ARRAS
NOVEMBER 1916 TO APRIL 1917
On the 23rd November the Division was transferred from the Fourth to
the Third Army, commanded by Sir Edmund Allenby. Most of the training
and reorganisation was carried out in the neighbourhood of St Pol,
and during this period several important changes in command took
place. On the 21st October, while the Ninth was still engaged at the
Somme, Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins was promoted to the command of
the Thirty-seventh Division. He had been somewhat unfortunate during
his career with the Ninth. At Loos and at Longueval his brigade had
the bad luck to run into the enemy’s defences where they had been
least damaged by artillery-fire; but these calamities were due not to
lack of foresight or leadership, but to circumstances that would have
similarly affected any other brigade. The General was noted for his
Spartan routine and his extraordinary personal bravery. He was able
to subsist on less than most men and limited himself to two meals
a day. When his brigade was in the front trenches, he paid a daily
visit to the line, and of his gallantry many stories were current.
During the fighting in July his H.Q. at Montauban were persistently
shelled, but he was never seen to twitch a muscle or dive for
shelter; not even under the fiercest bombardment did he forego his
daily tub in the open square at Montauban. His departure was viewed
with the greatest regret; for he had been with the Ninth since its
formation, and he was loved and respected by all who served under
him. But his promotion[64] was known to have been thoroughly well
earned and he took with him the congratulations and good wishes of
the Division. His successor was Brig.-General F. A. Maxwell, V.C.,
who came from the Eighteenth Division and had the distinction of
having led the battalion that took Trones Wood.
There was a change also in the Highland Brigade. On the 4th December
Brig.-General Ritchie was appointed to the command of the Sixteenth
Division. His service with the Ninth had been attended with almost
unbroken success, and both at Loos and the Somme his men had not only
shown great brilliancy and dash in securing their objectives, but had
proved themselves to be masters of the art of counter-attack. He was
succeeded by Brig.-General J. Kennedy of the Argylls.
On the 1st December General Furse[65] was appointed Master-General
of the Ordnance. It is safe to say that no name is more closely
associated with the annals of the Ninth Division than that of General
Furse. In the fourteen months during which he had been in command
he had succeeded in effecting that organised co-operation which was
the proof of the unity that bound Lowlanders, Highlanders, and South
Africans into one complete whole. He loathed water-tight compartments
and did his utmost to foster the closest intercourse and co-operation
between the various arms—infantry, gunners, sappers, and mounted
men—who only by acting in concert could realise severally their
highest fighting efficiency. The fighting spirit had never been
absent, but in training, in trenches, and in battle, he fostered and
encouraged it until it became an instinct. He was a reservoir of
power and ideas, and he had a natural _flair_ for striking phrases.
Anxious and alert to increase the efficiency of his command, he was
alive to the necessity of testing all new tactical appliances, and in
his numerous conferences the principal motive was “not fault-finding
but fact-finding.” An officer of the Division once remarked, “General
Furse made the Ninth Division, and the Ninth Division made General
Furse,” and there is much that is true in the statement. The leader
had every reason to be proud of his men and the men of their leader.
His appointment was viewed with both regret and gratification;
regret, because a tried leader had gone, and gratification because
his promotion was regarded as a tribute both to himself and to the
Division. But though his connection with the Ninth was officially
severed, he was able in his new capacity to render it useful service.
He was succeeded by Major-General H. T. Lukin of the South African
Brigade, the command of which passed to Brig.-General Dawson of the
1st Regiment. Major-General Lukin had won a great name while in
command of the South Africans, and much was expected of him in his
new position.
In the course of the next five months there were a few changes among
battalion commanders. In the Argylls the new C.O. was Lieut.-Colonel
H. G. Sotheby. Lieut.-Colonel Connell was invalided to England after
the action of the Butte de Warlencourt, and Lieut.-Colonel G. B. F.
Smyth, who had been thrice wounded in the war, left the Sappers of
the 90th Field Company to command the 6th K.O.S.B. In March 1917
Lieut.-Colonel Fargus went to England, and Lieut.-Colonel Thorne
took over the command of the 12th Royal Scots. There were several
adjustments in the South African Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel F. H. Heal
became C.O. of the 1st Regiment; Lieut.-Colonel Tanner returned to
the 2nd, and Lieut.-Colonel Christian took over the command of the
4th.
