THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT
OCTOBER 1916
After being withdrawn from the battle, the Division was allowed a
reasonable interval in which to heal its wounds. The last few days
in the Somme area brought a much-appreciated rest. All Picardy
glowed under a mellow sun, and in the glorious summer weather it
was no hardship to sleep in bivouacs. The forenoons were given over
to training and the replacement of kit; the “Q” Branches and the
Ordnance Staffs were kept busy making good the losses in equipment
and material. In the broad lagoons of the Somme near Bray were
magnificent bathing-places, to which the men were taken every day,
and here there was an element of danger, for the current was strong,
and a swimmer usually emerged from the river about a hundred yards
from the spot at which he had entered.
Small drafts began to arrive to fill up gaps; all battalions were
very weak in officers, and a company that had more than two was
decidedly well off. Fortunately most of the commanding officers
had escaped. In the 26th Brigade there were several changes;
Lieut.-Colonel Tweedie of the Argylls had been wounded, and, though
he remained at duty for some time, he was obliged finally to enter
hospital, and he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy of the
Seaforths on the 3rd August. Lieut.-Colonel R. Horn was appointed
C.O. of the Seaforths, and Lieut.-Colonel H. R. Brown of the
Camerons. In the 27th Brigade the command of the 12th Royal Scots
passed to Lieut.-Colonel H. N. S. Fargus on the 23rd July. Most of
the changes occurred in the South African Brigade. The 2nd South
African Infantry had lost all its senior officers, and Major Heal of
the 1st assumed command until he was relieved at the end of August
1916 by Lieut.-Colonel Christian from England. Major D. M. MacLeod
of the South African Scottish was wounded on the 17th July, and his
place was taken by Major D. R. Hunt. Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray had
been wounded, but happily not seriously enough to cause his removal
to hospital.
On the 23rd July the Division left the Somme district, and moved
to the IX. Corps area, with D.H.Q. at Pont Remy. Most of this long
journey was performed on foot under a broiling sun and over dusty
roads, so that the march was extremely fatiguing. Two days later the
Ninth was transferred to the IV. Corps[50] of the First Army,[51]
and this move brought it into the centre of industrial France. For a
few days units were concentrated in the large mining town of Bruay,
where an enjoyable time was spent. The men had luxurious hot-spray
baths at the mines, and changes of clothing; there were also numerous
first-rate concerts and other entertainments, where leisure could be
passed easily and agreeably. In a short time, however, units were
sent out to country billets in the neighbourhood, where greater
facilities for training were available. The 27th Brigade was
particularly fortunate, for its area included a deep quarry full of
water near Beugin, where all could indulge in bathing and swimming.
The Division, though no unit was yet up to strength, had almost
recovered from its severe handling, when the 26th Brigade took over
the trenches on the Vimy Ridge from the Thirty-seventh Division on
the evening of the 12th August. Two nights later, the 27th Brigade
occupied the line on the left of the 26th. D.H.Q. were established at
Camblain L’Abbé, where they remained during the period the Ninth was
at Vimy Ridge. The entire country in the divisional area was hilly
and undulating, the most prominent feature being the Vimy Ridge,
running north and south. It had been the scene of ghastly fighting
in the early summer of 1915, and though the German lines lay along
the crest of the ridge, our men gleaned some idea of the splendid
fighting qualities that had carried their brave ally through the
demolished villages of Carency and Souchez, and far up the western
slopes. The best blood of France had watered the whole area, and it
was with great reluctance that the French handed over the sector to
the British. One of the communication trenches had been named after
a famous regiment that had then played a proud and honourable part
in the attack, and, when rumours were afloat that the Germans had
retaken the ridge, some men of that regiment visited the area to
ascertain the position. They were undeniably cheered and relieved to
learn that the rumours were false, and that their British comrades
kept a firm hold on all that had been entrusted to them.
The line taken over was divided into the Berthonval sector on the
right, and the Carency sector on the left. In the former, the
opposing trenches lay far apart—at no point being closer than 70
yards—except for saps; in the latter, those on the far left were
almost touching each other, and a man could throw a bomb into the
enemy’s trench without difficulty. The whole front was fringed with
craters, which on the left were so numerous that they practically
merged into one another. Where the line cut them were the most
critical posts; here were the gates for an enterprising foe eager to
secure prisoners. The trenches were not too salubrious, since many
of the French dead had been buried in their walls or floor, and the
usual work had to be done nightly and daily by infantry, sappers, and
pioneers to make them substantial. In one part the sand-bags, full of
rough pieces of chalk, had been thrown up in such haphazard fashion
that the parapets appeared likely to collapse if a man sneezed.
