, was
now a regular practice; and after dusk the dovetailed planes of the
enemy flying low over our hinterland dropped light bombs and fired
machine-guns on our infantry and transport lines. In such enterprises
our airmen had been the pioneers, but the Germans were quick to
imitate them. At first, the men regarded these new disturbances as an
amusing entertainment, but as the raiders became more proficient and
expert, they realised that a fresh and deadly terror had been added
to modern warfare, and the “purr” of the “Albatross” became a signal
to rush for shelter. Anti-aircraft mountings for Lewis Guns were
issued, and they enabled the infantry to keep the enemy’s machines at
a respectable height.
We still retained the ascendancy in artillery, but the enemy was
alert and pugnacious, and his retaliation came almost as the echo
of our practice barrages. On the 5th June a minor operation was
carried out by the 27th Brigade and the Thirty-fourth Division on
its left. The object of the former was to advance its line up the
western slopes of Greenland Hill on a front of 850 yards. It was in
trenches north and south of the Arras-Douai Railway, which divided
its front into two equal parts. Cupid Trench was to be taken north
of the Railway, and south of it the line of the sunken road (leading
from Roeux), while outposts were to be established on a more or less
undefined shell-hole line occupied by the enemy some 200 to 250 yards
beyond the objective in each case. The advance was to be covered
by a creeping barrage, moving at the rate of 50 yards a minute,
supplemented by a machine-gun barrage and a Stokes mortar bombardment.
The battalions detailed for the operation were the 11th and 12th[82]
Royal Scots. The assembly was very difficult; entry into the front
system could be effected only by night, on account of the almost
continuous artillery-fire by day between it and the rear system, and
because the traffic in the trenches, which were poor, was visible
to the field-grey observers. As the attack was timed for 8 P.M.,
not only had the units, additional to the ordinary garrison, to
be brought up to the front line on the night of the 4th/5th, but
they had to remain crowded in its limited accommodation throughout
a scorching day, and hidden as far as possible from the view of
hostile air patrols. The question of concealment was of first-rate
importance, since any shelling of the congested trenches must have
caused heavy loss and would have rendered any operation difficult, if
not impossible. To provide cover for the extra men, scoops were made
in the parapets and wooden shelters were installed; fish-net screens
were then hung in front of each hole, and the troops were allowed to
emerge one at a time in turn from 4 A.M. till five minutes before
zero, when they turned out in full strength.
To deceive the enemy, they waited for twenty seconds before going
over the parapet. This raid ruse was eminently successful, since
the enemy, seeing no infantry move with the barrage, took it to
be a “Chinese Attack” and lay low. The men accordingly crossed
“No-Man’s-Land” without a casualty, though subsequently there was
brisk fighting, during which some gaps in our ranks were made by the
more spirited of the defenders.
The right company of the 11th Royal Scots, on the south of the
Railway, went up the sunken road and endeavoured to push out a strong
post about 150 yards north-east of the bend in it, but, encountering
a strong machine-gun nest, was brought to a halt. Ultimately this
post fell to a combined attack by the company, assisted by two
platoons of the reserve company, considerable havoc being wrought
among the enemy’s garrison by volleys of rifle-grenades. The centre
and the left companies reached their objective, the shell-hole line
about 200 yards east of the sunken road, and two platoons went on to
establish forward posts. One, moving along the Railway, pursued a
body of retiring Germans and overshot its mark, but later withdrew
to its proper position; the other, farther north, whose function it
was to mop up an organised shell-hole area just east of the road,
had been so slow in moving up that the enemy had time to recover
his nerve and brought it to an abrupt halt, but a liberal dose of
rifle-grenades, accurately directed, put the garrison out of action,
11 Germans being killed and 2 wounded.
North of the Railway the 12th Royal Scots attacked on a two-company
front. There was no opposition except at the junction of Cambrian and
Cupid Trenches, where the fighting was severe, for the unit on the
left, detailed to attack Curly Trench, lost direction, and coming
behind our left occupied Cupid along with the Royal Scots. The left
company with great difficulty cleared the north end of Cupid and
part of Curly, but about 70 of the enemy remained in the latter till
next day, when they were induced to surrender to the Thirty-fourth
Division, assisted by physical persuasion from the Royal Scots.
Two advance posts were established, one on the Railway immediately
opposite that held by the 11th Royal Scots and one farther north.
Under cover of darkness the 9th Seaforths arrived through a
formidable barrage and dug trenches on the captured positions, with
communication trenches to connect them with the original front
line. In spite of persistent shelling and many casualties this most
efficient battalion accomplished all its tasks. On their return the
Seaforths had to pass through a gas barrage, and lost a number of men.
During the night the Germans made two spiritless thrusts against
the 11th Royal Scots, but they were easily driven off by the fire
of the advanced posts. Some of them lay out until dawn, presumably
with a view to making another attempt. At 3.30 A.M. they retired,
but by a stroke of ill-luck the barrage that had been arranged for
that hour was cancelled, and they escaped with only the punishment
that Lewis Guns and rifles could inflict in a poor light. On the
night of the 6th/7th two further efforts at counter-attack, preceded
by artillery-fire, were made. The first was broken up before the
Germans had actually made a move, but the second along the Railway
was determined, and succeeded in driving in the strong post on the
Railway. But its impetus was so disturbed by the accurate shooting of
the advanced posts that it failed to reach the main line of defence.
The enemy withdrew in the early morning when our barrage came down,
and the Royal Scots reoccupied the Railway posts.
The action of the 5th June was extremely satisfactory, for while
our losses were slight, those of the enemy were exceptionally heavy
for the forces engaged. The 11th Royal Scots considered that they
had killed more Germans in this fight than they had in any previous
engagement of the war. The barrage was perfect, and the machine-guns
and trench mortars co-operated admirably with the infantry.
Tactically, the most noteworthy feature of the operation was the
effectiveness of rifle-grenades, when fired by volleys, in knocking
out machine-gun posts.
A little more ground was gained in the neighbourhood of Greenland
Hill by the Division, but this was done by peaceful penetration.
Covered by the K.O.S.B.,[83] a large party of the Black Watch dug a
trench to extend the line of Cuthbert and Cod south of the Railway
before midnight on the 10th. On the 12th and the 13th the Ninth
was relieved by the Fourth Division and marched to billets near
Ruellecourt. The Division had spent its last day in the Arras sector,
where it had experienced in almost equal measure the elation of
triumph and the depression of defeat. Over 5000 casualties, chiefly
among the infantry, had been suffered during the months of April and
May, and the men were sorely in need of rest. There was some fear
that the Division would lose the South African Brigade, as three
fresh battalions[84] had been attached to it for instruction, but
happily a prolonged stay behind the lines enabled the South Africans
to fill up their war-worn ranks once more and take their place beside
their Scottish comrades.