The training of the men followed the usual lines, but in one respect
there was a significant change. The bomb had proved to be a very
useful weapon, but it had been cultivated to such excess that the
men were in danger of forgetting how to use their rifles. The rifle
is the principal weapon of the infantryman, and practice in its use
became the foundation of all our training. The bomb was discouraged,
for it had been noted that a man with a rifle and bayonet in his
hands was more enterprising and aggressive than one with his pockets
full of bombs. About the end of the year a more efficient protection
against gas, the box respirator, was issued and the men were drilled
in the rapid adjustment of it.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HENRY TIMSON LUKIN, K.C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O.]
On the 5th December the Division took over the line north and east
of Arras. During the last week of November the battalions at dusk
marched along the long, straight _pavé_ road from St Pol and entered
the city through the majestic pylons of the Baudimont Gate. Arras
had been damaged during the German onslaught of 1914, but since that
time had been scarcely molested. This quaint old Spanish city, well
known to artists and antiquarians, presented a harmonious blending of
the mediæval and the modern. The eye was constantly surprised by new
aspects that offered themselves on a ramble through the streets—the
old, narrow, nubbly lanes, overlooked by ancient Hispano-Flemish
houses, opening out into spacious and ordered boulevards with
modern and opulent mansions, the commercial commodiousness of the
Petite Place and the Grande Place, and the ramparts of Vauban. The
natural centre was the two squares, Petite Place and Grande Place,
both now bordered by the ruins of stately gabled houses and so
often intermittently shelled that they were avoided by all except
sightseers and souvenir hunters. Near them, massive ruins suggested
a nobility and dignity of structure that the intact cathedral had
never possessed. But the greatest example of German vandalism was the
mound of masonry and dust that marked the site of the Hôtel de Ville,
justly celebrated as a notable example of Spanish architectural art.
Arras, skirted on the north by the River Scarpe, lay in a gentle
hollow, overlooked on the west by a semicircle of low hills, and
on the east by a ridge, which, farther north, passed into the Vimy
Ridge. From the station the railway ran east to Douai, a branch
swinging north to Lens, while towards the south it ran into Albert.
The Arras-Lens railway and the eastern ridge were held by the enemy,
whose guns commanded the greater part of the Albert-Arras line.
At the end of 1916 Arras seemed a city of the dead. On the long main
roads the rumble of wheels and the clatter of hoofs were seldom
heard, and the streets were deserted except for a few soldiers and
some civilians who skulked along under the eaves of the houses. Few
parts of the town were without the scars of war. In many houses the
jumbled and disarranged furniture told a story of panic and hurried
departure; in some cases the outside wall had been broken by a shell,
revealing the inside of a house intact, like the model of a doll’s
house. Here and there enterprising civilians ran excellent cafés,
where the men could supplement their rations at prices that were not
exorbitant. Near the station the Hôtel de Commers was the favourite
rendezvous for officers.
The trenches taken over by the Division lay on the western slopes
of the eastern ridge and extended from the south of the Scarpe as
far north as Roclincourt. The area was divided into three sectors,
“I,” “J,” and “K,” from south to north, and all three brigades were
in the line, the 26th in “I,” the South African in “J,” and the
27th in “K.” This position, with certain changes, was held by the
Division until the 9th April 1917, and the long spell enabled the men
to make the trenches as perfect as they could be made. During this
time the strictest discipline was maintained and the morning round
of the battalion C.O. brought reproof or commendation according as
each company did its duty. By 9 A.M. every man had to be washed and
shaved, the rifles clean and polished, and the trenches neat and
tidy. There was tremendous competition between the various companies
in the desire of each to better its neighbour in the provision of
comforts for the men; hot soup and cocoa were served late at night
and early in the morning to those in the front trenches, but perhaps
the last stage of luxury was reached when hot water was supplied for
shaving.