However, after a few weeks’ hard toil there was a marked improvement.
From our position a magnificent view extended towards the north,
and it was significant of the tendency of the British Army at this
time to work in water-tight compartments, that the division on the
left never sent observers to our lines, and yet from there the best
observation could be had.
[Illustration: ABLAIN ST. NAZAIRE, NOTRE DAME AND VIMY RIDGE]
Though all seemed to live on the edge of acute suspense because of
the constant mining carried on by both sides, the stay at the Vimy
was singularly uneventful. The approaches to the line were in very
good order, and reliefs were carried out in daylight. A communication
trench, cut right through the valley, emerged on the western slopes
of the ridge out of sight of the enemy. Its official name was Cabaret
Rouge, but “The Never-ending Road,” the title given to it by the men,
was a better description, for it took one over two hours to traverse
it from end to end. As there was practically no shelling of the
communication trenches and back roads, the transport and carrying
parties had a fairly easy and secure time.
Matters livened up in the sector after the Divisional Artillery[52]
had registered, but the enemy appeared to be husbanding his
ammunition, and contented himself with trench-mortar bombardments. He
stuck to fixed periods. It was remarked that one could wander about
peacefully in the sector during the day except between the hours of
2 and 4 P.M.—the time of the trench-mortar interlude. The type used
was the “rum-jar”—a huge, unwieldy shell that was thrown high into
the air—and a man was absolutely safe if he used his eyes and wits.
Sentries with whistles kept a lookout, and when a mortar was on the
way a whistle-blast gave warning. On such occasions it was easy to
distinguish the newcomers from the old hands. On hearing the blast
the latter placidly looked up, ascertained where the mortar was
likely to land, and acted accordingly; but the former stampeded in
a panic for any sort of shelter, content so long as it would cover
their heads. After a few experiences, however, most men learned to
trust to their eyes and their judgment; for no dug-out, unless it
was exceptionally deep, was proof against a trench mortar. A shorter
“strafe” took place in the evenings, between six and seven. The
officers of one mess, compelled to have dinner in the open, owing to
lack of accommodation, often had that meal interrupted, and it was
not an uncommon sight to see them leave a course and rush for safety.
The disagreeable element during this period was furnished by the
weather. From the end of August scarcely a day passed without
much rain, and thus there was the usual constant struggle to keep
the trenches from being flooded. There was a grave suspicion, too,
that enemy mines were perilously close to our parapet. One curious
incident happened. At 10.20 A.M. on the 19th August, the enemy
exploded a small mine on the front of the 27th Brigade. Three sappers
of the 90th Field Coy. were thrown into the crater caused by the
explosion, two being killed, and one buried up to the neck in the
débris. Some of the Germans were also buried, and an informal truce
was observed while the stretcher-bearers of both sides dug out their
comrades. The G.O.C., who was going round the line at the time, ran
a narrow escape, as he had just passed the area affected by the
explosion. There were however more alarms than events, and casualties
were exceptionally low. The customary routine for a battalion was
twelve days in the front system, six in brigade reserve, and six in
billets in divisional reserve, when a good deal of training could be
carried on. While the South Africans were at Frevillers on the 11th
August, H.M. the King passed through the village, and dismounting
from his car, walked along their ranks.
Apart from trench mortars, the chief thrills were provided by sniping
and raids. The prince of snipers dwelt in the Carency sector, and was
affectionately known amongst the men as “Cuthbert.” He was a deadly
shot, and destroyed an enormous number of our periscopes. No man
dared show a finger when Cuthbert was on duty; he was never known to
miss, so naturally he was the chief object of our snipers’ efforts.
Numerous posts were erected for his benefit, but no sooner were they
ready than Cuthbert sent a few bullets through the loopholes. At last
one was constructed that escaped his notice. Too much success had
made him careless; he rose from his lair and stretched his arms. That
was sufficient. With his disappearance our snipers had it all their
own way.