Behind the lines the duties of the transport, located near D.H.Q. at
Duisans, were neither rough nor unduly perilous. The busiest centre
of activity was the Divisional Tactical School, near Givenchy, under
the direction of Lieut.-Colonel Croft.[66] The cult of the rifle was
assiduously inculcated, and officers and N.C.Os. were divided into
sections, which competed with one another in all forms of warlike
sport. A great effort was made to banish the deadening effects of
trench warfare, and initiative and resource were stimulated by means
of tactical schemes. Each course was wound up with a great display,
in which the whole school carried out an attack, and the showers of
Véry lights (representing the barrage), the rattle of the rifles and
machine-guns, the line of flares, and a contact aeroplane gave a very
fair impression of a real fight.
Training, however, was not confined to the school or the back areas.
Though Arras itself was overlooked by the enemy, there was a wide
stretch of dead ground between the city and the eastern ridge, where
there were excellent facilities for training. Near Roclincourt a long
bank provided a natural butt for Lewis Gun practice from any range up
to 300 yards, and the valley offered ample scope for rifle-grenade
instruction. More could and should have been done; but, since the
days of 1914 when everyone that could be spared was needed to man
the trenches, it had been customary to regard trench warfare and
training as incompatible. Thus training as a rule had been confined
to such periods as the men spent out of the line. As a matter of
fact, battalions had often better chances of useful practice when in
the line than when in back areas, and in 1917 the more satisfactory
system of carrying on training at all times was begun. The vast
importance of constant training as a primary factor of efficiency
had been long neglected in France, but when the start was made
development was continuous. Though belated, the issue of pamphlets
which dealt with the action of the platoon (S.S. 143) and of the
Division (S.S. 135) in attack, was none the less welcome. Hitherto,
officers and N.C.Os. had been guided only by the general principles
stated in Field Service Regulations, but the pamphlets provided
illustrations showing the application of these principles to actual
problems. The more junior the commander, the more desirable it was
to make things clear to him by concrete cases, and in this respect
S.S. 143 was invaluable. The adoption of these pamphlets ensured both
a uniformity in training and organisation throughout the army and a
practical knowledge of the methods of dealing with the problems of
actual warfare.
During the winter, which was the driest one since the war began,
the health of the men remained good. Every precaution was taken to
prevent trench feet; each battalion in the line arranged for frequent
supplies of clean socks, and each man’s feet were rubbed daily by
the stretcher-bearers with whale-oil under the supervision of an
officer. In January and February 1917 a hard frost set in, the most
severe since 1839, and during this period men in the line were more
comfortable than those in Arras. There was a great scarcity of fuel,
and the strong temptation of men in windowless and draughty billets
to loot wood and furniture from empty houses had to be sternly
repressed. With the thaw came mud and hard work, but the trenches had
been thoroughly revetted and any damage was quickly repaired.
In November 1916 the sector was reputed to be one of the quietest
on the whole British front. “Even more peaceful than the Vimy” was
the remark of men who had gone forward with working-parties, and the
experiences of the first two or three days appeared to confirm the
statement. The trenches had been previously held by the Thirty-fifth,
a Bantam division, and were too shallow for people of ordinary
stature. If the enemy had been vindictive, he could not have failed
to snipe a number of our men, but happily he was not bellicose and
was ready to lie low, provided he was not disturbed. In the course
of a few days the trenches were deepened, so that one could walk
along the front line without being exposed from his waist upwards,
and after the Ninth Divisional Artillery relieved that of the
Thirty-fifth on the 28th December, the Germans were annoyed to find
that the peace of the sector had vanished. Peevish and fretful, the
foe retaliated chiefly by means of heavy trench mortars and lighter
ones, variously known by our troops as “aerial darts,” “pine-apples,”
or “fish-tails.” Though the former made a terrific din and flattened
the trenches, they did not cause much loss of life, but the latter
were very sinister weapons, and were fired five or six at a time, so
that, though they were visible, it was difficult to dodge one and
avoid running into another. From these came most of our casualties,
about 30 per week for each battalion in the front line, a fairly high
total for what was regarded as a tranquil spot. The duel of hate
however was much in our favour. The enemy trench system was divided
into sectors for retaliation purposes, and so admirable was the
co-operation between our infantry and gunners, that when a battalion
was pestered by trench mortars, it only required a single code word
such as “Dora” or “Minnie” to be ’phoned by the former to the latter
to ensure prompt punishment for the offending sector.
Raids were the most outstanding feature of these months and they came
to be regarded rather as a matter of course than as an adventure. Ten
raids, the majority of them successful, were carried out between the
1st January and the 9th April. Many of the enemy were killed and 49
prisoners captured, while our casualties, chiefly wounded, did not
exceed the number of the prisoners.
By far the most notable raid was that of the “Rifles” on the 14th
February. The credit for the scheme belonged principally to Major
M. N. Forsyth, M.C., who suggested it to Brig.-General Maxwell. The
ground selected for the operation was well adapted for a daylight
raid; it was east of Roclincourt and, lying in a shallow dip, could
not be observed from either flank. The most painstaking care was
given to organisation and arrangements. The raiding party, which
consisted of 20 officers and 320 other ranks under the command
of Major Forsyth, was divided into various groups, each with a
special task to perform, such as clearing dug-outs, demolition of
emplacements, blocking trenches, escorting and searching prisoners,
cutting wire, and evacuation of wounded. No raider carried any
identification mark either on his tunic or in his pocket. A plan of
the enemy’s ground was mapped out behind the line, and here men and
officers had a number of rehearsals. The general scheme was simple.
After a one-minute barrage by the artillery and trench mortars,
two groups were to leave our trenches and enter the enemy’s system
through two gaps in the wire previously cut by trench mortars. The
parties were to push rapidly up the communication trenches bounding
the area and were to meet in the third line, shutting in all the
garrison. Other groups were to follow and clear all the intermediate
trenches and dug-outs. The whole party after remaining for forty
minutes in the German lines was to withdraw at the end of that time
through three gaps, the third being cut during the raid. While
the raiders were busy, the artillery were to screen the area from
observation by a “box”[67] barrage.
The operation met with the success[68] its careful preparations
deserved. At 11 A.M. Major Forsyth led his party across
“No-Man’s-Land” and entered the opposing trenches. In the skirmish
that followed many of the enemy were killed and 43 were captured; 2
machine-guns, 1 trench mortar, and a large number of rifles and other
material were brought back. The slight casualties of the “Rifles,”
who well earned the praise[69] of the Commander-in-Chief, consisted
of 2 killed, 15 wounded, and 1 missing.
All other raids, though on a smaller scale, were marked by the same
particular care in organisation. At 3.8 P.M. on the 6th January a
company of the Black Watch, under 2nd Lieut. Proudfoot, and one
of the Argylls, under 2nd Lieut. Pardy, after a heavy preliminary
bombardment and covered by a smoke-barrage, penetrated to the enemy’s
third line and remained in his trenches for half an hour. The whole
system was thoroughly smashed by the artillery, and only 4 men were
found above ground, of whom 3 were killed and one was captured. The
remainder of the garrison, which according to the prisoner consisted
of 160 men, had sheltered in the dug-outs, where the greater number
must have perished when these were demolished by Stokes shells thrown
down by the raiders. This raid was undertaken at short notice by
the Highland Brigade, and its objects were to test the efficiency
of our heavy artillery in cutting wire, especially in front of
the second and third lines, and to find out if good observation
could be obtained from the hostile trenches on to a strong point
in the enemy’s rear, known as “The Harp,” which was likely to be a
formidable obstacle to our advance during the offensive that was
being planned. These objects were fulfilled, and the general opinion
was that the success[70] of the raid was due to the “heavies.”
The Germans showed their annoyance by subjecting Arras to a gas
bombardment so intense that it has been quoted by the gas experts as
one of the heaviest concentrations of the war. Equal success attended
dashing raids by the South Africans on the 2nd January and the 7th
April, and by the 6th K.O.S.B. on the 11th January. The attempts of
the enemy were feeble and half-hearted, a significant confession
of nervousness and consciousness of inferiority. Between the 6th
December and the 21st March four attempts to penetrate our trenches
were beaten off with loss.
[Illustration: WEST GATE, ARRAS]
At the beginning of March, Arras awoke to vigorous life. After
nightfall throngs of men jostled each other in the streets of the
town, and from the great main roads rose the hum of constant traffic.