The raids engineered in this sector met with fair success. On two
occasions parties of the 12th Royal Scots and of the “Rifles”
penetrated the hostile lines but failed to secure prisoners; the
former had the satisfaction of killing a few Germans, but the
latter found the trenches deserted by the garrison. The biggest
capture of prisoners was made by the South Africans. At 4 A.M. on
the 14th September, 2 officers and 60 men of the 2nd South African
Infantry entered the enemy’s trenches under cover of an artillery
barrage; they killed at least 12 and brought back 5 prisoners. The
only casualties were 2 wounded, one of whom unfortunately had to
be left in the German lines. On the evening of the 16th September
a successful raid was carried out by the Black Watch and Camerons,
and on this occasion the Highlanders satisfied the desire of the
G.O.C. for an identification by bringing back a prisoner, but at
least 50 had fallen victim to their blood-lust. This last raid was
carried out under a Stokes barrage, so terrific that dozens of the
enemy were killed, and the remainder paralysed with fright. All the
Stokes Guns in the Division had been collected for the operation,
and in forty-five minutes they fired 9000 shells, which completely
obliterated the opposing front trenches. At one time the 26th Brigade
was marked out for something more ambitious than a raid; for the
First Army desired to push the enemy off the crest before winter set
in, but the scheme was postponed, possibly because it would have used
up troops that were needed for the Somme.
On leaving the Vimy Ridge on the 25th September the Division, after
moving first to a training area under the Third Army, joined the
III. Corps[53] of the Fourth Army, and on the 9th October the 26th
and South African Brigades relieved the Forty-seventh Division in
the line near Eaucourt L’Abbaye. The move was made chiefly by route
march over wretched roads and in vile weather, but for a portion of
the distance buses were available. The 27th Brigade had a trying
experience. At 8 A.M. on a chill October morning, all the men were
lined up on a road near Barly, waiting for the buses, which did not
arrive until 3 o’clock in the afternoon, with the result that units
reached the terminus in inky darkness, and some of them had then to
march a long distance to their billets.
The Lewis Gunners had a most unenviable time. Battalions had now been
supplied with 10 guns, each with its mounting and 44 magazines, each
of which contained 49 cartridges. There were also bags with spare
parts, gloves for firing the guns when they were hot, jackets[54]
for carrying them, and hyposcopes, so that the gun could be fired
without the firer being seen. For the carriage of all this material
hand-carts had been provided in June, but they proved utterly useless
except on good roads, and they imposed an intolerable strain on
the men who pulled them. All the units altered these carts so that
they could be drawn by mules, but even so they were unsatisfactory
and broke down continually. When the Somme was reached, so was the
limit of endurance. The whole drainage system of the country had
been smashed by months of shelling, and the roads, poor at their
best, seemed to have no bottom; the ruins of whole villages were
thrown into them, but even that never appeared to make them any
firmer. The battalions of the 27th Brigade will never forget the
march from Lavièville to Mametz Wood. It was plain sailing as far
as the vicinity of Fricourt Wood. At this point the path lay along
the eastern edge of the wood, but the carts and mules sank deep in
mud, and had to be hauled out and dragged along by the sweating and
blasphemous teams. This harassing process continued until the carts
were eventually parked in the transport lines on a tableland on the
east side of Mametz Wood. One unit found the zigzag path to this
tableland completely blocked by an artillery horse which had fallen
and could not be persuaded to rise. The men were tired and hungry and
not relishing the prospect of a lengthy wait, they hauled the carts
and mules one by one up the face of a precipice and so reached the
transport lines.
In other theatres the outstanding event was the entry of Roumania
on the 27th August as a belligerent on the side of the Entente.
This event, which was greeted with boisterous and undignified
jubilation in France and Britain, was regarded as a decisive blow
to the Central European Powers, but the tribulation that the
immediate future brought upon Roumania seemed to indicate that an
exaggerated estimate had been placed on its worth and services.
The grievances of the Roumanians in Transylvania and Hungary, the
ostensible cause of war, led logically to an invasion of the former
province; and this campaign would have had a greater effect on the
war than the narrow aims of Italy, had it not been for the gross
ineptitude and short-sighted selfishness of Russia, whose overtures
and representations had the most weight in bringing the little Balkan
state into the field.