In the faubourgs and wooded fields round the city numerous batteries
of heavy guns, sinister and menacing engines of destruction, were
ready in position, and amid bosky recesses and inviting orchards one
often stumbled upon fresh emplacements that indicated the expected
arrival of many more. The evidences[71] of a projected offensive
were unmistakable, and these were confirmed by changes on our
front. Until the 14th January, the Ninth was under the VI. Corps,
but on that date it was transferred to the XVII., commanded by Sir
Charles Fergusson. As a result, the 26th Brigade was shifted from
the right of the line to “L” sector on the left, which was taken
over from the Third Canadian Division, and until the 11th February
the Division held the whole of the Corps front from the Scarpe to
the Arras-Lille road. That day the Highland Brigade and part of the
27th were relieved by the Fifty-first Division from Roclincourt to
the Lille road. On the 24th February the line was still further
contracted when the Thirty-fourth Division took over the rest of “K”
sector. This left to the Ninth only the “I” sector extending from the
Scarpe to St Pancras Trench, lying to the north of the Arras-Bailleul
road, the stretch of front amounting to some 1800 yards.
From the beginning of 1917 every man was hard at work on the
preparations for the great offensive that had been planned at a
conference held at the French G.H.Q. in November 1916. The general
idea was to carry on a series of offensives on all fronts for the
purpose of “depriving the enemy of the power of weakening any one
of his fronts in order to reinforce another.”[72] The design of
Sir Douglas Haig was to garner the fruits of the Somme struggle by
pinching off the salient between the Scarpe and the Ancre, into
which the enemy had been pressed as a result of that battle. With
this object, a converging attack was to be carried out by the Third
Army from Arras and the Fifth Army on the Ancre. Provided the
situation remained unchanged, there was good reason to expect that
this manœuvre would inflict enormous losses on the enemy and compel
him to use up his reserves, and thus offer a greater assurance of
success for the main object of the British Field-Marshal, which was
to secure the control of the Flanders coast-line before the end of
1917. The attack of the Third and Fifth Armies was to be protected
by an operation against the Vimy Ridge, which would also give us
the command of the Douai plains and might even lead to the capture
of Lens. Apart from these objects Sir Douglas Haig had no desire to
carry on a protracted fight in the neighbourhood of Arras.
These important projects were considerably modified at the beginning
of 1917. The striking power of the British forces was sensibly
diminished by the fact that a considerable portion of the line,
extending as far south as Roye, had to be taken over from the French.
Again the British plans were made ancillary to those of General
Nivelle, now in command of the French armies, who had planned an
ambitious campaign in Champagne, and the Arras offensive was expected
to assist his schemes by pinning down a large proportion of the
German forces. Moreover, the enemy, realising his danger in the
Ancre-Scarpe salient, anticipated the British attack by withdrawing
from that area to new and formidable defences (the Hindenburg Line)
in front of Cambrai, on the construction of which the Germans had
worked like beavers during the winter months. This timely retreat
largely eviscerated the hopes of the Arras campaign.
The plans of the Western Allies were marked by compromise and
strategic vacillation, and this was particularly unfortunate, because
1917 was the period that was expected to produce the greatest
disparity between the forces of the Entente and those of the Central
Powers in favour of the former. The principal scheme of the British
Higher Command was indefinitely postponed, and it would probably have
been wise to replace it by another plan, which, while assuring the
support promised for the schemes of General Nivelle, would yet offer
a prize worthy of a big effort. This end would have been fulfilled by
fixing Lens, and perhaps Douai, as the objective of the British Army.
If the former place were carried before the summer, its possession
by us would probably turn the north end of the Drocourt switch line,
and would certainly give us control of the Douai plains and enable us
to menace La Bassée from the south. The tremendously high moral of
the British Army, stimulated greatly by the common talk about 1917 as
the year of victory, deserved to be harnessed to ambitious and even
heroic schemes. Events in Russia also, culminating in the Revolution
while the preparations for the battle were being carried on, seemed
to demand a big effort. It was futile to wait to see what the effect
of the Revolution would be, and it was desirable to endeavour to
affect it by events in France. An important success at the beginning
of the year would probably strengthen the moderate elements in
Russia, and preserve it as an effective ally for the Entente. But the
Passchendaele project, which undoubtedly held out the most alluring
prospects if successful, obsessed the British Higher Command too
much to lead to any drastic alteration of plan. It is impossible to
doubt the cordiality and genuineness of the co-operation between the
British and the French armies, but both the schemes and the events
of 1917 demonstrated that the strategical unity of plan necessary
for success could be secured only by a single Command directing both
forces towards a single end.
A perplexing point in the preparations for the battle lay in the
fact that there was no approach to the trenches except through Arras,
which was an obvious mark for artillery. In the town reasonable
safety was provided by improving and strengthening the system of
underground vaults and catacombs, which were capable of accommodating
large bodies of troops. It was not so easy to form roads and routes
in sufficient number to allow of a smooth distribution of stores and
munitions, but in this respect the work of the Staff was so well
performed that there was virtually no delay or congestion. With
similar attention to details of organisation, communication trenches
were dug and allotted, so that the attacking troops could reach
their assembly position without hindrance. By the end of March the
preparations on the front of the Division were practically completed
with little interference from the enemy’s artillery, though numbers
of trench mortar emplacements were repeatedly hit.
The rôle of the XVII. Corps was to capture the enemy’s third system
of defences, running north from the Scarpe at Feuchy through the
Point du Jour. After this was accomplished, a further advance was to
be made south of the Point du Jour to secure the fourth system and
the village of Fampoux. Three divisions were to lead the assault, the
Ninth on the south, Thirty-fourth in the centre, and Fifty-first on
the north, while the Fourth was to be in reserve. On the right of the
Ninth the attack was to be carried on by the Fifteenth Division.
The Ninth was required to take the enemy’s third system from the
Point du Jour to the Scarpe and to consolidate a line leading from
the eastern end of the village of Athies to the Point du Jour. There
were three objectives, marked on the map as the Black, Blue, and
Brown Lines. From our front line the ground rose gently to the summit
of the ridge, on the reverse side of which was the German main trench
of the first system, protected by a triple row of strong wire, as our
air photographs showed. This trench, called Obermayer, extended to
the east end of the village St Laurent-Blangy and formed the Black
Line. From this point the ground dipped to a shallow valley and rose
again to the line of the Arras-Lens Railway (Blue Line), which on
the left ran through a deep cutting, but towards the Scarpe went
over a high embankment. From the Railway the ground sloped up to the
plateau of the Point du Jour (Brown Line) thickly covered with wire.
The fourth objective (Green Line), which included Fampoux, was to
be secured by the Fourth Division. The attack, to be covered by a
creeping barrage, was ultimately arranged for the 9th April and was
to be preceded by a preliminary bombardment commencing on the 5th.
All three brigades, the 26th on the right, the South African in
the centre, and the 27th on the left, were to take part, each on a
frontage of approximately 600 yards. Two battalions in each brigade
were to take the first and second objectives, after which the other
two were to pass through and carry on the attack. Four tanks were
to assist the Division by helping to clear the two villages of St
Laurent-Blangy and Athies. No battalion was to attack with its full
strength. Since the time of Loos never more than 20 officers per
battalion had gone into battle, the remainder along with some men
being left at the Transport Lines. The pamphlet S.S. 135 laid down
the proportion of men and officers to be left out of action, so that
even if a battalion received a shattering blow in battle there would
be the nucleus of a new organisation.
The preparations of the C.R.A. were marked by unflagging industry
and ingenuity. As the result of months of toil, the gunners had
constructed positions that enabled the batteries to function under
almost ideal conditions. There were no natural hidden positions to
serve as emplacements for the guns, so ridges of screens were built
up to conceal emplacements, situated in such a way that of the
seven[73] brigades under the command of Brig.-General Tudor only
one was more than 2000 yards from the enemy’s line. Arrangements
were also made to construct emplacements in one of the forming-up
trenches, so that when the infantry advanced batteries could move up
in close support. Moreover, all the guns were virtually square with
their tasks, so that the barrage would be formed by shells falling at
right angles to the line of advance. The R.F.A. Brigades were in St
Catherine, St Nicholas, and Roclincourt Valley.