In 1915 Russia had been precluded from invading Bulgaria by the
neutrality of Roumania, whose territory interposed an obstacle and
whose declaration of war now gave her an opportunity of turning the
situation in the Balkans in favour of the Entente. But Roumania was
allowed to prosecute her campaign single-handed, and after a few
initial successes had to meet powerful and well-equipped German
forces under Von Falkenhayn and Von Mackensen. The ability of Germany
to send a strong army to the Balkans was a disagreeable surprise to
the Western Allies, and showed that our offensive on the Somme was
not so menacing as official bulletins and press accounts had led us
to believe, and that our calculations of German losses were probably
greatly over-estimated. The effect of this intervention soon made
itself felt; the Roumanians, opposed and outnumbered, were compelled
to fall back, but their resistance was neither discreditable nor
negligible, and belated help from Russia, if generously given
and seriously intended, would have endangered the flanks of Von
Falkenhayn and perhaps have exercised a decisive influence on the
war. But only the most grudging and limited support was given, and
though an offensive from Salonica under General Sarrail detained
three Bulgarian divisions and eventually led to the recapture of
Monastir, the Roumanians were pressed back by the 10th October to the
borders of Moldavia.
More than two months had elapsed since the Division fought at
Longueval, and in this period continuous hammering had brought the
British forces far into the enemy’s territory. The greater part of
the ridge from Thiepval to Combles was now in our hands, and the
Germans had been pushed back to their fourth system of defences. With
good weather the speedy fall of Bapaume might be reckoned on. On
the front taken over by us, the principal feature was the Butte de
Warlencourt, a mound of chalk about 50 feet high, which stood at the
far end of the spur that ran from the main ridge through Flers, and
was flanked by the tree-lined Albert-Bapaume road. North-east of this
the ground sloped into a depression, which led into the valley of the
Ancre, and beyond it lay a spur running from the road towards Morval,
on which the enemy had his fourth position.
Behind the British front line lay the vast waste of wilderness
created by three months of savage warfare. Its general colour scheme
was a dull uniform grey, which changed to a dingy yellow when the
sun shone. The whole area was covered with the débris of battle and
of camps, but worst of all, from Mametz Wood to the front line were
scattered fragments of corpses and a heavy fetid odour pervaded the
atmosphere. The work of burying the dead was a slow process and even
in Mametz Wood, which had been in our hands for two months, the 27th
Brigade found a number of British and German dead still uninterred.
The entire area was intersected by rutted roads, which even in fine
weather could barely stand the stupendous amount of traffic that
passed over them in a never-ending stream. Every available man of the
27th Brigade, which was in divisional reserve, worked daily repairing
them, but all the labour served only to keep them passably decent,
and when the weather broke down, almost superhuman efforts were
required to keep them from collapsing altogether.
The line held by the 26th Brigade on the right, and the South
Africans on the left, lay to the north of the Abbey of Eaucourt. On
the 7th October the Forty-seventh Division had made an unsuccessful
attack, but had established posts in front of its line. The Ninth
joined up these posts and formed them into a new front line and a
starting-point for fresh operations. These were notified on the 9th
October, and the chief object of the attack, which was entrusted
to the Ninth and Thirtieth Divisions, was to clear the Butte de
Warlencourt. The objectives of the Ninth were two; first, Snag and
Tail Trenches, and second, the trench lying to the far side of the
Butte de Warlencourt, including the mound itself. Zero was fixed
for 2.50 P.M., and the attack was to be covered by a creeping H.E.
barrage, moving at the rate of 50 yards a minute.[55] The left flank
was to be covered by a smoke-screen, which the Fifteenth Division was
to put down between Le Sars and Warlencourt. To deceive the foe, a
“Chinese Attack”[56] was arranged for the 11th October.
[Illustration: BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT]
Brig.-General Ritchie’s plan was to attack with the 7th Seaforths,
supported by two companies of the Argylls and a section of the
26th L.T.M.B. The former, with two companies in line, each on a
two-platoon front, was to advance in four waves. The assault was
to be supported by Vickers Guns; one section was to follow the
Seaforths, another the Argylls, and a third was to garrison the
original front and support lines, the remaining section being in
reserve. The arrangements of Brig.-General Lukin were on similar
lines. The assault was to be made by the 2nd South African
Infantry, supported by the South African Scottish. Each battalion
was to form up in four waves, with two waves of carriers. On the
afternoon of the 11th, the “Chinese Attack” caused several hostile
machine-guns to unmask their positions and these were reported to the
artillery.
Both brigades were formed up early in the afternoon of the 12th
October, apparently without arousing the enemy’s suspicion. In a
drizzle of rain the attack was launched. One minute after zero the
enemy[57] replied with a heavy barrage, which cut all the telephone
wires and broke off communication between Brigade H.Q. and the
assaulting battalions. From that moment obscurity reigned, and for
a long time the only reports received by the Division came from the
Artillery and the Royal Flying Corps. At the early hour of 2.34
P.M. the former announced that our men had failed to reach the
first objective, but a rumour at 3.20 P.M. that some of our men had
been seen on the Butte and to the right of it raised hopes that the
assailants had overcome their difficulties. Whatever truth there was
in that report, it was certain at 8.50 P.M. that the attack on the
front both of the Ninth and Thirtieth Divisions had failed, though it
was not till later that definite information was received.