Ingenuity and initiative were shown in the arrangements for the
creeping barrage, which was to be formed by a combination of H.E.
and smoke-shell. Brig.-General Tudor had consistently upheld that
a smoke-screen offered the best form of support for infantry, and
though smoke had received a bad name at Loos owing to men losing
direction, he believed that this was due to the fact that on that
occasion the smoke had been produced by candles and had necessarily
been started on our own parapets. If the smoke-screen could be put
down on the enemy’s line it would guide our men instead of confusing
them, while it would still blind the enemy. At the end of 1915 he
pressed for the manufacture of smoke-shells, but nothing was really
done until General Furse took the matter up; as a result of his
importunity smoke-shells were made, and they began to arrive in
France about the autumn of 1916. The supply was limited, but as no
other division desired them, the Ninth was able to get the whole
quantity issued to the Third Army, about 4000 rounds. Smoke-shells
were employed by the Canadians to cover their raids, and also by
Brig.-General Tudor on the 6th January to support the raid of the
Black Watch and the Argylls, but the 9th April was the first occasion
on which they were used in a creeping barrage.
Zero was to be 5.30 A.M., and at that hour the barrage was to open 50
yards in front of the German front line trench. Where “No-Man’s-Land”
was 200 yards or more in extent, the assaulting troops were to leave
their trenches and form up in the open. One minute after zero the
barrage was to lift on to the front line, where it was to remain for
three minutes. The rate of advance between lifts varied from 50 yards
every one and a half minutes to 100 yards every four minutes. The
infantry was expected to reach the Black Line at 6.40 A.M., and the
barrier-fire would then advance 300 yards beyond it, where it would
remain until 7.36 A.M., by which time the leading battalions would
be ready to resume the advance. In similar fashion the Blue Line was
to be secured by 8.13 A.M., and the Brown Line by 1.20 P.M. At that
time the Fourth Division was to pass through and go on to the Green
Line. To prevent the enemy in the rear seeing the creeping barrage
and countering it, a distant smoke-barrage was to be formed by two
18-pounder batteries.
The artillery bombardment was to be supplemented by a trench-mortar
and machine-gun barrage. Forty 2-inch and fourteen 9·45-inch
mortars and twenty machine-guns were to take part. The Division
had been vastly strengthened both in Lewis and Vickers Guns; each
battalion had now sixteen of the former, and the arrival of the 197th
Machine-Gun Company had brought the Vickers Companies up to four.
All machine-gunners had received constant training in indirect fire
while in this sector, and during the battle the German positions were
to be drenched by showers of machine-gun bullets. One hundred and
twenty-six 18-pounders, forty-two 4·5 howitzers, and forty-seven guns
of heavier calibre were to support our attack.
While the preparations were being made, it was noticed that the
enemy’s aeroplanes had become very enterprising and aggressive. Up
to the end of 1916 scarcely one had ventured to cross our lines,
but from the first days of February there was a disquieting change.
On every clear day swarms of German machines patrolled the air and
penetrating far over our hinterland, boldly challenged conflict
with our planes. Individual combats between the rival airmen were
of frequent occurrence, and most of those that took place in the
view of the infantry resulted in the triumph of the enemy. The most
formidable and audacious of the hostile planes was a very fast
one, which, being painted on the underpart with a brilliant red,
was generally known as the “Red Belly.” It seemed to be much more
capable of rapid manœuvre than any of ours, and on one occasion a
single-handed “Red Belly” broke up and put to flight a squadron of
six British planes. These German machines were believed to belong to
Von Richtofen’s “Circus,” which became very famous in latter days
and was moved from one point of the front to another as required;
it consisted of from 30 to 50 planes, controlled by expert pilots.
Amid these circumstances the persistence with which our airmen in
unequally equipped and inferior machines rose daily to meet the enemy
and observe his lines, was a convincing proof of their grit and
devotion to duty. There was some hope, however, that the conditions
of July 1916 would be restored when the new and speedy machines,
which were being manufactured in great numbers, were ready to take
the air.