At the very start the Seaforths had suffered some casualties by
occasional shells from our own guns, which fell into the assembly
trenches, and when the barrage became intensive the number of
“short” shells increased. The difficulties in the way of artillery
observation were immense and as there were many scratches of trenches
that were not marked on the map, it was not surprising that during
the various actions fought near the Butte the infantry frequently
complained that they were being shelled by their own artillery.[58]
The first objective lay several hundreds of yards from our front
line, and the ground, which rose from our position in a gentle slope,
formed a magnificent field of fire for rifles and machine-guns.
The leading waves of the Seaforths advanced in perfect order, but
they were swept away by a blast of lead. The supporting companies
of the Argylls became involved in the disaster and a mixed party of
Argylls and Seaforths dug in on a line about 150 yards in front of
our original line. The others struggled back to their own trenches in
the course of the evening. The new line was held and strengthened,
and the front trenches were taken over by the Argylls. The supporting
sections from the machine-gun company and the L.T.M.B. were both
knocked out by the enemy’s barrage before they could leave the
trenches.
A similar series of misfortunes fell to the lot of the South
Africans. The attack simply melted away before the enemy’s scathing
fire and the South Africans were seriously disorganised. Not until
the morning of the 13th was the situation fully cleared up, when it
was discovered that a party of 60 with 2 officers had dug in close to
Snag Trench. It was impossible to reach this force during daylight,
but it was safely withdrawn under cover of darkness on the night of
the 13th October.
The attack broke down, because the artillery had failed to demolish
the enemy’s trenches and machine-guns; the barrage, though heavy,
was inaccurate, as was proved by the air photographs received after
the action. The whole operation was a rush, and was carried out in
spite of a strong protest by General Furse to the Corps and Army
Commanders. Since it was important that we should secure the Bapaume
Ridge before winter set in, he urged that a premature attack which
ended in failure would waste much more time than would be expended
in preparations to insure success, and he suggested that the attack
should be postponed for twenty-four or forty-eight hours to give his
men the chance of really localising the enemy by reconnaissance,
in order that the gunners might have no doubt whatever as to the
position of our infantry and that of the enemy.
No further operation on a big scale took place until the 18th
October. The intervening period was blessed with good weather, and
more advanced positions were dug to form a new starting-point. In
front of the South African lines, and on the left of the Snag Trench,
was a small mound, called the Pimple, which was believed to be
occupied by the enemy, as it appeared to be the key to the trench.
Brig.-General Lukin was instructed to send out a strong patrol to
seize this point, and on the night of the 13th October a party of the
3rd South African Infantry went out and reconnoitred it. It found the
Pimple unoccupied, but returned so late that there was no time before
dawn to send out a force to garrison it. However, on the evening of
the 14th October, a strong force under Captain L. F. Sprenger, who
later was wounded, went out and captured it. No serious endeavour
was made to dispute our possession of the Pimple, but when the South
Africans moved along from it and attempted to expel the enemy from
the junction of Snag and Tail Trenches, which was known as the Nose,
they were driven back by machine-gun fire. Later on in the evening
the Germans tried in vain to recapture the Pimple, which was further
strengthened by being linked up with the South African lines. The
position, commanding an admirable view right up to the Butte, formed
an ideal place for machine-guns and from it numerous losses were
inflicted on enemy working-parties.
Orders for the operation on the 18th October were received from the
Corps on the 14th, but the hope of taking the Butte at a stride was
abandoned and the objective became the Snag Trench. On the right the
attack was to be carried on by the Thirtieth Division. General Furse
again entrusted the operation to the 26th and South African Brigades.
The Camerons, with four companies in line, each on a platoon front,
were to lead the 26th Brigade attack, supported by a company of
the 8th Black Watch and a section of the machine-gun company. The
Stokes mortars were to co-operate with the artillery in barraging the
enemy’s front line. On the left front the leading battalion was the
1st South African Infantry, with three companies in line, each on a
platoon front, the fourth being in support, and a company of the 3rd
South African Infantry in reserve. The hour of zero was 3.40 A.M.
By this date the fine weather had broken down and the attack began in
a deluge of rain. Early information was received from the Camerons
that they had reached their objective, but great uncertainty
prevailed for a time as to the fate of the South Africans. It soon
became known that the left half of their attack had been repulsed,
but no news came about the right half. At 9.30 A.M. it was learned
that a few men of the right company of the 1st South African
Infantry had joined hands with the Camerons, who were in touch with
a battalion of the Thirtieth Division on the right. Elsewhere the
assault had failed.
The Camerons, carrying out their part with great dash, kept close
to the barrage and entered the German trench as soon as it lifted.
Except for some machine-gun fire from the left, resistance was
slight and the garrison of the trench fled precipitately to the Gird
Line. Blocks were immediately constructed on the right and left and
held by bombers. About fifteen minutes after the capture, the enemy
counter-attacked with bombs and forced his way in on the right, but
the Camerons, immediately retaliating, killed a large number of the
assailants and drove the remainder off in confusion. During this
action a Stokes Gun team rendered great assistance by putting down
a barrage on the Germans.[59] On the left the Camerons got into
touch with a Lewis Gun team of the 1st South African Infantry, but
could obtain no information concerning the rest of the battalion.
In the afternoon about 300 Saxons were seen to be massing as if
for a counter-attack. At once the S.O.S. was sent up and the men
in field-grey, peppered with bullets and shell-fire, broke up in
disorder and scrambled for shelter. Early in the evening, about 5.30
P.M., the enemy made still another attempt. A party of them left the
Gird Trench and, moving round to the left flank, endeavoured to expel
the Camerons by a bombing attack, but the garrison had received due
warning and easily checked the onset with a Lewis Gun. During the
night a company of the 9th Seaforths arrived and dug a communication
trench from the old front line to Snag Trench.
The Lewis Gun detachment of the South Africans on the left of the
Camerons proved to be the only section of the brigade that secured
the objective. The company on the left was held up by wire and came
under a withering machine-gun fire. All the officers having been
killed or wounded, the survivors were drawn back to their original
line. The fate of the other two companies was wrapped in obscurity,
and the bare fact is that, with the exception of the Lewis Gun post
and a few wounded, none of them ever returned. A wounded South
African reported that his comrades got into the German front trench,
which was full of dead and wounded, and it is probable that they
reached their objective, but, failing to recognise it as the trench
had been completely wrecked, had pushed on, only to perish through
machine-gun fire from the Butte.[60] A few stragglers made their way
back later in the day, bringing with them 19 prisoners.
On learning what had occurred, General Furse sent instructions for
another attack to be delivered at 5.45 P.M. The key of the German
position was the Nose, which was to be bombarded. The South Africans
were ordered to secure it and to establish a block about 500 yards
up the Tail, and as the Camerons had already extended their line
westwards they were in a position to assist the attack. Owing to
continuous heavy rain conditions were appalling. All firmness had
been soaked out of the ground, which became a sea of pewter-grey
ooze, and even the lightly-equipped runners sank with each step
beyond the knees in mud and took fully four hours to struggle over
1000 yards. The attack was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Dawson. He
arranged for the fourth company of his own battalion to attack from
the Pimple, while a company of the 3rd South African Infantry was to
enter Snag Trench east of the Nose and attack westwards. The assault
from the Pimple was made with bombs, but the trench leading to the
Nose dipped into a hollow which was commanded by machine-guns from
it. Beyond this point all advance was barred to the assailants. The
second party entered Snag Trench without difficulty and reached a
point within 25 yards of the Nose, but here the Germans were strongly
posted with three machine-guns in action and the advance came to a
halt. The South Africans then withdrew to their original trenches,
but later were ordered to reoccupy the Snag. This was done early on
the morning of the 19th and a block was established on the side of
the Nose.
Thus in spite of considerable progress the Division had been
unable to complete the whole of its job. The 26th Brigade had done
magnificently, but the Nose had defied all the strenuous efforts of
the South Africans, whose failure had been due to no lack of dash or
determination but solely to the dreadful conditions. Never did the
Division fight on a more grisly battlefield. The long muddy slope up
to the Butte was thickly strewn with British and German dead, and
in the more forward trenches corpses of all units lay sprawling,
wedged in by the slime that coated them. In the open near the Snag,
a long line of men of the London Division, each on his face, was
grim evidence of a gallant charge and the accuracy of the enemy’s
machine-gun fire. Here and there a body arrested attention by the
peculiar contortion of its attitude and served as a landmark to guide
runners on their way. The air was rank with the odour of death. To
eye, ear, and nose the whole place was repellant and it required
extraordinary strength of will even to appear cheerful amid such
ghastly surroundings.