The comparatively short line held by the Division after the 24th
February provided a welcome opportunity for the training of the men
on a more thorough scale than had been possible before any previous
battle. While one brigade held the trenches, another located in “Y”
huts on the Arras-St Pol road was engaged on work, and the third
underwent a course of training near Monchy Breton. This arrangement
allowed eight days’ training for each brigade in turn. From the
photographs taken by the Royal Flying Corps, the enemy’s system was
marked out accurately on the training area by tapes and shallow
trenches made by ploughs, and the frequent practice that the men
had over this course gave them a very fair idea of what they were
expected to do on the 9th April. Exact models of the ground to be
attacked were moulded in clay, and the men thus learned not merely
the character of the country, but also the names of the German
trenches.
When the preparations were nearing completion, the unwelcome
news was received that the enemy had evacuated his positions in
the Ancre-Scarpe salient. It was feared that he would evade our
blow by withdrawing from his line in front of Arras. Rumours of a
retirement had been circulated on the 24th February, and when the
Third Division in the south reported on the 19th March that the foe
had retired from his front line up to the Arras-Cambrai road, Sir
Charles Fergusson resolved to test his strength in front of Arras
by a daylight reconnaissance. This was entrusted to the 11th Royal
Scots. The operation was timed for 3 P.M. on the 21st March, by which
hour the infantry were assembled, but it had to be postponed for half
an hour to allow the artillery to finish their preparations. Two or
three hostile planes were hovering overhead, but it was impossible
to say if they had spotted the assembly. A heavy German trench
mortar opened fire during this period but the damage it inflicted
was insignificant. The assailants, consisting of two companies
commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Croft, jumping over the parapet, swept on
under desultory machine-gun fire and entered the opposing trenches.
A furious and intricate conflict ensued, and when some Germans
counter-attacked across the open, they were shot down by the accurate
rifle-fire of the Royal Scots. When at last Lieut.-Colonel Croft gave
the signal to withdraw, his men returned to their own line without
molestation. Though their losses—amounting to 5 officers and 70 other
ranks killed, wounded, and missing—had been heavy, they had fulfilled
their mission, and proved that the enemy was holding his line in
strength opposite the XVII. Corps.
For the next few days Lieut.-Colonel Croft’s men had a surfeit
of thrills. At 5 A.M. on the 22nd, after a short preliminary
bombardment, the enemy dashed across “No-Man’s-Land” and secured 3
men from a Lewis Gun post. On the night of the 23rd, the Royal Scots
replied in kind. Lieutenant Matthews with a small party entered the
opposing trenches and killed 4 Germans, whose outcry alarmed the
garrison. The raiders, however, did not escape without loss, one man
being killed, another wounded, and Lieutenant Matthews was missing.
Next day sentries reported that they saw a body believed to be that
of Lieutenant Matthews lying in the enemy’s wire, and Lieut.-Colonel
Croft issued orders for a patrol to go out after dusk and bring it
in. 2nd Lieut. Storey, mistaking the instructions, did not wait
for dusk, but went out alone in full daylight; though fired at
continuously, he was able to crawl near enough to see that what had
been taken for a body was only a piece of sacking.
The formations adopted and practised for the attack were the same in
all three brigades. The men were to advance in a series of waves,
a wave consisting of two lines, and each wave was to be followed
by a line of “moppers-up,” who were to clear captured trenches and
dug-outs of skulking foes, so that no damage might be done after the
leading troops had gone on. From right to left the disposition of
battalions was as follows: 7th Seaforths, 8th Black Watch, 3rd South
African Infantry, 4th South African Infantry, 12th Royal Scots, and
6th K.O.S.B., and these were supported by the 5th Camerons, 10th
Argylls, 1st South African Infantry, 2nd South African Infantry, 9th
Scottish Rifles, and 11th Royal Scots. The infantry were reinforced
by the sappers, machine-gunners, and the trench mortar batteries.
The four tanks were to be assembled in the valley just east of the
Candle Factory, and the noise of their approach was to be drowned by
machine-gun fire. The enemy’s front wire had been entirely demolished
by the 2-inch trench mortars, and constant patrolling had prevented
the gaps being repaired. This wire-cutting feat was a great triumph
for the 2-inch trench mortars; many people believed it was impossible
for them to cut the wire, but they did it most effectively.
On the eve of the battle the men were in high spirits and very
confident of success. The notion of a check was never entertained.
Since the beginning of December they had achieved a marked and
increasing ascendancy over the enemy,[74] who was known to be nervous
and much perturbed as to our projects.