For ten days the Highland and South African Brigades had held the
line and on the 18th October the G.O.C. instructed the 27th to take
over the whole position on the night of the 19th. Before the relief
commenced the mud-covered slope was again the scene of furious and
bitter encounters. Dawn ushered in a miserable day with torrents
of rain lashing down, and at 5.30 A.M. the Germans made a terrific
assault, using flammenwerfer. The Black Watch,[61] who had relieved
the Camerons during the night, met them in a desperate conflict.
The only weapons fit for use were bombs; rifles and machine-guns
were clogged with mud and could not be fired. The right company
easily held its own and repulsed the invaders. The greatest danger
came from the left, for on that flank the flammenwerfer caused much
havoc amongst the South Africans, most of whom were driven out of
Snag Trench, though a few moved eastwards and joined in with the
Highlanders. At their backs followed German bombers who inflicted
heavy casualties on the crowded troops, but a vigorous counter-attack
by men of the “red hackle” stopped the assailants and forced them
back for 40 yards. Captain Taylor of “B” Company hurried up from the
support trench to the front line, and grasping the situation made
arrangements for an attack. Bombing parties were organised and bombs
brought up. Fortunately 2nd Lieut. Gibson of the L.T.M.B. had one
Stokes Gun in good working order, and under its barrage the Black
Watch regained all their trenches and had even penetrated into the
South African sector by noon. The whole of the defences were then
reorganised, but the enemy did not venture again to tackle the Black
Watch.
The South Africans had been expelled from the Snag Trench by
flammenwerfer, which had inflicted most dreadful wounds. But the
Germans had not escaped without scathe; for in the operation they
exposed themselves to the machine-guns at the Pimple, which quickly
thinned out their ranks. After they were compelled by the Black
Watch to retire many took refuge near the Nose, but this point was
heavily bombarded by our gunners, and large numbers leaving the
trench darted in the direction of the Butte. Few of them reached
it; they were mowed down by the Vickers and Lewis Gun fire of the
Pimple garrison, commanded by Major Ormiston. Early in the afternoon
the South Africans sent forward a party to reoccupy the Snag and if
possible to secure the Nose. The first part of the scheme was easily
accomplished, but the tenacious machine-gunners ensconced in the
latter stopped all further progress. For some inscrutable reason
the wildest reports were sent back to D.H.Q. that the Nose had been
taken and that if only more bombs could be sent up the Butte could be
captured without difficulty. Such fallacious reports are extremely
dangerous; they may lead to the useless sacrifice of many lives. When
the relief of the South Africans began, General Furse was under the
impression that the Nose had been taken and he instructed the 27th
Brigade to exploit the success.
The relief on the night of the 19th October will never be forgotten
by any officer or man of the Ninth who took part in it. In the
forenoon under a soaking rain the units of the 27th Brigade marched
first to High Wood, and even there a man sank up to his ankles in
mud. The 6th K.O.S.B. and the 12th Royal Scots who were to take over
the left and the right fronts had a terrible time. The trial came as
soon as the communication trenches were entered. There seemed to be
absolutely no bottom in them and the men struggled along waist-deep
in mud. Darkness had fallen when they reached the trenches near
Eaucourt L’Abbaye and an intense hostile barrage added to the horror.
With devilish accuracy the shells pitched near the communication
trenches and many plunged right into them. Unspeakable was the fate
of any man who was badly wounded that night; he sank below the
mire and the men in the rear pressed on all unconscious that the
welcome firmness, which momentarily sustained them, was the body of
a comrade. Progress could be made only with the greatest exhaustion;
a yard seemed a mile. Every now and then the men had to halt for
a brief space, resting their elbows on the sides of the trench to
prevent their whole bodies being engulfed in the mud; without such
support it was fatal to stand still. It was not surprising that the
relief was not complete until 6 A.M. on the 20th October.
Many horrible tales were told about that relief, but no invention
could beggar the reality. Men with rifles and haversacks could
scarcely struggle on, but their lot was easy compared with that of
Vickers and Lewis Gun teams, whose guns had to be carried up and
also ammunition[62] for them. The magazines for the Lewis Guns were
taken in buckets, like nosebags, each holding four. The usual weight
for a man was two buckets, but that was a Herculean load on such a
night. Tales of distress reached the battalion H.Q. and parties with
ropes and spades set out to rescue stranded men. One Lewis gunner
of the 6th K.O.S.B. was so firmly embedded beyond the waist in mud
that when he was finally extricated with ropes both his ankles were
broken. The agonies endured by the Highlanders and South Africans
were indescribable. Parties of worn-out men coming down from the
front line threw themselves into any shell-hole, too tired to care
what happened to them, and it was a kind cruelty that drove them to
their feet and forced them on to some safer place. Many Highlanders
discarded their kilts as being too heavy, but indeed so glutinous
was the abundant mud that it was difficult to tell whether a man
wore a kilt or not. Some of the Black Watch dropped down exhausted
at the door of a dressing-station near High Wood, and their tunics
and equipment could not be removed in the ordinary way, but had to be
hacked off them before they could be revived.
After their purgatorial march the men of the 27th Brigade were unfit
to exploit any success, but the situation did not allow of any such
attempt as the 6th K.O.S.B. found when they reached the front line.
The enemy still held the Nose, and this was immediately reported
by Lieut.-Colonel Connell to Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins, who
immediately made arrangements for an attack to be delivered at 4 P.M.
Until that time the Tail and the Nose were to be bombarded and at
zero the 6th K.O.S.B. were to advance under cover of a barrage, which
was to lift 50 yards every time the infantry fired a green light.
The attack was to be from Snag Trench by bombing parties, but in the
event of this being checked another was to be delivered across the
open from the east by a support company an hour later. Lieut.-Colonel
Connell supplemented these instructions by ordering the company at
the Pimple to be ready to take advantage of these assaults. Both
attacks from the east were repulsed by the machine-guns at the Nose.
During these actions the garrison at the Pimple observing groups
of the enemy retiring from the Tail towards the Butte, inflicted
severe losses with machine-gun fire. At the same time, 2nd Lieut.
Johnson and a few men rushed across the open, drove out the enemy and
occupied the Nose. But the company commander, thinking that his men
were too few to hold the whole trench from the Pimple to the Nose,
evacuated the position. On hearing this, Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins
ordered the 11th Royal Scots in support to send a company to retake
the Nose and establish a post about 500 yards up the Tail, but
before it arrived the Nose was reoccupied by the 6th K.O.S.B. Under
the direction of Lieut.-Colonel Connell, who had gone to the Pimple
on learning of the evacuation, a party of the K.O.S.B. retook the
position and joined up with the company in Snag Trench. Later the
company of the 11th Royal Scots arrived and passed up the Tail, where
it established a post.
Thus on the night of the 20th October all the objectives of the
attack of the 18th were secured. Till the evening of the 24th October
the Division held the line and was busy strengthening its position
and digging new assembly trenches for an attack on the Butte. It was
the intention of the Corps to employ the Ninth in a battle that was
arranged for the 25th October. On General Furse’s representations
this arrangement was cancelled and the Division was relieved late
on the 24th.[63] Another engagement was indeed beyond the capacity
of the men. Though casualties were not so high, the nerve-strain
and fatigue were even greater than in July. More men were lost from
illness and exposure than from wounds and death, and the number of
cases of trench feet was exceptionally large. Many men on being
brought back from the mud of the line took off their boots to rub
their feet, which swelled to such an extent that they could not be
inserted in the boot again.
The work of the R.A.M.C., especially from the 18th October onwards,
was evilly affected by the conditions. A man too seriously wounded
to walk was in a piteous plight; he had to wait for several hours
until men were available to carry him to a dressing-station. The
usual number of men for a stretcher is two, but eight were scarcely
sufficient at the Butte de Warlencourt. It was perhaps inevitable
that in a place over which the tide of battle ebbed and flowed for
days and nights, a number of wounded should have been missed. For
several days after the Ninth took over the line not a few wounded
men of the London Division, the ghastly aftermath of an unsuccessful
attack, were brought in by patrols. Every man who could be spared was
sent to help the R.A.M.C. and the utmost efforts were made by the
Division to ensure that no wounded man was overlooked.
The action at the Butte de Warlencourt was the most dismal of all the
operations carried out by the Division, but it was ennobled by the
great qualities of endurance and heroism displayed by all who had a
share in it. In that waste of mud and water the ground captured,
though small in extent, represented no mean achievement. The Butte
remained impregnable, guarded by slime and weather, and it was not
till the enemy voluntarily evacuated the place that it was entered
and held by British troops. It may be questionable if the ground
gained was worth the cost, but the mud had proved a more powerful
ally of the adversary than had been expected.